JPRS ID: 10483 WEST EUROPE REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050059-7
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 59
• Content Type: REPORTS

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050059-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
JPRS L/10483
28 April 19~2
West Euro e Re ort
p p
CFOUO 27/82)
~ FB~$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050059-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500054459-7
NOTE
JPRS publications contain information primarily froan foreign
newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency
transmiss:.ons and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language
sources are translated; those from English-language sources
are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and
other characteriatics retained.
Aesdlines, editorial reporta, and material enclosed, in brackets
are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators su-ch as [Text]
or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the
last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was
processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the iafor-
mation was summarized or extracted.
Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words ar names preceded by a ques-
tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the
original but have been supplied as appropriate in context.
Other unattributed parenthetical notes with in the body of an
item originate with the source. T imes within ~tems are as
given by source. .
The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
cies, views or at.titudes of the U.S. Government.
COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGUI~ATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION
OF THIS PUBLICATION BE REST~CICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050059-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050059-7
JPRS L/10483
28 April 1982
W~ST EUROPE RcPORT
(~ouo 27/'s2~
CONTENTS
THEATER FORCES
FRANCE
Army Chief Lacaze Discusaea Strategic Weapona, tleutron Bomb
(Jeannou Lacaze Interview; L'EXPRESS, 2 Apr 82) 1
~
= POLITICAL
SPAIN
Coalition With Fraga Not Imposaible, Cabanillas Says
(Pio Cabanillas Interview; CAMBIO 16, 22 Feb 82) 6
Carrillo's Demise Expected To Aggravate Centrifugal Forces
(Jose Manuel Arija; CAMBIO 16, 1 Feb 82) 13
MILITARY
FRANCE
Grouna-p,ir Missiles, Weather Conditions Challenge Light
Army Plane
(Bertrand de Lacroix de Vaubois; ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI,
Mar 82) 20
Incr.eased F.fficiency, Reduced Vulnerability Sought
for Helicopter
(Andre Martini; ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI, Mar 82) 26
- a - [III - WE - 150 FOUO]
FOR OFF'TCIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050059-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R004500050059-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
THEATER FORCES FRANCE
ARMY CHIEF LACAZE DISCUSSES STRATEGIC WEAP~NS, NETJTFiON BOMB
PM151351 Paris L'EXPRESS in French 2 Apr 82 pp 37-42
[Interview with French Armed Forces Chief of Staff Jeannou Lacaze by
Guillemette de Sairigne: "The Arnry Ta~lks"--date and place not given]
[Excerpts] L'EXPRESS: In 1978, in reply to a question put to you by
L'Ei~PRESS following the parliamentary electione ("What if the left had
come to pawer?") you replied: "The arrned forces would not have moved but
I know many officers who would have gone home." In May 1981 the left won
and they did not....
Gen eral Lacaze: First, the military hierarchy did not move. Second, we
were not forced into a fundamentally different line from the one previously
followed. A politicization of the armed forces by a kind of American-style
' "spoils system" might also have been feared: that did not happen. That is
extremely encouraging and entirely to the armed forces' credit since they
, have been able to demonstrate th eir apolitical nature. Finally, aside from
; a f ew except ions, the postings and appointments which have been made so far
are ones which we had been planning for montha. If th ere had been an abrupt
change, some officers would possibly have left, and I would probably have
been the first. That was not the case.
The image of th e armed forces is that of a rather conservative community
becaus e by nature they need to hold on to baeic values and feel the ground
firm under their feet. But to a very Iarge extent the armed forces are the
reflection of the nation. Over the past few years they have shown they
could adapt to society`s development and were not hoatile to change.
L'EXPRESS: Some people claim that the armed forces are the only big atate
body whj.ch would allow itself to be radically reformed without saying
anything....
General Lacaze: First, is it particularly desirabl And to what extent
would we accept it? I do not know. Then what do you mean by "doing
something?" That military would have the task of leading the different
i armed forces. I think it woiild be impossible to reproach them if they
carried their ideas through and said to the government: "A diff2rent tool
~
I
;
' 1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050059-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R440500050059-7
FOR OFFIC'IAL USE ONLY
must have new missi~ns." For instance that would mean aba~doning the
large volume of external technical aid, reduc3ng the numUer of conventional
units in the army, producing additional helicopter regiments, having a few
extremely heavily eq~ipped armored and mechanized 3.:visions and professional
or volunteer armed forces. If that were the cas e it would be possible
to create a new concept. A concept still based on the nuclear deterrent but
with a conventi~nal system having much lese manpower, which would probably
be more costly on the whole and would reflect a national will for a
different kind of defense.
L'EXPRESS: What woiild you find unacceptable?
General Lacaze: Any upl~eaval which would call into question the very
foundations of dis~::uline and anythi.ng which could reduce tZze armed fdrees'
capability to fulfiil its missions. For instance, if our budget remained
below 4~erce:it of the gross domestic commercial product for long, the
missions set and the means provided would be incompatibl.e!
L'EXPRESS: Are you now the great coordinator of the :~rench Armed Forces?
General Lacaze: The job of armed forces chief of staff was created around
2U years ago with the aim of unifying the armed forces following rhe
Algerian war. While each branch of the armed forces has a chief of staff
responsible for its administration and training, I 3m responsible for the
us~ of the forces. It is my job to ensure coordination between the branches
of the armed forces in planning short and medium-term spending. It is also
my job ta help define the requirements for the men and equipinent ~f which
I will have operational use in case of serious crisis.
L'EXPRESS: What happens in time of crisis?
~ General Lacaze: The armed forces chief of staff can beoome armed forces
chief of general staff by government decree--the former ~ob of "commander-in-
chief" if you prefer. That is an initial spectacular gesture toward a
possible aggressor: it means that the government regards the situation as
serious and Lhat large-scale operations may be started. In case of a limited
crisis in peacetime, like the one in Kolwezi or Chad for instance, it is also
the armed forces rh ief of staff who is responsible for the use of forces
~ and who directs th e uni.ts put into action.
~
L'EXPRESS: What about the use of strategic nuclear weapons?
Ceneral Lacaze: The head of state alone is responsible for using them. Those
weapons--and this is the very urincipl~~. of deterrence--make us capable, even
after a strike which woul.d have destroyed a large part of. the co untry's
vital forces, of respo~uing strongly enough to cause the aggressor damage
wtiich in total represents the demographic and economic stake which we our-
selves represent. Thus they strip its actions of any logic.
2
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050059-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102109: CIA-RDP82-00850R400504050059-7
~FICIAL USE ONLY
i
! But, before reacning that point, there can be several stages. For inetance
~ a conventional response which, if it proved powerless to halt the enetny
~ offensive alone, could be comb ined with nuclear means. 'Phat would be
the fin~l warning, showing our determination to go on to the end if
necessary. But the use of those nuclear weupons, even tactical nuclear
weapons, is sub~ect to the pres3dent's agreement. It is I who endorses
the check but it is he who signs it.... Moreover the strategic nuclear
"button" is only the last reaort. In that connection I would like to
recall that our objective is not to have an arsenal capable of destroying
the world several times over as the two superpowers have. It is necessary
and sufficient for us to be able to inflict on an adversary, in the very
heart of his territory, loss of life and material damage disproportionate
to the benefit he could derive from his offensive action against us. Thus
. we are not ^eeking parity but only the level of aufficiency which we rsgard
as necessary. .
L'EXPRESS: Would the enhanced radiation bomb, known ae the neutron bomb,
ups et that plan?
General Lacaze: No, it too is merely a defens3ve weapon. It simply gives
the victim the opportim ity, not of showing additional determination, but of
envisaging the use o.f tactical nuclear weapons in conditions less unfavorable
to the inhabitants w'~o are likely to find themselves on the battlefield.
This i~ because it i~ very accurate and makes it possible to limit the threat
more to troop~ by considerably reducing th e blast and heat effects.
L'EXPRESS: So tactical nuclear weapons delay the use of strategic arms....
General Lacaze: No, because they st311 remain closely linked with strategtc
armaments. It is important to understand clearly that, in ~he French concept,
tactical and strategic nuclear weapons differ only in their ob3ect3ves:
tactical wea;~ons are aimed at forces and strategic weapons are aimed at
cities. But both are based on the same deterrent principle; both imply the
same extraordinary change of level from conventional weapons.
L'EXPRESS: Is France capable of manufacturing the neutron bomb?
General Lacaze: From the technological viewpoint we are fully capable of
n~anufacturing that weapon. It can even be done in the eighties if the
decision is taken.
L'EXPRESS: Is a soldier bound to favor such a weapon which limits civ ilian
ioss es?
(;eneral Lacaze: Yes, in a country like ours which is not showing any aggres-
sive intention. But the choice 3s not only military--it is primarily political.
~ L'LXPRESS: In case of a limited crisis, what is th e overseas intervention
forces' mission?
3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050059-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R004500050059-7
60R OM F'ICIAL USF. ONLY
General Lacaze: Those forces, wilich have been renamed "ra~id assistance
elements," can intervene in several cases. 1. to protect the overseas
departments and territories and French people living abroad whose property
or persons are threatened; 2. to honor_ a particular agreement which binds
us to a number of countries, particularly on the African continent;
3. to protect our channels of communication, wtiich are v3ta1 for transport-
ing thc goods essenCial to our economy, I am thinking, for instance of oil;
4. finally, some countries, which are not bound to us by expl3cit agree-
ments but with which Frar?ce traditionally has friendly relations, may
turn to us for as:~istance and advice.
L'EXPRESS: Does France have adequate means of carrying out such operations?
General T.acaze: Yes, as regards personnel. Possibly iiot fully adequate
as regards equipment, and that forces us to limit our ambitions. Last
November, during the bright star maneuvers in Egypt and Sudan, the Aniericans
demonstrated that they could drop a battalion of p~~-ratroopers 7,000 or 8,OOG' km
from thei~ bases with all its "su~~port." We cannot do that. But that is
a question oF economic choices. In France, for th e time being, there are
no large military transport aircraft. ~ven. in the United States the C-141
:s already an old-fashi~~t?ed airplane. But perhaps a new plane will be
available on tlie Western ma�rlcet l;etween now and 1985.
In any case three questiuns mu;~~ be answered: exactly what type of machine
do we want? Where can we f ind it? Supposing the Europeans of Americans
design sucn a machine, will c~ze be ~ble to buy it? Meanwhile we are ~naking
do by increasing the range and number of our transall aircraft.
L'EXPRESS: L~Ihen President Reagan envisages the battlefield in Europe, how
do you react?
General Lacaze: I am not particularly surprised. That is one of the
hypotheses which we must take into account. The Soviets and Americans will
do all they can to preser.ve their ~erritory from strategic weap~ns. That is
only h~m~an. There is no doubt tnat tliis possible battle in the plains and
mountains of northeast Furope would be the most dan~erous hypothesis for us.
Politicians and the military are perfectly aware of that situation, particu-
larly in France, and, in that respect, I note that the Maurras-style tone
[reference to Charles Maurras, a staunch sup,Urter of the Vichy government
who was sentenced to liEe imprisonment for r-,:E.~ason after World War II]
_ adopted by some commenta~ors on the subject ~~f our country possibly
capitulating without fi~;hting shows either their extreme insincerity or
t}~eir profound misunderstandi.ng both of ttie rrench concept and oi the
deterniination of those responsible for implementing it.
That leaves another possibility: that the canflict might break out not
abruptly and directly between th e two superpowers but outside Europe, using
a proxy. For instance in the Middle Fast, in Africa (and in that case we
would probably be dtrectly involved) or in Southeast Asia. I think that
that is the most probabl.e hypothesis. That is why I think it essential for
4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050059-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050059-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
- all our rapid assistance forces to be constantly kept at optim~ level, which,
of course, is not the maxim~nn leve].. Indeed, if we could not help to stop
that foreign conflict--l~calized one r_o begin with-there could be a
proce~s of escalation which it would be difficult to control:
[Lacaze continues] What I say there refere to the eighties. But if there
were to be nuclear prol3feration later and if other, 2ess important,
co~ntries succeed in manufa~turing 3, 4 or 10 bombs, then a new danger would
emerge. Indeed those cotm tries, which would not necessarily follow our
reasoning, could contemplate using those weapons without the enormous
precau~ions with which we surround them. And that would be very serious
because either the escalation would become uncontrollable and would lead
to the thr~old of generalized nuclear exchange or the authority of the
superpowers ~ould succeed in controlling the escalation and nuclear weapons
would have lost some of their deterrent value. That ie one of tt~e ma~or
risks in the next 10 or 15 yeara: that poasible "banalization" of nuclear
weapons .
L'EXPRESS: Do you think that the Polish crisis increases the preaent risk of
confl:Lct?
General Lacaze: I do not think so. It merely confirmed that the Soviet
bloc was still as we conceive it: the seat of a power based on a very
strong state syste~n, a monolithic religion, and anxious to fight to the
end against any schism which would be likely to undermine ita dogma.
COPYRIGHT: s.a. Groupe Express 1982
CSO: 3100/546
5
, , FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
i
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050059-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050059-7
POLITICAL SPAIN
COALITION WITH FRAGA NOT IMPOSSIBLE, CABANILLAS SAYS
Madrid CAMBIO ~6 in Spanish 22 Feb 82 pp 18-21
[Interview with Minister ~f Justice and Constitutional Development Pio
Cabanillas by Antxon Sarasqueta, date and place not given]
[Text] Pio Cabanillas, in addition to being minister of justice, is th~e con-
cealed hand behind almost all that is inexplicable in natfonal political life.
Pacts, maneuvers, operatiors. This is the enduring legend in political circles
and among observers. These are "intimate" issues which he himself defines as
"household matters."
CAMBIO 16: It is said that you, who have been everywhere, control the Founda-
tion for Progress acid Democracy.
Pio Cabanillas: No, no. It is a fact that when one has been in politics for a
long time, it seems that one has many men in place, although basically the fact
is that one knows many men.
Cabanillas says that he does not aspire to head the cabinet, because "I sin-
cerely do not believe I have the qualifications to be prime minister. In this
matter I want no mistakes made," he concluded. Perhaps because he is s~ close
to the palace post now held by Calvo Sotelo. "Well, I am a good friend of the
prime minister, but this friendship exerts no decisive influence on the ability
to ~rganiZe problems."
He denies almost everythi-:g and enjoys genial digs. For example, when asked if
the UCD [Democratic Center Union] group is more or less valuable now than when
he founded it, he responded with a Galician anecdote. "A pair of lovers are
sittiT~g on a beiich and a very well-dressed young woman passes by. They both
wacch her closely. Then the girl asks her sweetheart: ''Would you love me more
if I were rich?' And he answerss 'There would be no reason to love you lese."'
But the political personality of Cabanilles, who has a passion for the politi-
cal right wing and, by his own admission, an obsession to get close to things, ~
subjects and persons, has another dimension, which in the course of an inter-
view of more than 2 hours, leads a journalist along the paths of current polit-
ical development and the historical importance of events and personalities. For
example, Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo.
6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050059-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500054059-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
CAMBTO ]6: Do you believe that Calvo Sotelo is going to be prime minister in
the cabinet and the UCD for a long time?
Pio Cabanillas: I will tell you something which seems contradictory. Do not
forget the type of person who is prepared to depart, because ordinarily it is
these geople who remain. I believe that there is in the personality of Calvo
_ Sotelo a tranquility of being and a certain background of seriousness as to how
one should be. I also think that the morning after the day it i� concluded that
he will stay, he will depart, but I am also certain that he will not do so in
an arrogant way. There is a very valuable framework of human and personal
balancs i.n his political personality.
CAMJiIO 16: And do you believe that this image will serve the UCD well when it
comes to the elections, being in the final analysis drastically different from
the image which prevaile~i i?~ past elections?
Pio Cabanillas: What has changed is th~e mechanisms for getting close to the
voters, where the leader we had in Adolf.o Suarez and t1~e personality of Calvo
Sotel.o are concerned. The political "attractive force," in terms of a sincere
and cordial humanity, was something which Adolfo Suarez very obviously had.
Like many other individuals, I have been a witness to what I called his
capacity to enchant. One emerged from an interview with Adolfo Suarez convinced
of two major qualities--when I see him in the morning, I remember this, and I
sincerely believe it is still true.
CAMBIO 16: Can you name these qualities?
Pio Cabanillas: They are a desire to please and an attr~ctively normal way of
presenting himself. Adoifo could maneuver very skillfully in politics because
he bore within him a total rejection of any other type of attitude, interest or
curiosity other than political. He won votes and did so in brief specific
actions--speeches on television, trips, etc.
CAMBIO 16: What about Calvo Sotelo?
Pio Cabanillas: The breakdown of Calvo Sotelo's political personality is
rather different. First of ~.11, there is a jarring note. In Calvo Sotelo the
predominant note is correctness, but not the intention to charm. He gives his
equals a hearing and explains his beliefs to them, but not solely to persuade
them. Naturally, he also attempts persuasion like any.other politician, but
this is not his a prtori intention as was the case with Suarez. Secondly, his
approach to subjects is less balanced by intuition or instinct. Calvo Sotelo
usually has methodical research on the subject behind him. For exampl.e (here
Cabanillas laughed ironically), there is no weightier problem when it comes to
the prime minister than draf.ting notes, because he is a man much given to
grammaticel requirements, and therefore he is a great corrector of documents.
CAMBIO 16: What about Calvo Sotelo's image?
Pio Cabanillas: I think we must overcome a certain primitive compulsion to
attribute a certain kind of qualities to the political leader administering the
7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050059-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R400504050059-7
life of a country at a historic moment. There is the assurance resulting from
high-level leadership, the great charisma, the exceptional character. There is
no longer any need for men of genius who can save the country every morning
i with rnysterious or primitive formulae. Democratic and liberal life approaches
rather close to the ordinary political knowledge of the average man. I think
that mature men, thoroughly familiar with Spanish life and properly oriented~
quite suffice and always do well.
CAMBIO 16: During recent months it has been said that Suarez might leave the
~CD. Have you assessed the harm this might do the party?
Pio Cabanillas: Naturally, it would be a serious loss. Adolfo Suarez has ren-
dered great service to the UCD. I am a witness and I can assure you that Suarez
achieved the central post after a rather well thought out and responsible
analysis. Initially there was doubt, but after than no one had either similar
or comparable personal achievements when it came to establishing the framework,
achieviiig ideological goals and sacrifice for the survival of the party. A
general analysis of the content of his political activity is a different prob-
lem.
During the interview and throughout the discussion, the elections seemed an in-
evitable point of reference. "The political reality," Cabanillas ~aid, "made it
very difficult for last year to be other than a year colored by the election.
This is not an abnormal phenomenon, but rather I would say that I see normalcy
therein."
In his mi.nisterial office in old Madrid, near the noisy Gran Via, there was
silence for long moments. Cabanillas meditated, eyes downcas' as if in a
traT~ce. sketching squares and symmetrical lines on the back of. a letter with
his pen. "The fact is I assign great importance to 1982. It is one of those
years marked by history, in which somet:~ing new begins. The elections in 1983
will be highly indicative. For the first time, you cannot claim to be experi-
menti�ag, Ai~d obviously, one thing is indeed very important in Spain. If there
are justifications it will no longer be defensive assertions, but a confession
of ineptness."
CAMBIO 16: And how do you think our government should be aff ected until then?
Uo you support a parliamentary or electoral alliance or coalition with other
pa:�ties. with Fraga?
Pio Cabanillas: There is a whole series of laws to be completed which are of
total interest--they are laws for all. I am speaking of the laws on which ideo-
logical content exerts an inf.luence to justify their existence as laws, not be-
cause I believe that ideological content should prevail in each one of them. It
is state laws--like the I.OAPA, the most important since it wfnds up a major
operaticn regulating the autonomous bodies--which should be the focus of the
greatest volume of this legislature's work.
CAMBIU ~6: Do you then exclude an alliance with Fraga?
8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050059-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050059-7
FOR OFFICIAL U5E ONLY
Pio Cabanillas: When we know what the electoral results are, we will see. I
believe that iri each electoral confrontation there is a renewal in the politi-
cal sense, either because of a change of goals, of focus or of circumstances.
If the electoral results tomorrow lead to the formation of coalitions or what-
ever it may be (he emphasized these words), naturally one must deal with the
new reality. But it should not be forgotten that this is a logical need justi-
fied by the electoral results.
CAMBIO 16: But you do exclude such a codlition a priori, do you not?
Pio Cabanillas: No, no, a priori, no. As it says in the romantic poem "Not all
is thought of thee til then."
CAMBIO 16: I am speaking in terms of strategy.
Pio Cabanillas: Strategy has only one principle, to the effect that if you
think you can reach understanding, you begin cautiously to reduce emphasis on
the differences.
CAMBIO 16: But how can it be, for example, that the CEOE employers' group can
decide to support Fraga against a party which is in power and which represents
ii~terests close to yours?
Pio Cabanillas: The CEOE is a new institution. In political activity, it is a
consistent phenomenon for business associations to have to try to defend their
interests :.n the normal struggle in any political process, and in this connec-
tion, to s~~pport the political groups consistent with the content of these
interests. What they must analyze is whether in order to do so, they need
political leaders produced from among themselves, or whether it suffices to
support individuals already to be found in politics. One of the great problem~
will have to do with whether political leaders emerge from within the CEOE,
something which for the time being we will have to wait to see. It may be more
or less advisable for the CEOE to support the political content characteristic
of a party of the right wing and another of the center, but this does not seem
to me abnormal. What would be inconsistent is to support choices which if
jointly supported would produce a negative effect. And this is a subject for
the CEOE and for concrete analysis with each electoral event..
CAMBIO 16: Probably this is one reason the socialists want to govern in
coalition with the UCD after the elections, is it not?
Pio Cabanillas: Naturally I believe that it would be a very good thing for the
PSOE [Spaniah Socialist Workers Party] to arrange a government alliance with
the UCD. My concern is as to whether this would be good for the UCD.
CAMBIO ~6: You were one of the main sponsors at the time of the establishment
of the UCD. In what way has the situation of. your party changed since then?
Pio Cabanillas: As a party governing during one of the most uncertain stages,
characterized by the need to build up the institution simultaneously! the UCD
9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050059-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050059-7
has been ~~ffected by the inevitable wear and tear of governing, above all if
one undertakes the basic analysis of the difference between what it would be
desirable to achieve, what has been achieved, and the time frame within which
both considerations operate. As the sum total of the interests of the UCD mem-
bers who particularly want to continue in political life, our party has been
subject to the loss of those who do not see as possible or deem likely their
political survival within the confines of the UCD.
CAMBIO 16: In your view, which then has been more important, the departure of
three deputies to join the right wing or the resignation of Fernandez Ordonez
and his deputies to join the left?
Pio Cabanillas: Fernandez Ordonez and the deputies who went with him had
always had what we might call "plans to depart." I think that they always
achieved what they wanted by making their possible stay conditional. Sometimes
this was a pleasarit horse trade, and in other cases, it appeared to be or was
justified on the basis of ideological dogmatism. The departure of other depu-
ties to join the right wing was an act by men who had always indicated this
type of inclination, such that it was consistent.
CAMBIO 16: And what will the government and your party do in the coming months
to rebuild all that has been lost as well as the credibility and confidence
which may have declined following all of these vicissitude intentions?
Pio Cabanillas: I believe that we are doing this in the course of governing.
We are Eacing up to three or f.our themes which are truly hard and difficult.
The ]evel of demand is strictly speaking the political thermometer. Those who
demai~d everything and are doing so here and now are obviously revealing their
own lack of maturity.
CAMBIO ]6: They are continuing to do so now?
Pio Cabanillas: Yes, due to the natural tendency of certain groups to dissent
by way cf proof that they exist. It is only when they do not agree that it is
clearly obvious that they have a position. Basically what is forgotten is that
ane of. the great current needs is to "settle" sufficiently on the main guide-
lir~es in a period which will require another legislative terms, for the good of
Spanish democracy. '
CAMBIO 16: How do you explain and assess the fact, for example, that a govern-
ment which seems to have woii one round (Gibralter, the antiterrorist struggle)
could within 24 hours come to the point of dissolving the chambers because
three deputies iii its group have gone over to another?
Pio C:~banillas: This is the most important problem at the present time:
~~ssessmer~t of political events. There are three negative constants iti such an
assessmet~t. First, a high dose of skepticism. The second has to do with the
Eact thar. the parties have not as yet foui~d the mechanism for ,justifying their
owr~ actions, at~d all of the political speeches are aggressive toward their
oppoi~ents. We have just had an obvious demonstration of this in the speech by a
veteran politician (Santiago Carrillo) who, while having a problem in his own
p~,i-ty, spent all his time attacking the others.
10
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050059-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R400504050059-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY '
CAMBIO 16: What is the third constant to which you referred?
Pio Cabanillas: Political error. Clarifying formulae are needed but we con-
tinually have evidences that what we view as problems are not that. For
example, the analysis in political law on the pros and cons of nationalization,
and whether a policy of self-management will soon be achieved. Two terms which
are absolutely clear and are keys to the content of political doctrine are
deliberately camouflaged, and there is even more contradiction in deed and ges-
ture thati in content in order to relieve tension, while on the other hand tre-
mendous importance is given to the slightest political event, above all if it,
has to do with personal i.ssues.
CAMBIO ~6: Returning to the UCD, how will your party accomodate this liberal
resurgence it seems to be experiencing?
Pio Cabanillas: The most important thing about the liberalism within the UCD is
its identification with the concept of democracy. Support of pluralism as a
tield of political action--this is the liberalism of the UCD! Now if the inten-
ticn is to get into the UCD with a liberal label, there is no problem, but
understand us clearly, this does not mean liberalizing the UCD other than in
the sense of being free. In other words, it is not that you make of it a
liberal party fundamentally.
CAMBIO 16: Probably this is indeed the intention of some liberals.
Pio Cabanillas: But I do not believe that this means that the liberals alone
wil] rule in the UCD. And that is the issue.
CAMBIO 16: What is the importance of the Christian Democrats as a party?
Pio Cabanillas: No one can place a claim on the gospel or utilize it exclu-
sively i>> his own favor. Politics is a particularly secular phenomenon. There-
fore, one cannot take the religious concept and embed it in the ideological
conter~t of a party: this is ipso facto fraudulent. Now then, no one can deny
the weight of religious faith in Spanish society: to know its value is the
- ii~telligent responibility of a politician.
CAMBIO 16: How might the Pope's October visit influence the elections?
Pio Cabanillas: The people are sensitive to this event and they relate results
with attitudes. The visit of the Pope in October will be a very important event
in Spain. For we wil] see very clearly how firmly anchored the essence of
Catholicism is in Spanish life.
From the anecdote to the political situation, Galicia came to th~ f.ore re-
peatedly ir~ the interview with Cabanillas, and he went so far as to say that
this subject "merits a separate interview." But the fact is that certain sec-
tors have placed the blame tor the shrinkage of the UCD in Galicia on the
politician from Orense.
' '11
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050059-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R400504050059-7
"I have always thought and done everything possible" he responded, "to find a
great representative of the UCD in Galicia. Things did not work out that way.
Now the two most important groups in the Galician parliament (the UCD and the
AP [Popular AllianceJ) have a duty to reach agreement so that Galician
interests will benefit."
: COPYRIGHT: 1982, Informacio y Revistas, S.A.
5~ 57
CSO: 31]0/94
,
~ 12
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050059-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000540050059-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE UNLY
POLITICAL SPAIN
CARRILLO'S DEMISE EXPECTED TO AGGRAVATE CENTRIFUGAL FORCES
Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 1 Feb 82 pp 28-32
[Article by Jose Manuel Arija, based on interviews conducted by Rafael Cid (Madrid),
Ander Landaburu (Basque Region), Santiago S. Traver (Seville), Mario G. Bango
(Asturias), Albert Arbos (Catalonia) and Juan de Dios Me3.lado (Malaga)]
[Text] The Spanish Communist Party is currently going through one of the most
difficult periods in its history, as described by PCE members themselves. They
avoid using the word "crisis," but it is certain that they are deeply caught up
in one.
Unlike ather occasions, the crisis is not taking place within party walls. Something
different happened when the debate went public, with loud voices raised and with
alZ th~ ensuing consequences. This time the crisis is serious that the PCE's
very future is at stak~, its isolation or participation in s~ciety. But above
all, this is a crisis of identity: How must the PCE function in a democracy? What
is its role in the left, with a dominant socialist party?
A drop in membership, the loss of intellectuals, the closing of offices which have
been empty for some time, disillusioned militants, confusion among cadres, a trade
union breakdown, the decline of voter support, expulsions and the danger of a schism
characterize the serious overall situation of the communists. And what is more
alarming: For the time being, there is no note of optimism concerning their i~edi-
ate future; on the contrary, it looks even darker.
The ship of Santiago Carrillo, the PCE general secretary, is being pulled to star-
board by pro-Soviets and to port by the Euroreformers while the communist leadership
tries to set a course that will lead them out af the storm.
Tt�e joy over the legalization of the Communist Party in 1977 was short-lived.
Opposition leaders were released from ~ail, exiles returned from abroad and member
intellectuals and professionals publicly revealed their affiliation. But the warm
reunion also contained the seed of their differences. As Jaime Sartori.us, a 46-year-
old lawyer who was expelled from the Central�CommitteP, said: "We reformers are
communists who have been shaped by fighting for democracy." And these young profes-
sionals, who combined democracy and communism in their anti-Franco struggle and
en~oyed great independence in making decisions, were soon directly controlled by
former legendary exiles, who dominate the party apparatus and make decisions, which
is something they know how to do very well, since the "French leadership" is, above
all, made up of trained and experienced apparatchiks.
13
FOR OFF'ICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050059-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R400504050059-7
,
~
F( )FFICIAL USE ONLY
i
~
; 7'he PCE leadership:,is starting to make party policy from on high and to pass out
urders below. The legendary leaders are starting to fall from their pedestal,
not so much because of implementing incorrect political decisioms as for not bothering
' to give party members themselves any explanation; not b~cause of their externally
oriented democracy and Eurocommunist policy, but for internally maintaining an
; old-style party concept.
At least this is what the reformars think. According to ~~c pia-soviets, there
have been both external anZ internal mistakes, the case of both domes~{.c and
foreign policy. The policy of alliances, pu*_ into practice b~~ Santiago Carrilio
, from the final years of Francoism up to the present time, is criticized as "middle-
;lass" and "turncoat" by some. and by others as "inade~uate" because of ita lack
of internal democracy. ~
The results of the June 1977 general elections meant something more than ;ust a
cold shower for the communists. Many members and especially cadres felt betrayed
by the voters: How can it be--they thought and said--that we, who atruggled as
the opposition, were jailed and have always fought, received only one-third as
many votes as the socialists, who are all a bunch of upstarts?
The blow at the p~lls was hard to ta'~c.e. One explanation was that the low percentage
of votes was due to the fear of communism generated by Francoism. To overcome
that fear--they said--the policy of alliances must be intensified and citizens
must become accustomed to seeing co~unists together with parties to their right.
But the 1979 el~ctions produced the same results. The commnunists received a maximum
of 10 percent of the votes. The reformers concluded that only a more internally
' open party could break through that percentage barrier. The pro-Soviets think
the opposite: only a pure, hardline party will win over the massea.
The most recent congress of Catalonian coQnnunist members of the PSUC [Unified
Socialist Party of Catalonia] and the lOth PCE Congress in June further increased
the distance between Carrillists, reformers and pro-Soviets. The leadership is
proving to be unable to unify the party. The decision of the Madrid communist
counctl members, who refused to resign from their posts as a penalty for having
~uFported the Basque Lerchundi in his process of unity with the Basque working-
~1ass left, has given an added dimension to the PCE crisis.
'xtension of Crisis
The proportions of the new diagreement have given the conflict its own special
a.~~namics, due to the intransigence of the opposing sides. The reformer faction,
' ~ahl.ch includes the chastised council members, and the Carr;llists are playing for
keeps and in the end they will both lose. Expulsions and an extension of the problem
:re the immediate re~}ilt.
.'ue more intense the crisis grows, the more radical positions become. Differences
" political views are being replaced by motives of "individual dignity" and
~ersonal insults." Accusations, insults and contempt characterize the preaent
~.evel of the debates.
The latest opinion polls on voter intentions also reveal that the PCE's internal
r.risis has spread from members to the voters. In Andalucia, on the eve of the
14
~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050059-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R400504050059-7
FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY
elections for the Autonomotis Parliament, the communist loss could be very great,
according to the latest surveys. In Catalonia, another poll shows that the PSUC
would lose 7 percentage. points in Barcelona and the province (from 21 to 14 percent)
- and it is not hard to predict that communist vote pr~~spects will decline in Madrid
following the scandal over the expelled council members, both in the capital and
in its outlying suburbs of the industrial belt.
A quick look over the map of communism shows that no area wirh a significant
establishment has escaped the crisis. .
On a cold afternoon in March 1978, dozens of Asturian members deserted the PCE ,
on the first day of the Third Regional Conference, having criticized the party's
~ organizational methods and operation some days before. Since *.1:=n they have been
subject to persecution which they describe as Stalinistic, "until we were forced
to leave."
The Asturian communists were the pioneers of the present crisis. "The proceedings
endect, however, showing that we were right, because our problem," one of the dissi-
dents s4id, "was a problerl of all communist organizations in the country and sooner
or J.ater they will all end up the way things are now, n total disarray. We simply
preceded some events that were easy to foresee.''
The year of 1981 was an ill-fated period for the communists. From the beginning--
- with the Fifth PSUC Congress in January, which chucked Eurocommunism out the window--
to the end, with the expulsions af the council members, it was a series of departures
~ and expulsions, reaching to the Central Committee itaelf.
In Catalonia, the pro-Soviet faction, with a strong influence on Workers Comm~ssions,
has turned official party policy upside down. Referring to the pro-Soviets, Francesc
~rutos, the general secretary, said: "This is an initiative based on lies, slander
and demagoguery." ~
The Catalonian commuuists will hold their Sixth Congress in March and the schism
could arise there. Frutos thinks that the pro-Soviets' strategy consists of organiz-
ing to convince the Sixth Congress to adopt its positions and, if it does not do
so, to mount anorher similar initiative. "We discovered the conspiracy in time,"
Frutos concluded.
In Catalonia, the result thus far is the expulsion of 12 leaders, including Pere
Ardiaca, who until recently was party chairman, and 17 others penalized, not to
mention an ongoing serious internal split within the PSUC over political fragnenta-
tion and incompetence.
Leopoldo Espuny, a 41-year-old lawyer who is one of the principal theorists of
the Catalonian pro-Soviet faction, said: "We are going to try to establish a demo-
cratic congress in practice, but if our requests are ignored, we will hold our
own assembly, which will take place right after the official congress."
The split within Catalonian communism has become more and more pronounced within
the last 2 months. "It is up to the members to decide whether to establish a new
party and the time will be that possible constituent congress," Espuny affirmed.
15
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050059-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102109: CIA-RDP82-00850R400504050059-7
FOR OFFIC'fAL USE n'VI.Y
"'he pro-Soviets have little influence in the rest of the country, but carry con-
siderable weight in Catalonia. What is the reason for this presence of hardline
communism in the most developed region with the most moderate electorate? Several
reasons are given in the corridors of the Central Committee's headquarters in Madrid.
They first cite the "democratitis" of the PSUC's previous leadership, which, for
lack of authority, permitted the expansion and maneuvering of the "orthodoxy."
The second reason given is the Soviet Union's clandestine activities and third,
~ ~s a result of the irritation over unemployment, the status of immigrants and elec-
tion results.
'Che fact that a man such as 71-year-old Pere Ardiaca, the founder of the PSUC and
who has great prestige among communists, is leading the rebellion against Carrillo
has helped ~o give the Catalonian pro-Soviets an image of cohesion.
These rebels have now formed a--"parallel," the leadership criticizes--coordinating
~ committee, are publishing a weekly bulletin in which they explain their political
positions and have launched a campaign to collect signatures and attract members.
They are also backed by about 1,000 Workers Commissions cadres.
According to Pere Ardiaca, "Our identity as co~unists is at stake. From a general
standpoint, because agreeing to the leadership's demands means a return to social
democracy; from an internationalist standpoint, because it means isolating ourselves
from all communist parties and finally, from the standpoint of Spanish and Catalonian
politics, because it means actually giving in to the right. We have to become
communi~ts again; only in that way will we be able to recover lost ground."
New Communist Parties
Another expelled pro-Soviet, Francisco Garcia Salve, Father Paco, is also currently
very lctive in trying to establish a"true" Marxist-Leninist communist party. He
has just published a book, "Por que somos comunistas" [Why We Are Communists],
-;n which he not only calls for the creation of a new party but also provides advice
t,n how to starr_ building such a party.
'~~et us build a new communist party," Garcia Salve writes. "We must get on with
And with the most fiery fervor and euphoriar he repeats: "Filled with that
�;>w inspiration, with that strength which propels us along the path awaiting us:
~~?e unity of all communists in creating the new Spanish Communist Party." And
:!e hook concludes: "This green tree, tender and looking toward the sea, is planted
~,~re.,'
5ut irom this side, even looking toward the sea, unity does not appear easy. An
c.]d leader, ~nrique Lister, the founder of the Fifth Regiment in the civil war, a
;;t~neral in the Soviet Army and in other Eastern countries and the general secretary
ar~other pro-Soviet group, scowls and stresses loudly that there should be no
~ 'tier communist parties.
~reaking with the PCE general secretary is not a sufficient guarantee. The first
~hought of all those ~who break with the party is to create their own party." And
~.~:~ter goes on to say that the practical thing for his organization to do is to
"~r~aintain relations for specific actions with all those who share our views," be-
~�=use"among the anti-Carrillists there are all kinds, even people like the Euro-
,r~, ~ ~i.:,ts, ~~hn have little liking for Santiago Carrillo's anticommunist and anti-
._i~�m."
16
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050059-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-44850R000500050059-7
FOR OFFICIAL USF, ONI.Y
If the pro-Soviets seem determined to est.ablish a new party, with the aim of creating
a situation such as that in Greece- where there are two parties, an orthodox ma3ority
party and another small, Eurocommunist party--the reformers are taking another approach.
The plan which the Euroreformers have prepared also seems confused. Personal pride,
political differences and views on organization have managed to permeate the ranks
of Eurocommunist supporters, dashing any possibility of homogeneity or understanding.
Carrillists and reformers acknowledge tr.at they have made monumental mistakes and
that they were wrong not to estimate the consequences of their actions. Now the
situation is irreversible and each side is devoting its time and energy to 3ustifying
its own positions and belittling opposite views as loudly as possible.
From the time~ the problem developed up to the present time, it is not clear why
the reformer", who agree with Carrillo's foreign policy and with the main features
of domestic policy strategy, have broken almost completely with the party over
issues of internal operation.
"We reformers," Jaime Sartorius admits, "have also made gross errors which have
led to a weakening of the party on both sides, to a loss of its credibility and
possibly to an election defeat as well. And more seriouslv, to its social isolation.
But still most at fault is the leadership, which has the means and the power to
try to resolve this situation."
Another group of reformers is much more critical. Atnparo Rubiales, vice chairman
of the Seville delegation, states: "I believe that there is no way out and that
there will only be a long-term solution." Julio Anguita, the mayor of Cordoba,
confirms: "A solution will be more and more difficult."
This is the opinion of most municipal representatives, among whom the reformers
have their greatest strength. But they do not want to leave the PCE. They hope
to be expelled, which they consider to be more and more inevitable. Their intention
is not to form another party, but rather "collectives," "platforms" or "theoretical
revisions."
There are very �ew reformers who would be bold enough to sever the umbilical cord
on their own or to join another political party, as Luis Larroque, vice chairman
of the Madrid delegation, has done, having requested entry into the PSOE [Spanish
Socialist Workers Parry]. I know that my position is contrary to that of other
comrade reformers, who are thinking," Larroque answers, "about the possibility
of a middle path between socialism and communism. I do not believe that; there
is no such electoral space." Most reformers have adopted a wait-and-see stance
until one of two miracles happens: until Carrillo modifies his position or until
the PSOE chan.ges.
But the PCE leadership, led by its general secretary, Santiago Carrillo, seems
more willing to do without 1,000 or 2,000 members than to a11ow a faction which
is bothersome, because of its criticism, to remain in the party, even though it
is a group of the best prepared people.
17
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050059-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050059-7
i
~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
I
~ ,The vice general secretary of the communists, Nicolas Sartorius, will be in charge
~ oF stopping the spread of the pro-Soviet and reformer hemorrhage that is draining
' the PCE. "A debate must be opened with the critical factions in order to integrate
them," Sartorius says, proposing the channels of party by-laws as a framework for
discussion.
i
~ The start of reconciliation will prove difficult, because expulsions are continuing
~ at the same rate as the signs of intransigence. In Andalucia, for example, reformers
~ complain of being ignored when the tickets for the Andalucian Parliament were pre-
, pared, when they are precisely the ones who en~oy the best public reputation.
; An election defeat of the communists in Andalucia, within 3ust a few months of
the general elections, could result in profound changes in the PCE, changes which
would undoubtedly affect Santiago Carrillo himself. Many fear this aad are starting
to plan for the post-Carrillo period, especially since the general secretary has
become the main target of both pro-Soviets and Euroreformers, although fo:.� different
~ reasons and opposite aims.
~ A Difficult Future
~
Despite his harsh criticism of the Soviet Union, Carrillo continues to be the bridge
between Soviet sympathizers and those critical of "Soviet imperialism." And not
' only among rank-and-file mP.mbers, but even among the Central and Executive Committees.
Leaders such as Romero Marin and Ignacio Gallego, whom reformers describe as pro-
Soviets and eve~z Stalinists, would be hard pressed to work together with Eurocommun-
' ists in defining their party's political policy in the absence of a Santiago Carrillo.
, The question of what happens after Carrillo today represents a disturbing unknown
for the communists, especially since the PCE is running the risk, because of its
, internal problems, of withdrawing into a shell and acting according to a defensive
policy of fear concerning national issues.
'I.'his latter question has now caught the attention of the leadership. During the
~atalonian communists' Treball period, Nicolas Sartorius said: "The situation
requires that the leadership take the initiative, by putting the party in contact
with the masses, putting the leadership itself in close contact with party members,
in order to avoid the defensive temptations to which the party might yield and
as the only way of increasing our moral and political authority."
The Communist Party knows that it is risking the party's future with the present
crisis and its future views are thus aimed at overcoming "traditional communism."
This requires two things: urging and convincing the electorate that the PSOE is
a social-democratic party and devoting itself to what party members call "occupying ~
_ Gpaces in society."
i'ith only slight differences between socialist and communist programs, the PCE
:;ill only be able to ~ustify its existence by trying to displace the PSOE toward
the right, in order to thus occupy the place of socialism. Its second atrategy,
infiltrating society, would provide it with a new image, which would at least render
~ credible its intention to govern, an image which even a party with few voters,
~ such as Popular Alliance, has today.
,
18
FOR OFFiCIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050059-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R004500050059-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ON1.Y
Santiago Carrillo's challenge is to overcome the problems of advancing this dual
strategy and preventing a loss of votes in the upcoming elections. Iiis internal
obstacle lies in the difficulty of doing so with a party in crisis and being the
general secretary who has raised the most opposition among the members. Neither
Jose Bullejos nor Jose Diaz nor polores Ibarruri, his predecessors as head of the
PCE, created so much hatred or opposition among party members.
It may be that such ill will is a tribute to Carrillo for his attempts to modernize
the party, to accept democracy, to remove his organization from the Soviet arbit
and to put coexistence above the class struggle. The result has been that the
strongest contradictions did not occur between the PCE and society, but within
the communist family itself.
COPYRIGHT: 1982, Informacion y Revistas, S.A.
11915
CSO: 3110/84
19
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050059-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/42/09: CIA-RDP82-40854R040500050059-7
~ FOR OFFI~'lAL USE ONLY
i
i
MILITARY FRANCE
~
' GROUND-AIR MISSILES, WEATHER CONDITIONS CHALLENGE LIGHT ARMY PLANE
Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Mar 82 pp 32-35
~Article by Col Bertrand de Lacroix de Vaubois (a graduate of Saint-Cyr [class
of 1953J, Col Bertrand de Lacroix de Vaubois served in the armored branch and
the cavalry. Having earned the BEMS [Certificate of Higher Military Studies),
he was assigned to the general staff of the First Army, and subsequently cre-
ated the 6th RHC [Helicopter Combat Regiment] at Compiegne. Assigned to the
ALAT [Light Army Plane] command in 1978, he is presently the assistant senior
officer to the ALAT cocrnnanding general. He has more than 3,000 hours of flying
time.): "The Enemies of the ALAT"]
[Text] Combat helicopters are faced with a multitude o� threats.
The permanent ones, connected with weather and urban develop-
' ment, can be attenuated by appropriate training. The othera
arise in combat, and these are more difficult to parry.
The particular qualities of helicopters--mobility, maneuverability, transport
~ and reach capacity--give the Army's light-aviation formations tactical possi-
bilities that are of great advantage vis-a-vis the requirements of ground com-
bat. However, these possibilities are attenuated by passive or active threats
~ that limit their regular availability on the battlefield and sometimes make
' them vulnerable.
The first threats have to do with certain meteorological phenomena or the over-
~ flying of built-up areas; unfortunately, these threats are ongoing and exist in
peacetime too. The second are the doing of the enemy, with his antisircraft
; weapons or his own helicopters equipped with intensive-fire weaponry based on
the most advanced technology.
i
! Let us attempt to identify them and to describe the parries that can decrease
! our helicopters' vulnerability.
~ The Passive Threats
i , ,
There is a very widespread notion that the ALAT flies only in good weather.
i This is not at all true--firat o� all, because the borderline between good and
i bad weather is often difficult to define in the European theater, and secondly
~ because the safety of the personnel makea it necessary to impose in peacetime
j measures that are far more severe than in combat.
i
~
~ 20
i FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050059-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500054059-7
FOR OFFICIAt~ USE ONLY
(4)
(1) ( 2 ) ~ 3 ) ~~IREMENT
Niveau~ De~nition % M~ Lune Types de vols possibles
~ de p~
nuit Is nuit millilux5 nunges , ~ 7)
Vols TBA sans aide (1) dans ~ 14 )
O region a relief peu accidente.
~ Tres claire 14 Vols TBA ou tactiques avec(15 )
( 8) Mican (2) dans region rcconnue.
40 a�
. (16)
2 Claire 24 Vols TB4 ou tactiques avec
~._,~a, Mican dans t+e~gion r~econnue.
( 9 ) ' ~.'t.~3
3 lntermediaire 7 Vols TBA ou tactiques avec
ou Mican dans rEgion reconnue.
'(10) (13) (16)
2
ou
4 Sombre 21,5 Vols a altitude de securite.
(11) (17)
.7
Vols ~ altitude de securit~.
5 Trbs sombre 27,5 j"~~,
(12 ) 'c~~
(1) This type of Very-Low-Altitude flight is presently done only be the crews
of the ALAT Night Experimentation Center and by experimental flights.
(2) MICAN: microtube binoculars. '
Key:
1. Night levels 12. Very dark
2. Definition of night 13. or
3. % per year 14. VLA [Very Low Altitude] flight unaided
4. Amount of light (1) in regions whose relief has little
5. Measured in millilux irregularity
6. Moon + clouds 15. VLA or tactical flighta with MICAN (2)
7. Types of flight possilsle in known region
8. Very bright 16. VLA or tactical flights with MICAN in
9. Bright known region
10. Intermediate 17. Flights at safety altitude
11. Dark
Reduction of visibility (night, clouds or fog), snow and frost conditions,
electric-power lines--these are the dangers with which the ALAT crews are con-
tinually confronted.
Even though redticed-viaibility conditions sometimes offer the advantage of
masking movements and therefore of achieving surprise more surely, helicopters,
21
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050059-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R400504050059-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
not equipped with speciai instruments, need a minimum of space for moving
about. Study of the meteorological statistics enables one to form a more exact
idea of the constraints in this domain: they show that in Europe, visibility is
greater than 1.8 km and the ceiling is higher than 100 m an average of 95 days
out of 100.
If the standards for movement of ALAT helicopters are considered--S00 to 800
meters of horizontal visibility, depending on whether a single machine or a
formation is involved, and flight at altitude of more than 100 m--one notes
that these constraints are not very limiting. But if one wants to be able to
use one's weaponry effectively, one has to be able to see the target correctly,
especially if the practical range ot the munition is capable of reaching
4,000 m, as with the Hot. Night complicates the use of the machines, inasmuch
as they generally fly "by sight."
In recent years, the ALAT has made a spectacular leap forward in the use of its
nighttime resources: in 1974, 3,500 hours were flown, on bright nights and at
above-ground altitudes on the order of 300 meters, and in 1981, 12,000 hours
were flown in dark nights and at variable altitudes, sometimes no more than 50
meters.
, This type of flying, now well-mastered, considerably increases the effective-
ness of the ALAT, since it permits RHC movements of 150 to 200 kilometers, dawn
actions after nighttime positioning, helicopter transport to known zones bea-
coned by personnel of the recipient units, or participation in night crossings,
etc (see table).
In addition to these possibilities in flying by sight or with use of MICAN bi-
noculars, there are those offered by the practice of instrument flight, which
permits movement in clouds or in fog, with the sole restriction of avoiding
, storm clouds (cumulonimbus), whose turbulence risks damaging the instruments.
There is one particularly dangerous enemy that it has not been possible to
eliminate: icing--that is, the appearance of ice over the whole of an aircraft
flying in a humid atmosphere at negative temperature. Contrary to airplanes,
no helicopter to date seems to have a complete deicing device. At present, the
only really effective counter consists in not flying under icing conditions.
In our regions, the development of urban zones entails multiplication of over-
head wires, electrical or other. They are the helicopter pilot's nightmare:
over the last 8 years, there have been 14 ALAT helicopter collisions with
lines, causing the destruction of 5 machines and wounding or killing a certain
number of personnel.l
Detection of wires is in its exploratory phase with development of L1llAR (Light
Detection and Ranging), which acts like radar but with greater precision, while
having shorter range.
1. To our knowledge, the U.S. Army Aviation has experienced a percentage o�
collisions with lines in relation to flying hours that is roughly equal to
ours.
22
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050059-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500054059-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
A last resource has been designed and tested by the Canadians: it involves a
big shears,mounted on the cabin, that cuts the wire when it is contacted. It
seems that this device is effective for any wire that hits the cabin~ but it
does nothing about collisions with the main rotor.
Night, fog, icing conditions, electric lines--these are some of the threats
that the ALAT has to contend with and that it is seeking to counter. The most
effective,way to counter them lies in the skill of the crews, with rigorous and
ongoing training, and especially, the application of strict flying procedures.
In addition to these "enemies," whose effects can be attet~uated by appropriate
measures in peacetime, there are, in the event of conflict, other threats that
are far more dangerous. Put into effect by the enemy of the moment and aimed
at destroying the helicopter, they are either ground-based or aerial.
The Ground-Based Threats
, They take the form of actions on the ground or from antiaircraft weaponry. Ar-
tillery fire presents a threat to helicopters, which are vulnerable to projec-
tile bursts. Against such a danger there is no perfect parry, the only pallia-
tive being to avoid being seen during positioning and to stay in one position
for the shortest time possible.
Ground-to-air weaponxy as such is far more formidable. We cite some of it:
--the portable ground-to-air missile of the Redeye or SA7 type. The latter,
with its Mach 1.5 speed and its 4,000-m range, is an excellent individual weap-
on against helicopters flying at low altitude--all the more so because it is
almost impossible t~ detect it ahead of time, since it is not tied to a ve-
hicle. It is fc~rmidable because of its infrared self-buidance system;
--the very-short-range ground-to-air missile such as the Soviet SA9, also with
infrared self-guidance system, is capable of hitting a target at more than
7,000 m. Being transported by a launching vehicle, it is easier to detect,
though;
--the multitube cannon of the ZSU-23/4 type--a �ormidable weapon because of its
effectiveness at very low altitudes, its speed of readiness �or action, and its
great mobil~ty on the battle�ield.
'LSU-23/4 cannons and SA9 missiles are quite often grouped in the same mixed
battery, and the crews for the latter weapon have available to them the data
from the cannon's radar for detection and preorientation.
Depending on their capacities, these weapons constitute the priority target of
armed helicopters. An example of the importance attached to this task is fur-
nished us by the Americans, who have for this purpose developed a particularly
eFfective high-performance charge for the 2.75-inch rockets that can be fired
by their Cobra helicopters.
If one does not have such offensive weaponry, the only counter, apart from the
:nounting of special equipment designed to diminish the thermal signature of the
:urbines, lies in continual practice of tactical flying, as close to the ground
23
FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050059-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050059-7
FUR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
as possible, and respect �or the reach offered by the modern antitank missiles
[as published].
The Aerial Threats '
Until the relatively recent past, these threats were represented only by high-
performance tactical-support aircraft. It was considered that while such a
threat represented a certain danger to helicopters surprised on the ground, it
was minimal for the same machines in flight, because of the difficulty of spot-
ting them and their great maneuverability.
The recent reappearance of armored airplanes on the battlefield--the American
A-10, for example--presents the risk of imminent introduction of a new kind of
threat, so far not very well identified.
Such is not the case with the heavily armed helicopters such as the Soviet
MI-24 Hind or MI-8, or the American AH-1 S Cobra. As Colonel Belov, a Soviet
author, stresses in "Soviet Military Review"; "Just as the best antitank~weapon
has always been the tank in the conflicts of the past, the helicopter should
prove to be the most effective antihelicopter weapon in future operations."
Indeed, the existence of a hostile cannon-helicopter in the battlefield repre-
sents a more acute danger than the high-performance fighter planes, for its
use environment ie the same as that of friendly helicopters. Flying at the
same altitude and having the same turning radii, the enemy combat helicopter
detects and attacks other helicopters, without its being possible to employ ef-
fective parries against it in the face of this threat.
By way of information, the carrying capacity of an MI-24 Hind is as follows: a
12.7-mm quadruple machine gun of Gatling type mounted in a turret under the
nose, capable of use both for air-to-air combat and for air-to-ground riring;
4 antitank missiies; and 4 carriers with 32 57-mm rockets (or 4 bombs of 50 to
250 kg).
In the face of such a danger and until their powerful AH-64 is placed in serv-
ice, the Americans have decided to improve the offensive capacities of their
Cobras by replacing the present 7.62-mm Minigun turret with a far more high-
performance turret capable of receiving either a 20-mm or a 30-mm three-tube
Catling cannon.
The Frer?ch Army is going toward the placing in service of an SATCP2 capable of
air-to-air firing and construction of a specialized protection-support helicop-
ter.
Meanwt~ile, the problem of self-defense remains.
In ttie face of such a range of dangers, one cannot but wonder about the justi-
fication of the military~helicopter; yet more and more countries are equipping
2. Very-Short-Range Weapon System
24
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050059-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R400504050059-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
themselves with such materiel, ar~d the number of military helicopters built is
constantly growing. Two examples show why this current trend is well-founded:
--despite the extension of night flying, the development of instrument flying
and the collisions with lines,3 the accident rate of the French ALAT has
dropped steadily in recent years. Statistics for the year 1979 show that it
was seven times lower than for civilian helicopters;
--during the Chad operations, 36 impacts against our helicopters were noted,
yet despite this, none interrupted its mission. Likewise, helicopters belong-
ing to foreign countries have continued flying despite considerable material
damage caused by ASA.4
Let us therefore be optimistic, while at the same time instilling in our crews
a concern for painstaking preparation of missions. In the absence of invulner-
ability, that alone will enable them, in time of conflict, first of all to move
undetected, and subsequently, to remain untakable.
3. None of these collisions occurred in the course of tactical exercises.
4. Ground-to-air artillery
COPYRIGHT: 1982 Revue des forces armees �rancaises "Armees d'Aujourd'hui"
11267
CSO: 3100/498
25
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050059-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R004500050059-7
i F( )FFICIAL USE ONLY
~
~
I
I
+ MILITARY FRANCE
i
~
INCREASED EFFICIENCY, REDUCED VULNERABILITY SOUGHT FOR HELICOPTER
Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Mar 82 pp 36-38
[Article by Lt Col Andre Martini (a graduate of Saint-Cyr [class of 1954j, Lt
Col Andre Martini is a qualified test pilot and has 4,700 hours of flying time.
He has commanded the lst Helicopter Combat Regiment. He is presently chief of
the ALAT [Light Army Plane] group of the Army Technical Section at Valence.):
"Combat of the Future--the Evolution of the Materiel"]
i [Excerpts] To increase thecombat capacitiesof the helicopter,
~ three actions are currently being carried out: overcoming
poor visibility conditions, fighting enemy helicopters and
reducing vulnerability to antisircraft weapons.
~ When the subject of use of the ALAT is raised, two limitations are necessarily
; cited:
--it is not possible to construct a maneuver that includes the ALAT because its
~ availability is too often subject to meteorological conditions;
I
--helicopters are too fragile and too vulnerable to be engaged in combat zones.
These reservations are largely well-founded. It is true that helicopters can-
not fight when fog hits. But who can? It is true that a well-placed projec-
tile can do in a Gazelle or a Puma. But it has to be hit.
The available techniques and appropriate modes of use already make it possible
to reduce these constraints. For tomorrow, the studies in progress permit one
to foresee, for the helicopter, less dependence on meteorological conditions as
well as better ability to keep its freedom of action and to fight on a modern
battlefield.
Night Vision
Increasing the regular availability of helicopters means giving them the capac-
ity to overcome reduced visibility conditions at night or under low clouds.
Since the security of the movement of the craft under these conditions has
~ practically been ensured, it remains to give the crews the meana for combat--
' that is, for piloting, observing, identifying and firing.
i
~
;
; 26
i FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050059-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050059-7
FOR OFFiCIAL USE ONLY
Combat in fog is still in the realm of the future and will not be examined
here. It would, in effect, require extremely elaborate sids, the technology of
which is far from mastered and the cost of which is prohibitive.
Night combat, though, offers more promising outlooks for an attractive cost-
effectiveness balance-sheet. Tfao techniques are presently envisioned for pro-
viding the crew with the necessary information:
--intensification of light;
--thermal imagery.
The ALAT Night Experimentation Center and the Technical Section of the Army
have carried out evaluations that have led the EMAT [Army General Staff] to or-
der an initial series of binoculars termed "third generation." The microtubes
with which they are fitted are more sensitive than those of the preceding gen-
erations and offer better definition. They therefore have greater range (up to
20 percent more). This equipment makes it possible to read the on-board in-
struments and to obtain a good image of the outside in dark night. Piloting is
thus made possible in 75 percent of cases, at an altitude on the order of 50 m
above the ground--in any case, above the power lines, which are not detectable
in all cases. Firing, though, is not possible by virtue of the ranges ob-
tained. Thermal imagery has to be used.
The Technical Section of the Army and the Night Experimentation Center have
evaluated thermal cameras mounted on helicopters. The tests show that the ob-
servation and firing functions can be achieved under good conditions, but that
piloting remains very tricky and calls for greater system sophistication, es-
pecially to furnish to the pilot the image corresponding continually to the di-
rection observed.
It therefore seems realistic to go first toward a mixed system combining micro-
tube binoculars for piloting and thermal camera for observation and firing, un-
til the integral system, such as the one on the American AAH [expansion un-
known], can be installed on French machines.
The Antihelicopter Helicopter
Increasing the regular availability of the ALAT in the field also means giving
it the means for preserving if freedom of action in the face of enemy helicop-
ters. The helicopter has to be given the means for downing a machine of the
same type that is moving, as it is, in tactical flight and that it detects at
200 km per hour as it comes around the edge of a wood.
It is more or less obvious that the man in the best position to react effec-
tively in such a situation is the one flying the craft--that is, the pilot. He
has to have a weapon that he can aim immediately and of sufficient effect to
have a good probability of neutralizing the adversary. Initially, this weapon
could be a medium-caliber cannon with a practical range of more than 1,000 me-
ters and a rate of fire giving high fire density, so as to make up for the
weaponsystem's scattering, no matter how sophisticated the system might be. In
the second phase, an air-to-air missile should be adopted, precisely because of
the ease of use that it provides. It is indeed considered the most e�feFtive
antihelicopter weapon.
27
FOR OFFICIAL U~~E ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050059-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R400504050059-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
The helicopter is a platform whose instability is well-known, and high-perform-
ance conduct-of-fire is therefore necessary in order to achieve real effective-
ness of the weapons system. It should therefore make it possible, in particu-
lar, to do telemetering, automatic tracking of target, to take the movements of
the carrier helicopter and the target into account, and finally to aim the
weapon on the basis of the firing corrections calculated. Immediate use of
such conduct-of-fire will require the use of a helmet sight, which implicitly
requires that the weapon be mounted on a turret whose clearances are sufficient
to permit aiming of the weapon in the forward sector. In other circumstances,
use of an electronic sight will be necessary to permit use of the weapon system
under good conditions.
The weapon, conduct-of-fire and helicopter now constitute a whole; thus the
armed helicopter should be specific to the military need and be defined around
its weapon system. In addition, it will be necessary, despite the use of so-
. phisticated materiel, to seek simplicity of employment.
A good many of the technologies cited above have not been totally mastered yet.
Thus, in order to take on at this time, with minimal effectiveness, enemy heli-
copters that threaten the freedom of action of our own machines, it is desir-
~ able to equip them with existing weapons assemblies.
Reducing Vulnerability
Finally, increasing the ALAT's regular availability on the battlefield means
reducing the machines' vulnerability.
Tactical flying already makes it very difficult for a projectile to hit a heli-
copter, but with the performance characteristics of the specialized weapons im-
proving, it is necessary to use supplementary protection, diminishing the
machines' signatures, improving their resistance to impacts and limiting the
consequences of forced landings.
This is the object of the studies in progress, which will be applied to the ex-
isting fleet insofar as possible, and then integrated into all future craft.
The French choice of small, heavily engined machines that fit easily into the
relief is in itself a factor that reduces vulnerability, by diminution of the
visual signature.
The use of composite materials, for fabrication of the blades in particular,
makes electromagnetic detection difficult, while backswept cuffs and fenestrons
considerably reduce the sound levels.
The inErared signature remains the most preoccupying one. While thinning and
diversion of the jet flows from the turbine are sufficient to reduce the effec-
tiveness of self-guidance systems that use the frequency band close to the vis-
ible, the situation may change with the appearance of missiles whose self-guid-
ance systems work on higher frequencies.
To improve resistance to impacts, not only the present weapons but also the fu-
ture ones have to be taken into consideration--in particular, the electrostatic
~ 28
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050059-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R004500050059-7
FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY
proximity-fuse missiles, the antihelicopter munitions of tanks, and the neu-
tralization weapons (lasers, smoke bombs). The solutions envisioned combine
various techniques:
--general architecture providing judicious arrangement of the elements in rela-
tion to one another so as to create natural masks;
--choice of materials, especially composites, insensitive to gash effect;
--redundancies, self-shutoff of tanks;
--armoring (opaque or transparent)--a solution to be adopted only, as a last re-
~ sort, since it penalizes in terms of mass (50 kg/m2) and is in principle re-
served for crew protection.
Finally, if the machine has to make a forced landing, the consequences for the
materiel and the personnel must be limited. The characteristics of a heli-
copter's crash protection depend essentially on its basic design. The present
machines, which were not designed in this spirit, offer a probability of sur-
vival for vertical speeds less than 5 to 7 m per second. On the other hand,
when this concern.is introduced in the design stage, it is possible to achieve
a far higher level of protection, up to 10 or even 12 m per second, as with the
American AAH. The rule of the art is to use the existing elements, both for
their own function and as elements of protection. The techniques employed
range from anticrash seats capable of reducing vertical acceleration from 60 g
to 20 g to beams capable of absorbing energy by collapsing, and also special
tanks and flexible fuel lines.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 Revue des forces armees francaises "Armees d'Aujourd'hui"
11267
CSO: 3100/499 E~
29
FOR OFFtCIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050059-7