JPRS ID: 10487 JAPAN REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050063-2
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 63
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/ 10487 .
30 April 1982
Ja an Re ort
p p
cFOUO 2sis2~
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JPRS L/10487
30 April 1982
-i
i
t JAPAN REPORT
(FOUO 26/82?
' CONTENTS
POLITICAL AND SOCIOI,OGICAL
Lockheed Verdicts Expected To Affect Suzuki
(Kenji Kitahara; THE DAII,Y YOMIURI, 2 Apr 82).......... 1
Weinberger's Reply on USSR R~le Questioned
(Takuo Hayashi; MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, 4 Apr 82) 2
Trade Union Unification Movement Explained
(Tadanobu Us4mi; GETSUYOKAI REPOTO, 7 Dec 81) L~
Reform of Upper Hou se Election System
(Takehiko Takahashi; MAINICHI DAIZY NEWS, 7 Apr 82) .1 $
MILITARY
JDA To Make Tank Parts Tnterchangeable With M-1
, (NIHAN KEIZAI SHIl~IBUN, 10 Apr 82) 10
~ Japan-U.S. Military Technology Cooperation Issue Discussed
~ (Various sources, various dates) 12
Federation of Economic Organization's View
Defense Industry~s Activities in U.S.
. Pros, Cons on Technology Cooperation .
ECONOMY
'MAINICHI~ Views Trade F`riction, Market OpPning
(Editorial; MAINICHI DAIZY NEWS, 29 Mar 82) 23
Farmers Lobby Against Import Quota Lifting
(THE JAPAN TIMES, 29 Mar 82) ~5
- a - [III - ASIA - 111 FOUO]
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Budget Criticized for Lack of Emphasis on Expansion of .
Ik~mestic Demand
(Editorial; MAINICHI DAII,Y NEWS, 8 Apr 82) � 27
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Brief s
Supercomputer Development 29
Computer Logic Device ~9
Satellite Press Transmission Test 29
- b -
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~
POLITICAL AND SOCIOIAG ICAL
LOCKHEED VERDSCTS EXPECTED TO AFFECT SUZUKI
Tokyo THE DAILY YOMIURI in English 2 Apr 82 p 3
[Political Beat coiumn by Kenji Kitahara: "I~remier Suzuki's Luck"]
[Text] Prime Minister Suzukt's politicul luck They anticipated that these verdicts
remAins good wlth yet another advantage- would foretell the fate ot former premier
ous development which can only bolster Kakuei Tanaka in his own Lockheed trial
the beliet that there is no other leader whtch is expected to end around next
at the moment who could rsplace him as February. Therefore, they believed that
premier and president of the Liberal- Suruki's cabinet would suffer a severe
Democratlc Party (LDP). jolt.
This is the announcement th~t verdicts His enemies within the LDP and the
on Tomisnburo Hashimoto, former trans- ~opposition hope to force 8uzuki to quit us
port minlster, and T~kayukl Sato, former premicr, lf LDP Secretary-C3eneral Susumu
transport vlce-minister, will bc hunded Nikaido's nlme is referred to in the judg-
down June 8, behind schedule. ments. Nikaido is a reputed "gray offi-
On this date, Suzuki wlll nut be in Ja- cial," and he is intimate with both Suzuki
paii and the Diet will not be in session, and Tanaka.
preventing the opposition from using the But things ure not working out quite
verdicts against the government and Su- the way Suzuki's enemies would like them
zuki himself. to, a young Dietman says.
The premier is scheduled to depart Ja- We can only agree with a remark by
pun on June 3 on a long journey. He will a high ranking otflcial oi the Foreign
attend the Versailles summit, the UN spe- Ministry who said ttiat June would be a
' ciul General Assembly session on disarma- good time for Suzuki to be out of the
ment and then visit Brazil and other country.
- Latin American countries. He will receive But why d!d the Tokyo ~D'strict Court
_ news of the verdict in New York. set this date for handing down its ver-
' It seems h3ghly unlikely t:~at the cur- dicts?
rent normal Diet session wili be extended Was it by chance. If so, ;;ertainly
past Muy 1J, since there will be tew im- worked out very well Por the premier and
portant bills after passAge of the flscal flction leaders close to him.
1~J82 budget. The scheduling of the Srst two verdicts
The ~nti-Suzuki camp i:~ the LDP and ~ June and Tanaka's in February next
the opposition parties expected the ver- year, ufter the LDP election, are fortunate
dlcts on HAShimoto and Suto Sn the Lock- developments for Suzuki. .
heed trials to have a serious impact c,n Suzuki is a very lucky politician, despite
the pulitical situation and reduce Suzuici's his shortcomin~s in diplomacy and in
chances for reelection. security ~nd domestic uPfnirs.
COFYRIGHT: The Daily Yomiuri 1.982
CSO: 4120/227
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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
WEINBERGER'S REPLY ON USSR ROLE QUESTIOnED
Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 4 Apr~ 82 p 2
(Political Periscope column by Takuo Hayashi: "Weinberger's Reply"J
[Text) U.S. Detense Secretary people.
would be one that I can answer
Casper Weinberger met some ~~According to the first view, just 'No,' I see this is just not
300 Japanese and foreign it is owing to the protection quite so simple. This is one of
correspondents at a press extended by the U.S. 7th Fleet t h o s e h y p o t h e s e s a n d
conference ~eid at the Japan that the Japanese vessels are propositions that are extremely
National Press Club on Friday enjoying the free passage of this ditficult to test out."
two weeks ago. AL the outset, he region. Withoul it, the Japanese His rep'y was rather contrary
read a considerably lon~ sea-lanes would be interrupted to the expectations ot those who
statement. Onc of its major by the Soviet Union. thought he .would say In a
contents was to emphasize the clearcut m~nner that "the
need to ensure the safety ot the Second View second view is nonsense."
Pacific-Indian Ocean sea-lanes The second view denies the Later, the detense secreta
and urge the Japanese first view. It says that the free
government to realize the passa~e of the Japanese vesseis added that "I have the feeling
pledge Prime Minister 7.enko does not owe anything ta the that the tirst view is essentially
correct, pointing out the
_ suzuki made to the United eFforts made by the 7th Fleet. It ~~~ncreased Soviet threat" as
, States to defend Japan s sea- is due to the fact that the Soviet the reason tor it. And, in con-
lanes ,to a distance of 1,000 Union does not have any intent clusion, he d'eclared "the
, miles. Weinberger then an� to interrupt the sea-lanes. They s e c o n d v i e w'' w a s
s~vered the questions trom the further say, �Look at China s~~dangerouslyshort-sighted."
~ reporters present. vessels.' China does not have a
The press con(erence was strong navy and its relationship Frankly speaking, my im-
covered at length by the with the Soviet Union is even pression was that his reply was
newspapers an~ televison worse than Japan's relationship not very convincing. For in-
- networks at that time, but some with the Soviets. Nonetheless, stance. he ~i~ not reply to my
ot the important questions and its vessels can freely move in question as to why Chinese
answers were not reported in this region. And, it has nothing vessels ean (reely move in the ~
detaii. A case in point was the to do with the eftorts made by Pacific and indian Oceans
initial stage of the question and the 7th Fleet. K~ithout the protection of the 7th
asnwer session. The first ~~I feel this second view more F~eet. As one ot the reasons for
question was as tollows: convincing then the tirst view. the ~~increased Soviet threat,"
1 n your statement you Therefore, I would like to invite the detense secretary pointed
stressed the necessily to secure your view regarding thls second aut that "the Soviet Union is
the Pacific-Indian Ocean sea- V1eW,+~ equipped with aireraft carrfers
lanes. Now, regarding the free 1 was the one who raised this and strategic bombers." He
passage ot the Japanese question. The tirst part of added that "the Sovlet Union
tankers and other vessels in this Nreinberger's reply to my dces not need such o(fensive
region~ there are two opposing question was as follows; weapons it they are only tor the
views among the Japanese � purpose o! de(ending tha
Although 1 hope the puestion
. 2
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FOR n1~N'I('IA1. l!ti[�: O`l.l'
nalional land." This �~as not
convincing citl~er. Everyonc
presenl at the press conference
migfil have thought, "Then.
_ what about the c~se of the
United States?"
T'nrough m~y question I ex-
pressed my doubt cancerning
the "general part" of the U.S.
strategic concept. The reply ot
Defense Secretary Weinberger,
- as mentioned above, was not
convincing enough. The
Japanese government stand on
the U.S. strategic concept is
tliat `�it a~rees on the in-
troductory general remark but
puts up resistance against
detailed separate chapters." I
am of the opinion, however, thal
the Japanese government
should greatly raise questions
about the introductory part also
and argue with the U.S.
government.
COPYRIGtiT: Mainichi Daily News 1982
CSO: 4120/227
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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
TRADE UNION UNIFICATION MOVEMENT EXPLAINED
Tokyo GETSUYOKAI REPOTO in Japanese No 1054, 7 Dec 81 pp 10-15
[Excerpt from a lecture given by the president of Domei, the Japanese Con-
federation of Labor, Tadanobu Usami: "La.bor Front Unification, Political
Programs, Spring Offensive and Domei"]
[Text] Unification With a View To Realization of Political Programs
With regard to the issue of political alignment, I believe t.hat this unifica-
tion is not a unification of political fronts, but a unification at the labor
union level--that is, it calls for solidarity among various organizations:
� organizatians in support of the Socialist Party, a group in support of the
_ Democratic Socialist Party, yet another supporting Shakomin [Shakaito
(Socialist Party), Komeito (Clean Government Party) and Minshato (Democratic
Socialist Party)]. Thus we must avoid destroying the unity by an obvious
display of political colors. Our unification goal is the realization of
political programs, so we must boil down the political topics that we as a
civilian union care about into policies at the union level. Then we must
_ sell these policies to different political parties. Unless we do this,
there will be no resolution of political issues. We must do this construc-
tively.
~ If the political programs we seek are :~ncorporated into the tenets of the
Socialist Party, Komeito, the Democrati: Socialist Party and others, and the
respective parties work towar.d their reoi~zation, then the cumulative effect
will be unification of policies among the political parties. Such solidarity
would�'give growth to a healthy political force which I believe would be a
fine thing. But the prerequisite for us is not to get deeply involved in
the issues surrounding party level reorganization. Therefore unification
_ and the question of a political front are not directly connected.
But if we are to speak about the result...I do not iike the word "reform,"
but we are hopeful that as a result of the rearganization, the opposition
- force's structure will become more organized.
= Domei's Support for Middle-of-the-Road Force Is Clear
However, with regard to the current issue of Domei [Alliance], considerable
debate has taken place over the political questions and the issues have been
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boiled down to a meeting point. The Domei itself has been rather extensively
active in political issues in the past, and I believe it should con~inue to
engagQ in such activities hereaPter as well.
We ourselves have supporte~3 the Japan Democratic Socialist Party. It is
unfortunate that Japan does not have a healthy political force that can pose
an alternative to the Liberal Democratic Party. This is most unfortunate in
ter~ of cleaning up Japanese politics and setting up a functioning parlia-
mentary democracy. Thus, it is very important that we build up an alterna-
tive political force.
. But when I think about the socialist/communist forces in their present state
seizing political power, I am concerned that the outcome would be a"minus."
. That being the case, perhaps the best solution would be to build up the eo-
called middle-of-the-road political force. If the Democratic Socialist Party
would get bigger, that would be the best thing; but realistically, we are not
in a situation where we can put up a candidate for each of the election
districts. That being the case, the ultimate cho�~ce that is open is to
support Kamei, the Shin~iyu Club [New Freedom Club] and/or the Shaminren
[Shakai Minshu Rengo (Social Democratic Federation)].
The other day I met with President Akitani of the Soka Gakkai. As we
approach the final stages of the 1983 election, the issue of election support
is bound to surface. ~
No matter how much discussion th?re is among the political parties, the ques-
tion of election support is never satisfactorily settled. Though there may
be statements to the effect that Komeito will recommend a ceitain Democratic
_ Socialist Party candidate or vice versa, or t?~at such and such a faction will
support a given Shaminren candidate, the most imp~rtant thing is how the sup-
port organizations in the background will behave. Although an endorsement may
be said to come from the Democratic Socialist Party, unless the union takes
action, the Democratic Socialist Party's support will be an empty one. In
the same vein, Komeito's support without the actual participation of Soka
Gakkai would be meaningless. That being the case, there seems to me to be a
need for the supporting organization to deepen izs mutual understanding. I
spake forthrightly about my opinion that it is important that we somehow
change the current political situation and that the election should be
approached with the above detailed premise as a prerequisite.
Gakkai Gives Prominence to Human Rights, Peace Movements Over Elections
- President Akitani's response was that, although he understood my point of
view, it would be preferable that we seek further mutual understanding prior
to those steps. We talked in detail about promoting mutual understanding
- between the two mass organizations--one religious and the other labor, and
different in character, yet alike in that they are populist bodies--on such
topics as peace and human rights issues.
During this time, however, the question was raised at the Aomei central
deliberative council meeting: "Although we pay great heed to Gakkai, what
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about the organizational agreement? How is that to be evaluated?" For
instance, take the peace question. As a religious body, respect for human
life is of primary importance. In that context, we [Snka Gakkai] seek
peace. But heretofore, the Japanese peace movements have been somewhat
leftist-oriented. Gakkai would not want to subscribe to that leaning. It
wishes to continue its own unique peace movement without any political lean-
ings, one that is a UN-based peace movement. President Akitani commented
that vari~u~s efforts--including a large UN exhibit in Fukushima--are being
made toward this end.
In tt~e same context, although there has not been any clear organizational
c!ecision on the topic, the League for Construction of World Federation
- [sekai renpo kinsetsu domei), to which Tetsuo Katayama was the first dele-
gate, is a highly idealistic entity. We recognize it as an important ideal
and support the movement actively. Thus, regarding direction--in terms of
aims--we are not so different. President Akitani and I talked in this v~ein.
But I did feel strongly that if that is the case, the organizational agree-
ment has really been mislaid.
~
At the meeting with the ~resident of the Soka Gakkai we discussed many things,
- but we did not intend to concentrate on any specific religious body. There
is an organization called Shin shuren [Federation of New Religious Organiza-
tions?] led by Rissei Koseikai. We were planning to talk to its president,
Mr Niwano, too. But his schedule did not permit a meeting before the year-
end, and they requested that the meeting be scheduled after the new year.
We had their full understanding witli regard to our meeting with President
Akitani. After the new year, we sincerely hope that we can achieve closer
contacts with the support organizations in general--not anly the religious
organizations but others as w~ll; for example, the Shinjiyu Club's supporr.
force and Shaminren's parent body...though there are not so many of them--so
that we can sound eut those having goals similar to our own.
Defense Policy of Domei Remains Unchanged Since 1969
A word or two about the political front. In the case of the Domei, there
will be a general meeting beginning on 26 January. Deliberations are under
way now on the movement's policy. One of the topics being discussed is the
defense strength consolidation. This has drawn a lot of attention, but this
is not the first year that this topic has been taken up. The policy regard-
ing peace and safety was clearly stated in the 1969 policy statement of the
movement. But a lot of time has elapsed since then, and in January of this
year a delegate to the Domei general meeting raised the point that, despite
the fact that self-defense is a very important question, there has been no
written statement by the Domei on this subject.
Although we can say that ~ae have published a statement once before, not
everyone remembers it, so we decided to take this opportunity to reconfirm
our thinking on peace and safety. This constitutes a portion of the move-
_ ment's policy statement.
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As a result, we are receiving lots of criticism, for example that this is
militaristic thinking, or that it tends toward military aggrandizement. It
is none of these. Although we debate a great deal on taxes and welfare, all
that is predicated on a peaceful existence. We must value peace and safety
first of all. Everyone is very much aware that Japan has a peaceful consti-
tution and that we subscribe to the three antinuclear principles. The ques-
tion is what can Japan do while adhering to those tenets.
- In view of the three antinuclear principles, the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty
should be evaluated in the context of nuclear-related issues. As for the
Self-Defense Forces, insofar as there exists a nation, it should have the
right to defend itself from attack, and if there is that right, there should
be a self-defense capability backing it. But military strength that might be
_ used to settle international disputes, resulting in warlike acts, is pro-
hibited in the constitution. Thus we should not maintain such a military
capability. However, in the event of aggression by another state, we should
have sufficient self-defense strength to repel it. It is important that we
use our strength for defensive purposes only.
In addition, there is a potential for military takeover; thus it is important
- to reinforce civilian control.
COPYRIGHT: Kokumin Seiji Kenkyukai 1981
11460
CSO: 4105/63
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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAZ JAPAN
REFORM OF UPPER HOUSE ELECTION SYSTEM ~
Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 7 Apr 82 p 2
[Article by Takehiko Takahashi]
[ Texti ] p p o 1 i t i c a 1 p r o b 1 e m disappeared. The reason why advantageous in the national
remaining in the curreat Diet ~e LDP drafted and submitted constituency, but ia local
session is the proposed reform this bill is that a F~uge amount ot elec~oral districts, the
of the House of Councillors funds is requieed for the upper possibility exists that the votes
election system. The Liberal- House's national constituency will become dispersed and Diet
Democratlc Party desires to election. The party also judged seats will be last.
change the aational con- that the new system would be ~~If this happens, it will mean
stituency election system. A bill more advantageous in ob- assuring Diet seats in the
for this purpose was introduced taining Diet seats. ~ national constituency, without
in last year's ordinary Diet There are voices, within_ the conducting election campaigns,
- session but was aborted. The LDP opposing this system. The at the sacrifice of the Diet
LDP introduced the same bill in reason is that contrary to ex- members from local electoral
last year's extraordinary Diet P~ctal~ons, it will not be a distrlcts. There is'the daager
session. There it became an plus for the LDP in gaining ~at when those elected trom
item for continuing discussion Diet sPats. The explanation ~e national coastituency and
and was carried over to the g~~en for this is as foUows: � constituencies are added,
current Diet session. "In order to increase the the LDP DIet seats ip the House
_ votes for parties in the national of Councillors may decrease but
According to the reform pian, constituency, it will be they will not inerease."
voters would not casi ballots by necessary to run a~ large The LDP, ignoring such
writing We names of lndividual number of candidates in .local ' voices, has embarked on a
candidates. Instead, the voters constituencies. Up to now, even reform of the national con-
would cast ballots for t~e ~~ocal electoral districts with a stituency election system. This
political party they support. yuota of more than twu seats, has been included in this year's
Each party would p?epare and the LDP entered only~ one activitiespolicy. ~
announce beforehand a list ot candidate and obtained an At first Prime Minister Zeako
candidates in a designated assured Dietseat. Suzuki counseled "not to do
order. ~ anything unreasonable" but his
In proportion to the number of Two Candidates attitude ~ now is to realize
votes received by a politicai �gut in order to gain votes for reform. This has been made
paMy, the winning candidates ~e party, two candidates will clear in his replies to Diet in-
would be decided in the ~urder in probably be entered wherever terpellations.
which they are listed. there is a quota ot more than Among the oppositIon parties,
At tirst this method was two Diet seats. In such a case, the Japan Socialist Party alone
~riticized as being an ~n- ~e votes obtained by the LDP.. supports the reform plan.
tringement of the Constitution. W~~~ ~ncrease and this will be Although � with a'slight dif-
Today such criticism has ~
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terence in method from the Diet seats th~y possess
LDP concept. together, the passage of the bill
The middle-of-the-road intheHouseofRepresentatives
Komeito and Democratic and the House of CouncUlors
Socialist Party oppose the will not be easy before the
retorm plan. The Japan current Diet session ends on ,
Com~nunist Party, which runs May 19. It appears that an
candidates in all local electoral extension of the Diet session

- districts, is also opposed. The will bec,~me necessacy.
JSP's decision will be formally Prime :~inlster Suzuki has a
reached at a central committee beavy diplomatic schedule
meeting to be held Apri112. awaiting him in June. He would
A retorm ot the election Wdoubtedly like to avoid an
system will have a~crucial ef- extension of the Diet session.
fect on all political parties. It an Under such a situation~ there is
adjustment on method can be a strong possibility of the
- reached between the LDP and ~lection reform bill being
JSP and the reform plan is ~elved again.
approved, the other political (The writer is an adviser to
parties are likely to raise in- ~e Maintchl Newspapers and
tense objections. tormerchieleditorial writerl.
~ven if the LDP and JSP
attempt to railroad the reform
plan through the committee and
= the plenary session on the basis
of the overwhelming number o[
COPYRIGHT: Mainichi Daily News 1982
CSO: 4120/237
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MIL ITARY
JDA TO MAKE TANK PARTS INTERCHANGEABLE WITH M-1
OW110113 Tokyo NIHOi~ KEIZAI SHIMBUN in Japanese 10 Apr 82 Morning Edition
p 1
[Excerpts] The defense agency has firmed up a plan to make the mounted gun
barrel of its next generation tank (88-type tank),�which 3s currently Lmder
development, interchangeable with that of th e gun for America's next
generation mainstay tank (M-1). Similarly, it will also make shells used
by the 88-type tank interchangeable. This interchangeability is aimed at
maintaining Japan's ability to cont3nue war in an emergency--even if it
runs short of a~nunition--by receiving supplies from the United States.
_ This is the f irst time Japan has ever developed a weapon whose parts are
interchangeable with those of another nation's main piece of military
hardware. The United States is to build gun barrels for M-1 tanks by
- using the technology of a West German gun barrel maker through a license.
That is why ti~e defense agency ;~unding out the FRG Government on whether
it will furnish technical data to Japan. Inasmuch as the realization of
the defense agency plan will mean the de facto establishment of a trilateral
joint arms development system among Japan, the United States and West Germany,
it is bound to attract attention from a11 nations as a concrete example of
the use of interchangeable weapons by Western nations under their joint
strategy toward the Soviet Union.
The 88-type tank which the defense agency is developing will be used by the
ground self-defense force as one of 3ts major pieces of equipment. With a
view toward completing the development of the 88-type tank in fiscal 1988,
the agency will undertake the development of the gun tarret and shells
in fiscal 1982, Japan's present mainstay tank, the 74-type, has a 105-mm
gun, while 120-mm guns are mounted on the latest West German tank,
Leopard-II, and Britain's chieftain-type tank. America's M-1 tanks can
fire both 105-mm and 120-mm guns. The Soviet mainstay tank, T-72, has a
125-mm mounted gun. Thus, the general global trend is toward introducing
larger calibers. For this reason, the d~~ense agency has decided to mount
a 120-mm gun on the 88-type tank.
Previously, the defense agency sounded out the U.S. Defense Department on
whether it could provide technical data on the gun barrel for the M-1 tanlc.
However, the reply was that the United St-.ates planned to license-produce the
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barrel by introducing technology from the West German barrel malcer
(Rhinemetal). Acting on the U.S. suggestio n, the defense agency has sounded
out the West German Government on whether it will furnish technical data to
Japan on the shape, size and other aspects of the gun barrel in question.
A defense agency source has expressed the strong hope that the plan w~ll
materialize.
If the plan materializes, the use of interchangeable parts of major military
equipment between Japan and the United States, with West Germany acting as
a middleman, will become a reality for the first time. This raises the
possibility that a system of military cooperation between the United States,
NATO and Japan will be established in the future. When the issue of Japan-
U.S. cooperation in military technology was raised during the current
session of the lower house budget cotrnnittee, the government expressed the
view that "the joint research and development of arms and military technology
by Japan and the United States is not subject to the three principles banning
arms exports." Commenting on the 88-type tank development plan, the defense
agency source said: "In this case, we will build it at home by merely
introducing technology from outside. Therefore, it has nothing to do with
cooperation in military technology." However, it is expected that opposition
parties will make an issue in the Diet of the plan to develop the 88-type
tank--which will use shells interchangeable with those for America's M-1 tank--
contending that "th is plan is virtually tantamount to joint arms research and
development by a plural number of countries."
COPYRIGHT: Nihon Kei_zai Shimbunsha 1982
CSO: 4120/239
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MILITARY
JAPAN-U.S. MILITARY TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION ISSUE DISCUSSED
Federation of Economic Organization's View
Tokoyo NIHON KOGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 9 Feb 82 p 1
[Text] In the economic world, concerning President Reagan's 1983 budget
- message, there is the generally positive evaluation that "The aim is to
control adjusted inflation by reducing welfare and wages so that the public
will economize" (Yoshihiro Inayama, Chairman of the Federation of Economic
Organizations [Keidanren].) In particular, concerning the budgetary emphasis
on national defense, there is a common recognition that "Henceforth, the
pressures on Japan to increase its defense capabilities will get stronger"
(Kawamata Katsuji, Chairman of Nissan Motor Company), and even concerning
Japanese-American military technology cooperation which hns become a focal
point, Mr Inayama stresses the necessity for relaxing the policy of
~~~~hibiting arms exports and declares that "If world conditions change, it
will be acceptable to change the Three-Point Principles of Prohibiting the
Exports of Weapons." Further, regarding Japanese defense capabilities,
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries adYisor Gakuji Mor~ya, while stating, "Fundamental
policy must be determined by the government," indicates, "We must consider
national defense based on Japan's independent judgement (and not based on
American pressure)," and appeals, "Effective managemant of a budget which
emphasizes that the consolidation of equipment strength is important."
While annual expenditures in the 1983 U.S. budget stopped at the low growth
rate of 4.5 percent over last year's, the military expenditures actually rose
17.9 percent and a.rP approaching wartime levels. Concerning this increase the
U.S. Government has explained that "Z'his is to re-vitalize the Western
alliances and U.S. naval superiority," but in the Japanese economic world
there is agreement un the perspective that "the United States, not only wishes
to f ill the military gap with the Soviet Union in 1985, but also wishes to
establish superiority over the Soviets, and defense demands made of Japan will
get stronger" (Mr Inayama).
But concerning the way in which Japan should respond to U.S. demands, there are
slight differences in nuance: "If Japan were a member of the Western alliance,
cooperation would be proper" (Mr Inayama); "To simply follow in the wake of
U.S. demands would be dangerous; we must seek American understanding of Japan's
internal conditions regarding this point" (Mr Kawamata); and "Fundampntally,
Japan's defense policy must be determined by its own judgement" (Mr Moriya).
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Concerning military technology cooperation with the United States, even
though the government is enthusiastic from the standpoint of resolving
Japanese-American *_rade frt.ction, it is leaning towards the 3udgement that
"from the standpoint of the J.S.-Japan Security Treaty, technological
cooperat{on comes before the Three-Poirat Principle af Prohibiting the Exports
of Weapons which are our domestic policy." The economic world has hQratofor2
~ ~ consistently maintai~ed a cautious posture regarding this problem, but if we
take Mr Inayama's pronouncement that "We must obtain the public's
understanding" as a premise, it is showing a fairly positive attitude toward
technologic~t cooperation.
In response to the viewpoint that American deficits wi11 invite high interest
. rates and create difficulties for Japanese economic management, there is the
perspective that "The most important point is that high interest rates will
control inflation, and even if the Japanese Government will have few choices,
there is no other way" (Mr Inayama). Further, concerning Japanese-American
economic friction, *_here is a hint that there are limits to Japanese-American
coummercial cooperation in Mr Kawamata's remarks, "Friction may~not be resolved
even if there is an improvement in the non-tariff trade barrier situation.
~ There is no other means but furthering the opening of the market for
agricultural goods and the service industries."
COPYRIGHT: Nihon Kogyo Shimbunsha Tokoyo Honsha 1982
_ ~ Defense Industry's Activities in U.S.
Tokoyo SENTAKU in Japanese Vol 8, No 2 Feb 82 p 87
[Text] Japanese government officials and business leaders are very busy in
making connections with th~ U.S. Department of Defense (the Pentagon). Leading
manufacturers dea~.ing in the so-called a3vanced technologies such as ~
electronics, electrical machinery, precision machinery, and opt:~cal
machinery, etc., are establishing offices in ~lashington as if they were
competing with eath oCher. Their primary ~ob is to gather reports on American
economic and trade policy, but from last year to this year, the content and
activities have changed entirely.
What they are doing now is competing against each other in establishing contact
with consultants who were former Pentagon officials and have connections with
the Pen~agon. Among these consultants are former high Pentagon officials who
worked in positions as high ~3s Assistant Under-secretary of Defense. "They will
not deal with you if you suddenly go out to the Pentagon and say you want to
sell them something. Therefore you have to ask a consultant and have him get
you into Pentagon circles," explains an executive of a certain electric
machinery manufacturer.
The first step in the procedures for supplying materials to the Pentagon is
using the consultant as an intermediary, and next is tendering the samples
when you are "called in." Once a year the Pentagon holds a sample fair in
which the products of outside producers are all gathered together. It is
regorted that the number of Japanese manufacturers who displayed products in
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in last year`s product fair increased to close to ten companies. Because of
the denials of those involved this is an unconfirmed report, but it is said
that among the participants were Nippon Electric Company, Ltd., Fu3itsu Ltd.,
Minebea, Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, Omron Tateishi Electronics Company,
and Hitachi Construction Equipment.
Of note is Nippon Electric's achievement in 1980 in exporting short range
optical communications equipment for the American air defense system. The
direct supplier was a subsidiary of ATT, but the Pentagon ispected the
technology and the specifications and granted its permission. Compared to
Nippon Electric, Mitsubishi Electric Company and Kyoto Ceramics,~etc. are
late entries, but they have invited high Pentagon officials to inspect their
factories and are trying to establish some kind of connection.
Further, far-sighted manufacturers are planning to make inroads at the Pentagon
using American manufactureres as a front. Minebea has purchased Pacific
Propeller (Seattle), America's leading propeller manufacturing and repair
company, and Japan Airlines Electric Manufacturing has succeeded, through
a long-term contract, in supplying aircraft control equipmez~t to America's
Smith Industries and to Honeywell.
Efforts are not limited to the level of parts subcontracting; recently a
number of Japanese-American military equipment joint ventures have also bee
advancing. Toshiba Corporation has received a proposal from Hughes Aircraft
Company for the cooperative development of a"piggy-back" missile using a
charge-coupled device employed in video tape recorders. Mitsubishi Electric,
which has succeeded in adapting the mass production techniques of household
electironics to the production of military equipment, and Hitachi Ltd., which
has strength in the application of semi-conductor technology, have been
_ app-roached reapectively by Westinghouse and Rockwell International regarding
~oint development and oCher pro~ects.
Compared to these industries' activities to seek connections to the Pentagon,
- official government activities are less intense; but the ground work done by
MITI, which pos~esses the gift of foresight is the most adv~nced. Regarding
_ the problem of the aluminum customs duty rate, MITI has sought to contact
Defense Secretary Weinberger instead of U.S. trade representative Brock and
told Weinberger, "The continued Japanese production of aluminum is vital to
Japan's security." By doing so it checked the arguments within the U.S.
Government over the opening of the Japanese market to aluminum imports.
In the U.S. Government which changes organization with each change in
administration, only in the Pentagon is there no change in administrative
channels or fundamental policy even if there is a change at the top. It appears
that this is why Japanese officials and businessmen are most desirous of
making connections here.
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Pros, Cons on Technology Cooperation
Tokoyo NIKKEI KOGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 19 Feb 82 p 3
[Text] In the midst of rising strong demands for increased Japanese
defense capability the problems of joint development of arms and Japanese-
American exchange of military technology which are the basis of defense
strength have risen anew as issues. The Reagan administration in the United
States, attempting a policy of huge arms increases in order to restore a
balance with the Soviet military and in order to build up the Western weapons
. systems is aiming at the advanced technology f ields of new materials (fine
~ ceramics, carbon fibers), fiber-optical communications, and Japanese
- electronics, and has c~me to work for the ~oint development of arms and the
procurement of military tec:.zology for America. In response to this the
government of Japan and the LDP have postured and indicated a straightforward
response, "In order to effectively and harmoniously manage the Japanese-
American Security Treaty system it is necessary to respond to American desires
and demands regarding exchange of military technology."
However, the matter is becoming a political problem as there has been a strong
- negative response toward intimate involvement in the U.S. leadership's road
. to arms expansion even through military technology and development, and there
is also the counter-argument that the supply of military technology touches
on the Three-Point Principle of Prohibiting the Exports of Weapons. Just as
the prominence of defense expenditures has been made much of, our country's
expenditures fcr defense preparations purchases have been pushed to the high
level of 1 trillion yen and we have begun to grow into a large arm market.
Under these circumstances the picture is com~~~x: On the one side there are ~
in domestic defense industry circles voices saying that exchange of arms
technology and cooperation in joint development are essential under the
Japanese-Americar. security system; and on the other side there is the fear
that as there is close involvement as a subcontracting base for American arm
producers, future development of advanced technalogy industries will be
- controlled by that relationship. Should we move toward lessening friction
with the United States? Should we stick to the route of peaceful economic
relations? Various thoughts are mixed in confusion and we try here to put
the spotlight on the flaring problems of cooperation in military technology.
[Defense Problem Information Group]
The Three Principle of Arms Export (April 1967, Prime Minister Sato's response
in the Diet)
Our nation's arms exports are especially restricted under the Export Trade
, Control orders and such exports require the consent of the MITI cabinet
minister; however, in the following cases arms exports will not be recognized
as a matter of principle: 1) arms exports to countries leaning toward the
communist bloc; 2) arms exports t~ countries under UN-imposed arms embargo;
3) arms exports to countries invo].ved in international disputes or where
there is fear of such involvement.
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The New Three--Point Principle of Prohibiting the Exp~rt of Weapons (February
1976, Prime Minister Miki's response in the Diet)
From the standpoint of a peaceful nation and in order to avoid promoting
international conflict, arms exports have hitherto been dealt with
cautiously, and henceforth, based on the following policy, such exports
will not be promoted: 1) arms exports in those areas covered by the Three-
Point Principle of Prohibiting the ~xport of Weapozs will not be recognized;
2) even outside the areas covered by the Three-Point Principle, based on the
spirit of the constitution and other relevant laws~ we will be cautious in
the export of arms; 3) export of facilities related to the construction
of armaments will be dealth with in the same manner as arms exports.
Desirable Electronic Optical Technology; Japan Aims at its Own Weapons System;
Consciousness of the "Penalties of Greatness" in America?
It is said that in the course of the next 10 to 15 years overwhelming military
_ superiortty will atand on developments in advanced military technology.
The occurrence of fierce military competition between military superpowers,
the United States and the Soviet Union, even in the realm of space development
and not stopping with purely military technology such as neutron bombs,
battlefield nuclear weapons, and missiles, relates advanced technology and
military technology; and the connection between the two can only become more
profound at all points.
In the fields of electronics and fiber-optical electronics, etc., Japan has
acquired and developed technology of the most advanced level. The accuracy
of domestically produced missiles is conspicuously high, and even in the new
materials fields of fine ceramics and carbon threads, no other nation is
Japan's peer. Even in space, we have begun to launch stationary satellites;
the advances of domestic production technology are eye-catching; and in the
Defense Agen~y and industrial circlea the call for the establishment of our
own weapons system is rising.
What miist be noted is that Japanese-American mutual exchange of military
technology is suddenly appearing as an issue just as though it were to control
the movement towards establishment of Japan's own weapons system.
At a staff conference on Japanese-American security held in Hawaii last summer,
the United States strongly pressed for the exchange of military technology
and cooperative arms development on the one hand, while on the other hand
demanding Japanese military preparation efforts. The American analysis of
developments in Japan, including the argument that Japan was getting a free
ride in irs security arrangements, chiefly centered on four pointss
1) expenditures for the development of advanced technology had piled up so
that no one country, not even the United States, could bear the burden;
- 2) a policy to oppose COMECON which, with the Soviet Union at its center,
accepts an international regional economic specialization; 3) the Reagan
administration has declared advanced technology to be a resource; 4) the
desire to incorporate Japanese defense industries, which have extended periods
of payment, as essential subcontractors or "pinch-hitters" �or American
enterprises.
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Although there is an apparFnt contradiction in that, �rota the perspective of
the 18 b:illion dollar U.S. trade deficit with Japan which is largelq tied to
the American economic slump, the United States can n.ot 3nsist too strongly that
Japan supply her with_arms, there is nonetheless an attemgt to make mutual
military technology exchange and cooperat:ive development of military technology
a starting point in greater military cooperation.
The viewpoint whihh lies a little deeper is that which suggests that perhaps
the United States has begun to take steps, indirectly, toward.Japan in the
same waq the Soviet Union in Poland faced the laborers who comprised
"Solidarity" with an unbending posture and also suppressed the Czech
liberalization of the ~ell-laiown "Prague Spring." ~
At exactly the same time that Japan had begun to study the introduction of the
world's most powerful inter.ceptor, the F-15 Eagle, as successor to the F~4
Phantom, Japan's number one defense manufacturer, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries,
secretly gathered technicians and commenced planning a domestically produced
fighter to oppose the F-15. The intricacies of the F-15's introduction and
the unsuccessful birth uf the domestically produced FX are explained as the '
result of a decisive defeat of five domestically produced fighters by three
F-15's in a mock battle. ~
Not limited to aircraft, tanks, various missiles, and other characteristically
Japanese weapons have been born. Yn particular, naval vessels, with the
exception of the "Harpoon" and the "Asrock," are completely domestically
produced. Japanese naval vessel construction capability has reached so far
as to match that of the United States and the Soviet Union, even to the extent
of conceiving, in the 4th defense build-up plan, of a mini-aircraft carrier (DHL).
Even the United States, in strengthening its navy, has alluded to commissioning
construction in Japan.
_ It appears that it is in the supply of naval vessels to the United States
that the potential for arms exports is greatest, and this is the point where
special attention must be given to treatment of the Three-Point Principle of
Prohibiting the Exports of Weapons. However, because the arms standard
gradually is changing to Japan's qwn sys,tem, America will lc:~e technical
control and it is reported that ill feelings are harbored in the United States.
~ Japan was re-armed during the Korean War, but militarily it has relied
entirely on the U.S. umbrella based on the United States~Japan Security Treaty.
Similarly, even concerning military technology, with the exception of the
"buddy system" and the flying rescue boat, the PS-1, one-way imports have
continued. According to someone connected with Ishikawa~ima Harima Heavy
Industries, "American technology introduced from 1955-1965 was extraordinary.
But prior to its introduction during the next decade, we were generally able
to grasp what was coming, and in the mid-1970's, we had reached the point of
being a'ole to think, 'Our guess was right, that's what is was after all."'
In the field of electronics Japan has already begun to distinguish itself
here and there relative to the United States. The Japanese are developing
ingeniously unique arms with these technologies. Defense agency chief Ito
comments, "When Japan butts in, foreign countries want to construct a defense
~ net like a'hedgehog' which draws back in in~ured paw."
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NOR OFFICIAI. USN: UNLY
~
In these ~ords, we must perceive the thoughts toward the development of arms
- which are appropriate to Japan.
If we ask what will now happen~. to the movement to "guard the nation with
- domestic arms" which was hiddEn in the shadow of the Japanese-American~
military technology exchange which developed so spectacularly, we are forced
- to notice Japanese-American competition.
_ Military Technology Exchange Rising as the Trump Card in Resolving Trade
_ Friction; "We're in the Midst of a Cautious Investigation"--MITI
MITI has not greatly altered its attitude of "being in the midst of a
; cautious investigation" of the problem of Japanese-American ~oint
development of military technolog,y and the export of military technology to
tha United States. As the ministry which manages the Export Trade Control
Council which implements the Three-Point Principle of Prohibiting the Exports
of Weapons and places the concrete checks on exports, and as the ministry
which must answer to the government when it takes an active interest, it
is necessary to add caution to a cautious investigation.
In finding a way to deal with this problem and toldodge the opposition of
public opinion and the opposition parties, it is necessary to solidify a
policy which is agreed upon by boCh the government and the LDP, and the ministry,
wanting to look to the point where both government and party opinion have
finally settled, appears to have been forced into a cautious posture. They are
in particular focusing their attention on the kind of ~udgement of this
problem that the government's highest brains will make and speculate on when
- a decision wi11 be made.
In the midst of all this, Prime Minister Suzuki, in a lower house budget
committee meeting related a perspective which was perceived as a atep forward
when compared to previous policy. "In the harmonious management of the
United States-Japan security system which is the main pillar of Japan's
defense, both Japan and the United States have responsibilities. From this
perspective we are giving this problem serious consideration." After this
statement MITI seemed ta waiver, but later a clarification that "The Prime
Minister's remarks do not greatly cross the boundaries of the government's
thinking that, in reg~rd to this problem, we are, as heretofore, in the midst
of an investigation," was made within the government and once again the
ministry took its "cautious" gosition.
However, it is a fact that within MITI various positions have emerged in
regard to this problem.
One of these positions was expressed by an administrative official. "It looks
like MITI is taking a passive attitude toward this problem. That is not so."
He explains, "By n.o means are they ~ust leaving mattera to themselves, but it
is troublesome that MITI has made the ~udgement that at least in this problem
with the United States, it is not matter in which they must be involved."
He warns that the schema which sees the Defense Agency and the Foreign Ministry
as the activist faction and MITI as the cautious faction, begins to make it
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appear that "MITI's methods of seriously considering relations with the
United States are soft-headed."
MITI is now caught up in the whirlpool of trade frictions with the United
States. Resolution of these frictions i:s its most urgent theme. However,
there is no effective trump card in this matter. There are no good ideas to
resolve trade frictions with the United States and the sense of irritation
within the ministry is getting stronger. It is into this setting that the
problem of exporting military technology enters. One administrative official
emphasized, "We want to step into the pro~lem of arms technology exports if it
will he useful in resolving trade frictions." This same official states "It
- is absured to think that MITI regards the United States lightly. We are
thinking about it very seriou~ly."
That there might be a facet of the immanent export of military technology to
the United States which can be used as a trump card in the resolution of trade
frictions is one of the realities of MITI's cautious investigation.
On the other hand, there is also the view that extreme caution must be
_ exercised in exporting military technology to the United States because based
on our nation's guarantees of peaceful economic policy we import atomic fuel
from various countries and have commercial ties to various nations. The
promotion of a peacetime economy's industrial structure is the direction
which our country must also take in the future. "In this context, the
Three-Point Principle of Prohibiting the Export of Weapons is a principle
of very high value. It will not now be destroyed," says a certain
administrative official.
Taking the example of the various points of view shown by Western European
nations in response to the Reagan administration's new cold war structure,
the same official emphasizes that Japan too, from its own standpoint, can attain
an autonomous policy direction. MITI Minister Abe, who is one of the foci of
the policy debate, does not really alter the posture of "being in the midst
of investigation" but he emphasizes again the size of the common significance
which Japanese-American security and the Japanese-American alliance hold.
Furthermore there is the reality that the United States holds a great
influence in our national economy and, according to Mr Abe, it is a fact that
pains must be taken to harmonize Japanese-American economic relationships.
As the government and the LDP are in the midst of formulating a consensus,
this is perhaps a passible stage on which the minister might play a role.
At such a~uncture, Mr Amatani, former MITI adv3sor who trotted out the name
"merchant nation" (because Japan lives by its economic power, and not by
_ military power it keeps a low profile to minimize frictions and must be active
in bearing the burdens of economic cooperation) was sub~ected to sarcastic
remarks at a recent European financial conference when he showed indications
of concern that protectionism would come to the fore, "What kind of country
is it that complains of protectionism even though its own defense in
inadequate?" The defense burden and the export of military technology are not
directly tied together but there is a feeling that MITI must seek an answer
to such criticism overseas.
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"If it is Necessary, it Won't be a Problem"--Council of Economic Organizationst
Head Yoshihiro Inayama
Japan and the United States are both bound by the Security Treaty and if~ in
the course of making mutual efforts to protect themselves it becomes
necessary, I think that there will not be the slightest problem in cooperative
arms development and the exchange of military technology.
World conditions are changing greatly. If the Three-Point Principle (proclaimed
under the Miki cabinet) hinders Japanese-American military technology
cooperation, I think that, based on securing the understanding of the public,
it will be all right for the Prime Minister to alter them.
Today, when technology is making steady advances, even in the area of military
technology, I think it is necessary to import advanced American knowledge; if
Japanese technology is useful, we should provide it to the United States or
open the road to cooperative development.
Science and Technology Have Military Potential; "Peaceful and Military Uses
Can't be Separated;" Profound Dissatisfaction in the LDP
There are many in the LDP who have doubts about the Three-Point Prir~ciple.
This is because they were simply policy trends put forth from the standpoint
of parliamentary tactics at the time of the Mtki cabinet (1976). In a
dissatisfied voice it is argued, "We must not make a serious decision from '
the perspective of a sfmple parliamentary tactis" (Zentaro Kosaka, member of
the lower house, head of the LDP Foreign Policy Investigation Committee;
Motoharu Arima, member of the lawer house, LDP National Defense Section's
Chairman's Representative; Hiroshi Oki, member of the House of C~uncilors,
Chief., LDP Foreign Affairs Business Section).
However, there are various perspectivps on the significance of the Three-Point
Principle. There is, on the ane h~nd, the perspective that "the situation
when Japan must absolutely not export arms is when it would endanger world
peact" (Representative Kosaka), and, on the other hand "We must certainly
pro,ject a good image to the natians of the world" (Councilor Oki). Between
these two there is also the perpective of Representative Arima, "From the
perspective of the Japanese-American 5ecurity Treaty the export of arms is
inevitable becoming necessary." .
Representative Arima asserts, "We cannot have defense strength which is
separated from science and technoloEy,''' and says, "We must clearly understand
that today military power is a matter o~ scientific and technological brains.~'
In any event, there is strong dissatisfaction that a matter of such importance
as arms exporte and the supply of technology will have been determined by
a parliamentary tactic and there are strong ~voices that the government muat
determine a clear policy based on reason.
Diversion to Military Use is Dangerous---Socialist Party
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The Socialist Party's position has been summarized by Yokoyama Toshiaki,
Chairman of the Special Committee for the Investigation of the Arms Export
Problem. "Japan, from its government and diplomatic posture, must not export
arms. Needless to say, the constitution reflects the fact that we were at
one time aggressors against other nations. Today, if Japan wanted to, it has
the technology to build a hydrogen bomb. Therefore, if we divert even a
little of the technology which forms the basis for the people's livelihood
- to military use, we will enter a realm where there are no limits at all.
Thus diversion of such technology to military use is a matter which entails
a large element of danger. In just these times the government must be
strong minded and it is important to prevent arms and arms technology
exports."
Military Technology: The Flaring Problem in Japanese-American Cooperation;
Will it Become a Window for Breaking the Prohibition of Arms Exports?
Industrial Circles say "The Wind Is Blowing in the Direction we Want;" A
"Technology Transition" Is Essential; Drawing the Hoped-for Clear Line.
In the midst of the Suzuki cabinet's sudden shift to the right in the
prominence of the defense budget, the perspectives and thinking of industrial
circles are confused and we are unable to view them as clearly defined. It
would be expected that in industrial circles they would see merit in attitudes
_ such as that of the Hawk faction within the~LDP that modification of the
Three-Point Principle is natural, but in the Arms Construction Industry
Association, in the Federation of Economic Organization's Defense Production
Co~ittee, and in other related groups, policy debates have not even been held.
Even if they are not boldly raising their voices calling for the modification
of arms export conditions, as industrialists alert to their own interests
the severe change in international conditions brought about by the Soviet-
American confrontation and the American demands in relation to Japan's defense
~fforts probably have them thinking that this situation must necessarily
~ le~ad to opening the road to arms exports.
= In fact, at the time large-scale plants were being exported to the oil
producing countries of the Arab world and to C'hina, our country's industrial
circles looked with envious eyes at the figures of France, West Germany and
other European nations winning business deals which included fighters, tanks,
and other collateral military exports.
However, in public MITI takes the stance toward the Three-Point Principle
which it has heretofore, but industrial leadership explains. "Beginning with
cabinet ministers, the managerial class in the government is beginning to
indicate an understanding of the new situation." That is, it appears that
conditions will with difficulty bring a wind which blows in the direction
which the industrial circles desire. But wyen there are actually attempst
to export items which appear to contradict the Three-Point Principle, at
MITI's window, whe:e they must deal with the requests, it is reported that .
there is a negative response.
This is because in the ministry responsible there is an extreme dislike of
having to consider items which appear to conflict with the Three-Point
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Principle and tt~ere is fear of nursuit by the opposition parties as MITI
operates without clear guideli:ies in deciding to what extent a list of
export goods conflicts with the Three-Point Principle. This kind of
attitude is explained as being similar to that behind non--tariff barriers.
On the one hand, there are increasing examples of American defense-related
departments and others seeking demands of Japanese industries for cooperative
development and technology exchanges.
At present, the American demands are frequently in the fields which stand in
relative prominence such as optical communications and semi-conductors, but
when we consider the points in which Japanese industries in general commonly
excel--production., quality, period of payment, etc.--it appears that
- henceforth demands will extend to broader fields such as naval vessels, etc.
In one sense, just as prior to World War II, trade frictions between the
United States and Japan are filled with strain; but it is thought that
negotiations for cooperation in the realm of military technology will provide
_ material for some mitigation of these trade difficulties. In fact, because
trade frictions are the responsibility of the U.S. Department of Co~erce it
is not thought that the demands made of Japan regarding commercial frictions
wily be withdrawn if .Tapan cooperates in the military sphere, but such
cooperation is seen as a way to influence the attitude of the emotionally
- aroused American public in the direction of recognizing that "Japan and the
United States are bound by strong ties."
Will cooperation in advanced fields likely be realized? "It will be fine, if
it happens gradually," says Daisuke Kobayashi, Chairman of Fu~itsu.
Advancing the transfer of technology to developing nations, and not just to
the United States is the path along which Japan's livelihood rests. Bu~ in
reality, the government's stance is not clear even regarding this problem.
Since the Japanese companies involved are worried that technology and
knowhow provided by Japan under the guise of joint development of military
technology will flow to American companies, it appears that MITI must deal with
this problem In the United States, the military is aiding and aiming at the
_ development of very high speed integrated circuits based on a plan similar
to our country's super-large scale integration devices, but it is also said
that they are not making good progress. There is a perspective which says
that this is the reason why arms producers in the United Statea are
universally demanding Japanese cooperation.
~ In the opinion of Mr Kobayashi, Chairman of Fujitsu, and a host of othere in
electronics circles, "That perspective is a Japanese conceit. American
technology is not lagging to that extent. But if there is a demand~ we would
like to participate actively."
It is unmistakable that the time has come for the government to take a clear
position on the export of arms and technology transfer. We must listen
attentively for the voices saying, "It is necessary to debate the issues fairly
in the Diet, laying a foundation for national prosperity."
COPYRIGHT: Nikkan Kogyo Shimbunsha 1982
9940
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~CONOMIC
~MAINICHI~VIEWS TRADE FRICTION, MARKET OPENING
OW310232 Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 29 Mar 82 p 2 "
[Editorial: "Nature of Japanese Economy"]
[Text] The Japanese Government led by Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki is now
being called upon to make an important decision in the face of the ever-
- growing trade friction between Japan and Western countries. It is also high
time that we once again delve into the claims of the Western countries and
the contention of this country.
The Western countries are urging Japan to open its markets claiming that
the closed nature of the markets is directly responsible for their large-
scale deficits in trade with Japan. Japan, on the other hand, contends that
the core of the problem lies in the Western countries; their lack of effort
to exploit the market and their slow-tempoed growth of productivity. There
is some truth in what both sides say.
On the other hand, the problem is at once complex and puzzling. Even if
the Japanese markets are completely opened, it does not necessarily mean
that their trade deficits will disappear or that their problems of depression
and unemployment will be solved. The opening of Japan's markets will not
prove to be a simple panacea. ,
Thus, we hope that the Western countries will cool off and stop trying to
make Japan a scapegoat.
The Reagan administration should revise its economic policy which has caused
great confusion in the world economy. At the root of this confusion are
~ the fiscal def icit in general and military spending in particular. It is
reported that the Japanese Government in concert with European countries is
prepared to call this to the attention of the U.S. Government at the summit
conference scheduled for June. On this score, we are in accord with the
government and it is hoped that Japan will push forward its contention.
Since we believe that we should discuss the matter in a cool-headed manner,
we welcome the report that it was decided at the European community foreign
ministers' meeting to bring the question of Japan's closed market to a forum
of the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). It is extremely
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significant to discuss which market is more closed, the EC or Japan, and
what to do to improve the situation, in a multilateral forum instead of ~ust
bilateral discussions.
~ President Reagan reportedly told visiting Japanese Foreign Minister Yoshio
Sakurauchi that the trade friction is a problem involving all Western
countries and that the door should be opened to all trading partners. In
concrete terms, the president pointed out that the restrictions on 14 items
such as plywood, tobacco and certain agricultural produce including oranges
should be lifted.
Frankly speaking, it is highly difficult to pinpoint which country, Japan
or the United States, is more open in its trade practices. Japanese tariffs
are, in a way, as low as those of the United States. It appears that the
United States has intentionally made an example of Japan's remaining import
restrictions on agricultural products in an attempt to lemonstrate the closed
nature of the Japanese market.
One high-ranking U.S. official was quoted as saying that no country has an
agricultural policy perfectly commensurate with economic rationalism, and
that the U.S. Goverrunent itself has a restrictive policy toward the import
of beef .
The actual situation the world over may be as this American official depicted,
but still we cannot but conclude that the Japanese market which has such
nontariff barriers as import inspections and customs procedures is more
closed than others. As the U.S. side has pointed out, the government's
administrative guidance has often taken on the nature of industry protection.
The opening of the Japanese market will not be realized unless the structure
of the Japanese economy is improved as soon as possible. Prime Minister
Suzuki is reportedly determined to map out a policy of opening the Japanese
market by the time the summit conference opens in June. It seems that he
is sincere this time in taking the lead in formulating the measures, but
it must be stressed at the same time that any temporary patchwork for opening
the market will not satisfy our Western trade partners.
CSO: 4120/234 '
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ECONOMIC ~
FARMERS LOBBY AGAINST IMPORT QUOTA LIFTING
W0310422 Tokyo THE JAPAN TIMES in English 29 Mar 82 p 2
[Text] Japanese farmers are mounting a fierce campaign to prevent their
government giving in to American pressure for removal of import quotas on
agricultural products.
The United States is already Japan's main supplier but it wants even more
to help reduce a massive bilateral trade deficit that last year ballooned
to an es~imated $18 billion (using a different calculation, Japan puts the
f igure at $13.4 billion). Of Japan's 27 re~aaining import quotas, 22 are
- for agricultural products, now the focus of the increasing trade friction
between the two countries.
But to members of the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP) giving in to
American demands would be tantamount to political suicide.
The party has remained in power for the past 30 years because of the farm
bloc vote, and 60 percent of its parliamentary members currently represent
rural districts.
These include Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki and some of the men who are seeking
to succeed him in the future.
Two of the rising contenders for premiership, international trade and industry
minister Shintaro Abe and chief cabinet secretary Kiichi Miyazawa, represent
one of the key mandarin organge growing areas.
Ichiro Nakagawa, director general of the Science and Technology Agency, comes
from Hokkaido, an important beef and dairy products area.
Finance Minister Michio Watanabe's cor.:;~ituency is one of the country's main
tomato producing areas.
_ American liberalization demands cover most ma3or agricultural products for
human and animal consumption. But beef, oranges and other citrus fruit
appear to be regarded in Washington as the most important.
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The Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives (ZEN~HU), which has formed a
special headquarters to lobby against succumbing to the U.S. pressure, says
import liberalization would have "a devastating impact" on individual farmers
and would rock the very foundations of Japanese agriculture.
Japanese cattle breeders and dairy farmers cannot possibly compete with their
American and Australian counterparts, who have the benefit of wide open spaces~
it said.
Japanese beef demand is now running at around 420,000 tons a year, about a
third of which is imported, primarily from Australia. Prime beef used in
luxury hotels, hoivever, comes from the U.S. where cattle are fattened on
expensive grain.
Agricultural Ministry officials argue that increased beef imports would lead
to less demand for feedstufr" imports, which would greatly work to the disad-
vantage of American grain producers.
But, on the other side of the ledger, continued import restrictions mean
the Japanese public will have to continue paying a prohibitive price for
domestic beef--more than twice as much as in New York, for example.
ZENCHU says orange growers are also at a disadvantage because they cannot
lower their costs through large-scale mechanization due to the fact at least
half of annual production comes from mountainous areas.
Current restrictions inflate the price of imported fruit in the shops. But
imported citrus juice costs ,3bout half the domestic product, leading to
excessive stocks of the latter according to a ZENCHU spokesman.
Ironically, fruit importers also oppose liberalization. Imported oranges,
for example, represent only 2 to 3 percent of the 3 million tons coming on
the market each year.
Imports are handled by 96 government-designated companies. A leading trading
house reckons its profit margin on an imported orange at some 40 percent--
which would naturally decline if all the barriers were lowered.
~ Japan's monopoly system in tobacco is also under fire from the U.S, and
Western Europe.
- Japan lifted import ceilings on tobacco in 1972 and in November 1980 cut its
import tariff from 90 to 35 percent, and allowed 20,000 of Japan's estimated
260,000 tobacco retail shops to handle imports (compared to 14,200 previously).
But with a market share of only 1.4 percent currently, the Americans are
pressing for additional steps, including an increase in the number of retailers
allowed to sell imports and a 30 percent raise in import prices without hiking
retail prices.
These, the Tokyo government argues, would seriously hurt 104,000 Japanese
tobacco leaf growers, whose product is twice as expensive as the American
one and falls far behind in Guality.
CSO: 4120/233 ~
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ECONOMIC
BUDGET CRITICIZED FOR LACK OF EMPHASIS ON EXPANSION OF DOMESTIC DEMAND
- Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 8 Apr 82 p 2
[Editorial: "Expand Domestic Demand"]
[Text] Althaugh the fiscal 1982 budget has been finally
apDroved in the Diet, the nation's economy is saddled
with a raft of knotty problems. The budget lacks
consideration concerning domestic business
r~overy, welfare, and overseas economic friction,
anel its execution is no easy task in the light of the ~
grTi~i economic and political environment bath at
h0~ne and abroad.
Business at home recorded a minus grawth
during the three-month period of October through
December last year. The number of unemployed in
the United States and Europe was about 10 million
r4~pectively. Many countries are scared by the
nightmare oi a possible great panic resulting trom the
st~gflation now in progress at a rapid tempo. Trade
ft3~tion between Japan and the Western nations has
been escalated to an alarming degree.
While the world economy is in the doldrums,
Japan is faced with severe criticism .for its poor
colStributions as an economic power occupying 10
. percent of world's GNP. It is high time for tbis
~ cQuntry to play an effective role to trelp the world
ecpnomy recover from the current.severe conditions.
In this regard, we believe that Japan's economic
m~nagement from now on should place emphasis on
the easing of iriction and preventing further business
r~ession both at horne and abroad. In other words,
prgparations should be hastened to implemeat a~
s~pplementary budget tbat will enable an L~come tax
reduction with We fiscal year and tiscal expealitures
fo~ expans~On of domestic demaad: .
T6e Japanese government is plaaniag to con-
- centrate 75 percent of the scheduled public works ia
the first half of the year ~nd to lower the long-term
in~'erest rate as p~rt of ~ its business recovery
. 27
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F(3R- l)1~ 1~ IC'IA 1, l 1~F: ONI.Y
measures. This however, is not enough. It may be
n,~cessary for t6e government to introduce another
powerful measure trom this autumn to keep the
eoinomy going. It is said that a measnre to cope with
the economic friction will be completed sometime in
May, but a patchup measure for opening the market.
to foreign countries will have little effect in easing the
~_c~ticism. It behooves the�government to make efforts
~ ta~r continued expansion of domestic demand.
Moreover, the environment ot the people's
li~.elihood, which is far inferior to that of Western
countries, mu,~
~ be improved qualitatively. The
existing ecanomic structure that is too dependent on
e~orts should be shifted to one centering oa dome~tic
_ demand. The existing pattern of public enterprises
c6sracterized by the construction of bridges, high-
ways and new Shinkansen lines should be reevalusted
_ irom the ground up. A new vista should be opened
with emphasis placed on "national build-up" plans
such as the redevelopment of cities.
An income tax cut will not be eifective unless fhe
~cut is carried out for at least two years, that is, for
fiscal 1982 and 1983. The taz cut shauld be desigaed
not only to increase individual spending but to correct
t!~ iuequality resulting trom the tact that there has
been no reduction during the past five years. Ap early
tax cut announcement wiU have a great psychological
- effect.
- ~ Revenue sources must be secured to carry out
both the tax cut aad iacreased fiscal spending. To
secure the revenue sources a thornughgoiug cut ot
wasteful expenditures should be carried out by ad-
- minisirauve re~orm and :he geriod set ior fiacal
reconstruction by discontinuing the Qotation of
deflcit~covering nat~oaal bonds by 1984 should be
eztcnded tnrth~r.
Ody after,all possible meaaa are talcen for the
expansioa ot domestic demand, can we demand the
Uaited Statea to lower its high lnterest rate. The hig6
interes! rate in We U.S. is a polky aimed at curbing
inflatioa to 4e caused .by the iACCeased tiacal deficit
due to the inQafi~ed military spending. The American
. pqlicy as such, however, das stepped up recession the
werld over and made world currencies quite unstable.
Tbe yen's depreciation is a case in point. The yea's
appreclatlon is essential for the Japanese economy to
expand imports, d~crease industrial cost and
stabUize commodity prices. We must caU on the U.S.
to stop its arms expansion race whicd is the very
~~arce oi the high interest rate in tde U.S.
In short} ior the benefit ot the ta~cpayers, botA the
government and bureaucrats should abide by the
~7'riaciple oi fiscal democracy.
COPYRIGHT: Mainichi Daily News 1982
cso: 4i2o/232
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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
BRIEFS
SUPERCOMPUTER DEVELOPMENT--The Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI) Wednesday authorized the inaugurat3on of a foundation to develop a
"supercomputer" by th e 1990s. MITI gave the go-ahead to an application by
six Japanese computer makers and two electrical manufacturers to set up
the research and development institute ~ointly. The ministry will entrust
the foundation with th e task of~developing a"fifth-generation" computer,
and will provide it with 423 million yen ($1.7 million) in research and
dEVelopment funds for fiscal 1982. Foreign enterprises are invited to join
the foundation--officially named the Institute for N.ew Ganeration Gomputer
~echnology to be headed by Takuma Yamamoto, president of Fujitsu, Ltd.
The US Government has asked the Japanese Government to open the door of
the institute to for eign enterpr3ses wishing to join it, according to MITI.
However, no American enterprises have yet expressed any wish to 3oin the
foundation, MITI said. [Text] [OW171049 Tokyo THE DAILY YOMIURI in English
16 Apr 82 p 4]
COMPUTER LOGIC DEVICE--Nippon Electric Co. (NEC) has announced the develop-
ment of a new computer logic device with the world's fastest computing
speed, paving the way for development of the next-generation of "super
computers." NEC said the new logic gate had a computing speed of 10 pico-
seconds, surpassing the 13 picoseconds achieved by International Business
Machines Corp (IBM) of the United States in 1979. One picosecond is one-
trillionth of a second. The capacity of the NEC logic de~-l.ce, based on the
so-called Josephson el ement, which is expected to take the place of silicon-
based semiconductors in the future as the basic eletnent of computers, also
exceeds that of a similar Josephson computer logic gate developed recently
by the electrotechnical laboratory of the Ministry of International Trade
and Industry's Industrial Science and Technology Agency. [Text] [OW121141
Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 11 Apr 82 p 5]
SATELLITE PRESS TRANSMISSION TEST--The expeximental wireless transmission
of newspaper pages us ing the experimental communications satellite, Sakura,
was successfully carried out by the Posts and Telecommunications Ministry
Tuesday [13 April] at the ASAHI SHIl~UN's head office in Tsuki~i, Tokyo.
The very clear negative film received is shown in the photograph. The
_ wireless transmission of the teat pattern, which was computer-edited by
the ASAHI, was repeated, and the test results were very good. The test
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started out with an output of 100 watts and output was gradua.lly lowered
to 10 watts. There were no errors. The tests were carried out by the
ministry with the cooperation of the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone [NTT]
Public Corporation, and others. A vehicle-mounted relay station of the
NTT parked in the ASAHI's parking area was used to send the transmission
from the newspaper's page transmission device to Sakura. The signals
received back from the satellite were relayed by the station to the
- Asahi's receiving device to produce the negative film. Similar tests were
to be carried out Wednesday [14 April] using the pages of 13 newspapers,
including the MAINICHI SHIMBUN, YOMIURI SHIMBUN, TOKYO SHIl~UN aa~d
NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN. [Text] [OW170200 Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NEWS
in English 15 Apr 82 p 3]
CSO: 4120/240 END
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