JPRS ID: 10380 EAST EUROPE REPORT POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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, JPRS L/ 10380
12 March 1982
E ast E u ro e R e o r~
p p
POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS
(FOUn 5/82)~
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JPRS L/10380
12 March 1982
FgST EURO~E REPORT
~ POLITICAL, $OCIOLO~iGAL AND MILITARY 'AF~AIRS
: (FOUO 5/82) ~
CONTENTS
POLAND
'TIMES' Correspondent Describes Conditions in Warsaw
(THE TIMES, 8 Jan 82) 1
'GUARDIAN' Prints Partial Text of Gornicki Copenhagen Statement
- (THE GUARDIAN, 11 Jan 82) 3
YUGOS LAVIA . .
Italian Paper Interviews Milovan Djilas
(Milovan D3ilas Interview; CORRIERE DELLA SERA, 1 Feb ~2)..... 6
- - a - [III - EE - 63 FOUOJ
L'(1~ l1CCT!`T A T T TCC (1ATT V
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POLAND
'TIMES' CORRESPONDENT DESCRIBES CONDITIONS IN WARSAW
PM081319 London THE TIMES in English 8 Jan 82 p 20
~ [Roger Boyes "Letter From Warsaw:': "The Miseries of Living Each Uneasy Day as it
Comes"] ~
[Excerpt] Two weeks into martial law and, according to official accounts, local
opposition to military rule had ended. The thousand miners occupying the Piast
mine in Silesia have ended their sit-in strike, alt~hough it is not really clear
how the army achie~�ed this "pacif ication." Earlier pacification of the Wujec mine
involved the shootiug of.seven miners out of self-defense, according to the govern-
ment spokesman.
We have, the government s~Qokesman t~ell.s us (foreign correspondents, not the nation),
- entered the second phase of m~artial law: the thaw. That is certainly true enough
of Warsaw, but Radom, Gdansk and other towns appear still to be at the heavy snow-
~ fall stage of the cycle. And nobody knows how long Warsaw will remain quiet when
the telephones are restored. ~
Solidarity, the independent union, needs telephone contact to regroup, so the ~
military solution dictates there will be no telep.hone system. Unfortunately, the
~ economy also needs telephones and enterprise managers, already afraid of making too
independent-sounding decisions, are simply not functioning. The workers sense the
mood and partly in sympathy with Solidarity, partly out of~post-Christmas doziness,
produce only token amounts..
Two weeks into martial law and the stunz~ed shock has given way to national lassi-
tude and a barely concealed cynicism. At Szczecin shipyards, fork-lif~t truck
drivers ferry meaningless loads from one end to another, repeating the process
endlessly until it is time to go home. Home is where.most people go after work
nowadays; cafe society has dwindled to a hardy gaggle of students, unsu~e whether
they will be called up or whether they will have to repeat the winter semester.
Big ideas, once the small change of cafe conversation, are no longer so~.ial
currency. Informers are back in fashion; when asked, people laugh and say, of
course they were asked to cooperate and of course they refused. But the un~asiness
lingers and excuses are made: the last bus before curfew has to be caught at 8.30.
The soldiers no longer know why they are there, manning the roadbiocks, acting as
auxiliary policemen. The army newspaper gives warning daily of the Solidarity
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"extremists" but most soldiers would not recognize the gross caricatures fed to
them in their political education lessons. The conscripts have schoolfriends in
the union, while the professionals seem to have been expecting some form of
partisan attack, car bombs and shootings.
Instead, day by day they see quite normal Poles, commuting f rom queue to queue,
some of them openly contemptuous of the rifles and uniforms, mast of them sullenly
compliant. The troops are moved regularly, rotated with units outside Warsaw, to
- reduce the tedium and the sense of futility.
Even the dullest trooper has now realized that there is no ~mminent prospect of a
parachute atta^k on the bridge that he is guarding. Meanwhile, it is impossible
for anyone to cross a bridge by foot in Warsaw. A Pole who lives on the wrong side
- of the Vistula will have to wait for the notoriously self-willed trams to take him
the 100 yards to his home.
Solidarity still exists, both officially and unoff icially. Officially, because
unions are permitted provided that they engage in no union activities. Unoffi-
cially, because after dusk small knots of Solidarity sympathizers meet in
churches, the only really safe havea. Priests have bE~en instructed by their
_ bishops to take rio part in political activity, but the meetings happen anyway,
sometimes in the vestry by candlelight.
The Warsaw chapter of Solidarity, ance nine hundred thousand-strong, can still pro-
duce a regular bulletin of information, mainly about the condition of the detained
union leadership. It bears the hal.lmarks of hurried printing and is a sobering
testimony to what happens when a sophisticated organization with ten million inem-
bers has to go underground at a moment's notice.
- Two weeks into martial law and everything that matters is in a state of suspension.
Marriages are put off, coupl~s defer having children for another year, school-
leavers stop worrying about careers. Before 13 December, th~re was an obsession
with buying consumer durables--everything fron~ washing machines to abstract
paintings--before the zloty lost its value completely.
Now, the obsession is less pronounced. Sest travel light is the philosophy, spend
~ on food, the daily needs, forget the long-term planning. A journalist on ZYCIE
_ WARSZAWY, the now suspended, once lively regional newspaper, says he has nothing
- to do but there is no point in starting a book he has been planning because it
invol~~es political judgments. It is no time, with a wife and family to support, to
become: an instant dissident.
COPYRIGHT: Times Newspapers Limited, 1982
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POLAND
'GUARD?AN' PRIIQTS PARTIAL TERT OF GORNICRI COPENHAGEN STATEMENT
PM111205 London THE GUARDIAN in English ll Jan 82 p 5
[Unattributed report,: "'Solidarity Declared War.Against the State "'--f irst ~
paragraph is editoriaZ introduction]
[TextJ The following.is a partial text of a stateT~ent made by Captain Wieslaw
Gornicki, a senior advisor to GenEYal Jaruzelski, a~` a meeting of the World Peace
Council in Copenhagen last week. It is the fullest ~ublic explanation of its case
to come from the Polish martial law authorities since the EEC foreign ministers
f irst raised the possibility of sanctions against Poland.
. In this crucial moment of Polish history we ~csk all oux friends in the peace move-
ment, not only for understanding, but also for moral and political assistance.
Armed forces are s~ldom associated with peace activities, yet there are moments
whei~ the armed forces become the last resart of safe-guarding peace before it~is
too late. This is precisely the ~ase in Poland: Public opinioa asks what happened
in Poland. To our minds, tne relevant quPStion is ~ust the opposite: what did not
happen in Poland. A bloody prolon~ed civil war did not take place in Poland,
although we were on the verge of it. .
A military dictatorship has not been estadlished in Poland. Martial law is a
temporary measure, and it will be lifted as soon as possible. Civil ~iberties will
be restored. Finaliy, European pea:e and stability were not put into ~eopardy..
This had been a very real imminent.prospe~;.
That is the starting point. Now let me be more specific.
Nobody can blame the Polish authorities for lack of goodwill. They did their.
best to prevent the confrontation. Since last March I participated in all negotia-
tions with Solidarity as a member of the government. For about 14 months the
Polish government was willing tc? reach a compromise. We did see--perhaps wrongly--
a chaiice of widening tl.e structure of political life by including an independent
trade ~nion in the pattern of our state.
The sad truth is, however, that it simply did not work. Solidarity ceased to be a
trade union almost as soon as .it was born. It became an opposition political:
, party. The name of an opposition party may not sound very repulsive to many of
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you, but let me make it quite clear: Solidarity was never intended by its
extremist leaders to be an opposition party in the.Western meaning of the word.
Gradually it became a conglomerate of ~ust about everything right-of-centre, from
conservative, openly pro-capitalist tendencies to the brink of fascism. ,
On 30 October General Jaruzelski offered from the rostrum of the Polish Parliament
an entirely new formula for a front of national conciliation. It was meant as a
way of sharing exP~+~*_;~e power with nonparty groups and organisations. All mean-
ingful groups Polish society, including the Roman Catholic Church, expressed
their desire to participate in the front. There was one single exception:
Solidarity. ~
During November, the government undertook several initiatives aimed at national
conciliation. General Jaruzelski met the primate of Poland,~Archbishop Glemp, and
the~chairman of Solidarity, Mr Lech Walesa.
On 12 November, ~in the town of Trzehlatow [as published; probably TrzebiatowJ the
vice-president of Solidarity, Mr Marian Jurczyk, delivered his famous speech.
Mr Jurczyk said, among other things: "What we need are gallows... Those p~~~;~le
who run Poland are not Polish, they are either Russians or Jews with changzd
names... No talk with a government of traitors,"
Is that a trade union activity? Where in the world does a trade union call f or the
death ar.d extermination of fellow workers? .
On 4 December, the Presidium of Solidarity met in ltadom. ~his was an open
declaration of war against the Polish state. There is ample evidence that, between
4 December and 11 December, preparat:Lons were being made for a regular counter-
revolutionary coup d'etat, patterned after tlie classical CIA style. In the night
of 12 December, after the Central Commission of Solidarity openly proclaimed a
declaration of war against the state, no other o;~tion was left for Poland except �
extraordinary measures in order to res~ore law and order.
This is not the place to refure all lies spread about Poland. I will confine
myself to nine most evident distortions.
1. The total number of persons detained was approximately 5,050 at the beginning,
now it does not exceed 4,400. An exact number cannot be given because people are
constantly being released.~ The talk of "several tens of thousands of detainees" is
plain nonsense. ~
2. The total numb~er of casualties is ~ight nersons. I repeat.eight. We all
regret it.
3. Not a single detained person was sub~ected to cruel treatment, torture, beat-
ing, or exposure to the freezing outdoor air. A11 those persons will be eventu~lly
released, and they will give testimony as to how they were treated.
4. While martial law was obviously not greeted with enttiusiasm by everyone in
Poland, it was not rrue that the Polish nation as a whole resented it. On.the
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contrary, the Polish "silent majority" met it with a sigh of relief, irrespective
of actual political leanings.
5. The intr.oduction of martial law was a strictly Polish, sovereign, domestic .
~ issue. There is no.t a single proof or evidence of any foreign involvement.
6. Emergency measures undertaken on 13 December are not aimed at the restoration
of what brought Poland to ~he crisis of 1980.
7. It is not true that the preparations for martial law had been made many
months in advance... There were no plans f~r direct military action until
virtually the very last moment.
~ 8. It is not true that Polish clergy have been subjected to persecution or
reprisals. I know of only two or three cases ~.ri which priests were detained, but
martial law is mar.datory for everyone.
9. It is not true that all Polish trade unions, including Solidarity, were banned
- or prohibited or disbanded. Their activities were temporarily suspended and will
be pex7nitted to operate again as soon as possible. However, there will be no
place for an anti-communist oppnsition political party. That is over--once and
forever.
COPYRIGHT: Guardian Newspapers Limited, 11 January, 1982
I
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~ YUGOSLAVIA
~ ~
ITALIAN PAPER INTERVIEWS MILOVAN DJILAS
Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA i.n Italian 1 Feb 82 p 9
[Interview with Milovan Djilas by Ettore Petta: "The Italian Communist Party accord-
ing to Djilas: 'It Foilows the Footsteps of the Yugoslavia of 1948 but Its Third
Way Is Not Clear ~ ~ .
[Text] After the meeting with Moscow--Criticisms of the.Soviet
Union in the interview with the "great heretic" of Belgrade's
communism who is an exile in his own homeland.
Belgrade ._Milovan Dj ilas, the great heretic of Yugoslav communism, is also wondering
where the PCI [Italian Communist Party] is going: he can already see it mov,ing "on
- the road which we opened in 1948" and he thinks thafi~ it will go much further. Djilas
is interested in finding out whether the PCI will find a specific position on the
Italian political scene as a"reformist" party. Finding that place without 1'osiag
its image as a communist party however will be a difficult undertaking: the party
of Craxi and the party of Longo as a ma.tter of fact will not give.it much room to
maneuver. On the ~ther hand, the PCI "at tllis moment" no longer has a Leninist
cast to it; it has come out in favor of political pluralism which as a matter of
' fact is contrary to the spirit of Leninism. Hence the "break" with the Kremlin
' which will receive the final official stamp of approval the moment the Soviets es-
tablish that the Cossutta group is not able to create trouble for the Berlinguer and
Napolitano leadership "with its maneuvers."
In spite of his 70 years, Milovan Djilas still has a youthful face, almost like a
calm little boy. His permanently half-closed eyes are live~.y, attentive, loolcing
at the conversation partner like the eyes of an examiner. The half-lit room, in
which he received me with a little cu~ of Turkish coffee, is full of huge pieces of
furnitu~e, such as a big desk, a bookshelf, a sm~.~ll table.with chairs, and.a bed.
The window faces on tree-lined Palmoticeva Stree~, a silent little street although
it is in a vexy central location, behind the Federal Parliament. This is his king-
dom as a"domestic exile" where he however can receive anybody he wants to receive,
apparently without any controls. He says that an evolution of "modest liberaliza-
tion" is taking shape in Serbia and more gQnerally in Yugoslavia; he is certainly
; less pessimistic about his counr.ry's future than he was a few years ago. He does
not rule out the possibility that the PCI's pol3cy "might influence or shake the
~ awareness of the Yugoslav Communist Party and I believe that the current modest
liberalization in Yugoslavia will continue. The alternative would lie anarchy."
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But our conversation turned toward the conflict tha~t b.roke out hetween two big com-
munist parties, an argument which ohvious.ly fascinates.him: "Our hreak with Moscow
certainly took place in a situati.on tfiat a~as ~more difficult for us tfian the situation
faced by the PCI today." ~or Yugoslavia tfiis was really "a question of life or
deaCh" and this is why, Djilas says-, it was not even possible to listen to the argu-
ments of the Yugoslav pro-Soviet group; Serlinguer today can a11ow Cossutta to
speak without having to fear being overconie by the clout of the Soviet Communist
Party. ~
Now--says Djilas, talking about 1948--the crux of the issue is obviously political.
Today, the problem that divides Berlinguer from ~rezhnev is essentially ideological;
they fit:~ themselves facing a reformist party and a Marxist-Leninist party. After
the conflicts between Moscaw and Belgrade and later on with Peking, the current
conflict with Rome "is the most important and also the most original because it is
a conflict on the major questions of Leninism." The PCI however is not in an easy
situation. According to Djilas, "it is not clear" what Berlinguer means when he
talks about *he "third way": the PCI's present policy "is not y~~t the third way"
and the dilemma is this: a communist part~ ~s that only if it is a Leninist party
and if it is not Leninist, it is no longer even communist.
The "third way?" "I believe that Western Europe as a whole.is already living in a
form of democratic socialism, not perfect, not ideal, but there it is. The third
way~should be a new form of social and economic existence and this point is not,
clear in. the PCT. The problem of nationalization is complex: if nationalization
is productive, it goes well, otherwise it only produces red tape." The Eurocom-
munists, that is to say, the Italian and Spanish communists, according to Djilas
are "'the reformists of modern capitalism, a capita].ism different from the one
considered by Marx and Lenin and naw also,by the Kremlin. "Capitalism has changed
in terms of inentality and in essence" and can no longer be judged t~irough the eyes
of Marx and Lenin.
What is to be done, then? Is it necessary to invent a new Marx? Djilas answers
that real socialism is no longer capable of producing a new Marx and thus revitalizing
his theory. Marx' place in the modern world has been taken by Karl Popper and by
Leszek Kolakowski. He also mentioned the names of Zakharov and Zinovev, the Russian
exile in Paris, and thei: added that Leninist ideology is "sclerosed; I would not say
that it is dead, as Zakharov maintains, because it can still be used and the Kremlin
makes abundant use of it." But when it comes to so-ca1 led real socialism "nothing
positive can come out of it anymore and that is what Poland tells every day."
As far as the Soviet Union is concerr.~d, Djilas says that he is pessimistic because
"I am afraid that some day it might cause a big war." He says: "Look at Helsinki;
after that conference, the Soviets stepped up the pace of their arms drive, causing
an imbalance in East-West military relations." D~ilas added that "only a strong
West can save the peace."
Betwaen the Soviet policy of President Reagan and that of Chancellor Schmidt, Djilas
opts for the one of the White House although he observes that he can very well under-
stand Bonn's attitude since the Germans would be the first victims of a war. But
with the USSR "we cannot entertain any illusions: it is a military empire, like
the state of Ottom~n Turkey."
COPYRIGHT: 1982 Editoriale del "Corriere della Sera" s.a.a.
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