JPRS ID: 10479 WEST EUROPE REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500050055-1
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 46
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 55
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/10479
26 April 1982
~1/est E u ro e Re ort
p p
~FOUO 26/82)
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST IN~ORMATIO~I SERVICE
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NOTE
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~
JPRS L~10479
26 Apr31 1982
WEST EUROPE REPORT
(~'OUp 26/82~ ~
CONTENTS
TERRORISM
ITALY
Revelationa by Neo-Fasciat 'Repentant' Terrorist Tisei
(Antonio Carlucci; PANORAMA, 1 Mar 82) 1
POLITICAL
ITALY
] Liat of Pro-Soviet Personalitiea in PCI
(Matteo Spina; PANORAMA, 1 Mar 82) 4
MILITARY
FRANCE
Radar, Attack Qualities of New Generation Alpha Jet Described
(Gerard Collin, Jacques Morisset; AIR ET COSMOS, 13 Mar 82) 8
'Datex 82' Exercise Tests Attack, Defenae, Detection Capacity
(Jean de Galard; AIR ET COSMOS, 20 Mar 82) 18
Training, Recruitment, Selection of Helicopter Pilots
(ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI, Mar 82) 25
Training Methods, by Michel Mage
New Selection Criteria, by Maurice de Vasselot de Regne
Colonel Urges Preparation for Chemical Warfare
(Claude Meyer; ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI, Mar ~2) 33
- a - [III - WE - 150 FOUO]
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GENERAL
FRANCE
CNES Plans New Buildings for Satellite Projects
(AIR ET COSMOS, 6 Mar 82) 38
NETHFRLANDS
Mission, Problems of Security, Intellige:~ce ~prvices
(Rudie van Meurs; VRIJ NEDERLAND, 2C Mar 82) 41
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TERRORISM ITALY
REVELATIONS BY NEO-FASCIST 'REPENTANT' TERRORIST TTSEI
Milan PANORAMA in Italian 1 Mar 82 p 49
[Article by Antonio Garluc,:i: "What a Big, ]?umb Black Mole!"]
~ [Te;:t] T~:e repentant Tisei's c~nfessions open a new chapter
in the ~^.quiry into the "state massacre."]
The latest broad::ide against the carabinieri has been fired. Aldo Tisei, 28,
the most impor~tant black terrorist of those who have co~laborated with the
magistracy after their arrest, has made serious ::rouble for two colonels, one
a major, the other a former captain. For these twomembers of the armed
forces his accusations have been so exact that the Roman ~udges have signed
warrants of arrest against them. The ma3or, Sergio V~r.chioni, until his
� arre~t a liaison off icer with Crimin$lpol, and Sandro Spagnoli, ex-captain
and businessman since his discharge, have both ended up behind bars. As for
Salvatore Pappa and Luigi Caraco, both lieutenant colonels, the ~udges did
no more than issue a 3uuicial communique and cancel their passports.
Vecchioni, now conf ined in Fort Boccea, Rome military prison, has had to
defend himself against grim charges: having for years favored the members
~f the black ce17. headed by Prof Paolo Signorelli, marked by the ~udges as one
of the top leaders of fasciet terrorism. According to Tisei, an iron pact
between the fascists and the efficer--for five years commander of the Tivoli
company, 30 kilometers from Rom~e--called for information in exhange far his
protection. ~
The first contact t~et:.~een Vecchioni and Tiaei occurred in 1975. From
information furnished by the black terrorists, the carabir.ieri discoverd
the cache of pistols and other weapons captured in an underworld armory. From
this initial contact between confidant and po?ice, the aff iliation expanded
to other actions. "We turned over to Vecchic^ i the irformation we collected
during our investigations into the ]ocal reda, and [i.n return] he guaranteed
us adequate protection," Tisei told Judges Alb erto Macchia and Ro~erto
Napolitano.
This compact was functioning smoothly when t::e caxabinieri officer advised
Tisei and Sergio Calore, a fascist accused of murder, to take a change of
air for a while: the carabinieri in Tivoli had recieved a firm request from
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Rome for data on the black terrorists in the area. But the problem was
resolved within a few weeks with a watered-down report.
Mi~c:i different in the Sandro Spagnoli story. Tisei maintains that this
ex-off icer had always been a militant in the Ordine Nuovo, the extreme
rightist group which had gone underground after it was dissolved, although
it was responsible for some of the goriest crimes committed by fascist
terrorism. To provide better cover, Spagnoli decided to enlist in the
carab in ieri. Was he an inf iltrator beyond suspicion? This is a question the
judges continued to ponder even when they read the list of black militants
commanded by the ex-off icer, who is now accused of armed assault. Just when
he was on guard service with his unit at the Celio military hospital, the
escape of Nazi criminal Herbert Kappler was being prepared and carried out.
These facts involving the carabinieri are the latest in a long series outlined
in hundreds of page~ of interrogation. When Aldo Tisei went to prison in the
spring of 1981 for extortion against the businessmen ~f Tivoli, the judges
investigating black terrorism had no interest in him. But then he let it be
known that he had something to say and, within a f ew days, proved to be a
goldmine of information.
Lest it be thought that he was telling fables, he promptly confessed to
having conceived two murders--of Judge Vittorio Occorsio and Adelmo Cipriano,
one of whose relat~ves was a weapon collector and target of the neofascists.
Then came a roobery in which millions of lire were seized at the Ministry
of Labor and various bank holdups. This revelation Tisei f ollowed by
reconstructing the history of Ordine Nuovo and other units of the terrorist
right.
He explained how professor Signorelli became head of the group in 1970,
first by maintaining close contacts with the unit's former leaders ~aho had
fled abroad (Sal.vatore Francia and Elio Masagrande), then abandoning them to
realize his own ideas in organizing the Autonomia Fascista movement on two
levels, one clean and public, the other clandestine, ready for "military
action" and holdups for self-financing.
A position of out~c.anding importance now went to Aldo Tisei, particularly
after the arrest of Pierluigi Concutelli, who assassinated Judge Uccorsio in
January 1977. Following that event, Tisei. rose to the rank of the band's
mi.litary chief in tandem with Sergio Calore. Thus, the repentant was always
abreast of. everything that happened; he also gathered information on the
black terrorists' past exploits. In fact, he offered the judges a hitherto
unpublished witness report on the role played by Stefano Delle Chiaie,
re~ognized leader of the Avanguardia Nazionale, at the same time full time
confidant for the Ministry of the Interior in Che case of the Piazza Fontana
massacre and the complicity of all black terrorist units which helped Franco
Freda escape from obligatory confinement in Catanzaro.
But ~he repentant did more than clarify details of many episodes which the
magistracy had been probing for years. His revelations have been new and
h~ghly disturbing. Incredible at f irst was his account of fascist espionage
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in behalf of the Libyans in exchange for arms, drugs and money. And when
Tisei declared that the corpses of two youths killed by mistake could be
found in a small artificial lake on the periphery of Rome, the investigators
obtained firm confirmation of the secrets he had up his sleeve.
Before opening the chapter on the carab inieri, Tisei had told another tale, ,
one that landed Germano Sangermano, Florentine lawyer and ever a defender of
fascist killers, in ~ail. "he was the liaison between our comrades in jail
and the organ ization."
COPYRIGHT: 1982 Arnaldo Mondadori Editore, S.p.A. Milano
9653
CSO: 3104/158
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POLITICAL ITALY
LIST OF PRO-SOVIET PIItSONALITIES IN PCI
Milan PANORAMA in Italian 1 Mar 82 pp 35-38
[Article by Matteo Spina: "All Brezhnev's Men"]
[Text] This is the list of the personalities who remain
faithful to the USSR, and their real political weight.
As Vadim Zagladin, CPSU vice deputy of international relations, confided to
Adalberto Minucci, member of the PCI secretariat, the Soviets have no intention
of abetting or financing a rupture within the Italian conmunist party. And as
PANORAMA has been able to ascertain in Moscow, the CPSU only wants to stimu-
late the debate, and provoke censure against the present PCI leadership,
promote efforts to document and disseminate information on the socialist
countries, just as INTERSTAMPA, the review founded by Ambrogio Donini and
his feisty septuagenarian comrades, is doing.
The Soviets are counting on Armando Cossutta and his numerous friends.all
over Italy, in sympathy with the old-time partisans. Hoping for active
Italian-USSR exchanges, they rely on the tough elements in the unions,
detecting favorable prospects in the South, in the traditionally labor zones
of the North, the region of Veneto, and the red cities of Emilia and Tuscany.
After taking an extensive poll in many regions of Italy, PANORAMA can now
trace a map of the PCI members who do not see "the propuls~.ve thrust of the
October Revolution" as exhausted by any means.
Paolo Robotti--Communist worker of the first generation, brother-in-law of
Togliatti, iron-bound Stalinist, even though he was imprisoned and tortured
in the USSR during Stalin's regime. In 1980 Roberto Napoleone published his
book "Chosen From Life." In his presentation he declared positively that had
the PCI summit broken off with Moscow, it would have been swept into oblivion.
Roberto Napoleone--Before undertaking INTERSTAI~A, among other publications he
- issued the works of the Czechoslovak Husak. Always in difficulties, neverthe-
less he disdains charges that the East is financing his current pro~ect.
Ambrogio Donini--For the nth time, this octogenarian professor has thrown
himself into the pro-Soviet adventure with youthful confidence. After the
PCI's protests on the Soviet takeover in Prague in 1968, he organized a
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"conser~vative" pressure group which, it was said, followed a program which
had much in common with the Manifesto group.
Guido Cappellor.i--Party administrator responsible for the Middle Classes
Section and typical apparatchik, he is known to be moderate in internal
politices but pro-Soviet in international affairs.
Nino Pasi--Former NATO commander, senator of the independent Left, he was
among the f irst to spend full time i~ pro-Soviet a~itarions at the PCI base,
participating in dozens of assemblies in every part of Italy. He publishes a
review STRUGGLE FOR PEACE.
Luigi Cioff i Degli Atti--Vicepresident of the Centr~,.l Control Commission, PCI
unit endorsed by many old-time leaders, some of them once consigned to the
periphery by Togliatti. Shy, unwavering in his loyalty to the party, he is
considered more a case of conscience than anything else.
Giulio Cerreti--78, collaborator of Sorel, Thorez and Togliatti, from 1932
to 1945 he was a member of the PCF Central Committee. The USSR awarded him
the Victory medal. Elected to the Constituent Assembly, he served in four
_ parliamentary legislatures. He is on the board of directors of INTERSTAMPA,
and contributes to it an anti-Berlinguer column.
Giorgio Colorni--Partisan ex-commander and former chief editor of UNITA. He
resigned his post as secretary of the Milan Togliatti section because of
irreconciliable difference with the party's central committee decisions.
Guido Valabraga--50 years old, expresident of the Italian Youth for Zionism,
ex-director of the Contemporary Hebrew Documentation Center, for years a
collaborator in the Mid~~le East section of RINASCITA, today professor of Near
East history at the University of Bologna. He is one of the drafters of a
document drawn up by the leaders of the Alliotta section rejecting the party
leadership's resolution and the decisions of the central committee.
- Alberto Maria Cavallotti--Deputy to the Constituent Assembly, he is an
_ adherent of the old guard in every respect. On Sunday, 14 February, in
Milan, with Nino Pasti he co-presided at the assembly of the pro-Soviet peace
committee. In his speech he declared, "We are much stronger than the 50,000
men recruited in the streets by the Solidarity union."
Giovanni Pesce--Gold medal Resistance winner, 64, he headed the Milanese
armed partisan group. He was a Togliatti bodyguard, later full time function-
ary in the Milanese federation, but abandoned the militia when Cossutta
stripped Alberganti of his post as secretary. Today he is president of the
City of Milan private vigilance police. His speech before the presidency
of the pro-Soviet assembly at Anpi, Milan, was greeted with enthusiastic
applause.
Serio Ricaldonea--Onetime Alfa Romeo worker and director of FGCI in Milan
during the 1950's. Now somewhat estranged from the party, he works for the
Milat~ Italia-Vietnam association. Under his sponsorship, numerous telegrams
of solidarity were dispatched to Cossutta.
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Antonio Costa, Leonardo Banfi, Alfredo Novarini, Gianfranco Rossinovich,
Elio Del Pizzo--After the state of siege was proclaimed in Poland these five
Milanese communal councillors abstained from a motion passed at the Palazzo
Marino denouncing "Soviet imperialism," signed by the communist group among
others.
Lauro Casadio--A partisan in his youth, today vice president of the Lombardy
region. In Milan he is considered a trusty ally of Cossuta, whom he has
followed since 1956, year of the clash between the old Stalinists and the young
party innovators led by Cossurra and supported by Amendola. He likes to
define himself as an "Amendola-Longhiist."
Bruno Cerasi--Former partisan and member of federation units since 1946. He
is now sports assessor for the province of Milan. More than a veteran
Stalinist, he is classif ied as a"pure-blooded Cossuttaite."
Arnaldo Bera--Wholly loyal to Giuseppe Alberganti, ex-member of the secretariat.
Decidedly a Stalinist of the old guard, ex-senator, today a member of the
INTERSTAMPA board of directors.
Alessandro Vaia--73 years old, with an honorable record as commander of the
Garibaldi Battalion in Spain. After the war he was vice secretary of the
Milan federation in charge of the Office of Cadres. Highly regarded by all
in the Milan PCI branch, he is considered the "eminence grise" in its
relations with the USSR, the man best f itted to lead the party's most
nostalgic current in the shadows.
Manlio Pirola--He is one of the worker cadres most esteemed in the party,
ex-president of the Pirelli internal committee, former secretary of the
Bicoeca Temolo section. When he was abruptly dismissed by Pirelli, he 3oined
Cossutta in the Milanese provincial secretariat. Since 1976 he has headed the
Milk Center and participated on the Milan PCI federal committee.
Amerigo Ciocchiatti--Ex-senator for Varese, 70, he wrote enthusiastic letters
to NEW TIMES, the Soviet weekly published in Italian, to endorse the USSR's
good motives.
Alfio Caponi--City councillor in Perugia, ex-senator, and historical figure
in the struggles of the Umbrian share croppers.
Bruno Donatelli--56, president of the Narni (Terni) Italia-USSR, with 300
members one of the strongest branches in Italy.
Dino Rebbio--Retired, 52, enormously popular secretary of PCI section 39 in
Turin.
Adelio Albarello--Former deputy, president of Italia-USSR in Verona. He
organized an active nucleus of dissidents, deplored by the Veneto PCI as
"a thorn in its side."
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Salvatore Careri--55, ex-regic~nal deputy, currently secretary of the Palermo
Noce section. He told PANORAMA, "I do not think that the USSR has exhausted
- its propulsive thrust toward sacialism. Thanks to it, today there are free
peoples."
Carmelo Lupo--0f Palermo, 39, formerly naval shipyard laborer, now member o:
the regional FIOM-CGIL secretariat. To PANORAMEI he declared, "I was a pro-
Soviet when I 3oined the party many years ago, and I still consider myself
as such."
Salvatore Rindone--A native of Catania, PCI deputy, 38, credited with an
extremely long series of party jobs on the local, regional and national level.
Luigl d'Auria--One of the PCI party founders in the province of Naples, At
75, he is a popular party figure in Campania.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 Arnaldo Mondadori Editors, S.p.A. Milano
9652
CSO: 3104/158
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MILITARY FRANCE
RADAR, ATTACK QUALITIES OF NEW GENERATION ALPHA JET DESCRIBED
Paris AIR ET COSMOS in French 13 Mar 82 pp 26-31
[Article by Gerard Collin and 3acques Morisset: "The 'New Generation' Alpha
Jet Trainer/Support Plane--a Very Advanced Weapon System, Unparalleled for an
Airplane of This Class"]
[Text] In about a month, a modified Alpha Jet will fly at Toulouse-Colomiers,
specially modified to receive a conduct-of-fire system designed for battlefield
attsck, advanced in technology, and presenting operational characteristics far
superior to airplanes of its category. This plane's possibilities are such
that its promoters do not hesitate to speak of a new-generation Alpha Jet. A1-
though is official designation--at least as far as its first cumstomer, Egypt,
is concerned--is Alpha Jet MW2,* we have therefore adopted, for the present ar-
ticle, the expression New-Generation Alpha Jet Trainer and Attack Plane, or
"Alpha Jet NGEA," which corresponds perfectly to the operation carried out by
the Dassault specialists~with a view to developing this new fighter.
The Alpha Jet was originally, and remains, a tandem two-seater and twin-jet
plane, designed for carrying out basic-training missions, advanced-training
missions and tactical-support missions. The advances achieved over the train-
ers of the preceding generation areconsidered remarkable by the users: its fly-
ing qualities are excellent, tailspins can be done without danger, its piloting
characteristics are very close to those of the mast modern fighters, and its
firing-training or fire-support capacity is considerable, thanks to carrying
capacity rarely achieved on an sirplane of this size. Added to this are siz-
able internal volume available for mounting supplementary equipment, the high
security offered by the twin-jet design, and considerable range due to the com-
bination of three factors: very carefully worked-out aerodynamics (reduced
drag), large internal fuel capacity, and low fuel consumption by the double-
flow Larzac 04 turbojets (developed by SNECMA [National Aircraft Engine Design
and Construction Co] and Turbomeca).
The Past, the Present...
The Alpha Jet program, launched ~y Dassault and Dornier at the request of the
French Air Force and the Luftwa�fe, made it possible first of all for these
* The MS1 is one of the veraions--of conventional type--presently offered for
export.
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air forces to modernize their fleet, but with the FRG favoring the fire-support
function and France the advanced-training function. Other air forces soon took
an interest in the Alpha Jet, and to date, some 10 countries have chosen the
Franco-FRG airplane (543 planes). The countries mentxoned so far are Belgium
(33 planes), Abu Dhabi (6), Ivory Coast (6), Togo (5), Morocco (24), Nigeria
(12), Qatar (6), Egypt (45) and Cameroon (6). More than 330 have been deliv-
ered to date, including a little more than 100 to France and 150 to the FRG.
To fill these orders, two assembly lines were initially installed in the pro-
moting countries, but without duplicating the models made. The maximum output
of 13 planes per month was reached last year.
...and the Future
This, we are tempted to write, is the past and the present; as for t:~e future,
it is marked by the development of the Alpha Jet NGEA, already ordered by
Egypt (two)~tiand Cameroon. We note first of all that rational use of modern
combat planes such as the Mirage 2000 requires ongoing operational training in
conduct of fire. But simulators (which also happen to be very expensive) do
not entirely fill this need; whence the necessity of a trainer with advanced
equipment, of the same technological level as the reference airplane. Apart
from the new-generation Alpha Jet, such a plane does not exist, for a very
simple reason: its design requires experience with the combat plane that is
possessed only by t?ie builders of airplanes of this type. And Dassault is the
only one offering a complete range: the Mirage III, Mirage F1, Mirage 2000, A1-
� pha Jet, etc. With its industrial logic thus combined with its experience,
Dassault was the builder in the best position to develop a plane such as the
Alpha Jet NGEA, with the synergy fully effective and making it possible to de-
velop, from the basic airplane, a machinP capable of evolving over time and of
being fully valid at the end of this centu~y.
As for Egypt, that country will be the first to use a panoply of airplanes as
formidable as that which joins the Mira~e 5-E2 witl: the Mirage 2000 and the Al-
pha Jet NGEA. Before going on to consideration of the Alpha Jet NGEA's avion-
ics and armament, we mention also that the Alpha Jet's airframe and engines
will also be capable of evolving. The engine cc~rrently mounted on the assembly
line is the Larzac 04C6, characteri~ed by its having an oil accumulator that
makes it possible to extend the range of reverse-thrust flight. But SNECMA,
Turbomeca, MTU [Motor and Turbine Company~ and KHD [Klockner Humboldt Deutz]
are already developing a Larzac 04X that offers in particular the advantage of
furnishing, at low altitude and high temperature (ISA [International Standard
Atmosphere] + 15 �C), 13-percent more thrust. For a given mass and runway
length, the Alpha Jet equipped with ttii, improved Larzac version will be able,
for example, to take off at outside temperature some 10 degrees higher.
In parallel, it would also be possible to envision an increase in carrying ca-
pacity, which is already 2.5 tons for outside loads, with the internal fuel
tanks (1,520 kg of fuel) full.
* Egypt has ordered 20 MS1's for training and conventional attack, and 15
MS2's for "high-precision" attack. It should be noted that the same country
is going to receive some Mirage SE2's, equipped with an ider_tic,31 weapons
system.
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The Alpha Jet NGEA
Practically since the Mirage IV, Dassault has progressively developed the weap-
ons-systems capacities of its combat planes. Since the first analog computers
for attack and bombing, the processing of information has been largely digital~
ized. There have been very important developments of the data-pickup devices
themselves, especially as regards the kinematic pickups--for altitude, bearing,
speed, position. The progress at this level has recently taken the form of
adoption of inertial power plants of the 1-nautical-mile-per-hour-or-better
class; as regards Dassault, this occurred first with the Super Etendard, but
now it is the case also with the Mirage 3, 5 and 50, the Mirage 2000, 4000,
etc, and now with the Alpha Jet.
By virtue of its weapons system, the Alpha Jet NGEA is a"mini-Mirage 2000,"
overall, except for the radar.
It carries:
--a SAGEM ~Company for General Application of Electronics and Mechanics] ULISS-
81 inertial power plant. This power plant is in the "80" series of ULISS's, .
already adopted on Super Etendards ("80"), export versions of the Mirage F1,
Mirage 5 and Alpha Jet ("81"), and the Indian Jaguars ("82"). In addition to
the inertial-power-plant function (bearing, course, speed, position), this
power plant also functions as a computer for attack, for management of the Di-
gibus multiplexed digital-bus line, for aerodynamic calculations and for elabo-
ration of the summary data presented in the heads-up sight;
--the Thomson-CSF [General Radio Co] VE-110 haeds-up sight adapted to the Alpha
Jet, with its ;ymbol generator;
--a Thomsan�C~F TMV-630 laser telemeter;
--and therefore a Digibus multiplexed digital-bus connection analogous to that
of the Mirage 2000. The rest of the avionics is relatively more conventional:
radionavigation, communications, IFF [information friend or foe], radioaltime-
ter, weapons-control housing, etc.
It should be noted that it has been easy to integrate th~s.~ molern avionics into
the Alpha Jet: the space available in the electronic "holds" was sufficient;
the electric-power supply was also sufficient; only the 400-VA [volt-ampere]
converters (ATEI [Electronic Industrial Techniques Applications Co]) had to be
replaced by 1,000-VA converters, also made by ATEI.
- "Nav-Attaque" Family of Systems
One of the most interesting aspects of the Alpha Jet NGEA is that this airplane
fits in with a logic of avionics-systems development which, practically speak-
ing, has existed from the Mirage III's to the Mirage 'L000/4000's, with the Mi-
rage 5, Super Etendard and Mirage F1 and 50 inbetween, covering many types of
weapons: bombs, missiles, cannon, rockets.
The family of SNA's (Navigation and Attack Systems) is based essentially on the
principal elements consisting of: SAGEM's ULISS family of inertial power
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r~K urr~~iw~ u~~ u~~Y
Installation of the Alpha Jet's Inertial Navigation and Attack System
TELEME RE LASER COLLIINATEUR BOIiIER DE N.~VIGAflON
11 N CSF TMV 6701 7ETE HAUTE ~ 3~ ~[ENTR LE A~ NER71F ~ 4~
I ITH CSF VE 1101
C(~MPAS f'`. SCCOURS uAGEM UNA 91~
~ 2 ~SFIM :G 90~
(6)
~OITIER uENcwiiEUR r~
RADIU ALTIMETREl~ , ~ bE SYMBOLES ~j
~ITRT AHV 91~`.1 ._J iTH {SFI ~
INDICATEUR COLLIMATEUR
RADIO 1ETE HAUTE~ 3 INDICATEUR INDICATEUR
~ ~ THOMSON CSF SPIIERIQUE DE NAVIGATION
ALTIMETRE VE I10 C ~ 9~ ~ ZO ~
(11) (12)
AV AR
PAN PAN
(13 (1 ) ~
fHOM50N� CSF
VE I10 C~ 1[l SYSTEME NAV�ATTAQIJE
BOITIER GENERA E~a SAGEM ULI55 81
DE SYMBOLES ~ 1 S ~
~1~
IELEMCTRt
t.ASER
THOMSON/CSF
~MV 6;i0
( HAGIO
AL I Ih1ETHE
~8~
Above, the installation sites of the essential elements of the Alpha Jet NGEA's
avionics. Below, a synoptic diagram of the system. The bold line represents
the Digibus multiplexed digital-bus connection. The two "PAN's," fore and aft,
are the inertial-power-plant command and visualization stations.
Key:
1. Laser telemeter (Thomson-CSF 7. Radioaltimeter indicator
TMV-b30) 8. Radioaltimeter
2. Emergency compass (SFIM [Measuring- 9. Spherical indicator
Instruments Manufacturing Co] CG-90) 10. Navigation indicator
3. Heads-up collimator (Thomson-CSF 11. Fore
VE-110) 12. Aft
4. Navigation and attack housing (SAGEM 13. [expansion unknown]
liNA-81 inertial power plant) 14. Thomson-CSF VE-110 C symbol-
5. Radioaltimeter (TRT (Radio and Tele- generator housing
phonic Telecommunications] AHV-9) 15. SAGEM ULISS-81 "Nav-Attaque"
6. Symbol-generator housing (Thomson- system
CSF)
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plants, the heads-up cathode-tube sights (VE-~t10, 120 or 130) from Thomson-CSF
(and ESD [expansicn unknown]), the radars ~AGAVE [expansion unknown), Cyrano IV
or RDM [Multipurpose Doppler Radar]), for which can be substituted laser tele-
meters for particular mission purposes, even at the cost of the volumes avail-
able in the nose. The flexibility of installation of such systems on an air-
plane such as the Alpha Jet is greatly strengthened by the integration made
possible by the Digibus multiplexed aigital connection, which in effect offers
greate ease of interconnection by comparison with point-to-point connections.
This bus line architectur~ also offers great self-testing and maintenance capac-
ity.
Finally, it appears that the avionics system of the Alpha Jet NGEA is the log-
ical result of the weapons sytems already developed for the Dassault family of
combat planes. There are three consequences of this fact:
--the first is that the Alpha Jet NGEA's avionics system has, for practical
purposes, already flown; integration of it into the new carrier that the Alpha
Jet constitutes should therefore be only a simple routine matter in the last
anal~~sis. Furthermore, integration has already been achieved without difficul-
ty on the Bretigny bench, with Dassault's considerable experience with equival-
ent systems taken advantage of in this case too;
--the second is that a Dassault customer can define, for two or three types of
weapons-carrying planes, avionics systems that offer a high degree of commonal-
ity, which has obvious advantages in the matter of logistics: spare parts,
bench-testing, training of maintenance personnel, etc. This is the case with
Egypt, for example, with the Mirage 2000, the Alpha Jet NGEA ~called "MS2" in
this case) and the Mirage SE2's (modernized);
--the third consequence is that the pilots themsel~rns will have, between one
plane and another, an avionics system from the same family, which also presents
several advantages, and training in the Alpha Jet then becomes a real prepara-
tion for an advanced system such as that of the Mirage 2000.
To our knowledge, Dassault is the only builder in the world who can thus offer
this avionics-system "family" approach, which testifies to the effort made by
the airplane builder and its principal associates (SAGEM, Thomson-CSF, ESD) to
obtain maximum synergy between a modern avionics and the sirplanes carrying it.
The Advantage to the NGEA
What does the NGEA version of the Alpha Jet offer by comparison with the pre-
ceding versions? The answer to this question first calls for consideration of
some of the possibilities offered by the system:
--the inertial power plant offers great attitude precision (on the order of 1
minute of arc) and speed precision (on the order of 1 meter per second). This ~
overall precision gives high quality of kinematic reference for sighting at:d
triggering of fire. The navigation precision (better than 0.8 NM [nauticalltile
per hour CEP [circular error probahle is advantageous first of all in its
short-term potential (as in the CCPI/PI (continuous calculatiun of point of im-
pact]/PI [initial point] attack mode; see below): the quality of navigation is
such that a localization precision of some 10 meters can be guaranteed after
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MVK UrClI.IAL U,C. UIVLY
readjustment on a known point for several minutes, which is sufficient to en-
sure maximum effect of the weapons used.
Overall, thanks to the inertial power plant, the navigation and attack system
is higher performance characteristics than a conventional system with gyroscop-
ic power plant and Doppler: the precision of the inertial power plant is not
affected by accelerations (in close maneuvers, for example). Likewise, an in-
ertial power plant does not suffer from the fluctuations of the echoes encoun-
tered by the Doppler on the ground, or from the weakness of the Doppler echoes
in calm seas.
Navigation is fully autonomous, and the inertial power plant offers precision
be*.ter than 0.8 NM/hour CEP, readjusted from time to time in accordance with
the needs of the mission;
--the laser telemetry makes it possible to readjust the sirplane's navigation
on a known point (a steeple, an accident of relief, etc) with precision to a
few meters; the telemeter also makes it possible, in attack modes, to measure
the dislance to the objective, and therefore to trigger fire with great effec-
tiveness. Of course, a laser telemeter, even if it is more precise in measure-
ment of distance to an objective on the ground, does not give all the possibil-
ities offered by a radar. But it does not cest what a radar does either, and
it is relatively easy to install in an airplane. In the case of the Alpha Jet
NGEA, the airplane is thus equipped with a"laser nose"; the optical window
cuts across the airplane's nose slantwise.
By comparison with a"telemetry" calculated by triangulation (distance + radio-
sonde altitutde), direct measurement by laser is, of course, distinctly more
precise, being free of the errors of distance evaluation and of altitude fluc-
tuation due to the accidents of the relief flown over.
Several Modes
The Alpha Jet NGEA has five modes of attack: CCPI, CCPI/PI, delayed CCPI, CCPL
[continuous calculation of point of drop), CCPL/PI.
--CCPI for braked bombs, cannon and rockets--that is, principally for the weap-
ons fired with flat trajectory. A reference mark presented in tr~e sight gives
continually the point of impact on the ground of the weapon chosen; the pilot
triggers fire when this reference mark coincides with the target.
--The CCPI mode exists also in the CCPI/PI version, which offers the possibili-
ty of designating a known point (called the initial point) in relation to the
target.
--The delayed-CCPI mode, used for braked or even superbraked bombs. In this
case, the high downgrade of the trajectory means that the target is out of the
sight's field of view before fire is triggered ("the rear sight is...too low").
In this case, a phantom target appears in the sight's field, and the pilot
triggers fire when the phantom target and the likewise fictitious point-of-im-
pact reference mark coincide.
--The CCPL mode, used for smooth bombs and certain braked bombs. The pilot
triggers his attack by means of a laser-telemetry designation of the target.
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F(
~ POINT DE LARGAGE TkAJECTOIRE DE BOMBE
AUTOMATIQUE ~
DESIGNAiION ~ 3 ~ \
~ 2 ) \
\
_ - (5) ~
~ POINT INITIAL , ; ~ ; .
_ -'~l'~`.~`~''~- ~ I \ ,
r , , ~
_ _ , , ~ . \
cl~ ~ ,
Illu~tntion ~u mod~ d'aKaqw ~n CCPL/PI : I~ dMiqn~tlon�tilim~hl~ ~~C~~~
~ur I~ poiM Initid (I~ poM) I~ Is p~~w d'~tnqw ~ I'~bH d~~ ( 6)~,
ob~tael~t n~tunl� (lol la eolllny, 1~ Ivy~p d~ 1~ ~ iWit
eomm~ndi autom~tl4wn�M p~r i~ ealeul~NUr d'Nf~qw lee w d~n~ CIRLE ~
1~ antnl~ IMrtINI~
Key:
1. Illustration of the CCPL/PI attack mode: the telemetry designation on
the initial point (the bridge) launches the attack pass under cover of
the natural obstacles (here, the hill), with dropping of the payload
commanded automatically by the attack computer comprised in the iner-
tial power plant. 2. Designation 3. Point of automatic dropping
4. Trajectory of bomb 5. Initial point 6. Target
(1) TIR ( 2) LARGAGE ~ 3~POSITION A L'EXPLOSi:.~N
(4) .
I TRAJECTOIRE BOMBE I ,
~ ~
~i ~
~ ~
~ f~ ' ~ ~ ``1
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ j 20NB D'ECLATS
\ � ' ~ (7)
. ,
~
( 6 )cis~.e
Illustration of the delayed-CCPI attack mode, in which the objective is outside
the sight's field; a phantom objective is created to provide for the firing of
braked or superbraked bombs.
Key:
1. Firing 4. Bomb trajectory 6. Target
2. Dropping 5. Line of sight 7. Burst zone
3. Position at explosion
The attack computer then takes charge of the sequence; it begins by giving the
pilot the pull-out order, so as to prepare for the pilot's "disengagement." In
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rvK urri~iwL uJC. V1VLY
doing so, the computer continually calculat~s the bomb's point of imnact on the
basis of its behavior in ballistic flight. Firing is triggered automatically
when the calculate~ point of impact coincides with the objective designated at
the beginning of the sequence.
--The CCPL mode makes it possible to use a phantom target that is offset by g
quantity (geometric vector) that is known in relation ~o a real objective. The
pilot then designates the phantom target: an accident of relief that is known
very precisely in terms of longitude/latitude coordinates, or in terms of rela-
tive distance/bearing magnitude, in relation to the objective. ~his desi.gna-
tion is associa*ed with a laser telemetry that makes it possible ta adjust the
Alpha Jet NGEA's navigation to within a few meters.
Navigation is then continued by means of the inertial power plant. Because of
a deviation of less than 0.8 NM/hour (CEP), a simple calculation shows that ov-
er a distance of some 10 kilometers, this position retains a precision on the
order of some 15 meters--in other words, a precision more than consistent with
the zone of effect of the weapons used.
This mode, called CCPL/PI, then enables the airplane to engage its attack in
the best way, so that the plane can remain "covered" for as long as possible
under the protection of natural obstacles (hill, valley, cliff, etc). Thus the
entire initial approach from adjustment/designation on the phantom objective
can be done under cover, without possibility of direct detection by the enemy
attacked.
Because of the automatic pull-out and dropping commands, the attack will have
the benefit of maximum surprise effect; for what is involved~is an attack with-
out ever seeing the target--and thus, vice-versa, without ever being seen by
it.
The maximum distance between the initial poin*. and the target is on the order
of some 10 kilometers; this distance is related to the short-term quality of
the inertial power plant's deviation.
The distance between the dropping point and the target is, of course, limited
by the range (ballistic) of the bomb--typically a maximum of 4 or 5 kilometers.
The resulting overall precision at impact (navigation precision + precision of
ballistic flight) is a few 10's of ineters, which is still entirely consistent
with the radius of action of the bombs used.
The CCPL/PI mode offers--it should be noted--the considerable advantage of en-
abling the pilot to prepare for his mission (before leaving on it) by offering
him the possibility of entering the coordinates of the adjustment point and en-
abling him subsequently to adjust his navigation, and thus to engage the attack
phase before reaching the front line--and therefore under the best calm condi-
tions. He is then freer in his movements, especially in order to see to his
own defense.
The total NGEA system thus offers a range of attack and firing modes from di-
rect fire--target in the sight's field, with continuous calculation of point of
impact (CCPI)--to the "stand-off" firing modes (CCPI/PI). This latter mode of-
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fers the least vulnerability, but presupposes a short-term kinematic reference
of very high quality--that is, position equivalent of less than 1 nautical mile
per houi, levels beyond the reach of the conventional combinations of Doppler
and gyroscopic power plants.
It has also been calculated in Dassault that the Alpha Jet NGEA (wihout even
taking into account the laser telemetry, and on flat terrain) offers the fol-
lowing gains in firing precision by comparison with a"conventional" Doppler-
gyroscopic power plant version:
--CCPI (superbraked bomb) at 400 knots, 200 feet: 30 percent;
--68-mm rocket: at 1,500 m, 400 knots, 10� dive: 40 percent;
--cannon: 5� dive, 400 knots at 1,000 m: 20 percent.
The A~GEA's advantage increases if the terrain overflown is irregular, for laser
telemetry adds 10-percent precision by comparison with use of the radioalti-
meter.
Soon to Be Flying
The NGEA program is under way. A mockup bench has already been in operation at
Dassault in Aretigny since last Fall. A complete bench for integration of the
navigation and attack system began functioning at Bretigny in February. The
first NGEA plane is to fly at the beginning of April. The first delivery (to
Egypt) is to be at the beginning of next year. Two other benches will be
built: one for the Toulouse plant and the other for Egypt.
The Alpha Jet NGEA is obviously a long way beyond the trainers transformed into
attack planes by the addition of external attachment points and conventional
avionics. The Alpha Jet NGEA is indeed unique, and comes as an extension and
natural complement of the Mirage 3 and 5/Mirage F1/Mirage 2000 family. It will
be surprising if other buyers, after Egypt and Cameroon, do not come along.
Total Safety in Case of Ejection
Among the elements contributing to the ease o~ use of the Alpha Jet and the se-
curity of its use, we mention the landing gear, of Messier-Hispano-Bugatti de-
sign, with low-pressure tires and of such dimensions that an increase in total
mass can be envisioned with few modifications (wheels and brake), and the ejec-
tion seat. The French Alpha Jets are equipped with type-Mk 4("zero-90") Mar-
tin Baker/SEMMB [expansion unknown] seats, and the FRG Alpha Jets with Stencel
S-III S"zero-zero" sests. The Belgian Alpha Jets also have Martin Baker seats
--B10N "zero-zero." The customer indeed has the choice: since the Martin Baker
Mk 10, for example, is also used on the Mirage 2000 (and the F1), the customer
may be interested in choosing the same type of seat for a fleet composed of two
or three types of plane. This is the case with Egypt in particular.
We note finally that the Alpha Jet take the window-glass fragilization system
equipped with a pyrotechnic sequence, developed by Dassault at Velizy and en-
suring absolute safety. This system, qualified up to 600 knots, is the last
- word in fragilization; it eliminates the ejection-speed limits.
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rvrc vrr~a.~wa. .~o~c. vi~i.t
PHOTO CAPTIONS
1. p 27. Under an Alpha Jet wing, two examples of load-carriers developed
and produced by the Rafaut company: at left, a bi or tri adapter,
type AM1000/2000, carrying two Beluga bombs from MATRA [Mechanics,
Aviation and Traction Co]/Thomson-Brandt, and at right, a TG600
releaser-ejector (14-inch loads, maximum of 1,450 pounds/650 kg)
carrying a drum.
2. p 29. This configuration--one of the very many already flight-tested--
shows that in addition to the four inodular 400-kg bombs, the plane
can also carry a fifth bomb by using the under-fuselage cannon-
container attachment point.
- COPYRIGHT: A. & C. 1982
11267
CSO: 3100/473 .
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MILITARY FRANCE
'DATEX 82' EXERCISE TESTS ATTACK, DEFENSE, DETECTION CAPACITY
- Paris AIR ET COSMOS in French 20 Mar 82 pp 26-28
[Article by Jean de Galard: "'Datex 82': Air Defense Put to the Test--This Ma-
jor Exercise Is Integrated with a Vast Log~istical Operation This Year"]
[Text] It was in the heart of the Detection and Control Center of Cinq-Mars-
la Pile, near Tours--the most modern of F.urope's air-defense installations,
presented to the press for the first time--that Lt Gen Bernard Capillon of the
Air Force, air-defense commander and Air Force commander of the air-defense
forces, chose to comment at length on "Datex 82."
This major exercise, which once a year enables the Air Force to train its air-
defense personnel--in particular, the crews, the interception controllers and
the ground-to-air gunners--under conditions as close to reality as possible--
was held last Tuesday and Wednesday. It is a punishing and constraining opera-
tion--in our last issue we stressed the fortunate compromises that it occa-
sioned on the part of the civilians and the military--but a necessary one,
since it makes it possible to evaluate the capacities of the national air ~le-
fense system. It put into action not only radar and sight surveillance organ-
isms, the air bases and all of the Air Force's active defense facilities (air-
planes with their air-to-sir weaponry, ground-to-air missile batteries and
double-barreled antiaircraft cannon), but also elements of the Navy and of the
Army. Datex 82 therefore made it possible to put the coordination of all the
components of air defense to the test. Furthermore, this year like last year,
Datex was integrated into a vast logistical operation (exercise Ex Log) started
on 15 March, the purpose of which was to check the effectiveness and coherence
of the measures to put the Air Force on a war footing in the areas of backup
and technical support of the forces. The aim was also to check the ability of
the manufacturers and maintenance centers to increase their rates of delivery
or repair of materiel in a situation of sudden crisis.
The balance-sheet provided for at the end of the exercise involved 2,750 re-
sults: 1,200 defensive and 1,550 offensive, with the latter involving the par-
ticipation of airplanes of the Strategic Air Forces, the Tactical Air Force and
air forces of allied countries: the FRG, Spain, Great Britain, Italy, The Neth-
erlands, and American and Canadian forces in Europe. The air-space zones af-
fected by Datex 82 ranged from low altitude (500 to 4,000 feet, 150 to 1,200 m)
to high altitude (flying levels above 320-340). This exercise was to entail
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a�vi~ V~�a'aa.~Ma. li.7G Vl\L!
the closing of some 20 airports to traffic under IFR [Instrument Flight Rules]
conditions.
Datex 82, which was carried out in accordance with the usual safety norms and
with respect for the rules concerning nuisances, did not, of course, correspond
~ to any particular fictive political-military situation.
The CDC [Detection and Control Center] of Cinq-Mars-la-Pile
The CDC of Cinq-Mars-la-Pile was put into operational service on 27 October
1980. It is operated by 370 persons, including 200 controllers. It is one of
the 10 stations that support the Air Defense Command in the execution of its
missions. The CDC's and Satellite Detection Centers (CDS) that belong to the
air-defense chain of command are installed at Contrexeville, Drachenbronn,
Doullens, Mont-de-Marsan, Lyon Mont Verdun, Nice Mont Agel, Brest, Romilly and
Narbonne.
What characterizes this center, which is located 30 km downstream from Tours
and occupies a very central position, geographically, is that it is the most
recent and most modern station of the STRIDA ~Air-Defense Data Processing and
Representation System) system, the automation of which began 20 years ago.
STRIDA, as we recall, is based on two essential principles: real-time process-
ing of radar data and linking of the stations, both among one another and be-
tween each~of them and the Air-Defense Operations Center ~CODA) located at Tav-
erny. This linked network offers multiple reconfiguration possibilities that
enable one to make up for the unavailability of one radar station or another.
STRIDA's chain of command involves three levels:
--the satellite detection centers, which may be either civilian or military and
which do not have any operational function; they normally have only facilities
for detection and for extraction of digital plots, linked to one or more CDC's;
--the detection and control centers, which constitute the basic units of the
system and provide for: establishment and transmission of the general air situ-
ation in the zone of responsibility of each of them; management and control of
the interceptor planes; control of military operational traffic and coordina-
tion with the other traffics, for the purpose of proper management of the air
space;
--the CODA. This main center, installed at Taverny, has an emergency center in-
stalled at Mont Verdun. As the organism for synthesis and command linked with
the CDC's and with the allied air-defense systems (NADGE [expansion unknown),
412-L and Combat Grande), it has permanent responsibility for threat evalua-
tion, broadcasting of alert, and general conduct and coordination of opera-
tions.
The CDC's of Nice and of Tours are equipped with new-generation materiel (Visu
IV); the Drachenbronn station--the oldest--is still equipped with CAPAC (expan-
sion unknownJ Visu II materiel; the CDC's of Doullens, Contrexeville, Lyon and
Mont-de-Marsan are equipped with standard CAPAC III Visu III materiel. Visu IV
is distinguished from Visu III by the independence of the consoles; each of
them constitutes, in fact, a minicomputer that provides for its own image-gen-
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eration and its own management, by means of a microprogrammed computer block.
The improvements incorporated in the equipment of the Visu IV involve mainly
the typing of instructions, presentation of data (colored cards), and technical
organization.
The operations room of the CDC of Cinq-Mars-la-Pile has been built underground
at a depth of 25 m(at the level of the bed of the Loire), and connects with a
large group of underground galleries used by an Air Force depot.
The missions of the CDC have a triple character. Where air-defense missions
are involved, a distinction has to be made between aerial surveillance and in-
terception guidance. The former is done continually and makes it possible to
establish the general air situation in the national air space at any time. It
comprises the conventional phases of detection, identification, threat evalua-
tion and broadcast of alert. Guidance of the interceptors makes it possible to
carry out the sky-policing mission: guidance of the fighter planes on alert to-
ward any unknown or infringing aircraft; assistance to any aircraft in trouble;
control of fighter-pilot training missions.
The CDC of Cinq-Mars-la-Pile can also handle military operational traffic-con-
trol missions: offensive, liaison, reconnaissance, tactical-suuport and in-
flight refuelling missions and control of the flights of the trainers of the
Fighter School (GE 314) based at Tours.
The third type of mission--NBD (nuclear, bacteriological, chemical)--is the
preparation and broadcasting of radioactive alert: on the one hand, activation
of the BGA (General Alert Office), and on the other hand, activation of the
CEDAR (Center for Evaluation and Broadcasting of Fallout Alert). The alert is
broadcast both to the armed forces and to the population at large.
On the surface, the radars (a Satrape radar plus a 23-cm 2D main radar, plus
three manual altimetry radars), the radio centers, the living area and the ra-
dio relays constitute four distinct blocks.
A number of IBM computers (360/30, 370/135, 3031) do the processing of all the
radar data received. Very advanced logical elements make it possible in par-
ticular to transmit air-defense data to Taverny and the other stations automat-
ically, to aid in decision-making and to control interceptions.
In the STRIDA stations of the first and second generations, using the VISU II's
and ~II's, a linear modeling has,been adopted. In the Visu IV stations, such
as those of Nice and Tours, the performance characteristics of the computing
units and the new form adopted for the consoles, as is shown by the photos on
the preceding pages (the low consoles are for direction and the high ones are
for exploitation), have led to a new layout: the direction consoles are grouped
at the center of the room, while the exploitation consoles are attached to the
walls and are in the direct view of each section chief.
The visualization capacity of the CDC of Cinq-Mars-la-Pile represents a square
area of 4,800 km on each side. The center can provide 26 simultaneous data-
transmission connections and the central computer makes it possible to process
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ruec urr~t,~AL u~r, utvLY
1 million pieces of information per second. Thirty-two simultaneous intercep-
tions can be done.
An electric power plant installed underground ensures the center's autonomy in
case of need.
- The COZ [Zone Operations Center] North
Air-defense operations at the national level are directed from the CODA of Tav-
erny, which, as we recall, has an emergency center installed at Lyon Mont Ver-
dun. The national territory is itself divided into four air-defense zones
whose limits coincide with the four air regions (but without strict superimpo-
sition of these limits). Under the authority of a general officer, each zone
has an operations center (COZ) that conducts the operations at the regional
level. The COZ North is installed at Cinq-Mars-la-Pile; it is geographically
"very close" to the detection and control room of the CDC of Cinq-Mars. The
COZ Northeast is installed at Contrexeville; the COZ Southeast, at Lyon; and
the COZ Southwest, at Mont-de-Marsan.
The COZ North, responsible for instantaneous conduct of air-defense operations
in the north and west of the country, has at its disposal three Mirage F1
wings, based at Creil, Cambrai and Reims; three CDC's (installed at Cinq-Mars-
la-Pile, Brest and Doullens); and connections, proper to each of these CDC's,
with the civilian, allied and neighboring organisms and, as the case may re-
quire, with the Navy's ships at sea.
The missions of the COZ North are carried out in six areas:
--identification surveillance of all aircraft penetrating into its zone;
--tactical direction of air-defense missions, in peacetime as well as in time
of crisis, war or exercises;
--distribution of the training missions among the control centers;
--supervision of proper execution of military operational-traffic controlled
flights;
--direction of search and rescue operations involving civilian and military
aircraft presumed to have suffered accidents;
--conduct of in-flight operations for aircraft in trouble (general-aviation
aircraft in particular).
Its facilities are, on the whole, those of the CDC for everything related to
detection, processing, exploitation and visualizatic~n of data, as well as to
communication transmissions. In the operations room of the CDC, it has a civ-
ilian coordination detachment (DCC) that participates in air-s~ace management
by ensuring, with it, coordination of civilian and military air activities.
Responsible for activation of the Coordination and Rescue Center (CCS) around
the clock, it received 126 alerts last year, resulting in the initiation of
17 operations.
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In case of tension, crisis, or exercise, such as Datex, the COZ North becomes
the fIQ of the ~eneral commanding the North air-defense zone. In the operation-
al-control chain that en~ompasses the operations rooms of the air bases, the
Crotale firing sections, the control squadrons and the Military Coordination
Detachments (DMC's) installed with the civilian control organisms, the COZ is
the last link before the CODA, the Air-Defense Operations Center, at the heart
of the air-defense command.
Exploitation of Datex
For every major air-defense exercise of the type held in the skies of France
last Tuesday and Wednesday, there is a very detailed expoitation of the re-
sults. This exploitation involves a fine restitution of the operations of at-
tack, defense, detection and neutralization. It yields valuable information
about the rates of activity, the thresholds of saturation. In this regard, it
should not be concluded from the short duration of the exercise--48 hours--that
it corresponds to what the national air defense would be capable of supporting
in time of crisis. The restitution of the operations also furnishes valuable
information on everything that has to do with logistics: availability and reac-
tion time, especially this year, in view of the fact that the Ex Log and Datex
exercises were simultaneous. It makes it possible to evaluate the capacities
and the deficiencies correctly.
The dates for Datex 83 have already been set. The exercise will take place at
the beginning of March next year.
COPYRIGHT: A. & C. 1982
11267
CSO: 3100/513
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a va~ va a'l~.ana. v.i~ vl\Ll
MILITARY FRANCE
TRAINING, RECRUITMENT, SELECTION OF AELICOPTER PILOTS
Training Methods
Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'I~[JI in French Mar 82 pp 41-42, 47 ~
[Article by Colonel Michel Mage, FYench Army, commandant of the Army Light
Aviatton Tactical Training School; a Saint G~r graduate, class of 1945, his
past assignments include: executive officer, lst Artillery Regiment, G-4,
3d Military Region, and C.O. lst GALDIV [Division Light Aviation Group]; he
served in Indochina and Algeria, and holds a BEMS [certificate of advanced
military education]: "Instruction in ALAT"]
[TextJ ALAT [Light Army Aviation] schools have the mission of forming
proficient pilots capable of serving in operational units. But these schools
must also train, with the assistance of other service schools, all support
personnel, nonspecialists, and other enlisted men assigned to ALAT.
Upon reading the title of this article, "Instruction in ALAT," your first
reaction is undoubtedly: "Ah yes, pilot training."
Pilot training is, of course, the ma3or training activity because, year in,
year out, some 120 officers and noncommissioned officers must receive the
basic technical knowledge and skills required of a helicopter pilot. Yet this
training is but the initial phase of a lengthy apprenticeship and continuing
instruction and training designed to assign to units those operational pilots
capable of effectively holding their own in combat.
Pilots, however, constitute only 40 percent of all ALAT officers and NCO's.
Hence ALAT's specific training activities also encompass all those persons
who are either aircrew members or ground personnel who keep the aircraft
flying: mechanics, radio operators, air traffic controllers, meteorologists,
firemen, photographers, and simulator instructors.
This article's title covers, therefore, a broad sub3ect area and my comments
cannot possibly cover all aspects.
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Helicopter Pilot
ALAT's Specialization Training School at Dax has the mission of providing
basic helicopter pilot training to officers and NCO's of the French Army,
Navy, Gendarmerie, and Custams Service, plus military personnel from a
certain num6er of foreign countries.
The course is 7 months for NCO's and 9 months for officers, because the latter
also get an additional period of observer training. These courses may seem
long to the unitiated reader, but their objective is far different from simply
learning to fly solo, a skill that can be acquired in some 20 lessons taken
in a flying club. Course lengths in foreign armies are similar to ALAT's.
At Dax, the student pilot must learn to fly under all possible day-night
conditions: nap-of-the-earth as well as at 3,000 meters in mountainous
terrain, and in bad weather with horizontal visibility reduced to 800 meters.
A pilot must also know where he is at all times and be able to employ all
methods of navigation. Lastly, he must be able to land his helicopter in a
small clearing, on a valley floor, or on a mountain peak with ~ust enough
room for his skids. Ae must do all this without neglecting his regular
military training and while keeping himself in good physical shape.
After the primary flight training phase, the school program, therefore,
includes cross-country flying, low-and very low-level navigation, night
contact training, mountain flying, and instrument training designed to teach
the young pilot to make instrument landings utilizing radar or beacons and
markers. These activities total approximately 130 flying hours in Alouette 2
and Gazelle SA 341 helicopters.
Operational Pilot .
After that, however, this "conventional" pilot has to be transformed into a
combat pilot, in ether words, given the knowledge and skills required to
make maximum effective use of his helicopter in combat operations. Effecting
this transformation is the role of the ALAT Tactical Training School at
Le Luc.
This additional training begins with the "Voltac" or tactical flying course.
The school devised this special course and it now has been copied by all
foreign army aviation schools. Its purpose is to teach pilots how to perform
and survive on the battlefield by using terrain for cover while flying at
appropriate speed over and around obstacles.
Certain pilots are then trained as gunners and misaile operators o*_-
reassigned to transition training into the SA 330 [Puma tactical transport
helicopter). After this, they all spend 3 years putting their training into
practice and acquiring their own experience in a unit ~ith the guidance and
advice of their seniors.
~ 'I'he next course of instruction and training is for pilots having 1,000 flying
hours. In this course, they receive the additional knowledge and skills
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required of an aircraft com~nander: particularly the special procedures for
f]ying as member of a patrol, further training in flying by instruments,
and detail~d instruction on identification of ground and airborne equipment
and weapons likely to be encountered on the battlefield. Upon graduating
from this course, the noncomonissioned officer may be considered an
operational pilot.
Squadron Commander
_ The process described above for NCO's is not easily applicable to co~issioned
officers who are assigned to ALAT after having served as lieutenants in a
regiment. In their case, primary flight training is followed by more
- intensive tactical training which rapidly qualifies them as patrol leaders.
But their most important phase of~instruction occurs when, after 3 years
service in a unit, they are about to be assigned as aquadron leaders. This
phase is the ALAT "captains course" similar in lerigth and general sub~ect
matter to the company commander courses offered in other service schools.
In the ALAT course, however, emphasia is placed on the internal operation of a
squadron, the missions of the three types of regimental helicopter aquadrons--
reconnaissance, antitank, and utility-tactical transport-and lastly on
thorough familiarity with the organization, equipment, weapons, and tactics
of French Army divisions and corps, echelons which the squadron commander
is frequently called upon to suFport. This epecial instruction and training
is indispensable.
Support Personnel
A pilot is capable of flying, however, only because of the presence alongside
him of comrades in arms who have received equally intensive technical
instruction and training.
- 1. Mechanics first of all. They are almost as numerous as pilots in ALAT
units. They greatly outnumber them, however, if we include the mechanics in ~
third echelon maintenance activities.* All of these mechanics or repairmen--
airframe, engine, avionics, and radio mechanics, plus flight controllers or
engineers--receive nearly a11 of their instruction and training outside ALAT
at the Advanced Ordnance School in Bourges.
2. Air traffic controllers operating Spartiate radars, meteorologists, and
fire safety officers, all receive their basic instruction and training in
civilian or ~oint service schools.
3. ALAT nonspecialists--18 percent of ALAT's total personnel strength--and
its 3,000 privatF:s must not be forgotten because without vehicles, refueling
tankers, and gr~und-based radio facilities, the helicopter is but a lifeless
machine. All o.f these personnel have to be trained to perform the same
overall combat mission.
* Third edition: Major repairs that are an Ordnance responsibility.
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FOR ( ,
Hence instruction and training is a priority matter not only in ALAT
schools but likewise in all ALAT units.
Training Costs and Facilities
What is the cost of this peacetime instriiction and training? In personnel,
equipment, and helicopters or flying hours, this cost accounts for 20 percent
of ALAT's total budget. At first glance, the bill seems quite high. Yet can
a student pilot fly for an hour without requiring an hour of an instructor
pilot's time? And how can annual flying hours be expressed other than in
the ~ours of work performed by a mechauic?
Admittedly modern technology is making it increasingly possible to use
simulators as training sids. For instance, there are flight simulators for
the SA 330 and Gazelle helicopters, plus a HOT [antitank missile] fire
simulator. But while these aids do facilitate the instructor's task, they
do not exclude his presence in the large ma~ority of cases. For the time
being, however, simulators are capable of imparting only a certain knowledge
and not real know-how.
_ Some 10 years ago, a missile operator's training program included the firing
of 10 live rounds. Today, a HOT operator completes his training by firing
one real missile after having "fired" about 500 with a simulator.
Mountain Training
The pilot training program at both the ALAT Tactical Training School and ALAT
Specialization Training School includes a mountain training phase. Why?
The answer is simple. Except for those who live in them, mountains mean wild
and jagged terrain, an unusual and hence hostile environment with surprising
reactions that are at times difficult to foresee. Yet all of our crews
must be eapable of operating in mountainous terrain in support of our ,
Alpine troops. It is, therefore, altogether logical to teach our piiota to
fly in this environment where they can sharpen their skills and become more
aware of the limits of their equipment. This training is progressive and
always includes a pre-mountain phase before flqing above 2,000 meters. At
that altitude, the pilot will be confronted with a view altogether different
from what he sees in flat open country. He will fly in thinner air and will
have to land in extremely varied terrain such as ridge lines, slopes, and
valley floors. His chief ally--or enemy if he misunderstands it--will be the
wind that may even prevent him from making some landings. Consequently
mountains are, as for the alpinist, a veritable training school. For that
reason, ALAT operates a permanent flight training center in Saillagouse, near
Mont Louis. All French pilots and many foreign pilots train there.
The obvious conclusion is that instruct3on in ALAT represents a considerable
investment. It is still a very modest expenditure, however, if we
compare it with the cost of the equipment traineea are being taught to use.
Furthermore, it is necessary if ALAT units are to perform their assigned
missions effectively.
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New Selection Criteria
Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Mar 82 pp 43-44
[Article by Captain Maurice de Vasselot de Regne, chief of the ALAT sircrew ~
personnel selection branch center; a 1966 graduate of Saint Cyr (EMIA), he
first served as a platoon commander in the Armor; after earning his wings as
a helicopter pilot in 1972, he was assigned as instructor pilot at the
ALAT Specialization Training School in Dax and later as C.O. 3d Squa.dron,
Sth Light Helicopter Group; he has logged a total of 3,000 flying hours:
"Recruitment and Selection of ALAT Personnel"]
[TextJ In 1956, Headquarters ALAT approved the use of psychological-technical
tests in its aircrew personnel selection process. These tests were devised
by the Air Force Center for Applied Psychology Studies and Research (CERPAIR)
in Le Bourget. For the past few months, these tests have been administered
to women candidates for helicopter pilot training.
Following the 1973 decision to transform ALAT into exculsively a helicopter
force, the Directorate of Armament Research, Studies, and Techniques (DRET)
directad the Center for Applied Psychology Research and Studies (CERPA) in
Toulon to develop a new aircrew personnel selection system.
After a feasibility study based on a survey of 165 instructor pilots and 800
student pilots throughout their training, an ALAT selection branch of the
lst CS [Selection Center] was established on a trial basis on 10 May 1977.
Because of the results obtained, the ALAT aircrew personnel selection branch
center was officially activated in the Fort Neuf [New Fort] at Vincennes on
13 April 1981.
Recruitment
ALAT officers and NCO's are drawn from extremely diversified sources.
Officers
Cadets attending the military academies at Coetquidan--ESM-EMA [Special
Military Academy (former Saint Cyr)-Interarms Military Academy]--who opt for
service in ALAT are required to take the flight physical and psychological-
technical tests for aircrew personnel during their first year after
graduation while attending the lieutenant's course at one of the service
schools. After 2 years of troop duty as a platoon commander, they are
required to confirm their option before being assigned to the Flight Training
School at Dax.
Approximately 150 off icers in each graduating class at Coetquidan opt for
ALAT, but the latter's annual requirement is only for 30 officer pilots.
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Noncommissioned Officers
There are several recruitment methoda:
1. Direct Recruitment
Young persons recruited by army information centers and meeting the "branch
09" eligibility requirements prescribed for admission to the National
Noncom~issioned Officers 5chool (ENSOA) at Saint Maixent, are given a flight
physical and aircrew personnel psychological-technical tests. They are
selected by Headquarters ALAT.
2. Lateral Recruitment
Regular NCO's of the army's arms and services who are under 30 years old and V
have at least 5 years of service may be admitted into AI~AT after having been
rated "aircrew qualified" upon completion of their flight physical and
psychological-technical tests.
3. Semidirect Recruitment
EVSO's [volunteer student NCO's] who have successfully completed the ENSOA
course and who meet the same eligibility requirements as applicants for
direct recruitment are offered the opportunity of serving in ALAT upon
graduation from that school.
Before being assigned to the Flight Training School at Dax they muat have
served 2 years in a troop unit after having obtained the BMP 1[First Degree
Professional Military Certif icate]. In addition, their "aircrew qualified"
status must be revalidated.
'Branch 09' Eligibility Requirements
SIGYCOP [physical profile]: 1 2 2 1 1 2 2; NG [expansion unknown]: 12 or
higher; NS [expansion unknown]: 3 or higher; general knowledge test;
score of 15 or higher; height: between 1.6 and 1.9 meters.
Certain air force and navy noncommissioned officers may apply for aircrew
duty in ALAT. Eligibility requirementa are described in directives specific
to each of the two services.
Selection
The aircrew personnel selection branch center administers a batter of tests
adapted to ALAT requirements: tests to measure an applicant's aptitude for
helicopter pilot training and his ad~ustability to militarq life.
The selection system's originality consists in introducing tests designed to
assess the applicant's military and aeronautical motivation and study any
vulnerability manifested during stressful situations.
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rvn vrr~~tr+a. l~J?. V~~L~
The battery of tests includes:
1. A neurophysiological examination designed to screen out applicants who
display certain traits liable to make them unfit for operational flying.
2. Psymochetric questionnaires that inquire into the applicant's antecedents,
his military and aeronautical motivation, and his psychometric and
temperamental characteristics.
3. Psychomoter tests or simulated flying tests, the results of which are
used to construct a perfectibility curve. The applicant's behavior during
these tests is also scrutinized.
An applicant's processing in the selection branch center ends with an
interview with the clinical psychologist attached to the center and an officer
observer-pilot. A synthesis of the results is prepared jointly by the
psychologist and the chief of the aircrew selection branch center. The
resultant classification of applicants cannot be considered to be a positive
index of success or failure but merely a statistical index expressed as a
percentage chance of success.
The ALAT selection branch also examines helicopter pilot training applicants
for the Gendarmerie, Ordnance Corps, Paris fire brigade, Civil Defense
Organization, and Customs Service. It processes approximately 1~000
applicants per year.
In 1980, 52 trainees were accepted for the ENSOA; 48 of them graduated and
were promoted to NCO rank; 47 of these NCO's entered the Flight Training
School and 39 are now rated pilots.
Thus the success rate from admission to the ENSOA to graduation from the ALAT
Flight Training School is 75 percent.
Any selection system whose validity is not checked regularly is liable to
become ineffective quite rapidly. For that reason, parts of the test battery
were validated during the trial phase. Such partial validation has continued
with regard to all applicants accepted for pilot training since July 1973.
The new selection system is based on modern methods of obtaining and
interpreting, in real time, a well-rounded picture of the applicant's
personality.
The system uses situational tests that place the applicant as closely as
possible in real-life situations faced by a pilot. These tests constitute the
first step in seeking an essential correlation between the selection of
personnel and their military and technical training.
The continuous effort to enhance efficiency and performance in the use of
complex and sophisticated equip.ment demands of aircrew personnel a high degree
of skill and military motivation.
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Their processing at the AI.AT aircrew personnel selection branch center in
Vincennes is the first stage in the selection of this personnel.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 Revue des forces armees francaises "Armees d'Aujourd'hui"
8041
CSO: 3100/500
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FUK Urrll;lAL UJC. U(VLY
MILITARY FRANCE
COLONEL URGES PREPARATION FOR CH~"IICAL WARFARE
Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Mar 82 pp 62-64
[Article by Colonel Claude Meyer, commandant of the ~Yench Army NBC (Nuclear,
Biological, Chemical) Defense School. After graduating from Saint Cyr (ESMIA),
class of 1955, Colonel Meyer served in artillery regiments and staffs. He
completed his advanced techn.~cal military education (BTEMS) in chemistry in
1965 and has since then hac? various duty asaignments in NBC units and staffs:
"Chemical Warfare, Past and Future"]
[Excerpts] The t~~levision viewer and even the least
informed re~der cannot help but note the frequent references
to chemical warfar-e in all of the media thesp days. TI1i3
situatiun raises +.he following qvestion: Have ck~emical
weapons--introduced onto the battlefield:~ in 191!~ but
absent therefrdm dur'^g World War II-~-d.efinitely iallon
into disuse or, on t~ie contrary, m�tst indications of their
seeming resurgence be tal.cen seriously? The following
article does not discus~ the problem of protecting civilian
populations from this threat. It examines chemical warfare
from the standpoint of forces conducting combat operations.
Nor does it deal with biological warfare which is
altogether different in nature from chemical warfare.
The article expresses the author's personal views and does
not necessarily reflect official French Ministry of
Defense and Armed Forces policy~
Preparation for war implies extensive knowledge of the threat in a11 of its
forms so as to enable us to cope with it and turn the situation to our
advantage. If we were to ignore or overlook an entire ma~or category of
weapons possessed by a potential enemy, we would be under an insurmountable
handicap. The specificity of chemical weapons, with their background of
terror and the inhuman aspect we attribute to them, would make the situation
even more serious. That is why it is essential for us to examine with the
greatest possible care the chemical risks in the context of a European
conflict during the period 1980-2000 and be clear-sighted enough to draw
the necessary inferences from such study.
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From a technical standpoint. the new toxins are extraordinariZy more
effective than first-generation toxins. This qualitative "leap" is measured
by a factor af approximately 50 for nonpersistent agents~~-those called
gases for a long time--and reaches a factor of 500 for certain persistent
agents, i.e. those which enter into the body through the skin in the form of
undiscernible droplets. Consequently a man can be incapacitated by minute
quantities of such substances and their employment requires merely
reasonable logistical support.
Furthermore, recent advances have further increased the effectiveness of
modern chemical agents: thickened toxins that impede decontamination
measures, mixtures that complicate protective measures.
We are, therefore, obliged to conclude that the nature of chemical warfare
has changed. If not a new type of warfare, it is at least one that must be
~ viewed in an entirely new light. Techaical progress has radically changed
basic tactical considerations. Chemical warfare is now militarily "credible."
What is kno~m about the available means of waging chemical warfare? How
prepared are the armed forces of the wo~ld's major nations?
It is common knowledge that the Western World's chemical warfare capability
is that of the United States. In the 1950's that country made a very great
effort and built itself a respectable arsenal of modern chemical weapons.
But failure to have replaced it in time has caused the arsenal to become
obsolescent. As a matter of fact, chemical ammunition occasionally poaes
serious storage and preservation problems and much of it has to be disposed
of for safety reasons.
The U.S. armed forces are currentlq believed to have a chemical weapons
stockpile equivalent to 35,000 tons of toxins. In the U.S.A. there is a
certain noticeable desire to "upgrade and update" this arsenal by getting
back int,~ chemical weapons production.
For while the American capability has eroded, such is not the case in Soviet
bloc countries where there has been a continuous massive investment in
chemical warfare. The ratio of chemical warfare forcea is considered to be
10 to 1 in favor of the East. Actuallq this figure is probably an
underestimation because of the geographical distribution of stocks. Moreover,
experts concure in acknowledging the excellent level of operational and
psychological readiness of the Warsaw Pact forces. Their troops train with
real chemical agents. Staffs take chemical warfare factors into consideration
in their planning. There are chemical warfare specialists assigned at all
command echelons. The Soviet Union reportedly has some 100,000 men in
its so-called "chemical" troops.
All of this has changed the tactical context and created conditions conducive
to an imbalance. All of this blurs the reasons for refraining from the
use of chemical agents, reasons that may formerly have prevailed.
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Geneva Convention
- All of this brings up a philosophical question. What influential role could
international conventions play? Whenever chemical weapons are at issue,
the temptation is to take cover behind the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which
prohibits the use of "asphyxiating, toxic, or similar gases" and casts
"the civilized world's" discredit upon this type of weaponry.
To begin with, however, this protocol was a follow-up to several other
agreements--the most important one having been signed at The Hague in 1899~--
all prior to World War I, and all of which remained a dead letter in 1915.
Furthermore, the signatories actually agreed only not to use chemical weapona
first, while reserving the right to retaliate in kind. Thus the slightest
incident, the slighest provocation, would be enough to trigger a general
chemical war through a series of successive reactions.
Lastly, the actual validity of referring to world opinion is questionable.
Could the fear of international reprobation restrain nations fully prepared
for such disapproval from using a type of weapon capable of giving them a
ma~or advantage?
The great powers are, of course, quietly continuing chemical disarmament
talks at the Geneva Disarmament Conference. Yet even though an agreement ~
is theoretically not impossible in the long r.un--despite some very slow ~
progress--we have every right to be skeptical about such an agreement's I
significance if it does not include a system of verification. But ~
implementation of such a system on nat3onal territoriea does appear to be
utterly impractical, and especially since certain modern production methods I
would make it possible to easily foil any inspection. ,
Consequently the ri~terrent character of international conventions is not
such as to reassure us when faced with the risk of chemical warfare.
The aforementioned conditions--decisive technical developments, acknowledged
absence of balanced forces, and skepticism about the effertiveness of.
agreements--mean that dodging the issue by referring to past conflicts
would now be tantamoimt to our assuming a suicidal attitude. In other. words,
we cannot finesse our way out of this problem.
This necessitates preparing our armed forces for chemical warfare. To maintain
our operational capability, such preparation must render us capable of
withstanding, without excessive losses, or; attacks liable to be launched
against us.
This problem has long been neglected. Hiding beh3nd the broad concept of
"special weapons," some persons placed chemical and nuclear weapons in the
same category. This had the dual advantage of artificially moving the threat
away from the troops by placing it in the military~political sphere, and of
completely handing the problem over to specialists.
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Now, however, a new and contrary pattern seems to be commanding attention.
_ Literature on the sub~ect indicates that chemical warfare is being
conventionalized. While nuclear weapons remain capable of completely changing
the nature of a conflict, chemical weapons can strike anytime and anywhere
on the battlefield like conventiot.al weapons.
Meeting the Threat
The threat thus having been defined and confirmed~ one vital question remains:
Are we prepared to meet it?
These past few years, France, like its allies~ has taken cognizance of its
c;~rrent necessities. Our units are equipped with first--generation equipment.
Our personnel are receiving increasingly better instruction and training.
Above all, however, we have entered an important stage characterized by the
following measures: issuance of second-generation individual protective
clothing and equipment plus detection and warning devices; activation of NBC
defense regiments at army corps level, thereby enabling commanders to
concentrate their reconnaissance and decontamination efforts on a required
area; offering staff-officer courses at the Army NBC Defense School, courses
based entirely on operational considerations. Our progress is on a par
with that being made by our allies. In general, there is no noticeable
difference between our standards and those of our allies. This is quite
normal in view of the present very active cooperation in chemical warfare
matters.
Does this mean then that everything is running smoothly in the best of chemical
worlds?
- Unf~rtuna.tely things are not that simple. The truth is that chemical defense
will long remain cumbersomely restraining. Suitable protective measures can,
of. course, save the lives of most troops provided they are well-trained.
Defense against liquid toxins requires complete protection of the body. The
effectiveness of protective clothing has a severe counteraction, however,
in the form of physiological discomfort, and the higher the temperature the
greater the discomfort. Hence a choice would have to be made between
� acceptance beforehand of losses due to chemical agents, an intolerable
situation, and a reduction in the operational capacity of units through
physical and psychological attrition, a situation that is not much more
satisfactory.
It is even less satisfactory when one realizes that the heavy odds are that
the enemy will not have similar handicaps inasmuch as he will seek to make
maximum use of his advantage by attacking preferably those forces incapable
of retaliating in kind.
Is this problem therefore insolvable? Is there no appropriate response to
this challE.nge?
A larger and larger nim?ber of Westem experts believe and write that there is
only one feasible solution which would consist in reducing the present
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imbalance so as to keep the enemy from yielding to temptation.
It is sound tactics to encumber the enemy by compelling him in turn to fight
swaddled in unwieldy and exhausting protective clothing and have the pace of
his maneuver slowed by the multiple precautions he would have to take.
Yet the risk of such tactics cannot be accepted without caution.
A drastic solution with the attendant dangers inherent in proliferation?
Certainly, and the problem is not a simple one. But it has to be faced
because, here as in other fields, military history shows us the deterrent
character of certain balances, even partial balances.
Thus, for nations desiring to have a coherent defense, the fact of arming
themselves with a limited chemical arsenal could contribute to banishing �
the specter of chemical warfare. Though paradoxical, would this not be the
most effective way of complying caith the Geneva Convention?
COPYRIGHT: 1982 Revue des forces armees francaises "Armees d'Aujourd'hui"
8041
CSO: 3100/501
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GENERAL FRANCE
CNES PLANS NEW BUILDINGS FOR SATELLITE PROJECTS
Paris AIR ET COSMOS in French 6 Mar 82 pp 42, 48
[Article: "New CNES Space Installations in Toulouse"]
[Text) The forthcoming development at the Toulouse Space Center [CSTJ,
which is operated by the CNES [National Space Studies Center], of activities
for the operation of satellites, and in particular application satellites
(SP~T, Telecom 1, TDF 1, Sarsat-Sargos), will involve the construction,
beginning this year, of two new buildings (see AIR ET COSMOS N4 867) with a
surface area of 7,400 m2, or one-tenth the existing area of the buildings of
the CST.
The first new building--provisionally given the name "Space Systems"
building--will house, in three stories, the Center for the Processing of
Space Messages (CRIS), the Mission Control Center (CCM) for "SPOT," the two
Specialized Con~rol Centers (CCS) for TDF-Expo!�t, and the "Sarsat" project.
This building will have a surface area, spread out on three stories, of
2,855 m2.
The necessary equipment for the management of the "SPOT" system--at the
Aussaguel-Issus image-reception station, at the Center for the Processing of
Space Messages (CRIS), and at the Mission Control Center (CCM)--will be very
substantial. There will be no fewer than 15 calculators of the Solar type,
with their accessories, wtiich will take up 150 m2 of floorspace at
Aussaguel-Issus for the image-reception station, and 1,100 m2 for
technical installations and about 35 offices at the CST. Two zones will be
provided for the operation of the "TDF 1" satellite.
One of them will be for the installation of the specialized control center for
the preoperational "TDF 1" satellite, whose principal mission is to provide
for the management of the plat'form and of the payload, as we11 as for
maintenance on board the satellite. This control center will be connected to
two other stations (a switching station at Bprceney-en-Othe and specific
station) and to the center for operation of the payload.
The other zone for the "TDF 1" satellite will involve the installation of a
control center serving operational satellites, the responsibility for which
will be turned over to the CNES (particularly for the Swedish satellite
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rux urrt~~,L u~~ uNLY
"TELE-X"). This center will also be able to provide for the maintenance, on a
temporary hasis, of these satellites during ''receiving~' operations when they ,
are in flight, or in case of a failure of domestic systems for the maintenance
of the satellites. It will also be able to be used in the development and
preparation of particular operations.
For the "Sarsat" project, a station to receive and process signals from
American and Soviet satellites is presently being set up at the "Sarsat"
mission control center, where distress signals will be processed. This center
will be connected, on the one hand, to the other control centers of the
countries participating in the program and, on the other hand, to French and
foreign rescue centers which will direct rescue operations. The functioning
of the alarm service of the control center will be handled by a team from the
Directorate General of Civil Aviation assigned to the CST, while the initial
startup of the station is to be handled by the CNES. The teams will provida
for a continuous watch, 24 hours out of 24.
The demonstration phase of the "Sarsat-Cospas" ~roject will last for at least
1 year. It will begin in 1982, 4 months after the launching of the first
satellites such as the "NOAA-E." The first few months will be reserved for
technical trials for systems evaluation. The experimental distress beacons
are now being developed.
The second building will have a surface area of 2,470 m2. It will be
assigned to the SPOT-Image Company, which is charged with the promotion and I
commercial sale of imagery provided by the "SF~DT" satellite tiiroaghout the I
world. ~
I
At the time of the launching of the "SPOT" satellite, expected in May 1984, the ~
SPOT-Image ComFany will have need for: 500 m2 for a photographic lab~:atory, ;
300 m2 for information offices, 250 m2 for the reception of customers, and ;
250 m2 for files and office space for 39 people by 1985 (50 people in 1990).
As this building will be constructed for the SPOT-Image Company out of the CNES
budget, the SPOT-Image Company will pay the CNES annual rent for the building
and for services rendered.
FIAS Center ~
In addition, in response to the growing demands for training of foreign
engineers and technicians which have resulted from the interest shown by many
countries in space technology, the CNES has decided to join in the effort
undertaken by the French Aeronautical and Space Industries Group (GIFAS) to
establish a Center for International Aerospace Training (FIAS) in Toulouse.
The CNES is putting at the disposal of GIFAS 17,000 m2 of land ad~oining the
National Civil Aviation School (ENAC) for the construction of the Toulouse
center of the FIA'S, which will include: a classroom building (450 m2), a
conference room (with space for 250 people), and a residence for the students
(2U0 rooms, a restaurant, and a gymnasium).
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Construction of these pro~ects~ which will begin ~n February' will be
completed at the beginning of the 1983�-1984 university year.
COPYRIGHT: A. & C. 1982
5170
CSO: 3100/431
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GENF.RAL NETHERLANDS
MISSION, PROBLEMS OF SECURIT~, INTELLIGENCE SERVICES
Amsterdam VRIJ NEDERLAND in Dutch 20 Mar 82 p 10 ~
[Report by Rudie van Meurs: "How Was That Again with the Intelligence Services?"]
[Text] Two ye ars ago the Internal Security Sexvi.ce (BVD) had been in existence
for 35 years. In his congratulory speerh, Minister H. Wiegel (Internal Affairs)
took into account that the question about the "good faith" of the service would
come up again and again. "We must not lament that or get irritated about it," he
soothed those present. "It is the democracy itself which puts this thorn in our
flesh, and it is good that it stings."
The lumps and wounds this thorn leaves behind regularly become public. Just last
week it became known how the BVD misled a widow from The Hague in order to spy on
a former member of the Red Youth from her front room. That same day HET VRIJE
VOLK described the attempts of the BVD to increase drastically the number of con-
fidential posts in the government while according to policy that number should
be decreased instead The Internal Security Service, during its 37 years of
existence, has become the most famous or the most infamous if you like es-
pionnage service in the Netherlands. An apparatus with 750 permanent civil ser-
vants, part of whom operate from the headquarters at Stadhouderslaan in The
Hague and another part of whom work in the "external service." Yet, the BVD is
only one of the intelligence- and security services of the Netherlands.
Last week the Foreign Intelligence Service (IDB) caused a controversy. The
ALGEI~EN DAGBLAD reported an exit of civil servants who can no longer cope with
the tensions. Not because their work is so nerve-racking, but because the person-
nel policy is failing. It has been like that for years. Alrea dy in 1977 the
report of the permanent chamber commission on intelligence and security mentioned
problems within the IDB. "They were partly in the personne~ area, and partly
they concerned the limitation which charges the co-workers of the service only
with the gathering of information and does not give them the opportunity to in-
volve themselves also to some extent with the judging and evaluating of that in-
formation for its possible significance in the forming of policy." A change was
made in the orgar~ization, but the gentlemen remained dissatisfied. The Foreign
Intelligence Service falls directly under the prime minister (general aff airs
The task of the IDB is "the gathering of inf ormation on foreign countries which
can be of importance to the government." Until recently the information gathered
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by the Foreign Intelligence Service has been 80 percent of a military nature,
while the remainder is in the political-economic area. For a long time already,
the ministers wanted the "political-economic area" to gain more importance. That
did not happen. The foreign espionnage service is led by officers of the ex-
ternal service who come primarily from the Marine Corps of the Royal Navy and
those people have their preferences. There are also military intelligence se~~
vices: the Naval Intelligence Service (MARID), the Land Forces Intelligence
Service (LANID), and the Air Force Intelligence Service (LUID). Those three ser-
vices operate under the responsibility of the minister of defense. LANID, for
example, recently went after a former military man in Land van Heusden and Altena
who had founded a grassroots group of the Organization of Conscientious Objectors
in his hometown. The three military intelligence services have a grand tasks
they must "gather information about the potential and the military forces of
other powers,which i~ necessary for a proper build up and effective utiliza-
tion of the military forces." Moreover they must gather information "necessary
for the protection of the army." One might say that the Foreign Intelli~ence
_ Service and the military intelligence services are involved in active espion-
nage for the Dutch Government. The five intelligence- and security services have
a coordinator who falls under the responsibility of the pri.me minister. That co-
ordinator is a powerful man. He is authorized to "invite other government
bodies, government services and civil servants to supply information considered
necessary by him to carry out his task."
And the various intelligence services, in their turn, can reap advantage from
that. But r.he most powerful of all is the Internal Security Service of which
H. Beernink said on one occasion (but that was before he was minister of inter-
nal affairs and responsible man of the BVD): "In my opinion the BVD, as an in-
stitution, as a secret police, means a violation of the Dutch polity as desired
by the legislator. It is a shame that the government has preserved this insti-
tution after the war."
The BVD, just like the other services, operates secretly. Its task is to "gather
information concerning organizations, groups and individuals with respect to whom
in view of their goals or actual activities there are serious suspicions
that they are a danger to the survival of the democratic legal order in the state,
or that damage to the security or other important interests of the state is to
be feared from them." And the BVD further serves the promotion of ineasures to ~
protect information whose secrecy, in the interest�of those sectors of the govern-
ment service and of industry, is of vital importance for the keeping intact of
society."
Which those organizations are that want to overthrow the democratic legal order
is determined primarily by the BVD itself. The secret services are controlled
by the pe rmanent chamber commission for intelligence- and security services (the
parliamentary group chairmen of the big parties) which meets in secret. Thus
the democracy is being preserved.
The espionnage and counter-espionnage services are assisted in their work by the
Police Intelligence Service (PID) which is housed in any good-sized police bureau;
the protection officials of the departments, Second Chamber and other government
services; the military police and especially the border guard; the security of-
ficers of the larger Dutch companies such as Philips, Holland Signaal and DAF;
and officials in the tax service. And that is only a small handful. A complete
inventory of all secret operations would approximately furnish the picture of
one half of the Netherlands controlling the other Y?alf.
END
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