JPRS ID: 10405 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040051-6
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• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 51
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/10405
22 March 1982
~ N~ar East North e~fricc~ Re ~rt
p
cFOUO 11is2~
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~ JPRS L/10405
_ 22 March 1982
~I~ 1 R EAST/NORTH AFR I CA REPORT
c~oUO ~.i/sa~ ~
CONTENTS
� INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
Arab Aid to Mauritan ia Outlined
(MARCHES TROP ICAUX ET MEDIT~RRANEENS, 29 Jan 82) 1
IRAN
Khomeyni Seen Influencing Islam Internationally ,
(Jacques Buob; L'EXPRESS, 29 Jan-4 Feb 82) 3
Sovieta Said To Be 'Aiming at Iran'
(PARIS MATCH, 12 Feb 82) 10
IRAQ .
1 Deputy Oil Miniater's View on Iranian l3ombing
; (R.oger Matthews; THE FINANCIAL TI~S, 5 Mar 82) 13
~ JORDAN
' 'T.~iT: OBSERVER' Intervieks King Husayn ~
(Husayn Interview; THE OBSERVER, 28 Feb 82) 15
MAURITANIA
Increase in French Aid Planned for 19~2
(MARCHES iROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 29 Jan 82) 18
SYR IA
Diacussion on Interview With President Hafiz al-Asad
(Patrick Seale; TI~ OBSERVER, 7 Mar 82) 19
- a- [III - NE & A- 121 FOUO]
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
ARAB AID TO MAURITANIA OUTLINED � ~
- Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ~:T MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1890, 29 Jan 82 p 256
[Text] The Arab Organization for Industrial Developz~~nt (OADI), together with
UNIDO and the Ma.uritanian Government,~has organized the f irst solidarity meeting .
in order to cooperate with the industrial~development bf the Islamic Republic
of Mauritania, held in Nouakchott from 18 to 20 January 1982. The purpose of the
meeting was to find means.enabling countries and Arab development Institutiona
participating in it to cooperaCe so as to promote industrial development in
Mauritania. The.meeting examined in detail all proposed pro~ects and modes of
bilateral and multilateral cooperation within the framework of Arab economic
cooperation.
Seven countries attended: Algeria, Tunisia, Iraq, Qatar, Kuwait, Libya and
Mauritania, alor_g with six Arab development institutions: the Arab'Investment
Guarantee Company, ~he Arab Industrial Development Fund, the Arab Organization
for Industrial Development, the Arab Libyan Foreign Investment Company, the Saudi
Development Fund and the Islamic Development Bank (IDB). Finally, two interna-
tional organizations were also present: UNIDO and the UNDP.
_ The chairman of the meeting~introduced the pro~ects proposed in order to promote
. industrial, economic and social development in Mauritania: 1) establishment
of a phosphate fertilizer plant; 2). date processing and packing plant;
1) establishment of a foundry in Nouakchott; 4) an agroindustri~l sugar com-
plex in Boghe; a su~ar refinery in I~ouakchott; modernization of the Nouak-
chott slaughterhouse; 3) a handicraft vi'llage i.n Nouakchott; 8) establishment
of a tannery.in Nouakchott; 9) a brickworks in Boghe; 10) proposed restruc-
turing of the M;nistry of Industry and Com~erce;. 11) establishment of a National
Professi~nal Training Center in Nouakchott; 12) an electric powerplant in Nouak-
chott; 13) a livestock feed production plant in Nouakchott; 14) proposed ~
construction, repair and maintenance of boats (naval repair .yard)~ at Nouadhibou;
= 15) development of cottage fishing; 16) establishment of a dairy at Rosso;
- 17) establishment of a livestock vaccine manufacturing plant; and 18) purchase
of a Boeing 737.
Mauritania's representative gave a brief report on the nature of the projects and
_ the ob~ectives of the economic and social development plans, which can be summed
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up as follows: optimum utilization of natural resources; substitution of na=
tional products for main products now imported; d~evelopment of handicrafts and
- the establistunent of small and medium-size industrial units; and the completion
of certain major pro~ects, such as the sugar and oil refineries.
Discussions and delibe~ations took place within the four committees. Most of the
delegations manifested great interest in the pro~ects submitted to them and pro-
_ mised to finance either the feasibility study or~to contribute to their financing
_ directly. ~
Finally, the meeting recoffinended that the OADI, UNIDO and the UNDP grant financial
and technical aid to the projects requiring additional financial resources, ta
the maximum extent they are able to do so.
_ CUPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982
, 11,464
CSO: 4519/119
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. IRAN
KHOMEYNI SEEN INFLUENCING TSLAM INTERNATIONALLY
Paris L'EXPRESS in French 29 Jan-4 Feb 82 pp 74-77
[Article by Jacques Buob]
[Text] "The wurld," said Abdelkrim, "is domiriated by two iunperialisms: capitalism
and communism. Why in the world should we submit to those systems? We have Islam.
_ Islam is our culture and our roots. It is also a political philosophy. Why should
we give up something that once made us powerful?"
We were walking on the campus with our hands in our pockets because the wint�:r sun
is cool in Tunisia. Abdelkrim is a liberal arts student. He wears jeans and a
windbreaker. Also a beard, but it is a shaggy beard, not like the well-trimmed
- ones adorning the faces of those known here as the Moslem Brothers. Abdelkrim is
more of an anarchist.
"Of course," I answered, "but if you are taking the Iranian regime as a model for
development, the situation doesn't look very encouraging." ~
"Don't go so fast. Khomeyni can be criticized. But his arrival on the scene proved
that Islam could take power--that Western ideologies are not inevitable. He de-~
feated the United States! Do you realize that? What a shock in people's minds!"
What is certain in any case is that since Khomeyni, the movement generally known as
Moslem fundamentalism has won milliuns of follawers. And the cry "God is qreat,"
chanted by muezzins from the tops of minarets, is no longer simply the call to pray-
er that European tourists see as "local color." It has become a revolutionary call.
It is to the cry of "God is great" that the Afghan mt:jahed~n attack Moscow's tanks,
that Anwar al-Sadat's assassins fire on the rais, that Syria's Moslem Brothers ex-
- plode deadly bombs, that Algerian fundamentalists clash with the police, arid that
_ "Panatics" ~ccepy the mosque in Mecca. ~
All the regimes--progressive or conservative, Marxist or dictatorial--now fear fun-
damentalist outbursts. This includes--especially--Saudi Arabia, keeper of the holy
places, even though it is the guardian of orthodoxy.
In the space of a few years, the sociopolitical climate in the Islamic world has
changed spectacularly. One can sense it just by wandering around the streets.
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In Algiers, for example. In educated Algeria, which has been pressed into the au-
stere mold of Houari Boumediene's progressi.ve Thtrd Worldism. Ever since independ-
ence, the influence of the omnipresent Na~ional Liberation Front (FLN) and its mass
organizations 1-.as far exceeded that of the mosques. For that matter, the only
oneS who preached ~n them were old fogeys whose sermons were censored in advahce.
In Algiers on Fridays, the s~.dewalks and streets are full of the faithful. The
imams speak. And they are no longer afraid to denounce government poli~y and the
corruption of inen or morals. The universities are restless. In the streets, one
can no longer count the number of girls wearing the "hijeb"--the scarf covering
their hair--and the voluminous robe concealing their shape. It is the uniform of
the Islam of reconquest.
This is the second generation of independence. The FLN, colonization, and the war
. of national liberation? This generation knows nothing about it, and what is more,
it is not the least interested.
"You fought the war and won independence? What independence`? All you think about
is cars, refrigerators, and Western comfort. You don't even speak Arabir. All
y~u think about is France--the West and its turpitude. You still expect salvation
to come fro~n there. You have denied your culture, and you are not even independ-
ent!"
That is how one young man talks to his father, who was a mujahed and shed his blood.
In the universities, the fundamentalists have set up places of prayer that may be
transformed into political rostrums--an easy shift, since in Islam, whatever is
religious is political and vice versa. In the su~ner, it happens that women at
the beach are set upon, ar~d gangs break into private parties on the pretext that
- cassettes by an "obscene" singer are being played. A woman judge (according to
t.he Koran, a woman cannot.dispense justice) is the target of vitriol in the street.
Knives for fighting have been found on university premises. And last September,
there were bloody 'incidents at the Laghouat oasis, where police had to use force
to evict a group of armed fundamentalists who had taken over a mosque and ejected
its official imam.
"Playing With a Live Grenade"
But Presidenb Chadli Bendjedid has attempted to win the believers over. He played
- on the fundamentalist th.eme to eliminate the last supporters of Boumediene and the
pro-Marxists surrounding Mohamed Salah Yahiaoui. He has made the pilgrimage to
Mecca twice. He has lifted the censorship of Friday sermons. He has allowed cer-
tain prominent peop].e close to the fundamentalists to enter the government, where
they hold such important portfolios as religious affairs, justice, and i~iterior.
The 5-year plan calls for the construction of 160 mosques, an equal number of
Koranic schools, 3 institutes of Islamic science, 26 centers of Islamic culture,
and 2 national--and, naturally, Islamic--academies. The Arabization of education,
often anarchic, is finally taking big steps forward.
' Will all those concessions to God's side be er.ough to shield the regime from a
�undamentalist outburst? It is not so certain.
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For the moment, the Algerian fundamentalist movement lacks a leader. Ahmed Ben
Bella, released after long Xears i.n prisoti and converted to Islami.c theses close to
IChomeyni's, miglit be the man. His wife already wears the hijeb. In any case, he
has understood the enormous politi.cal strength represented by the new faithful in
the mosques.
"Chadli has tried to use their support to establish his power, which is still frag-
ile. He has encouraged their progress. But he is playing with a live grenade.
Someday it may very well blow up in his hands."
Omar poured us another swig of scotch. Below the building on the sidewalks of
Didouche-Mourad Street, there was the crush of people that one sees every evening
in Algiers--all those innumerable Travoltas who still dream of big cars, girls, and
moneyo Meanwhile, the fundamentalists are becominq structured in the lycees, uni-
versities, factories, and government offices (especially in the sectors of informa-
tion and culture). They are opening judo clubs where they learn to fight. The au-
thorities have orderEd them closed. Meanwhile, private individuals bring in some
- famous mufti at their own expense to preach in private on the glories of Islam.
"How about you, Omar? You like the bottie and you live it up. In those people's
eyes, you are totally decadent."
"Yes, and totally French-speaking, too--in language and culture. Instinctively.
If they ever come to power, 2 will be ccnsidered one of the real 'depraved of the
- earth.' So anyway, how about another scotch?"
- What are the reasons for this return to sources by the young people? They are the
= same everywhere. A generation crisis and a mystical crisis, and also a search, in
the face of imported and maladapted ideologies, for an authenticity which coloniza-
tion killed and which decolonization has not been able to revive. There is also a
- crisis with the regimes in power.
Those postcolonial regimes are dictatorships, harsh or mild, and as single-party
regimes or something very close to it, they have stifled all discontent. As a re-
sult, the only place left for free expression has been the mosques, where God's
screen allows everything. Orie can let fly at President Habib Bourguiba, that agi-
tator who drinks orange juice in public during Ramadan. Or at al-Sadat, who al-
- lawed his wife Jihane to be kissed by the abhorred American, Jimmy Carter, in front
- of all the world's television cameras.
The lawyer for Lieutenant Istambouly, al-Sadat's assassin, exclaimed: "They are not
assassins! They are angels from heaven!" Behind their zoo grating, the 24 c~n-
spi.rators, who are all said to be members of the Tekfir Wal Hijra (Excommunication
and Hegira) group, yell and shriek with laughter as they wave their pocket Korans.
No, they are not guilty, because the divine word justifies the murder.of tyrants
who do not follow the precepts of the prophet. All they have done is apply God's
word. They have killed the corrupt man who made a pact with Israel, abandoned his
_ people to poverty, and imprisoned good Moslems. Glory to them! They are certain
- of dying. Glory to them! They will go to paradise.
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"Gave the Moslems' Hearts Back to Them"
Egypt is the cradle o~ the authentic Moslem B~others. The brotherhood sprang up
here in Dhu al Q3'da 1347 of the Hegi.ra--that is, in May 1929. It was founded by
a sChool teacher named Hassan e1~Banna.
"When I heard his voice for the first time, I dreaded the moment; when he urould fin-
ish his speech.. Tn 100 minutes, he took the hearts of the Mosl~~ns into the palms
of his haiids and stirred them as he willed. When he stopped talking, he qave the
- Moslem~' hearts back.to them, but not md.ne, which.remained in r,is hands."
Those words, spoken by one.of Hassan el-Banna's first disciple:s, are reported by
Gilles Keppel, a French university student who is currently completing a thesis on
_ the Moslem Brotherhood. They could just as well as have come from the lips of those
who not so long ago used to invade an entire neighborhood in Cairo around a poor
- mosque to hear the bewitching voice of a blind imam. Friday after Friday, Sheikh
Kichk would justify in advance the fall of al-Sadat's regime. Hassan el-Banna died
on 12 February 19~9 at the hands of Gamal 'Abd-al-Nasir's secret police. Kichk is
in prison--silenced by al-Sadat, who realized too late that Kichk's monotonous chant
carried a fatal message for him. But Kichk's voice still speaks to millions of
Mos~ems beyond the borders of the state of Greater Islam. His voice, recarded on
innumerable cassettes whose extraordinar~r proselytizing power was first recognized
by Khomeyni, continues to preach in the deserts and cities on behalf of a strictlu
Islamic society in which the Sharia--Moslem law--will be the foundation for every-
thing.
Di~?loma-Carrying Assassins
Hosni Moubarek, Egypt's new rais, is taking a moderate apgroach and freeing some of
the Moslean Br.others interned by al~-Sadat, among them the brotherhood's emir, Sheikh
Telmesani. But the old emir has ~long been considered a moderate in terms of the
fanaticism displayed by the small groups springing up in Egypt and throughout the
Moslem world. To a certain extent, those "extremists" are to the Moslem Brothers
what the Baader Gang was to Alain Krivine's Communist League.
The members of those groups are not poor illiterates who have been swayed by reac-
tionary theses. No: A1-Sadat's assassins are university graduates who have known
modern schools and studi.,ed "Western" subjects. Incidentally, the famous Islamic
A1-Azhar University in Cairo is not the refuge of the fundamentalists. They prefer
the schools of science and medicine.
As they do elsewhere. Listen to this 24-year-old Tunisian woman. She teaches
French. She wears the hijeb. She is engaged. Her future husband does not want
her to work, and she agrees. . ~
"A woman's chief mi.ssion is to insure her husband's peace, tranquillity, and happi-
ness and to take care of his household. There are colleagues who can always re-
place me as a teacher, but not as a wife a:id mother."
We asked her: "Do you feel ~hat there is a biological difference between men and
women?" ,
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"Yes. A woman's role, first of all, i.s to bear children. But also to pr~pagate a
good understanding of Islam: the spark needs only a breath to break i.nto flame. T_t
must be revived tr save thi.s peo~le. Have not the faith and its influence been at
t;ze root of Tslamic civi.lization, which transformed a namadic people into a con-
quering people?" There passes a picture of the Iranian Guardians of the Revolution,
mAn in combat uni~orm and women in chador, defending Islam's gains with Kalashnikovs
by their sides.
Now to London. In a comfortable hotel room at the Swiss Cottage, Dr Said Ramadan
; serves tea and small cakes that a Pakistani '~rother has brought to him from over
there. Imprisoned and exiled by Nasir and r.?arried to Hassan el-Banna's daughter,
he is considered one of the MosTem Brotherhaod's most brilliant thinkers.
"Well, Doctor, what do you think of al-Sadat':s assassins? Were they right to kill
the dictator?"
Ramadan hesitated.
"First of all, you should understand that the group's name--Tekfir Wal Hijra--is a
pure invention on the government's part. That in itself shows how inf~~rmation can
be invented. Those poor guys acted with their heart and their f aith. But who can
tell us that the entire affair was not manipulated from the start?"
There was another moment of silence, and then he added: "The situation is very c,.:a-
plex."
In mid-December, a highly secret meeting of all the Islamic parties throughout the
world was held right here in London. It was attended by representatives of the
Philippine groups engaged in a bloody guerrilla war against the regime of President
Ferdinand Marcos, as well as by Afghans, Syrians, Tunisians, Egyptians, and Saudis.
Iran and Libya sent observers. From Algeria, Ahmed Ben Bella himself kept up with
_ the proqress of the "summit meeting" by telephone.
During that strange meeting, there was considerable discussion of relations between
the Islamic movements and the Soviet Union. We had already discussed that question
with Abdelkrim on the campus in Tunis. He had said: "Listen, we cannot look at
things the same way you do. The enemy here in our regions is capitalism. The
colonizers--the ones who rubbed our noses in the mud--were not the 5oviets. They
are not the ones supporting Israel and humilxating the Arabs. Of course, the So-
viets are atheists. We don't trust them. But they are not hereditary enemies.
Not yet."
At the London meeting, the talk was more or less along the same lines. Except from
the Afghan representatives, obviously.
What was that secret meeting? The embryo of an Islamic terrorist international?
Said Ramadan said: "Do you want me to answer frankly? Well! At the beginning, we
did not know exactly why we were meeting. And when ~.t was over, we still didn't
know why we had met."
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Fte repeated: ~'The situation is vezy complex." And indeed it is �or the (authentic)
Moslem Brothers, an`~o, while they have retained defi.nite moral authority and have
considerable finan~~3a1 resources, are being increasingly left behind by small groups
which, like the European terrorists~(the ETA jBasque Fatherland and Liberty Graup]
br the Red Brigades, for examFle) are suh~ect to man3puZation b~cause of their veX'y
fanaticism. ~
There is no taboo against terrorism in the name of God, and (progressive) Algeria
and Egypt are not exempt from it. Neither is secular Tunisia, which has imgrisoned
90 fundamentalist leaders and thinks it has found the answer in reestablishing a
_ multiparty system that does not exclude the Communist Party. Neither is Moroccn
and its extremely wealthy king. In Morocco the phenomenon is latent but already
perceptible. Neither is Syria and its regime with its links to Moscow. In Syria a
real religious war is underway between the Moslem Brothers, who are being savagely ~
repressed but who continue to reappear, and the minority Alawite sect to which the
government belongs. Neither is Iraq, where the:Ba'thists are on the defensive. And
neither is Saudi Arabia, whose degenerate princes "spend millions of dollars in the
casinos" and are ~he "playthings of U.S. policy in ~the region." Those regimes are
all targets for fundamentalists seeking an ideal Islamic society that remains to be
invented.
In an attempt to simplify things, we can identify four major sources of inspiration
and financing for the Moslem fundamentalist movements. ~
1. Iran: Imam Khomeyni has never concealed his desire to ~ee the revolu�tion ex-
ported in the natne of the Islamic world's recovered pride. Incidentally, his atti-
tude is in total agreement with the Koran. ~
2. Libya: Mu'ammar Qadhdhafi has never made a mystery of his sympathies for all de-
stabilizing groups, especially those which, lacking his "Little Green Book," bran-
dish the Koran.
3. The Moslem Brothers: They have now chosen to take power by democratic means and
condemn unjustified violence. But their organization, dating back a long way and
~ well accustomed to operating ur.derground, as well as their pan-Islamic ideology and
moral authority, make them a basic element in Islam's fight.
4. And lastly, there is Saudi Arabia, which finances many T,lovements, notably those
that might open a breach in the "progressive" regimes. In Syria, for example,
where it sends the Moslem Brothers aid by way of Jordan, and in Afgharxistan, where
it supports the extremist fundamentalist group known as Hezb-i-Islami.
As Ramadan says, the matter is complex when one realizes that while Qadhdhafi may
well be playing the KGB's game, Saudi Arabia may well be playing that of the CIA.
"Mr Ramadan, in the case of the takeover of the mosque in Mecca, is it not true that
you naturally support those who seized tY,e Kaaba and denounced the corrupt power of
the rulers in Riyadh?"
"Some very good people were involved in that. But there were also agitators. All
of it, incidentally--as was true of the attempted coup d'etat in Bahrain (see
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L'EXPRESS No 1591)--served only to bring about a buildup o� Saud~ Arabia's army and
police. Whom does the crime benefit? In the final analysis, the Americans."
"He's Crazy, But He Paxs"
Unless, of course, the Sov3.ets are behind all that. Who is to know? Very compZex,
Mr Ramadan. All the more since out of a11 the manigulation and countermanipulation,
one thing is certain. Everyone has something to gain from playing with the formi-
- dable desert wind that is sweeping the Moslem world. It is a very real wind.
- Abdelkrim had said: "After all, in all of this, Khbmeyni was the only one to elude
all the traps set by the superpawers. He threw them all out."
"Yes, but at what cost? W'hat about Qadhdhafi?"
"Qadhdhafi? He's crazy. But he pays. He was almost successful in January 1980,
when he threw his commandos against Gafsa. But he is not really reliable. Of
course, Khomeyni is going a bit far. But perhaps that is the price we must pay to
g~t out of the capitalast-co~nunist pincers."
The sun was going dawn, and it was cool. Abdelkrim got on the bus that would take
him d~wntown.
"Well, goodby. See you soon," we said.
"Inch Allah!"
COPYRIGHT: 1982 s.a. Groupe Express
11798
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~
IRAN
SOVIETS SAID TO BE `AIMING AT IRAN'
PairS PARIS MATCH in French 12 Feb 82 pp 70, 72
[Text] In Iran, the war is~in full s;aing on all fronts. Against
Traq, the Army is waging slow and deadly trench warfare. Deprived
of most of its monarchist generals and short of spare parts, it is
all the less capable of wresting a semblance of victory because ~
revolts are breaking~ou~ everywhere in the interior. Kurds, Turko-
mans and Baluchis are openly rejecting the Tehran regime. In Teh-
ran too, a real battle is being ~ought in the corridors. The fact ,
is that everyone is preparing for the post-Khomeini era. And ~the
Tudeh party, communist and pro-Soviet, is tirelessly infiltrating
the Islamic state. In e�fe~t, the Soviet Union is preparing to
- take possession of the old ayatollah's heritage. Bivouacking on
the northern border, it is awaiting the favorable opportunity. .
An exceptional occurrence: no executions are planned for next Thursday in Iran.
The turbaned fanatics who surround Khomeini are getting ready to celebrate the
third anniversary of the establishment of the Islamic Republic. But behind the
public show planned for 11 February, an underground battle is in full swing in pre-
paration for the post-Khomeini era. The equilibrium of an entire region of the
world depends on the butcome of this struggle: ei~ther Iran will f.all into the Sovi-
et orbit, or else this country will restore friendly ties with the West. The es-
- sential element of the situation is that the popular support for the regime of the
mullahs is in the process of crumbling, which was entirely foreseeable. Anyone who
knew Iran in the 1960's and at the beginr.ing of the 1970's can testify that this
country was at the opposite pole from r.eligious fanaticism. It was in reaction to
the frantic modernism imposed by the shah that the mosques became the center of re~-
sistance. An abrupt return to the traditions of the Shi'ite sect was the only way
of asserting its differentness and of rejecting an American-style culture--that is,
a culture imported from outside. But in 3 years, the Islamic Republic has betrayed
- its ideal. Ignorant and intolerant mullahs have monopolized all powers, and today
_ the hope is no longer what it was. Enthusiasm is now limited to the lowest strata
of the population, the ones that always applaud when gallows are raised.
_ It has to be said that with regard to executions.; the machinery is running at full
steam. Opponents of the regime and representatives of ethnic or religious minori-
- ties are being shot pell-mell every day. Those called smugglers and those accused
of immoral conduct--drug addicts, pederasts and adulterous women--are executed al-
so. The local newspapers report these events with the greatest care, and it seems
that one can have confidence in the macabre statistics they present: during hot
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spells, there may be up to 100 executions per day; in the cooler periods, the fig-
- ure may drop to 10. The manner of killing is left to the initiative of the local
committees, who generally find rifles most expPditious. Reliable sources state
that out of every lOQ executions, there are at least 10 hangings. As for the tra-
ditional stonings, they are rare, and sometimes an entire week passes withouC
stones ilying and breaking heads. Meanwhile, the war with Iraq continues--a small-
scale war resembling an endless boxing match between two punchy boxers. This con-
flict is exhausting the little that remains of the Ir.anian economy. Oil is flowing
in driblets. The factories are working in slow motion. Imports are limited to
food products and a few rare spares for military materiel.
All this is sad, but it does not keep Iran from being a great country that today is
_ in quest of its future. To simplify matters, one may say that there are two camps
that are working behind the scenes. In one of the camps are the petite bourgeosie,
who are called the bazaar, and a certain number of officers seeking their Bona-
parte. There are also tribes who, in the Iranian context, remain important: the
Gashgai and the Boyer-Ahmadi of the Shiraz region, the Baktiari of the Ispahsn re-
gion, the Kurds of the Kermanshah region, the Baluchis of the Pakistan-border re-
gion have had their fill cf the terror imposed by Tehran and are opposed at any
cost to the pro-Soviets' pulling the chestnuts out of the Islamic fire.
In the other camp, there is the communist party, which in Iran is called the Tudeh
par.ty and which is infiltrating with all its might, into the religious circles too.
The current presi.dent, Ali Khamenei (not to be confused with Khomeini), as well as
the president of the Supreme Court, Mr Ardabili, and the first vice president of
the National Assembly, Mr Ktioiniha, are considered religious personalit'es who sym-
pathize with the Tudeh party. If, at the end of a long haul, the Tudeh ~ucceeded
in getting a sort of national union started, Iran would not take long in becoming a
disguised satellite of the USSR. A number of cogwheels are already in position.
First of all, experts from the Eastern countries appear whenever the surroun~ling
disorder makes it necessary to call on outside help. Thus, Soviets are found in
the steel industry and the secret police, Bulgarians in the petrochemical industry,
and East Germans in antiaircraft defense. Secondly, the Tudeh party is strengthen-
ing its hold on the civil administration by taking all the deputy~minister and per-
sonnel-chief positions it can get. Thirdly, centralization of the economy is pro-
ceeding at a good clip, and trade relations with foreign countries are now in the
hands of the state offices. Finally, the "Guardians of the Revolution" corps is
growing stronger. at the expense of the Army. The number of militiamen is to reach
70,000 ty the end of 1982 and 120,000 by the end of 1983. There is even talk of
creating an armored division whose mission would be domestic intimidation more than
cumbat at the borders.
The most probable scenario is that the communists will not attempt anything while
Khomeini is alive. Rather, they are making ready to take possessic~n of the inheri-
tance once the obstinate old man, already very weakened, has given up his soul to
the God of the believers. If they achieve their ends, the face of the world will
be changed. Nothing more or less than that. Iran has the material capacity to be
the world's second-ranking exporter of oil. In particular, it occupies an un-
equalled strategic position on the Gulf that used to be called, and rightly so, the
Persian Gulf. On the other side of this arm of the sea, within reach of a launch,
lise Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the Emirates.
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All this is so clear ~hat the moment has come to pose a questioYi. This question
has nothing to do with human rights; Xather, it is inspired by traditional power-
relationships policy. Here it is:.is it proper, from a strategic point of view, to
get so upset about the fate of Poland, which before all these events was already
part of the Soviet bloc, and to be so totally disinterested in Iran, which for it~
part is on the verge of toppling into either one camp or another? Isn't it an ur-
gent matter to aid--secretly but strongly--those Iranians who would prefer to be
our friends rather than the vassals of their very powerful neighbor who is bivou-
acking to the north of their border? In the current confrontation, to ask the
question is to answer it.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 par Cogedipresse S.A.
11267 ~
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IRAQ
~ DEPUTY OIL MINISTER'S VIEW ON IRANIAN BOMBING
PM051307 London THE FIr1ANCIAL TIMES in English 5 Mar 82 p 3
[Dispatch by Roger Matthews: "Iraq Admits Serious Bombing Damage to Oil
Facilities"]
[Text] Baghdad--Iraq has suffered "serious and extensive" damage to its
oil facilities during the war with Iran, now 3n its�eighteenth month,
which will cost billions of dollars to repair or replace Mr 'Abd al-Mun'im
al-Samarra'i, deputy oil minister, said in an interview here yesterday.
- His account was in sharp contrast to earl3er Iraqi assessments which had
tended to play down the amount of damage caused by Iranian bombing.
Mr al-Samarra'i said, however, that Iraq's oil exports were running at
abcut 900,000 barrels a day (b/d). The Syrian, Lebanese and Turkish
termina.ls had an effective capacity of l.rm b/d.
The deputy minister said damage had been particularly severe in Kirkuk and
Basra. A wide range of facilities had been bombed in Kirkuk, the main oil
producing area, including degasif ication plants, processing plants and a
pumping station. Refineries, especially in Basra, had been critically
damaged.
Officials had not yet been able to carry out a detailed assessment, but
Mr al-Samarra'i believed that several facilities were beyond repair. He
was pessimistic about.the prospects for the deep-water terminal at al-Faw
- which had been struck severaY times by the Iranians.~
More.au~b itious repair work on facilities in the north may be able to start
soon because of improvements in Iraq`s air defence system. However, three
Iranian aircraft which last week attempted the first air raid on Kirkuk since
_ August 1981 were driven off. The lead aircraft was brought down by a surface-
to-air missile and exploded in mid-air over Kirkuk golf course.
Iraq has received approval from Riyadh for the construction of a pipeline
running across Saudi Arabia to the Red Sea. The pipeline will t;~ve a capa-.
city of 40m to SOm tonnes a year, and a new terminal will be built to handle
the crude on a site still to be decided.
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Officials in Baghdad want to start detailed design work immedia;.ely, but
the project is being delayed by difficulties in reaching agreement with
Saudi Arabia over financing. Mr al-Samarra'i said the Saudis had not yet
agreed to help with the f inance.
Mearnahile, Iraq will continue to press Saudi Arabia for a change in its oil
production policy. "We are in a good position to persuade our Saudi brothers
of the negative effects of what they are doing," he said. Iraq was being
forced to review its own pricing policy as a result of what was happeninQ
on international oil markets. which was short-si~hted and self-defeatinQ
for the nroducers. .
"Saudi Arabia is a soverei~n countrv and has the riQht to uroduce oil at the
level it wishes. but w~ must remind the Saudis as Arabs and members of the
OrQanisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) that their policy cannot
be in either their own short-term or long-term interests," Mr al-Samarra'i
said.
COPYRIGHT: The Financial Times Ltd, 1982
CSO: 4400/156 ~
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JORDAN
'THE OBSERVER' INTERVIEWS KING HUSAYN
PM011525 London THE OBSERVER in English 28 Feb 82 p 10 ~
[Patrick Seale report of interview with Jordanian King Husayn; date and
place not given: "Husayn Offers To Defend Gulf From Iranian Subversion"]
[Excerpts] Amman--In an exclusive and wide-ranging interview with THE
OBSERVER, the King [Husayn] who in August celebrates 30 years of rule, `
declared that Jordan was ready to participate in the defence of the Gulf.
'We Arabs, alone, can help each other if there is trouble,' he.said. 'At
stake is not only our security but our identity. A super-pc~;~r,' he
- added in a dismissive reference to American military moves in the area, 'can
only intervene if another has already done so, and then it is too late.'
With the Iran-Iraq war still raging, and a dangerous Iran-backed shia
underground beginning to show its hand as in last December's abortive coup
in Bahrain, problems of security in Arabia loom large in the king's mind.
- La.st week Saudi Arabia concluded a security agreement with Oman, one of a
network of such agreements it has been stitching together with its other
fellow members of the Gulf Cooperation Council--Bahrain, Qatar, the
Unit ed Arab Emirates and, before too long, Kuwait.
But the Jordanian view is that such arrange~ments between weak states would
be more credible if underpinned by Jordanian military power.
In other words, Jordan is making a bid for 'associate' or 'honorary' ~
membership of the Gulf Cooperation Council, offering its own rapid deploy-
ment force to douse any fuCure revolut3onary firQS.
The commander-in-chief of Jordan's armed forces, Sharif Zayd Ibn Shakir~,
told me that paratroops in battalion, or if necessary brigade, strength
could be airlifted at speed to any Gulf trouble-spot.
On a visit here two weeks ago, the United States Defence Secretary
Caspar Weinberger hinted the United States might consider selling Jordan
F16 f ighters and mobile Hawk ground-to-air miss3les.
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This announcement raised such a storm of ~sraeli protest that President Reagan,
ducking for cover, declared that his defence secretary had brought him no
suGh Jordanian requests.
Was that the way the King saw it? 'Although we didn't present specific
requests to secretary Weinberger we did, of course, discuss our needs and
~ requirements. What else does one talk about with a defence secretary?
'We do have a problem. We have a role in this area which we will n~t
~ hesitate to play. Israel has access to the b est~in the American arsenal.
Some other neighbours have access to the best in the Soviet arsenal. Mean-
while,our own capability is compromised.'
He added with great firmnESS: 'We have a legit3mate right to seek new
equipment and will pursue the matter and see what the responses are.
~ Last year, the King bought about 275 British Chieftain tanks with which to
counter Syria's heavy Soviet-built T-72s. He will also shortly be taking
delivery of advanced, mobile Soviet SAM-8s, effective against low-flying
aircraft.
The King held out the prospect of further purchases from Britain, not only
by Jordan alone but by 'a wider circle of Arab countries'--no doubt a
reference to the poss3bility that Jordan, Iraq and some Gulf Cooperation
Council members might buy the Tornado, bu31t by the Anglo-German-Italian
consortium, Panavia.
- The King's active, even passionate, support for Iraq reflects his strategic
vision of an Arab world gravely threatened by Khomeyni's Iran, in his
view an expansionist, intractable and fana.tically shia power.
'This is not a war between Iraq and Iran alone. Iraq holds the front line
of a conflict affecting the entire Gulf and much of the Arab world beyond it.
Our entire future is at stake. .
'An Iranian victory would make the Arabs of no consequence, it would set
Shia against Sunni throughout the area with devastatin~ effect. Fortunately,
Iraq (which has a larQe Shia population) has not split under the s*_rain
and remains united as a nation.
'We have no alternative but to support Iraq to the utmost of our ability.'
The KinQ's most bitin~ criticism is directed a~ainst President al-Asad of
Syria whom he accuses of breakinQ Arab ranks by joininQ Israel. in support
of the enemy in Tehran.
So. to shore up the Arabs a~;ainst revolutionary Iran. the King would dearly
like to break the Tehran-Damascus axis, and its extension to the Shia
militias of Lebanon.
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There is little doubt that he woul'd 13.ke to see a change of regime in
Damascus. He described the recent righting in Hamah as 'a popular uprising.'
liut he categorically re~ects Syria's charg~ that he gives help to its
enen?ies. 'We have never interfered in the affairs of others nor do we
tolerate their interference in our own~.' Last week Jordan expelled the
Syrian military attache and his staff.
On his other flank, the K3.ng watches with mounting frustration as Israel
tightens its grip on the occupied West Bank across the Jordan.
For all its international reknown, the PLO has patently lost the battle
on th e ground. In despair, activ3sts among the local Arab population are
turnin g either to the Muslim brothers or back to the secular violence
preached by r.he popular front leader George Babash. A few collaborators
have rallied to the Israelis.
Moderates such as the King cannot give a lead so long as the United States
turns a blind [eye] to Mr Begin's expansionism.
'What is American policy in relation to their very clear and explicit
commitment?' the ~King aske in real anger.
'If America has torn up security council resolution 242, if it has given up
the struggle to effect an Israel3 withdrawal, it would be the biggest
disaster imaginable.'
COPYRIGHT: The Observer Ltd 1982
CSO: 4400/156 .
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~ MAURITANIA
~ INCREASE IN FRENCH AID PLANNED FOR 1982~
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1890, 29 Jan 82 p 256
[Text] From 1981 to 1982, French aid to~Maurita~ia will increase from 20 to 36
million French francs, according to an announcement made "by French Minister of
Cooperation Jean-Pierre Cot, who, along with Ma3 Ahmed Ould Minnith, Mauritanian ~
mini~ter of foreign affairs and cooperation, presided over the first,meeting of

~ the French-Mauritanian ~oint commis;sion on cooperation held since the army's
overthrow of President Ould Daddah's civilian regime in July 1978. The meeting
took place from 21 to 23 January in Nouakchott.
Several Mauritanian pro~ects will be financed by FranCe, Cot added, particu7.arly
- a proposed international communications earth station and a transit center in
- Nouakchott. These pro~ects are the first phase af a plan to modernize communi-
cations infrastructures in which France intends to participated, he said. .
- Scientific and technical cooperation between France and Mauritania was also exam-.
ined, particularly in the field of~fishing, and a committee will meet iri March
to set up a research unit in the sector.. In the meantime, the framework agree-
ment is to be signed with the EEC.. Cot said~he had received assurances from Mauri-
tanian authorities concerning the continuation of the acttvities of French fisher-
men in Mauritanian territorial waters.
Lt Col Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidalla, Mauritanian chief of state, met with ,Iean-
Pierre Cot on 22 January. The latter sa~d aft~r the meeting that he had "noted
agreement between France and Mauritania on almost all problems discussed, mainly
the matter of the Western Sahara."
Cot also visited the Nouakchott Lycee, a technical institution financed by
France.
- COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982
11,464
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SYRIA
DISCUSSION ON INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT HAFIZ AL-ASAD
LD070848 London THE OBSERVER in English 7 Mar 82 p 15
["Secure al-Asad Blames U.S. for the Bitter Battle of Hama" by Patrick Seale]
[Text] Fresh from the carnage of the Hama uprising--the great internal
threat to him in almost 12 years of rule--President Hafiz al-Asad of Syria
is a relaxed, confident, even ~ovial man.
For good reason: He has won. In an exclusive, 2-hour interview with
THE OBSERVER last week, he said: 'Tell my enem3es that my healtti is robust
and my will is firm.'
Dr Henry Kissinger, in the latest volume of his memoirs, describes al-Asad
as 'proud, tough, shrewd, cordial.' Apart from good health and determina-
tion, these are the qualities which have kept al-Asad at the top in Syria
since November 1970--and near the top since 1963, when the Ba'th Party ~
seized power. He is likely to stay in the saddle for some time.
Far from overthrowing al-Asad by sparking off a popular revolution, the
Muslim brotherhood has suffered a grave defeat. Its stronghold has been
flattened and hundreds--if not thousands--of its best fighters have been
killed or captured. Like losers everywhere, it has forfeited public
support.
Doubtless it is still capable of sporadic acts of terror, but the lesson of
Hama is that the strategy of urban insurrection does not work in Syria.
Only if a substantial part of the army, of his own 'Alawite community,
turns against him will al-Asad be overthrown.
For the moment, he maintains control, firstly, by his grip on the Ba'th
Party's military wing, the real center of power; secoudly, through a country-
side, well-oiled network of patronage, ~obs, perks, handouts and favours;
and thirdly by means of a powerful security and antiputsch apparatus.
The strength of his Muslim opponents lay in the real grievances of the
population which they ma.naged to mob3lize: disgruntlement at widespread
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, profiteering by governm~nt agents; brutal repression of dissent by
Rifaat al-Asad, the president's brother, who heads the regime's special
forces; and the daily vexations of roadblocks and security checks.
The weakness of the Muslim brotherhood ie that few Svrians would like to
live under an avatollah-stvle t~overnment. In the past 30 years Svria has
been larr~elv re~+shaped on secular lines. The rising generation has known
no other society than that of the Ba'tR, which tomorrow celebrates
19 years of power in Syria.
In the fighting at Hama, the re~diness to die of the Muslim brothers was
met with an equal readiness to die by defenders of the regime.
In the interview, the president laid the blame for Ha.ma squarely at the
door of the United States. Making his clearest accusations yet, he aaid:
_ "I have no doubt that this was an American intelligence operation. I have
proof of U.S. involvement. It is three sorts.
'Some of the criminals have confesaed their contacts with U.S. agents.
Secondly, at Hama we confiscated advanced coummunications equipment, and
other equipment of American origin, which could only have reached the
criminals with U.S. approval and through the channel of U.S. agents.
'Thirdly, it was the State Department--in obvioue collusion with Muslim
brotherhood groups abroad--which f irst broke the news of the Hama fighting.'
(Although the insurrection started ~;n 2 FPbruary, news of it reached the
outside world on 10 February when, simultaneously a State Department
official in Washington and a spokesman for the Muslim brotherhood in Bonn
revealed it.)
With heavy irony, the president speculated: 'Perhaps the United States does
not consider that its terrorist acts in Syria come under the heading of
international terrorism, which it seems keen to combat in other parts of
the world."
For his part, he promiseu tough treatment for those he sees as agents of
the United States. "American lackeys have to be crushed."
A1-Asad believes the United States wants him overthrown because of his
opposition to Camp David and to open the way for a peace settlement leav3ng
Israel in possession of occupied Arab terriCory. "The United States and its
agents in the area thought they could make Syria kneel to Israel's will."
Syrian relations with America have generally been edged with mistrust. The
nearest the two countries got to friendship was in May 1977 when
Pres ident Jimmy Carter met al-Asad in Gen~va--a meeting which left al-Asad
- with the 'good and positive' impression that America would take Syrian
- interests into consideration and help bring about an 'honourable' peace.
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Deterioration
Then disillusion set in. 'What has happened since has made us increas3ngly
certain that the United States has no policy 3n this area; rather there is
only an Israeli policy which the United States is carrying out.'
While it is true that al-Asad continues to make himself available to American
visitors--he saw Philip Habib, Pres3dent Reaga~n's special envoy in Damascus
last week--there is no doubt that Hama has resulted in a further sharp
deterioration of relations with the United States.
The farther al-Asad moves from Washington~, the closer he gets to Moscow.
'Our relations with the Soviet Union, already good and friendly, are .
strengthening steadily," he said.
The Soviet presence in Syria is apparent but, it seems, not resented--
although about a dozen Soviet technicians have been murdered by al-Asad's
Muslim opponents. The Soviet Embassy is the biggest embassy by far, and
the ambassador, a long-serving diplomat, has the greatest access to the
pr.esident of any foreign .envoy. .
Western diplomats estimated there are about 2,500 Soviet military advisers in
- Syria, under the command of a lieutenant-general and concentrated in a3r
defence and,electronic warfare. The Russ3ans are suppiying Syria with as
many tanks as it can absorb, and it is generally agreed that 3ts armed
forces are stronger today than at the time of the 1973 war.
Soviet-Syrian closeness found expression in a treaty of friendship signed in
October 1980. A1-Asad a~reed to the treaty, after a decade of hesitation,
in reluctant recoQnition.that. faced with an American-backed Israel. he
needed a biQ brother. ~
But al-Asad remains his own man. and ther.e~is no evidence the Russians dictate
his regional m~ves. He did not consult them when, in a cool show of nerve,
he moved ground-to-air missiles into Lebanon's Beqaa Valley last spring,
restricting Israel's freedom in Lebanese skies. Menachem Begin has vowed
to destroy the missiles, but they are st311 there.
'We are where weare," the presidentsaid.'We are present on Arab soil, in a
fraternal Arab country. Neither Israel nor anyone else has a right to
intervene. But if we are.attacked, we will �ight back.'
On the wider Arab-Israeli issue, al-Asad sees no future for a negotiated
settlement so long as Begin remains in office. 'Since Begin refuses to give
any territory back, on what can we negotiate?'
A1-Asad seems,to put his faith 3n an Egypt restored to anti-Israel belligerence
and a revival.~f a fwo-front strategy. 'Egypt is part of the Arab nation. It
will return to the Arab fold- without str3ngs. Its cause is the cause of
the Arabs, its stand is the stand of the Arabs.' ~
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He added: 'I have known President Mubarak very well for a long time'--both
are former air force commanders and both trained 3n Russia--'but there has
been no contact between us since he took over the presidency.' (Some other �
Arab co~.:ntries have made furtive contacts w3.th Egypt, sti11 off3cially beyottd
the pale.) ~
Three constants d~etermine Syria's relations with its ne3.ghbours.
One is that Syria feels it alone stands in the way of an Israeli walk~over, that
it is the only active champion of Arab rights, the guarantee that Arab d3gnity
will one day be vindicat ed. Many an Arab would echo the pres3.dent's
assertion: 'I have no doubt, even for a minute, that we will regain our
rights, no matter how long it takes.'
A second constant is the conviction that Lebanon, Jordan, and what is left
of Arab Palestine, t~long h istorically to Syr3a and fall within its natural
sphere of influence.
The third is that Syria is the geopolitical heart of the region, th~t nothing
can be done without it, that it is the maker of peace and war.
A1-Asad has been notably stubborn in affirming Syria's importance. The
visitor leaves his presence conv3nced that no diplomatic initiat3ve which
omits Syria from th e equation can succeed.
COPYRIGHT: The Observer Ltd 1982
CSO: 4400/156 END
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