JPRS ID: 10399 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040045-3
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• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 92
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 45
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/ 10399
. ,18 March 1982 ,
- Euro e~ Re ort
We~t . p
p
(FOUO i 7/82~~
FB'S FOREIGN BR~ADCAST INFORWIATION SERVICE
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NOTE �
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JPRS L/10399
18 i~larch 198 2
= WEST EUROPE REPORT
(~ouo i~/sa1 ~ ~
CONTENTS .
Tx~~ FoacES ~ '
UNITED KINGDOM
- ,'SUNDAY TTMES' Urges Government To Abandon Trideut .
(Ed~tor~al; THE SUNDAY TTMES, 28 Feb 82) 1
POLITTCAL
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Inner-German Relationa Since ScY~midt-Honecker Meeting Viewed
(Peter Jochen Schmidt; EUROPA ARCFITV, 10 Feb 82} 3
~'RANCE .
- Government Chaxact eristics, Continuity, Conflicts Vie~wed ~
(Olivier Duhamel; POWOIRS, No 20, 1982) 11
Diasident Hineker Examinea PCF Crisis, Future
(~'rancois Hincker; PROJET, Jan 82) 19
PBF Competence, Ab ility To Apply Policies Examined
(Roland~Cayrol; PROJET, Jan 82) 25
PCF Decline, Reaourcea for Recovery V3ewed
(Jean Baudouin; POWOIRS, No 20, 1982) 34
Krasueki Purpose: Reinforce C(~, Wage PCF Attack '
(Franz-Olivier Giesb ert, Claude-Frencois Jullien; LE N~WEL
_ OB~E'RVATEUR, 6 FeB 82} 42
PSF Deputies' Factions, Geographic Distribution Surveyed
iDavid Hanley; POWOTRB, No 20, 198~) 46
ITALY ,
DC's Piccoli on Party Clashes Over El "~tv,~,do~�
(Flem3nio Piccoli Intervie~r; LA STAI~~~, .16 Feb 82) 57
- a - [TII - WE - 150 FOUO~
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SPAIN
Maneuverings for Possible UC1~-AP Coalition Described
_ (Antxon Sarasqueta; CAMBTO 16, 8 Feb 82) 59
FSOE Bides Its T~ne in Midst of UC'D Defect3ons
= (Antxon Saxasqueta; CANIBTO 16, 1 Feb 82) 65
MTLTTARY
FRANCE .
- Defense Budget for 1982 Stresses E~nployment, Equipment
(ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI, Jan-Feb 82) 68
General Deacribes Air Region's Logistice,l, Defenae Funetions
(Jean Ra~au Intervie~r; ARMEES D'AUJOURD'f.IUI, Jan-Feb 82) 72
Air Region's Role in Air Defense Operations Described
(Michel Garrelie; ARMEES D'AU~TOURD~HUT, Jan-~'eb 82) 79
Terra.in-Following Radar Tested for Mirage 2000N Program
- (ATR ET COSMOS, 13 Feb 82) 83
i1NITED KTNGDOM
Home Guard, Fxpanded Territorial A,rmy Advocated
(Henry Stanhope; THE T~NIES, Mar 82~ 85
Nott's Announcement on Reservists Welcome, But Not Enough
(Editorial; THE TIMES, 7 Mar 82; 87
- b -
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~ THEATER FORCES LTNITED KINGDOM
' S UNDAY T IMES' U~tGES GOVERI~MENT TO ABANDON TRIDENT
PM011527 London THE SUNDAY TIMES in Englieh 28 Feb 82 p 16
[Editoriai: "Wrong Weapon, Wrong Price"]
[Text] Very soon, th e government will announce its decision on the next
generation of the British nuclear deterrent. In fact the decision has al-
- ready been taken to b uy the Triden~ D5, the most powerful and expensive
weapon the Americans h.ave ever begun to build. All that remains is for the ~
bes t terma to be co ncluded, and for the cabinet and parllament to agree.
We hope cabinet ministers think aeveral times before accepting the case which
the prime minister and the defence secretary are preparing to put to them.
Trident is atrategically unsound, financially beyond this country's reach,
and, within the total pattern of defence, a gravely unbalancing element.
Possessing a nuc,lear deterrent now, Britain should not eimply give it up.
This would e~erve, neither British interests nor the cauae of world diearmam~nt.
If Polaris/Chevaline, the present weapon, 3s ever surrendered, it sliould be
in exchange for a surrender on the other side. But this does not mean that
Britain needs Trident. Trident is deaigned to hit Moscow and penetrate Soviet
~ miLaile silos. It is a first-strike weapon. The TI.S. needa this capacity,
but not Britain. If Britain is in tHe deterrence business, the capacity to
' destroy a couple of Russian cities is deterrent enough: to cut of.f an arm of
the bear, as General De Gaulle uaed to say. Leaser weapona than'Trident--less
vulnerable tn constant technological change,and not nearly so expensive--are
capable of doing that: or rather, which is the point, of posing a threat to
do so which the Russians cannot be certain of eliminating.
As Lord Carver argued on this page last week, the concept~of a tru'ly "inde-
pendent" deterrent do es not, in Br3tain's circumst~nc~s, stand up to serious�
examination. :?e contends that no situation exists in which the threat to use
~ it would be credible if th`e Americana were not also ready to cross the
nuclear thr~shold. On this analysis, purchase of Trident D5, coating perhaps .
10,000 million pounds would increase the firepower but reducs independe~ce
still further. If independence is i~aportant, time aad money would be better
spent in the next few years uncoupling frotn rQliance on Was~?ington for the
guidance systems, satellite targetting and other technology critical to miasile.
ogeration.
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Trident has oecome heavily favoured at the Ministry of Defence. It would
keep Britain in the super-league. To hear some apologists, one might also
imagine it had no side-effects. Mr Nott seems to have persuaded himself
that it has absolutely no conseq~uences for the rest of the defence budget.
This is Whitehall casuistry a~ its most tendentious. Planning for Trident
already means having a smaller navy, arnry and air force. A11 conventional
arms are being weakened to satisfy the simplistic belief that "Moscow"
will be fright:ened by Trident more than anything else.
If these arguments do not pers~�ade a conservative cabinet minister, another
one should. Hitherto Britain'g nuclear defence programme has been pursued
with b ipartisan support. Labour's unilateraliste have not managed to over-
run the co~itment of successive labour cabinets to the nuclear bombers
and Mhe Polaris submarine force. Sometimes th3s has been achieved by
~ questionahle secret dealings. But it has at least meant that nuclear
decisions, with their long lead-times, have survived changes of governmenL-.
Tride.~t would not survive in the same way. The SDP-Liberal Alliance
explicitly opposes it, as, of course, does the Labour Party. Linking Trident
to British 3obs, as the government is now attempting to do, is unl3kely to
change this. Unless the Tor3es w3n the nexti two elections outright, there-
fore, it is impor~sible to see how ~rita3n will ever take delivery of the~
missiles. Yet a whole ~efence strategy will have been built around them.
- There will be no fall-back position. Recovering the ships and tanks, not
to mention the strategic thinking, sacrificed to pay for Trident will be a
longy if not impossible ~ob. If they go along w3th Trident, the cabinet
may go down in history as the agents of a paradox: wholly pledged to
strengt~ening Britain's defence, they will have weakened it.
COPYRIGHT: Times Newspapers Limited, 1982
CSO: 3120/47
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POLITICAI, FEDERAL R~P'UBI,IC OF GgtMANY
~NN'~R-GESMAN RELATIONS SINCE SCHI~tIDT~ONECKER ME~fl'ING YI~TID
Bonn EIT80PA ARCHN in German 10 Feb 82 PP 77~4 ~ .
~Article by Peter Jochen Sahmidt~ member of FRADTi~ITRTF~ AI,LGII'~T1~TE editorial
staff: "Inner-German Relatione Siuae SoY~midt-Eoneaker Meet "
~ex~ The meeting between Cba,ncellor Helmut Schmidt and the g~eneral eearetary -
of the SID and chairntiau af the G~IA aounail of state Eri~h Honecker, whiah wae
~ finally arranged after three tries and was held between 11 and 13 December 1981
in the Schorfheide, northeast of Berlin, seema to have overoome the deadloak in
inner-German relatione ~ociasioned by the auddea GDR cha,ng~e of poliay vi~--a-+vis .
the FRiG in Oatober 1980.~ The GDiR let it be known that it was prepared to s�eturn
to the basia precepts of the treaty and normalization polic3y between the~two
German atates a,nd at least for the preaent to drop the demand ind~reatly raised
in Honeaker~s Gera apeech of 13 October 19802 for a revieion of the baaia treaty '
document.
The 3oint communique iasued at the alose of the Werbellinsee meeting3 sta~ed .
that Schmidt and Honecker had agreed that the basia treaty of 21 Deoember 1972
aa well as the agreement~ and arrar~g~ements worked out eince have laid the ground-
work for the solution of~outstarid.ing problema and areated the ~'conditions neaes-
sary" for mutually advan~tag~eous and continuuusly inareasing� cooperation. "Deapite
- continuing d3fferencea of opinion on fundamental iseues~" they undersaored their
desire "to persist in their efforts to attain gnod-nei~borly relatione." They
flxrther sta~ted their intention "to continue negotiatione and oonveraationa in
varioua fielda, to overcome exieting diffiati.7.ties aad to investigate poasibili'=
ties for fl,irther developing their treaty relations.~' �
Arma Control--~A New Element .
~vercoming the deadlock, however~ daes not mean that relations between Bonn and
East Berlin ca~ etart right up again in early 1982 where they ].eft off in the
fall of 1980. The fact is that a new element has entered into the inner-German
equation~-that of axms control and diearmament. Thie "world policy"~dimenaion.
of its dialogus is particularly dear to the GDR. For that mattet, it h~e to be~
if it does not wish to arouse the suspicions of the Soviet IInion. In hie Gera
speeah, Honecker ha.d already made it clear t~ha,t the G~t~s treaty poliay with the
FRG is an iritegral part of the poliay ooordi.nated among the Wexeaw Pact aountriee
to secure pgace: But aecuring peace~ he said~ was above all a political iaeue
~ ealling for meaeurea in direat pursuit of aolutions for the moat important pro-
- blem of our time-an end to the arme.raae aad arm~ control. "It is above all for
securing peace tha.t the two German states bear a fair amount of reaponsibility."4
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The SID general aecretary returned to this theme in his report to the 10th Sm
pa,rty congress in Apxil 1981. "Tn our policy toward the FB~, tao~ we are abov~e
all else com~.itted to serving peace and securirig it permanently~" he said then�
"Only that which aerves the cause of peace is of advantag+e to people iri both
German statee and to all peoples on our continent."5 Theee statenben~e malce it
clear that the GDiR~a policy vie-a-+vis the FRiG hae turned into an iaetrument of
the Soviet IInion's "peace policy" almost entirely. It is the priority g+oa.l of ~
this Soviet poli,cy to prev~ent the stationing of new Americ~n mediut~rang+e nu-
clear missilee in Wastern E~irope.
Despite sealing itaelf off toward the FRG~ the GI)R haa nonethelesa been consi-
stentl.y trying sinae the fall of 1980 to draw the FRG into ta].ke about axme con~ �
, trol and disa,rma~neat and about their ~oirit reeponsibility for peace. Although the
FRG lmowa full well that the two German atates are not in the least oompetent to
diacuss arins control a,nd dieaxmament iea~es and that the FAG might even run iato
a,dditional prablema with thQ IInited States~ if it did honor the GI,1R~s wishes, it
finally agreed to ta,lk about theae is~ues with East Berlin. Only in this way, the
feeling was in Bonn, could the line to the GD~t be opened up again at all and wa,s
there a charice of overcoming the deadlock in inner-Germau ~reaty neg~otia,tions
about easing human harc~sh3p in the divided country. The F~ pler~i.potentiary for
disarma~ent and arms control isaues, ambaesador Friedrich Ruth, went to East
Berlin on 3 July 1981 for talks with the G~t disaaamament expert, ambasea,dor F~nat
Krabatsah; a,nd on 4 September 1981~ F~,gron Bahr, chairma,n of the Bundestag ~ubcom-
mittee on disarmament and axws control~met with Krabatsch in Eaet Berlin ae well
as with Honecker and~with Hermar~n Axen, a member of the Politburo a,nd aentral com-
mittee secretary for international liaison.
The fact that the December meetin$ between Scl~midt and Honecker took place~ how-
ever~ cannot be termed a result of the FRG~s permitting the GDiR to draw it into
_ discusaions about d3sarmament and arms aontrol. The decisive factor was that ~Ehe
Soviet Union wished to ha.ve the meeti.ng between the chanaellor and the SID g+eneral
aecretary take place ium~ediately following the Bonn visit of Soviet pa,rty boss and
chief of state Brezhnev and prior to the dra,matic crisis in Poland which could
alreac~y be foreaeen. As a target of Mosaow~s "peace policy~~ the FRG ha,a played an
important role all along ae evidenced by the fact that Hrezhnev~s first foreign
vieit following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan took him to Bonn of all places
where the aoviet leader hoped to enlist chanaellor Schmj.dt as a~~media,tor" be-
tween ~~~ashing~ton and N[oscow. ~ren if the cha,ncellor did not turn out to be a~~me-
- diator" but merely an ~~interpreter~"6 the meeting with Brezhnev did open the way
for the meeting with Iionecker on Werbellinsee.
In his talks with Honeoker-aa in the ahaxicellor~s eaxlier meetinga with Brezhnev--
security, arma limitation and disarma~ment problema played a prominent pa,rt. I,en~-
tY~y paseagea of the ~oint comtmuzi.que referred to diecussiona about "topical inter-
_ na.tional problema within a European and worldwi.de context." The communique~s very
firat paragra,ph sta.tes tha.t Honecker and Sahm3.dt voiced their firm resolve "that
wax should never a~ain ataxt ou~ from Germa,n soil~' and tha,t both a3des axe awaxe
of their great responsibility for aecuring peace in ~irope. "Fu].ly coneaious of
the fact that differing social systema exist in both states and that they belong
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~o two different alliancea, they made lmown their deeire actively to pro~note the
process of detente and to contribute to securing permsxient peace and etability
in 3.nternationa,l affairs."
The Shacl,ow of the Events in Poland
This "internationalization" of inner-German relations serves to strengthen the
aelf-esteem of~sthe GDR which feels that it has thua oome one step closer to fu11
reco~ition by the FRG. Such laxigvage also malc,ea it poasible for the GDR to in-
troduce interna,tional iseues into the inner-German dialogue with ~eater intensi-
ty than heretofore and at ex~y time and thereby to distract attention from inners ,
Gerr~z issues whenever this seems advisable. In his toast at the gueet houae of
the council of state on the Doell.nsee, Honecker eaid: "Good-nei~borly relations
ca.nnot thrive in the shadow of new II.S. nualeax missiles. We cannot disen~a~;e our-
selves from world politics."7 The SID general searetary used even plain.er languag~e
in an intexview with NEUF~ DE'[JTSCHLAND a few daye later.8 orp~ Were domina-
ted by the interrela.tionehip-adduced to more than once before--between the bila-
teral and the international aspects of our relations. As we have said before,
they are of the utmost importance for ~,~ace and detente which far exaeed the bi-
lateral aspeats. On the other hand~ neither of the two states aan disengag~e it-
aelf from world politics. They would not remain untouched, i.f there were a grene-
ral world criais." Thia makes it plain that the GDR~s leeway in working for an
improvement in inner-~erman relationa has virtually been reduced to zero and that
such i.mprovement ca,n come about only, if ~he "world situation" or the conduct of
the FRG permit it-~in Moacow~s view.
In his article at year~a end 1981~82~ Honecker said: "No one can ignQre the fact
that the deterioration of the world eituation is oaeting its shadow."y First of
all, there is the long Poliah shadow. It fell on the inner-~erman relationehip
even as Schu~i.dt and Honecker were meeting. It was on the last day of the chan-
cellor''s GDR visit that the Polish'covnail of state declared maxtial law throug~i-
out the country and that PZPR fixst secretary, General Jaruzelski, aseumed dicta-
torial power in Poland as cha.irdnan of a~rM3litasy Council for National Salvation."
Critics above all in the CDU~CSII said the chancellor should have broken off the
visit ae soon ae these developmenta becaame known. The ohancellor did not but went
throu~ with his program.
And so~ Germans in the East and in the West were able to eee those maoabre pic-
tures on their television eareens ahowing uniformed and aivilian eecurity foraes
of the GDR as they occupied the Mecklenburg Qity of Guestrow whiah made it more
than pla.in ~ust how stable the relationship of trust between the GDR leaderehip
and the people is of which the Sr'~ has boasted so m~x~y times. The Gueet~row vieit .
inspite of the events in Poland was neceasaxy for the ea,ke of the citizene of the
GDR--~nd because of the meeting in Guestrow cathedral betweeri tha chancellor and
Heinriah Rathke~ the bishop of the evangelical-Lutheran church for Mscklenburg.
Throug~out the ahaxicellor's entire viait~ the bishop was the only Ger~mri from
the GDiR able to speak freely with him--without aoting on'ha~Ylalf of the party or
the government.~~ "I~ too, would la v~e done the aame thing beeause I~ too~ would
Yiave felt that the Germasis in Eaat Berlin and the GD~R~ who were ur~happy enou~
about the trip being cancelled twice, would have failed to understaxid that he
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would leave so abruptly without waiting to see whether this at~6empt had a chaxice
of succeeding. These were the words used later by Richard von Weizsaecker (CDU~~
the lord mayor of Berlin, in support of the chancellor's decision not to break
off the trip.~~ Further developments in Poland will show in part what the poten~
tiai consequencea of the Werbellinsee meetin~ turn out to be.
E~ch~rig~e of Vi2ws But No Concrete Results
The chancellor and the SID general secreta,ry did no+- .^,:,nduct ne~,rotiations whsn
they met but did enga~e in an exc.l~as~e oP views~ supported by their respective
delegations. Given the type of ineeting it was, concrete results were not to be
immediately expected. But staxts were made on how a. mamber of difficult issues
might be brou~t closer to resolution. It is worth recalliag~what Honecker said
in a toast at a dinner in the Hubertusatock hunting lodg+es "Let me say that we
managed to make out certain areas in very impor~ant isaues affecting the thoughts
and emotions of the citizens both of the FRG ~,nd the GDR upon which should build,
whexe we should come even closer and whiah aonstitute a ray of hope for a ftiiture
in peace and closer cooperation...I think that the exchang+e of views we ha,d on
these iasuea will contribute in various ways to our achieving fruitf~il reaults
in the fu~ure.tr12 ~,e~e ~tatements and another polnt made by Honecker in his
NEUES DEUTSCHI~AND interview-"We wieh to carry the treaty policy with the FRiG
further...This may very well include the reaolution of practical isoues in which
the other side has expressed an interest."--~va.y be termed si~als or advance no-
tices addreased to the citizens of the GIaR that the GDR intends to reaah f~rther
accomodatiox~s with the FRG relating to a,n easing of hum~an hardehigs.
This would itlClude.the minim~am exchan~e of currency provision ffxst of all. As
a consequence of the 4Jerbellinsee meeting~ the FRG has good reason to hope that
' the GDR will at least partially rescind the cirastic~ inc~r~eased min3.mum exahange
rates for visitors to East Berlin and the GDR that were instituted on 9 October
'1980 and then expanded to young people and retired persoas by the middle of 1982.
These twin measures have ca.used a sharp drop in viaitors, with visits to Berlin
down by more than..50 percent. One of the reasons the chaneellor went to the
Schorfhe;~~ was to arrest this trend and to get travel to the GIaR to inarease
aga.in. Eber since the start of the treaty policy w3th the 4
power agxeement~ the
currency exchan~e minim�ma were declared to be an "internal affair'~ of the GDR
and thus not an issue sub3ect to treaty regvlation. As a means of malting the
FR~G~s wishes more palatable to the GIlR~ Bonn agreed to let the no-interest over-
dra.ft ("ewing") credit in inner-Germa,n trade amounting to D~I.~~50 million annually
run. beyond the 31 December 1g81 deadline until 30 June 1982. IIntil that time,
both aides are to work out in negrotiations whether and to what an extent the
"swing" credit should continue. Both the chanoellor and the minister of economica
who accompani.ed him impresaed updn their GI~R counterpaxts tha.t there exists a
"paycholo~ical political relationship" between the extension of the "awing" cre-
dits and the reduction of th~ m3nimum exchang^e regulations. But th~.~y~ too~ know
tha~ it is not only the GDR that is interested in the continuation o:~ the no-
intereat overdraft credits but Weat German firms active in inner.-Germaxi trade
as well~ in view of econou~.tc conditions.
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In the discussions between the chancellor and the SID gen~eral secratary the Bonn
side also tried to ascertain whether the GUR rea].ly intends to make the dema,nds
raised by Honedzer in his Gera speech a precondition for the continuation of ~he
treaty policy:~'- the recogni.ti.on of GI~R citizenship; the conversion of the perma-
nent missions in embassies; the firm establishment of the frontier along the Elbe
between Schnakenbur~ and Lauenburg in the middle of the river, and the diseolution
of the central registration office of t:ie I,and 3uatice a.dministration in Salzgit-
ter~ The result was that the G~R does not wish to do so. Althoug~ Honacker spoke
to all four points at some length~ he also said that the GDR was not settir~ a~ny
preconditions. These issues will remain a part of the inner-Germail dialogue. As
far as the Elbe frontier and the Salzgitter matter ase concerned, the GDR ma.y be
hoping to achieve its aims in the long term.
As to the most important of the isauea--citizenship--that does not come in for
mention in the 3oint communique at all. In the NEU~a DEDTSCHZAND interview~
Honec:ker took a guarded view. "For the GI)R~" he said~ "citizenship is not a
matter for neg~otiation. The FRG should at long last accept thi.s simple truth.
The GDR existr~ and in the whole world there is no state that does not have citi-
zens. ~~Iha.t we expect of the FRG ia that it respect G~1R citizenship withaut reser-
vations." Respecting GD~i citizenahip i~ a different matter from recognition of
it. The latter wou].d mean reatricting Gern~an citizenship--which binds all Gerin~ns
in the I'RG, in the GDR and in West Berlin together--to the inhabita,nts of the.F'RG
alone. But, accordin~,r to the basic law and the conatit~itional court's opinion~on
that law~ there can be no question of that. As for re~pecting GDR citizenship,
that is already being done by the FRG authorities. German citizenalaip~ which all
GI~R citizens posaess according to our laws~ entails no duties fnr them but is a
privilege of which they may but do not have to avail themselvee~ if and when they
find themselves under the ~urisdiction of the basfc law. The FR~ ca,nnot give up
- its claim to this paxticu].ax aspect of the aitizenship iaewe. "It is necessary...
~ to discontinue the issuasice of temporaxy F'RG travel documente to citizena of the
G1aR on short-term visits in the F'RG as well as the iasuance of FRG passporta to
citizens of the GIIR by FRG embassies in third countriea," Honecker aleo said in
the interview. This issue as well as the demand for convereion Qf the perm~,nent
missions into embassies muat be classified as "continuing matters of dispute on
f'undasaental questions " with treaty policy being puraued "irrespective" of the
da.fferences.
Efforts to "Ease Human Haxdships"
The ~oint comunznique ata.ted tha,t efforts aimed at re-uniting families~ mitigating
hardship and reaolving other humanitarian i~sues would be "carried forward in a
aonstructive spirit." In thia field~ however~ there wa.s no etandatill or reversal
despite the sudden shift in GIlR policy in Oatober 1980. In fact, the riumber of
families re~united in 1981.was a good deal higher than in a11 previous years--or
rather the nwnber of G~DR citizena below retirement ag~e given permission to make
a le~al move ta the FRG or to.West Berlin. Oae caa only hope tha~ the 1981 totai
will be repeated in the years to come. Yn the Sohorfheide~ diseuaafons were also
held on expanding the GDR citizena~ posaibilities to travel to the West. But the
chancellor did not return from the GDR with more than the hope that GDR citizens~
travel on urgent family business wr:ich has recently deareas~d will rise sharply
once again. ~
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Continued Development of Relations
Schmidt and Honecker agreed at their Werbellinsee meeting to streng~then and ex-
pand the contractual framework existing be+ween the two Germa,n statea. As for
the G~R~ it is primaxily i.nterested as befor~ in agreements that are to its ad-
vantag+e in economic and financial terms~ while the FR~G aima at an exp~,nsion of
- the area of freedom for the is3Y~abitan~s of the G~R. Tn concrete terms, there was
an agreement to start negroti.ations on a loz~g~term framework for economic and in-
dustrial cooperation--also including third maskets-in which the GDR hae expressed
g~ceat interest. But such a cooperation agreement is frau~t with political dan-
~ers.,The legal base for innc~r-~ex~ma.n trade-~rhich thereby has beaome a special
trade aa:z~x~ement between two d3fferent currency areas-~r~as laid by the "Berlin
A~eement" of 1951 which provi.des a long-term~ stable foundation for trade relar
tions between the two Germa,nies. This legal founda.tion is shaken once it is '~sup-
plemented" by an a~greement between two states and not two different currency
areas. Such a coopera.tion agreement would turn inner-~erma,n tra.de into foreign
trade. Furthermore, West Berlixi would have to be inoluded on the basis ~f the
Frank-Falin formu_la. According to the "Berlin Agreement,~~ however~ it is an in-
tegral part of the DM currency axea.
In the ~oint communique~ Hone~ker and Sc,Y~mi.dt expressed the belief "that the on-
going discussions by experts on water safety would soon lead to conerete solutions."
These discussions concern deealirLation of the Werra river ar~d purification of the
Havel and the Spree. There alreac~y is agreement on the teohnical aspects. The
main problem i.n ~he upco~ix~g negrotia~ions will be to agree on how to share costs.
In connection with the na,tural.gas pipeline deal between an energy firm in the
FRG and a natural gas exporting firm in the Soviet IInion,, n,a~ural gas is also to
be supplied to West Berlin via a pipeline from Czechoslova,kia whiah leads throu~
the G~. At Werbellinsee, the GDR confirmed its intention to neg~otiate with the
contractual pax~{,~ners and the Berlin gas works about thia natu~al gas transit pipe-
_ line. On the other ha,nd~ there wa,s no fharther di.seussion abnut a plan still being
aispd when the chancellor~s visi~ was scheduled in the summer of 1980 which called
- for the construction of ~ soft-coal electric power plant near Leipzig which wa.s
to have been paid for by the GI]R among other things by supplying electricity to
West Berlin. But there ia talk once again about the electrification pro~ec't for
the railroad transit routes between Ber].in and the FRG.
The meeting between the chancellor and the SID genera.l secretasy is to provide
new impetus for the negotiations on a scientifia agreement and an agreement on
cultiu~l cooperation rrhich have been stalled for years. The ecience agxeement~
- which is to re~u].ate cooperation in science a,nd teclznology as well as education,
has broken down on the issue of including FRG institutions located in West Berlin.
ti~Jork on the cultural agTeemen~t has been blocked Uy the GbR~s dema,nd for "return"
_ of the former Prussian cu].t~aral hold,i.~gs. An agreement with the GI1R--a,nd prior to
tha.t with the Soviet IInion--on the science a~reement appeaxs possible. As for
concluding a cultural a.~reement~ there are no chances of tha.t happerLing. In the
~oint co~+Y+~~~que then~ Schmidt and Honecker sta,ted their intention of expandin~
cultural cc~pera,tion as well as exchar~ea in other axeaa "within the framework
of existin~ pc:~sibilities. T17sre axe a number of po~sibilities in faa~t. One may
reca.ll the proposal made by the farmer head of the FRG pern~nent mieaion in East
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Berlin, Guenter Gaus, who used the forum of the Berlin SPD'a Land partx congress
in November 1981 to call for the eatabliahment of a top-level inner-German com-
mission to arrange for the exchange of cultural Y.~ldings removed for safekeeping
during wartime--other than the collections which axe paxt of the Prussian cultural
holdings foundation.~4
There is no shortage of initiatives with the aim of furthering bilateral rela-
tions. Berlin, too, asked the chancellor to raise a n~,unber of isaues at his meet-
ing with Honecker--like the inclusion of the GDR-operated S~3ahn in a West Berlin
mass transport system and the retention b~yond 1984 of the Staalcen border crossing
point to serve transit traffic to Hamburg~ a poi.nt the GDR wishes to discusa as
well. Both Schmid.t and Honecker clear'ly indicated their good will with regasd to
carrying the normalization process i.n ~errnar~y further. In that sense, the pro-
~pects for Germax~,y are less somber at the start of 1982 than they were in eaxly
1981. ~3ut the express desire of both sides to imprave relationa does not offer a
guaxantee of success. Succe~ will d.~pend more on how the world situation develops.
'
- FOOTNOTES
1. Cf Glinters: ~;ast Ber?i.n Policy Change Vis-a-Vis Bonn, EUROPA A.RCHIV 1~1981,
p 31 ff
2. NL'UES DEUTSCHLANll, 14 Nov 80
3. Verbati.m text on p D 79ff
4. NEfTES DEUTSCHLAND~ 14 oct 80
5. IdEfT~ DEUTSCHLAND, 12 Apr 81
6. Cf Docusents on Brezhnev Visit, ~OPA ARCHIV 1~1982, p D 1ff
7. I�;E[TEa DEUTSCHI~AND, 14 Dec 81 -
8. Cf excerpts, p D 82ff
9. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 31 Dec 81
10. P~CF'ITRTER ALLGII~IN~, 19 Dec 81
11. Speech of Lord I~Iayor at Annual Dinner of Berlin Presa Asaocia~ion on
14 Dec 81 in Berlin Land Press Service AKTUELLES DFR WOCHE, special edition
~ VI No 51, 18 Dec F31
12. IdEUk~ DEtTTSCHLAND, 14 Dec 81
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13. The agreement in question was signed on 17 Dec 81 in Fa,st Berlin by the
head of the former "trusteeship office for i.nterzonal tra,de--the name of
which wa,s changed to "trusteeship office for xndustry and trade" follow-
ing the Schmidt Honecker meeting~--and an officiai. of the GDiR minietry o~
foreign trade.
14. Guenter Gaus: Peace Policy for Geruiar~y in BFRLINER STIP'.~~ supplement to
_ No 46, 12 Nov 81
COPYRIGHT: 198? V~rlag fuer Internationale Politik GmbH, Bonn
9478
Cso: 3~03/286
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PflLITICAL FRANCE
GOV~RrIMENT CHARACTERISTICS, CONTINUITY, CONFLICTS VIEWED
_ Paris POWAIRS in ~Yench No 20, 1982 pp 127-135
- [Article by Oliviex Duhame~l, professor of public law at the University of Franche-
Comte and author of "La ga,nche et la Ve Republique," 1980, and "Histoire des idees
politiques," 1982]
[TextJ The winning of governmetit power by the socialists in 1981 completes the
Fifth Republic. The Fifth Republic is finished,l even if it atill requires certain
modulations and still poses certain problems.
- 1. The Legitimate Fifth Republic
This republic, the product of a swift maneuver and one which had been stabilized
by a number of violations of the letter of the constitution, is more accepted than.
ever by the main political forces. Where the left wing is concerned, the 10 May
1981 presidential victory brings to its conclusion a long rallying process, which
was implemented, moreover, through succeasive presidential elections.2 It is def i-
nite evidence that the Fifth Republic allows alternation in power, which is not
reserved to the one f3ction more often than the other. As to the opposition, it
is difficult for it to challenge a xegime which it founded, and one in which it
hopes again to hold power one day.
The roots sunk by the Fifth Republic are not solely the product of the consensus
which it enjoys where the political actors are concerned, but also its integrafiion
with the people .gover.ned. Now and henceforth they pursue the ma~ority logic (see
sec'tion 5 below), the characteristic of a new political culture. In expanding their
' 10 May presidential choice to the legislarive realm on 14 Jun.e, the voters were
not only affecCed by the socialist "grace,"3 but were also faithful to thE logic
of the reglme, and to that extent contributing to its surv ival.
- 2. The Useful Fifth �Republic
Giving the lie to the political criticisms and complex technical scenarios struc-
tured on the sub~ect of the change in governments,4 the winning of power by the
opposition came about practically without inatitutional problems. Its adversaries
of yesterday have today become those who make use of it, and feel entirely com~or-
table in so doing, beginning with F. Mitterrand. "The institutions were not de-
signed for my purposes. However, they suit me well."5 ~
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3. The Fully Utilized Fifth Republic
Procedures decried of old anci not so lon~ ago have been proved since 10 May to be
very helpful. The lack of concern with constitutionalism on the part of the left
wing has become total, conf irming that constitutional concepts are dictated by the
distance from power.6 For example, the new president has made full use of the re-
~ ~~urce.. of article 8, by appointing his sole choice of urime minister on 21 May
1981; those of article 49, paragraph 1, continuing the iJaullist interpretation to
the effect that the assun:~ption of responsibility by a nt~w prime minister is not
compul.~ry; and those o;: article 12, by dissolving the National Assemble, etc, cn
~ 21 May, pending recours~, to a referendum when circumstances are favorable to it.
The socialist government announced that it would utilize article 38, at the end
of its f irst 6 months in office, making it possible to implement measures normally
within the purview of the law by ord3nance. Daily it is implementing the prov ision
which the constitution and the assembly regulations confer upon the government to
limit parliamentary authority. The socialist leaders have lost any parliamentary
complex, because socialism takes the 10 May concepts, that is to say the "president-
people" pairing, as its basis.
4. The Monist Fifth Republic
~ As an extension to the reference to Carre de Malberg,~ monism is reversed, such
that the parliament is only the agent of the presider.t, through government inter-
position. F. Mitterrand implicitly endorsed this hier~.rchy in his first message
to the parl3.ament on 8 July 1981. "The change I proposEd to':the country d~ring the
presidential campaign, which the men and women of France approved, which the majority
in the Na.tional Assembly has endorsed, will henceforth dic;:ate your steps....My
commitments constitute the charter for governmental action. I would add, aince
universal suffrage has be proclaimed a second titne, that these commitmer,~ts have
become the charter for our legislative action."
The pyramid is clear and presidential supremacy confirmed, not only over the par-
liament, but over the ministers--for example, the .communists, as well. "No one
in the cabinet, or elsewhere, is unaware that the president of the republic can
at any time ensure that his view, in the national interest, prevails" (interview
in LE MONDE, 2 July 1981).
The continuity of the presidential-monist interpretation is also typical of the
relations betw~een the president and the prime m3nister: ~
The re~ponsibility of the president is "the outcome, that is to say the long-range
view and continuity" (deGaulle, "Memories of Hope," Vol II, 1971, p 68). The presi-
dent "concerns himself with the essentials" (Pampidou, 18 August 1980). His role
- "is to concern himself with the long run" (V. Giscard d'Estaing, presa conference
on 21 November 1978). "I act or I intervene in what might be called the main guideT
lines, the major directions" (Mitterrand, BBC interview, 8 September 1981).
The prime minlster, "the second in co~nand, pursues the activities of the moment
and directs those who carry them out" (deGaulle). He "rows the boat" (Barre, ~
5 March 1979). He may "act entirely as he wishes with regard to the problems of
daily life" (Mitterrand to the BBC). This overall distribution does not, however,
prevent occasional intervention by the president, of which no one learns except
when it~comes too late.$
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Within this unchanged framework, ehadings msy occur r. o;: only because of the person-
alities of the leaders, but also the rhythm imposed by ~he system on their 7-year
terms. In this connection, Pierre Avril detected "a typical fluctuation in presi-
dential practice"9 which one can extend to the entire Fifth Republic, and which
could be schematized as follows:
Phase 1-- Phase 2-- Phase 3--
Presidential Political Prime Less Active Balance Between
Term of Office Minister (President Prime Minister President~and
Less Active) (President A~ctive) Prime Minister
De Gaulle
(1959-1969) Michel Debre Pompidou I Pompidou II and III
Pomp idou
(1969-1973) J. Chaban-Delmas Messmer I and II Messmer III
Giscard
(1974-1981) Jacques Chirac Barre I Barre II and III
Mitt~rrand
(1981...) Pierre Mauroy ? ?
The paradox of the initial presidential hesitation is explained by the proximity
of the election. The new p~esidential legitimacy make his intervention unprofitable,
not to mention the fact that the relations between the two men have not yet had the
time to deteriorate with the exerci~e of power.
Thus the unequal dyarchy,~-~ or in reality monocracy,ll is perpetuated. It is the
more pronounced since the votes on 10 May and 14-21 June were homogeneous and gave
the president a clear and massive ma~ority.
5. Majority Fifth Republic
The socialist victory brings us back to the norm in the present French regime, in
other words a government unified by an identica~, policy on the part~ of the president,
the cabinet and the National Assembly. After the promulgation of the 1958 consti-
tution, it took 4~years, during which the strength of General de Gaul.le:,~was ~do~inant,
with recourse to fu11 powers, to article 16, to a referendum, to the 1962 revision
and dissolution in order to establish the new ma~ority regime, unprecedented in
_ France. This the period between 1958 and 1962 was not an exception, but a founda- ~
tion. And it was the~7-year term of Giscard d'Estaing which was "abnormal," because
it began with a minority president with a parliamentary ma~ority, interrupted by
the resignation of J. Chirac (August 1976), and it ended without a ma~ority. This
~ anomaly underlay Giscard d'Estaing's failure.
The error comes �rom another anomaly: the marvel of his election without a party
in 1974. The former president did not want to dissolve the assembly elected in
- 1973. He was not able to win the 1978 legislative elections clearly and personally.
He either did not want ta or could not create a large political party. Without
a party, and thus a fortiori with a dominant party, he lost government office. ,
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~ L'va. v4 t tvis~a+ uv.+ ~...+s
Fran~ois Mitterrand did the exact opposite:12
1. He asserted his leadership over the noncommunist left wing through candidacy
in the presidential election (1965).
2. He won over the Socialist Party, which was then transformed into a governmenE
party, or more exactly, the party ~f the president.l3 ~
3. He won partial coritrol oi the government through the presidential election,.
and with a presidential party.
4. He gained total~control of the political power through the dissolution and the
absolute majority of the president's party.
Francois Mitterrand,~by dint of remarkable persistence and by taking the risks that
imposed, assured himself of a dominant party. He did this like the first two presi-
dents of the Fifth Republic--like them, but in reverse order--first of all the cre-
ation and conquest of the party, and then the winning of power. And it is pr.ecisely
the reverse of that order which is likely to change the course of the Fif th Re~,ublic.
6. The Partisan Fifth Republic
The Fifth Republic is partisan in the sense in which political scientists use thi~
term (tr~ Portuguese call "partisan" that which functions through a party). Indeed,
. the cabinet does not represent the Socialist Party alone but includes members of
other parties, mainly the PCF (as in the past the UNR [Union for the New Republic]
provided assistance to the Independent Republicans), and secondarily the MIG (as
~ during the preaidency of G. P rnnpidou, when the centrists of the CDP [Democratic
and Progress Center] conferred a tripartisan dimension upon the cabinet) and inde-
pendent personalities (as always within the presidentialist logic).14 Indeed, in
1981, the parliamentary ma3ority included 44 communist deputies. But it was above
all made up of 285 socialist (or similar) deputies, representing 39 aeats more than
the absolute ma~ority needed. And'the Socialist Party, if indeed it was profoundly
renewed by F. Mitterrand, existed before he came to head it in 1971. It has existed
since 1905 and will continue ta exist after Mitterrand's 7-year term. Put in another
way, it is not merely a question of, a president's party created ex nihilo by or
for a chief of state, as was the case with the UNR in 1958.
This unprecedented relationship between the president and his party, between the
party and its president, might to some extent weaken the rigidity of the monist .
pyramid and lead to some friction. �
7. A Fifth Republic in Conflict
In 1981, the disagreements between the Socialist Party or the PCF and the regime
were much less important than the conflict between the ma~ority and the opposition.
These latter differences were not fully the product of the apprenticeship necessary
because of the new distribution of the roles between the ma~ority and the oppoaition,l5
but in a deeper.sense from the election of government leaders with a determination
to change French society. Now reform is, at least when it 3s in progress, less
likely to involve a consensus than the pursuit of the established order.
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Where the strictly institutional ].evel ie concerned, it is nonetheless striking
to note that the~clashes on legitimacy (presidential or parliamentary, arbitral
or partisan, etc) hsve y ielded to procedural conflicts. There are no longer any
clashes about who the cabinet members should be, but the ma~ority and the oppoaition
- ingult eac~ other on~the sub~ect of the twists in parliamentary procedure and the
subtleties of obstruction.
It is entirely possible, therefore, that ~ore serious conflicts will develop with
the two institutions which in the short run might function as counter-authorities--
the Senate and the Constitutional Council. But urginga to wisdom are not lacking,
~ on the one hand because the aovernment leaders ttave no nonbr'utal means of reforming
these institutions (the normal procedure accordin g to artic:e 89 allows the Senate
to block a. constitutional revision), and on the other hand, becauae neither the
senators t:~r the members of the Constitutional Council have any interest subtle
opposition leading to ~he ri.sk of their conversion (by the "extraordinary" referendum
procedure of article 11). 'lhe riska of a c.onflict are modified by the advantages
of ~~c.~:Y~omise and limi~ed ~y the weight of the ma~ority (see number 5 above) . But
when that no longer 2xists....
8. Toward~an Unstructured Fifth Republic?
On the institutional level with which we are concerned here, the Erench regime could
be profoundly altered by the adoption of proportional representation. The adoption
of this system has been a part of all the programs of the left ~;~ing--socialist,
communist and ~oint--since 1971, and is the model of the promises made by Francois
Mitterrand as a candidate.l6 ~lithout any need to examine all of its effects, we
know that it would profoundly alter the articulation of authority between the presi-
dent and the parties. The chief of state would thus lose the ma~ority premiwn but
he would gain an unstr uctured assembly capable of yielding variable ma~orities.
Instead of the ma~ority "puzzle," which can be ahaped in only one single way, he
would have the proportional "erector set," which can be put together in v~rious
ways. But everything really depends on Che type of proportional representation
implemented, and the imagination of political ecomm~iats in this field proves limit-
less. There is no reason not to~think that if proportional representation is not~
postponed indefinitely,l~ it will be conceived in such a way as to accommodate a
ma~ority premium. Whatever comes of this undertaking, the French regime will pose
another difficulty when it comes tq achieving the unity of authority between the
president and the 3ssembly.
9. The Semi-presidential Fifth Republic
The term suggested by Maurice Duverger i~ adopted here for the special problem
of the noncoincidence between the presidential and parliamentary tertns of office
in a system in which the president is elected by the people, but the cabinet is
responsible to the parliament. Lacking a constitutional revision, always a difficult
matter because it is r isky, only dissolution can offer�a solution--if we set aside
the improbable hypothesis of a presidential resignation and reelection. It may
indeed seem absurd to refer to dissolution when President Mitterrand has such an
imposing ma~jority in the National Assembly. Let us recall, however, that dissolution
serves several~functions. It is o~e of the possible methods of recourse to the
people in the event of political or social crisis (example, May 1968). It also
represents a sword of Damocles for resolving possible conflicts with the ma~ority
party or parties, or better still, it remains as a constant threat to limit them
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at the source. Article 12, with its specifically presidential authority, functiona
like a strike force- zhe less it is used, the better it works.
But dissolution is not a matter solely of the dissuasive logic so characteristic .
of the Fifth Republic.. It also provides a way of attem ting to�resolve the problem
_ of the lack of synchronization in the terms of office.l~ It settled this matter
in June of 1981, entirely to the advantage of the preside~nt, but only temporarily.
� If he does not turn to dissolution aga3n in the co~lrse of his 7-year term, the present
- president will f ind himself in 1986 with an assembly, whatevar the exact majority
within it may be, which has been elected for 5 years, while only 2~ears of his
term remain--or in other words, reduced author~.ty--as was the case w3th V. Giacard.
~ d'Estaing in 1978-1981. The situation might be,quite different in the event of
. dissolution at a favorable moment, if one such o~curs (let us say toward 1983-1984).
The president would then retain the means ~or guaYanteeing his supremacy, and ex-
erting control over who succeeds him, for example. ~
10. The Social Monarchist Fifth Republic ~
Above and beyond the efficiency of the systam and the fact that it is more demo-
cratic than the preceding one, to the extent that unity of authority has its source
in the expression of the will of the voters and in respect�for the choicea they
make a~ to the allocation of p~wer, the Fifth Republic also has a monarchistic trait
in tfiat it is the choice of a single man by a11 to represent and command them--
what La Boetie ca11s voluntary servitude in his book "Contr'Un."19 To go back'to
the current problems of the Fif th Republic,a~ the election of a chief of state by
the people for 7 years poses' the problem of his su~:.~asor.
The choice candida*.es for the highest post in the land is not rationalized in
France as it is in other countries.Zl Indeed, the election of the socialist pres~-
dent changes little, to the extent that the Socialist Party is the only one to.havt
organized internal competition in order to select its presidential ~andidate. The.
fact nonetheless remains that the length of the presidential term tend to accenCuate
it monarchist nature while at the $ame time--an inverse effect--it alters the possi-
bility of reelection.22 The party, the cabinet, the prime minister or�ministers
(implicit heirs apparent by the ir functions, or who feel that they are) and all
tc~e institutions are characterized by an obsession about the succession, particularly
si~ice no ~uridical procedure regulates the choice from among r.he few pretenders �
- to the highest post among whom the voters must choos~. This process of filtering
toward the top is basic. Should it be entrusted to the party members, or to their
leaders? Should it be controlled more or less officially by the president in office?
Should it be influenced by polls? Should it be entrusted to the voters? These
. questions obvi~usly go beyond the framework of a brief presentation of the current
characteristic:a of thP Fifth Republic. But it is significant that it cannot be
completed with~ut asking them, to such an extent that the inadequacies in the French
system introduce the worm of succession into the fruit of a new election at the
outaet.
' FOOTNOTES
1. In the precise sense of the word--"to provide the last element necessary for
the full completion.of a state or deed," rather than its second meaning, reserved
for individuals--"to deal the final blow (to someone)," Petit Robert.
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2. See Olivier Duhamel, "The Left Wing and the Fifth Republic," PUF [University
Presses of FranceJ, 1980, p 247 et seq.
One can note the communist paradox: in self -criticiam, its leaders accuse them-
selves of having proposed no candidate at a11 in 1974, while at the same time
they criticize the bipolarization phenomenon and urge the casting of effective
votes in the presidential election.
3. See below, "Chronicle of Public Opin ion," p 171 et seq.
4. See POWOIRS, Na 1, "Alternation," 1977, new edition, 1481.
5. Interview in LE MONDE, 2 July 1981.
6. See "The Left Wing and the Fifth Republic," op cit, pp 548-552.
7. See "Contribution to the General Theory of the State," Sirey, 1920, reissued
by the CNRS [National Center for Scientific Research], in 2 volwnes, 1962.
8. A typical example was the exemption from the capital levy granted for works
of art on 29 Oct~ber 1981, i.e., after the approval of the draft law by the
- Council of Ministers and after the committee discussion in the aesembly. The
minister delegate to the minister of economy and f inance for budget and the
socialist deputies on the commic:tee were thus forced to support what they had
~ust previously f irmly re~ected. This was the reason for the disillusioned
comment by Mr Fab ius: "I am only a minister."
9. Pierre Avril, "What Has Changed in the Fif th Republic," POWOIRS, No 9, "The
Giscard d'Estaing Policy," 1979, p 58.
10. See Jean Gicquel, "Constitut.ional Law and Political Institutions," published
by Montchrestien, 7th ed, 1980, p 862, and for a less continuistic in~erpretation
of presidentialism in the Mitterrand style, see "Addendum to 30 July 1981, p 21.
11. In this sense, presidential monism can be viewed as a variant of what Maurice
Duverger calls "the semipresidential system," "Check to the King," Albin Michel,
197$. The terminological quarrels have not been settled.
Concerning the logic governing the systems of popular election of the president,
seen Jean-Luc Parodi, "Effects and Noneffects of Presidential Election by Uni-
versal Direct Balloting," POWOIRS, No 14, "To ~lect a President," 1980,
p 5 et seq. ~
12. And Jacques Chirac himself also pursues a"Mitterrand-type" strategy, that is
to say within the�logic of the Fifth Republic. .
13. Concerning this transformation, see Hugues Portelli, "The Presidentialization
of the French Parties," POUVOIRS, No 14, "To Elect a President," 1980, p 100
et seq, and "French Socialism as It Is Now," PUF, 1980. ~
14. Another indicator is the presence of nonparliamentarians in the cabinet. The
proportion came to 30 percent in the first Mauroy cabinet and~ Z~ percent in
the second, formed after the elections (Jobert, Boudy, Bad3r~ter, Cheysson, Delors,
Dreyfus, Lang, Henry, Dufoix and Fiterman, the latter having been defeated in
the legislative elections). ~
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.
15. Mentioned by F. Mitterrand on his return from Cancun on 25 October 1981, LE
MONDE, 27 October 1981.
' 16. See below, Jean Gicquel, "References and Documents," "Creteil Manifesto," Point 47.
- 17. For a presentation of the different types of proportional representation, see
~ Pierre Pactet, "Political ~nstitutions--Constitiitional La.w," Masson, 5th printing,
1981, p 100 et seq.
18. See Jean-Lus Parodi, "On Several Institutional Leseons in Fren~h Style Alter-
nation in Power," REVUE POLITIQUE ET PARLEMENTAIRE, No 892, May-June 1981, p 47.
19. Written in 1548 under the title "Discourse on Voluntary Servitude" and published
- in 1574 under the title "Contr'Un," and rediecovered by Miguel Abensour in the
- collection "Critique of Politics" (Payot, 1976, followed by analyses by Pierre
- Clastres and Claude Lefort).
20. Concerning the discussion of political ideas, see Francois Chatelet and EWelyne
Pisier-Kouchner, "Political Concepts in the 20rh Century," PUF, 1981, p 982
et seq, "Themis." See also Philippe Braud, "Universal Suffrage Against
Deueocracy," PUF, 1980.
, 21. Fo: example, in, the United Kingdo'in (designation of leaders by the parliamentary
group (conservatives) and the party (laborites), or the United States (primaries
and conventions). See Marie-France Tounet, "The Designation of Presidential
Candidates in the United States," POWOIRS, No 14, "To Elect a President," 1980,
_ pp 41-61.
22. Candidate Mitterrand's Manifesto called for either the reduction of the presi-
dential term to 5 years or a ruling making a president who has served a 7-year
term ineligible for reelection (see below, p 141). President Mitterrand opted
for a nonrenewable 7-year term (see interview in LE MONDE, 2 July 1981).
COPYRIGHT: Presses Universitaires'de France., 1982
5157
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POLITICAL FRANCE
DISSIDENT HINCKER E}{AMINES PCF CRTSTS, FUTURE
Paris PROJET in French Jan 82 pp 42-48
[Article by Francois Hincker, former member o~ the PCF Central Conanittee and a
founding member of the dissident group Rencontres Communistes"]
[Text] The original title of this article L"~e'Communist Party
at the Crossroads"] is the same as that of Francois Hincker's
book published by Albin Michel in October 1981.
The French Communist Party is in a paradoxical situation today. France has four
Communist mi.nisters, and Com�nunists are in senior government posts. Polls indicate
, that the public widely agrees with ideas which for a long time were popularized
only by the Communists--among them the wealth tax and the nationalizations. The
_ open expression of anticomanunism has never been so wezk--neither the government nor
the left has anything to gain f~om pursuinq it, while the rightwing oppasition and
the various brands of conservatism are concentxating their criticisms on the gov- �
ernment and the Socialist Party.
- But the PCF has lost one-fourth of its voters. On 26 April and in even greater num-
bers on 14 June, for the first time since 194~5, many more votexs voted Socialist
(40 percent) than Communist (28 percent). The PCF can play a role in government
and Parliament only to the extent that the Socialist Party is willing to permit it.
L'HUMANITE is the only national newspaper that has not progressed since 10 May.
Communist posters, tracts, meetings, and newspaper vendors are becoming vexy rare.
_ Less perceptible from the standpoint of material indications, but even more serious,
the Canmunist presence, Communist ideas, and.Comanunist speeches, which once aroused
as much hatred as enthusiasm and which in any case constituted unavoidable features
- of the French political landscape, are naw marginal and trite. On the right, the
presidential campaign was less anticeanmunist than simply acoanaunist, For the first
time since 1934, the future of France can be i.magined without a Canmunist Party.
Since the autumn of 1974,.which was when the so-called polemics between the PS.and
the PCF began, and even more strongly since the autumn of 1977 and the breaking off
of discussions on updating the Common Program; the PCF had not stopped emphasizing
~ that it would be.catastrophic for it and "for the workers" if the Socialist Party
became capable.of reducing it to a secondary role. But that is what has happened.
The Coimnunist strategy has therefoi;-. failed.
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Lastly, despite the~absence of f~gures pronided by the PCF i.tgel�~-~.f wa =2xcept the
information contained ~.n the draft resolution on the congxess, accord3.ng to which
the party has lost ce11s in the firms-~-there~are many indications of a clear decline
in co~nunist militancy. Tt is unbe7.ievable that the PCF sti11 has 700,000 members
when, from every direction, ~ven the least cra~tical m~abers are reportiag a drop in
membership in their ce11s and, even more, the 1ow rate of participation in meetingtl.
In short, despite its organization and its r~sources, which are sti11 unequaled,
despite its unequaled presence among the workers, whether direct3.y or indirectly
(through the CGT [General Confederation of Workers]), and despite the municipal of-
fices it occupies, the PCF has been stricken with lifelessness.
Why? How are the Co~nmunists ~eacting to this attack of languor? Wrhat future possi-
bilities can one foresee for the PCF? Those questions will be, or should be, de-
bated during preparations for the next party congress. In any case, they are in the
minds of all Comununists.
How the Party Explains its "Decline"
The draft resolution in preparation for the next congress gives the party leader-
ship's viewpoint on the causes of its electoral decline. I say electoral, because
the draft denies any F~c:litical decline--it denies the weakening of the PCF's abil-
ity to influence the 'i,alance of forces in France. Its reasoning goes as follows:
For too long the PCF wa:~ faithful to a strategy whose two pillars were, first, non-
critical adherence to the Soviet model of revolution and socialism, and second, a
popular front or union of the left policy. The first was unsuited to French so-
ciety, and the second tended to do away with the party's identity. So when the
- Common Program was signed, the PCF found itself completely exposed: that which was
proper to it repelled public opinion, and that which attracted public opinion--unity
and the reforms contained in the program--belonged to the PS as much as to the PCF.
The draft adds that confusion of the two leftwing parties occurr~d at the deepest ~
level of awareness--precisely in the awareness that the Coqnmon Program was already
quite a bit, while for the PCF, "the battle for socialism" was the order of the day.
With the 22d Congress in 1976--where the Soviet model was repudiat~d and the broad
outline of a French path to "democratic socialism" was laid down--and the 23rd Con-
gress in 1979--where the PCF's autonomy was stressed--things were finally straight-
ened out. But it was too late to benefit from that at the ballot box. Since the
election system acts as an inducement to making one's vote coun't, the French who
wanted to defeat the right at all costs voted for Francois Mitterrand and then for
Socialist deputies.
In its internal structure, and independently of the facts, that reasoning holds
water. But in reality, the facts contradict it.
Democratization, Then Retreat From Union
In the history of the PCF, the notion and practice of popular fronts and unions of
the left (1935-1938, 1943, 1947, and 1972-1977) have marked off periods when, re-
gardless of its loyalty to the USSR, the specific policy of the PCF was departing
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from the Soviet model so far as to contzad~.ct ~.t and fore~hadowing precisely the
'�democratic socialism" of the 22d Congress: a reappropr3.at~on of democratic and
national values, broad a11~.ances (w~th ~.ntellectuals and bel3ever~), and openness
to alZ social and national problems far re~noved from the sole area of exploitation
of the workers. This Nas true of the period of the Ca~unon Program, 3M which the
- PCF changed its type of propaganda and its talk (debati..ng assemAlies, the "party
speakinc,~ frankly," and so on), drew up an original theory of pres~nt-day French so-
ciety ("state monopoly cap~talism"), formulated a qreat number of proposals of all
kinds--especially that for the democratization of society (the "Charter of Fr~edoms"
in 1975 and the 1977 statement on self-management)--and, lastly, ~dopted a point of
view that was clearly and seriously critical of the USSR.
On the other hand, the breaks in the union of the left hane always provoked a sec-.
tarian withdrawal by the PCF into a"class against class" strat~gy, a delimitation
of "camps" (the "ideological war") that forbids broad alliances, an activism cen-
tered essentially on economic and even labor union activity (it could legitimately
be said in 1979 that the PCF had become "a fifth central labor union"), and a rap-
prochement with the USSR (followtng the approval of Soviet intervention in Afghani-
stan, which occurred in the conditions known to everyone, all criticisms of the
existing socialism disappeared).
Was the PCF more committed to the path of democratic socialism in 1977 than in 1980,
. and did it appear to be? There can be no doubt about the answer. In 1977, the
PCF's political influence and its image were at their highest level. And the mu-
nicipal electinns were proof of that, incidentally. The tidal wave of lists pre-
= sented by the union of the left put Communists and Socialists into the t~wn halls
without discrimination. Citadels of bourgeois France passed to the PCF--Rheims,
Saint-Etienne, Bourges, or Beziers--while the old royalist country did not hesitate
to vote for lists that would give the PCF deputy mayors (In Angers and Roche-sur-
Yon!).
It is true that autonomous electoral influence--measurable in the legislative
elections--did not follow, and from that standpoint, the official reasoning concern-
ing the "lag" is not without value. But then what can one say about the policy af-
ter 1977, which, supposedly to make up for the lag, 3.s nav returning and pushing
concepts and practices to the point of caricature, even though they were in fact
what characterized that 'lag? What can one say about the assessinent of the state of
French society, which is correctly deemed to be advanced, developed, and democratic
and one to which it would be wrong not to propose a hard and uncompromi~ing revolu-
tionary program?
The Real Lag in the PCF
Between 1967 and 1979 (the European elections), the PCF did not progre~s (1967:
il 22.5 percent; 1968: 20.5 percent; 1969: 21.5 percent; 1973: 21.5 percent; 1978:
20.5 percent; and 1979: 20.5 percent), but in 1981, and only i;~ that year, it col-
lapsed. Until 1981, the PS certainly progressed faster than the PCF, but in 1981
the PCF really lost. So something must necessarily have happened between 1979 and
_ 1981.
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The involution descrihed ~ust now was pr~.o~: to 1380, but i.t remai.ned scarcely. per-
ceptible to o communist electorate whose relationship w~.th i:he ~arty di�fers in na-
ture from that of other voters to the~z parties-~a great d~al ~.s required to shake ,
- it. On tlze other hand, the pres~:dential campai.gn--~or the: elect~on that arvuses
_ the most publi.c intere~t--brought the PCF~s new sectax~i.an line sharply into foous
for everyone. 1'Aat 13ne was totally antiunitary and aimed solely at strengtheriing
- the PCF. And the communist vaters, I~ecause they are Workers and the masses, and
because the common people know that thei.r only weapon is unity, are passionately
attached to that unity. In their eyes, tlze one who takes the initiative of break-
ing it is to be punished. It happened to the SFIO IFrench Section of the Workers
International (French Socialist Party)] in 1969, and it happened to the PCF in 1981.
- In the final analysis, the real question is this: haw could the PCF leadership
imagine that such a tYioroughly antiunitary policy would pay off? How could that
workers party make such a frontal assault on the basic structure of the communist
people?
What it reveals is a dramatic break with the people the party is supposed to repre-
sent. It also reveals what constitutes the PCE" s real lag beyond the other lags.
The PCF has always~judged and continues to judge the pe~pie's movement according
to its own influence and that of the CGT. Whatever it controls is qood and in the
vanguard; whatever develops outside its control is dangerous and even a provocation.
And i.t is certainly true that since 1967, the class struggles have been entered by
types of workers, social categories, and regions where the PCF was involved in mis-
sion work: young workers from rural areas or those with a smattering of school'ing
through the technical education centers, clerical workers, working women, the
French Coupling Company in the west, or Lip in the east. It is also very true that
many new themes of struggle (more "qualitative" than economi~-feminism, the quality
- of life, and so on) were viewed w~th mistrust by the PCF and the CGT and required
a new approach to politics and new golitical practices.
So while hist~rians and sociologists, but also the majority of the workers, vi~w
the period of the Common Program as one of unequaled gro-~ath by the working class
movement, the PCF sees it as a period of stagr_ation and e~ven of failure.
Party in Government
And that notion--I am coming to the PCF's attitude in the situation following 10 May--
remains and has even grown stronger. The weakenir.g of the PCF amounts to a vicious
circle--the party knows that in the weakened s~ate in whioh ~.t finds i~self, any
working class movement today would benefit the PS even more. That is why it is not
attempting to promote them, and even less to seek union at the rank-and-file le�~el,
although union theoretically exists at the very top--in the government. That pas-
siveness is reinforced by the di�ficulty the party would experience in passing from
"struggles against" to "struggles for"--even if it wanted to--so that government
- action would succeed, so that the experiment would lead as far as possible along
the path to democ;ratic socialism, and so that the workers would take over as many
posts as possible. But does it want to? Wanting to would indicate PCF recognition
theit "change" is possible under the PS's leadership, that Francois Mitterrand is
not the same thing as Giscard, and that the direction taken by its presidential
campaign was totally wrong.
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F3ut the Communists are Qart~.cipating ~.n the government, the government is adopting
satisfactory measures, and quite obvious~.y, the right and the emploXers do not at
a11 seem to feel that ~ranco~.s Mi.tterrand is governi;ng from the right and that he,
Giscard, and Ch~trac form a S3.r~gle ."gang of three�~^~11 0~ th3~s leads party members ~
to wonder, desp~te everxthi.ng, about the r3ghtness o~ a pol~.cy ~tRat had assume~
the exact opposite.
Does this mean, as some commentators think, that the PCF leadership is hoping that '
the current government will fail and ~ust wa~.ting for an opportuni'ty to pull its
ministers out of the government? Not at a11. For the PCF leadership, the Commu-
nist ministers are the only positive thing it can show the congress. Moreover, they
- give the PCF modest--the campaign abcst communist infiltration is ridiculous--but
- real positions of pcwer, and those are always good things to accept. On a deeper
level, the PCF leadership feels that the party will be in difficulty foY many years
to come. So it must do what every CP does in such cases: pull back to what is
solid--the apparatus--and wait for better days. I do not think it..feels--at least
I hope i~ aoes not--that those better days would come about through the failure of
- , the current go~rernment. As in Chile, that would be as disastrous for the PCF as
for the ~S. But the historic Niessian~sm that is more or less shared by every com-
munist may allow hope for a divine surprise: Meanwhile, the PCF leade.rship does
nat want to harm the experiment. Nei.ther d~es it want to support all of its pos-
sible developments, becausn the credit would go to the PS. It is therefore empha-
sizing that the PCF is not a government party but a party in the government and
that the government's program is not a co~non program (and it is in fact difficult
to maintain t:at the protocol of agreement signed b1 the PCF and the PS in such
- haste on 23 June has anything in common with the Comanon Program). As a result, the
PCF is not seeking to propose anything, but only to support and watch. Whi1e Com-
munist legislative bills used to rain down during legislatures in which there was
no chance of their being considered, there are practically none now, when they
might be. With all the more reason, the PCF is not taking any initiative in con-
nection with general conferences on working conditions, education, tawn planning,
;and so on.
- Crisis of Diversity
- It would be surprising if the PCF's strat~gic and electoral defeat, the current in-
activity, the sharp changes in the party line, and certain instancea of double talk
until just before 10 May had not provoked a serious crisis within the party. 5ymp-
toms had appeared as early as 1978, but those were limited to intellectual circles.
They disappeared in part because many party members, either because they respected
the traditional silence within communist parties or because they were discouraged,
or both, tiptoed away. But in 1979, tY.e affair involving the Paris Federation--
the PCF's largest--showed that the crisis was widespread. It exploded in 1981.
Well-kncwn Communists dared to organize a permanent center ror debate 3cnowr. as
Communist Encounters. On being punisi?~1, they received cons:~derable support, in-
cluding that from cleputies, ma.ddle-rank cadres, and even party officials. They were
i~ot cast away from the coimnunist people into outer darkness--far from it--and that ~
is unprecedented. They were the visible portion of a vast 9.ceberg of criticism. '
The criticism was diversified: some blamed the current leadership for its sectarian-
ism after 1977, while others blamed it for its opportunism ~efore 1977. But since
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the same party leadership had pres~.ded oner both the sectaxa.an:~sm and the opportun-
i.sm, it was ~o1~~~ca11x i,so~.ated, wi.th the apparatus phenomenon partially masking
that isolation and dela~ing~~hut thereby agc~cavat~.ng~~the cr3,s~.s point.
In thase condit~,ons, the only positatve sol,ut3,on would be to redirect the PCF into
positive action---parti.ci.pata'.on in the governmen~ :,~r Co~nunist ministers should help,
because.govern3ng means making choices, and befor~. choos~ng, one must analyze, seek,
and discuss--and for the party to undertake an uncompromising examination of con-
science tY~at would leave nothing covered. Exchange would ~hen �again be possible
among the various componen~s of the communist people, considering that their diver-
sity is an asset and a source of cohesion, while divisions develop in the shadow of
unanimism. It would be surprising if, in its iormal proceedings, the congress it-
self were to give tangible signs of that double rectification, but it is not impos-
sible that the ambient politinal conditions (within the party) might allow some hope
to survive. ~
The men on the left and those militant for change ought to hope so, because it is
not written anywhere that when the PCF's inheritance--a people's inheritance, an
inheritance of social liberation values, and an inheritance of the ~aorking class's
integration into the nation--is left without heirs, it can be taken up by others.
lf it could, everyone would be the loser.
COPYRIGHT: by CERAS, 15, rue R.-Marcheron, 92170 Vanves. 1981
11798
CSO: 3100/333
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FRANCE
PSF G~OMYETEN(~, ABILITY TO APPZY POLICIES EXAMII~D
Paris PROJET in F~ench Jan 82 pp 32-41
[~Article by Rcland Cayrol, of the National Foundation for the Political Sciencess
'The Boot and the Political Commissax~ 3ix Contradiotions With Respect to the
Socialist Party"; passage~ encloaed i.n alantlines printed in italics~
[Text~ The hour for st~cktakirrg has~ to be sure, nat yet arrived for the Socialiet
Pa.rty. Six months is too long a time to continue to be awayed solely by the moods
and emotions of thoee firat days~ but it is too short a time to make a genuine
~ ana.lysis of an experiment. ~
Comment con;:erning the PS has, in ~act, been muted. The fiery pronouncements of
the "headhunters" saved the paxty'a recent congre~s at Valence from the indiffer-
ence of the ma3ority of the intelleatuals, xho--it appeass--took refuge either in
the silence of a haughty akepticism or in the aafety of corrventional praise. It
is indeed difficult to do otherwise: there are so many contra~dictions within the
PS, in the rela.tions between the PS and the governmerrt, and Kithin the government
itself, that it is risky to pin one's hopes today on a particular choice~ on a'
particular mod.e of evolution, or--in short--on any particular method for resolution
of these contradictions rather than on ar~y other.
Under these conditiAns, the best way to initiate a debate is perhaps merely to try
to focus attention on some of these coritra~dictions, and to do so by challenging
cer~tain figurea in our political system xho axe surrounded by exaessive reverence.
Let us daxe to do so~ to the extent that we are ab].e.
~om the Conquest of Pewer to the ~Zercise of Foxer
As a party the PS is very suecessful at xinning elections to offic=e~ but hox xill
it perform a~ the helm of government? This party--xhoss progress in terms of votes,
members arr]. intellectual i:nfluence during the past decade is a rare phenomencn 1n a
developed courrtry--actually welcomed its victories of Ma.y-June 1981 as a God.-given
- sur,priae. ~rer rtady to conquer nex positions of power, tt~.a PS xas not prepared to.
~ exercise ttiat power= it had never been placed in the role of a"government party."
In party congreas after pa,rty congress, hoxever~ the P3 had been hearing soma~ of
its activists declaxe that it should "raise the question of governmental poxer."
Today, it appears clear that with fex exceptions xhat these party members wanted
xas more in the na,ture of a theoretioal diacussion of governmental poKer than the
translation of par~y policy into tera+s of the exercise of that power.
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Here we find the first apparent contra.d.iction that one might wish to point out
within the socialist axperiences although armed with nwnerous--aixi authorita-
tive--texts covering all sectors of social activity, the new socialist political
and administrative officials axe in general quite helpless as soon as it b~comes a
question of transforming these orientations irrto apecific decisions.for evaryday
problems. Moreover, these officials have not found--and often have not even
thought to seek--support from the party for their action.
Our intent in this artiale is of course not to "hand ou~ bad grades." Obviously,
the absence of alternation in the ranks of governmerit for so mar~y years is largely
responsible for this lack of synchronization betxeen genexal discussion and the
translation of that discusaion into action. It is also true, however, th~.t this
phenomenon relates ba,ck to What can be regarded as a genuine ahortcoming of the
Socialist Pa,xty during these past few yearsi namely, t,he party's tendency--as a
part of the opposition--to Qover over xith an ideological veneer a genu3.ne weakness
in sectorial ana.lysis and in the formulation of precise proposa~.s. The PS has been
more successful at theorizing about reformism than at perfecting the basic frame-
xork of ref orms .
5ome will say: "But what about all the reforms cax~ried out during the past 6
months, the na.tiona.lizations, the decentralization? Let me be understood correctly:
it is not my intention to diminish the real merits of the work accomplished. I
have determined, however, that even with respect to those themes that are a wholly
familiar part of the socialist ritual--for example, the nationalizations and ~the
decentralizat3.on--no precise plan had really been finalized before the party's
ascension to power: the technica,l and. political deba,tes did not arise xithin the
government and the ministerial offices until the moment it became neces~ary to
undertake concrete measures. Moreover, neither the literature--nor the structures--
of the I'S were able at the time to serve as operative references.
To this initial contradiction we ma,.y add two problems which are unqueationably
linked to it: ~
1. The problem of "c~mpetence": the adversaries of the socialist government (and
certain of its principal supporterst) complain daily of the inaufficient competenee
of the PS cadres Who have been promoted to positions in the governmental apparatus.
There~ too, time will also see to it that our novices are endowed with experience~
and therefore with competer.ce. Speaking in more ~eneral terms, however, there is
the problem of establishing the cri~eria for competence--notably economic oompe-
tence. Pierre Nla,uroy has on several occasions (at the Valenee congress~ among
others) explained that it would 'be impossible to forinulate a aritique on the basis
of criter~a of the type found in Ra.ymond Baxre's textbook on econemics. Contrary
to one journa.list's recerrt a.ssertion, it would appear not tc~ be true that there is
"only one way to manage the economy." Very well; but what exactly axe these ~other~
criteria?
2'he question appears to be all the more serious because in ma.r~y ma,tters (the bud-
getary procedure, for example) the 1~S ca.dres have poured themselves without appar-
ent difficult into the molds inherited from the preceding governments. What,
then, would ~nother logic~ be, in terms of the mana.gement of the affairs of state?
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2. While the rQsponsibility of the PS in this situa,tion is obvious~ it cannot
- cause us to overlook the responsibility of its partners of the political ~,nd social
Left. Take the case of the labor unions, for example. When their advice xas asked
(sometimes for the first time) about certain policies (on cul.ture, for exampl.e),
- some large uni:ons discovered that they had nothing to propose, not just with respect
to methods of managemerrt (for that is assuredly not their role) but even with ret~-
pect to overall ~uidelines. The French Left is definitely having difficulty being
a Left in government~ with the result that xhen it does Hin power there is an inevi-
table lack of synchronism between the party members appointed to positions in ~he
governmental appaxatus (who must thenceforth think in terms of governmental action~
on ~he one hand, and those who rema.in within the party structures (where these
terms axe not norma.lly in vogue and are therefore disconcert3ng). ~
F~om Double Talk to Simple Talk
Politics--European as well as French--had accustomed us to the faaaous "double talk"
of the social democrats~ a revolutionaxy thesis based on a strict Marxiat ortho-
doxy (for the party congresses and the activist culture) on the one hand, and on
the other hand the timidly reformist practice of "socialist management of capital-
ism."
The experiment of 1981 irrtroduced (for the first time~ perhaps?) a distortion into
this pattern~ what has happened is that the French socialists are intending to
prove they have divorced themselves from the pattern. For years~ as paxt of the
opposition, the PS criticized its counterparts in the countries of northern Europe;
F~ancois Mitterand himself has repeatedly re~ected the Swedish model on grourrds
that it is not genuinely socialist. Calling for a veritable process of "breaking
_ with capitalism," the authors of the "Socialist Flan" protested in advance against
the suspicions (mostly on the part of the communists) that this~is "double talk."
Indeed, we ase in the presence of a corps of inembers and leaders of a Socialist
Party that genuinely believes in the possibility of applying their doctrine~ which
is in part a doctrine that re3ects the political practices of the social democrats.
In fact (wrui io the surprise of many Center-I,eft voters who had voted for "change"
but did not expect that the socialist platform would be implemented) the socialist
government is carrying out the reforms promised by the socialist candidate during
the presidential election campa.ig~. and by the PS during the legislative election
campaign. There is genuine confidence among the socialists that it is possible to
change French society, to "change the way of life"r when someone replies by citing
the existence of obsta~le:, that have stood in the way of other experiments, they
ea~erly respond: "Yes~ but we ha.ve the political wil~." For his pa,rt~ the prime
minister unceasingly declarese "I'm a ma,n Kho sta.nds his ground," and "I'm a
fighter...."
In short~.the language of the PS in power is a simple language which basically
revives the language developed in the statutory texts of the party since 1971�
Here ir~deed is something new in E~ropean socialism which abun~dantly justifies the
impa,ssioned attention axoused in the ranks of the Leftist socialist ewrrents of
thought outside our borders.
Not everything is necessaxily so simple, however, arxi it is here that we find we
are risking a second corrtradiction. The fact is that xhile hoping to break xith
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the social democratic "double talk," the PS remains today strongly conditioned by
certain factors that have served to explain the "dev~.ation" of other experiments
and the ina,bility of these experimerrts to "break" with capitalism. We ahould like
here to mention only two of these factors.
= Favoring the institutional approach (the syatem of elections, governm~ent~ the
assemblies, the char~es in procedures), the PS has always felt a certain distrust
- of a ci~ilian society that would be too autonomous vis-a-vis the world of politics.
Because it re3ects the leftist doctrine of the "creative sponta,neity of the masses,"
because it fears the communists' ability to seize certain controls in aociety~ and
because it fears that a"liberal-libertarian" alliance--and even the reactionary
Rig~t--ma,y irrtrude irito overlar~e spa.ces opened up in freedom, the PS does not
propose to have the mechanisms of social change d~a~ate overmuch ~om its plan.
The policy followed during the first 6 months in the communica.tions sectori the
_ reticences with respect to the free radiobroadcasting stationsz the change in tone
toward the ecologists; and the strange procedure of dividing the decentralization
~ bill into two parts axe good exa,mples of this institutional approach. But does
this not therefore pose the da,nger of returning to the gractices of the party-state
and of placing definitive limits on the corrtours of change? We must be careful not
to go so far a.s to hurl the accusation of "totalitarianism," and particularly not
in the direction of the only politica.l movement--democratic socialism--that ha,s
never given birth,~anywhere in the world, to a repressive state. One should rema.in
, vigilarrt against this inevitable temptation--on the part of a majority party--to
orient the mechanisms of change exclusively towaxY]. its own profit arxi. to restrict
change to the political aspect of society. One should also give thought to the .
significance of J. P. Chevenemerrt's address to the Valence congress, in which he
expressed the hope.that greater efforts would be ma,de "go that the government will
truly be your governmerrt, so that this power will be your power, ~so that this
state will be your state~" (the emphasis is mine).
One of the 'f%~'le:;P.4 of "activist talk" h~,s tended to disappear f"��om the official
socialist line since last Ma,ys the concept of self-ruanagement. We ar~ insteati
witnessing the reappearance, a.s a~ackground theme in many of the speeches~ of the
old social democratic concept accord.ing to which the party, the government, or the
~ admini.strative esta.blishment should carry out a"political translation" of �~he
aspirations of the masses arri of the social struggles. There, too, does not one
run the risk--without meaning to--of renouncing all dialectics of action that are
based on political action arxi revertir~ to the concept that sirice the government is
a governmerrt of the Left and therefore a"good" government in the service of the
workers, the workers need only ~place their conf'idence~ in that government $o that
it �can cha~nge'. things to their ber~efit? And in so doir~, does one not only risk
elimina,ting .~nuch of the incentive for mobilization but also, once again~ risk
limiting the objectives of change to the tra;ditiona,l sphere of the politician?
Does not a party that is largely domina,ted by teachers and middle-level cadxes run
the ristc--by spAaking in the name of the workers--of depr3ving the latter (without
wish~.ng to do so) of certain benefits which they have expected from the change? In
short, the socialists should be particularly vigilant in order not to fa11 again
irrto the fa.miliax ruts of grevious socialist experiments, even after having explic~
itly aba.ndoned the practice of "double talk."
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F`rom the Union of~the Popular Forces to the Socialist Government
One of the origina.l features (ard one of the virtues) of the PS st-rategy duriz~ the
ast 10 years ha.s been the policy of a united Isft. The alliance with the PC
~Communist Pa.rty~ ha~ at one ancl. the same time made possible the reintegration of .
- the communists ir~o F`rench political lifei anchored the PS to the Lefti helped the
PS to break with the "social-cerrtrist" practices= and ma.de posaible the election
- victory of the entire Left (and thereby reduced the electoral influence of the PC).
- Moreover, the inclusion of four communist ministers in the government ia undoubt-
edly destined to play a definite role with respect to the publio image of the PC
and thersby help to bring about change in F`rench politics. One of the unusua.l
aspects of the Valence congress was the fact that Michel Rooard was the only apeak-
er to include the communists' participa,tion in the government among the gains ma.de
during the recent period.
The alliance With the PC, however, has never been described by the socialists as a
mere electoral tactic. On the contrarys according to the PS texts the alliance is
part of a unitary strategy, and party activists and lead.ers alike have called for a
"new practice of unity." In the period leading up to the presidential election,
F. Mitterrand and. the PS a.dopted the concept of a"union of the populax forces,"
including the PS-PC alliance within the framework of a broader arrangement (both
social and political) for the purpose of playing a leading role in the transforma-
tion of F'rench aociety. ~ ~
The problem posed here is one nf knowing what this "union of the populax forces"
can signify--and what the term "unitary strategy" can encompa,sa--no longer during a
period of wixining election to public office but rather during a period when a
socialist-led government is at the helm. The response today a,ppears to be somewhat
unclear, inasmuch as nei�ther in the top echelons nor among the rank and.file have
the PC-PS discussions really been resumed. Not only is there no 3oint effort, or
joint action, by the two paxties but the very problem of the organization of their
future relations (a question not taken up at the socialist congress) appears hardly
even tc ha.ve been included on the agenda of the various sections and federations of
t~ie P5. P~iust we await the preparations for the municipal elections in order to
reactivate unity for the electoral event?
The PS response vis-a-vis its other partners of the political and social Left does not
appear to ~e very clear either. With respect to the n~ture, and possible modalities,
of the relations between the dominant party and the sme11 groups of the CenterLLeft
(the P~G [Radical Leftist Movement) e,nd the PSU [Un3fied Socialist Party] ( in other
xords, the extreme Left), one cannot say that either the idea~ or the prop~sal~
have fused since May or June. With respect to the strategy for relations between
the party and. the labor unions, or between the government and the labor unions~
there too (although this is not to be sure, the classic but strongly reinvigorated
practice of ,joint social effort~ the current response of the Socialist Party is
hardly visible (even though some observers believe they axe Kitnessing the forma-
tion of a privileged PS-CGT [General Confederation of La.bor] axis.
In fact~ this question concerning the fate of the union of the.populax forces and
the unity of the.Left bears on the questions that directly concern the PS itselfs
the PC-PS alliance (together xith its vaxiants) has helped. greatly to give the
Socialist Party a more preoise image in tha yeare since 19'l1. Depending on whether
it remains a dominant party that conducts ita experiment as it ehooees~ maintaining
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only obligatory relations with its minority partners in the government, or whether
instead it revives--not only in o.fficial sectors but throug~out the na.t~.on--a
policy of continuous (and possibly conflictual) relations with the other "popular
_ forces," the PS will impart an entirely different colorati~n to its orm actiona and
to those of the government.
~ From a Collection of Tendencies to... a Collection of Tendencies
Everyone knows the importance, the essential character, of the role played by ideo-
logical "tende.ncies" within the ~S since the pa,rty's founding. Today, although
they have theoretically been dissolved, one is ~truck by the persistence of their
impact.
In the forma.tion of the government, the different tendencies of the party were
represented on a more or less proportiona.l ba.sis. The way in which the intragov-
enmental tensions are managed inevitably reminda knowledge,~ble observers of the ~ay
in which the resolutions committees have functi.oned during i�he na,tional congresses
of the PS .
These tendencies would seem to have disappeared, but it is unquest.ionably on the
basis of these defux~ct groupings that F. :(itterrand and L. Jospin suhtly formed the
paxty's new leadership and federal teams while singling out the Rocazd faction and
diminishing (as is well known) its influ~nce by comparison with the preceding
congress at Metz...
The "tendencies" have therefore been relegated to the baakground, but one cannot
_ coriverse for more than half an hour with a membeP of the former raa,~ority group
without his expla.ining tha,t the influence of -the "Rocax~dians" should be reduced
still further, or more than half an hour with a member of the former Rocardian
group without his dxeaming aloud. of ways to stage a comeba,eks
The "tendencies" as such are no more, but the paxty activists are so accustomed to
finding themselves in a sma,ll group that their personal ar~i. affective fellow-
ships--from the ra.nk and file to the top echelons--are more likely to consist of
"the comra.des of the group" than of "the comra,d.es of the party." Moreover, every-
one tries to preserve his own magazine, his own bulletin, or his own he:~,dquaxters
in order to perpetuate--insofax as possible--the spirit of the ancient chapels.
And to keep the flame alive.
The tendencies axe no longer in vogue, but everyone plans to use the government as
a base from which to promote the influence of the former group to which he once
belonged.
Having criticized the American Left, Jean-Pierre Chevenement, of Research, is now ~
pointing an accusing finger at American sociology. He is happily rediscovering a
proletarian science that would in time replace bourgeois science, arx]. is attempt-
ing--by using the discredited devices introduced some time ago by A. Saunier-Seite--
to place on the boasd of directors of the CNRS [National Center for Scientific
Research~ a member of the Editor3al Committee of the raa,ga,zine N~N, an organ founded
by CERES [Center for (Socialist) 5tudies, Reseaxch and Education].
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At the very outset~ Francois Mitterra.nd installed "Mitterandists" of unquestion~ed
loyalty in the state apparatus. The list of his guests at the luncheons.and
breakfasts in Elysee Palace attests (to no one's surp~ise~ to the fact that the
interests of t~e ma.jority "currerit" (pardon me, the former ma.3ority current) of the
PS are uppermost in his mind. .
With the support of Michel de la Fourniere and Robert Chapuis, Michel Rocard i.s
endeavoring to cornrince himself that the best xay to resurface (some day, who
knows?) at the hea.d of a tendency which xould fina.lly constitute a ma.~ority within
the party is to~submerge himself in a"party of una,nimity." Space is lacking here
to discuss the question of what constitutes cour,a,ge in politics, or whether it ~zas
more courageous--during the official prepaxation of the Valence congress--to
rema.in silent or to defend one's positions regaxdless of the price one might have
to pay during the short term.
So the temiencies are defunct--but are they? No, they axe onl~ asleep~ thanks to a
peculiar arrangement made at the highest level. Or rather they are as if "freeze-
dried," waiting for a little boiling water in order to live once again, fresher
than ever. One ma.y either deplore this sta~te of affairs or. scoff a~ it~ provided
~ne is outside the P5, but it is nevertheless quite unders~tandable: strong politi-
cal and serrtimental ties have existed for yeara, and one ~rould have to be aither a
fool or na.ive to imagine that they could suddenly be loosened.
This is undoubtedly not the importarrt question, however. I believe instead that at
the present moment the most serious question facing the ma,jority party is the fact
that while the submerged tend.encies await their opportunity to resurface--whenever
- one or the other of them believes cor~ditions axe favorable--the political debate
- concerning party orientations is ipso facto buried, deep within a pa.rty that dt~es
not know how to organize a confrontati.on that does not imrolve conteste for posi-
tions of leadership in the pa.r-ty apparatus. ~hould not an authentically demo-
cratic and pluralistic paxty (as the PS uncontestably is, more so than ar~y other in
F`rance ) be capable of deba.ting in an open--and, if necessary, a.d.versarial--manner
the prizes and o~-tions ox power? Arri if divergent policy lines manifest themselvea
with respect to these questions of today and tomorrow, should not the party be able
to develop new interna,l currents of opinion, new "ten3enoies," rather than merely
- to reproduce~ behind the scenes~ the same opposing views of the same groups and the
sa.me personal~lties?
F`rom the Culture of Aetivism to the Delights of Power
What~ then, is the role of the socialist activists when their party ia in power?
In the opiiiion of some activists from the rank and file who spoke their minds at
Valence~ the response is clear~ they must exercise suxveillance over the co~ade
ministers, be the guardians of the paxty line, become genuine political commissaxs
- o~ex those who axe appointed to governmental office. In short, to quote one of
their numt~er~ "The ~overnment must be the pa,rty's boot."
One can ima.gine that this role would be moderately sati.sfactory to the comrade
ministers. '1'hey have often indicated--have ~ in fact ~ said in so mar~y words--that
they errvisage things in another way. To quote Laurent Fabiusi "In this new situa-
~ion we are induced...to develop a new form of activism, xhich I should like to
ca.ll an "activism of explana,tian".... Rea:!~;;y today, as you well know~ is the
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- activists in tha maxketplace, in the workplace, being assailed by requesta, objec-
tions and questions, to Khich they axe as yet poorly equipped to respond.... This
is the ta.sk for the coming morrths: the 'activism of explana.tian.~' Here we have--
_ in my opinion--the initial axis of change for the Party." Then ~~here is the famous
quip of Jean-Pierre (hevenement~ "It is perhaps easy to proelaim that the Scscialiet
Party is not a'party-boot.' But, my deax comrades, not everyone has the talent to
be a'party-boo~.' It's a fine, harndsome p~.ece of footgeax."
The same speaker added, howevere "The problem is to act in such a way that the
governmerit and the pa.rty--in carrying out their activities--will be united in the
effort to anchor F`rance to the Left, to change the way of life, to truly open the
way to 3ocialism." This indeed appears to be the prob?am. These activists axe
very often local elected officials who axe in contact with the pressures, the peti-
tions, the demands of the citizens, of the voters. How oa,n they be ma~de responsive
to the groblems and choices of a goverrunent of comrades--of a governmental struc-
ture which they already find to be very distarrt, with all those bureaucrats who
appear to take themselves 3ust as seriously as their predecessors?
To be sure, the paxty committees have the role of formulating initiatives~ a role
which is~ moreover, not as simple as it seems, for how can an~yone be sure that
these committees will not outbid each other with rospect to the latitude of aetion
of the government, and how can ar~yone guaxantee that these committees will not be.
staffed by activists who are disappointed or embittered at not having been snapped
up by the state apparatus? To be true, the party has the task of serving as a
transmission belt to~ the ra.nk and file for presidential and governmental direc-
tives s the "activi.sm of explana.tion" so dear to Ia.ixrent Fabius ~ and the team
hea.ded by I,ionel Jospin is skillfully busying itself to perform that funetion.
This does not, however, fully satisfy a pa,rty in whieh the culture of activism has
always been valued highly. Well, then3 Then the party must specifically invent--
if no seri~us interna,l problems are created for the future and if no serious de-~
mobilization is provoked in its ranks--ways and means for its followers to accom-
plish the tasks that Pierre Mauroy a.ssigned to them at Valencet "A party in which
no one wishes--arui, moreover, would be una.ble--to serve as a docile spokesma,n for
a governmental decision. There axe more--and better--things to do. Wherever they
may be~ the socialist activists must launch ideas and proposals, experiments and
initiatives. For to the exterrt that it is a structure of ideas, a great soeial3st
party should be a vehicle for action wherever there axe socialists. Activists and
elected officials--in your neighborhoods, your towns~ your city halls, your depart-
merrts and your regions--it is your responsibility to change the way of life." Thi~
axis unquestiona,bly correspands to the activist consciousness of the Socialist
Paxty~ and it rema,ins for the party's leade~ship elements to�conceive how to build
this axis in the context of everyday reality.
From (~ange to E~cpectation
The socialist activists have for years labored for political change. Without
believin~ in an overni~ht utopia, they have hoped that victory at the polls would
brin~ extensive and immediate social and cultural change. Standing before that
everyday symbol--the sma.ll screen of a television set--we can un~derstand their
annoyance when they realize how little change has taken place in respect to human
beings, and even less in respect to methods and content. We also ca.lculate the
risk, hoKever, that injustice arui axbitrary action would ensue if the activists
were heeded fully in their persona,lized list of grievances.
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'~?e can therefof~e uriderstand why ma.ny socialist experts have recourse to sectorial
ma.na~ement practices--practices that ase new for them ar~d axe, moreover, very time-
_ consuming. One can~also understarui the discomfort of intellectuals who are deeply
irnolved in the paxty~ who are basically less at their ease than they Kere under
Giscaxd. d'EstaiYig; because in those da.ys the compromiaes nacessary for the opera-
tion of the government did not concern them.
Its victory in May-June brou~ht F~ench socialism face to face with respons:Lbilities
that axe assuredly historic in na.ture. In the preceding pages we have above all
raised questions--and called attention to certain contradictions--that are not easy
to resolve. It seemed useful to state these questions and contra.dictions in these
pages and. to do so without ar~y reservations, in considera.tion of the fact that
political change has created too ma,ny--and too profourrl--expectations not to
attempt a continuing ana.lysis of the ways and means that have been put in place to
respond to them. The victory of the Left (and first and foremost the victory of
the PS) in Ma.y-June was a response to a present-day need for political change in a
situation of social and economic crisis. It was also the result of a structural
change in ~rench society that has developed from t.he combined effects of urbaniza-
tion; the increasing transforma.tion of the middle class into salaried employees and
wage earners; de-Christianization; the increasing youthfulness of the population;
arul the "shock wave" of Ma.y 1968. The new governmerrt and the Socialist Pa,rty axe
expected to resporui to this structural challenge while at the same time resporxiing
to the immediate challenge of the preserrt situa,tion--the challenge to resolve the
crisis.
Under these ~or~ditions, it would appear essential to question the ~PS on a continu-
_ ing basis with respect to its corrtradictions and its limitations~ and in this way
to pa.rticipate in the indispensable debate concerning the political options of
French society.
COPYRIGHTs by CERAS, 15, rue R.-Marcheron, 92170 Vamres. 1981
10992
cso: 31oo/33z
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POLITICAL FRANCE
PCF DECLINE, RESOURCES FOR RECOVERY VIEWED
Paris POUVOIRS'in French No 20, 1982 pp 45-53
- [Article by Jean Baudouin, professor of political science at the University of
Poitiers, and author of "Le PCF et 'le socialisme aux coiileurs de la France' -
1968-1978," thesis, 1978, Rennes: "The June 1981 Communist Failure: Electoral
Retreat or Hegemonic Crisis?"]
[Text] One can readily imagine the trauma suffered by the communists on hearing
Ehe results of the June 1~81 legislative election. Forced back to a level of elec-
toral influence comparable to that in 1936, it may have seemed to them that within
a span of two successive balloting sessions, the efforts of two militant genera-
tions to guarantee the unchallenged hegemony of the party over the French left
wing had been brutally reduced to nothing. Prior to examining the political pro-
cesses which led to this situation and the various~responses the leaders of the
party are attempting to implement, it would perhaps be well to clarify further
this notion of failure which is at the heart of all the analyses.
_ 1. The Problem of the Failure
No one disputes the June 1981 communist failure--neither the commentators on
political life who undertake to draft an exhaustive inventory of its immediate
' evidences--electoral retreat, loss~of inembership, strategic chaos, identity
crisis, nor the leadership of the communist party which acknowledges the "serious
- reverses" suffered and is trying to clarify the short and long-run reasons for the
phenomenon. There are however two ways of interpreti:ig this setback:
Either one can presume that it is a question of a temporary retreat, substant.ial
indeed but not at all permanent and susceptible to being overcome eventually, com-
parable to that in June of 1958, with the socialist thrust serving in a reactive
capacity in this connection analogous to the Gaullist wave at that time, or
One can on the other hand presume that it is a matter of structural decline which
could be discerned as early as the preceding electoral consultations, confirming
the increasing failure of the organizational forms and systems of thought, in-
herited from Stalinism to adapt to a national situation which had changed pro-
foundly in po~litical decor and sociological profile.
The "lower" hypothesis of retreat is, naturally, that chosen by the PCF leader-
ship. If in fact one examines the main exegetic texts drafted since the elections,
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p~~rticular the report by Georges Marchais to the Central Committee on 28 and
29 June and the draft resolution approved by the Central Committee on 12 and
13 October, three kinds of explanations are provided:
Th; first is of an institutional nature. The aggressive trend toward presidential-
izing the regime resulting from the 1958 constitution, paralleled by the bipolar-
izing dynamics of elections by majority balloting in two rounds (advantage to the
dominant party, incentive for useful votes), gave an unrealistic advantage to the
socialist party, while at the same time penalizing the communist party. The de-
cline in the communist vote would therefore be more the product of a particularly
perverse electoral "technology" than a cutting rejection of a political. line. "47e
underestim~ted the serious threat which the new institutional mechanism posed for
our party.
The second paints a more traditional picture and derives more from "demonology
than rEas~n. The party was the victim of a"atmosphere of inerciless ideological
warfare," cleverly orchestrated by the dominant powers, massively passed along
by the mass media, and subtly endorsed by the socialist leaders. The breaking wave
oE anticommunism deflected thousands of potential voters from the party.
Finally, the third explanation is the most innovative to the extent that it
directly challenges the history of French communism: the party bears the cost of
the "strategic delay" accumulated following the 20th CPSU Congress. If the august
names of Maurice Thorez and Waldeck-Rochet are never mentioned, they are implicit-
ly reproached for "having reacted the traditional form of unity of which the
~ Popular Front remains the prestigious model, that is t~ say the search for a basic
~ overall political agreement with the socialist party."
~
It would be unreasonable to deny the import of this last argument. It is not in
fact usual for a party in the Stalinist tradition to cast a critical look at its
own history and to excise from it, in abrupt fashion, a manifestation as decisive
as the strategy of a single front at the summit with the socialists. The.party in-
terpretation does not however deviate significantly from the grand apologetic and
- legitimizing tradition of its hagiologies. In faci it offers the advantage of ex-
cusing the current leaders of the party and absolving the founding norms of the
system (authoritarian stateism, ideocratic temptation, internationalist solidar-
ity). A spotlight focused on the "indi~~idual errors" of the preceding leadership
groups is also an artifice making it possible to isolate a moment in the "pro-
cess," the better to preserve the inalteratle validity of the "project." -
In truth, wnichever hypothesis is adopted, a politist cannot save time with 3n
overall interpretation of the contemporary development of the party. It is high
_ time to discard all of these "existentialist" concepts which have so thoroughly
muddied our understanding of the communist party i*: the ~ourse of these recent de-
cades. Just as i~t was absurd to pose the question "Has the communist party
ch~~ngc~d" unceasingly, without previously establishing the element~ in the commu-
nist system which must in fact be altered before one can conclude that there has
been a real change, it would also be extremely sterile to adhere to a situational
concept of the failure, to add together and assign a hierarchy to its immediate
evidences, for example, without integrating it in a general "pathology" of the
~
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- communist system which alane can make it possible to clarify its significance and
to measure its efficiency. �
zn this connection, it seems that the June 1981 electoral retreat provides spec-
tacular confirmation of a process which is certainly older but whose intensity was
ros ect of the joint program: the gradual transition
- modified by the exalting p P .
- of French communism from an ~~�rgileCesPwithinhFrenchrsociety (in particularnaalza-
tion of a certain number of priv g
quasi-monopoly on the representation of the least favored strata) toward a
� " characterized precisely by the gradual dismantling of these
critical epoch, owerful and
privileges. The communist institution is tending to move from the P There is
stable "countersociety" it was toward a peripheral and marginal society.
hardly any need to~add that within the,fras~rate ic processesrwhichlledetosthas~
we will limit ourselves to describing the g lannin to cope
deterioration and the responses which the communist leaders are p g
with this r_oemonic crisis.
2, The Development of the Crisis
If one stucties the development ~f communist strategy between 1965 and 1981, one
art tested the joint practices at the "summit"
can see that the leaders of the p Y
and then "at the base," in both cases leading to failure, but constituting none-
theless a traditional parallel to thebhistory of the party. Hasn't its rhythm
the alternation of so-called periods of _
since its origins been characterized y
overture characterized by an effort to rsicn ofrdenunciationtof thPlsocial demoso
called periods of withdrawal, under the g
cratic betrayals? In truth, there are tof factors which are inconsistent with t is
a'oint government program is something
description. On the one hand, the goal ~ owerful socialist party
~ unprecedented. On the other, the reestablishment of a p
- finally rooted in the left emerged as thenedethetretreat of therPCFtage in the
union, served as a catalyst for and d~ep
The launching of a joint dynamics just after the death of Maurice Thorez seems
consistent at first glance with classic objectives. The issue was indeed to
develop new prospects for change by updating the alliance with the socialist party
olitical and
at the summit again. It was a question above all of establishing p
emon in this alliance with a view to winning power under the most
electoral heg Y
favorable conditions. The long-term broWpnningathedsupportkofgaavastlpublicrand
through on the level of state ~ower y
when the party debits this joint research to a mode
nationalized sector. However, it erases the strictly heterodox
introduced in the era of the Popular FF�~~tthe first time in ~ts history, in fact,
aspect of the joint program strategy� ower between the social-
the PCF is contemplating the long-term sharing of state p
ists alone and the communists alone with a view to advancing toward socialism~and
whereas in 1936 it rallied to the formula of "support without participation,
artici ated in a reconstruction go~~ernment which in-
between 1945 and 1947 it p P
cluded representatives of the "national boaTgeoCOndescendVtoaestablishtsuchwfavor-
nowhere else in Europe would a communist p Y
able and such rich links with those hereditary enemies of communism, the sociareat
democrats. The unprecedented scope of the joint program aims explain the two g
impcratives which the communists adopted for themselves as of ~972. On the one
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hand there was a"sociological" imperative designed to extend the traditional
- audience of the party into the new wage-earning strata created by the "scientific
and technical revolution," and on the other hand, a"political" imperative seeking
to design the contours of a"socialism of a French hue" and to modify its idehtity
_ on major points. Unlike the situation in 1936 and 1945, the party leadership is
willing to wager its candidacy.f~r power on significant reforms: a loosening of
its links with the Soviet Union, abandonment of the concept of the dictatorship
of the proletariat, recognition of pluralistic socialism, reestablishment of a
climate of discussion within the party--partial, awkward and more or less sincere
reforms which would despite everything involve it in a process of moving away from
the Soviet Union, involving it almost despite itself in a Eurocommunist approach.
"Bad luck" would have it that this move was paralleled in time by a spectacular
recovery for the socialist party, while the dynamics of unity benefitted more from
the modern and sincere "reformism" of the socialist party than from thP stiff and
ambiguous "reformism" of the communist party. The contradiction which was already
visible at the concJusion of the June 1974 presidential elecCion became fully
obvious during the negctiations in the summer of 1977 about the updating of the
joint program. The socialist party veto both of its institutional demands (n~t to
the "republican monarchy") and its economic conditions (more nationalizations and
more self-management by the rank and file) stripped it of the last "resources" it
could have hoped to mobilize in order to control the direction of the fur_~.~re
regime. I11 adapted to the presidential function, excluded fro~o the key minis-
tries, ignored within the great technocratic structures of the state, the party
is very concretely faced with the scenario it fears the most: serving as the
workers' guarantee in a simple social democratic handling of the crisis. Tnis is
the reason for the decision to abandon the union of the left. And it is ~.s of this
moment that another great disappointment for the PCF takes shape. The return to
_ a strategy of isolation and insults toward the socialists (the thesis of the
"swing to the right"), the purpose of which was not only to reestablish party
unity on the classic foundations (allegiance to the Soviet Union, priority for the
poor and the oppressed, exaltation of the revolutionary party), but above all to
destroy the roots of socialist renewal and the various legitimacies it claimed--
this frenetic isolationism turned against i.t again, nourishing a broad and endur-
ing dispute within the. party, and outside it, further strengthening the reformist
credibility of the socialist party. The "perverse effects" of unity appeared in
all their "hideousness" in May and June of 1981. Not only did the communist party
suffer unprecedented electoral reverses, but a powerful and triumphant social .
democratic sec:tor lurked within the state mechanisms conceived by General de
Gaulle.
Thus not everything in this communist exegesis linking the retreat of the party
with the culmination of. a wrongful logic of unity with the socialist party at the
summit is necessarily false--with the basic reservation that one cannot draw
justification from such a modern development to explain the profound reasons for
the communist decline. The seriousness of the failure of the joint strategy (the
- party's loss of stability in its traditional monopoly on the representation of the
~aorkers class) enabled the communist leaders to invert the responsibility issue
' and to blame rash "Eurocommunization" for a decline which was above all due to
the c.ontinuation within the party of ~ystems of thought, organization and action
inherited from the Stalinist period.
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3. A Shift in the Stakes
The communist failure in June of 1981 was a sudden consolidation of the gradual
shift of the stakes involved in the socialist-communist rivalry since the signing
of the joint program: ~
Between 1972 and 1981, the primacy the PCF had enjoyed in the electoral field,.
c.*hich enabled it to appear to be the "first party of the left," slipped away from
it, little by little;
In 1977 and in 1981, the disruption in the union of the left and the symbolic par-
- ticipation in the regime il~ustrated, on obviously different levels, the same in-
- capacity to establish a dominant influence on the level of the cen*ers of power;
and ~
i
After the formation of the new government, the competition between the socialist
party and the PCF developed in a final sector--political and~ideo~ogical control
of the workers class, the exercise of the "tribunicYal ft~nction."
Control of the Tribunicial Function
The PCF today has only two "resources" capable of contributing to a resumption of
its influence left--the solidity of its institutions, on the one hand, and the
density of its popular roots, on the other. The second factor is moreover the pre-
ponderant one insofar that it is true that an organization which is not implanted
= in mass practice is in the medium time range doomed to schism. Now the triumph~of
the socialist party, if it shatters the mythology of the "party of the workers
class," does not destroy the old exchange system linking the PCF with the "least
favored strata" society and in part explaining its enduring prosperity from top
to bottom.
On the one hand, it remains the only national party which has incorporated in its
organic "genes" the messianic postulate of the primacy of the proletariat and
which vigorously stimulates the advancement of cadres of worker origin on all
levels of the organization.
On the other hand, it continues on a permanent basis to structure the demands and
the expectations of major sectors of the workers class thanks to its dense and ex-
tensive network of "links" made up of the cells in enterprises and neighborhoods,
the municipalities controlled by the party, the po.pular and family aG~ociations
and the local sections of the CGT [General Confederation of Labor]. ~
Finally, one should not regard the enduring similarity between the daily adminis=
tration of the party and the opinions characteristic of the social strata they
' claim to represent as a minor matter. Support of national values, the cult of
athletics and virility, a tendency toward "machismo" or racism (Vitry), an inflex-
ible campaign against immorality and pornography--the party, except for temporary.
concessions to "fashion" ("we are the party of women's liberation"), carefully
- cultivates this "traditionalism" which is inherent in a certain popular ethos.
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Tt is precisely this tribunicial singularity, the main if not the exclusive source
of its spread, which is today becoming the nodal point in the competition between
the communists and the socialists.
This is because, first of all, of "situational logic" almost impossible to change.
The coexistence within a given field of a powerful social democratic party and a
powerful communist party is not viable. The natural logic of the former leads to
seeking among the popular strata the support needed to expand its social base and
to justify its~,demands for reformist administration of the system. The profound
logic of the latter leads to extension of its influence beyond the popular cate-
gories which it "staffs," with a view to supporting its proposed penetration of
state powers. Both sectors seek to harvest the same ground. In France at present
the socialist7par~y cannot consolidate its position as a dominant party unless it
succeeds in guaranteeing itself majority control of the workers class, and thus
reducing the influence the communist party exercises over it through the CGT in
significant fashion.
This is because, secondly, of "situational benefits" recently acquired by the
socialist party. The lasting conquest of state power finally provides it with an
opportunity to overcome its original handicaps and to correct its unfortunate lack
of presence in the enterprises. It is now in fact well situated to mobilize a
whole complex of "resources" (mastery of economic and social policy, initiative
in structural reforms, launching of an "anticapitalist" discourse) which will
allow it precisely to achieve from "above" what it has never been able to accom-
plish from "below"--imposing itself as the privileged translator of the demands
of the productive workers, confiscating for its own exclusive benefit a"tribuni-
cial function" of which it was constantly deprived in the past, whether it be by
anarchosyndicalism at the beginning of this century or by the communism of a
- Leninist hue beginning in 1936.
There can be no doubt that the communist leaders are more than acutely aware of
the major danger which threatens them. What in fact will remain of their old
proletarian legitimacy if the.dominant sectors of the workers class move toward
the "reformist" parties and unions? What credibility would a party incapable of
representing the workers effectively with the public authorities have with those
_ voters? It is in order to block a process which in the end would lead to a mar-
ginal position of the Scandinavian type that the communist leaders are under-
taking, within the difficult post-May 1981 context, to set up a system of back-
fires.
The System of Backfires
Safeguarding the tribunicial privileges of a party threatened by social democratic
hegemony at all costs--that is the guideline making it possible to organize the
sometimes disparate segments of the communist strategy.
First of all, it clarifies the seeming paradox inherent in the decision to parti-
cipate in power. Is it not remarkable, in fact, that the PCF leadership renounced
leftist unity in August 1977 with the justification that it would no longer con-
trol the anticapitalist dynamics of the experiment? And that in June of 1981, that
same leadership engaged in feverish competition as a candidate for power when it
no longar had any guarantee at all of controlling its direction? In truth, even
symbolic participation in the state regime was the only means available to the
party for conjuring the mortal threat that public opinion in the workers sector
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rvn ~rri~itw u~~ vriLr.
wouLd identify the socialist state with change, social democracy with social re-
_ form. The participation of four communist ministers at least gives credibility to
- this idea that the party is also playing its part in the effort toward social re-
newal which Francois Mitterrand cannot set aside without reversing himself.
Furthermore, it explains the subtle dialectics of unity and autonomy which governs
the relations between the PCF and the state regime. On the governmental and
parliamentary levels.the party manifests great loyalty, asserting its solidarity
with the advances made and maintaining a cautious silence when it comes to the
measures in contradiction with the communist program. On the tactical and propa-
ganda level, on the other hand, the party engages in discrete but firm one-upman-
ship with a view to pointing out the temporarizing of the socialists and identify-
ing the thresholds which must be crossed in order to move forward. The measures
initiated by the socialist regime both in the realm of taxing capital and financ-
i'ng social security have also been the subject of "unfavorable commentaries" by
the communist leaders. Finally, on the trade union and worker demand levels, the
CGT does not hesitate to place itself in the vanguard of a number of battles
and to radicalize certain demands. The existence of a government dominated by the
socialists is not of a sort as to hinder its activity, unlike the period immed-
iately after the war in which it represented strikes as the "weapon bf the trusts"
and urged the workers to "roll up their sleeves." In the final analysis, the harsh
self-restraint which the communists impose upon themselves on the ministerial
level in no way prevents them from seizing every opportunity to appear as the
~ natural defenders of the poor and the oppressed.
This is not unrelated, finally, to this whole process of internal party consolida-
tion underway since the electoral "trauma" of June. The very limited maneuvering
room which the party has henceforth precludes any fantastic innovations in the
organizational realm. As a result, the current leadership is very faithfully
adhering to the organicist tradition inherited frocn the Thorez era, consistent
with which the unflagging unity of all the party institutions rallyinz around the
leading strata constitutes not only the key to future developments but also the
~ prerequisite for political renaissance. The party has been adamant with regard to
the criticai movement with its nucleus within RENCONTRES COMMUNISTES and s~ymbol-
ized by the former federal secretary for the Paris region, Henri Fiszbin. It has
taken care to isolate and exclude the opposition elements in the various CGT
structures, so that this great central workers organization~will remain the privi-
leged spokesman for the party among the workers. Finally, during the Central
Committee meeting held on 8 and 9 October, it noted the disappearance of "hundreds
of enterprise cells" and decided to reactivate the party presence in the trade
union and associational movement as a whole.
FOOTNOTES
l. Dr.aft Resolution, L'HUMANITE, 13 October 1981.
2. Ibid. '
3. Ibid. ~
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4. Concerning the limits of this relaxation, see our article "The PCF--A Return
to Archaism," REVUE POLITIQUE ET PARLEMENTAIRE, December 1980.
= 5. This expression was "immortalized" by Georges Lavau, "Communism in France,"
CAHIERS OF THE SNSP, 1968.
6. It was the Central Committee which had the duty of stating at the 8 and
9 October 1981 session that "The founders of RENCONTRES COMMUNISTES are no
longer members of the party."
COPYRIGHT: Presses Universitaires de France, 1982
5157
CSO: 3100/345 `
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POLITICAL FRANCE
KRASUCKI PURPOSE: REINFORCE CGT, WAGE PCF ATTACK ~
Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 6 Feb 82 pp 22-23
[Article by Franz-Olivier Giesbert & Claude-Francois Jullien: "The Krasucki Offen-
sive"] �
~ [Text) The PCF is seriously ill? Then it is up to the.CGT to take
over. And the future secretary general shrinks from nothing in or-
der to restore combativeness to the old house.
Every day, the dispatches that �all onto the desk of Jean Auroux, minister of la-
bor, announce new social conflicts: "Strike Hardens at Renault-Maubeuge," Occupat-ion
of Motta Tce Cream Factory in the Orne," "Customs-0~f'icer�conflict still at Tm-
passe," etc. The 39-hour matter has'thus, in a few days, set on fire the France of
the factories--a matter that came juat in time for the CGT.
A CGT man himself, Jean Auroux is nc�~ taken in by the game in the rue La Fayette
central organization. Henri Krasucki, who suspects him of primary.anti-CGT-ism,
even asked Pierre Mauroy for Auroux's head one day. Like the experte of Ma.tignon
or elsewhere, the minister of .labor has understood that the CGT is henceforth mak-
ing use of the discon~ent in order to strengthen its positions. On Thursday, Kra- '
sucki again lit into him by name.
Is the CGT, for all that, in the process of going into dissent against the govern-
ment? Not really. Not yet. For the time being, Henri Krasucki, a brooding threat
to the new regime, is content to issue a lot of "warnings.." T+hien he writes to the
prime minister, it is to tell him that the workers of Renault "have been deceived."
One day, he vituperates "the leftist forces that want to manage the crisis." The
next day, he lights into the "bad ordinance" on reduction of work time. Andre
Sainjon, the young boss of the metallurgical woxkers of the CGT, throws the ball
farther: "Th~ government's decisions are too limited, indeed sometimes contrary to
change."
It is obviously not by chance that it is a man like Henri Krasucki who is taking
the reins of the No 1 workers' central organization today. It is being attacked on
all f.ronts. Within itself, first of all, by its dissidents who are challenging the
watchwords inspired directly by the PCF. Before the first round of the presiden-
tial. election, the Confederation's anti-Mitterrand campaign had scandalized the.
partisans of unity. The support for the Warsaw putschists only aggravated the mal-
aise. Federations and departmental unions are on the verge of going over t~o inter-
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nal opposition: thus it is in Seine-Maritime, or in the Pays de la Loire. The fu--
ture secretary general is trying to root out the movement by refusing, for example,
. to renew the bad CGT members' cards for 1982. Thia amounts to de-facto expulsion.
Locking Up the ~fachine
On the outside, things are going no better for the CGT leadership. In several oc-
cupational test-elections, it has lost points to the advantage of the CFDT, and
sometimes, the FQ.[Workers Force]. Thus, the drop was 7 percent at the Brest naval
yard and in the SNIAS [National Industrial Aerospace Co~ of Toulouse, and 12 per-
cent at Renault-Billancourt. According to certain internal estimates, the CGT lost
between 10 and 20 percent of its members last year. The organization's finances
~ are feeling the effect of this.
What can Krasucki do under these conditiona? His mission i.s not to be agreeable
but rather to keep the house in blind obedience. For this purpose, he would have
to lock up the machine, of course, while at the same time making his organization
the most combative on the front of the struggles. The future of communism in
France is at stake. Tt?e leadership of the PCF is well aware of the fact that its
party has been sick for a long time. Thus it is up to the CGT to take over, to
"become the spearhead of the working class," as the hallowed expression puts it.
Georges Seguy, the trade-unionist of the PCF's political buresu, was naturally not
the man for the situation. A good soul, he haci long dreamed of a more open and
more democratic union, encompassing more than 3 million members. Henri Krasucki,
who is the party's man in the CGT, will for his part know how to take drastic meas-
ures. He has already begun to do so, for that matter--all the more easily in that
he is the rrue boss of the central organization. At the last executive-committee
meeting, Rene Buhl, the "unity critic," declared that he is ready to sign the lead-
ership's motion. But on one condition: that it call for the freeing of the trade-
unionists imprisoned in Poland. Seguy, who was chairing, seemed ready to accept
this. He turned toward Krasucki--and the answer was no.
It was not entirely of his own volition that Seguy quits the leadership of the CGT.
What is involved was, of course, an eviction. It was the friends of "Krasu" who
spread the reports about the "health problems" of the secretary general i�fl office.
Georges Seguy, for his part, does not explain his departure in terms of any fa-
tigue. To the leaders of the executive committee he explained last year, half-
heartedly, that it was necessary to "make room for the young." Smiles in the.
ranks. Everyone in the trade union knows that Henri is 3 years older than.
Georges. In his reply that day, Krasucki declared that Seguy had definitely "real-
ly deserved to leave." ~
The two men have several points in common. For example, it was in the middle of
their adclescent years that they went into the Resistance, before being deported.
But they do not have the same style. Georges Seguy, ruddy and lively, readily
serves whiskey on the rockes to his visitors. Krasucki, pale and austere, ~rumin-
ates day and riight through his files, which he knows like a book. "He is the best
negotiator," says Yvon Chotard, the No 2 of the CNPF [National Council of French
Employers]. .
Seguy and Krasucki are not on the same wavelength politically either. It is tradi-
tional in any communist organization, of course, for roles to be divided and for
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the boss to appear to be an open person, at odds with the "hardliners." But this
time, the legend was true: Seguy, who urged unity of action with *_he CFDT, was cer-
tainly less firm than his "right-hand man." He is one of those communists who are
~ not very infatuated with the "Soviet model." At the congress of the World Trade-
Union Federation in Prague in 1978, Seguy was often caught in a clearly bad mood in
the corridors. "Someone read a message from Brezhnev," he laughed in a small,
fiendly group; "Interesting. Why not a message from Bokassa?" A quip--but it says
a lot. Later, he did not hesitate to meet with the Czech "charter 77" dissidents.
This is the kind of "provocation" that Krasucki has never relished.
"Sounding the Alarm with a Sleigh-Bell"
"Krasu," for his part, remains an unconditional supportei of the October Revolu-
tion. He has not understood the PCF's critical phase vis-a-vis the Soviet model.
In a recent book, "Synidcat et Unite" [Trade Union and Unity] (published by Edi-
tions Sociales), he warmly hails the "immense role"~that the Eastern countries "are
playing for the maintenance of peace, the support.that they are givi,ng to the worik-
ers' movement." When you talk to him about the Polish tragedy, he shrugs his
shoulders: "Without the USSR, Poland would be nothing at all."
A"retro" communist is what Henri Krasucki is. More political than Georges Seguy,
he has also failed to make a career in the party. Thorez took n~te of him in the
1950's. He was made a political-bureau alternate in 1964. And since he thrives on
theory, he worked in the key sector of the intellectuals. But it was necessary to
prepare for someone to take over from Benoit Frachon,.the trade-union patriarch.
At the time, it was inconceivable that a Poliah immigrant, and a Jew to boot, could
become the boss of the No 1 French central workers organization. But he was the
ideal factotum to back up the exuberant Seguy. And so he became.
His headquarters is a"worker's life" center, full of souvenirs of his trips to the
Eastern countries.. He entrenches himself in it. The journalists of "the VO [Vie
Ouvriere (Worker's Life)]" never see him up close--except in the cafeteria, where
he often eats, apart, with members of the confederation bureau. He does not get
into "the VO" because he shuttles between the headquarters of the CGT, in rue La .
Fayette, and that of the PCF, in place du Co]~nel-Fabien. Little by little, he has
taken control of all sectors of the central organization: the confederation press,
the federations, beginning with the biggest of them--metallurgy.
If this model apparatchitc has been able to impose himself, it is doubtlessly also
because of his innate sense of formula. He loves to be striking: "One cannot s'ound
_ the alarm with a sleigh-bell." And he does not hesitate to speak gruffly. Last
year, to explain his central organization's reception of that Walesa whom he.
spurns, he went so far as to say to the executive coimnittee: "In France, Solidarity
is us, the CGT."
The government, in any case, does not take lightly the ~ine ~ormulas or great dia-
tribes of "Krasu." The fact is that all of his words have been weighed. But there
is no need to read between the lines to understand the real reasons for the Kra-
sucki affair. The French Communists know that they will have to break with the So-
cialist group sooner or later if ~hey want to exist. Since the PCF is paralyzed by
the governmental solidarity, the future secretary general of the CGT gives himself
, the responsibility of preparing the ground, with reliable people. In carrying on
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~~F.
iY
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the battie fo~:'"~~ofound change," he ia taking account of the impatience of the
working class and clamping down on the internal challenges. Three birds with one
stone.
The 39-hour matter is a windfall. "The government," says Krasucki, "~s finding a
way to bring about a reduction of the work~week under such conditions that the
workers are discontent." That is because everyone is finding some advantage in it:
The customs workers are angry: their supervisory suthority has jumped at the oppor-
tunity of the 39-hour work week to cut down on the advantages they have already ac-
quired. One officer or another could include his travel time in the 40-hour work
week; but that is no longer the case with the 39-hour week= At Kodak, in Vin-
cennes, the "continuous process" workers were working 38 hours a week. H~nceforth
they wi.ll work only 37, but the management is taking advantage of this to reduce
their night-work allowances. Elsewhere, workers are feeli~g themselves robbed of
the 5th week of paid holidays. An employee of the Galeries Lafayette who worked
underground enjoyed 2 days of vacation time because of his seniority and 3 extra
days for "fatigue." His bosses decided that the Sth week should cancel these small
favors.
The CFDT is not at rest. After a meeting, described as "courteous," with Yvon Gat-
taz, the boss of the bosses, Edmond Maire denounced the "legalism" of certain com-
pany chiefs who strive to apply the law to the letter, all the better to betray its
spirit. But for his part, he refuses to challenge the goverrnnent in the matter of
- the 39-hour week: if anyone is guilty, it is the employers, and they alone.
Should one be afraid of Krasucki? His wheezy old machine should not be underesti-
_ mated. The CGT still holds EDF [French Electric Power Company], the SNCF [French
National Railroadsj and the RATP [Independent Parisian Transport System]--a number
of strategic points, in other words. In the nationalized sector, in which the
trade unions are destined to exert more and more influence, it gets 53 percent of
the votes, on the average. In the private sector, only 38 percent. But it ia
clear that the CGT hegemony is no longer what :it was--far from it. "The future of
our central organization is not very rosy," sayss Pierre Feuilly, 34, leader of the
Socialist dissidents. "Its threa`-s are only blusters."
Perhaps. But it would be risky not to take Krasucki seriously.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 "le Nouvel Observateur"
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r'ux ur~r~l~l~ u5~ UNLY
POLITICAL FRANCE
PSF DEPUTIES' FACTIONS, GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION SURVEYED
. Paris POUVOIRS in French No 20, 1982 pp 55-66 '
[Article by David Hanley]
[Text~ The parliamentary faction produced by the election comprises 269 depu-
ties. An attempt will be made here to make a closer study of those elected on
14 and 21.June 1981 (thus we will not concern ourselves with the alternates for
those elected who have become ministers. All this will perhaps change little as
to the basic data, it may perhaps do so on the level of factions, since .these
alternates are not always of the same persuasion as these ministers). Despite
~ these limitations, we have chosen to undertake2an analysis based on factions, for r
the analyses of the deputies published to date have devote~d little concern to
~ this dimension of the PS [Socialist Party], which is however essential if we are
to understand its internal functioning, and which confers upon this party a large .
part of ir_s uniqueness. If everyone knows that the PS representation has more than
doubled, and that its deputies are now and henceforth active more or less e~ery-
where in France, with spectacular penetration in the east, west and center, and
that the bulk of the new parliamentarians are men in their forties, wage earners
in general in the intellectual professions in the broader sense (see the innumer-
able commentaries on the "professors' Republic), it appears that an analysis ba~ed
on this key factor might possibly contribute some modifications to this very
roughly sketched image, casting a little light in the process on the internal
mechanisms of this party which now, as Harold Wilson puts it, appears to be "the
natural party of the government."
The Factions4 '
The deputies have been classified on the basis of t.he motions they supported dur- .
ing the indicative vote for the Metz Congress in 1979, and we have not excluded
any motions. For if category D reflects above all the existence of a serious
crisis within the Bouches-du-Rhone federar_ion, and if.category F did not achieve
the necessary five percent, both reflected a certain sensitivity. Of course, we
have been unable to take into account the factional changes which have occurred
in the meantime (this is the case for a certain number in the F category, in par-
ticular). It is also difficult to assess all of the nuances ("A certain individual
voted for C but fee~s close links with A"--or the reverse). Tactical rall;es,
wherein a deputy approved one motion out of a sense of duty or concern for the
future, ara inevitably excluded as well. Thus our classifications reflect the Metz
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choice in all its harsh reality, but perhaps this will give tnem a certain
indicative value.
, Table 1--PS Deputies by Faction, 1981
Absolute % of % of % of
Number of 1981 1978 Metz
1981 PS PS Seats
Faction Deputies Group Group (1980)
A(Mitterrand) 129 48 52.8 40.1 ~
B(Mauroy) . 42 15.6 20.7 13.6
C(Rocard) 45 16.7 16 20.4
D(Defferre) 5 1.9 1.9 7.8
E (CERES [Center for
Socialist Studies, '
' Research and Edu~a-
tion 36 13.4 6.6 14.4
F(Pierret) 11 4.1 1.9 3.2
Unclassifiable 1 0.4 ~
Total 269 100 100 99.5
~ In comparing the percentage of deputies elected by each faction with its score in
the indicative vote for Metz, we see that the Mitterrand faction benefitted the
most, with a gain of some eight percent. If the Mauroy faction also showed a
little ga'}~n, one might perhaps see therein the effect of a certain presidential
dynamics. The Rocard faction, in the minority at Metz, showed a loss, while the
CERES faction succeedeg for the first time in obtaining more or less the number
of deputies it merits. One is also struck by the persistence of the category F
differentiation (CERES dissidents, for the most part), despite the fact that this
faction does not officially exist. This doubtless reflects not only the weight of.
certain strong personalities within their federation, but also real autonomy in
the choice of candidates by the section members. Without a doubt Mitterrand was
well aware of the persistence of the catergory F preference when he appo3nted
Edmond Herve to his cabinet.
The Routes Followed
W~chin the parliamentary group, one can distinguish several directions.~ Let us ~
take Eirst of all the sudden "dropout" in the districts which, according to every
expectation, should have come back into the PS fold. There do not appear to be too
many such cases: we are thinking of the old battle comrades of the chief of state
such as R. Dumas (Dordogne 1) or G. Halimi (Isere 4). In cases such as those of
V. Neiertz (Seine-Saint-Denis 5) or A. Bellon (Alpes de Haute-Provence 2) are in
all probability less a matter of reward for services rendered in the past than an
investment in the future, with the obvious desire to put potential stars in place.
All of these examples, it should be mentioned, fall within category A.
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In ~he old party bastions where a renewal is in progress, the "cursus" of the new
group often seems to resemble that of its predecessor. For example in Ariege or
Haute-Garonne, the new deputies are men of a certain age with experience in ~
executing municipal or departmental responsibilities. Even when a younger man with
a Paris degree takes over (J. P. Balligand in Aisne, or A. Rodet in Limoges)
they have usually been well broken in previously in departmental life. If these
comments are valid above all for categories A and B, it is nonetheless possible
to say that the typical deputy has had extensive experience in municipal or county
government dating back to 1977 at least, and has made himself a reputation as a
capable and industrious administrator. Many of these deputies were candidates in
the 1978 legislative elections, and they are now harvesting the fruits of their
local labors and the effects of the change in opinion on the national level. This
is valid for all of the factions taken together: the success of the likes of R.
Carraz in Cote-d'Or or K. Haye in Giror~de, both of them CERES mayors in working
class suburbs, is indeed very similar to that of inen with the most classic of pro-
files, such as Mitterrand supporter L. Robin in Ain or G. Bonnemaison, of faction
B, in Epinay. ~
Within this category of local elected officials, it is possible to distinguish
various shadings. One can separate those who are truly native sons (for example
in the CERES, M.-J. Sublet in Rhone, or G. Benedetti in Gard) from those who,
despite their local popularity, remain both in terms of their roots and their pro-
fessional activities Parisians, working from a distance. We are thinking of the
likes of J.-M. Belorgey in Allier or C. Goux in Var. It seems to us that this
phenomenon pertains above all to the Mitterrand faction.
There is also a certain polarity berween the party and the locally elected
officials. If at least 25 of the new deputies were the."federal leaders" in their
department, and if the intraparty responsibilities are often interlinked with the
mayors' mandates, there is another profile which seems to be less directed towards
public life. This seems to us to be particularly true of the CERES, which has
among its deputies a number of individua;.s without other electoral mandates
(G. Toutain and J.-P. Planchou in Paris, J. Natiez in Nantes, A. Chepy in Marne).
These members are committed to making of the PS a serious political tool, con-
sistent with the CERES line, but in so doing, they.have bypassed local mandates.
One can also distinguish a certain number of elected officials who, although not
natives of their districts, settled there some years ago in order to establish (or
revive) the party and their faction there. At present they are seeing their years
of effort well rewarded, and one might note among them in particular such CERES
f.igures as J.-P. Michel in Haute-Saone, J. Gatel in Orange or M. Suchod in
Dordogne (the latter was, it is true, elected to office during a partial election
at the end of 1980). .
Ret-in~ng the analysis of elected posts held by deputies according to faction some-
what, we see first of all that there are many deputies who do not seem to hol.d
a.ny office. That having been said, the percentage of local elected officials
appears very high for category B, and very low for the CERES. Among the officials
in category B, moreover, half serve as mayors or county original councilors--an
indication of really remarkable local ties, and proof, if such be needed, of the
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persisi.ence of a type of.municipal socialism which must indeed be associated with
the SFIO ~French Section of the Workers International]. The CERES obviously pre-
fe�rs a p~irty with local responsibilities, since it is underrepresented in all the
categor~es in Table 2. Faction A is strong in all categories, and the Rocard
supporters are difficult to class?.fy. There is a goodly number~of deputies who
hold no elective posts and relatively few who are both mayo.rs and county coun-
cilors. On the other hand, the~^ is a goodly number of county councilors pure and
simple. Should we see therein a certain difficulty in gaining local power, or a
more deliberate rejection of the responsibilities of mult'iple posts? The same
question can be asked for those in category F, few though they be.
Geographic Distribution
The regional distribution of the deputies is also a rich source of information
(see Map 1). ':etting faction D aside as a purely regional phenomenon, we are
struck by the extreme splintering of faction F(except perhaps in Vosges, where
C. Pierret ~~~mself is an elected official). This suggests~members holding solid
local elected offices (B. Vennin in Saint-Etienne, J. Osselin in the Lille
suburbs). In greater. depth, this means that these deputies have had a certain~
autonomy in relation to the Paris CERES even before their. affiliation with it,
which enabled them to survive the breach in 1978-1979 better than was possible
elsewhere. This was certainly the case for the two elected officials mentioned,
since J. Osselin is a member of M. Wolf's group, and B. Vennin headed an important
group of former PSU [Unified Socialist garty~ members who joined the PS during the
Socialist Assises (1974). ~ ~
As to the CERES, it is harvesting the fruits of a decade of patient waiting and
effort. In the "missionary territory" in the east~and west, where the PS has
finally broken through, it is in many cases the CERES which has headed the federa-
tion for a long time. If ever a national movement were to oeeur, this faction
would profit from it. Now that this has happened, the CERES is electing officials
in ~Iarne, Haute-Marne, Moselle; Meurthe-et-Moselle, Haute-Saone and--most .
creditably--Haut-Rhin. The same observation could be made.�for Pari~s, long the
_ pride of the faction, where there has been a gain of from~one to~seven deputies.
If the triumphant CERES are~often party cadres in the east, it is on the contrary
- local and departmental elected officiais which carry it forward. in the west, in
particular in Loire-Atlantique and Ille-et-Vilaine. Elsewhere and above all to the
south of the Loire, it i's a matter of isolated successes (A: Lejeune in G~:eret), '
often due also to previously established municipal influence. Generally speaking,
the CERES.fits in much more comfortably in the "new" federations in the east and
the west. But it has left its mark more or less everywhere, and, by way of in-
teresting evidence of the spread of its influence, there are at least 18 deputies
in the other ca%egories, including F, who were members of the CERES in the past.
The Rocard faction is str.ong in the west, particularly in Bretagne, where it bene-
fits from a whole CDT and leftist Catholic tradition of which a certain PSU group
has long been the embodiment. In the east, on the other hand, where it should a
priori have advanced, it finds itself limited by the other factions, except in
Moselle and Meurthe-et-Moselle. Without a doubt this reflects the influence of the
likes of Y. Tondon and also the weight of a CDT rank and file, in many cases
characterized by anticommunism. One can also find representation of the Rocard
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Faction all along the easter.n frontier, ranging from Doubs to the Hautcs-Alpes.
l~ere again, it is a question of areas with a Catholic tradition in which the left
- wing has had difficulty progressing. In the Paris area, there are strong sectors
in the west and south suburbs, that is to say in the relatively prosperous quar-
ters: is it that the Rocard line is mainly attractive to "white c~llar groupe?"
Thus far, then, there is nothing very surprising where the modernist trend is con-
~:erned, but what is more surprising is the rather good representation, all in all,
Eor the Rocard faction in the southwest, in the old SFIO federations such as
Ariege, Tarn, Lot-et-Garonne. Should we interpret this as a sign of a temporary
rally in connection with Metz or the dawning of a more profound~renewal'? Time
alone will tell.
The category B deputies are recruited above all in Nord-Pas-de-Calais. They
account f.or 15 out of 42, with four others in the neighboring departments. What
we are seeing here is the whole legacy of a traditional municipal socialism. This
is equally true for the area south of the Loire, where the deputies in category
B, above all from Limousin, Puy-de-Dome and the coastal departments. On the other
hand, there are hardly any in the east or the west (except for Nantes). There is
a whole socialist sensitivity which doubtless cannot be transferred to the new
terrain. One cannot fail to stress the close links between the B category deputies
and the mayors of the large cities, particularly since it is known that the motive
forces of the B faction on the national level are none other than such deputies
- serving as maycrs as A. Chenard, J.-M. Boucheron, M. Sainte-Marie, etc. (and,.
naturally, P. Muuroy). ,
Category A is found more or less everywhere, which gives it a certain strength
which goes beyond the simple presidential phenomenon, or even the unconditional
attitude where the former first secretary is concerned. If in Nord-Pas-de-Calais,
it sometime harvests the fruits of a pro-Mo11et Yine which P. Mauroy has not en-
dorsed, it also shows real strength in Bretagne, so pro-Rocard by inclination.
While it has been able to arouse party patriotism well rooted in the old leftist
ter.ritories in the southwest, and its secularism is further echoed in the anti-
clerical departments in the center (for example Allier, Saone-et-Loire), it is
this faction too which predominates in the new departments won by the PS, often
in brilliant fashion, in the heart of France, and above all along the Loire.
Indre, Indre-et-Loire and Cher bear witness to this. A geographic treaty arranged
with the CERES in Paris provides the Mitterrand supporters with three more'seats
- in the northern part of the capital, since the CERES controls principally the sec-
tors in ~he east. Here we see the reward for a number of years of patient but
dedicated struggle to win the federation back for the CERES--a battle waged, as
we know, by L. Jospin and B. Delanoe. In the suburbs, the Mitterrand faction is
- strong in the north and the east. The only corner of France where they are rela-
tively weak is the east, and here again one must not forget either the two depu-
ties elected from Meuse or the brilliant victory of J. Oehler in Strasbourg. Even
' in the alpine departments, a priori so unpromising, category A is very strong in
Isere. Tl~e members of faction A will henceforth play a role in 68 of the 88 metro-
poliran departments in which ~here is PS repr~sentation, which gives them a sub-
stanti.al base for the Luture.
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The Classic Criteria--Occupation, Age and Sex
Within the factions, it seems difficult to establish differences very clearly
within the large mass of those elected who come from the wage earning petit bour~
geoisie, with that professor~o preponderance which has so amazed the analysts.
However, l.et us stress the fact that in category A, the liberal professions
account for 15 percent, and in the CERES they account for more than '3 percent.
If we take note of the weight of a certain "radical" tradition in the former, this
rather high percentage is nonetheless somewhat surprising in the renewal trend.
_ In categories B and C, as we can see, the liberal professions are substantially
less well-represented. Where teachers are concerned, on the other hand, we see
uniierr.epresentation in the CERES in relati~n to the average for the group, offset
by an excess of engineers and higher management cadres (since these two categorie's
account for 39 percent of the CERES tntal). The base for the CERES group seems to
be an alliance between technicians with practical knowledge and those with manage-
ment expertise. There is a high percentage of teachers in the Rocard faction, on
the other hand, with slightly fewer "Higher Technical Cadres" (only 22' percent).
In category B, the seven percent figure for teachers bears witness to the con-
- tinuity of a long republican tradition. But we should probably not give too much
. .importance to these internal shadings ~in the group, for these are people all of
whoin have a certain cultural level. We can see that the two workers are dis-
_ tributed between categories A and C.
The Socialist Deputies � �
_ ~ In terms of the age of the deputies, a glance at those newly electedl~ shows hard- '
ly any significant differences (see Table 4), the great renewal being from every
irdication the achievement of those between 35 and 49 years of'age. This is par-
. ticularly true of the Rocard and Mitterrand factions, but category B seems to have
more deputies in the age bracket above 50, which is quite consistent with the
rather distinguished profile of the pro-Mauroy deputy mentioned above. If it is
often suggested that the supporters of Rocard and the CERES are mainly younger
than the supporters~of other factions, this is only partially accurate, at least
for the deputies, because categories A and E have a good proportion of inen of a
certain age. This phenomenon suggests that experience and local reputation may be
assets as useful as ideological vigor or the level of militancy. Yet once again,
the members of the Mitterrand faction seem rather typical of the averag,e.
As to feminine representation, it must be said ~~iat equality remains in the
iuture. If onE deputy out of 14 is now a woman, we can see that the factions
differ rather substantially. If category A is again very typical, we note that �
there is only one woman in B and *.wo in C(one of whom won an improbable victory
in a suburb where the inf~luence of the PS remains very limited). A disparity be-
tween word and deed, one might say. On the other hand, tlie CERES can hold its head
realtively high, sirice one out of every six of its deputies is a woman. It is true
that within the alternate mechanism it was possible to increase feminine represen-
tation, but this was done in a somewhat clandestine fashion, behind the backs of
the members (in the voters) "who would nat understand...." It is always'~the male
star, a likely candidate to head a ministry, who has been put forward. Thus'one
can speak of an advance, but only a very small one, it seems to us.
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,
What can we conclude on completing this brief overview? Wit'~.~.n category B, a cer-
tain SFIO trend still survives and is even spreading. Its profile of distinction
should not be underestimated. The two renewal factions, modern~ist and Marxist, the
Ro~ard and CERES groups, have indeed carried the party to new terrain, but on the
level of political personnel there is less of a difference from the other factiohs
than one would expect. The CERES for its part has a predelection for an orienta-
tion within the party rather than in public life. As to the supporters of
F. Mitterrand, they remain--in terms of age as well as profession and geographic
distribution--rather typical of the average for the socialist group. Could they
then constitute a kind of lowest common denominator--those who, as has been said,
detest Rocard and fear the CERES? Or would they be very simply typical of the mass
of inembers and sympathizers, dedicated to bringing about pragmatic chang~ in an
atmosphere of calm and efficiency? A reexamination in five years, or after the
next elections--and the party congress which will be held in the meantime--will
perhaps give us the answer.
FOOTNOTES ~
l. Thi's figure included 266 deputy officials installed by the PS (254 in metro-
politan France, 1 in Reunion and 1 in Guadeloupe). We have seen fit to add to
these the two "dissidents" J. Giovanelli (Morbihan 6, Rocard faction) and '
R. Patriat (Cote-d'Or 3, Mitterrand faction), as well as Gisele Halimi (Isere
4). All three are in our opinion a part of the rising socialist tide, despite
some difficulties at present between their federation and the natural leader-
ship of the PS. On the other hand, we have excluded 6 various leftists, too
heterogeneous to be included in the framework of the analysis set forth here
(these are Messrs Castor, Cesaire, Dabezies, Hory, Pen and Pidjot).
2. See for example Gilles Fabre=Rosane and Alain Guede, "The Bourbon Palace
Swings Toward the Center," LE MATIN, 6 July, 1981, or the sociological
analysis by Roland Cayrol in LE MONDE, "The June 1981 Legislative Elections,"
p 84.
3. For an excellent overview of the gains of the PS, see LE MONDE, op.sit,
PP 78-85.
4. We use this word rather than the better known but also more recent "trends."
This latter term, less forceful, in our opinion ignores the elements of compe-
tition in many cases fierce, characteristic of these groups within the party,
_ and which gives it much of its strength.
5. Curiously, the percentage of category A deputies in the group is slightly
lower than that for the last legislature. The absolute number (up 74) is the
important figure.
6. Prior to 14 June 1981, the CERES had only seven deputies. It had 14 percent
of the seats at the Metz Congress, but only a quarter of those at Nantes.
7. The "dynasti.c" heritage situation (M. Masse took over his father's seat in
~ Marseilles) appears unique in 1981, and doubtless has to do with the special
conditions which make the socialist sector in Bouches-du-Rhone so rich.
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' rutc urrt~teu. u~~ uivLx
8. Our information is doubtless inadequate, because the majority of the elected
officials must be municipal council members, at least. What is important here
is that they have not chosen to make much of this responsibility (to the point
that LE MONDE would mention it in its descriptions of the candidates, for
example).
_ 9. The other factions are represented in the departments as follows: B in 24,
C in 32, E in 26 and F in 9.
10. We do not have sufficiently accurate data on the ages of the outgoing
deputies to analyze the whole group, but we do not think this is likely to
alter the value of this analysis much.
11. Prior to 14 June, the socialist group had two women (out of 106).
COPYRIGHT: Presses Universitaires de France, 1982
5157
CSO: 3100/346
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POLTTICAL ITALY
DC'S PICCOLI ON PARTY CLASHES OVER EL SALVADOR
PM220943 Turin LA STA1~A in Italian 16 Feb 82 pp l, 2
[Intei~view with DC Secretary Flaminio Piccoli in Rome by Luca Giurato: "Piccoli:
They Are Asking for a Stocktaking? Right, It Must Be Done Immediately and Com-
prehensively"--date not given]
[Excerpt] Rome--[Question] You have always said that the stocktaking [of the
government's record] should be carried out after the DC Congress in May. You
now seem prepared for a rapid confrontation. Why? ~
[Answer] For the sake of truth, it should be said~that everybody, even the
prime minister, has been perplexed about the timing of the stocktaking. We are
being accused of being responsible for the ma3ority's difficulties, even in
foreign policy, because we are not prepared to take stock. That suggestion is
becoming a burden. Therefore let us say that we are not avoiding any discuesien.
It worries us that a ma~ority cou~,d collapse on a foreign policy issue, with the
risk of undermining an agreement [between government parties] which still strikes
us as absolutely necessary. It is better to clarify the situation immediately
rather than allowing it to deteriorate.
[Question] The government has been defeated in Parliament on articlea of ma~or
legislation. The socialists have dissociated themselves from foreign policy
lines. Can Spadolini still count on the ~ive-party ma~ority or not?
[AnswerJ I think so. He can certainly count on our desire to continue and to
improve collaboratian. We are aware of the difficulties but we think that this
government has not completed its task. We are certain that a break would now be
a defeat as regards steering the count~y out of the crisis, which we all want,
and also a defeat in the sphere of the struggle against terrorism, which now
requires unity of the democratic forces more than ever before. [answer ends]
As regards DC policy on El Salvador, Piccoli has some proposals which mark a
significant step forward on the problem which is now plaguing his party most:
"We agree with Spadolini on not sending government observers to the elections.~ ~
However, we propose to entrust the job of monitoring the elections in E1 Salvador
to the United Nat3ons. The United Nations has significant impartiality and the
strength to appoint a delegation which can express a clear and incontrovertible
' opinion. If that delegation decides that the elections are not honest then we
wi11 a11 have to accept its reply. ~ad first of all we will have to accept it."
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[Question] Many people are puzzled by the DC stance on E1 Salvador.
[Answer] In E1 Salvador an experiment is taking place under the guidance of
Duarte, a man who was persecuted by the right in 1972. He is a democrat who,
to b~ceak the spiral of the reactionary rightwing military, on the advice of
poli.tical experts, 3oined for"ces with the democratic part of the army. We are
_ on the eve of elections, which, with the reform, constitute Duarte's pledge.
- We--Piccoli explained--conde~ all atrocities, whichever side they are committed
by, particularly those committed by the army. However, we warn, and we realize
this from our memory of history, that if this experiment fails (and at the
present time there is clearly a concerted desire on the part of the co~unist
parties and som~ socialist parties to define the elections as a"farce") and if
these elections in E1 Salvador fail there will eventually be an intervention by
' an army which has entirely returned to the old colonialist, hegemonist and vio-
lent methods. We must remember that the United States is not prepared to
tolerate another Cuba. Will it refuse to do so whatever the cost? We hope not,
that would be regrettable, but U.S. policy has major and serious crude aspects.
[Question] Is there a change by the DC on this sub~ect too?
[Answer] We 3ust want to stress that anybody who hinders a final democratic
attempt in a tense country, perhaps the tensest of all, opens up a future full
of risks and dangers. We agree not to send a delegation of observers from our
government. We are, however, now sending a party delegation which will infor~
us of how things are going. ~
[QuestionJ The DC is isolated in that assessment. Does it realize that?
[Answer] Of course I realize it. Arousing popular feelings about things hap-
pening thousands of kilometers away from here is the easiest thing in the world.
People have always painted one side all black and the oth~r all white. We well
remember the case of Vietnam, but we also remember that the invasion of Kampuchea
has been forgotten or virtually ignored. Therefore I feel the strain of all
this, even if I am convinced that the DC will not remain isolated. The Social
Democrats have a different position--many aspects of the statement given by
Spadolini on this sub~ect were accurate, and even the liberals are very careful.
- In foreign policy the parties identify with their own respective positions and
~ the way in which you react to that policy requires truth and consistency.
[Question] Do you fear a U.S. military intervention in E1 Salvador?
[AnswerJ I fear it if the hope that there is some possibility of a form of
democracy in that country is destroyed. I fear it and I condemn it in advance.
But I fear it. You have to be cagable of poliCical realism. If that interven-
tion comes we will conde~ it. We must also recognize that things have happened
partly because an opportunity has been wasted to restore to a people like the
Salvadoran people their capacity to express themselves in a free election. The
danger lies precisely in this: To define these elections as a"farce" in
advance strikes me as really arbitrary.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 Editrice LA STAI~II',~ S.p.A.
- CSO: 3104/127
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POLITICAL SPAIN
MANEUVERINGS FOR POSSIBLE.UCD-AP COALITZON DESCRIBED .
Madird CA1~I0 16 in Spanish 8 Feb 82 pp 26-30
[Article by Antxon Sarasqueta: "UCD, Going After Fraga"] .
[Text] The w3nter sun of the Costa del Sol and the calm horizon of the
Mediterranean were the setting for the Center's awakening against its politi-
cal adversaries. The nightmare of the defections was behind them; the most
, important of which, after Francisco Fernandez Ordonez going over to the social~ .
democrats, was the departure of Miguel Herrero, a"wrerker" who had worked
within the UCD [Democratic Center Union] on behalf of Fraga. "Now Fraga must
be confronted with his incon~istencies," the secretary general of the UCD,
Inigo Cavero, declared to CAMBIO 16, while his "noisy" counterpart in the AP
[Popular Alliance] was trying to minimize the matter, calling it "water over
the dam," and offering "impartial support" to President Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo.
They were turning their minds toward the subj ect of agreements in the new
session of parliament, the last one before the general elections, which will
focus on the new electoral law. At least three reports concerning this
pro~ect are on the respective desks of three ministers, according to informa-
tion obtained by this magazine.
"We will have to go to confrontation with Fraga." That was how the secretary
general of the UCD, Inigo Cavero, summ,ed up the state of mind of the centrist
leadership, which is convinced that the leader of Popular Alliance is under-
mining the stability of the party in power and of the government itself in
his far-reaching operations. That is not all: a certain colleague of
President Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo even told.this magazine, in a sharp tone and
with a determined attitude, that "as lot~g as.I'm around, there will be no
agreement with Fraga.." '
The fact is that Calvo Sotelo has cons~.dered the leader of~the most conserv-
ative ,fact3.on, of the Right., to be more an adversary than a possible ally. Or
a dangerous a11y, as Calvo Sotelo,himse~.f once pointed out in private, when
referring to Fraga's behavior in some ag~eement in parliament.
The reasons for this are complicated,, and convincing.
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An alliance with Fraga would kindle a tremendous controversy between the
Right and Left, destroying the Center, which today holds power s.nd which
manifests it in its highest representative: Leopoldo Calvo SotElo.
On the government level, the "big Right" would abort the whole process
_ of consolidating democracy, which is now.in the midst of developing its
basic standard, the Constitution (because the most progressive sector of
the UCD, represented by Adolfo Suarez, the social democrats and some
liberals would certzinly abagdon the ship.)
It is clear that the political and social stability which was retrieved
- after a critical situation at the time of the unsucc.essful coup of a year
ago, has been based on the autonomy agreements between the government and the
~ majority opposition party and the National Agreement on Employment (ANE)
between the administration, the managerial CEOE [Spanish Confederation of
Business OrganizationsJ and the socialist and commun3.st unions around the
table.
On the other hand, those who are interested in the elections appear to be
advising the current pre�sident of the government and of the UCD to stand up
to Fraga's sector firmly, which would allow them to regain lost ground and
- pick up votes. That strategy would help the president--when you think of
it--in getting hold of the ballots of that progressive center.
A distinguished government minister added, "Calvo Sotelo, besides having his
hands on the reins of power, is an undeniable liberal-conservative, who in
a close alliance with Fraga would gain hardly any new adherents, but instead
- would have many desertions from his following."
- Fraga's Contradictions ~
Perhaps it was all t~is that made Cav~ro declare to this magazine, after
- admitting that up until now the UCD had not tangled with Fraga because they
needed his votes--helping to create the myth wh3ch surrounds the Villalba
politician--: "Now Fraga musz be confronted with his contradictions."
_ A Fraga who, after being crush.ed by outside campaigns, his own errors, and
the ballot boxes came back as the great leader of the conservative Right,
while at the same time his greatest political foe, the then president Adolfo
Suarez, was beginning his decline.
The duke of today was then a president who was beginning to become estranged
from powerful forces (Church, Army, capital), and was being hounded by the
most conservative sectors of his party and the socialists; while Fraga was
beginning to receive strong support from some sectors of the economy, .;,ainly
from business.
The Fraga "fever" reached its peak with his spectacular triumph in the
Galicia regional ~lections.
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It was Fraga himself who, days before that campaign began, made his first
warning to Calvo Sotelo in an interview with CAMBIO 16 at his Perbes seaside
estate, implying suspici4n that the head of the government would make a far- .
reaching agreement with the socialists. "Calvo Sotela has more r�esources
than anyone to contribute to the natural ma~ority (UCD-AP), and we will not
pardon him if he doens't do it," said Fraga to representatives of this maga--
zine.
Alliance leader added: "As soon as that great moderate mavemenC is formed--
the Democratic Right, or whatever we may want to call it--.*_hose problems
(of instability) wi11 decrease. Everyone understands that."
These statements aretaking on importan�e today. In anallzing the "why"
of these Center-Alliance tensions and the defaction of the centrist deputies
to the parliamentary group headed by Fraga, the pres3dent of the AP is seeking
to secure his objectives by means of various coalition agreements with Calvo
Sotelo.
"The Wrecker"
"We tiave to know which way we're going," Fraga's voice almost thundered,
"it must not Ue like what happened in that famous incident in the history o�
~ Spain where Admiral Aznar said on that election night of 13 April that he was
' goint to go and read the "Rocambole," '1et it turn out as ~od wills'...look:
it's not going to be that way."
Days later, in his Corunna country house with the "Fraga Wines" warehouse and
' c;ffice that once belonged to the film producer Samuel Bronson, he was visited
by Miguel Herrero de '`inon, still spokesman of the centrist parliamentary
group, the moving spi_it and one of the leaders of the "Moderate Platform,"
whose purpose was to defeat the Suarez apparatus of the UCD and Francisco
Fernandez Ordonez' social democrats.
Actually, the close palitical ties of Miguel Herrero and Fraga had begun some
time ago. They both had already studied the political situation and the
prospects for the future during a parliamentary visit to Japan in the spring
of 1981.
In spite of these contacts, and his statement at the end of May 1981 at a
lunch with a group of journalists, that he favored a legislative agreement
with the Democratic Coalition--hlnting moreover that a coalition with the
Fraga group would be easier than one with the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers
Party]--Miguel Herrero, after setting up the "Moderate Platform," asserted on
29 July ~ust before the summer recess that that operation had nothing to do
with Fraga. However, the whole corrse of events during the crisis of changing
the presidency of the UCD and the working out of the change of government
had a very negative effect on Aerrero de Minon's confidence in his party
and its future.
"Miguel does not believe in the UCD, and was wrecking the party," concludes
a colleague of the president of the Cortes, Landelino Lavilla, who is in close
touch with the "rebel" centrist within the christian democratic tamily.
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Miguel Herrero oelieves that the new centrist leadership, headed by Calvo
Sotelo, is "sacrificing" him as president of the parliamentary group, and
in exchange is offering him the Ministry of Culture. Sources from the
"Moderate Platform" who have worked together closely with Miguel Herrero
assured this magazine that Calvo Sotelo did not persuade him at the time th2y
offered him the post, because they did not give him guarantees of autonomy
or clear objectives. Moreover, the government was:not abont to come to an
agreement on a parliamentary majority with Fraga; rather, the social democr.ats
who were loyal to the president would strengthen th~ir positions in spite of
the departure of Ordonez. ~
The dissatisfaction of Miguel Herrero and the other UCD parliamentarians
began to blossom last December. Miguel Herrero mrade.the de^_ision to go~over
to the Fraga group. And this idea was communieated---~~spite his denials--to
another of the "moderate" leaders, the christian democrat Oscar Alzaga.
Miguel Herrero has adopted an overly belligerent position favoring a policy of
understanding with Fraga and a conservative slant, and he fears he will be
- dumped by the centrist leadership in view of the coming general elections.
Sources clos~ to Inigo Cavero assured this m~gaaine that Miguel Herrero had,
in a last-ditch aCtempt, asked the secretary general of the UCD and President
Calvo Sotelo for sufficient guarantee of appearing in a favorable spot on
the electoral slate, which would assure him a seate
Alzaga Stopped It ~
That account had been passed on to the members o� the centrist executive
secretariat, with the addition that the leadership was prepared to offer him
- certain guarantees in writ3ng of keeping the seat. This letter, it appears,
did not satisfy Miguel Herrero as a definitive guarantee.
Miguel Herrero's negotiations with the AP were already too far advanced by
then. More ~delegates wEre going to follow him in defecting to the Democratic
Coalition group, as Jorge Ve~tringe himself, the secretary general of the AP
explained. The list included Jose Manuel Ote~o Hovas, ,~ose Luis Meilan,
and others�with christ~ian democratic leanings. Some of them, like those
mentioned, emphatically denied that they had anything to do with the operation.
In the end there were only three defections: Miguel Herrero, Francisco Soler
and Ricardo de la Cierva. The one who first gave impetus to the "critical"
sector, and later to the "Moderate Platform" which neutralized the main part
of the maneuver, according to very reliable sources, was none other than his
old companion in the operation.
'"It was Oscar Alzaga who pl.ayed a decisive role in controlling the blood-
letting," said a high official in the Moncloa who had followed the course of
events step by step~. ,
Vestringe con~irmed this when CAMBTO 16 agked him why the changes that had
been announced by him had not taken place: Because it appears that pressure
has been put on those people, and Chey have,reconsidered their posit;on."
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Fraga's moderate statements on his return from his trip through Latin
America, and the abrupt halt in the campaign of statements by his secretary
general were steps which involved a conciliatory turn toward Calvo Sotelo.
Althcu~h Vestringe admits in his statements to this magazine that Fraga's
ho~+s:~ that he had last summer regarding Calvo Sotelo have not been fulfilled,
he affirms that "there is sti11 probably time to turn the situation around."
Af ter calling the defection of deputies "water over the dam," Vestringe
stated that as the Andalusia election begins, CD [Democratic Coalition]
will continue to offer its "impartial ass;stance" to Calvo Sotelo in solving
- problems of national interest. In parliamentary terms they explain it this
way: "David i5n't playing Da
rid anymore, but is being a friend of Goliath,"
recalling that as far as numbers go, there are 13 CD deputies as opposed to
the approximately 150 in the UCD.
Thus the new 1982 session of the Cortes is beginning with a relationship
between tr.s forces "supportive of" the Calvo Sotelo government, despite the
political and tactical differences within the groups of the party in power
and of the opposition themselves.
Coalition deputies Jose Maria de Areil~a and Antonio de Senillosa had been
on the point of going over to the UCD. The temptation to do so ~~~as great at
first, because of strong pressures from the centrists, but the element of
"responsibility" won out over other interests, and both deputies refus~ed to
make a spectacle of them~elves in parliamentary switchovers which would have
been unedifying to the democratic faithful. One thing is clear: there is
guaranteed support for the Calvo Sotelo government.
This does not come as a surprise, beeause, as Areilza himself admitted to
this magazine, he--together with Senillosa and also Pio Cabanillas--was in
on the operation of the center at its beginning, and ever since Ca1vo Sotelo
assumed power he has been closer to the chief executive than to "raga. His
formal incorporation into the election operation which Calvo SoL.:lo will head
is only a question of time and of inethod. Cavero believes that a11 the prob-
lems resulting from the changes in the parliamentary group are caused "by
something which is very difficult to put before the public": the problem of
appearing on the ballot with any chance of being elected in the coming elec-
tions. To reaffirm his theory, the secretary general wondered: "If this is
not the case, why are the conflicts mostly arising in the parliamentary
grou~, and not in the infrastructure of the party or in the government? Be
that as it may, in view of the many upsetting events during the final stretch
of the legislature which will usher in the g~neral elections, it is certain
that refo.rm of the electoral law has become one of the key issues which both
the government and the opposition unquestionably must face.
The PSOE and the AP are calling for 3t, considering it a top priority consti-
tutional necessity. ~The government and the UCD say yes, but...there is not
enough time. And what time does remain is unfavorable, because it is so
near the elections. On this Ca1vo Sotelo and Inigo C;ivero agree.
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Cavero insists that there has been some talk on the highest level with the
socialists about setting up--as a provisional formula-=a mandatory ruling
obliging the new government which emergss from the elections to introduce a
law of this type for approval within a period of 6 months after appointment
of the new executive.
The centrists, 13.ke the rest of the majority parites, including the leader
of Popular Alliance, Manuel Fraga, are in favor of eliminating the present
system of closed slates, replacing it with another using open slates, and
~ even direct election by electoral district, so as to achieve a more direct
deputy-voter relationship.
However, tt?ere is some initial fear being felt--especially by the centrist
forces, which also hides their own f ears--that the Spanish voters would be
confused by a more open election system, and that it is better to wait a
longer time before proceeding on Chis course. In the middle of this week
sources from the socialist executive board denied to this magazine that th~re
was any agreement with the government to determine the date for and the
general provisions of the new electoral law, although they asserted that
contacts and negotiations on this sub3ect were impending and inevitable.
Calvo Sotelo admitted in Torremolinos that his government already had a plan
concerning a new electoral law, and CA1~I0 16 later confirmed that at least
three ministers have drawn up.their respective reports on the 1aw: political
Vice President Rodolfo Martin Villa, Minister of the Interior Juan Jose Roson,
- and Minister of Justice Pio Cabanillas.
With important debates in parliament approaching, with such decisive votes
coming up as those on the new regulations for the Cortes, the LOAPA [Organic
Law for Harmonization of the Autonomies Process] LAU [Law for University
Autonomy] et cetera, and at the very time when the trials of the coupists of
23 February are going on, political matters are getting into complicated
entanglements which are very complex and difficult to predict. Although
at this late stage the government has its majority guaranteed for reasons of
- stability, and is ruling out prospective general elections.
COPYRIGHT: 1982, Informacion y Revistas, S.A.
8131
_ CSO: 3110/80
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- POLITICAL SPAIN
PSOE BIDES ITS TIME IN MIDST OF UCD DEFECTIONS
Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 1 Feb 82 p 24 '
[Article by Antxon Sarasqueta: "Election Maneuvers"]
[Text] With the uproar of the Andalusia and Catalonia regional congresses,
the ruling party is again having to contend with t~e "defection syndrome".
This attrition is being engineered from the.ranks of Manuel Fraga's Alliance,
and is furthered by the wide-open race for seats which the insecure deputies
of the UCD [Democratic Center Union] have thrown themselves into.
The example of the social democrats, who followed former Minister Francisco
Fernand~z Ordonez in deuarting from the UCD, was recurring now ~n the Right,
with the announcement of a string of defections by the most staunch conserv-
atives, beginning wlth Herrero dQ Minon.
~ And, as if to prove that anything is still possible in the UCD, the centrist
deputy from Almeria, Francisco Soler Valero, who was aligned with Fernandez
Ordonez a.nd the social democrats thraughout almost the whole legislative
session, was also negotiating his going over to the Democratic Coalition, on
the.condition that they guarant~e him the seat and autonomy like that enjoyed
by Antonio de Senillosa and Jase Maria de Areilza.
In the context of this surrealist comedy, where what is really at stake
behind the scenes is the guarantee of a seat in the next legislature, it was
still surprising that men like Jose Luis Meilan and Jose Manuel Otero Novas,
_ who had stayed in the UCD as long as they held powerful positions (the presi-
dency of a bank or the head of a ministry)--even if it was at the side of
tY?e Adolfo Suarez they reviled--shauld flee now that Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo
occupies the Moncloa, just as Ricardo de la Cierva did previously.
These regrettable moves are only ~o be expected as the result of a party
_ bei:,g created froin power, and for it, and where the "sense of party" is
- unknown.
These destabilizing d�:'ections make us think about the possibility of future
general elections, which the Calvo Sotelo govermm~et is opposed to, as is the
ma3n opposition party, which FelipP Gonzalez,,secretary general of the PSOE
[Spanish Socialist Workers Party], himself confirmed. The one who would
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benefit most from any future ele-tions produced by instability would be the
_ Alliance man, Manuel Fraga. Both Felipe Gonzalez and Fraga are involved in
weakening the Calvo Sotelo government in the context of the defections from
- the Center to the Left and Right; but the socialists see greater advantages
in holding elections in a climate of stability, and there is not enough tim~
to achieve this after the trials of the 23 February coupists. The reaffirma-
tion of the autonomy agreements between the government and PSOE, which t~ok
place in the Moncloa at the highest level, tend toward achieving that stab3l-
ity until the end of the legislature. .
- Difficult Consensus
However, the fact that 1982 will be a year in which the parties and the
government come face to face in a key election makes it unlikely that a line
' of general consensus will recur in the parliamentary session that begins in
February. . ~
The PSOE also needs time to reinforce its election front with a band of
"independents," who come from the Center and from the renewers who are desert-
ing the PCD. At the ~ame time they are publicly distancing themselves from
- Santiago Carrillo's communists, despite the municipal agreements which
formalized the unity of the Left on a national leeel. These initial breaking
of these agreements in a plac~ of such national importance as tt~e capital of
Spain and province, although in theory it came about for t~chnical reasons,
has helped to confirm the flight of the Carrillo followers.
Caught in the n~iddle of the "sandwich" of Socialists and tiLliance members, ~
the government and the UCD were trying to establish their strategy regarding,
first, the Andalusian elections slated for 23 May, and more i..mpoxtantly,
the general elections.
- Thus it was that Calvo Sotelo, after lashing out at the irresponsible deserters,
was singing the praises of moderation and liberalism, and announcing his '
candidacy for leading the Center in the coming general elections.
" In the UCD's "renewal from within" operation, the pr~sident of the Congress of
Deputies, deputy from Jaen and leader with presidential aspirations, Landelino
Lavilla, was under strong pressure this week to decide to try for the regional
presidency of the AndaZusia UCD before the name of Soledad Becerril came up.
"There come times in politics when a leader has to get down into the arena
and be knocked over, and this is the role that Landelino has to play now
in Andalusia," a minister who is politically close to the president of the
Cortes told CAI~IO 16.
It was Marcelino Oreja who first played that role; and the next step,
motivated by the "critics," was to put up Lavilla and the minister of educa--
tion, Federico Mayor Zaragoza, for the presidency of the Catalonia centrists.
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"The spirit of defeatism which has spread.throughout the UCD must be overcome,"
a close colleague of Calvo Sotelo told this magazine. He cited as an example
the case of Marcelino Oreja, who heads an election platform in the Basque
Country, with support that goes beyond the strict orbit of the UCD. Calvo
Sotelo himself, and the new leaders of the UCD, intend to apply this alterna~
tive to the rest of Spain. In view of the low level of acceptance which UCD
is encountering in society--according to polls which are being carried out,
and which in the case of Andalusia have caused "alarm" on the highest levels
of the party and the financial sectors which support it--the centrist leaders
are looking for solutions which will allow grea.ter diffusion and differentia-
tion of that political force.
COPYRIGHT: 1982, Informacion y Revistas, S.A.
~ 8131
CSO: 3110/80
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MILITARY. ~ l?RANCE
DF~'ENSE BUDGET FOR 1982 STRESSES II~LOYMENT, EQUIPNmVT ~ ~
Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HiJI in French Jan-Feb.82 pp ~-9
[Article: "The Defense Budget for 1982"]
[Text] The 1982 budget for defense and the armed forces~-presented
to the National Assembly on 14 November 1981 and to the Senate on
~ 4 December 1981--totals Fr 122.855 billion, up 17.63 percent over
the 1981 budget.
� A Growing 33udget . ~ ~
The 1982 defense budget ~otals Fr 122.855 billion, not counting pensions, which be-
for 1977 were put into the common-charges budget. This is a 17.63-percent increase
over the 1981 budget, which was Fr 104.443 billion.
Since the programming law of 19 June 1976, relative to military expenditures and
armed-forces equipment for the years 1977 to 1182, could not be totally implemented
during its term, the government has decided to give itself an addi:tiQaai year for
fulfilling the objectives set. This budget will not be separated from the one for
1983. The dates of these two fiscal years will align with those of the interim ~
plan. They will be followed by a military planning law extending over the 5 years
from 1984 to 1988.
In 1982~, the defense budget will represent 3.895 percent of .the gross domestic pro-
duct minus services~(PIBM).
Percentage of PIBM Devoted to Defense
3.39 3.55 3.63 3.62 3.67 3.85 3.895
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1951 1982 .
Priority to Expenditures Having an Impact on Employment
This budget favors those expenditures that have an immediate impa~ct on employment,
with the equipment expenditures at the top of the list. They are going up faster
_ than the operating expenditures, so as to make it possible to:
--maintain the priority assigned to the nuclear forces;
--continue to equip the armed forces with modern materiel;
--bolster the research effort.
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The equipment expenditures represent Fr 56.302 billion, or 45.8 percent of the bud-
get, which corresponds to an 18.16-percent increase in payment credits over 1981.
The program authorizat'ions increase only 12.5 percent, with the major programs pro-
_ vided for by the programming law coming to a conclusion.
Operating Expenditures (Tit2e III)
The Title III operating expenditures cnme to Fr 66.553 billion, or 54.1 percent of
the defense budget.~ They are up 17.18 percent over 1981.
The pay and social-charges credits, which represent 66.48 percent of Title III and
36 percent of the defense budget, are up 16.66 percent.
In addition to the pay increases, they make it possible to finance certain measures
~n favor of the military and civilian personnel--in particular:
--increasing the enlisted man's pay to Fr 11.5 per day;
--scaling~of.enlisted men's pay in order to~encourage draftees to take on responsi-
. bilities;
--the awarding of a field-service bonus to draftees: set at Fr 6.5 per day;
--for draftees serving the in FFA [French Forces in the FRG], some advantages in-
tended to compensate for the effects o� service far from home: free travel on the
FRG railways, an allowance intended to alleviate the disadvantages connected with
variation of the deutsche mark;
--creation of 16,81 active-army jobs, in addition to the 1,000 jobs created by the
rectifying finance law of July 1981.
These 1,681 jobs break down as follows:
--900 jobs for active-army personnel, including 225 women for the Gendarmerie;
--408 jobs for the Navy, for preparing for the outfitting of the public-services
ships and the launching of the sixth missile-launching nuclear submarine in 1986;
--3 jc?bs for active-army physicians, in the industrial-medicine category, for the
establishments of the General Delegation for Armament;
--200 jobs for workers, for the Air Force, to enable it to free up the personnel
needed for reinforcing pr~tection of the air bases;
- --112 jobsfor nurse's aides and head nurses for the Medical Corps;
--10 social-assistant jobs for the Gendarmerie;
--48 jobs in miscellaneous services.
As regards the staffing, the budget provides for assignment of state-worker status
to 11,589 "temporary" or unaffiliated workers and integration of 496 ORI (indirect-
management workers) with the state-worker personnel.
Along with these creations of jobs, the budget also includes some measures for spe-
cific categories, such as the 5'0-percent upgrading of the patrol a�,lowance given to
the crews of the missile-launching nuclear submarines and the increase in the
amount of the qualification bonuses granted to qualified-specialist officers:
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The credits devoted to armed-forces activity, impeded by the price rises for petro-
leum products, will make it possible:
--for the Army, to do 100 days of field exercises away from quarters, in~luding~47
days with limited-potential (armored) materiel for the combat units and 30 days'
field exercises for the command and service units;
--for the Air Force, to reach total annual activity on the order of 420,000 hours;
. ,
--for the Navy, Co ensure tu all combat vessels activity close to 100 sea days and
15 haurs of flying time per month for each pilot of the Naval Air Force.
A variation of the dollar exchange rate and the price of crude oil--estimated at
Fr 5.5 and $43 per barrel, respectively--will more or less influence the quantities
of fuel allocated.
Finally, the appropriations of credits for operating purposes and the everyday
life of the armed forces are going up at a rate equivalent to that af the defense
- budget. They will make it possible to continue with the renovation of the bar-
racks, particularly those of the French Forces in the FRG.
The Equipment Expenditures (Title V)
They total Fr 56.302 in payment credits (up 17.72 percent over 1981) and Fr 72.298
billion in program authorizations ~up 12.5 percent). These credits will make it
- possible to: "
--maintain the priority assigned to the nuclear forces--30.04 percent of the Title V
payment credits are devoted to them, as well as 20.6 percent of the program author-
izations. They will make it possible to continue with development of the M-4 mis-
sile so that it will be operational in 1985 on board the sixth SNLE [missile-
launching nuclear submarine], the "Inflexible"; the equipping of the second Albion
Plateau launching unit with S-3 missiles; and continuation of the adaptation of the
medium-range air-to-ground missile (ASMP) to the Mirage IV;
- --bolster our research effort, to which defense will devote Fr 19.571 bill~on, in-
cluding 4 billion for basic research, which grows by 18.8 percent over 1981.
The principal research programs for the Army will involve the main combat vehicle
to succeed the AM~C-30, the antitank helicopter, and the engineers' armored vehicle.
The Air Force will concentrate its efforts on development of the Mirage 2000, the
armament for it, the laser-guided bombing systems, and the M-88 engine project.
As for the Navy, it will continue with development of the SNA's (nuclear~attack
submarines.], the antiaircraft and antisubmarine corvettes and their, weapons sys-
tems.
--continue the equipping of the armed forces with modern materiel.
The Army will receive credits that will enable it to ensure continuation of the
major ordering programs provided for by the programming law. Thus, 50 AMX-B2
tanks, 47 AMX-lOP's, 2,400 wheeled tactical vehicles, 270 VAB's [Forward-Area Ar-
mored Vehicles], 30 AU-F1 155-mm cannons (with high rate of fire), 6 tractor-drawn
155-mm cannons, 21 Roland antiaircraft batteries, 18 SA 341/43 helicopters, Hot
antitank firing stations, 120-mm mortars, and 43,000 Famas rifles will be ordered.
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In 1982 the Air Force will order 25 Mirage 2000's, which will be added to the 48
_ ordered previously; 30 Epsilon training planes; 10 light helicopters; and for pro- ~
tection of its bases, 56 20-mm antiaircraft batteries. At the same time, 28 con-
crete airplane shelters and 11 underground PC's [Command Posts] will be built with
'infrastructure credits.
For the Navy, the emphasis is on the credits devoted to the modern combat and pub-
lic-service ships. Nine ships will be ordered: two antisubmarine corvettes, one
nuclear attack submarine, two antxmine ships, two patrol boats, and two 300-ton
public-service ships.
The Gendarmerie, in conclusion, will be able to continue its program of replacement
of automotive and armored vehicles, development of its communications, purchase of
four light helicopters, and construction of housing for its personnel. Finally,
subsidies are provided for to aid the self-financing e�fort of the local collectiv-
iti~s building Gendarmerie barracks. ~
COPYRIGHT: 1982 Revue des forces armees francaises "Armees d'Aujourd'hui"
11267 ~
CSO: 3100/366
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MILITARY 1~Ri~NCE
GENERAL DESCRIBES AIR REGION'S.LOGISTICAL, DEFENSE FUNCTIONS
Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Jan-Feb 82 pp 30-33
[Interview with Lt Gen Jean Rajau, French Air Force, Commanding General, 3d A3r Region,
by editorial staff; date and place not speci�ied]
[Text] [Question] General, you are the commander of an air region (RA). Can you
briefly describe for us this territorial organization you head?
[Answer] Quite obviously I can knowingly discuss only the 3d RA, the sir region with
which I am very fam3liar.
First of all, its geographical aspect. The 3d RA covers 20 departments spread over
four administrative regions, Aquitaine, Southern Pyrenees, Poitou-Charentes, and
Limousin. Within .this.territory, the air force has 13 bases, including five ma~or
air basea (Bordeaux; Cazaux, M~ont-de-Marsan, Toulouse, and Cognac), two technical
training and school bases (Rochefort�and Saintes), four service and supply bases
(Limoges, Rocamadour, Merignac-Beause3our, and Toulouse-l~flers, an administrative
base), one communications base (Cenon), and one.support base (Bordeaux Faucher).
A total, therefore, of 13 bases plus some shared installations, air force information
offices, and the air force detachment supportin,g the Airbo~ne Troops School at Pau.
As for the region's personnel and their distribution throughout the various bases and
stations, a distinction should be made between those troops organic to the 3d RA and ~
the other air force troops belonging to such specialized ma~or commands as the Air
Defense Command (DA), the Strategic Air Force (FAS), or the Military Air Transport
Command (COTAM).
The 3d RA "is " southwest France, a southwest remote from the enemy which in the past
has traditionally come from the north or east. These historical reasons are what
prompted the concentration in the southwest of schools (mechanics and pilota),
depots, firing ranges, and test centers. The region does, of course, have some
operational units, but they are less numerous than in the northern and eastern
regions. These units consist mainly of Jaguar aircraft based at Merignac, ~trategic
bombers hased at Mont-de-Marsan, Cazaux, and Bordesux, plus transport aircraft at .
Toulouse.
Air force personnel stationed in the region total approximately 21,000 men, 9,000 of
whom are organic to the region. From a manpower standpoint, this places the air
region on a par with a ma~or command like, for example, the Air Defense Command. ~
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The regionts 9,000 men include about 500 officers, 3,000 noncommissioned officers,
a little more than 5,000 draftees, plus 500 civilians. I should poin~ out that there
Is a s'narply higher percentage of draftees in the air regions than in the major
cummands because the regional protection, security, and transportation tasks require
a great deal of manpower.
[Question] What is the air region's role?
[Answer) I think the simplest way of explaining the RA's role is to proceed by
subtracting from everything the air force must do to accomplish its mission. Broadly
speaking, the air force has to train its air crews, it has to have aircraft available
and aimed, it has to protect its bases, it has to feed, transport, clothe, house, pay,
and care for its personnel, it has to instruct them, supervise them, supply them with
necessary equipment, etc.
Briefly stated, a specialized ma~or command with troops stationed in the region strives
essentially to bring its units to the highest possible level of operational
� readiness. This entails the assignment of personnel with highly specialized skills,
mainly pilots, engineers, mechanics, and controllers. This entails supplying units
with equipment (aircraft, radars, airborne weapons, etc.) and providing adequately
for its effective maintenance. '
So what then is the region's role? Well it is everything else, in other words, an
exceptionally varied spectrum of tasks ranging from public relations to defense of
bases, and including communicat3ons, social welfare services, antiaircraft artillery,
transportation, food, pay, etc. ,
That is, in my opinion, the most convenient way of defining the region's primarq
mission. Yet the air region also has an important operational role in connection~with
missions that may properly be called national. By decentralization, the region has
been delegated certain responsibilities of specialized ma~or commands whose
~urisdiction covers the entire nationul territory. ~
[Question] Can you describe some of the fields in which th3s decentralization applies?
[Answer] The first field in which there has been such delegation is air defense.
The CAFDA (Air Command [component] of the Air Defense Forces) has, in fact, delegated
considerable authority to the air region commander. To exercise this authority, the
region commander has a general officer assigned to him as his deputy for operations.
It ~~ight seem that this officer's dual command authority greatly complicates his
task. In practice, however, such is not the case, because tha division of
responsibilities is accomplished very logically.
Given the speed of attacking aircraft and the operating range of fighter-interceptors,
it is evident that air defense can only be broadly national in scope. All information
on the air enemy is immediately relayed via data transmission facilities from ane
- region to another, but ma3or decisions on the overall defensive courses of action
are made by a single unified command.
At the same time, hawever, numerous measures are taken at regiona~. level. Specifically,
the air defense of bases is a decentralized responsibility as concerns the alerting
of units and the engagement control of Crotale [surface-to-airJ missiles, antiaircraft
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guns, and soon, very-short-range surface-to~.air missiles. The Commanding General,
Air Defense Com~and at Taverny is responsible for overall air defense operations and
does not handle local situations. Con~equently, while the division and interpenetration
of all these responsibilities may seem complicated, they can, in actual fact, function
flexibly and effectively.
Things work about the same way between regional ai~field air traffic control centers
and the large surveillance and control radars. Air traffic control invo~.ves
- particularly air restricted areas, such as controlled firing areas or airbome
training drop zones. These matters have a regional aspect that must take into account
a large number of local or national factors, such as the overlapping of airways,
population centers overflown, lo~-altitude flight paths, etc. Hence it has been left
to the air regions to settle these questions themselves or recommend solutions
thereto.
Of course, at the national level, the DIRCAM (Military Air Traffic Directorate)
approves, negotiates, and coordinates solutions with the civil authorities, test
centers, adjacent countries, etc.
The same proce.ss is followed in the very diffused field of communications. This is a
difficult entity to grasp and direct instantaneously at national level, and for this
purpose we have a major command, the CTAA (Air Force Com~unications Command).
As is the case for air defense, the region commander ie assigned a colonel who "wears
two hats," one as regional communications officer, the other as CTAA representative. ~
Communications personnel have difficult and complicated schedules. They are often
stationed in isolated locations and operate highly specialized equipment. A
well-devised and thoroughly understood decentralization enables action to be taken
efficiently and.rapidly, tt~e~reby ensuring r~~liable operation of a service of prime
importance to the air force.
In an altogether different connection, the region commander may be called upon to use
the troops stationed within his territory--whether they be his own organic personnel
~r those of the specialized major commands--in providing general assistance to public
authorities. He does this by order of hi.s higher headquarters or with their approval.
In the event of a major disaster, it is oi~vious that for the public good we will
assign personnel and equipment from certa:Ln units: schools, tests centers, etc. to
relief work. ~
[Question] Isn't there also some delegation of authority ~ithin the air region itself?
[Answer] Certainly, and in this respect I must mention the air base commanders.
They are the fabric, the web, the framework of the air force, the structure on which
everything rests. I have 13 base commanders under my cammand, 12 colonels and one
general. They are my most valuable subordinates on which everything hinges. They
receive orders from both me and the specialized ma3or commands having units stationed
on their bases. The air force's organizational structure g3.ves them considerable
authority. I ask them to keep me informed about everything that happens in their
area and field of activity, and to report any measures they take or request measures
to be taken by me. The air force has assigned its most brillant officers to these
command positions. If I had to venture a comparison, I would say it has placed them
, in the position of "the captain of a ship at sea." In my vtew, this is an excellent.
thing. It constitutes that decentralization desired by the a~r force.
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[Quegtion] What is the region's mission in matters of Territorial Operational ~
Defense (DOT)?
[Answer] In DOT matters, the air region participates in the overall defensive action
ealc~ri by the armed forces. First of all, by defending the air bases, particularly
air force key points, and then other points whoae protection a plan has assigned as
an air region responsibility. Naturally, the air region maintains close liaison with
army units participating in the DOT mission. It also participates.in frequent 1~OT,
regional exercises.
[Question] Can you tell us about the decentralication measures taken in a crisis
situation?
[Answer] That's an important point. . In fact, regulations provide that the region
commander is delegated all powers of the central auth~rity over the territory he
commands whenever communications with that authority.are interrupted. This delegation
does not include employment of nuclear forces. It is a very broad delegation of
powers, however, and the air region commander, in close cooperation with army and
naval co~anders of the same area, will form an integrated force capable o+~ continuing
combat operat ions under the authority of the defense area commander, in spite of the
outage of communications with the central suthorities.
[Question] Will you please discuss general military discipline? ~
[Answer] The air region is charged with enforc3ng the rules of military discipline
with regard to all personnel stationed within its territory.. It handles sanctions,
that is to say penalties as we11 as rewards, cou~endations, and decorations.
The region has its own air police--nearly 200 men in the 3d RA--organized into air
base det.achments. Commanded by a field grade officer of the National Gendarmerie,
the air police are responsible for air base security, the prevention of violations or
the apprehension of violators which, fortunately, are very few in number. In this
- respect, we realize that, compared with the army which does not have its own police ,
force, we are lucky indeed to have an sir police organization which renders us such
yeoman service.
The region also has a defense protection and security section which is active not only
- in the region's own units but also participates in providing security for defense
industries.
[Question] And what about the rest, general? .
[Answer] There is a great deal more. The region furnishes s'~ort--hau1 transportation
service for the air bases, and long-haul transportation by rail, truck, occasionally ~
by boat, of materiel for the depots or personnel and equipment transiting aur region.
The region also operates air force firing or gunnery ranges with all their attendant
safety problems.
It also manages the air force's real estate. This is "big business" when you consider
the surface areas and number of buildings involved. An air base frequentlq covers
300 to 400 hectares and has many buildings and other structures. The region buys and
sells real estate according to detailed procedures and with the appro~;al c~f Air
Force Headquarters. Lastly, it builds facilities required by the air forces.
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All medical services are a regional responsibility. They are handled by the region's
Director of Medical Services. Nwnerous physicians, approximately five or six p~r
base, dentists, veterinarians, and pharmacists look after the good health of the troops
and the high quality of their food. All meaical personnel belong to the Armed Forces
Central Medical Service Directorate but are directly attached for duty to the air
regions. Furthermore, inasmuch as these physicians specialize in aviation medicine
[flight surgeons], thay also serve in regional organizations known as CEMPN's (Medical
Evaluation Center for Flight Personnel) where they determine whether civilian and
military fliQht personnel are fit for duty.
The air force must be present everywhere. Hence it has to participate in various
ceremonies, celebrations, and festivals. This participation may include delegations,
the regional air force band which has great public agpeai, parades and demonstrat~.on$.
The air force must pro3ect the most favorable image possible so as to entrench itself
in the nation's mind. This is done through multiple contacts~with local political,
professional, and religious leaders.
Lastly, there is recruitment and public information. In this field too, the main
activity is directed by a central agency, the SIRPA-AIR [Armed Forces Information and
Public Relations Service-Air Section]. This section attends to the air forces
distinctive public image, and as a corollary, to the quality of ~.ts recruitment.
Ttiis is an effort of great importance to the region commander because it demands
extensive regionalization and excellent insertion into the national fabric. .Recruiting
is a matter that takes a long while to produce a favorable outcome. It demands ~
constant work and one has to work a long time before obtaining results. Yet when a
reputation is established, when trust sets in, it lasts a long while. We traditionally
recruit in certain regions for variable reasons that need to be understood and have to
be cultivated.
Concurrently with the recruitment of volunteers there is the induction of draftees.
Every 2 months, some 1,000 airmen are inducted at various bases in the region.
They are processed, given.antitude tests, classified, divided into groups and given
5 weeks of instruction. They are then assi~ned to units on the basis of air force
requirements and their individual qualifications.
[Question] Moreover, general, there are the reserves and mobilization.
[AnswerJ Yes indeed, mobilization is a vital matter in the air force. If we want to
double our personnel strength, which is our goal, we must have a very sound and
sustained reserve policy. This is another of the region's tasks. We need well-trained,
- highly motivated personnel that can be assigned to positions very, very r.3Pidly.
Manning combat stations round-the-clock requires a great deal of manpower., It is not
easy to watch and remain alert in a gtm site so as to be prepared for an engagement
that will last but a few seconds. The gunner and the gun crew have to be constantly
on the lookout, sharp-eyed at all times, never relaxing their vigilance.
There are also the ground observer teams along our borders. This likewise is a
manpower-consuming mission. Thus protection of our bases, our antiaircraft defenses,
and our border ground observer organization can be effective only with numerous and
competent personnel which only a well-trained reserve air force can furnish.
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And besides, above and beyond the matter of immnediate effectiveness, there is the
= tremendous fellowship of those who have served in the air force, fellowship that is
strikingly demonstrated at all meetings and conventions of our reservists. All those
who have served in our air force have remained extremely loyal to us and are often
our a~bassadors to the general public. ,
[Question] Today, supersonic aircraft can fly over France in 20 minutes. Today,
"telematics" permits immediate centralization of data on events, stocks, and other
information scattered throughout ttxe territnry. Urnder these conditions, is there
~rill just~fication for having an air region?
[Answer] At a time when everyone is t~.lking about decentralizing~ should we question
the validity of one decentralization effort which in my opinion, because I am one of
its principal opera*.ors, is a total success? I think it would be a big mistake.
- I consider this decentralization to be successful because Air Force Headquarters allows
its region comm~anders who, in turn, allow their base commanders, freedom of action
commensurate with the field of activity they have to cover. My higher headquarters
assigns me s.pecific missions coupled with appropriate guidelines. It also gives me
the means to carry out these missions: means in the form of personnel: officers,
noncommissioned officers, and pilots with different military occupational specialities;
means also ain the.form of equipment, aircraft, radars, weapons, a variety of
vehicles--300 to 400 per base--, all sorts of accessories and instrumentation, plus
countless shelters. Lastly, it givea me money in the form of fuel for aircraft and
mator vehicles, and in the form of funds with which to feed, clothe, house, and pay
troops, build and maintain our installations.
But once the framework is established, once the means have been supplied, it allows
me the broadest initiative in actually carrying out its orders. Of course, what I do
is carefully reviewed, inspected, and monitored ex post facto. Yet who can take
timbrage at that? The quid pro quo for the freedom given me must inevitably be an
ultimate rigorous review of my actions. In like manner, I review what the air bases
do, but without thereby interfering with the way my orders are being carried out.
I have tests and inspections made to evaluate each base's operational, technical, and
administrative capabilities.
In short, I do try to behave toward my air force troops the same way Air Force
Headquarters acts toward me. In other words, I avoid any meddlesome centralism and
;ndeavor to make the best possib].e use of each individual's abilities.
- Admittedly modern aircraft do fly extremely fast. We must, therefore, be fullq
cogriizant of what is happening within a radius of 300-400 kilometers around us because
we have very little reaction time. We must also be informed of what is happening near
each "air" key point and these two interests are not compatible.
Telematics is, of course, a valuable tool. For personnel administration, the region
has an inquiry station, i.e. data terminal equipmer.~ for inquiry into the air force's
personnel data processing center. Regional stock control and movement of spare parts
are handled by telematics. The region also receives air defense data by telematics
and can take appropriate preparatory measures. Above all, however, there are the
physical realities of inen and equipment, realities that can truly�be perceived only
at the local 1eve1. An air region is a coherent unit to which present means of
communication provide ready access. All installations in the region are within easy
travel distance. No base is more than an hour away from my headquarters. Whenever
a ma3or problem develops, as soon as a base commander calls me and I have to determine
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personally what must be done, I can be on site very quickly and give him important
help by immediately ordering resources brought in from other installations. Then
there is the life style, the geographical context, the military mission, all of which
vary from one air region to another.
Hence the air region, with its mission or "calling" often dictated by history, with
the style and temperament of the people assigned to it, is a coherent geographical
and military unit. Within the flexible and trustful style developed by the air
force in its chain of co~and, the air region concept is fully 3ustifiable. Our
decentralization is a success. We must be very careful not to change it in any way.
- COPYRIGHT: 1982 Revue des forces armees francaises "A~rmees d'Aujourd'hui"
8041
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h'UK UH'h'1C:IAL U5[: UNLY
MILITARY FRAN~E
AIR REGION'S ROLE IN AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS DESCRIBED
Pairs ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Jan-Feb 82 pp 34-35
[Article by Lt Ca1 Michel Garrelis, French Air Force: "One Quarter of Blue Sky"]
- [Text] Supervision ~nd coordination of air defense operations and declaration of an
air defense emergency~ demand centralized information. This is the mission of the
- Headquarters, Air Defense Command (DA) in Taverny north of Paris. But the French
Air Force has chosen to decentralize at air region (RA) level responsibility for
directing the air battle and managing air defense resources.
Pursuant to instructions issued in June 1970 by Air Force Headquarters, the Commanding
General,~Air Defense Command and the Commanding General, CAFDA (Air Command
- [Component] of the Air Defense Forces) have delegated to each air region commander
the respunsibility for operational readiness of flight units and control and
reporting units stationed within each RA's territory, and likewise for control and
coordination of Military Operational Traffic (COM) within e~ch RA's area of
jurisdiction. In addition, an RA commander's authority covers all military air
traffic matters, whether i~ be traffic around the airfields (regional responsibility)
or flights conducted under the control of air defense radar stations.
Moreover, an RA commander must ensure that these air defense units receive the
= logistic support needed to maintain their operational readiness.
Lastly, he is responsible for the training, control, operational readiness, and~ �
employment of the region's surface-to-air weapons defense units.
To enable each air region commander to discharge his assigned duties, metropolit_~,~
_ France is divided into four air defense areas (ZAD) whose boundaries were desig~~~~3
to correspond as closely as.possible to boundaries of the [four] air regions.
Each ZAD is commanded by a general officer who also serves as the air region .
commander's deputy for operations.
_ Each air region has a special staff section, the air defense sect'.on (D~'DQ). The
DVDA is usually headed by a field-grade air force officer. For routine mbtters, it
- is ur~der the operations division of the air region general staff, but on many matters
it reports directly to the region's deputy for operations who is also the
- Commanding General, ZAD. The DVDA actually serves the latter as a sort of standing
_ working group.
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The DVDA is generallq organized into four branches whose titles clearly indicai~e
their functions: control branch (handles radar stations), air traff ic branch,
surface-to-air w~eapons branch, and field exercises and maneuvers branch.
The Chief of the DVDA is directly responsible for matters relating to the fighter
wings.
The Commanding General, DA and the Cammanding General, CAFDA issue operation plans
_ and orders to RA commanders, as well as directives covering the employment of air
defensc: units stationed within their area of responsibility.
RA commanders have these plans, orders, and directives executed by their deputy for
_ operations, the Cou~a.nding General, ZAD, who is also chairman of the Joint ~egional
Military Air Traffic Committee: coordination of the activities of units-responsible
to the Ministry of Defense: DGA (General Directorate for Armament), Naval Aviation,
ALAT (Army Light Aviation), and t:~e Air Force. The ZAD commander is also co-chairman
of the CRG (Regional Management Committee), a civilian-military body responsible for
airspace organization and management at regional level.
From the foregoing remarks ~e can define the duties and functions of the RA deputy
for operations and Commandi.ng General, ZDA in peacetime and wartime.
Peacetime .
In maintaining units operationally ready, the ZAD commander's main task is to ensure
that instruction and training is conducted in compliance with standing instructional
and training procedures (CPI) established by CAFDA.
In performing this task, the ZAD commander personally conducts frequent inspections
or has them made by DVDA officers. He also periodically holds meetings with all
- unit commanders. He is authorized to take at his level all necessary measures to
remedy deficiencies or correct mistakes, while reporting such deficiencies, mistakes,
and corrective measures to CAFDA.
The ZAD commander appoints officers from the DVDA to assist CAFDA teams conducting
operational readiness tests. He participates in these evaluations in the manner
prescribed by standing field exercise procedures published by CAFDA.
He issues special orders for air defense exercises applicable solely to his area of
responsibility, whether the exercise or maneuver is organized by CAFDA or the ZAD.
Pursuant to specific CAFDA orders and instructions, he participates at his level in
the execution of the following tasks: military ~p~rational air traff ic control,
rescue operations, and providing minimum civil air tr_affic control service as
required when so ordered by the government.
- 'Lastly, he gives special attention to flight safety problems in combat units as
well as control units. In this connection, all incidents are thoroughly investigated
and analyzed, and all possible immediate-action measures are taken to improve
equipment or procedures.
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The Commanding General, ZAD exer~cisea authority over:
a. Flight units (fighter wings);
b. Surface-to-air (gun and missile) units;
c. Control units and stations: control ar.u reporting Centers (CDC), military
coordination detachments (DMC), etc;
d. Units of the other services (army or navy) when attached to his co~and.
To assist him in dischargir.g his responsibilities, the air region cammander's deputy
for operations and ZAD commander has:
a. A DVDA (described above); .
b. An area operations center (COZ) whose functions in the operational chain of
command lies.between the air defense control center at Taverny and the ZDA units;
c. An air defense control center located with the ~OZ and activated and manned by
DVDA personnel during exercises and maneuvers., in periods of crisis, and in
wartime.
The ZAD co~ander also ensures that all logistic support measures ~re taken as ,
required for effective performance of air defense missions.
~ ~
Wartime
Pursuant to general orders and special directives issued by CAFDA, the ZAD commander
conducts air defense operations within h3s area. In so doing, he directs the air
defense battle and controls all air traffic.
The scope of the duties and functions of the commanding general.of an a~ir region and
his deputy for operations, the ZAD commander, and the diversity~ of the forces under
- their command, are indicative of the importance of the air defE:nse role assigned to
each air region. ~
The voli~e of airspace allotted to each region and the presence of necessary logistic
support facilities within its territory thus give the Air Defense Command a suitable,
- flexible, and~efficient organizational structure. ~
AIR DEFENSE
Echelon Normal Chain of Command Operational Chain of Command
Air Force Hq CG, CAFDA High Air Defense Authority at
air defense control center
Air Region CG, ZAD Area air controller ~
Air Base (fighters) C0, Fighter Wing Flight operations officer
Fighter aircraft
Air Base (radars) C0, Control and Reporting Chief Controller
Center Control consoles
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~
_ ~
~
~ ~
~
~ Author
Lieutenant Colonel Michel Garrelis, the author of the above article, entered the
Air Force Academy in 1956. After graduation, he served as an air defense controller
in different air force radar stations. After having com~nanded the control and
reporting center at Cinq-Mars-la-Pile, he served on the 2d Air Region staff. He ~.s
currently assistant officer-in-charge of the Northern Air Defense Area's operations
center.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 Revue des forces armees francaises "Armees d'aujourd'hui.
8041
CSO: 3100/369
~
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MILITARY FRANCE
TERRAIN-FOLLOWING RADAR TESTED FOR MIRAGE 2000N~PROGRAM
Paris AIR ET COSMOS in French 13 Feb 82 p 17 ~
'[Article: "Tests of Antilope 5 Radar on Vautour Aircraft"] .
_ [Text] The ~'light Test Center (CEV) has begun testing the flight control system
that will enable the Mirage 2000I~-penetration version--to fly at extremely low Ievel
while avoiding terrain obstacles. ~
, This system is.based on the Antilope 5 radar developed 3ointly by Serge Dassault
Electronics and Thomson-CSF. This terrain-following radar is designed to enable the
aircraft to automatically follow the terrain at minimum safe altitude. Hence the
requirement to obtain a good image of the terrain, analyze it, determine therefrom--
consistent with the aircraft's dynamics--the ideal flight path, and generate flight
path control signals to be transmitted to control surfaces via the aircraft's
autopilot. This entire sequence obviously has to be performed in real time, thus
requiring use of high-speed, high-capacity computers.
For its current tests of this system, the CEV is using the Vautour No 358, a utility
_ twin-jet aircraft designed for the Mirage 2000N's Antilope radar development tests.
Last y~ar, this aircraft was modified at the Clermont-Ferrand Aeronautical
Industrial Plant to permit installation of the entire terrain-following component of
the Mirage 2000N navigation system. A very compl~te set of ineasuring instruments
was also n~ounted 3n the Vautour. Lastly, the entirely new forward part of the
fuselage was fitted with a cylindro-conical section ("detachable collar"), thus
giving the Vautour's,fuselage the shape of the forward nose section of the Mirage
2000N and providing space for the conditioning unit~needed to caol the radar.
Evaluation of the Mirage 2000N's very low-altitude flight~control system recently
began at the Istres Flight Simulation Center. The system generates the radar image
of the terrain, image on which flight control commands are based. In addition, a
micro-video camera relays to the pilot inside the Mirage 2000N simulator cockpit
the picture it obtains by "flying over" a terrain model board, the flight path flown
, by the micro-camera being similar to the one generated by the simulator. ~
Clermont Ferrand Aeronautical Industrial Plant
Since 1976, this facility has completed modifications and adaptations for the Mirage
2000N program on the following aircraft used as test beds: Mirage 3B No 202 for
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autopilot tests; Vautour No 377 for tests of the RDM [Doppier multifunction] radar;
Vautour No 307 for tests of the RDI [Doppler] radar and the mount for the Matra
~ Super 530 missile; Mystere 20 No 79 for RDI radar tests; Mystere 3B No 235 for tests
of the air data computer and the inertial platform; and Mystere 20 No 124 for tests
of ~he electronic countermeasures system.
COPYRIGHT: A & C 1482.
8041
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MILTTARY UNTTID KINGDOM
HOME GUARD, EXPANDED TERRITORIAL ARMY ADVOCATED
PM041513 London THE TIMES in English 4 Mar 82 p 1
[Report by Henry Stanhope: "Home Guard Is Revived: Forces To Train Teenagers"]
[Text] The government is to create a new home guard to protect some of
Britain's more vital parts from crack Russian troops in wartime. A pilot
s~heme will start in four areas ~f the country next September.
Details were disclosed yesterday by Mr John Nott, secretary of state for
defence, who also announced expansion plans for the territorial army,
including 12 new TA centres, and an adventure training scheme that will be
~ run for young people by th e Ministry of Defence.
The new reserve, foreshadowed last year in THD TIMES, will be called the Home
Service Force (HSF)~and, if the pilot scheme is successful, will include
about 4,500 volunteers.
The army is looking for people aged between 18 and 59 who will probably have
to assemble for four or five weekends a year. Because the trainirig periods
wili be few it is hoping to attract former servicemen, regulars :~r reserves,
or policemen, who would already know something about "drill and teamwork."
Ideally the army would like young men in their twenties who might not be
able to spare ~the time for t~he territorials . They will be paid and w~ill
wear a khaki uniform, but the deta3.ls have yet to be dECided.
A senior officer said last night: "We have not yet decided what weapons
they will~carry, but they will have something better than pitchforks."
The need for such a force was decided on after a survey which 13.sted about
1,000 key points, such as telephone exchanges, pawer stations, electr3cal
transmitters, or even railway stations, ;:hat would need to be guarded in
! wartime.
The threat comes from the large Soviet special purpose forces, many of whose
troops would be expected to be deployed against Britain in a future war.
They could be parachuted into Britain or landed by ship, charged with the
task of sabotaging ~.ommunications and power supplies.
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The new force would free regular and reserve troops for more mobile defence
work. Sources said last night that the cost of the pilot scheme would be
"peanuts."
The four pilot companies, each of whi.ch will have 95 members, will be centered
on Perth, Birmingham, Bury St Edmunds, and on Reading, Portsmouth and ~
Maidenhead in the south-east. They will use TA centres and facilities.
The TA expansion comes in the wake of last year's announcement of~a phased
increase in its strength from 70,000 to 86,000. Some units will be allowed
to recruit above their establishments and the number of training days is
being raised to 42.
~ New units w ill include the equivalent to two royal engineer regiments and
one extra company for the Royal Irish Rangers, the 51st Highland Volunteers,
and the Royal Regiment of Wales. The emphasis will be on home defence.
In some areas TA centr.es will be improved and new ones will be built at
Bangor (Northern Ireland), Bedford, Sutton Coldfield, Telford, York, Colby,
_ Newham, (South Teeside), Walsall, Colchester, Bath, Widnes, Aintree and
Alnwich. ~
The adventure training scheme will prov3.de outdoor courses of two or three
weeks for young people with the services, starting next month. They will be
available for up to 7,000 teenagers aged between 16 and 18 who can start
applying to their local service"career and information offices from March 29.
The scheme will cost 1.5 m pounds, funded from the defence budget.
The ARY scheme will be run from Fort George in Scotland under Lieutenant- ~
Colonel John Blashford-Snell; the navy;will take boys to HMS Raleigh, the
jim ior training establishment at Plymouth; and the RAF will organize its
contribution at Cosford in the West Midlands and at Catterick, North
Yorkshire.
Ministry of Defence officials said yesterday: "It is not backdoor conscrip-
tion. We are not looking for recruits."
It will not be exclusively for the unemployed; priority will be given to
applicants from cadet forces. Travelling expenses, food, and accommodation
will be free.
The courses will offer training "outward bound" style under the care of some
of the services' best instructors .
COPYRIGHT: Times Newspapers Limited, 1982 ~
CSO: 3120/47
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MILITARY UNITED KINGDOM
NOTT'S ANNOTJNCENIENT ON RESERVISTS WELCOME, BUT NOT ENOUGH ~
PM051413 London THE TIMES in English 5 Mar 82 p 13
[Editorial: "Swords and Ploughshares"~
[Text] Mr John Nott's announcement about increasing the reservists and
providing adventure training for a few thousand unemployed youngsters is
to be welcomed, as far as it goes; but it does not go very far. Last June
he said that the government was determined to give greater emphasis to the
reserve forces, and this has now resulted 3n an increase of 16,000 men
in the territorial army. No increase, however small,.should be decried,
but Mr Nott has failed to go to the heart of the question of reserve
military power, and he should try again.
Britain's strategic defence policy is based on the principle of nuclea.r ~
deterrence. Hawever, since the abolition of conscription, all governments ~
have found it convenient to hide behind that pol3cy we need, on the ground
that the only danger we face is of a total breakdown of deterrence rather
than a partial one. Hence we anty need a nuclear bomb, with a small number
of volunteer armed forces, backed up by even fewer reservists.
- This goes against the whole princip?_e of reserve power, which should be
based on the view that--in peacetime, or relative peacetime such as we have--
one's standing force should only be allowed to contract if the reserve
forces correspondingly expand. In that way the nation preserves mach3nery '
for military expansion to meet a whole range of future emergencies, not ~ust
the to~~-narrowly defined contingency of a breakdown in nuclear deterrence.
The bankruptcy of this policy was fully apparenC only a few years ago when
the strain of law enforcement in Northern Ireland virtually incapacita~ed the
army for arry other purpose, in spite of its continuing pretence to meet
NATO and global commitments.
Mr Nott's new reservists, therefore, will prov3da some temporary palliative
to the regular amry. But, if ev~n Northern Ireland can incapacitate us, any
future emergency will reveal much more starkly how gravaly the chiefs of
staff have neglected their duty to provide Britain with appropriate ma~hinery
for expansion of the services to meet unexpected emergencies.
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The proposal for adventure training is also an attr.active one, but incomplete.
Mr Nott said that the very low nwnbers leaving the armed services, and the
consequential reduction in r~;ruitment, had produced some spare capacity
in the training E:- ~~3blishments of all tfiree servic.es . That training capa-
city should not be frittered away providing canoe trips and such like.
It is th e seed corn of the country's future military potential. But it
is more than this, since military trade training improves the quality of ,
those who pass through th e machine in a social as well~as a military sense.
Social and military qualities are not necessarily incompatible. There is
more to military training now than learning to [word indistinctJ. There
is more to it even than gunnery,.tactics or fieldcraft. It is noticeable
that four out of every five recruits enlist because they wish to learn a
trade which would b e valuab le to them later as civilians.
The national value of this training machine is thus not only that it trains
servicemen with technical skills. Mos t of those skills are as relevant to
industry, as they are to th e military. There is much exchange of information
and experience between service training establishments and their counter-
. parts in industry, particu].arly in 3unior management and trade training.
When the economy picks up we will again need more skilled manpower than
exists. We should harness the military training machine to this fsture
industrial and economic requirement, by using its spare capacity now to turn
out young men~and women trained in modern techniques. In peacetime there is
always pressure to turn swords into ploughshares. But we should not forget
the service training machine's ability to turn out swordsmen who are plough-
men too; and the better for it.
COPYRIGHT: Times Newspapers Limited, 1982 ~
CSO: 3120/47 ~D
88
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040045-3