JPRS ID: 10423 TRANSLATION TANK ATTACK

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JPRS L/ 10423
31 March 1982
~ Translatic~n
~ T'ANK ATTACK
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JPRS L/10423
31 March 1982
TANK ATTACK
Mosco~a TANKOVYY UDAR in Russ~an 1977 (signed to press 1 Dec 76)
pp 1-271
[Book by Prof, Arm Gen Aleksey Tvanovich Radziyevskiy "Tankovyy udar
(Tankovaya armiya v nastupatel'noy operatsii fronta po opytu Velik~y
Otechestvennoy voyny7" jTank Attack (The Tank Army in a Front-Level
Offensive Operation from the Experience of th~ Great Patriotic War]
Vcyenizdat, 20,000 copies, 271 pages plus appended diagrams]
CONTENTS
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ 1
CHAPTER I: TANK ARMIES AND THE BASES OF THEIR COMBAT EMPLOY~~ENT 4
l. Soviet Armored Troops on the Eve of the War . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. The Formation of Tank Armies, Their Organizational Structure
and Combat Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3. Principles in the Combat Employment of Tank Armies 2~3
CHAPTER II: THE PREPAR.ATION OF OFFENSIVE OPE:ZATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
l. Conditicns and Methods for Preparing the Operations 43
2. Adopting the P1an for the Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3. The Planning of Combat Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4. Issuing of Combat Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5. The Organization of Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7C~
6. The Organization of Control Posts and Communications 76
7. Combat Training of the Troops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
8. Parey Political Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
CEIAPTER III: THE CONDUCT OF OI'FENSIVE OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
. 1. 'i'he Committing of Tank Armies to the Engagement and the
Development of the Success . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
2. PiirSUit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
3. T!Ze Cond uct of Meeting Encounters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
4. Crussing Intermediate Defensive Lines and Maneuvering in the
Operational Depth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
5. Crossing Water Obstacles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
G. 0~~~~rations of Tank Armies in Pincer Optrations . . . . . . . . . . . 141
jII - USSR - FOuO]
-a_ jIII - USSR - 4 FOUO]
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Page
7. The Conduct of Combat Operations to Capture Cities 148
8. A Tank Army Offensive from Direct Contact with the Enemy 153
9. The Conduct of the Defensive in the Course of Offensive Operations . 158
10. Troop Control in the Course of Offensive Operations 165
CHAPTER IV: MAINTAINING AND RESTORING THE BATTLEWORTHINESS OF TANK ARMIES 184
l. Operations of Tank Armies with Limited Forces under Conditions of
Signif icant Losses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
2. The Repairing of Combat Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
3. Maintaining Material Supplies at the Required Level 199
4. Bringing the Armies Up to Strength for Personnel 208
5. Measures to Maintain High Troop Morale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
Conclt~sion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
- Diagrams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
(BRIEF ANNOTATION] ~
Using extensive factual material, the work analyzes the experience of employing tank
armies in offensive operations during the Great Patriotic War. The book discloses
the prerequisites for forming tank armies, their organizational structure and combat
capabi?ities, the questions of preparing for the operations, the committing of the
armies to an engagement and actioas in the operational depth. A major place has
been given to the art of controlling the tank troops. Also examined are the ques-
tions of maintaining and restoring tank army combat carabi_lity.
The book is designed for officers and generals in the Soviet Army as well as for ~
everyone interested in military history.
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INTRODUCTION
The main trend in the development of present-day international relations is the turn
away from hostile confrontation to detente and to peaceful coexistence and coopera-
tion between states with different social systems. .This turn of events has been
caused by changes in the balance of forces on the world scene and has been possible
due primarily to the active and enterprising foreign policy of the USSR and the
other nations of the socialist commonwealth. In consistently and steadily carrying
out a policy of strengthening universal peace and international security and supple-
menting political detente with military 3etente, the Communist Party and the Soviet
government at the same time have not for an instant overlooked the aggressive aspir-
ations af the reactionary imperialist circles and decisively condemn their efforts
aimed at increasing military preparati.ons, continuing the arms race, inflating mil-
itary budgets and returning to Cold War times.
The General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade L, I. ~3rezhnev, in the
Accountability Report at the 25th CPSU Congress said: "The enemies of detente and
disarmament still possess sizable resources. They are working actively, in various
forms and from different directions. Although at present the possibilities of ag-
gressive actions by imperialism have been significantly curtailed, its nature re-
mains the same. For this reason the peace-loving forces must show high vigilance.
Energetic actions and unity are required among all the forces of peace and good
will."1
The Soviet Armed Forces vigilant~y guard the interests of ~he Soviet state, peace
and the construction of communism. In the postwar times they have changed beyond
recognition in a comparatively short historical period.
On the basis of scientific and technical achievements, at present n~w types of
weapons are being developed more rapidly than ever before and these have signifi-
cantly increased the fire power, strike force and maneuverability of the troops,
tha organizational structure of the Armed Forces has been improved ane~ the methods
of preparing and conducting combat operations have been bettered.
Quite understandably all of this has constantly necessitated the further development
of a riumber of military theoretical questions, including the provisions related to
defining the role of tank troops in modern warfare and the methods of their combat
employment. A profound, critical analysis of the very rich experience of the Great
Patriotic War and, in particular, tr~e employment of tank armies in it helps largely
in successfully solving these problems.
1
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ruK ~rri~.,~?., ~~r, ur~~Y
uuriu~ che years of the past war the Soviet Tank Troops were the main assault and
maneuvering force af the Ground Troops. They played an important role in breaking
through enemy defenses and were the decisive means for developing a tactical success
into an operational one. The first of these tasks was carried out predominantly b~
a portion of the tank forces, that is, by the separate tank brigades and regiments
which were attached to the rifle formations and use3 for direct infantry support.
The second task was carried out by the basic mass of the tank troops, that is, by
the tank and mechanized corps and tank armies, alti~ough they frequently were em-
ployed for completing the breakthrough of defenses.
Over the war years, the tank troops developed into a mighty force. By the begin-
ning of 1945, there were 34 tank and mechanized corps in the operational army of
which one-half of them was part of the six existing tank armies.
The tank armies were a resource of Headquarters, Supreme High Command [Hq SHC] and
were attached to fronts operating on the main sectors, as a rule, for use as an
echelon to exploit a success. Having up to 600-800 and more tanks and self-propelled
artillery mounts [SAU], they made powerful tank attacks against the enemy to a great
depth, they defeated its operational reserves and rear services and created good con-
ditions for surrounding and destroying enemy groupings, often operating a significan~
distance away from the fronts' remaining forces. In certain instances, the tank
armies advanced in the front's first echelon and in completing the frontal offensive
operations also engaged in defensive operations in a difficult and tight situation.
The extensive employment of tank armies, the general growth of the combat might of
the front field forces and the improved art of preparin.g and conducting combat oper-
ations considering the war's experience substantially have altered the zature of of-
fensive operations. Their dPcisiveness has risen, the depth and pace have increased,
the duration has been shortened while combat operations have become much more fluid
and dynamic.
Modern offensive operations will also be characterized by a decisiveness of aims,
by great scope, maneuverability and dynamicness of combat operations. For precisely
this reason, a study of the experience of t:he combat employment of tank armies dur-
ing the years of the Great Patriotic War at present is of important significance.
The wartime combat experience and theoretical views in many regards have not lost
their significance for present-day conditions. Their study, theoretical assimila-
tion and use are one of the imnortant tasks of Soviet military science.
In generalizing and analyzing the experience of the employment of tank armies during
the offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War, the author has endeavored to
disclose the preconditions for their formation, their combat capabilities, the form~
and m,ethods of preparing and conducting the operatio,zs, the most characteristic
, traits of combat operations and the ways for improving the art of troop control and
command, the maintaining and restoring of battleworthiness.
- The work is based upon archival documentary materials, official manuals, published
military history works as well as the author's personal recollections. Since during
the war years the author served in the 2d Guards Tank Army, naturally the work pays
more attention to analyzing the experience of its combat operations:
2
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A study of the experience of the combat employment of tank armies during the years
of the Great Patriotic War will contribute to a more profound understanding of the
nature of offensive operations, to broadening the operational-tactical viewpo`:nt of
Soviet officers and to improving their military thinking. It will serve th~ cause
also of further strengthening the combat might of our Armed Forces.
FOOTNOTE
1 L. I. Brezhnev, "Otchet Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS i ocherednyye zadachi partii
v oblasti vnutrenney i vneshney po?:.itiki" [Report of the CPS'J Central Committee
and the Party's Next Tasks in the Area of Domestic and Foreign Policy], Moscow,
Politizdat, 1976, p 28.
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~
CHAPTER I: TANK ARMIES AN1; THE BASES OF THEIR COMBAT EMPLOYMENT
During the years of thP Great Patriotic War the forming of tank armies which pos-
sessed hi.gh mobility, maneuverability and striking force was a natural phenomenon
stemming from the entire previous developmental history of the Soviet armored and
tank tr.oops. This ~oas cz~itsed by the need to conduct offensive operations with de-
cisive goals to a great depth and at a rapid pace. The successes of socialist con-
struction, in particular in the defense economy, created the material and technical
basis which made it possible to turn this necessity into a reality.
1, Soviet Armored Troops on the Eve of the War
Weapons and Organizational Structure of Armored Troops
On 23 February 1922, on the day of the fourth anniversary of the creation of the
Worker-Peasant Red Army [RKKA], participating for the first time in the parade on
Red Square was an armored detachment consisting of seven armored vehicles and sev-
eral auxiliary ones. In it wer~ also two 6oviet-produced light tanks and during the
summer of the same year the TOE were fcr the first time established for peacetime
armored units.
A year later, at the beginning of September 1923, the ~rmored forces underwent new
organizational changes. The individual small motor-tank detachments (armored de-
tachments) were grouped into a relatively large formation, a tank "squadror_" which
consisted of two f leets: heavy and light.
.
In 1925, the TOE were introduced for the separate heavy and separate light tank
battalions. Each battalion was to have 34 tanks.
In the summer of 1929, an experimer.tal mechanized regiment was organized and this
was under the comanand of one of the prominent proponents of creating the armored
and mechanized troops, K. B. Kalinovskiy. On the basis of this regiment, in May
1930, the world's first armored f~rmation was organized, a mechanized brigade con-
sisting of tank and motorized regiments, reconnaissance and artillery battalions
as well as a number of special subunits. It had 60 tanks, 32 tankettes, 17 armored
vehicles, 264 motor vehicles and 12 tractors.2
Under the decree of the Labor and Defense Council of 1 August 1931, the so-cailed
large tank program was adopted and this proceeded from the view that technical
achievements in the area of Soviet tank construction "have created solid prerequ~-
sites for a fundamental change in the overall operational-tactical doctrine on the
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use of tanks and have demanded decisive organizational changes in the motor-tank
troops in the direction of creating higher mechanized formatio~:s capable of inde-
' pendently car~:ying out tasks both on the battlefield and to the entire operational
depth of a modern combat front."3
Tn the autumn of 1932, on the basis of the llth Rifle Division in the Leningrad
Military District the XI Mechanized Corps was formed and on the basis of the 45ch
Rifle Division in the Ukrainian District, the VL Mechanized Corps. The mechanized
corps included a mechanized brigade of T-26 tanks (three tank battalions, a rifle-
_ machine gun battalion, an artillery battalion, a combat engineer battalion and an
antiaircraf* machine company), a brigade of the same composition but with BT tanks,
a rifle brigade and corps units. The corps had around 500 tanks, over 200 armored
vehicles, 60 guns and other armament.
During the same year the formation was commenced of 5 separate mechanized brigadPS,
2 tank regiments, 17_ mechanized regiments, 4 mechanized battalions for the cavalry
divisions, 15 tank and 65 tankei.te battalions for the rifle divisions. As a result
of these measures, the number of personnel in the motor-tank troops by January 1933
hdd increased by 5.5-fold in compari~on with 1~31 while their proportional amount
in the army increased from 1.6 to 9.1 percent.4
. The ~;otor-tank troops were armed with new equipment including: tne T-27 small tanks
(*3nkettes), the T-26 and BT-2 light tanks, the T-28 medium tanks and the T-35 heavy
tanks.
On 1 January 1933, our Arme: Forces had 2 mechanized corps, 5 mechanized brigades,
2 separate tank regiments, 12 mechanized regiments, 15 separate tank battalions and
' 69 mechanized and tankette battalions. In 1932-1933, the plant conveyors began
turning out BT-5 and T-26 (cannon instead of machine gun) tanks as well as the T-37
amphibious tankette. In 1935-1937, the Red Army began to receive over 3,000 tanks
- and tankettes annually.
In 1938, the mectiianized corps were reorganized and renamed tank corps. By the start
of 1939, their number had been increased up to four. They each had two tank bri-
= gades and one rifle-machine gun brigade. In September 1939, two tank corps, the
XV and XXV, participated ii~ ;he Red Army's liberation of ti,.e oblasts of the Western
Belorussia and Western Ukraine. Due to the lack of experience in engineer and
material support for the large mobile rormations, the insufficient skills of ~he
personnel in controlling them and in carrying out marches, various shortcomings
were detected in the corps ~perations. Relying on this and considering the previ-
ously made proposals, the Main Military Council of the Red Army on 21 November 1939
ruled that the tank corps be broken up. In their place individual motorized divi-
sions were to be organized and according to the TOE they would each have 275 tanks.
The motorized divisions were to be used as an echelon for exploiting the success of
a ~ombined-arms army and also as p-.rt of the cavalry-mechanized group (mobile group
ol a Eront). By May 1940, there were four such divisions in the Red Army.
Soon thereafter life showed that a motorized div~.sion could not perform those func-
tions for which a tank corps was destined. The erroneousness of the decisior. to
break up the tank corps was apparent with the start of World War II in Western
~ I;urope. In June 1940, the combat experience in the West was discussed at the
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People's Commissariat of Defense.[NKO]. The results of this discussion were re-
ported to I. V. Stalin.5 The Soviet government took a decision to create a new type
' of inechanized corps, separate tank and motorized divisions as well as tank brigades.
The mechanized corps was to consist of two tank and one motorized divisions, special
units and subunits. A tank division consisted of two tank regiments, a motorized
_ rifle regiment and a howitzer artillery regiment and support subunits. It was to
have 375 ~anks of different types. A motorized division was to have two motorized
rifle regiments, a tank regiment and an artillery regiment (according to the TOE,
275 light tank~). According to the wartime TOE, a mechanized corps was to have a
total of 36,080 men, 1,031 tanks, 258 guns and mortars, over 5,000 different-purpose
motor vehicles, 350 tractors and around 1,700 motorcycles.
The generalizing of combat experience, the scientific prediction of the nature of
the impending war and the correct determining of the role of armored troops in it
made it possible for the Soviet tank builders to successfully solve the problem of
further improvin; armored equipment. From the winter of 1939, the troops began re-
ceiving tanks developed by a group of designers headed by M. I. Koshkin (T-34) and
Zh. Ya. Kotin (KV). In terms of their basic indicators such as armament, armor,
cruss-country capability and maneuverability, these tanks, particularly the T-34
taak, were the best in the period of World War II. This is also testified by state-
ments of foreign specialists.
Thus, the former Nazi Engr-Gen Erich Schneider has written: "The T-34 tank made a
sensation.... The Russians, having developed an exceptionally successful and com-
pletely new type of tank, took a great leap forward in the area of tank construc-
tion.... The attempt to develop a tank along the lineG of the Russian T-34, after
its careful inspection by German designers, was infeasible."6 Guderian was also
forced to admit that "...the enemy...had a new type of tank which greatly surpassed
the ~erman ones in terms of cross-country capability, heaviness of armor and cannon
capability against armor."
Also noteworthy is the opinion of one of the leading ~ourgeois tank specialists
D. Orgill who in a book on the T-34 tank has written that "there should be a gold
inscription on the desk of the designer for successfully solving the basic problem
of maximum conformity of armament effectiveness and tank mobility, its ability to
make a dest.ructive strike and remain invulnerable to the enemy strike.... The T-34
tank was developed by persons who were able to see the battlefield of the mid-20th
century better than anyone in the West was able to do."~
Thus, the development of the T-34 and KV tanks was a new stage in the development of
Soviet armored equipment which determined the basic direction in world tank building.
The rearming of the Soviet armored tr~ops with new equipment shuuld have sharply in-
creased their combat capabilities. These measures were to be carried out in 1941.8
By the start of the war, the tanks turned out had been only 1,861 (636 KV and 1,225
'1'-34) while a predominant portion of the armored equipment was oid model tanks. By
the middle of June 1941, the manning levels of the mechanized corps in the border
military districts for all types of combat vehicles was 53 percent, while the pro-
portional amount of new tanks was insignificant (there were just 1,475 of them).9
The corps had 39 percent of the TOE number of motor vehicles, 44 percent of the
tractors, 29 percent of the repair equipment and 17 percent of the motorcycles,l0
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Consequei:rly, the armored formations tormed by the start of the war were not fully
armed with weapons and equipment. At the same time, their formation made it pos-
sible to pose in a new light the questions of using large armored formations in the
coming engagements.
Views on the Use of Armored Troops. Traini.ng of Command Personnel
The questions of the employment of armored troops were first reflected in the orders
of the Revolutionary Military Council [RVS] on the use of tanks and armored detach-
ments during the Civil War years. The basi.c principle of their combat employment
was considered to be close cooperation of the tanks with infantry. In the 1920's,
the question was posed of the possibility of employing tanks for carrying out inde-
pendent missions. In particular, the provisianal instructions on the combat employ-
ment of tanks put out in 1928 provided for two forms of their employment in offen-
sive combat: in close cooperation with the infantry as close infantry support
(CIS) tanks and as a forward, freely maneuvering echelon operating outside of fire
contact with the infantry.
The tanks to be used in close support for the infantry were not given indenendent
missions. The tank saturation rate varied within the limits of one-three platoons
per rifle battalion. A freely maneuvering tank group was given an independent mis-
sion to neutralize enemy artillery, ~ts clase reserves and to disrupt communications
and control. It consisted of one or two t~nk companies per r~fle regiment operating
in the f irst echelon. In addition, there were provisions to create a reserve tank
echelon for increasing success in combat. 5oon thereafter this provision was rein-
forced in the 1929 RKKA Field Manual.
The gradual increase in the tank fleet encouraged the further development of Soviet
military theoretical views on the combat employment of tanks. In the 1930's the
- basic provisions were worked out for the theory of a deep offensive operation. Its
essence was in the simultaneous neutralization of the enemy to the entire depth of
its grouping and for this the artillery, tank and mechanized troops, aviation and
airborne formations were to be employed. During these years new regulations and
manuals were developed on the combat employment o~ armored troops and these were im-
proved as the army was outfitted with new combat equipment.ll A number of military
theoretical works appeared and these examined the problems of the operational and
tactical employment of the armored formations and units.12 On the pages of the
periodic press, and particularly the journals VOYNA I REVOLYUTSIYA [War and Revolu-
tion], VOYENNAYA MYSL' [Military Thought], MEKIiANIZATSIYA I?~IOTORTZATSIYA RKKA [RKIiA
Mechanization and Mc~torization], VOYENNYY VBSTNIK [Military Herald] and
AVTOBRONETANKOVYY ZHURNAL [Motor-Tank Journal], as well as the newspaper KRASNAYA
ZVEZDA [Red StarJ, there was a broad exchange of opinions on the most urgent ques-
tions of employing the tank and mechanized units. Also of positive significance
was the work done to generalize the experience of controlling tank formations abroad.
It must be emphasized that the works of K. B. Kalinovskiy were of particularly great
significance for the development of operational-tactical views. He can ~ightly be
called one of the founders af the Soviet theory for the e,ployment of armored troops.
The tank's "technical evolution" which gave it greater mobility combined with suffi-
cient range, he wrote in 1930 in the newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, "has turned it from
a narrow tactical means of infantry attack into a means of broad operational scope.
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'I'he modern tank is capable of participating in all phases of an engagement and oper-
nclitions proceeding from the aim of the operation, its scope, the sequence of car-
rying out the missions, the effective strength of the army, the reinforcements, the
operational configuration and a number of other factors.
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In the first offensive aperations by tank armies in 1943 (Orel and others) with a
momentum of advance averaging 3-5 km and a maxi.mum of 8-20 km per day considering
the limited number of radios, wize communicati.ons in the army was the basic means
of control. Radio communications were organized, as a rule, only over nets, trans-
port was widely used and most often solely alcng an axis or circular route.
However the increased momentum of advance even in 1943 demanded a revision of the
existing principles for utilizing the communications and the employment of them
chiefly on an integrated basis.
Radio co~rnnunications were to be employed in the course of the entire operation and
particularly with the going over of the army to pursuit as well as by reconnaissance
and the battle outposts units (subunits). This made it possible to quickly estab-
lish contact with the control posts which were on the move or a significant distance
away and in those instances when their location was unknown. Radio provided communi-
cations across impassable barriers and over enemy occupied territory.
Wire communications (telephone and telegraph, over field, permanent cable and over-
head lines) was provided in the army's disposition in preparing for the operation,
in the course of the offensive with a momemtum of less than 3 km per hour, inside
the control posts and with the front and Hq SHC (General Staff). Here consideration
was given to such positive aspects of it as independence from the time of day,
season and atmospheric interference, convenience of use and relative secrecy of
calls and from 1945 also the possibility of obtaining several communications chan-
nels in one circuit using multiplexing equipment.
Communications by transport was planned for use in all stages of an operation and
from the summer of 1944 not only along an axis but also along routes. This acceler-
ated the delivery of documents to the addressees and increased reliability as the
_ failure of transport on one r~ute did not involve promp.t delivery in others. More-
over, transport was the sole means of control.for a number of chiefs of the special
troops (engineer, chemical and other). In certain operations, for example, the
Uman'-Botosani, information was transmitted to subordinates solely by liaison air-
craft as well as tanks, armored personnel carriers and even SAU as a consequence of
the difficulties of moving the radios and establishing wire communications under the
conditiona of the spring mud.
The planning of communications with the superior control bodies, with subordinates
- and cooperating formations was carried out by the integrated use of the equipment
but if possible by duplication over several channels and even by using links with
the fzrst echelon formations and the forward detachments. Considering these require-
m~nts ~ommunications was organized by telegraph, high frequency and low frequency
telephone, radios and transport, and for radio over several nets and links: 5-7
from the command post with the corps and 4-6 from the operations group, 2-4 from the
command post with the cooperating formations and 1-2 from the operations group.
It must be pointed out that teletype communications between the army command post
and the front command post was established only in the autumn of 1944. Communica-
tions by liaison aircraft was established from the command post and from the second
control echelon and very rarely from the arn~y operations group.
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l~~,r tlie areillery, communications was planned, as a rule, over or.e or two radio nets
;~ncl i r~~m ]944, more c~ften over two or three. In addition, a radio link began to be
~�r~�cie~~cl Crum [he army ar.tille~y commander to the army artillery group and if this
~;r~~up was not. created then to the artillery hrigade command post. Communications
- werE> also organized by wire and trar_sp~rt.
fvi~h ..iviation, communications prior to 1944 was established using one of the iollow-
i~i,~; v~iriations: over a cooperation radio net (the 3d Guards Tank Army in the Orel
Or�~rarion), using two radio nets, one for cooperation and the other for guidance of
the r:ir zrmy (the 2d Tank Army in the Orel Operation), over the air army`s radio net
and over the radio link of the air and tank army staffs (the 5th Guards Tank Army in
the Belgurod-IChar'khov Operation). From mid-1944, more frequently provision was
made 1or communications over the following radio nets: cooperation, reconnaissance
(a network of receivers down to the tank brigade), guidance (to a tank brigade) and
o~~er a rxdio link between the air army's staff and the op~rations air group at the
conunarid post (as part of the operations group) of the tank army (Belorussian and
- Vislul~~rations. The most important forms of instruction were exercises and tactical
clrills in the field identical to the one on which they would advance. Moreover,
there was the practice of holding conferences, assemblies for officers, particularly
for the special troops, meetings to exchange experience and analyses of conducted
engagements and operations. 7'hese exercises were led by the army commanders as well
as rhe r.ommanders of the formations, units and subunits. The st3ff officers pro-
vid~~cl siKnificant aid in sol.ving the problems of troc~p combat training.
As ri result, the effective combat training of the subunits, units and formations
combined with the training of the staffs and the party political work carried out
en~ured the able and bold actions o� the men in offensive operations.
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r~~iK ~rr~~,i~?~ ~~JC, VIVLY
8. Party Political Work
- Party political work in the preparation o~ o�~ensive operations by tank armies was
organized on the basis of the decisions o~ our party's Central Committee, the
Soviet government, the orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the directives of
the Chief Political Uirectorate and the operation orders of the commanders. This
encompassed all aspects of the preparation of the operations and had as its main
aim the fulfilling of the set combat miasions and the creation in the personnel of
a lligh offensive drive and unswerving determination to achieve victory over the
enemy. Here consideration was given to the particular features of tank army opera-
tions as mobile groups of the fronts. These iilcluded: the necessity of adv-:ncing
boldly and rapidly without engaging strongpoints in extended battles, the possibil-
ity of operations by individual units and formations away from the main forces and
the necessity for each tank crew to show initiative, boldness and daring in combat
operations.
The political sections of the armys and formations, in carrying out party political
work, were guided by the instructions of V. I. Lenin who said that where "...polit-
ical work is carried out most carefully in the troops...there is no laxness in the
army, its morale is better and there are more victories."43
As a rule, the organizing documents far party political work were the calendar plan
oE the army military council and the work plan of the political section for the
political support of the operation. These ref lected the content, forms and dates
of the conducted measures and the responsible executors. In preparations for a
number of operations, a plan of ineasures for the assistant chief for political af-
fairs of the army political section was drawn up as a separate document. From
February 1944, party political work for rear support in addition was planned by the
political section of the rear administration and this section had been set up in
the tank armies in accord with the order of the People's Commissar of Defense of
26 February 1944.
The forms and methods of party political work were determined by the conditions for
preparing for the operations and by the specific combat missions and were the most
diverse. Widely used were individual talks, assemblies, meetings, the showing of
- films, the presentation of awards and letters of thanks, the publishing in the army
and corps newspapers of information on the heroic and decisive actions of the sol-
diers, letters from the parents of hero tankmen who had fallen in engagements and
so forth.
At the center of attention were questions relating to the organizational strength-
ening of the party and Komsomol organizations and above all the primary ones. The
- best soldiers who had distinguished themselves iu battles were admitted as members
oE the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevikj] and the Komsomol. In prepar-
ing Eor the Belgorod-Khar'khov Operation, for example, in the lst Tan:: Army, due to
the correct ass3gning of communists to the subunits, by 1 August 1943, there were
457 party organizations functioning (of the company and equal levels). In almost
every tank crew there was a VKP(b) member or a party candidate member.4`' On
1 January 19~+5, in this army, of the 433 tank commanders, 258 were VKP(b) members
~r candidate members and 85 were Komsomol members.45 On the eve of the Berlin
Operation, 60-70 percent of the tank commanders and drivers of the four tank armies
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p.ir.Licipating in this operation were communists. In the 6th Guards Tank Army by
ttie start of the Manchurian Operation, 72 primary party organizations had been or-
ganized and over 2,000 men admitted to the party.`'6
The Chief Political Directorate and the military councils of the fronts and tank
armies demanded that the commanders and political bodies be constantly concerned for
the military and political growth of the command personnel. Thus, a special order
of 19 May 1944 of the chief of the Chief Political Directorate demanded that the
questions of the political indoctrination of officers be viewed as one of the most
important tasks in all party political work. These questions were periodically
discussed at sessions of the military councils, meetings of commanders and politi-
cal workers and assemblies of the party aktiv and party organizations. Independent
- work was the basic method for raising the ideological and theoretical level of the
officers. To help those independently studying Marxist-Leninist theory, lectures
and reports were given in addition to individual and group discussions, consulta-
tions, seminars, colloquiums, theoretical conferences and the discussion of arti-
c1ES published on the pages of the periodic press.
In the work with the military and political personnel, the military councils of the
armies saw to it that they were fully armed both with political as well as military
knowledge. In this regard the practice of holding assemblies for the leadership
during the period of preparing for an ope~ration proved effective. The participants
oE an assembly, for example, from the 2d Guards Tank Army (December 1944) heard a
report on the international situation and tha party's decisions on ideological
questions and on the work methods of enemy agents. Special attention was paid to
explaining the missions with the shifting of military operations to enemy territory.
In exchanging experience such questions were discussed as the work with replace-
ments, the activities of the political bodies in organizing troop logistical sup-
port, the recruitment and ideological-political indoctrination of the personnel and
the content, forms and methods of party political work in all stages of the opera-
tion. The plan for the assembly held in the 6th Tank Army (July 1944) also included
ttie questions of familiarization with new Soviet and enemy� military equipment.47
An important task on the eve of an operation was work with the arriving repiacements.
� This was aimed at instilling steadfastness, courage, combat activity and high disci-
pline in the young soldiers. For these purposes, wide use was made of propagandiz-
ing the combat traditions of the units and formations. The political workers al-
ways recalled the words of M. I. Kalinin, '.'it is essential...that each new recruit,
in arriving in a regiment, know not or.ly its number but all its combat history...
that he be proud of his regiment and always defend its honor."48
t~~,r e:cample, in the Sth Guards Tank Army in preparing for the Belorussian Operation
the brigade commanders or their deputies for p~~itical affairs personally received
tl~e younb soldiers and spoke with them. The replacements were carefully trained in
the subunits where talks were conducted on special subjects. The party and Komsomol
~~r~;anizations helped the new men in mastering the program of military and political
_ ~ r~i i n i?ig, they created ri comrade.ly situation and helped them to more rapidly and
completely become part of the combat life of the subunits. They were acquainted
~oitii t}~e combat traditions and campaign record of_the units and formations. Talks
hy f~rn~er. soldiers were organized at meetings. Movies were shown devoted to the
~;rc:~t P,~trii~tic War i~lcluding to the defeat of the Nazis at Moscow, Stalingrad,
Lenin~;rad and the Kursk Salient.49
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'I'f?r ~�(~ief. forms of political indoctrination �oz the nonenlisted personnel were
E~ulitical e~cercises (twice a week) and political talks. Moreover, of important
significance were the activities of the low--level agitators, the readers and the
army press. For increasing the ideological level of political exercises as well as
all mass agitation work, seminars were conducted for agitators with reports and
lectures on the contents of the next subjects of exercises, on the international
situation and other questions as well as on exchanging experience in mass agita-
tion work in the subunits. Thus, at the end of July 1945, in all the formations of
the 6th Guards Tank Army, 3-day assemblies were held at which lectures were given
and reports made on the subjects "The War in the Pacific and Our Missions" and "The
Communist Party--The Leader and Organizer of Our Victories." On the last day of
the assemblies, those attending exchanged work experience.50
Une of the aims of party political work was to instill in the men a burning hate for
the Nazi invaders. Here the basic forms were oral and printed propaganda and agi-
tation and for this materials were used from the State Extraordinary Commission,
facts :ibout atrocities by the Nazis in the areas of army combat and letters to the
men from the nation's rear.
On the eve of the counteroffensive at Kursk, in the lst Tank Army, for example, the
army newspaper NA RAZGROM VRAGA [To the Defeat of the Enemy] published a special
issue under the overall headline "Soldier of the Red Army! Vengence for the Blood
of the Soviet People!" It published documents collected in Kurskaya Oblast. They
were widely used in conducting political exercises and agitator talks. In sending
out documentary materials on Nazi atrocities to the formations and units, the army
political section at that time appealed to the men:
"Fighter. of the Red Army! Let your heart burn with a sacred flame. Our hate for
the enemy has neither a national or racial nature. We hate not merely the German
but rather the German invader, the enslaver. To hate the enemy means to so love
our motherland that for the sake of victory we disdain death and will not rest as
long as even one idazi butcher with weapons in hand remains on our Soviet land."
~ Such appeals caused each man to think about his personal contribution to the defeat
of the enemy and they increased combat readiness.
An important area ot ideological, political and military indoctrination was the work
with the soldiers of non-Russian nationality. Special mass agitation work was con-
ducted for them. It was entrusted to agitators, readers and propagandists who knew
their mother tongue. For working with this group of soldiers in all the armies use
was mad~ of literature received from the Union republics and the frontline news-
paper.s published in Ukrainian, Uzbek, Kazakh and the other languages of the Soviet
peoples. The press widely used the appeal letters to the �ronts to fellow service-
men from the workers of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and the other
Union and autonomous republics. "'Victory or Death--There is No Other Way Out!'
is wf~at each true Uzbek patriot is now saying who is ready to surrender his life for
tlie motherland, Eor the happiness and freedom of his fathers and children," urged,
for example, the appeal of the Uzbek workers to their fellow servicemen in the 4th
'1'ank Army on the eve of the Orel Operation.
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c.r~;,t ;ittc~ntion was given to indoctrinating the men in a spirit of fraternal
t:riend5hip witn the peop~es o� the liberated European nations. The Declaration of
tlie Soviet government on the liberation mission of the Soviet Army was explained to
the soldiers and otficers, and meetings were organized, for example, between the
S~viet soldiers and Folish citizens. Party political work was organized considering
the necessity of conducting combat operations outside our motherland. A number of
measures were carried out for ensuring military secrecy and observing high military
discipline and ~~gilance. Special assemblies and seminars were conducted with the
propagandists and agitators.
Ttie idea of the unity of the party and the people was broadly propagandized and
this was reflected in the numerous specific ties between the rear workers and the
frontline soldiers. For these purposes, for example, they used the delivery of com-
bat vehicles built with the personal funds Qf our nation's workers to the forma-
tions.
I)uring the days of the preparations for the Korsun'-Shevchenkovskiy Operation the
army's Eormations received tanks built with the personal funds of the Kabardin
workers. The letter of the Kabardins addressed to the army commander was read in
all the units and subunits. In it they wrote:
"1'o general tank troops, Comrade Bogdanov!
"The Kabardin workers with enormous enthusiasm have collected money to build the
- tank column Death to the German Invaders. In a short period of time 20,600,U00
rubles were collected. Many patriot kolkhoz members contributed large amounts of
their personal savings. For example, the kolkhoz chairman from Nal'chikskiy Rayon,
P. Sabl.irov, contributed 101,000 rubles, the kolkhoz members Kardangushev, Tlupov
and hashirov each gave 50,000 rubles while scores of kolkhoz members contributed
15,OOU-30,000 r.ubles.
"Kecently the Red Army Cammand informed us that the tanks built with the money from
the Knbardin workers have been turned over to the tank formation under your command.
All the population of our republic was informed of this. The Kabardin workers with
great joy welcomed this news. They are happy that the combat vehicles built with
tiie.ir. 1~ibor savings will be driven into battle by the glorious tank troops of your
formation....
"1Je wuuld like to learn to what men the tanks have been entrusted and how they will
det~eat the Nazi invaders in these veh~cles. At the same time we would like to pass
on ,In ~~rdent Bulshevik greetings to all the soldiers, officers and generals of your
i-ormation on behalf of the Kabardin workers."51
'1'ii~~ t ir.st-rate 1'-34 tanks presented to the tank troops soon thereafter participated
i~i h~ittles. The army military council sent to the Kabardin workers a letter of
t}~,inks wl~i~~h stated:
"in tl~e mi~;hty vehicl_es built with the money of the Kabardin workers, the courageous
rp5.
'Cl~e corps was pursuing the retreatin~ enemy with two brigades. The reconnaissance
Sub units and advance battalions of the brigades were unable to capture the crossings
c~ver the. river. In the first attempt to cross the river without a halt, only the
o5th Tank Brigade was successful and it had seized a small bridgehead with its in-
- C:intr.y. At the same time reconnaissance found a ford at the village of Gushcha.
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Ln order to distract attention from it, the brigade's commander sent a tank bat-
talion to the north where there was another ford. The 20th Tank Brigade was unsuc-
c~sscul and began to search for fords to the north of the site of the first attempt
to cross the river.
In order to feel out the river alor.g the entire 18-km crossing sector, the corps com-
mander put the 36th Tank Brigade also in the fi~-st echelon. As a total five conven-
ient crossing points were found and this made it ~,~ssible to commence the crossing
along the entire front. The enemy, not expecting such decisive actions, was unable
to put up substantial resistance. The corps captured a large bridgehead and, having
driven off counterattacks, developed a further offensive from it.
In a number of instances, particularly when the crossing equipment attached to the
tank armies fell behind, in crossing large rivers, they used crossings captured by
the rifle troops. Thus, in the course of the Lwow-Sandomierz Operation the first to
capture a bridgehead on the Vistula River was the 350th Rifle Division of the 13th
Army in the area of Baranow. Having widened it, the division made it possible to
cocmnence the crossing of the main forces of its army and the lst Tank Army and after
them the 3d Guards Tank Army crossed to the Sandomierz bridgehead.
The crossing of a river from a march formation was carried out by the tank armies
in zones 20-50 km wide. In the Proskurov-Chernovtsy Operation, the lst Tank Army
crossed the Dnepr River in a zone 70 lan wide and the Prut River even in a zone 80 km
wide. The wide crossing zones made it possible to find the necessary number of con-
venient crossing points, to detect weak points in the enemy defenses and to scatter
enemy efforts and this told positively upon the successful crossing of the river by
all the army's forces.
The capturing of bridgeheads on a water obstacle by the forward detachments was an
important but still just the initial stage of its crossing by a tank army. Having
created certain prerequisites for the crossing, they thereby drew the enemy forces
to themselves and ordinarily the enemy made one after another counterattack in en-
deavoring to push the forward detachments back into the river. The fierce battles
for bridgeheads often obstructed the erecting of crossings without which it would
have been impossible for the tank army main forces to cross the river. For this
reason the next mission after the capturing of bridgeheads on a water obstacle by
the forward detachments was their widening with the simultaneous arranging of cross-
ings for the main forces.
The bridgeheads were widened by the forces of the forward detachments if the enemy
~ defenses beyond the river were weak or with the aid of a portion of the main forces
from the first echelon tank corps. In a number of instances, as was the case on
the Vistula River in the summer of 1944, the bridgehead was widened by the forma-
tions of the tank and combined-arms armies, particularly if the bridgehead or sev-
- eral of them assumed operational significance and a new offensive was planned from
them.
A particular feature of the engagements to broaden the bridaeheads was that the of-
fensive and defensive battles frequently alternated. The skillful conduct of de-
fensive battles made it possible to hold onto ~the occupied lines and to cause the
enemy significant losses The going over to the of�ensivP, particularly soon after
the successful repelling of enemy strikes made it possible to capture new lines, to
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shove the enemy back from the river and thereby create favorable conditions for the
crossing of the tank army's main �orces.
The successful repelling of counterattacks and counterstrikes occurred when they
had been able to transfer to the bridgehead in the shortest time the largest pos-
sible amount of antitank artillery and even a small number of tanks and SAU while
aviation securely covered the troops fighting for the bridgehead.
During the war years the basic mass of the tanks and SAU crossed the medium-sized
and wide rivers on rafts or over bridges. For this reason, with the capturing of a
bridgehead on the opposite bank, further success depended largely upon the prompt
bringing up of regular crossing equipment to the site of the crossing and upon the
speed of erecting the bridge and raft crossings. It must be pointed out that the
armored and mechanized troops in the course of an operation very frequently lacked
the standard crossing equipment as this usually lagged behind the advancing troops.
Characteristic in this regard are the actions of the 3d Guards Tank Army in the
crossing of the Dnepr River. During the night of 20 September, having a mission of
"no later than 24 September to reach the river ready to cross it from a march forma-
tion,"53 the army began to rapidly pursue the scattered units of the enemy LII Army
Corps. In the first echelon were two tank corps and a mechanized corps and in the
second a cavalry corps. A tank brigade made up the reserve. Advancing at a speed
of around 80 km per day, the forward detachments of the first echelon corps, without
engaging the large strongpoints, at mid-day of 21 September reached the Dnepr River
in the area of the Bukrin bend. The forward detachments immediately began to organ-
ize crossings. Contact was established with the partisans. During the night of
22 September, the infantry from the mechanized brigades with the aid of indigenous
inhabitants crossed the Dnepr River on boats, rafts and other crossing equipment.
However, the crossing of the tanks was held up due to the lack of crossing equipment.
For this reason the 3d Guards Tank Army spent around 14 days to cross the Dnepr in
September-October 1943.
The more rapid erecting of crossings on the ~Iistula River made it ~ossible for two
tank armies (the lst and 3d Guards) to cross this river in 3 days. 4 Here in the
lst Tank Army the VIII Guards Mechanized Corps crossed the river in 29 hours and the
XI Guards Tank Corps in 31. As a total, 182 tanks, 11 armored personnel carriers,
55 guns, 94 vehicles and 700 motorized infantry troops crossed during this time.55
At the same time, the delayed arrival of engineer equipment at the river and the
slow erecting of bridge crossings led to a situation where even in the course of the
Vistula-Oder Operation in a number of instances the crossing of the tanks from the
army's main forces began approximately one day after the river had been reached by
the main forces56 and this ultimately reduced rhe momentum of advance.
Along with the using of bridge crossings, during the war years extensive use was
also made of the fording of rivers (the lst Tank Army in the crossing of the Dnestr
and Prut rivers and the 2d Tank Army in the crossing of the Western Bug River and
others).
In individual operations, tank formations crossed a river over the ice. For example,
in the course of the Vistula-Oder Operation, the f.orward detachment of the VI Guards
'I'~~nk Corps of the 3d Guards Tank Army under the command of the deputy corps commander,
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" Col I. I. Yakubovskiy (now Mar SU) on 13 January reached the Nida River. The sub-
machine gunners crossed the river over thin ice while the tanks and SAU forded it.
In order that the ice did not impede the movement of the tanks, it was broken up by
firing the tank cannons. For the crossing of artillery and motor vehicles the com-
bat angineers rein�orced the ice with wooden planking. Soon a 60--ton bridge was
erected from prefabricated elements. ~ao days later, the forward detachments of
the VI and VII Guards Tank corps crossed the Pilica River in the same sequence.
The successful crossing of the Nida and Pitica rivers was the result of the mass
heroism of the personnel in the forward detachments as well as the resourcefulness
and determination of the soldiers, sergeants and officers. Heroism was manifested
by the army's personnel upon reaching the Prosnya River, where stubborn battles
broke out for the crossings. The enemy mined the bridges in retreating and organ-
ized defenses on the opposite bank. The guardsmen acted boldly and decisively.
Submachine gunners under enemy f ire crawled to the bridge and cleared it of mines.
As a result the tanks were able to cross to the opposite bank and capture a small
bridgehead. The first on enemy ground was the tank platoon of the communist Lt V. I.
Novikov who subsequently was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for excep-
tional bravery. The machine gunner of the tank, Sr Sgt A. I. Daneliya, also commit-
ted an immortal feat during those days. Having taken over for the dead commander,
he skillfully conducted a fire duel with the enemy until his tank caught fire. The
Nazis endeavored to take the Soviet tank troops alive, but Daneliya, in rushing out
of the tank, met them with deadly fire. He was able to drive off several enemy at-
tacks and then extinguish the flames. Taking over the controls, he drove his power-
ful combat vehicle against the enemy and crushed its battery with the tracks. A. I.
Daneliya was also awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.57
The Pilica River was successfully crossed over the ice by the troops of the ].st
Guards Tank Army in the Vistula-Oder Operation.. The forward detachment from the
XI Guards Tank Corps (44th Guards Tank Brigade) during the night of 16 January 1945
reconnoitered the system of enemy defenses on the river's opposite shore and t11e
presence of fords. At OS00 hours, the brigade with a motorized rifle battalion,
with support from two tank battalions and the 1,454th SAU Regiment, after brief ar--
tillery shelling from the tanks and SAU, crossed the Pilica River on the ice, it
drove back the enemy and by 1000 hours had captured a bridgehead where it took up
the defensive with the mission of supporting the crossing of the river by the corps'
main forces. By this time the 20th Separate Pontoon Bridge Battalion had arrived.
In conducting engineer reconnaissance, the combat engineers rapidly erected a bridge
Irom a N2P park with a load capacity of 60 tons. First a strip of ice 50 km wide
was blown up. Simultaneously the combat engineers from the 134th Guards Combat En-
gineer Battalion equipped a ford having commenced the crossing of the forward de-
tactiment's tanks.
The crossing occurred almost analogously in the zone of the VIII Guards Mechanized
Corps where the forward detachment consisting of the lst Guards Tank Brigada cap-
tured a bridgehead and supported the blowing up of a bridge across the ice by the
combat engineers from the lst Separate Motorized Pontoon Bridge Regiment. Inci-
dentally, this was a very rare occasion when the pontoon sections were laid directly
on the ice (it was up to 35 cm thick) an3 the bridge assembled on the ice. As a
result, significant time was saved and the bridge over the Pilica River some 82 m
long with a load capacity of 50 tons was erected in 5.5 hours.58
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In the ~~ourse of the wax, the tank armies had to cxoss deep canals with steep con-
crete facings. In this regard o� de~inite interest were the operations of the
troops in the 3d Guards Tank Army in the Berlin pperation.
The army commander, Gen P. S. Rybalko, decided to cross the Teltow Canal during the
morning of 24 April (the canal was 30-35 m wide and 4-5 m deep) simultaneously with
all the corps. The VI Guards Tank Corps was to operate in the center. The crossing
was organized in a short period of time. The commander and staff of the VI Guards
Tank Corps on 23 April conducted reconnaissance and organized cooperation with the
infantry, artillery and aviation. On the same day a reconnaissance in force was
carried out in the aim of detecting the enemy fire plan. The first canal was to be
crossed by the two forward detachments of.the 22d Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade
which had the mission of capturing a bridgehead and supporting the erecting of pon-
toon bridges for the crossing of the corps' main forces. The brigade's actions were
to be supported by the firing of all the corps tanks and artillery as well as the
~ attached 31st Artillery Division.
In the aim of supporting the crossing of the canal, the X Artillery Breakthrough
Corps and the 16th Assault Combat Engineer Brigade were attached to the 3d Guards
Tank Army. The average artillery density was ~:15 guns and mortars per kilometer of
front and considering the SAU, 598 guns and mc,rtars. Some 700 guns were set with
direct laying (90 guns per km).
On 24 April, after a SS-minute artillery softening up, the forward detachments from
the 22d Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade on wooden rafts and across the frameworks of
uestroyed bridges, under the cover of tank and artillery fire, crossed the canal and
captured small bridgeheads on the northern bank. Some 50 minutes later, in using
the success of the forward detachments, the brigade's main forces began crossing on
wooden collapsible boats. The enemy responded with strong artillery and machine gun
fire. The boats on which the courageous guardsmen were crossing were repeatedly
pierced by bullets and shrapnel. The Scniiet soldiers quickly repaired the damage
and continued to carry out the mission.
In the crossing many men of the brigade showed exceptional courage. The commander
of the minelaying platoon of the 22d Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade, MSgt A. I.
Vorob'yev, became a true hero of the battles on the Teltow Canal. Having skillfully
chosen the site of the crossing, the men of his platoon and he made 16 trips under
heavy enemy fire. After the capturing of a.hridgehead, being wounded, the master
sergeant and his comrades in arms made passageways for the infantry. Vorob'yev
personally removed 10 antitank mines. For courage and heroism shown in the crossin;;
oE the 'leltow Canal, MSgt A. I. Vorob'yev, Sr Sgts D. T. Pastukhov and N. N. Gurov
were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
Behind the battalions of the 22d Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade, the forward units
oE the 48th Guards Rifle Division began crossing and this division, from 23 April,
fought jointly with the VI Guards Tank Corps. The presence of bridgeheads made it
possib.le For the army engineer units by 1400 hours to throw up two pontoon bridges
over which the tank brigades and the main forces of the 48th Guards Rifle Division
began to cross. On the same day the other army formations also crossed the canal.
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We must particularly emphasize the role which was played by the engineer troops in
carrying out the missions of crossing canals in Berlin. The great height of the
granite sides greatly impeded the crossing of the obstacles and the erecting of
floating and wooden bridges. Combat eng~.neexs were assigned to the forward detach-
ments. Under the cover of tank fire and smokescxeens, they, using 60-kg explosive
charges, blew up the granite structures. Rope ladders 7 m long and elements of
f loating small bridges were made for the infantry.
In conducting offensive operations to a great depth and at a rapid pace the tank
armies gained experience in the successive crossing of a number of water obstacles.
Thus in the course of the Vistula-Oder Operation, the 3d Guards and 4th Tank armies,
in carrying out the immediate mission of the front, in 5 days had to cross four
rivers, the Czarna Woschodna, Nida, Pilica and Warta, while the lst and 2d Guards
Tank armies had to cross the Pilica, Bzura and Warta rivers.
The essence of the successive crossing of water obstacles consisted in having the
army troops cross two or three rivers simultaneously. For example, the troops of the
2d Guards Tank Army on 16-17 January 1945 were crossing the Bzura River with the for-
ward detachments while the main forces were crossing the Pilica. The 3d Guards and
4th Tank armies on 13-14 January crossed the Nida River with the forward brigades
while the main forces were crossing the Czarna. When the main forces were crossing
the Nida, the forward brigades had already crossed the Pilica. Approximately the
same sequence occurred in the crossing of the Pilica and Warta rivers.
The experience of the successive crossing of rivers acquired during the Vistula-Oder
Operation when the rivers had an ice cover of up to 30 cm which with the limited
amount of crossing equipment made it possible to cross on two obstacles was further
developed in the course of the Berlin Operation under conditions when the spring
flooding had not yet abated.
The First Ukrainian Front began an offensive with the crossing of the Neisse River.
Some 45-50 km from it flowed the Spree River, and between them the small Melkse
River and the Fliess Canal. Having crossed the Neisse River, the 3d Guards Tank
Army attacked the enemy on the second zone running along the Fliess Canal. On
18 April it had already begun to cross the Spree River with its first echelon when
its second echelon was still crossing the Melkse River and the Fliess Canal.
For the successful crossing of the Spree River each of the tank armies was assigned
a pontoon battalion. This made it possible in the crossing area of the 3d Guards
Tank Army to build a tank ford, two crossing points using boats, two raft cro~sing
points and a bridge with 30-ton capacity. In the crossing area of the 4th Guards
Tank Army three bridges were built with a capacity of 30-60 tons and a raft crossing
point. Such a number of crossings made it possible for the tank armies to complete-
ly move the first echelon corps across the Spree River on 18 April and the second
echelon on 19 April. Having captured a bridgehead 10 km along the front and up to
5 km in depth in cooperation with the 13th Army, they created the prerequisites for
a drive toward Berlin.6a
The experience of the Great Patrio tic War showed that for the tank troops rivers were
difficult-to-cross obstacles. Their crossing ~aas complicated by the limited amount
of crossing equipment, particularly for tanks, and by their lag behind the troops.
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_ In many operations the tank armies were still able to cross numerous rivers. They
also gained rich experience in the crossing of canals along the banks of which many
reinforced concrete defensive works had been built. By their rapid actions and by
the capturing of bridgeheads on the water l~:nes from a march formation or after
brief preparations, the tank armies supported the offensive by the main forces of
the fronts at a rapid pace, without extended delays on the water obstacles where the
enemy usually created defensive lines.
The success in crossing water obstacles by the tank armies was achievEd by the early
preparation of the troops, the crossing equipment, including local, for the crossing,
by the decisive defeat of the enemy on the approaches to the river, by the surprise
reaching of the water obstacle by the formations along a broad front, by the daring
actions of the forward detachments, by the rapid construction of crossings, by the
- precise organization of a control service on them and by the prompt increasing of
efforts on the opposite bank.
The experience of the war showed that for the rapid crossing of water obstacles by
tank armies, they should include such crossing equipment which would not lag behind
the troops, amphib ious tanks and armored personnel carriers while ordinary tanks
should have equipment making it possible for them to cross deep rivers.
6. Operations of Tank Armies in Pincer Operations
Pincer operations and the destruction of large enemy groupings, particularly start-
ing with the counteroffensive at Stalingrad, were the basic form for the conducting
of a strategic off ensive by the Soviet Army. In no previous war has any army of the
world conducted such a large number of pincer operations as the Soviet Army did in
the Great Patriotic War. In 1944-1945 alone, 32 major pincer operations were car-
ried out. This was clear proof not only of the strength and might of our Armed
Forces but also the high development level of Soviet military art and its superior-
ity over the military art of the Nazi Army.
The encircling of large enemy groupings was carried out, as a rule, by two or three
fronts and sometimes by one front, under the most diverse situational conditions and
by various methods. In those instances when the Soviet troops deeply outflanked the
opposing grouping, its encirclement was achieved by breaking through enemy defenses
on the flanks and subsequenrly developing the offensive in depth along convergent
axes (the Stalingrad, Voronezh-Kastornoye, Korsun'-Shevchenkovskiy, Iasi-Kishinev
operations and others). The encirclement of a large enemy grouping was also achieved
by breaking through the front of~its defenses on several sectors with the subsequent
development of the strikes in depth and the coming out in the flank and rear of the
basic enemy grouping (Proskurov-Chernovtsy, Minsk operations and others) or by mak-
ing one or two enveloping strikes in the aim of pressing the enemy against impass-
able terrain or. against the sea (East Prussian Operation).
= In all instances an indispensable condition for the successful execution of a pincers
operation was the outflanking by the Soviet troops of both or one flank of the op-
posing enemy grouping. This required not only the rapid breaking through of enemy
defenses but also raF,id maneuvering in the operational depth. This determined the
special role in the ~ir.^ers operations for the formations and field forces of ar-
mored and mechanized troops.
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Tank armies in pincer operations carried out various missions. They quickly com-
pleted the breakthrough of the tactical enemy defensive zone and quickly reached
- the operational depth, they cut li.nes o~ cowmunications and in cooperation with the
mobiie groups of the combined-arms armi,es closed the encirclement ring, they created
*.he mobile external encirclement peximeter or repelled the strong enemy counter-
strikes which sought to relieve the surrounded troops. They also played a major
role in breaking up the surrounded grouping into parts as was the case in the
Ostrogozhsk-Rossoch' and Berlin operations.
The Soviet armored troops gained their first experience in encircling a large enemy
grouping, and here under ~he conditions of the lack of overall superiority over the
enemy in resources, in the Stalingrad counteroffensive. The mixed 5th Tank Army
under the command of Gen P. L. Romanenko was fighting in the sector of the main
thrust of the Southwestern Front. Having broken through the enemy's defensive front
on 19 November 1942, the army on the same day with the forces of two tank corps
began to carry out the mission of exploiting the tactical success into an operation-
al one. ~ao mechanized corps of the Stalingrad Front were attacking toward the army.
With the reaching of the area of Kalach, Sovetskiy by the mobile troops on 23 Novem-
ber., the inner encirclement perimeter was created around the Stalingrad enemy group-
ing. Some 22 divisions and 160 separate units of the 6th Field Army and a portion
of the f orces of the 4th Tank Army numbering some 330,000 men were encircled. The
high momentum of advance by the tank formations (up to 50-70 km on individual days)
made it possible to anticipate the enemy in responding to the situation, to quickly
and securely close the ring of encirclement and shift efforts to the external per-
- imeter.
The mixed 3d Tank Army carried out approximately analogous missions in the
Ostrogozhsk-Rossoch' Operation (January 1943), where immediately after breaking
through the enemy defenses, its tank corps at a rate of 30-40 lan a day rushed to the
. inner encirclement perimeter as a result of which by 19 January the enemy grouping
consisting of 13 divisions was cut into two parts and quickly destroyed. Over 87,000
soldiers and officers were taken prisoner.61
Thus, the mixed tank armies in pincer operations independently broke through the
enemy defenses, after which they directed their tank corps to close the ring of en-
circlement. Generally their efforts were concentrated on the external encirclement
perimeter. The experience of employing mixed tank armies disclosed certain short-
comings in their organizational structure related chiefly to the presence of fo~rma-
tions with varying mobility and the difficulty of control in the course of the oper-
ation. With the creation of homogeneous tank armies, these shortcomings were elim-
inated. The front's comanander gained a highly maneuverable means o� attack which
could decisively influence both the course of the offensive operation as a whole as
well as the pincer operation, in particular. The tank and mechanized corps of a
tank army began to be employed in a pincer operation on a massed basis for carrying
out those missions which were the main ones at each stage.
In the Korsun'-Shevchenkovskiy Operation (January-February 1944) during its first
stage, the tank armies were employed to encircle the enemy and in the second stage,
in accord with the specific conditions, to repel strong enemy strikes on the exter-
nal perimeter. In this operation, the first experience was acquired in employing
two tank armies (5th Guards and 6th) moving toward one another in the aim of closing
the ring of encirclement around a large enemy grouping.
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; 'i'tie assault grouping of the Second Ukrainian Front, the mobile group of which in-
: cluded the 5th Guards Tank Army, went over to the offensive on 25 January. A day
later the First Ukrainian Front attacked. In the first echelon of its assault
grouping was the 6th Tank Army. On 28 January, that is, on the third-fourth day of
- the operation, the forward detachments of the tank armies linked up in the area of
Zvenigorodka and sourrounded an enemy grouping on the Korsun'-Shevchenkovskiy
Salient. Some 10 German divisions and 1 brigade (up to 80,000 soldiers and offi-
cers) were caught in the ring. The Nazi troops had fallen into a"new Stalingrad,
although in truth, the scale of the catastrophe this time was somewhat less...."62
After completing the encirclement of the Korsun'-Shevchenkovskiy enemy grouping, the
5th Guards and 6th Tank armies were to form the external encirclement perimeter.
The uniqueness of the developing situation expressed in the enemy's employment of
major forces (8 tank and 6 infantry divisions) to relieve the surrounded grouping
required that the tank armies go over to the defensive on the external encirclement
perimeter.
It must be pointed out that by this time the tank armies had suffered significant
losses (in the 6th Tank Army there were around 100 tanks and up to 20 SAU, while the
Sth Guards Tank Army had 250 tanks and SAU).63 Considring this as well as the need
for the tank field forces to conduct defensive operations, the commanders of the
First and Second Ukrainian fronts, Gens N. F. Vatutin and I. S. Konev, immediately
took measures to reinforce them. One rifle corps of four-division strength was at-
tached to Pach tank army. In addition they also received artillery units. The de-
fenses created by the tank armies were quickly turned into a bastion on which were
dashed all the enemy's attempts to break through to the surrounded troops.
In the course of the operation, in repelling counterstrikes by strong enemy tank
groupings on the external perimeter, the 2d Tank Army was committed to the engage-
ment from the Headquarters reserve. Under the conditions of the spring mud during
one day it made a forced march over a distance of 120 km and successfully carried
our the set mission. The experience of employing it was a very instructive example
of a tank army'~.s rapid maneuver. in the aim of ~oining battle on a threatened sector.
As a whole the efforts of the tank armies in cooperation with the combined-arms for-
mations, the artillery and aviation thwarted the enemy's attempt to release its
grouping and thereby the basic goal of the operation was achieved, tt:at is, to de-
stroy more than 10 Nazi divisions. In carrying out all missions in the pincer oper-
ation, the tank armies demonstrated great maneuverability, power and strength of
their attacks on the offensive as well as stubbornness and tenacity on the defen-
sive. In the Proskurov-Chernovtsy Operation (March-April 1944), during which for
the first time in the war years three tank armies were employed on the axis of a
Eront's main thrust, our troops gained their first experience in encircling the
enemy in the operational depth. The splitting of the Army Group South by a powerful
tank attack on the axis of Chertkovo combined with a decisive maneuver by the tank
_ armies, led to a situation where on 28 March in the area to the north of Kamenets-
Podol'skiy, at a distance of 150 km from the forward edge, the enemy lst Tank Army
w