JPRS ID: 10372 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 18
• Content Type: REPORTS

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R400540040018-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
. JPRS L/ 10372
~ 5 Mar~h 1982
- Near East North Africa ~e ort
. p
(FOUQ 9/82) ,
F~~$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500040018-3
NOTE
JPRS publications cont;ain information primarily from foreign
newspapers, periodica:Ls and books, but also from news agency
transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language
~ sources are translated; those from English-language sources
are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and
other characteristics retained.
Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed ia brackets
are supplied by JpRS. Processing indi~ators such as [Text]
or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the
last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was
processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor-
aation was summarized or extracted.
Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the
_ origirtal but have been supplied as appropriate in context.
Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an
~ item oiiginate with the source. Times within items are as
given by source.
The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
cies, views or at.titudes of the U.S. Government.
COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THt~,T DISSEMINATION
OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500040018-3
FOR OFFICIA~. USE ONLY
JPRS L/10372
5 March 1982
,
;
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
(~ouo 9/s2~
CONTENTS
ALGERIA
Private Sector's Status Examined
(Kamel D3aider; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 18-31 Jan 8~) 1
EGYrt
Rise and Fall of Jihan al-Sadat
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 11-17 De1 81) 4
Lutf3: al-Rhuli Comments on Grouping Party Program
(AL WATAN AL-'ARABI, 11-17 Dec 81) 12
I RAN .
Promises, Results, Methods of Khomeyni Revolution Compared
(Ulzich Encke; EUROPA ARCHTV, 10 Jan 82)....................... 20
Ongoing Anti-Bahai Terrorism Reviewed
' (POURQUOI PAS?, 21 Jan 82).........~ 28
Regime Represses 'Heretic' Baha'is, 'Autonomist' Kurds ~
(L'E~'RESS, 22-28 Jan 82) 32
Marty~rs of God, by Jacques Buob
Winter of Maesacre in Kurdistan, by Christian. Hoche
SYR~A
" Pro-Iraqi Magazine Commentp ~n Hamah Incidents
(AL
WATAN AL-'ARABI, 19 Feb 82) 36~
- a- (III - NE & A- 121 FOUO~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY '
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R400540040018-3
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Syrian Mediation I3ole in Iran-Iraq War Queationed ~
(Editorial; AL WATAN AI~-'ARABI, 8-14 Jan 82) 39
3UDAN
~ ~
Demoastrationa Seen aa Heralding Inevitable Rewlt
(Abou Sameh; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 18 Jaa 82) 43
-b-
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02109: CIA-RDP82-00854R000500040018-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~ ~ ALGERIA
PRIVATE SEG�rOR ~S STATUS EXEIMINID
~ t~aris AFRIQDE ASIE in French No 257r 18-31 Jari~82 pp 25-26 ~
~ rticle by correspondent Kamel Djaider: "The Distinction"; passages quoted
also printed in italic~
rTex~ The FLN Centr Cammittee devoted its sixth meeting essentially to
debate on the place and role of the pri~te sector in the Algerian national
economy. The aim was to determii:e as exactly as possible the field of ac-
tion of that sector so that it sha11 contribute effecti,;ely to the process
of economic and social development, without giving it the power td question
fundamental decisions anew.
There is reason to recall here tha.t the Algerian private sector, which ac-
counts for more than a third of national production--of which two thirds is
- in agricultural and one third in non-agricultural employment--does not have
access to the strategic domains (hydrocarbons, mines~ transportation by air,
~ sea, or rail, or telecommunications).
~ Before its s~zbmissi~on�to the country~s~highest political body, the question
of the private sector~had already be~en debated at the baee~ within FZN struc-
tures. It emerged from this debate that�in~the mind of the Al~erian citi-
zen the problem is to lay down the framework--if not the limits--within
~ which that sector should develop so as not to risk turning ir_to "a spring-
board for the seizure of power." The dominant concern was to localize the
economic fields in which its action could complemer~t the activity of state
enterprises without risk of market control~ worker exploitation~ or unjust
cornering of wealtfi. ~
Decisive Planning ~
' On the eve of the initial working session, it appeared quite evident that
the direction being taken was towaxd implementation of a policy in which
planning would intervene decisively.~~"T~t~�is inconsistent to be told that '
_ this debate could turn or deviate towards a discussion of choice," wrote
the Algerian Press Service as that working session opened. "It.is illusory
to wish to change the course of history,~~ it added, and considered it op-
.
1 ' ~
FOR ORFICIAL USE ONLY ~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3
rvx vrr tt,ieu, u~~ U1VLY
portune to recall that "recent experimente elsewhere, notab:ly in Saudi
Arabia, have shown how dangerous it was, as much from the standpoir~t of eco-
nomics as in terms of political and social~consequences, tc~ wish to streng-
_ then a private sector...~~ ,
Still, the general orientation was all mapped out, since :~t is understood
in Alg~ria that private sector activities "must be situat~ed and limited in
such a way that they cannot acquire economic power or influence the centers
of state decisions" (National Charter). The real task, t;hen~ for the 20C
central committee m~mbers, was to "distinguish between t?nat pri.vate sector
wY~ich plays a use~ul role in the country~s economy, and that parasitic or
middleman private sector which endangers not only socia].ism but all inde-
gendent economic development" (National ChartPr).
It is pointed out in Algiers~ moreover~�that if~~liia private sector must be
so situated aE to complement the state�sector~ that is to ba done also to
reduce recourse to foreign production~ and primarily tr~ that of multination-
a1s, which "remain the foremost ~nemy of all countries on the road to inde-
pendent development." Fram that standpoint firm emphaeis was placed, in the
grassroots debatesa on the riaks entailed by u~aintai.ni,ng~ any relations be-
tween the private sector an.d foreign cagitalist circlEas, and the need was
~ reaffirmed for the state to conti.rnae in control of th~e Economa.c levers di-
rectly linked to foreign countries.
_ It is publicly admitted today that the Algerian private sector, which has
grown considerably in recent years~ ~~has developed in an anarchic and wild
manner, both geograghically and in the branches of its production."
~ There are actually two types of private sector. Or.e, powerful and profit-
able, ha.s spread into the most varied fields of cUnstruction and industrial
_ processing~ thanks to the immerise ~possibil~i~i:es��c~f public markets, to the
inexperience of taxation and ~ricing administrations, to the protective
wall sheltering the domestic�market from compet~~tion by imported products,
and finally to the exceptiona.l boom in consumption. ~~he other, that of
agriculture, traditional building, fisheries~ handi~crafts, services, retail
trade, and transportation, after experiencing r.elative prosperity in the
shadow of colonization, ha~�~s!een its capa.cities under-utilized, at times
forzen, or simFly destroyed. At the periphery of the state economic appara-
tus set kp in the decade of the 70~s~ there arose in a very empirical way
a private ~'market place" which fed almost exclusively on the products of
the imbalances in the emerging modern national economy, such as shortages,
weaknesses of monopolies~ and frailty of the first marketing institutions.
In that spreading jungle of middlemen--businessmen, wholesalers, proxies
and connivers "speculative economic operations" range from the small cig-
arette retailer to the "nabobs" ~'representing" foreign firms, for whom the
most effective working method remains the practice of corruption applied
, to certain officials of the public sector.
2
FOR OFFICIAL USE ON'LY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500440018-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
To Strengthen the Public Sector
After completing an extremely thorough task of information and investigation,
- carried out in depth and in close liaison with economic operators in the
state sector, the FLN Economic and Social Cammission drew up a number of
documents which place private activity in its macro-economic context and
focmulate the essential questions concerning or.ganization of that sector.
It is this Economic and Sccial Commission report which the memLers of the
central committee studied during the two working days.
Starting with a global approach which. considers that "the whole economy
, functions as a unit," this sixth sesuior_ examined the question from the
angle of the pressing need to strengthen the state sector.
Considering that the country's private sector developed "with the help of
a very ragid growth of investment impelled by the state since independence,"
Algerian leaders considered that it is "the~good~or bad management of this
aggregate of material and human resources (of the state) which in large mea-
sure determines the good or bad functioning of enterprises, whatever their
status (socialist or��priva~t~e~)."�~ ~
In that spirit they consider that in the future it will be the role of the
state to "make the rules of the gatae" by integrating private sector develop-
ment with national planning. ' " " ,
To that end, it is pxoposed to set up ~.egal machinery, ~.~.th financial and
commercial instruments intended to organize and control that sector so as
- truly to embody it in the general movement of the country's economy, and
cause it to play, under proper conditions, the role assigned to it by the
constitutior. and Na.tional Charter.
- COPYRIGHT: 1982 Afrique-Asie ~
6145 .
cso: 4519/102
3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3
� FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
:
EGYPT
` .
a .
i
!
~
1
RISE AND FALL OF JIHAN AL-SADAT
;
Paris AL-WAZ`AN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 252, 11-17 Dec 81 pp 44-46
[Article: "The Sorrows of a Woman Who Was Egypt's First Lad~y: the Rise
~ and Fall of Jihan al-Sadat"] �
;
' [Text] Her last request was to be appointed ambassador
~ to the United Nations.
~gyptian television declines to designate a weekly pro-
gram during which she would discuss the glorious deeds
j of the late president.
Is.Jihan al-Sadat making preparations for leaving Egypt? The news is prov~-
cative, but what is even more provocative is the life of this woman who in
recent years attained a[measure of] personal glory which vanished in [a
1 few] tumultuous, dramatic mo~ents.
She was the first~and foremost lady in al-Sadat's Egypt. How did she rise,
and how did she fall? How did she take part in government as the second
unproclaimed president? How did. she disappear from the limelight, which
left her a woman veiled in black and facing one of two choices: travel to
~ the United States or to West Germany?
i
, Between the [presidential] palace and [the contemplation of] exile the
story is a long one. This dispatch which AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI received from
Cairo is a collection of stories about Egypt's talented and ambitious Eva
Peron. For many this has been a closely guarded secret. These stories come
under the short title of "A Woman's Sorrows."
Because of their amazing nature, discussions about Jihan al-Sadat have
~ overshadowed any other discussions here [in Cairo]. They have even over-
` shadowed discussions about the life of Anwar al-Sadat himself. In most
: private gatherings the sorrows of the Lady in this particular period of
time have captured a large part of the interests of various circles.
The sorrows of al-Sadat's widow, who was Egypt's first lady are sorrows
� of a very special kind. They are sorrows for a personal glory that has
irrevocably vani~hed; they are sorrows for personal ambition fhat has
~ 4 .
FOR OF6'ICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3
. vn vr~ ~a.~na, vOG Vl~L1
melted inta thin air. Everyone knows that Mrs Jihan's ambitions did not
stop with her desire for wealth and for taking part in economic projects.
Everyone knows that her ambitions went beyond that and that she also enter-
tained political ambitions and a serious desire to "take'part in governing
Egypt" beside her husband, the late president. She even entertained
ambitions of governing Egypt by herself when necessary after his departure.
She would thus become another Eva Peron. She herself expressed that desire
to participate in the reins of power as her late husband's successor when
~ commenting on her husband's assassination in a conversation she had with Mr
Mansur Hasan, former minister of state for presidential affairs and former
minister of information and culture. Mr Mansur Hasan was removed from these
positions by al-Sadat in a cabinet shuffle in which he was the only target.
This was only one week before al-Sadat's death. In that conversation Mrs
Jihan said, "If al-Sadat's killers had succeeded in assassinating all the
political leaders on the reviewing stand for the military parade, I would
have gone myself to the Broadcast Building and made a statement to.the
people or announced Bulletin No 1."
It may be that Jihan al-Sadat's unruly desire to take part in the govern-
ment of Egypt as her husband's successor was the only reason that led her
to appear the way she did at her husband's funeral. Her appearance was
the subject of various comments in every Egyptian household. Her appearance
was that of a strong woman who was in control and who was not shaken by
what had happened. She also took pains to appear, as she usually does,
elegant and beautiful. She refused to cover her head with the black veil
of mourning, and everyone who saw her on the television screen noticed
that she was arranging her hair with her hand while her husband's body
was being laid to rest. Her fingernails were also covered with white nail
polish, and this [too] was the subject of numerous comments here. It was
also the subject of a comparison between al-Sadat's widow and the widow
of the former Shah, the Shahbanu, who appeared beside her fully dressed in
black.
Jihan al-Sadat, Umm Kulthum and the Wives of Others
Ever since the earliest days of al-Sadat's managing the government of
Egypt, Jihan al-Sadat has been working at maintaining for herself a
position of pre-eminence among the women of Egypt: Egypt's first and
foremost lady.. Toward that end she set out first on the scene of social
activity to prepare herself for her entry into the field of political
activity. Because the road to [her objective] had to go first through c.:lari-
table societies and societies for social activities, that was a reason for
her early clash with many of Egypt's women who were prominent then in that
field. Umm Kulthum was one of those women. At that tim~ Umm Kulthum had
adopted a charitable or a social project through a society she had estab-
lished for that purpose. She had begun gathering donations and contribu-
tions to that society. But Mrs Jihan soon took over that project under the
pretext of developing it. She removed Umm Kulthum, and she even kept her
away from it after she contrived a.misunderstanding with her and claimed
that she refused to have Umm Kulthum address the president by his name of
5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-04850R000500040018-3
FOR OFFICTAL USE ONLY
Anwar or by his nickname of Abu al-Anawir. [She claimed] she told Umm
Kulthum in one of their meetings, "He is the president. You must address
him as any other citizen addresses him. You must address him as Mr
president."
Umm Kulthum was extremely intelligent. She understood this message, and
she gave up her role as "prima donna" after a new one came along and wanted
to be everything by herself. Ever since then, Umm Kulthum retired from the
social activity she had initiated. She also retired from singing so that
the first lady and the new star can control the a1=Wafa' wa al-Amal pro;ect
by herself with the assistance of Mr 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman who had begun to
worm his way into the ruler's household, trying to enter it from every
door, even from that of the first lady.
What happened with Umm Kulthum happened with every other lady who was
trying to find for herself a place on the scene of social activity. Jihan
al-Sadat considered that personal competition and a challenge to her
position at the top.
That was also the reason for the fall out she had with the wife of Husayn
al-Shafi'i, who was vice president at the time. Mrs al-Shafi'i had also
begun to be active in social work through the Baladi [My Country] Society.
She had estabJ.ished that society and defined its goals: to carry out opera-
tions to clean up Cairo.
The first lady overshadowed all ladies, and her society, al-Wafa' wa
al-Amal overshadowed all societies. Mrs Husayn al-Shafi'i disappeared from
the scene just as Umm Kulthum did; her charitable society failed;,and her
husband, Husayn al-Shafi'i, was removed from his position for re~,'sons he
himself does not know to this day.
Many women were removed in this manner and for any reason no matter how
trivial. What mattered was that Egypt's first lady re:nain the center of
attention, remain in the limelight, remain in the center of activity and
remain the subject of people's conversation. It was important that she
remain the first in everything, even in beauty and elegance. It was for
this last reason alone that Dr 'A'ishah Ratib, the minister of social
affairs in Egypt, was removed. Later, she was removed even further when she
was appointed ambassador in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and did not go
back to her former position as professor at the university. Dr 'A'ishah
Ratib's crime was that people in Egypt had begun comparing her wi.th Jihan
a1-Sadat. People were saying that Dr 'A'ishah was more knowledgeable. She
paid the price of all this by being removed from her position, and she
became an example for other women who would try to compete with The Lady in
any one of these areas. Therefore, it was enough for a beautiful woman to
appear on television, and people would say that Jihan would get rid of her!
The Story of Mrs Himmat Mustafa
There is another story that is not less curious or amazing than the prece-
. ding stories: It is the story of Mrs Himmat Mustafa, zhe former television
V
6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-04850R000500040018-3
r~K urri~~n~ u~~: UNLY
announcer, and the present director of Egyptian television. This "lady" has
an instinctive talent for finding her way to reach rulers. During the age
of 'Abd-al-Nasir she was more of a Nasirist than 'Abd-al-Nasir himself.
People remember how she appeared on Egyptian television on the day
'Abd-al-Nasir announced that he was stepping down, that famous 9th day in
June. [People saw] Himmat Mustafa weeping on the television screen, and she
was asking people to reject the decision and to insist on the president's
leadership and on continuing the march.
'Abd-al-I~asir died, and the lady who was a Nasirist changed her colors and
became a follower of al-Sadat. She would shed profuse tears before every
interview she had with the new leader. She was the only one wlio interviewed
the president in the annual television interview al-Sadat made on his birth-
day. She would always cry at the beginning of every interview. She would
cry with emotion, considering that "she was in the presence of an `
inspiring, capable and talented leader who saved Egypt from perdition." She
also used her tears to pave the way for hex visit to Jerusalem. When prepa-
rations were begun to make up the media delegation that would accompany
al-Sadat to Jerusalem, Mrs Himmat went to meet the president. She wept in
his presence and pleaded with him about how much she wanted to "experience"
thi~ unprecedented political and historic event. The president complied
with her wishes and her tears, and Himmar_ Mustafa was the only Egyptian
woman in the official delegation *_hat visited Jerusalem with al-Sadat. This
was before a decree was issued appointing her presidential adviser for
press rel3tions along with Sa'd Zaghlul Nassar who was then President
al-Sadat's press secretary.
She thus became the first Egyptian woman to hold a position in al-Sadat's
private secretariat. For her, getting close to the president was the begin-
ning of the end. This is because the first lady did not allow anyone that
much ambition, that much advancement and that much success in overcoming
obstacles: Only 9 months after she was appointed to that position, the lady
announcer was removed from that position ir? an appropriate manner and
appointed director of television broadcasting. This is despite the fact
that there were candidates for that position who were more experienced and
more.efficient than she ~s and who also had seniority. But Himmat Mustafa,
nevertheless, continued to be loyal to the first lady, appreciating the
fact that the first lady did not remove her altogether but prepared for her
a position suitable to the loyalty she had dernonstrated to the president
and to his policy.
The Limousine [Service] Project
Since Mrs Jihan al-Sadat has been interested throughout the past years in
"ensuring" her economic future as a precaution against any unforeseen
situation whatsoever, she has therefore set up numerous economic pr~jects
and ~ntered into partnerships with major investors and capitalists in other
- projects. The most important of these projects to which she was~related
were those of al-Wafa' wa al-Amal Society and the limousine [service]
project.
7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-04850R000500040018-3
~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
As far as the first project is concerned, despite the fact that it is a
social project, its budget was not subject to any kind of supervision by
the state. Project books and contributions made to the society in Egypt and
from abroad, which Mrs Jihan worked diligently to obtain, remained a
closely guarded secret not known to anyone except chose who aie in charge
of the project who are her close aides.
But what is known to everyone is that in the name of this project Mrs Jihan
received large sums of money. Specifically, she received contributions
- from international and especially American agencies and organizations.
She also received contributions from important Arab personalities before
the political boycott of Egypt. The project was also used as a cover to
bring into the country devices and equipment that were not scrutinized by
customs. Consequently, no one knew what was in those huge containers that
came from abroad and were addressed to al-Wafa' wa al-Amal Society. No
one also knows how much money was offsred to that society or in what
account these funds were deposited. However, the answer to this baffling
matter soon came in news that the well-known 1,000 hectare California ranch
had been purchased in the name of the first lady. This is the farm where
the late president's son, Mr Jamal al-Sadat, was staying for a few days of
rest and relaxation when his father was assassinated.
The other project is that of the Limousine Automobile Company. This is
Mrs Jihan's project; it is hers alone. She has monopolized the operation
of a fleet of Mercedes automobiles that are run by radio in various parts
of Egypt. It is estimated that the capital of this company is 100 million
Egyptian pounds.
If making such economic preparations was a kind of precaution against the
surprises [future] days may bring, and based on the principle that politics
is a dangerous game in the Third World and that [it is a game] whose future
is unknown, the first lady's [preoccupation with these preparations] did
not mean that she ignored her political ambitions and her desire to take
part in government. Th~erefore, she began preparing herself politically,
academically and socially for this mission.
Academically, she found an opportunity to become Dr Jihan al-Sadat. As
long as she was in government, education would serve government. She was
able--and no one believes this--to start on the road with the secondary
school certificate and to go to the university. Then she obtained a
master's degree, and she is preparing for a doctorate.
The "Unknown" Talent
The Egyptian university suddenly discovered that Mrs Jihan was an unusual
talent and a clo~e~ed genius. She used to pass .every year with excellent
_ marks, revealing a~enius that exceeded that of the professors themselves.
Naturally, there were scandals everywhere, and people talked in whispers
about professors who sold their consciences for a position granted to them
by the first lady. Dr Rashad Rushdi was one of tnose who "taught" the lady.
8 .
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3

APPR~VED F~R RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3
h'UK UN'h'IC:IAL USE ONLY
The reward he received for his loyalty was a presidential appointment as
adviser for artistic and musical affai~rs. Mrs Jihan conferred positions on
most of the members of Rushdi's family. She even appointed his nephew,
journalist Ahmad Bahjat editor-in-chief and president of the board of direc-
tors of one of Egypt's. weeklies. She also prevented his trial in the sec-
tarian sedition incidents. His articles ir. AL-AHRAM were a clear invitation
- [to sedition], inciting Muslims one time and Copts the other time.
Just as Rashad Rushdi was rewarded, various professors who offered their
academic services to Mrs Jihan were rewarded. Dr Mustafa Abu Talib, who
was director of the university when the lady [was a student at the univer-
~ sity] became speaker of the People's Assembly. Dr Subhi 'Abd-al-Hakim who
- was dean of the College of Arts where she graduated and where she was later
appointed, became president of the Advisory Council and so on.
On the political level Mrs Jihan al-Sadat tried to maintain for herself a
prominent position on the domestic scene and on the foreign scene as well.
In addition to chairing the local council (the political council) of the
governorate of al-Minufiyah, she used to attend various political events
inside and outside Egypt. When she visited the United States "alone" last
February, she did not hesitate to make numerous political statements just
as though she were responsible for making that policy. This provoked the
opposition in Egypt and prompted Dr Hilmi Murad to write and ask what right
did "the president's wife" have to make political statements. That mere
question was enough to arouse the president's anger against Hilmi Murad who
was later disciplined when he was arrested along witn those who were
charged with inciting sectarian sedition in Egypt.
Mrs Jihan used to affirm to everyone that she was a lady qualified for
government. She used to "negotiate;" to meet with delegations; to meet
with stars; to give press interviews; to dance with heads of state and
to show the West an image of a woman who was extremely modern and
enlightened. Besides, she was a daily item on televisi~~n news in one form
or another, and [she apeared] in various publications.
Actual Participation in Government
Naturally, Mrs Jihan al-Sadat was not satisfied with the fact that the
years she would spend by her late husband's side would merely be years in
which she would prepare herself for government. Instead, she thought she
should spend these years participating in government as well. Hence, her
presence influenced the decision making process. There were numerous minis-
ters who were personally loyal to her. In fact, she was capable of issuing
her instructions to all ministers if there was a need to do so. There were
juurnalists whose survival depended on her. Aminah al-Sa'id was her per-
sonal friend and adviser, and so was Muhammad 'Abd-al-Jawwad, president of
a news agency, and Safwat al-Sharif, president of radio and television
broadcasting. In addition, the speaker of the People's Assembly and the
president of the Advisory Council depended on her as well. For a period of
time 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman represented the strong arm she extended into the
9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040500040018-3
FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY
management of government. But then there was a disagreement between them
because of family problems. She replaced him by Sayyid Mar'i who was a
close political adviser and a relative.
The Shock and the Collapse of Ambition
The lady's'ambition continued even after al-Sadat's assassination. In the
first hours that followed the assassination of her husband, some of her
proteges told her that the People's Assembly would nominate her vice presi-
dent. This was something she urgently desired and was striving for. But
she was later surprised, after the presidential referendum and the selec-
tion of President Mubarak president, to see ali. her hopes begin to
collapse. President Mubarak turned out to be completely different from what
she expected or thought he would be. The man dealt with himself firmly,
thinking he should set an example for everybody. He issued instructions to
the agencies of the media asking them not to publish any news about his
f.amily or his private life. They were not to publish anything about his
wife or his family under any circumstances whatsoever. He issued instruc-
tions to the ministers asking them to stay away from the limelight and to
- refrain from making promises they cannot keep and statements they cannot
carry out.
Mrs Jihan was by necessity out of the limelight, .but she could not tolerate
that. She wanted to.test the situation herself so as to determine what the
coming days would be like for her. She began making numerous requests.
She asked that television cameras record her private meeting with one of
the.delegatioris that came to visit her from the United States. Safwat
al-Sharif, director of Radic and Television [Broadcasting Agency] declined.
He told her he was at her service and that he would actually like to do
that. But he said he could not do what she asked because his instructions
would not allow him to. He affirmed his loyalty to her, and he was moved to �
tears during.his conversation [with her], so she comforted him.
Then she asked that a statement be broadcast to the people to commemorate
the 40th day of her late husband's death. That request was denied with
intense regrets. Her response was to publish a statement in the newspapers
stating that "Women would not be receiving mourners coming to offer con-
dolences."
~ She asked that an.hour on television be designated every week for a discus-
sion of the late president's glorious deeds and accomplishments. The reply
[she was given] was, "We will think about it, God willing."
She asked that a number of rest houses which had been designated for the
late president be designated for her and the family just as the mansion
in al-Jizah and Alexandria were. But she was told that that would not be
possible also. At the same time President Mubarak asked that a Large number
of these rest houses be disposed of and turned over to the agencies with
which they were originally affiliated, such as the rest house at Ismailia
which is owned by the Suez Canal [Authority].
- . 10
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007142/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000540040018-3
r~uR ur~~~ic:~A~ u~E OI~LY
Ambassador. . . Or?
Jihan thus realized that her ambitions for government, for stardom, for
the world of limelights had begun to collapse altogether., So her last
request was to be appointed ambassador of Egypt at the United Nations.
And here numerous questions are being raised in Egypt.
Would this be the beginning of a permanent immigration? Has the lady who
used to be the first lady decided to immigrate to her ranch in California?
Or is this a political ambition that cannot easily be forgotten? Will the
lady actually travel and begin her voluntary exile? Or will future days
open the books on the last 10 years: the books oii politics, on the economy,
- on the university, on al-Wafa' wa al-Amal, on the Limousine Automobile
Company and on whatever [else] has been hidden?
COPYRIGHT: 1981 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI
8592
CSO: 4504/169
11
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3
FOR OFF7CIAL USE ONLY ~
EGYPT
LUTFI AL-KHULI CONSNiENTS ON GROiJPING PARTY PROGRAM
Paris AL-W4TAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 252, 11-17 Dec 81 pp 42-43
[Article: "An Open Letter about the Grouping Party's Position on Current
Egyptian Conditions; Lutfi al-Khuli Says, 'Our Strategic Choices Are Firm
and Binding, and Our Tactics Do not Include Trickery and Submission'
[Text] The document published by AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in its recent issue,
which included the full text of the polit;.~?1 report issued by the National
Progressive Unionist Grouping Party, the opposition party in Egypt, raised
broad p,olitical reactions in the Arab homeland and in some European circles.
We received scores of telephone calls and a large number of letters early
in the weE~, especially from Egyptians. '~hese calls and letters commented
on.the report and also on the position of the Grouping Party after the
departure of dl-Sadat. The Grouping party is the party that endured the
most in the campaign of arrests which was launched by the former president
of Egypt against different factions who opposed his policy.
Readers who communicated with us were asking if the Grouping party had ~
changed its policy after President Husni Mubarak took over the responsi-
bility [of the presidency], especially with regard to the Camp Dayid
accords and the Egyptian-Israeli treaty. They were asking if the Grouping
party had changed its policy after the new Egyptian president released some
of its leaders, who were among the 31 persons released from custody, even
though others are still being held pending trial by the State Supreme
Security Court. '
In an attempt to answer these questions AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI contacted Mr ~
~Lutfi a1=Khuli in his capacity as one of the leaders of the Grouping party.
His name is still~included in the detention and trial decree. At the
present time he is in Paris where he is undergoing trc:atment. He preferred
answering our questions in writing. The full text of }.iis reply follows.
1.. I thank you and I also thank [our] brothers who wrote the letters for
the interest you show in Egypt's causes and in the struggle of its people.
I also thank you for your conscientious effort to inform your readers about
the positions and policies of our party which has been and still is a new
12 .
FOR OFF[CIAL U3E ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3
r~K ~rri�w~ u~~ UNLY
experience in political organization and thought in the context of the
experiences of the Arab homeland in this field. The Grouping party is an
- attempt to set up a public, legal party that would serve as the political
home [so to speak] for all leftist factions with their various ideological
premises. These would come together in Egypt's [current] circumstances,
around strategic political, economic and social choices and form one politi-
cal force with unified action.
2. The strategic choices for our party are stilY firm and binding. Only
the party's General National Congress can change these choices, and the ~
National Congress has not been convened, nor has it considered any proposed
changes to these strategic choices until this writing. Accordingly, it is
not true and it is basically irrelevant to say that changes have been made
recently in these choices or that the party's program, which includes these
choices, has been amended after the death of President al-Sadat and after
, President Husni Mubarak became president.
Chief among these choices are that Egypt is an indivisible part of the
Arab homeland; tliat the Pa?estinian question is the central question of the
Arab Liberation Movement; that the Liberation Organization is the only legi-
timate representative of the Palestinian people; that there is to be no
reconciliation with the Zionist enemy; and that the Arab-Israeli dispute
is a national, not a regional dispute. This struggle is a distinct part of
the struggle of the Arab Liberation Movement against all old and new forms
of imperialism and colonialism.
Hence the position of our party has been and still is to condemn the Camp
David policy; to reject the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and the normaliza-
tion of relations with Israel; [to reject] Egypt's isolation from its Ara.b
nation; [to.reject] the military facilities granted to.the United States;
and [to reject] Egypt's departure from the policy of non-alignment.
Possibilities for Change
3. Our party, like any other party in every society, has sErategies and
tactics to serve these strategies. If a strategy is firm, tactics have
to be flexible,so as to deal effectively with the variables and given fac-
tors of [all] situations.
Naturally, President al-Sadat's departure in the bloody, tragiE manner
in which that incident took place and under the circumstanc'es in which
it occurred [would seem to suggest change]. [When] President Husni Mubarak
. took office, some ~f the slogans he proclaimed were a rontinuation of Presi-
dent a1-Sadat's policy, especially with regard to the Camp David policy and
peaceful relations with Israel. In other slogans some differences with
President al-Sadat's policy were noted, especially with regard to relative
freedom for the opposition to express itself and changing the method of
implementing the open-door policy, by putting more emphasis on production
rather than on consumption. He also stopped hostile campaigns in the press
against Arabs. .
13
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3
FOR OFF'iCIAL USE ONLV
Furthermore, President Mubarak invited our party along with other parties
to engage in a dialogue with him.
In view of these "new conditions" there are all kinds of possibilities
for change, and these exist side by side with specific policies that the
regime will continue to pursue.
Hence, I am quite certain that our party has not changed its strategic
choices; nor has it changed its positions on the Camp David policy, on the
treaty and on the normalization of relations with the Israeli enemy. At the ~
same time our party, which is.a political force and not a political club,
has not hesitated in its pursuit of tactics to deal with the possibilities
and given data of the new conditions and with President Mubarak's invi-
.tation to engage in a dialogue. Tactful dealings do not mean that our party
is engaged in trickery or is submitting blindly to new conditions. Tactful
dealings rather mean geeting to the bottom of these conditions, examining
their depth and their orientation and participating with all the other
national forces to steer these new conditions toward a proper patriotic,
national democracy.
Leadership in the Field
4. It is self-evident that the determination of the party's policy in dea-
ling with the premises and possibilities of the new conditions is first
and foremost the responsibility of the party's leaders who are out in the
field. Those are [the people] who have the opportunity to find out the
nature and the dimensions of circumstances; they have their hands on the.
pulse of the nation, and they know the opinions of the infrastructure of
parties. They are not the ones who were thrown in prisons or who were
_ forced to stay abroad, regardless of their status in the leadership
[hierarchy]. When I say the leaders of our party who are in the field I
mean the members of the Central Committee and the General Secretariat who
were not arrested and who stayed out of prison and the secretary general of
the party, Mr Khalid Muhi al-Din. The actions they take adhere to the
party's program and the party's strategic choices and [demonstrate] an
appreciation of their responsibilites to all the levels af the party's
- leadership until that time when the party recovers from the blows that
befell it.
5. What was published ~in your magazine is actually the complete text of
"The Proposed Political Report." This proposed report is prepared, accor-
ding to the traditions of our party, by a committee whose members are
selected from the members of the General Secretariat. The proposed,report
was prepared in the light of discussions about current condition~ within
the secretariat.
6. According to the rules and traditions of the party, after the proposal
is prepared, it is presented to party organizations in the governorates for
discussion. What comes out of these discussions, along with observations
and critical remarks, is compiled and the general secretariat ultimately
-14 ~
~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3
MuK uh~M~IC;1Al. UgE UNLY
presents the proposed report, to which a collection of observations and
critical remarks are attached, to the Central Committee. Both documents are
discussed in the Central Committee, and suggestions for deletions,
additions or amendments are offered by the colleagues who are members of
the Central Committee. There is a special committee within the Central
Committee which writes the final text of the party's political report in
light of the principal lines [about which an agreement] is reached during
the open, democratic discussion.
I cari affirm that not a single report that was presented by the general
se~retariat to the Central Committee throughout the life of our party has
not been enriched by discussion. There was not a single report whose final
form was not slightly or greatly different from the proposed report that
had been presented. We consider this phenomenon in our party healthy and an
indication of its vitality.
Eight Observations
7. According to reliable information I received the proposed political
report that was presented by the general secretariat went through all these
stages.~It was discussed, and the discussion produced a set of observations
and critical remarks made by a number of colleagues. These were included in
a party document that was presented to the Central Committee along with the
proposed report.
Of these observations and critical remarks we mention eight points only
to provide an example.
First, the proposed report based its analysis on two anomalous incidents,
notwithstanding their extreme significance. These are: (1) the phenomenon
of terrorism that has surfaced recently; and (2) the sudden and violent
departure of President~ al-Sadat. The fact that these two incidents were
considered the center of the report and not its introduction upset the
basic organization of the report, t~.xrning it into a document that was
closer to a political statement than a political report submitted to the
party's Central Committee.
This resulted in the absence.of ari integrated analysis of material facts on
the Egyptian scene from various points of view. There is no analysis of the
relationship between material facts in Egypt and those on the Arab and
- international scenes; nor is there an analysis based on the party's prin-
ciples and political positions, as defined during the course of the party,
of the mutual effects between those material facts in Egypt and those on
the Arab and international scene at this stage. This absence of an integ-
rated analysis has resulted, in turn, in the fact that proposed party
functions were to a large degree general [in character] and did not express
the specific aspects of those material facts.
Second, despite the fact that we appreciate~the gravity of the terrorist
incidents--incidents which we condemn--that have recently surfaced in poli-
tical life and despite our appreciation of the importance of the change in
15
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3
FOR OFFICIAL U~~ ONLY
,
the presidency, with President Husni Mubarak assuming the office of presi-
dent after the assassination of former president, Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat,
we do not see in all of this anything that would make us conclude that we
are facing a new political stage, as the proposed report states on the
basis of these two incidents.
It is our opinion that the term, "new stage," in this regard means prima-
rily a set of coordinated, basic policies whose sum total constitutes the
public policy of a regime at a certain stage of its development. Unless we
are facing this change in secondary policies or in executive programs that
would put basic policies into practice, [what we have] constitutes no more
than a new management of the same public policy that is adopted by the
regime.
We may in fact be on the verge of a new stage, but what was presented by
the report does not constitute the components of such a stage. The report
lacks an adequate, integrated, coherent analysis of effective forces on the
local scene and of international variables to prove that we are on the.
verge of a new stage, especially since the proposed report affirms tnat the
change that came about with the departure of President Anwar a1-Sadat did
not alter the basic nature of the existing regime even though it is
possible that that may lead to the replacement of a few courses of action
and methods of execution.
Third, the proposed report begins by saying that it is the masses and
nations that make history. Then the report states with regret that the
masses in Egypt, in this historical period, are not capable of shaping
their lives to serve their own interests. [In Egypt] the present and the
future of the masses is determined by the role played by one individual
whom fate places at the top of government. That is why there were fundamen-
tal differences, which were referred to in the report, between
'Abd-al-Nasir's and al-Sadat's period. Thus, [the report states that] we
believe.that it is the masses who shape the future, but that they are not
cap.able of doing so [in Egypt] where history is forged by the individual
who heads the government. All these absolute contradictory statements lead
to confusion and raise questions. .
What is the use of our work if the masses are impotent? Is not this an
excuse for being passive and apathetic? If an individual's role is that
absolute, is not this an ideological justification for advocates of poli-
tical assassination who think that assassinating a president will~lead ro a
change in our destiny?
Fourth, the proposed report openly agrees with the emergency measures that
are being adopted by the government. Is this the position of a party,
scores of whose leaders and members were arrested? [Is this the position
of a party] whose publications were confiscated?
The report speaks about the September measures that led to the detention
~ of ],536 citizens and the transfer of more than 100 university professors
and journalists from their position~ to others that have nothing to do
16
FOR OFF'ICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-04850R000500040018-3
h~UN UN'N'I(;IAL USE ONLY
- with their areas of specialization. The report speaks about these measures
as "nrotective measures" taken after matters got worse. Does the party
really consider these measures a preventive strike even though that strike
came late?
Fifth, the formulation of the report is controlled by the agencies of the
media whose current jargon it uses. Because terms such as security, safety,
tranquillity, peace, violence, terror, liberalization of production, etc.
are used often, they have assumed the form of slogans without a clear defi-
nition of the party's understanding of any of them.
The report was also full of judgments or absolute and premature condemna-
tions such as those that are current in the agencies of the media at the
present time. For example, the report states that President al-Sadat was
assassinated by the "bullets of fanatic terrorists." How did we come up
with such a judgment when the investigation is still being conducted in
total secrecy, when the trial has not yet begun and the~courts have not yet
issued their verdict? Such condemnations and descriptions are among those
that are being used by agencies of the media at the present time. The fact
is that the line quoted by media agencies has changed more than once in
this regard since President al-Sadat was assassinated. It was said that the
assassination was the result of the individual motives of a group [of
- people] outside the army. It was said that the assassination was related to
the tragic events of Asyut. It was said that those who carried out the
assassination were 12 men from the armed forces after [it was reported
that] they~were 4 or 5 outside the armed forces. The whole truth is still
unknown. Nevertheless, we set ourselves up in judgment, and we issue ver-
dicts! The proposed report also openly accuses Islamic groups of working
for others abroad and of receiving finances from abroad. This is what has
been repeated by the agencies of the media; but the truth [of these allega-
tions] has not been established, and no reliable verdict from the courts
has been issued. This is the same charge that is often repeated with regard
to factions of the opposition. And once again we issue a condemnation. It
was not that long ago that the Grouping party was accused in the events of
18 and 19 January 1977 by the former president, and the campaign that was
launched by media agencies in that regard has not been that long ago. But
the courts did speak and vindicate all the members of our party.
Sixth, the proposed report mentions that we are not opposed to finding
ways out of the pitfalls of the Camp David accords. In our opinion this
wording is unfortunate. It is the position of the party to reject Camp
David and, accordingly, to take action in an effort to avoid its con-
sequences. As far as looking for ways to get the Camp David process out of
its pitfalis is concerned, that is the function of those who made the
- accords and those who support them.
Seventh, as our party affirms its conviction that the question of ~
Palestine--the homeland and the people--is the center of the struggle in
the area, it is aware of its role in making the joint Arab struggle in
support of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the only legitimate rep-
resentative of the Palestinian geople, a struggle that can settle this
~17 ~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY �
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3
i
~ FOR OFFICUL USE ONLY
~
i
I
question, not only in the interests of the Palestinian people and their
legitimate rights, but also for establishing a just and comprehensive peace
in the entire area. This is the proper road to the restoration of stable
- ~ Egyptian-Arab relations.
Eighth, an exchange of opinion about current problems with the broadest
political and social forces in Egypt is essential to preclude the growth
of the violence and terrorism phenomenon. This is based on an awareness
of the danger of this destructive phenomenon, not only to any democratic
action, but also wiXh regard to the question of progress in Egypt in
general.
8. These are some of the observations and critical remarks that were dealt
with publicly during the Central Committee's open debate and in party
documents. I have no doubt that all of this has enriched the proposed poli-
tical report and Ehat that has accordingly been reflected on its final
version which was approved and issued by the Central Committee. Unfor-
tunately, I have not yet received the final report that is binding on the
party. I will send you a copy as soon as I receive it, and I ask that you
print it.
9. I[respectfully] decline to answer your question about my personal
position on the propo.sed report as a member of the party's General Sec- ~
retariat. This is because my obligations to the party do not give me the
right, regardless of my position in the party, to discuss the party's
documents in newspapers. Such discussions take place freely within the
organizational channels of the party. This is what I actually did when I
sent my observations and my critical remarks to the General Secretariat in
Cairo. The General Secretariat alone has the right to announce them and
circulate them in accordance with the bylaws of the party.
l0. Finally, I hope that my letter to you will have help.ed as much as ~os-
sible in answering your questiors and the questions your readers have regar-
ding the positions of our party, the methods and means by which the party
makes decisions and the climate under which those decisions are made or the
political report is issued. Once again I thank you for your interest.
With sin~ere appreciation and regard,
Lutfi al-KY?uli ~
AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI: It is known that Mr Lutfi al-Khuli is a member of the
General Secretariat of the Grouping party and that he is the party's
secretary for Arab affairs. His name was on the list of detainees whose
arrest was ordered by al-Sadat last September. But he escaped prison
because he has been abroad since last August, recovering from a heart
attack.
Last November President Husni Mubarak issued a decree turning Mr al-Khuli
and 21 of his colleagues who are under arrest to the Supreme State Security
. 18
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500440018-3
rv~c vrrn.lAL UJ~ V1VLY
Court. They are being charged with trying to form a national coalition
. to overthrow al-Sadat's regime in cooperation with the Soviet Union and
Islamic groups.
In statements made to international news agencies Lutfi al-Khuli had asked
President Husni Mubarak to try from his new position to create a healthy
climate.in Egypt that would close the tragic chapter which ended the life �
of President al-Sadat. He asked him to do so by releasing immediately and
without exception all those who were arrested in September; by restoring
all university professors, journalists and writers who had been removed
from their positions to their positions; by .repealing all the laws that
restrict freedom, chief among which~is the Law of Shame; and by reinstating
~ the legal board [of directors] of the bar association. That board had been
removed from office arbitrarily in violation of the constitution. Mr
al-Khuli asked President Mubarak to open the door to a real dialogue about
fundamental political choices, chief among which is the Camp David policy.
Such a dialogue was violently repressed and aborted by the legislative and
security agencies during the administration of President al-Sadat.
Mr al-Khuli also asked President Mubarak to convene an Arab summit con-
ference and to present to it the Camp David policies he had inherited.
He asked that all Arab officials be placed squarely in front of their res-
ponsibilities regarding this matter so that a unified Arab position can be
achieved and Egypt, through that position, can be restored to its leader-
ship role in the Arab homeland and in the Arab Liberation Movement.
Mr al-Khuli affirmed that all this required che formation of a national
coalition government in which all national forces and parties would partici-
pate. Such a government would have credibility and effectiveness with both
the Egyptian and the Arab masses.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI
8592
CSO: /~504/169
` 19 .
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~
- IRAN
PROMISES, RESULTS, METIiODS OF KHOMEYNI REVOLiJ'~ION COMPARED
Bonn EUROPA ARCHIV in German No 1-37, 10 ,Tan 82 pp 21-28 .
[Article by Ulrich Encke of the Bavarian Radio, Munich, who was radio correspondent
of the Working Group of the FRG Broadcaeting Institutes in Tehran in 1979-1980
and has been traveling correspondent for Iran since: "Between Revolution and
Tyranny--Three Years of Mullah Rule in Iran"]
[Text] Independence, freedom and social justice--to reach those three aims,
Ayatollah Khomeyni ~ad said in his exile in Paris, would be the main task of the
Islamic Republic. They are still being repeatedly talked about in Iran, but their
propagandist nature has meanwhile become apparent to all. The historic opportunity
of a new political beginning following the revolution has been missed. Reviewing
the situation not quite 3 years after the revolution, one realizes that~Iran has
not even approached those three great aims. Though under different ideological
auspices, the same problems still determine everyday politics, and the same unsuit-
able attempts at solving the problems are being made. Even the internal organiza-
tional structures of the ruling fundamentalist Islamic camp and of the opposition
ominously recall the past.
Economic Dependence on Foreign Countries
The dependence of the Islamic Republic of Iran on foreign countries today is every
bit as great.as it was under the shah and can only increasP in the future. The
Islamic fraternal war with Iraq, which professes to be secular, has made p~strevolu-
tionary Iran dependent on arms supplies from abroad. If the deliveries of kerosene
from.the Soviet Union for the Iranian Air Force were to atop or if the dtiiveries ~
- of mun'itions, missiles and grenades from the Western countries--particularly the _
United States, Great Britain and the German Federal Republic--were to cease, the
ayatollahs would h~ave~to hoist white flags on their southern and western fronts.
The war itself was started by Iraq--no doubt about that--but it was a war which was.
definitely welcome to those in power in Tehran, who needed a new domestic political
~ lightning rod after the end of the embassy siege in Tehran. In addition the war
provided an opportunity for tying down at th~ front an army which~was suspected of
being politically unreliable. These considerations are still valid today, more
than a year after the war began. It is therefore not only Baghdad but also Tehran
that bears responsibility for the war. Dependence on foreign arms was wittingly
taken into the~ba*gain in order to cover up insoluble domestic political problems.
~ 20.
~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Some initial parallels become apparent here. At the same time the dependence is
now becoming noticeable, for, unlike their Iraqi adversary, the Iranians have only
managed to remedy the shortcomings in the supply of spare parts and ammunition
caused by the war, while liaving been denied access to new and more effective weapons
systems. They will not lose the war on that account, but they will not win it on
that account either. There are primarily two reasons which have led to this stale~
mate. For one thing, the unpredictability of Tehran's policies have been standing
' in the way of any military partnership with countries in the East or West. For
another thing, there are economic difficulties because Iran's ability to pay is
being placed in doubt.
The collapse of Iranian economic activity abroad caused by the revolution and the
utter lack of concepts of law and order on the basis of Islamic values have driven
the country into an economic and financial crisis from which it certainly cannot
escape on its own. Already some few crisis symptoms are making it clear that the
Islamic appeals for moderation, such as are now the order of the day, cannot help
the country along.
Iranian foreign currency reserves have dropped to about 2 billion U.S. dollars,
forcing the government to make drastic restrictiona of i.mports, which had again
begun to rise slightly last year.l The preferential treatment of food imports to
insure basic needs occurred at the ~xpense of imports of raw materials and semi-
finished goods. This in turn could not help but have repercussions in the sector
of the finishing industry. Thus in late fall 1981 ~he utilization of industrial
capacities--down to 40 percent as it was--was reduced by another 15 percent. With
an inflation rate which is 25 percent according to official data but actually is
- as high as 50 percent in certain sectors,2 and an unemployment rate of an estimated
5 million, this could be coped with only if, as in former times, funds could be
provided for the individual and society as a whole with the aid of foreign currency
obtained from oil exports. Current oil production does not make this possible,
however.
If Iran adheres to its current production quota of 800,000 barrels a day,3 foreign
currency reserves will be all used up in about 3 months. According to--albeit
unofficial--computations by the ministry concerned, Iran would have to produce at
least 2.5 million barrels a day to keep its economy going more or less. Consider-
ing the current problems, such a figure would represent a utopian target.
Unsuccessful Social Revolution
So here too postrevolutionary politics have led to increased economic dependence on
foreign countries rather than to the hoped for emancipation. This is but one side
of the medal, however. In addition to the country's economic freedom, the utopias
of economic improvement and social justice entertained by both the middle class .
and the lower class and above all by the lumpen proletariat settled around Tehran
went for naught. The middle class had speculated that after elimination of the
upper class it would form the new elite in the country and.thus be able to play a
leading sociopolitical role, but its largely opportunistically motivated contribu-
tion to the revolution was not acknowledged.
21
~ ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R400540040018-3
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
- Following the predictable breakup of the antiahah oppoaition movement, the post-
revolutionary power struggles assumed the nature of a class struggle. The masses
of the lower strata and of the subproletariat under the lea~3ership of the fundamen-
talist portion of the clerics rebelled against the middle class and its intellectual
representatives. A campaign agains t the "Westernized intellectuals" justified by
cultural independence, restrictive measures against bourgeois, leftist and also
Islamic Oppo~ition groups, as well as the banning of any kind of non-Islamic ideas,
pushed all forces not belonging to the fundamentalist camp first into a hopeless
minority position and then underground.
This political plan might have worked if the economic and social needs of the
- "barefoot" had been satisfied at the same time, but in light of the enormous eco-.
nomic difficulties that was and still is impossible. For almost 2 years this had
no political consequences. Despite no change in the catastrophic economic situatioa
of the individua~� the mass identified with the revolution and its fundamentalist
propagandists. The fee?.ing for the first time in one's life to be able to develop
an identity of one's own, and thus a senae of one's own importance, weighed more
heavily than any everyday economic difficulties. "The emphasis on being prepared
to suffer and on a sense of importance on the part of the members of the lower
class in this ideology apparently can cover up time and again the discrepancy
between the expectations aroused by the revolution and the miserable actual
conditions."4
Today this does not seem to work any longer, however. At least the fundamentalist
camp apparently does not believe any longer that it can, In the meantime, it so
happens, there has occurred, not the hopec? for more equitable distribution of social
prosperity, but a redistribution of poverty, with the criteria of distribution
deriving not from overriding postulates of juatice but from the power interests of
the fundamentalist clerics.
The political program now in force can be reduced to a simple common denaminator:
development of the country has been abandoned at the expense of develogment in the
capital, Tehran. In the final analysis, in a country whose area is bigger than Che
European Community, it is the masses in the capital that decide who is in power
in Iran.
The land re�orm, which previously had foundered on ideological Islamic debates
about the question of ownership, has now had to be abandoned for the time heing for
economic reasons. This also means that nothing has become of the plan--actually
not very realistic anyway--to lead the l~pen proletariat composed of persons
having fled the rural areas and now residing in the sout:: of the capital back to
agriculture, and thus to a way of life with which it was f amiliar at one time.
Apart from isolated idealistic overtures, it has also been necessary to stop the
holy war for reconstruction. The center no longer distributes funds to supporters
of the fundamentalist camp who only a year ago still got whatever they needed while
working almost all over the country, in small groups, primarily on projects of
electrification and irrigation and building schools, hospitals and other social
institutions. This has not only led to the suspension of innumerable small develop-
ment projects but also has destroyed the fruits of the labor of trust connected with
them. Other cost-effective reform programs--for instance, in the cultural and
educational sector--were also suspended.
22 .
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007142/09: CIA-RDP82-40854R040500040018-3
~OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
To the extent that the remaining funds are not uaed for the subsidy of food
serving everyone's purpose, they are now being channeled to the south of Tehran--
- in other words, to where the residuum of the Islamic revolution is located, the
Muslims whom Khomeyni affectionately calls "the barefoot." Without these the mullahs
and ayatollahs could not stay in power today, any more than the shah could have been
- overthrown without them. They have no been turned into "oil rentiers"--though at
an extremely modest level--in order to insure the necessary mass base for exercising
power.
Thus Iranian politics, however, are lapsing into the old mistakes which doomed the
shah's regime--gross neglect of rural development at the expense of the Tehran
hydrocephalus so vital for power; a privileged position not of a social class but,
in terms of the entire country, of a small group of chosen people; forgoing of
reform programs and thus of a national perspective (which really was a quite impor-
tant aim of the revolution) and squander of the natural oil wealth to procure funds
for small groups with the sole purpose of promoting the rulers' power interests.
The Machinery of the New Repression
= Political, economic and social injustices are the inevitable result, and this in
turn leads to discontent and attitudes against the mullah regime. Politically
speaking, the fundamentalists appear to be unable to resolve this conflict of
objectives between the struggle for a power base at the center and the need for a
balanced development of the whole country. They therefore react the same way as
others have done before them in Iran--with repression and, in part, brutal oppres-
sion. The instruments they use for this are those organizations which were created
originally~ for securing the revolution. They are the revolutionary courts which
were formed because of a justified distrust of the judiciary built up by the shah
and which are now under the complete control of the Islamic clerics. They are the
revolutionary committees whose task it was at one time to smash the local shah
organizations and to perform in the villages and the urban districts of the major
centers a labor of trust for the revolution closely affiliated with the citizenry.
Finally, they are the "guardians of the revolution"--the revolutionary guards who
at one time were built up as a politically reliable force vis-a-vis the old army.
One cannot tell as yet to what extent today's SAVAM, the organization which succeeded
the infamous St~VAK intelligence service, is employed in this, but one thing is
sure: some~political opponents have already been "treated" at the new Tehran
intelligence service headquarters.
In the first months after the revolution, when they almost exclusively confronted
representatives of the old system, these revolutionary organizations still enjoyed
the confidence of the .population as a whole, their actions being considered severe,
but just from a revolutionary point of view. Moreover the people believed the
assurances of the religious leadership and, above all, the repeated assurances of
Ayatollah Khomeyni, that all these organizations would be dissolved again once the
judiciary had caught up with the past. It did not happen that way. The revolution-
ary committees, the revolutionary courts and the revolutionary guards have been
anchored in law, and provisional revolutionary tools became institutionalized
instruments of oppression of a ruling minority. It it is the work of these feared
and hated organizations that causes a feeling among average Iranians that the third
great revolutionary aim--more internal freedom--has not been attained either, and
probably cannot be attained any longer under the present conditions.
23.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007142/09: CIA-RDP82-40854R040500040018-3
FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY
Though the ideological auspices are different, one cannot overlook the parallel
to the ti.me af the shah here either. The more the desire to stay in power becomes
a political aim in itself, the more the internal contradictions become evident. The
more articulate the opposition caused by *his becomes, the more brutal are the blows
from above.
- This became apparent for the first time when the Iranian media were made to toe the
funda^~entalist line and freedom of the press was virtually elimiaated. It became
noticeable again when political developments at the universities were not taken
in hand the way the fundamentalist liked, and the universities were forcibly closed.
They have remained closed to this day, with about 600,000 young people being robbed
= of their acade~iic prospects. The whole thing was declared to be a counterrevolution.
The same process could be observed at elementary and secondary schools; what had .
started as an "Islamic purge" of the teaching staff and curriculums ended up as
a political forcing into line and control of the schools which had nothing to do
with any.educational reform. The same has h3ppened in the plants, where the strike
councils so vital to the revolution have been dissolved and replaced b,y loyal plant
committees.
Breakup and Weakening of the Opposition
This seizure of power by the--at the ti.me still solid--fundamentalist camp, penetra-
ting all social spheres, resulted in a polarization which also forced the opposition
to regroup. There too, there were parallels to the expiring ti.mes of the shah that
could not be overlooked. Representatives of opposition groupings were either driven
underground or went into exile of their own volition. The first to be affected were
the leading men of the National and the National Democratic Front, representing the
bourgeois and left-liberal camp. Then came the turn of the Islamic social revolu-
tionary mujahedeen and the Marxist-Leninist Fedayeen-e Khalq. Finally, the last
prominent victim was Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr, considered to be part of the leftist
Islamic camp. He was removed from the office of president and after several weeks
underground remerged in Paris, from where, imitating his erstwhile idol Khomeyni,
he intends to organize a counterrevolution.
Bani-Sadr's removal and flight put an end to the camouflage of the differences in
the Islamic Republic, with the internal opposing positions becoming clearly apparent.
- The upholders of armed resistance are the social-revolutionary mujahedeen, who are
presumably responsible for the numerous terrorist attacks of the past few months.
But just as the most varied ideological and religious groupings united at the end
of the shah's rule in a kind of front of rejection of the ruling house, so today
too the muhajedeen are merely the label of a checkered opposition movement. Just
as then, so again today bourgeois and left-liberals, enlightened and leftist Muslims,
Marxist and grand bourgeois have agreed to the lowest co~on denominator--to reject-
ing the present rule in Iran. This means that this opposition movement too already
contains the seed of its breakup, with new political conflicts programmed.
This is one of the reasons why the opposition as yet has not taken a consistent
stand as an overall social counterforce. Another reason is the active terrorism
developed by individual groupings of the movement, which is also a subject of
controversy within the opposition. The radical ideological claim of the muha~edeen
acting as the spearhead and the ruthless way in which they proceed have so far
prevented the politically unorganized masses from making common cause with the
24. .
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02109: CIA-RDP82-00854R000500040018-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
opposition movement. As a result two groupings--meanwhile largely isolated as
far as society as a whole is concerned--are fighting each other with terrorist
actions, while the frightened population is observing events from s safe distance.
The brutality with which the execution machinery was started has been as repulsive
as the ruthlessness with which the opposition placed its bombs. At the moment the
deadly merry-go-round, constantly started again by mass execution, ensuing bombings
and more mass executions, appears to have come to a comparative halt. There are
several reasons for that. Even though the muha~edeen who provide the active fighters
from their underground organization stress their unbroken fighting strength almost
daily, they have been hit seriously by the execution of 2,000 of their members.
While there are no exact data about the strength of their organization, they
probably have had at most 5,000 fighters and another some 30,000 supporters. All
their boasting notwithstanding, the fact that their leader, Massoum Rajawi, had to
go into exile in Paris, indicates that their ogranzation is not all that strong.
Making a virtue of necessity, the opposition has declared its now noticeable reserve
to be its new strategy, with the justification that there no longer exists an
unequivocal confrontation but that there is a split right through the ruling funda�-
mentalist camp itself which the opposition must take advantage of. Any violent
action against the religious camp, they say, would only lead to solidarity within
that camp--a solidarity which otherwise was in doubt.
- Permament Power Struggle ~
The political differences within the religious camp are in fact apparent. For one
thing, there are differences of opinion concerning the handling of the opposition,
- with some demanding ruthless severity and others considering a policy of reform
to be a more effective way of proceeding against the opposition than executions.
For another thing, there are fundamentally different orientations. The group
around President Hojjat al-eslam Ali Khamenei aims at testing a model after the pattern
of Libya or Syria, leaning on but not sumitting to the Soviet Union in the process.
- The politicians around Speaker Hojjat ol-eslam Hashemi Rafsanjani want to build up
an independent but rather Western oriented Islamic society. These differing concepts
become apparent in all questions of detail--from the question of ownership to cul-
tural revolutionary overtures to evaluation of the clerics' political leadership
role in government.
As in all the other questions, Ayatollah Khomeyni, as the leader of the revolution
who continues to stand above all else, avoids any kind of clear stand. In accor-
dance with the principle of "divide and rule," he tries to maintain a balance
between the two competing groupings as far as political power is concerned. That
is becoming daily more difficult, however. After the devasting bombings to which
the few genuine political leaders of the religious camp fell victim, Khomeyni finds
himself increasingly constrained to intervene in everyday politics--in other words,
to deal with questions of detail and then also make decisions.
Despite the internal split in the fundamentalist camp and despite the decreasing
political charisma of the leader of the revolution, the calculations of the opposi-
tion car.not be expected to be realized in the near future. From a security point
of view, the Tehran regime appears to be able to at least curb the opposition
25
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02109: CIA-RDP82-00854R000500040018-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
activities as long as the opposition movement does not become a mass movement, and
for the reasons given above there are at present no indications that this will
happen. Should the muhajedeen prevail, it would be reasonable to expect an attempt
to follow the Algerian pattern. It is more likely, though, that its opposition will
fail. A breakup of the entire opposition movement and the buildup of innumerable
new opposition groups underground would then be the result. A breakup, however,
amounts to the collapse of one's own strength.
Unless there is foreign intervention (and at present there are no signs of that),
the current fundamentalist regime therefore, despite international isolation and
despite domestic political and economic political failure, will continue to be able
to make do. The only force capable of organizing a large-scale counterblow, the
army, is tied up with the war with Iraq until further notice. Moreover, particu-
larly after the flight of Bani-Sadr, there have been personnel purges within the
army whir_h, while not bringing the forces into the fundamentalist line, broke their
political back--if indeed such ever existed.
The Iranian opposition active abroad, whether it is part of the monarchist camp
or part of the leftist Islamic forces around Bani-Sadr, lacks any support in the
country itself. Its activities, eagerly noted by the public in the west and east,
play no part in the domestic Iranian confrontations and occupy no place in the con-
ciousness of the average Irahian. Unless there is an intervention by a foreign
power which could bring the opposition forces back to Iran, a solution of the Iranian
crisis is possibl.e only from within; not only the people in Tehran but those in the
rural areas are convinced of that.
One can therefore not expect a consolidation of the situation in one direction or
another in the foreseeable future. Moreover, the real difficulties wauld only
begin after a clarification as to who holds the power in Tehran, because the power
struggle described above is limited almost exclusively to the capital proper.
The ethnic minorities living in the provinces surrounding the capital, under the
lee of the disturbances following the revolution at the center, have been able to
realize their long-cherished dream of large-scale autonomy. In Kurdistan this
virtually led to civil war, while in the other provinces it was tactly put up with
owing to the weakness of the central power. Regradless of who will win the power
struggle in the end, there is no doubt but that any new regime is found to follow
one tradition of the time of the shah--a centralized government apparatus and a
centralized-government claim to power, implemented by force if need be. In light
of what is already happening in this country, this is a gloomy propsect.
FOOTNOTES ~
1. There are no reliable statistical data in Iran. Published figures therefore
are subject to considerable fluctuations. The following data, based on internal
calculations of individual specialists in the ministries, can therefore also
be only approximate.
2. The total number of employed is about 12 million.
3. After the victory of the revolution, 4 million barrels a day were mentioned as
a politically desirable production quota. The exchange value corresponded to
the actual need for foreign currency by Iran for the country's reconstruction
26.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02109: CIA-RDP82-00854R000500040018-3
h'UR UFFICIAL USE ONLY
according to knowledge available at the time. For comparison~, daily
production during the last months of the time of the shah was 6 million
barrels. ~
4. Kurt Greussing, "Neue Politik, alter Despotismus. Perspektiven der islamischen
Revolution." [New Politics, Old Despotism. Prospecbs of the Islamic Revolution.]
In "Religion und Politik in Iran" [Religion and Politics in Iran], Frankfurt/
Main 1981, p 25.
COPYRIGHT: 1982 Verlag fuer Internationale Politik GmbH, Bonn
8790
CSO: 4620/22
27. ,
FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3
~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
IRAN ~
ONGOING ANTI-BAHAI TERRORISM REVIEWED
8russels POURQUOI PAS? in French 21 Jan 82 pp 38-40 .
[Articlea '~The Ma.ssacre of the Innocents"]
~[Text] The execution squads, the galloxs are not idle in Iran.
In spite of the Iranian-Iraqi war xhich is continuing and in-
tensifying on the Western border~ the repuhlic of the ayatollahs
hunts down its opponents~ the "hypocrites" as they are called by
' the authorities in Tehran, w3thout respite.
The Islamic revolution is wa.dj.ng in blood. The ~ blood of terror-
ism and of repression.
It is true tha.t the grovernment of the mullahs is being attacked ~
from a11 sides, tha.t every day political or religious leaders
~ are assassin~ated, tha.t innocents perish in assassination at-~
tempts, that public buildings hlow up or are t~cen by storm, ~
that Pasda.rans (the revolutionary guards) axe attacked. This
terrorism is echoed by the terror of the state. The repression
- is indiscrimina.tely hitting the Mujaheddin Moslems, the Marxists
of Peykar, tne bazaar tradesmen, the mo:iarchists, the Kurds and
other ethnic minorities. Thousands of Iranians and not neces-
saxily op~onents have been jailed without charge a.nd without ~
~ sentence. Last year~ 2000'hypocrites" were officially executed.
Henceforth, this slaughter has been b~oadened to include the
~ Bahais the most important religious minority in Ira,n ad-
vocates of a-politicism and non-violence.
The example of Iran.has shown how an enforced march toward modernization and the
monopolizing of the riches by a minority can push the people tot,rard those whose
only privilege is the fact that they shared their auffering. The shock ~rave which
came down from Qom has not finished trouhling the Third World~ explained a pa,rti-
cipant in t'he seminar, organized by the University of the United. Nations, and de=
vated to "socio-cultural alternatives for development." The "third roa,d," repre-
sented by the Tranian revolution~ is not very tempting. What is happening in Iran
is not a stopping of the train of progress, but a return to berbarism. Over there,
it is impossihle to mista,ke the revolution for a gala dinner.
� 28
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY .
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3
rva~ vrt 1~.ttW UJP. VriLY
To be sure, the government of the mullahs is being attacked from a11 sides at once.
By the Iraqi army as well as by the na,tional oppositions or by the autonomist Kurds
and Baluchis. To these attacks~ these acts of terrorism, the government responds
with repression. The revolutionary gu,ards shoot or ha.ng people after summary trials
some last only a few minutes held behind closed doors and where the a,ccused
axe not allowed to ha.ve the assistance of a lawyer.
"The Islamic revolution has no other option but violent and Uloody purges," admit-
ted Ayatollah Rafsanjani, the president of parliament.
But why does this regime with its back to the wa11 persecute the Ba,ha,is? Why ha.s
it undertaken to systematically elimina,te the spiritual leaders of a non-violent
community which does not allow itself any political activity? Why is it destroying
their places of worship~ their cemeteries? Why is it confiscati.ng.the property of
the Baha.is?
. ~
The Iranian leaders axe complaining that they are being kept out of the concert
among nations and axe preparing to send "goodwill missions" throughout the world.
You do not need to be a genius to predict that their emissariea will ha,ve great
difficulty in getting people to recognize the merits of an Islamic revolution
soiled by the ma,ssacre of the innocent Bahais.
It was on 23 December tha.t eight &~,hais, members of the National Spiritual Assemhly
(the community's highest body) were arrested while mee+.in~,~ at the home of a fellow
Bahai in Tehran. Without notifying their families~ wi~`h~ut a trial even, the eight
Ba.ha,i spiritual leaders were executed and buried in the "infidels' cemetery."
A month-and-a-half before, six Baha.is, also members of the National Spiritual As-
sembly, had been arrested and shot. On 3 Januaxy, in the face of the emotion
aroused in the West by these assassina.tions~ the president of the Iranian Supreme
Court, Ayatollah Ardebili, denied the execution of the Bahai officials and tr~ed
to make believe that they ha.d. been eliminated by opponents. However, on 6 January
he rescinded his statements, and confirmed the death of the eight Bahais "executed
for ha,ving spied for Israel and the United States."
People at the Belgian Bahai Center are indignant about these accusations formulated
by Tehran:
"Who will believe that spies get together before passing information on to foreign
powers? And if they were really spies, wY~y then did the regime want to keep their
arrest, their detention and, finally, their death, a secret? Why not have set up
a trial, why a ha,sty burial without the knowledge of the families? The truth is
that these crimes axe a disgrace to Islamic justice. Henceforth, a secret organi-
zation with support within the Revolutionary Council will attend to the persecution
of the Iranian Baha.is."
Th4 fate of the Baha.is there are more than 300,000 of them in Iran ha,s never
been enviable. In December 19?8 already, 60 houses belonging to Ba,ha,i faithful in
Shiraz were looted, and 25 in Nayriz were burned down. In Savistan~ followers of
the Bab were taken to the mosque and forced to renounce their faith. In June 1979~
all Bahai properties, including their places of worship and their cemeteries were
29
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3
; FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~
confiscated. Their national center in Tehran was turned into an Isla.mic universit,jr.
The commercial enterprise Shirkat, estahlished by the Ba.'~ais 50 years ago and em-
ploying 15,000 Baha.is, was seized by the new regime. I1~.._Saptember 1979, the revolu-
tionary guaxds attacked the House o~ the Bab in Shiras, the Bahais' holiest shrine
in Iran. In September 1980, seven Ba.h~ais from Yazid were executed, ostensibly for
"spying for foreign powers and anti-Islamic activities."
New executions toaSc place in November in Tab~iz. In December, a&tihai couple livir~
in Shiraz was awakened in the middle of the night~ beaten, doused with gasoline a,nd
put to death by fire.
In January 1981, Dr Hakim, professor of anatomy at the University of Tehran, was
shot down in his consult3ng room. The property of his wife of French na,tionali-
ty was confiscated. March 1981: new death sentences passed and executed in
Shiraz.
The list of Bahais who ha.ve been arrested, t~utalized, plundered, assassinated, is
as long as a requiem. In the face of ~this attempt to elimina.te &tihai believers,
the 6,000 Spiritual Assemblies spread throughout the world have made known their
anguish to Ayatollah Khomeini, to President Bani-Sadr, to the United Nations, to
the European Parliament, to governments and to the human rights defense leagues:
- F~ccept for the persecutions in the middle of the 19th century, which took the
lives of 20,000 of the fixst believers, the current threat of total destruction of
the Bahai community in Iran has never been so iauninent or so rea1.
International indignation has forced the Iranian authorities to cha.nge their atti-
tude~ but not their policy. There aze no longer any "official" trials or execu-
tions of Ba.hais. But a kind of death squa,d has undertaken to remove the disciples
of the Ba.b and shoot them.
The Shiites, who are a minority with3n the Moslem world~ have suffered from the
predominance of the Sunnis. It is distressing to see former victims become the
executioners of another religious minority, and the tolerance prescribed by the
Koran goes unheeded.
The current Iranian regime ha.s formulated various accusations with regard to the
Bahais.
1) The Ba.hais collaborated with the Pa.hlavis.
"The assertion that the Ba,hais supported the former regime," explained a member of
the Bahai Center in Belgium, "comes from the fact that the Ba,hais never denounced
the Shah's regime, that they did not join political organizations opposed to the
regime, and tha.t some Bahais held important positions in the b~anches of tha,t re-
gime. According to the teachings of their faith, the Baha,is owe loyalty and obe-
dience to the government of the country in which they live, whatever its form or
its policy. Hence~ they never participate in subversive activities. Furthermore,
the Bahais are not allowed to become politically involved or to hold a political
function. These ba.sic principles do not change with the governments."
30
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007142/09: CIA-RDP82-40854R040500040018-3
r~n ~rr l~tt~t., U~~: UNLIf
During the ~8 yeaxs of the Pahlavi rule~ the Spiritual Assemhly of the Ba,ha,is in
Iran. made repeated appeals to the Shah~ to the ministers and to the M~.jl3_s (parlia-
ment) to convince them to grant equitahle treatment to the Ba.ha.i community. But in
- vain. The authorities did not do anything to protect the lives and property of the
Bahais, whose religion did not receive legal status. In 1975, the Ba,ha,is refused
to become members of the Rastakhiz Party (single paxty introduced by Reza. Pahlavi)
and, more recently, they refused to vote in the na,tional referendum for the estab-
lishment of an Islamic republic~ which has earned them even more hostility.
2) The Ba,hais are enemies of Islam.
"The Ba.ha.i faith is usually considered an heretic sect of Islam, desiring to ove~
throw Islam in its current form. However, in spite of its roots, it is as differ-
ent from Isla~n as Christianity is from Juda.ism," stated one Ba,ha,i. "Our faith
teaches us that religious revelation is continuous and pro~essive, and that
Ba.ha.'u'llah~ our founder, is the most recent but not the last of the divine teacY~s
sent to guide humanity. The Ba.hais believe in the essential unity of a11 major
religions in the world, and honor their founders as divinely inspired prophets.
A Ba.hai who would try to oppose Islam, to denigrate it or to destroy it that or
any other religion would be in profound disa,greement with the basic principles
of the Bahai faith."
"According to our beliefs, a11 the major religions teach the saane ba.sic spiritual
principles. They differ solely in theix social teachings, which change in function
of the needs of the era they were revealed in. For exa.mple, among the Ba.hais men
and women have the same rights~ privileges and responsibilities. Consequently,
the women paxticipate fully in a11 the spiritual and administrative affa3.rs of the
community. Because they are different from the social teachings of Islam, these
practices only reinforce the accusations, directed against the Baha,is, tha.t they
axe hostile to Islam."
3) The Bahais are agents of Zionism.
Because the Baha.i World Center is located in Israel, and because numerous Bahai
pil grims visit that country, the disciples of Baha'u'llah are suspected of having
secret dealings with the Hebrew state.
As one Bahai explained: "The Baha.i World Center was established in the last cen-
tury long before the establishment of the state of Israel and it ha;s absolu-
tely nothing to do with Zionism. Baha.'u'llah was exiled to the Holy Land on the
order of two Islamic governments (Iran and Turkey). He remained there until his
death in 1892. His tomb is located in Haifa and attracts Bahai believers."
It is an irony of fate, a mockery even, to see the Bahais of Iran persecuted, max-
tyred and elimina,ted. Indeed, their founder, Baha'u'llah stated: "The light of
men is justice~ do not suffocate it with the adverse winds of oppression and of
tyranny. The goal of justice is the appearance of unity among men."
COPYRIGHT: 1982 POURQUOI PAS?
8~3
cso: 4619/4~
31
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500440018-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
SRAI1
REaIl~ R~PRTS3ffi '~TIC' HANI'IS,~AUTONO~II3T~ $URD6 `',i
. l~rtyrs of (~od
Parie L'~BESS in French 22-28 Jan 82 pp 76,?7
/-~rticle by Jacquee Buob 7 ~ �
- .
~Text~ There are ~over 300,UOO.of them in Iran. They conatitute the priaci-
ti
ution8ofutheIsla ic Republic p
or~t,e~cta~Jex~at(about 50,0oo),~acnria iaaa ~
(200,000), and Zoroastriana (30,000). It doas not proteat the Baha~ia.
Aud though they do not yet xear a yellox atar, it is.almoat~the eame 4s if
they did. "The holocauat hae atarted~M asaerta a member of the ccmmunity in
- . France.
Since the~start of the revolution, 97 Bshs~is have been ezecuted. About 1t0
more have disappeared, kidnap~d, vanished. Heretica, epiea iu the pay of
Zionism, collaboratora of the former regimes anything is good anough to a6t
off a Baha~i hnnt. W!~}r?
The history of thia nex faith begins on 22 May 18l~, at Cbiraz, in Peraia.
That day, a young man of 25, Mirza L1i M~a~ad, arinounces the impending ~
arrival of a mesaenger from Ood. He is na~aed the �Bab,~ xhich mean$ door. ~
The oae opening to kno~+ledge. Soon~ he e~ye, the era of peace and ~uetice
promiaed by all the holy booka xill begin. For, in hia opinion, religiona
have only one (iod. The Hab ie the acx?~ianaton_'oP AbrabaQ, Moaes, Buddha,
.Kriahr~?, Zoroaater, Jesue, sYid Mahomet.
~F`iret conversiona. First martyra: 20,000 de4d, it ia reported. The Bab is
shot at Tabriz. Nis succesaor, Baha~u'l1ah,;preaenta himeelf as~the Measiah.
- He formulates the principles of the new faith. He launchee an appeal to the
princes to stop vara. He preachee the equality of inen and xanen. He aeserts
that humankind may henceforth addresa Ood i+ithout an intermediary, and takes
advantage of that to proscribe ~cyr form of alergy. There ia nothing very
Shdite in all that. And the mullahs, as one might gueas, xill never forgive
~ 32
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
this denial of their role and their privileges.
Abriul Baha, who succeeds Baha~u~llah, travels in &~rope and America. Mill-
ions of people throughout the wor]td become converts. With ao problems.
F.~ccept in Iran.
From the accessioa to power of Reza khan, in 1921, persecutione~are resumed.
Purges in the administration. Obligatory declaration of one~s religion to
enter the civil service. Baha~i marriages declared i21ega1.
Muhamnad~Reza continues his Yather~a policy, cleverly channels popular anger
against the Bab~s followers, whenever the aoci~]; situation becaaes too tense.
In ~955, a fresh pogrom. A vast nati6nal campaign is launched over the radio,
in the ne~spapers. Military aad religious leaders take part in the destruc-
ti~on of the Baha~i Geater in Tehran.
During periods of moderation, the Baha~is, middle-clasa, often enlightened,
people, again appear. in the forefront of social liYe. /Ilthough their reli-
gion forbids them to engage in politica, some are found in the Shah~s en-
tourage, like his private pt~ysiciaa, and others in the arnqr. Later on, they
will be criticized for this.
"They ~re Pernicious"
With the coming of�the re~rolution, they believe they will cease to be outcaets.
Wild dreamz they constitute a political group. "T~~r are pernicious," Imam
Khomeni aeaerts to a Kuwaiti ~ournalist in 1979�
At the IraniBa embassy iu Paris, a diplaaat, HosBein Mashayekhi, asaerts
that the Haha~is are agents of Iarael.
It is easy to accuse them of Zionism, eince their holy place, where the Hab
lies buried, happens to be in Haifa, once Turkish, but now ala8 for themt
Israeli.
More pogroms in sanuary 1979. Property confiscated, men dragged off to the
mosque to be converted by force. Kidnapings, murders. Cemeteries desecrated,
razed by bulldozers. Trials, ~executions, diaappearances.
Since 21 Auguet 1980, date of their arrest, there has been no neva of the
eight membera of the National Spiritual Assembly, the highest Baha~i author-
ity. Their successors, intercepted on 13 Decsraber 1981 by an "unidentified
armed gang," are discovered by chance buried in the capital's cemetery for
unbelievera. On 1 Jaouary, the leaders of the Tehran cammunity are executed.
The plan for extermination of the Baha~ia has begun. Where will it end?
- COPYRICtHT: 1982 s. a. (}roupe Express
33
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Winter o3' MsQSam~e in Ki~rd~,s~ban
Paris Z' ~g in i~ench 22-28 Jan 82 p 77 .
/~ArticZe by Ct~ristian Hoche ]
~Text 7 It ia anowing in Mahabad, the capital of Iraaian Kurdistaa. A ae-
vere vlnter hae settled in over the valleya and the mount,ain foot-hills of
the rebellioua province. In apite of the oold and the deprivatioa;~ several
tbouaaad�Feahmer8as (Kurdish reaiatance fi~hters) are atill detying the
Tehran goverrm~ent....
"De~nocracy for Iraa, autononpr for $urdiatan,p an entire~people in rebellion
has been~crting outt~or years. In vaini "The Iran-Iraq coaflict haa totally
eclipaed the frightPul repreaaion prevailing todq~r in cyr province. ~rery
day people are c~ying awid general iadifference, murdered'at the dictatea of
the ~ullahs,M xe are told by I~iohaen S~lehi, epecial envoy of the Kurdish
religious leader, Sheik 8zaedine Hoateini.
Because they dea~and the ri~ht to be different, the Peahesrgae, xho overshador ~
a territory of 100,000 square kilamete~s, ara engeged in a nercileaa fight.
Two Ii'anian ar~r infantry diviaiona --the 128th, quartered in Sananda~,.and
the blath, baaed in puroumieh supported by regimeata of Paadaraaa ((~ardi-
aaa of the Hevolntion), air Yorce detachsenta, and reie~orceanenta lram the
Tabria and (~hazvin divisions, aro pitileasly moppin~ up ~he Kurdieh area.
Heavy art,illery boa~bardnenta, ponndiaga from h~licoptsra~ harvests burned,
villages �cleaned np~; since ?sarch 1980, near~y 10,000 pereona, cirilians
and conbatanta, h~ve thus been killed in the name of Mlenient aad merciful
Islam."
In the village of Inderghaah, near 1~lahabacl, vhich a~rved aa a xithdra~ral base
for the Pesmaergas, the (}uardians of the Revolution proceeded to a mass murder.
"0~ t~ Nov~ber 1980," Irbh~ea Salehi recounta, ~t,he Paedarans ~urrounded the
little hamlet Df 500 homes. They cold-bloodedly nwaaacred 1~0 peasanta, ia-
cluding xa~en, childrea, and old men. On 22 Nove~nber 1981, they attacked it
a8ain~xith mortars and 155=millimster can~wn. pntccuaes 8 dead, 20 serioualy, ~
xounded, aad 100 hanea deatroy~ed.N ` ,
1 large-scale battle is now baing vaged along the Haneh�Sardaaht road, xhich
is 60 kilometers long. L11 the villa~ea alon~ this Proatier road are said
to have been aystematically shslled.` Thm Iraai,aa ar~qr~a ob~ectivea are to
finiah cutting off the northtirer~t~.trontier, mop up pocketa of reeiatance, and,
above all, prepare for a huge offenaive agaiaat the Iraqi Yorcea, yhich are
~?ithdrat~m to the veet of Baneh.
NavinB alre~r been eub~ected for 2 y~eara to a euPfocating economic blockade,
Kurdistan �is dyin~ in s3lence,p in the worda of Ahderramane (~heaseAlou, lead-
er of the Iranian Kurdiah De~aocratic Party (PD~I). i~Toraes aoae tribea in
Iranian 8ureliatan snch as the Bar$ani have allied~theraselves xith the
34
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-04850R000500040018-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Iranian ar~r to Yight againat thsir blood-brot~era. In July 1981, indeed,
the tomb of the preeti~ioua Iraqi Kurdish chieY, 1KustaYa Harzani,xaa deae-
crated in Oabnaviyeh. Provocation? Probably. Iatiaediately, Barzani's aons,
Idries and Massoud, accused the PDEI of iconoclaam, and attacked, with their
1,500 combatants, supported by the_(i~uardiane of the Reqolution, the Peahmergsa~
poaitions in the North of Kurdistan. "Jl dagger in the back,p ldohsen Salehi
acknoWledges.
Politically divided, the Kurdiah people ~e in agree~ment about one things the
armed struggle to "drive away the nex tyrant in Tehran.p In a mesage that
reached France during the last fe~r daye, Sheik Eszedine Hosaeini etressea
that "the Irsnian maases have as their only aolution the overthrow of the
- regime to establiah a democratic republic.N ~
But cut off from the rorld by a military cordon, xith no outside aid available
tQ them, deprived of inedication, of milk, caa the Kurdish people hold out
much longer?
COPYRIaHTs 1982 s. a. aroupe Expreee
1211~9
CsO: 1~619/u9
35
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R400540040018-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
SYRIA
PRO-IRAQI MAGAZINE COI~A4ENTS ON HAMAH INCIDENTS
- JN211658 Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 19 Feb 82 pp 18-22
[Excerpt] The Syrian.city of Hamah has for 2 weeks been isolated from the rest
of Syria. The ugliest massacre ever perpetrated in an Arab city in contemporary
Arab history is now taking place in Hamah. The number of victims, according to
reports by arrivals and diplomatic sources, has thus far amounted to 3,000. The
casualties may be more than that because the.information leaked is still little.
Secret reports from Beirut say that the number of victims is not less than 6,000.
The blood tax being paid by Hamah is not the first of its kind and the massacre
being perpetrated by the special forces and the defense squads, which are reaerve
forces basically formed to act as a tool to protect the ruling family in.Syria
against its political opponents, is also not the first of its kind. Most of the
Syrian cities, particularly Aleppo and Hamah, have previously witnessed popular
uprisings which were strongly resisted by the authorities. However, these
uprisings always ended up in armed confrontation between the repressive military
tool and the inhabitants. There came a time when this tool began to turn against
its owners. In the March 1980 uprising, which lasted 20 days, for example,
intensive units of defense squads and the 5th army division, supported by the
47th brigade, combed the city of Hamah for 1 month from 7 April to 7 May 1980.
These forces tortured the'people and cut off water and electricity throughout
- the combing operation. Two years after this campaign, the 47th brigade sided
with the people in fighting against the regime until the end.
In an attempt~to retaliate for the abortive March campaign in Hamah, which robbed
the authorities of much of their esteem, the special forces took revenge by
confronting a group of worshippers on 'Id al-Fitr, killing,83 of them near one
of the Aleppo mosques. There also came the Tudmur massacre in the same year,
in which 746 political prisoners, most of them Syrian intellectuals, were
killed. This was followed by the Hamah massacre on 24 April 1981, in which 124
were killed after confronting the regime's forces in the follmaing three Syrian
villages: Salhab, 'Ayn al-Kurum and Wadi al-'Uyun. On that day the special
forces and the defense squads besieged Hamah and prevented its people from
entering it. A battle took place.and 300 were killed, as reported by unofficial
sources.. These forces also shelled the city mosques, including the 'Umar ibn
al-Khattah, al-Afandi, al-Dallul and al-Ahdab mosqu~es.
36
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
The recent battles in Hamah actually happened as a result of a popular decision
for general confrontation. The decision was adopted by the field command of the
fighting vanguard in the city on 19 January 1982. The confrontation was scheduled
to begin on 25 January, but was postponed until 2 February when the fighting
vanguard groups moved and attacked the Syrian forces stat~ioned in the city as a
precautionary measure. Hundreds died in the first attack and the first day ended
with massive losses among the Syrian military.
Before reinforcements reached Hamah, the people ~oined the ranks of the attacking
vanguard, nccupied public buildings, ruling party centers, police stations and
military airport and gained full control of them in something like an armed
popular revolution. The surprise was that the 47th armored brigade, which was
in charge of quelling the uprising and which arrived in Hamah from the township
of al-Qutayfah, had divided loyalties and soon afterward joined the people. A
battle between the 47th brigade, supported by the city inhabitants, and the
defense squads, the special forces and parts of the 21st brigade took place.
The fighters blew up the al-Rastan bridge so that no additional reinforcements
would reach the city.
In order to face this critical situation, the authorities resorted to the use of
the air force. At first they used helicopters in a landing operation which failed
after two had been downed. Fighter planes were then used; the first attempt
failed when the planes flew over the town and~pilots failed to drop the bombs.
T'he second attempt was carried out under the supervision of the Syrian president's
brother, Rif'at al-Asad, and Defense Minister Gen Mustafa Talas who were directing
the operations 10 km away.
As fighting intensified inside the isolated city, the regime's forces set up
barricades on the Aleppo�Hamah highway. Hamah w~s also besieged from the direc-
tion of Homs. A nunber of military co~uniques were issued by the various fac-
tions of the Islamic revolution on other clashes in Aleppo, Latakia, Dar'a and
Damascus and the state of tension in other Syrian towns. The communiques point
out that 3,700 officers and men joined the people of Hamah complete with their
missile units and three tank battalions. Ttaenty planes were ordered to bomb the
town but they remained neutral. The authorities' siege of the town extended to
over SO km away and the people of Hamah scored many direct hits. [Sentence
as published]
In another communique, fierce clashes were reported to have taken place in Aleppo
on 10 February and the firing was heard all over the city. A group of fighters
controlled a relay station which transmitted these communiques on 1000 khz
declaring the possible liberation of the city. Clashes also took place in
Latakia among the people themselves and between them and the army. Travelers
to Turkey through Aleppo said that they heard intermittent shooting over their
heads. Other sporadic clashes seemed to have occurred in Dar'a and Damascus when
the Hamah clashes were continuing. These clashes came 1 week after the attempted
coup which was planned but had no chance of success. The coup attempt was
planned by 200 army officers from the various army corps and proved that the
opposition to the Syrian regime is not confined to a few indignant army officers
or to the Muslim Brothers Organization b ut is an opposition which runs the
37
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
length and depth of Syria. The oppositionpermeates the armed forces and civilians
and includes entire cities. This made the Westem press cAnsider these events
the first real threat to the Syrian regime in 11 years.
~ The bloodbath which began on Tuesday, 2 February, has not ended despite tons of
artillery shells and missiles which destroyed hundreds of houses in Hamah alone.
, Entering and leaving the city was impossible for Syrian citizens and Arab and
foreign reporters even 2 weeks after the outbreak of fighting. However,
travelers spoke about ambulances actively transferring military casualties from
Hamah to Homs and burned army vehicles and tanks seen by first aid men themselves.
An extremely tense situation is reported among army ranks, and the naval forces
are indignant. A large number of troops from the defense squads were deployed
arotmd the capital to defend it within security measures to protect the Republican
Palace and government buildings. ~
It is naturally impossible to estimate the final casualty figures. The various
communiques of the Muslim brothers reported 2,000 killed and 3,000 wounded among
the military forces. A communique said that units from the Sth brigade and 9th
division comprising 3,500-4,000 sol.diers have joined the people. The communique
added that these units are armed with a fully equipped missile battery, two
artillery battalions and one tank battalion. Long-range artillery in the town of
Masyaf, near Hamah, shelled the rebel artillery and the Hamah artillery replied,
- silencing the Masyaf artillery. ~
COPYRIGHT: 1982 AL WATAN AL ARABI
CSO: 4404/277
38
FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3
_ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~YRIA
SYRIAN MEDIATION ROLE IN IRAN-IRAQ WAR QUESTIONED
Paris AL-WATAN AL-`ARA,BI ~t~ Arabic No 256, 8-14 Jan 82 pp 18-19
[Editorial: "The 'Schemer' of Damascus and the 'Mullah' of Tehran: Hafiz al-Asad's
'Initiative'...Its Mysteries and Reasons"]
[Text] Why do you think that Hafiz al-Asad is playing--or pretending to play--a
part in stopping the Iraq-Iran war, after it has lasted more than 16 months?
Did Hafiz al-Asad forget all this time that Iraq forms a strategic depth for Syria
and that its large, strong army is an indispensible force to confront the Zionist
entity...to now start extricating the Iraqi army from its very long battle with Iran?
Did Hafiz a1=Asad forget that the Iraqi army kept Damascus from falling in 1973,
without which he would not be in power...or at least the capital of his regime would
be a city other than Damascus, perhaps Aleppo...or Latakia?
Why did Hafiz al-Asad not discover this fact...and the fact that he is "defenseless"
against Israel without Iraq since Egypt pulled out of t~e battle...until the official
annexation of the Golan Heights, while he merely watched the occupation of the Golan
for many years, occupying himself by plotting and scheming against Iraq and Lebanon?
The.interesting thing is that he did not discover all these facts and stir his "na-
. tionalistic" conscience until his recent visit to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries.
These are questions, or mysteries, which political commentators are trying to answer
and get to the bottom of.
No doubt the annexation of the Golan Heights is a great humiliation for Hafiz al-Asad.
What will he do? Can the Syrian president satisfy his people with decisions on pa-
per issued by the Arab League or the Security Council...how do the Syrian people
view this regime's continued support for the Iranian regime in its war against Iraq;
tying down the Iraqi army when Israel is annexing the Golan Heights and al-Asad is
incapable of military confrontation? This is one of the mysteries...
Another mystery being discussed by Arab political circles is that the leaders of Sau-
di Arabia and the Gulf, although out of honor they are publicly courteous to Hafiz
al-Asad, openly told him, "It is impossible to have true 'Arab solidarity' against
Israel when you are supporting the Iranian regime against Iraq, and it is also im=
possible to organize an effective confrontation with Israel while Iraq is busy with
the war with Iran."
39
. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3
~
~ i
FOR OFFICIAL U~E ONLY '
I ,
~ :
~ The most dangerous aspect of this for Hafiz al-Asad is what he has heard openly or
I indirectly to the effect that Israel's annexing the Golan while Iraq is preoccupied
' means Chat Syria cannot confront Israel militarily. This means that there is no
' need to increase financial support for Syria...what would this support go for?
If Saudi Arabia and the Gulf stop financing Syria, this would be the real predicament
for Hafiz al-Asad's regime. Then how would he face his people on all his other pre-
dicaments [such as:]
1. Israel is occupying the Golan and there is no real way to confront this danger-
ous move.
2. Internal opposition intensifies daily...and the regime is foundering in the dom-
estic slaughter.
3. The regime and its military are sinking in the Lebanese quagmire.
4. The economic problem is growing and cannot be solved without a continued flow of .
money from the oil countries. ,
These are the mysteries and reasons.
However, what.is the mystery of this dramatic changeover by the Tehran regime from
threatening to occupy Iraqi territory and overthrow the Bagdad regime to suddenly
complying with Hafiz a1-Asad's hypocrasy and making these flexible statements? A
few days after Hafiz al-Asad ~eturned from Kuwait, where he discussed the so-called
Syrian-Kuwaiti initiative to stop the war, the Iranian Prime Minister flew to Damas-
cus. Theran has welcomed the upcoming visit by Hafiz al-Asad to Iran, although al-
Asad wanted to make the visit and requested it of the Iranian regime.
This visit was planned much earlier, and what made al-Asad delay it was not moral
opposition.to Iranian aggression against.Iraq, but fear of the reaction of the Syr-
ian Arab people. This latest visit is merely carrying out a visit not made earlier.
Its purpose remains coordination between the Iranian and Syrian regimes to plot
against Iraq and the Arab Gulf.
Moreover, officials in Tehran have started speaking a"diplomatic" language which
none had spoken before. At the beginning, the Iranians fought Iraq under the mili-
tary leadership of Bani-Sadr, who depended primarily on the military and on a great
deal of political flexibility to decrease Iran's isolation. Bani-Sadr fought from
Septemter 1980 until June 1981, when he left the presidency...without any success in
driving the Iraqi forces from Iranian territory. It became clear that his army could
not withstand the Iraqi army.
After Bani-Sadr, the mullahs took over completely. When Bani-Sadr was in power, the
mullahs said that he did not know how to fight the Iraqis...and if they were in con-
trol, they would know how to drive the Iraqis out of Iranian territory; however...
how could they invade al-Basrah, al-'Umarah and even Baghdad to overthrow the regime!
After the mullahs got what they wanted, they tried their luck with the Iraqis. At
first, the battle east of al-Karun excited them...despite their huSe losses there,
they applauded...and exchanged congratulations and renewed their hopes...they started
40
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3
FOR OFFIC.IAL USE ONLY
giving Iranians hope of a day of victory: theq did not realize one important fact,
that the Iraqi leaders had already decided to withdraw from that area...they ignored
this fact and imagined that the situation on that front had turned around, with the
Iraqis retreating...and the Iranians advancing.
Then, in the battle of Basatin in December, the Iranians actually made progress;
however...as the regime's leader Khameneh'i said, they liberated "250 square kilo-
meters and a border village named Basatin from the 15,000 square kilometers occupied
by the Iraqi army and important cities such as al Muhamrah [Rhorramshahr] and Qasr-
e-Shirin"...the Theran regime tried to portray the result of this battle as a great
victory, ignoring the magnitude of their losses- more than 6,000 dead and three times
this number wounded, a great number of tanks and weapons destroyed, out of proportion
to their "progress"--an insignificant progress as confirmed by Rhameneh'i's speech.
In the shadow of this erroneous estimation, the mullahs decided to continue to take
risks, thinking that attacking the Iraqi forces repeatedly would confuse them and
lower their morale, turning the situation on the front to their advantage...therefore
they forced what was left of their best units...especially the volunteers whom they
spent months gathering...into a difficult battle in the area of Kilan and Sumar in
the middle sector of the front. It was impossible for the Iraqis to withdraw from
this area because it was not like east of al-Karun, which was far from the Iraqi bor-
der. The river forms an important barrier between the two armies, and this area di-
rectly overlooks the Iraqi border cities of Rhanaqin, Mandali and Naft Khaneh, which
were shelled bq Iranian artillery on 14 September 1980, causing the outbreak of war
between Iraq and Iran.
In the battle of Kilan and Sumar, the Iraqis decided to stand fast...they did not
withdraw...and a very lengthy battle broke out which lasted about a week.
Because the Iranian's plans were based on risk-taking and on the psychological aspects
as they saw them, their losses were enormous...while the Iraqi losses were slight be-
cause they were in a defensive position, had excellent weapons and their fortifica-
tions were strong. In this battle, the Iranians lost more than 11,000 combattants
[killed] and three times this number wounded...the volunteer and [Revolutionary] Guard
forces were almost wiped out. The mullahs considered these forces to be their pri-
mary weapon in their new method of confronting the Iraqis...and by this the mullahs
lost their main weapon and their magic, as Bani-Sadr lost his magic months earlier.
On the other hand, these battles forced the Iraqis into a state of watchfulness and
emergency preparedness. President Saddam Husayn and the party called for party mem-
bers and the people to volunteer to provide new blood for the battle, and volunteers
began to pour in. Many thousands of young men from all Iraqi governorates gathered ~
in army camps to complete their military training, and new brigades of fighters began
rushing out to the front, and wliile the mullah's magic was failing in Tehran, the'
Iraqi forces were renewed and vigorous. ~
This explains the change by the ruling mullahs in Tehran from their fiery statements
a few weeks ago about entering Iraqi territory to suddenly welcoming the initiative
of their friend Hafiz al-Asad. A friend in need is a friend indeed...Hafiz al-Asad,
who was backing up the Iranian regime in a state of war now becomes the Khameneh'i
regime's back-up to get out of the ~dile~a of war.
~
; 4~
,
FOR O~'FICIAL USE ONLY~
l
;
~
,
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
If Hafiz al-Asad is in a very uncomfortable position because of the continuing Iraq-
Iran war and his support for Iran in the shadow of these circumstances which we
point out...he will not be able to risk the collapse of his allies in Tehran. Hafiz
al-Asad is a"schemer" who knows what side his bread is buttered on...and when to
_ act. He went to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf...heard what he heard...and decided on
the method of the "schemer" to try to "rescue himself" and "rescue his friends" in
Tehran and to appear to the people as if he is doing a"nationalistic service."
However, is Hafiz al-Asad actually trying to achieve peace, or maneuvering to win
time for himself and his friends in Tehran?
There are grave doubts about this move; however, the most obvious truth is that time
is no longer working for the "schemer" of Damascus or the "mullah" of Tehran.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
9882
CSO: 4404/225
42
FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-04850R000500040018-3
!
( FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
i
~
i
~ SUUAN
~ .
DEMONSTRIITTON5 SEII~1 AS ~iERALDINa INEVITABLE $BVOLT
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in F~ench No 257, 18 dan 82 p 21~
rArticle by Abou~Sameh: "Revolt"
7
`Text 7The events that have occurred in the Sudan tbe past fey days express
~e continuous state of crisis ~fflicting (~eaeral Num~yri~s regime. Despite
the special laxs enacted lamt JuB:y, fresh demonstrationa by university and.
aecondary school atudenta occurred at the end of lsst Dec~aber in proteat
against the diasolution of the Federation of University Studentso State
aecurity forces had isaued a warnin~ to the atudenta, Who xere aeaembled in
their federation offices, declarfng;.any meeting to be an "illegal act" viexed
by the authorities as Na subveraive action," or evea a"plot re~mote-controlled
by foreigaers," seeking to incite the massea to rise againat the authorities.
The studeate responded to tbi8 tbseat by occupying the university, from xhich
they were evicted after a violent aeaault led by anti-riot equads. Se'veral
hundred xere arrested, and xent ofY to ~oin ths other 10,000 or so political
prisonera. ~
The moveraent toxard revolt wa~ not entirely put doxn, aince 10 daye later,
the protest movee~ent broke out again. Thia time it Waa the secondsry atudenta
ia the capital, who atartin~ on Sund~y, 3 Jaauaiy, held a seriea of non-stop
demonstrationa, in Which all the educational inatitutione took part, including
the girls' aecondary achoole. 1a they marched on ~h~ Boulevard de la Repnblique,
vhich leada to tbe preaideatial palace, college and male end female seaondary
school atudents, and even eight- aad nine-year�old chiYdren ahouted alogana ~
que8tioning the economic recovery program publishad by the Sudanese head of
~ atate. Tbe movement snowballedj ne~ct day co]~legs.. and aecondary studente
in tbe larger citiee took up the cry of thoae in Khartoum. The demonstrationa
quickly aasumed the characteriatics of a maa8 movement. Neither the police
nor the armed forces~ armored vehiolea Were able to atop the tide of popular
discmntent that sxept, thereafter, over moet regiona of the Sudan. Th~usands
of voicea, previouely muzzlad, cenaored, oppreaaed, challanged Nwnayri's
team: "The aoat of stapla foods muat return to normal!" This demand ia a
basic one, for it affects the living conditiona of the great ma,~ority of
Sudanese, cru8hed by the econaaic recovery prograia set up by 1~Iumayri. This
~ 43
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007142/09: CIA-RDP82-40854R040500040018-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
progrem, imposed by the International Monet,aiy l~und (II~IF), includea raising
the prices of sugar (62 percent), tea (1~3 percent), and oil (85 percent). It
xas to avert any dieagreement over this program that the authoritiee decreed
the dissolution of the power~ul Federation of Railro~d Workers, then the
closing of all educational inatitutions.
In so doing, the goverruaent ka8 trying to avoid a confrontation that could
well be fatal to it, especially aince in the South autonomistic tendenciea
have been apparent for some time. Thue, in Juba, the capital of the South,
an opposition party dubbed Council for the Autono~ of the South has ~ust
been formed. Its main ob~ective is to mobilize the populace around the idea
of se~f-determination of the aouther~n population, which differs from that
of the North through its Christian or animiatic beliefs (the Sudanese of the
North make up the Islamic ma3ority). At the head of this aeparatist movement,
which already includes hundreds of professionals and intellectuals, are 17
former ministers and 3 leftist political leaders. Thirty-one members of this
neW party have ~ust been arreated and accused of being nremote-controlled"
by ...I,ibya. .
Caught betWeen popular discontent, in the North, and the separatists, in the
South, Numayri finds himself locked in; the economic measures required by
the II~' in return for a loan of 220 million dol7.ars for the current fiscal
year induced him to devaluate the price of basic raw materials.
To this is added one fundamental factor: the Withdrawal of the state subsidy
for these very same staples. Low purchasing power, combined with riaing unem-
ployment, the reduction by half of cotton output, the basis for e~cports (hence
the prime source of foreign currencies), amount to symptoms of what Numayri~s
fate will be in the months ahead.
1211~9
- CSO: 1~519/115 END
44
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500040018-3