JPRS ID: 10485 USSR REPORT MILITARY AFFAIRS

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JPRS L/ 10485
29 April 1982
U SS R Re ort
p
- MILITARY AFFAIRS
CFOUO 5/82)
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N'ux urriuAL u~~ u~~~Y
- JPRS L/10485
29 ~pril 1982
USSR REPORT
MILITARY AFFAIRS
(~OUO 5/82~
CONTENTS
MILITARY SCIENCE, THEORY, STRATEGY
Development of Fighter Aviation Tactics
(ATAKUYUT ISTREBITELI, 1981) 1
GROUND FORCFS
Book Excerpts: Artillery Sergeant's Handbook
(SPRAVOCHNIK SER'LHANTA ARTILLERII, 1981)��������������� 18
- a - L222 - USSR - 4 FOUO]
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MILITARY SCIENCE, THEORY, STRATEGY
DEVELOPMENT OF FIGHTER AVIATION TACTICS
Moscow ATAKUYUT ISTtZEBITELI in Russian 1981 (signed to press 3 Jul 81) pp 1-2, 190-
= 191, 3-4, 5-7, 8; 25-28; 1~9; 73-75; 96-97, 109; 110-111, 126-127; 128-129, 1l~;
1.1.45-11~6, 167-168; 169, 185-189
[Annotation, table of contents, foreword, introduction and excerpts from chapters
1-9 as indicated from the book ~~Fighter Planes Attack", by A. B. Krasnov, Voyen-
izdat, 20,000 copies, 191 pages]
[Excerpts] This book provides an overview of the development of fighter aviation
tactics during World War II and the post-wax period in terms of an assessment o~
foreign military resources. Included is an examination of particular aspects of
the work of aircraft commanders in planning for aerial combat as well as control-
ling it from the ground and in the air.
The book is intended for f~.ight and command personnel of the air force. It might
also be recommended for unit commanders and staff officers of other branches of
the armed forces as an aid in organizi.ng combat operations utilizing air support,
and also for students and cadets at military academies.
Contents
Foreword 3
Introduction 5
Chapter l. Tactics and Combat Missions 8
l. Providing air support for ground forces
2. Safeguarding other airborne operations 18
Chapter 2. Tactics and Technology ~5
1. The background of technological capabilities
2. Tactical and technological paradoxes 38
3. Areas of tactical and technological interaction 1~3
_ Chapter 3. Countertactics ~9
l. Tactics of assault aircraft during PVO[air defense] penetration
2. Looking into the future 63
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Chapter 1~. The Ability to Foresee 73
1. When unexpected conditions are encountered
2. Combat simulation--a creative process 85
3. Preparation for group aerial combat 89
Chapter 5. Co^~plete Utilization of Weaponry Capabilities 96
l. The commander, planning and weaponry
2. The pilot, aerial combat and weaponry 101
3. New conditions--new requirements 105
Chapter 6. The Importance of Minutes and Seconds to a Commander 110
l. In the airfield control tower
2. In aerial combat 117
3. Again, new conditions and new requirements 12~.
Chapter 7. The Element of Surprise--the Mother of Victory 128
1. First to make visual contact
2. The tactical aspect of surprise 129
3. The means to achieving the element of surprise 133
4. Testing vulnerability to surprise 139
Chapter 8. Skillful Control of Aerial Combat 7.l~5
l. The use of modern we~ponry--a collective ski)1
2. The commander~s creative skills and automation 151
3. The commander's place--in the control tower or in the air? 161
Chapter 9. Achieving Victory in Combat 169
l. A sense of the new and the burden of habit
2. The right to take risks and initiatives in combat 171
3. Diff~icult in training--easy in combat 178
Procedural cnntrasts 181
5. Fighter aviation tactics--the scientific breakthrough 185
_ Foreword
Thanks largely to the tireless efforts of the Communist Party and the Soviet people,
Soviet fighter aviation has been equipped with mo@ern supersonic jet aircraft. In
the hands of ideologically hardened and socialistically dedicated flyers, they are
a formidable weapon in combat against ari~r airborne adversary. Of the many factors
which enter into the combat effectiveness of a fighter piZot, one of the most im-
p~rtant is his tactical skill. Actually, this is so because the decisive role in
the achievement of victory in combat belongs to tactics.
Professor A. B. Krasnov, doctor of military science, a veteran of the Great Patri-
otic War, and a former pilot himself, recounts in his book the course of develop-
me:zt of fighter aviation tactics. .
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The unique aspect of this particular book consists in the fact that the author does
not restrict himself to a dispassionate exposition of the problems before him. He
undertakes a brilliant analysis of opposing tendencies in the development of tac-
tics used in battle against a powerful adversary, he makes use of parallels and
contrasts, he uncovers the unifying element which, i.n the final accounting, makes
possible his transition from incomplete analyses to broad generalizations and su-
perbly compelling conclusions. And, most important of all, he ivites the reader
to think. The author does not offer hastily conceived responses to complex tactic-
al problems, he thinks along with the.reader--making him a participant in searches
for optimal solutions and concentrating his attention on as-yet unsolved problems.
, These nine chapters are, in their own way, nine self-contained problems in tactics.
The first three chapters of tr~e book are an original outline of the development of
fighter aviation tactics since World War II. The rich, thoughtfully selected, and
extensive factual material from the history of domestic and foreign avlation traces
changes in fighter missions, orders of battle and tactical measures in terms of the
development of aviation technology, and shows how the art of aerial combat has im-
proved. The author successfully correlates experience gained from the past to the
reality of modern conditions, thereby providing a deeper understanding of the de-
gree of consistency underlying the development of tactics.
In succeeding char~ers, the author examines means for improving the tactical skill
of fighter pilots. With great lucidity, the author discourses on the origins of
foresight on the paxt of a commander, alternate planning for aerial combat, tYie art
of the use of weaponry, the intelligent use of time factors, the element of sus~-
prise, and on other integral components of tactical skill. A major role is assigned
~to the business of controlling fighter combat from the ground and in the air.
The interrelationship of the commander to modern automatic control systems is a mat-
ter which will draw interest as it takes on a particular urgency in the era of sci-
entific and technological revolution in militaxy affairs. Especially likely to
attract attention axe those parts of the book which analyze ~actical training meth-
ods for flying personnel in light of current requirements for the education of air-
borne combat crews.
The precise application of logic in examining any number of problems, the ability
of the author to draw upon material from the most diverse areas of science and tech-
nology--all of this makes the book highly absorbing and interesting. This book
should prove useful for flyer, unit commander, and staff officer, as well as for the
yout~ who wishes to know more about aviation. It is highly instructive, thought-
provoking, analytical, and makes independent conclusions. In this, its value is
indisputable.
Marshal of Aviation, I. Pstygo
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Introduction
A la.rge group of bombers under fighter escort was heading for its assault objective.
It had been detected by ~round spotting posts only upon its approach to a base of
enemy fighters, which were quickly dispatched to intercept; it. Gaining altitude
rapidly, the fighters banked into the sun, then swooped onto the enemy. From the
airfield below, one could readily observe part of them engage the bomber escort,
while the rest attacked the bombers. The air battle had begun...
This particulax scene could be observed quite frequently at the beginning of the
Second World War. The air speed of bombers of that era did not exceed 300 lan/hr.
They advanced on their objectives in massive groups employing close-order flight
formations, preferably at great altitudes, where their detection and recognition
from the ground were difficult. In addition to tight fl?ght formations(reduced
~ vulnerability to fighters), bombers employed defensive armament and evasive man-
euvers to repulse fighter attacks. Comb~.t was carried out with mutual visual con-
tact betwee~z the aircraft of opposing sides. At night, fighters were able to at-
tack only those aircraft which could be illuminated by searchlights from the ground.
The nature of aerial combat has changed appreciably since that time. Today, fight-
ers operate at great distances from their bases, in difficult weather conditions,
and at any time of the day; at times, they open fire and destroy an enemy without
even making visual contact with him. The control of aerial combat requires the use
of ultramodern electronic equipment. Of course, as in the past, the fighter pilot
must hone his flying skills to the point of perfection in order to repel an enemy.
However, finely honed flying skills are merely the basis for aerial combat. In the
modern era, tactical preparation plays an ever larger role in any attack.
Fighter attacks in modern warfaxe are extremel~T swift, A fighter pilot is alloted
mere seconds prior to entering the thick of battle. In these seconds, he must e-
valuate the situation and decide how best to proceed in combat. This involves
judgements about how to make a stealthy approach and achieve an advantage in posi-
tion for the start of an engagement, about the type of attack to employ, how to
forestall possible target maneuvers, as well as other~ no less complex, tactical
problems. It is precisely for the sake of these seconds separating the pilot from
the moment at which the enemy is detected to the point of opening fire that essen-
~ially all of his professional training is conducted. Each unsuccessful attack is
not only a waste of the efforts of all who participated in this training, as well as
- a needless expenditure of strength and nerve by the pilot himself, but, more import-
- antly, a threat that the ene~r~y will be able to strike with impunity at fighter-
protected objectives.
This is the reason for assigning a major role to tactical preparation in the train-
ing of combat pilots, since it allows for the collective use of all lrnowl?dge and
skills obtained in the study of many different disciplines. Of course, an in-depth
mastery of tactics was not essential in the past, but its significance has now in-
creased. This fact serves to explain more than the rapid development of aviation
technology. Today, the success of any combat encounter depends in great measure on
the ability of commanders and all pilots to foresee the development of events, to
ma.ke full use of the capabilities of their weapons, and on skillful combat control.
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The science of fighter aviation tactics has developed at an especially rapid pace
in recent years. Many rigidly fixed id~as about methods of achieving victory in
air warfare are changing, and it is sometimes not easy, in compaxing new develop-
ments with firmly established concepts based on past experience, to discover the
cause-and-effect relationships existing between tactics and aviation technology,
or to reconsider the usefulness of well-establ.ished tactical measures in light of
a change in aviation tactics by the other side, when neither the sum total of ex-
perience nor common sense consideration provides a clue as to how to proceed, what
to do or what not to do in order to avoid dangers axid carry out the combat mission.
Such situations have occurred more than once in the history of tactics.
How has the deveopment of tactics proceeded in the past, and how is it continuing
in the present? How are problems and d.ifficulties which arise in the course of
that development being overcome? Why did its former significatlce become obsolete
and lost? These questions, which are the subjects of systematic discussion in the
foreign military press, the author has attempted to answer in this book. To en-
sure that these answers are as fully comprehensive as necessary, the book addresses
a wide range of factors affecting the development of foreign fighter aviation tac-
tics, but primarily, aviation technology, aerial combatant tactics and ground PVO.
tTnder the influence of these and numerous other logically interconnected and con-.
stantly changin~ factors, new tact~cal measures are being developed and tactical
requirements with regard to technology are being formulated.
This book is not a duplication of previous textbooks or procedural manuals, nor is
it a code of regulations and recommendations for the science of tactics. 'rhe author
seeks to motivate the reader to ponder and reflect, to assist him in a re-evaluation
of '~older~~ concepts in tactics, to instill the desire to search for new ideas and
arrive at indepe:ndent conclusions. But, the search for answers to the problems of
tactics, like any other seaxch, leads to understanding. For this reason, the reader
will not always find in this book unambiguous evaluations, while certain other
problems of tactics are analyzed from divergent, sometimes conflicting, points of
view.
Chapter l. Tactics and Combat Missions
The scope of fighter aviation combat missions is broad and multifarious. Behind
each of these missions stands its own organization, its own complex of combat oper-
ations and tactical procedures.
The development of tactics employed in the execution of the most important of the
standard missions, beginning with the era of the Great Patriotic War, is examined
in the pages that follow.
Chapter 2. Tactics and Technology
l. The bacYground of technological capabilities
In the brilliant azure of the sky spins the carousel of aerial combat. The com-
batants can see each other quite cleaxly, they can even distinguish heads ;n hel-
rnets and eyes. They ax~ struggling to extract everything they can from the tech-
nology at their ~command. Tracer fire flashes over the cockpits. A new group of
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aircraft enters the combat zone. Its leader dip~ his wings twice--this is the sig-
nal, ~~Attack after me'~... This is the way aerial combat engagements were conducted
at the beginning of the last war. ~
Today, the skies belong to missile-launching fighter-interceptors. These word com-
binations have become commonplace for us. Pilots take off at supersonic speeds for
a preaesignated target axea, locate an enemy within a ra.~ge of many tens of kilo-
meters and, using target tracks displayed on a radar screen to plot tactical man-
euvers, attack invisible enerr~y aircraft. Guided missiles destroy an enemy in any
- weather conditions and at any time of day. Aerial combat tactics have changed be-
yond recognition.
The developmental processes of aviation technology are ever ongoing. The replace-
~ ment of obsolescent aircraft, which not long before had seemed to be the height of
technological perfection, ushers in new aircraft, with even greater combat capabil-
ities. But changes in technology necessarily lead tn changes in fighter aviaticn
tactics. Initially, these changes may be piecemeal, barely noticeable, but they
accumulate gradually and over time supplant entrenched tactical procedures, as was
the case, for example, in the era of piston-driven aircraft, On the other hand,
they may take the form of a rather abrupt quslitative change. A quantum leap of
this sort occurred in the transition of fighter aviation to jet aircraft.
During the Great Patriotic War, and even in the years preceding it, modifications
in fighter aviation tactics due to technological influences arrived relatively
slowly. Along with speed, the rate of climb and service ceiling of aircraft in-
creased, as did the power of air weaponry, but in the achievement of any substan-
tive distinc~ions between one techn~logical prototype and another, years elapsed.
- Thus, every five to six year s, flight speed increased by an average of 100 lQn and
ceiling by 1000 r~. For example, the I-3 fighter, which was put in servi.ce by the
Soviet Air Force in 1928, had a maximum speed of 278 lrni/hr and ceiling of 7200 m,
while its modification, th~ I-15, put in service in 1934, possessed figures of
367 lan/nr and 9000 m, respectively. Five yeaxs later, the I-16 fighter(fig. 5.1)
featured a speed of 1~60-~.9~ 1Qn/hr and a ceiling of almost 10,000 m. The t~Yakovlev~~
and ~~Lavochkin~~ fighters(figs. 5.3 and 5.1~) from the era of the Great Patriot~c Wax
operated at speeds of approximately 600 lan/hr and ceilings of up to 11,000 m.
By the same token~ the transition to new tactical procedures similarly took place
over the course of rather long intervals of time.
For almost 25 yea.rs, the aerial combat tactics employed by fighters had been based
on horizontal maneuvers. Only after the introduction of aircraft capable of speeds
of 500 km/hr and better, did fighters progress to combat in the vertical planes.
The transition from machine guns to canon entailed an increase in the fire power
of fighter aircraft and made possible an extension of the overall range of weaponry,
but fighter pilots, as they had before, sought to use their weapons from minimal
ranges, where the likelihood of destroying targets was greatest. Fighters contin-
ued to operate in tight combat formations, subdivisions and units, maintaining vis-
ual contact, with each other and energetically maneuvering in combat. In the post-
wax years, while the fighter aviation arseru~al retained a good many piston-driven
# Soviet Aircraft, Moscow, DOSAAF, 1974
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aircraft with speeds already reaching the vicinity of 600 1Qn/hr, tactical measures
were for the most part outmoded. Any further increases in the speed of piston-
driven aircraft became practically impossible due to the limitations imposed by
engine weight and scale.
Only with the appearance of jet aircraft(figs, 5.5-5.8), did fighter aviation tac-
tics undergo significant changes. The flight speed of fighter aircraft immediately
increased by 350-It00 lan/hr and cli.mb rates nearly doubled, while ceilings rose.
The history of fighter aviation had never before seen such a dramatic increase in
the capabilities of aviation technology. Bt~t scientific and technologica'1 progress
continued to bring forth ever newer advances in military technology. Foreign mili-
tary e~erts rank the development of supersonic fighters, radar predictors and air-
- to-air guided missiles among the most important of all advances affecting the stat-
u.s of fighter aviation tactics in the 1950~s. It is their collective opinion that
this resulted in many theoretical tactical concepts losing their importance, k~v.le
others required_substantial reworking#.
Chapter 3. Countertactics
In the militaxy sector, one witnesses the constant application of one of the funda-
mental laws of Marxist-Leninist dialectics: �development is a~ntest of opposites".
Thus, in conformity with this law, there are two opposite, yeti dialectically re-
lated contestants to be considered: air power directed against ground forces and
other objectives(let us call it assault aviation), and fighter aviation, which is
intended to protect them from air strikes. Assault aviation tactics are a very im--
portant factor affecting ~t;a development of fighter aviation tactics. In following
closely the aviation tactics against which fighter aviation is deployed, its past,
present and even its future, we can also make objective evaluations of inethods used
in the development of fighter aviation tactics. A word of reservation here: we are
not interested in all tactics employed by assault aviation, but only in those which
are implemented in the fierce hostilities accompanying PVO penetration to the
strike objectives. This particular aspect of assault aviation tactics also exerts
a dir~c~ effect on fighter tactics.
Chapter The Ability to Foresee
l. When unexpected conditions are encountered
'~Target group, ahead and to the right... Commence attack:~~ The radioed instruc-
tions were heard by the flight commander, Capt. 5. Klochkov. They were followed a
short time later by commands to two other flights.
These commands were given by Lt. Col. Brusentsov as he oversaw the operations of the
control tower crew and gazed intently at the plotting board displaying the tactical
air situation. The ~~enerr~v" was employing jamming countermeasures, making the situa-
tion in the air uncertain. The commander had no way of lrnowing what tvpe of combat
flight formation the eneir~y aircraft were in, or which of his tactical group would
# ~~Interavia~~, 1974, no 12.
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encounter fighters. What, if any, information had his pilots to act on as they scram-
bled their flights to intercept individual targets? He was assuming that, as in
previous training excercises, the ~~enerr~y" would seek to penetrate PVO defenses in
separate small groups and in individual unescorted aircraft. In that case, the pre-
determined defense plan had to be the right choice if it was to ensure successful
repulsion of the assault forces.
But then Capt. Klochkov reported: .
"I see the target. Eight aircraft..."
Brusentsov~s knitted brow revealed his concern. The balance of strength was clearly
not in our favor. At this moment, the noisy bustle of the control tower was inter-
r~.pted by a new alarming report:
~~I am under attack from a pair of fighters"--transmitted f,he commander of the sec-
ond flight.
Lt. Col. Brusentsov moved close up to the plotting board. ~~Where in hell did this
pair come from?"--he wondered aloud. "And what is going on with the third flight?
Maybe it has not sighted its target, and is still continuing the search;'~' It was
already becoming cleax: a serious miscalculation had crept into his plarining.
Let us now attempt to analyze what has happened. At first glance, the actions of
the commander are above reproach. It is a fact that he did not have at his disposal
complete information about the ~~enemy'~--he had no knowledge of his plans or tactical
strength. The ~~enemy'~--as later became clear--intended tn strike with eight air-
craft ur.der escort of two fighter groups. It was precisely this that the Zt. Col.
was not able to foresee.