JPRS ID: 10351 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030060-7
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 52
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 60
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/ 10351
25 February 1982
~!ear East North Af~~ca Re ort
p
(FOUO 8/82)
- ~'g~$ FOREIGN BROADCA~T INFORMATION SERVICE
,
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NOTE
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- transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language
_ sources are translated; those from English-language sources
are transcribed or reprinted, ~,aith the original phrasing and
other characteristics retained.
Headlines, editoriar reports, and material enclosed in brackets
are supplied by JPRS. Processii~g indicators such as [Text]
- ur [Excerpt] in the first line of e~ch item, or following the
last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was
processed. Where no processing ~.r~dicator is given, the infor-
matioa was summarized or extracted.
Jt:familiar names rendered phonetically or tr~nsliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
~ tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the
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Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an
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_ given by source.
- The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
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JPRS L/10351
25 February 1982
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
cFOUO s/s 2 ~
. CONTENTS
PE RS IAN GULF AFFAI RS
Various Iranian Acts on Arab Side of Gulf Described, Conde~ed
(Ahmad Hafiz; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 25-31 Dec 81) 1
~ ALGE RIA
, Political System, Policies Defined
(MARC~IES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 1 Jan 82) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Adoption of Infcrn~ation Code Noted
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANE,~IS, 8 Jan 82) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Briefs
Algeria-5oviet Cooperation 9
I RAQ
President Demands Military Sacrifice of Party Members
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, ~-14 Jan 82) 10
Info rmation Minister Criticizes Opponents, Imperialists
~ (Kamal Hasan Bakhit; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 8-14 Jan~82)........ 12
MAU RI TAN IA
Loans �or Gorgol Noir Project Ratified
(1~fARCHES TROPICAUX ET ME~I'?`ERRANEENS, 1 Jan 82) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
MORDCCO
Article Examines Saharan War Status
(MARCHES TRfJPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 8 :Tan 82) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Phosphate Industry Production, Development 12eviewed
(MARCHES TRQPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 4 Dec 81) 25
- a- [III - NE & A- 121 FOUO]
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Loan Gr~.ited for Bou-Gaffer Mining Development
(MARQiES TROPIGAITX ET MEDII~RRANEENS, 1 Jan 82) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
- Essaouira Gas Iliscovery Ibubles REgion's Production
(MARCEI.ES TROPICAUX ET N~DITERRANEENS, 1 Jan 82) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
- TUN IS IA
Interview With Habib Achcur
(Habib Achour Interview; AL WATAN AL-'ARABI, 11-17 Dec 81).... 32
Aftermath of Elections, New 5-Yea�: Plan Examined
(Francois Poli; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 30 Dec 81) 37
Article Reflects on Slow Democratization
(Habib Boulares; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 30 Dec 81) 42
- Agz, ement Signe3 To Create Fishing Company
(MAR(.'EiES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 8 Jan 82) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
B rie fs
Tunisia-Kuwait Cooperation 48
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PERSIAN GULF AFFAIRS
VARIOUS IRANIAN ACTS ON ARAB SIDE OF GULF DESCRIBED, CONDENIl~IED
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 254, 25-31 Dec 81 p 35
/Article by Ahmad Hafiz: "The Dreame of Khomeyni's 'Empire': TehrsAn Exported
_ Them, Dubai Discov~red Them and Bahrain Squelched Them"/
/Text/ A plot has been exposed which is being d~.recCed against fit~e Arab Gulf and
has been aimed at th2 Gulf's stability for a substantial period of time. The plan
that was thwarted in Bahrain a few hours before it was to be put into effect is a
chapter in a long story, an episode of sabotage in an ongoing serial that is being
prepared for the Gulf states through a theory wt~icn holds that an "Iranian security
belt" should be established which will realize the dreams of the "Khomeynist em-
pire." AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has gathered the fpllowing information on the latest de-
velapments.
Bulf secu�rity sources are in agreement on one scenario, whictt claims that the
rulers of Tehran, specifically Iranian intelligence, are financing the process of
"brainwashing" a number of deranged young people in the Gulf because they have been
won over by Khomeyni.'s "philasophy" Chat the Arab Gulf reg~nes should be changed
and that a gr~~up of regimes should be es~ablished which are in harmony with the new
Iranian regir~e: What has happaned in Bahrain seems like a coup-oriented act, and
it is not ~he �irsC of its kind in the context of the Iranian plan, which in its
~ turn is a rush to the front lines to protect tlze Iranian regime from collapse.
The "coup-oriented" Irar~.tan theory emerged after the first theory rad failed; that
propounded "exporting ~he revolution" of Khameyni~s after this "revolution" had
- lost its first ardos and the brilliance ~f the first weeks of excitement--a bril-
liance that was connecCed not so much to the Ayatollah's "revolution" as to the
result of the suffering that the fall of the Shah itself had caused.
Stagnant Merchandise
= Therefore the "revolution" is merchandise that cannot be exported. From this poinC,
Iranian media set forth in quest of anoCher method for dealing with all the Gulf
_ countries wiChout exception, and that is the method of large and small, explosions
in the terrorist mariner--the assassination of o�ficials, the destruction of of-
ficial and unofficial organizations, the terrorization of ordinarSr simple people
and deprivation of their stability.
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Since Bahrain appears to be the firsc iiut in the Gulf cluster, the close~t to the
Iranians' reach, it was the �irst Carget. Encouraging the rulers of Iran tc, com-
mit aggression against Bahrain was the fact that the Gulf Cooperation Council was
start9.ng to grow as an effective organization and rhat the plot had to be carr3.ed
out before tlie bonds of Gu1f cooperat:~.on cauld be strengthened in a manner where
- it would subsequently be difficult to penetrate the Gulf security sphere. What was
~equired first and last was for Iraii to continue to be the "policeman," just as it
was in the e.ra of the former empire--the first and foremost police.man.
This is u~hat the fi~st investigations into the infonnation revealed. The security
- agencies in the Gulf countries cooperated with Bahraini authorities in following
up on all the threads connected to it. Benefit has been derived �rom information
availabl~e up to this point on the details of the "first instalment," which showed
that the nucleus of the "main conspiracy" which had the Gulf countries as a whole
as its target was an organization called the ~slamic Front for the Liberation of
Bahrain," headquartered in Tehran. The people supervising this organization achemed
against the heart of the existing regime in Bahrain on the date of its celebration
of the national holiday, which fell on 15 December, and the declaration of the an-
nexation of Bahrain to Iran. Execution of the scheme was to be carried out start-
ing wi~h the assassination of the emir of Bahrain, .ihaykh 'Isa ibn Salman A1
Khalifah, his prime minister, and a number of senior officials in it. Meanwhile
an armed group was to s~t off a number of dynamite charges and throw bombs at some
official inst~llations and buildin~s, whi.le another group would organize and lead
demonstra~Lons of a popular charac~er in support ot the new "Islamic revolutianary"
regime, wi.th posters call.ing for union with Iran: Radio Tehran wauld immediately
broaclcast a statement supporting the new regime in Bahrain and declarisig that any
aggression against Bahrain would be an aggressi~n against Iran. According to the
p1an, the organizat3.on members present in other Arab Gulf countries would at the
same time throw explosives ir. different axeas in Gulf capitals, then would lead
l.imited demonstrations in support of the new regime.
Thus, as r_he conspirato~:s pianned it, the area would be plunged into chaos and the
Gulf Arabs would be indefinitely pr~occupied with theix securiCy concerns.
Deli~eration for the Moment
By the na~i~re of the case, officials in Arab Gulf countries have not yet officially
made any declarations about these dimen~ions of the plot. There people's opinions
tend to favor the need for careful deliberation in disccrvering all the secret
threads aimed at countries outside the area people prefer to wait until opportuni-
ties axe appropriate before officially announcing the scheme in full. The Saudi
minister of the interior, Prince Nayif ibn �Abd-al-'Aziz, referred to that when he
said, in exactly these words, "Saudi Arabia is one of the countries that were the
targets" an.r~ "The security of Bahx'ai-~ and the Gulf emirates is part of the security
of Saudi Arabia." The Saudi minister of the interiar asserted, "Among those ar-
rested in Bahrain were 13 Saudis, and contacts are underway between the two
countries in this regard." A fsw days after the declaration of these statements,
Prince Nayif iaent to Bahrain to learn from close at hand of the investig~.tions
that the Bahrain suthorities had conducted into the organization members who had
been arrested; these o~ere 60 in number and included persons holding Saud~,Kuwaiti
and Omani passports.
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It is worth pointing out that the first news on the "terrorist organization" was
- distributed by the security ag?ncies in Dubai, which arrested six persons after
thPy had become suspicious of treir Bahraini passports. In the ir~vestigations,
they discovered that t:~ese were forged and hancled the persons over to Bahrain,
which detained them on a preventive investigation basis. Hawever, it soon discov-
ered that behind the six pers~ns were 60 others frrnn all the Arab Gulf countries
who liad come to Bahrain via Tehran to dye the pure blue waters of the Gulf a deep
blood red, while other groups awaited theu~ in the Gulf capitals to begin carrying
out the plot oi an adventure of which the least that can be said is that it was
destructive.
COPYRIG1iT: 198i AL-[~7:1TAN AI,-'ARABI:
11887
CSO: 4404/224
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ALGERIA
POLITICAL SYSTEM, POLICIES DEFINEll
Paris MARCH~S TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1886, 1 Jan 82 p 9
[Arta.cle: "A Clear Definition of th~e Political System"]
[Text] Since he assumed his duties nearly 3 years ago, President Chadli Bendjedid
- has been very sparing witn doctrinal political declarations. The line that he in-
tended to follow has gradually been drawn, to be sure, both in the light of his de-
cisiuns and through the activities taken on by ttie Central Committee of the FLN and
by the National Popular Assembly. It thus emerged, for example, that contrary to
the expectations of certain commentators, the new chief of state did not intend to
restrict the party's role, and that quite to the cantrary, he expected decisively
important collaboration from its Central Committee. But it is only in his "speech
to the nation" on 20 December 1981 that President Bendjedid has systematically de-
scribed the political functioning of the Algerian state of today. This part of ttie
pre~idential message merits particular attention.
The Guiding Role of the Party �
After describing the most important activities carried out by the political leader-
ship in the past year, especially as regards satisfaction of the citizen's needs,
the president declared clearly: "Algeria is the country of the guiding party, not
the country of the management party." The party, he explained, had increased ac-
tivity in 1981, asserting its vanguard role i.n the conduct of the revotution, as
well as in expression at the needs and the hopes of the people; the major qualities
of the "guiding par~y" are "mutual con�idence between it and the masses, its capac-
ity to identify with the objectives of the nation and assimilate the nation's ac-
tive forces." ~
Among `he party's recent achievements, the president listed: the increased numbers
of intellectuals and cadres joining, which has made it possible to improve the mix
of the different categories of citizens within its cells; the installation, at the
head of the Coordinating Council of each wilaya, of. a mouhafadha secretary, chosen
from among the members of tt~e Central Committee--a measure that strengthens the
party's guiding role on the spot and ensures a bond bel-ween the rank and file and
l-he political leadership; and examination by the Central Committee of the problems
of national interest, which are first det~ated at_ the rank-and-file level withi.n
the organic frameworks of the party and of the state.
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The Elected Assemblies and Democracy
The president, next addressinc the members of the National Popular Assembly direct-
ly, first stressed that the National Assembly is the first one to be elected by the
people in accordance with the provisions of the National Charter, and he expressed
his appreciation of their "sincere efforts." To be sure, the chief of state was
generally very sparing with resounding oratorical rhetoric; but nonetheless, the
modest level of the praise bestowed was noted.
- Furthermore, this measured praise came after a racher severe evaluation of the
elected Assemblies of the wilayas and the commur~es, certain of which "have not al-
ways been up to the objectives of the revolution ancl the aspirations of the masses."
+ The Central Committee's Resolutions
A Central Committee decision--thou~h an old one--was stressed: involves medical
care without charge, which "shall forever remain an irreversible popular acquire-
ment," with every effort made to improve the quality of preventive medicine and
medical service.
The resolution on cultural policy was represented as further clarifying "all the
notions about the funda~rental components of the nation," and as an achievement of
"responsible democracy: a nation with a centuries-old past, united by the language
of the Koran, that has forged itself in the crucible of Arab-Islamic civilization,
whose ranks have been so~idly united in the course of the hard struggle for inde-
pendence and social justice, cannot help but be faithful to his history...and to
its principles."
The last session of the Central Committee--the sixth--studied the topic af the
private sector. The president remarked, in this regard, that "the strategic sec-
tors, which can influence p~litical and economic decision-making," will remain in
_ the public sector, ensurin~ "the collective ownership of the means of production."
TY?e "nonexploiting" private sector will have its place, aimed at "national develop-
ment and satisfaction of the citizens' needs." It should be complementary to the
public sector, "probably as a stimulant, and not as a substitute." It will be nec-
essary to define its field of action, and to "protect it from itself, so that it
will not veer toward the explaitation that our religion forbids, and not be a
thrEat to the advance of our socialist society."
It will be noted that the Central Committee's membership no longer includes Messrs
Bouteflika,. Abdesselam and Ghozali, who were ministers under President Boumediene.
Production, Consumption and Morality
- Speakin~; of the socioeconomic problems of production and consumption, President
Bendjedid introduced into the examination of them, for the benefi.t of- Lhe Algerian
_ people, a preponderant element of morality, and he gave son~e admonitions that were
of unaccustomed severi[y. Everyone, he ~aid, "should asic himself what he has given
to his country, should question whether his output is in line with the pay and al-
_ lowances he receives.... There is no longer any room among us for anyone who lives
at the expense of society.... No excuses will be accepted any longer from people
who regress in their work." The rate of prodiiction has increased in many cases;
but, the president 1-emarlced, "it st.i11 has not reached the level that would meri.t
prai.se and admiration."
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African and Arab Affairs
The president pointed out that Algeria belongs both "to the Arab Maghreb and to the
Saharan group of countries," and drew from this fact the conclusion that "political
_ good-neighborliness" is necessitated: there is no ar::biguity about the cuuntry's
borders, and the completion of their demarcation is :~:n progress. The president's
extensive tour around Africa has made it possible, ~iespite the diversity of the po-
litical systems, to strengthen friendship and coopera.ion.
LJhile striving to maintain a"minimum of Arab solidarity," Algeria cann~t accept
that "nationai rights should be ceded to the despoiler"--this being a discreet and
measured condemnation of Ehe attitude of Egypt, which conflicts with the struggle
of the Arab people in occupied land. The entire nation will have to take up the
provocations suffered on the Golan Heights and in Jerusalem, and make "a new selec-
tion among friends, enemies and spectators."
On the other hand, "the unity of the Arab Maghreb constitutes a fundamental support
in th~ confrontatiun with racism and Zionism.... Thus should peace be reestab-
lished in this vital part of the Arab nation." Algeria is thus adhering to the so-
lution adopt~ed by the OAU for the Sahrawi probl.em; while confirming its friendship
and consideration for its Moroccan brothers, it cannot ignore the struggle of a
people demanding its natural right: it will respect any choice expressed by the
people of the Western Sahara "in a free, general and global referendum, without
any foreign pressure or interference." Thu~ the president confirms that Algeria's
policy toward the Sahrawi problem has not changed. But he Pxpressed this determin-
ation in very moderate terms and in as conciliatory a manner as possible, w:~ile
avoiding gi.ving the slightest pretext to Moroccan sensibilities.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris 1982
11267
CSO: 4519/90
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ALGERIA
ADOPTION OF INFORMATION CODE NOTED
- Paris MA:cCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1887, 8 Jan 82 p 72
[Article: "Algeria: First Information Code"]
[Text] Algeria has provided itself with its first "Informati,on Code," thus fil-
_ ling a juridical vacuum which has been noted since the independence of the
country, both in terms of the regul~tion of ~ournalism as well as in terms of
information policy.
This "Ir~formation Code," approved on 28 December by the National Assembly, which
amended some 60 of its articles and brought in new provisions to the government
draft, states in particular that "the right to i~FOrmation is a fundamental right
of all citizens" and that the state must assure the ~rovision of "complete and
objective information."
It also statCs that "information is an area where nat~ional sovereignty is exercised
under the aegis and direct.ion of the National Liberation Front [FLN]." The
journalist is requirecl to provide information "in the framework of the socialist
choices def ined in the National Charter," while expressing "the revolutionary
will" ur.~ler the direction of the FLN.
The off icial text, whi~h has not yec been puhlished, def ines in Article 9 the
conditions in which foreign institutions present in Algeria shall exercise their
info rnaati~n activities. It sets ott the provisions of the monopoly by national
institutions in terms of information and regulates publicity-type information in
Lhe c~untry.
The code also def i~:es the rights and duties of the journalist, in particular freedom
02 access to sources of information, the 1ega1 proteetion of the profession and of
the journa;.ist, ~he exercise tiy citizens of their right of response in the
media, the prohibition against publishers receiving funds from foreign organizations,
- etc.
Penal provisions and punishments are also provided for in the text of the code to
prevent "abusive practices flowing frbm the privilege of writi.ng and of providing
information, the daily newspaper EL MOUDJAHID points out. The newspaper notes
in this respect that even though the National Assembly has been at sor~e puins to
avoid making this law into a"Penal Code," it i~ nonetheless true that a"reading
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c~f the document as a whole nevertheless serves to bring out a wide predominance
of penal provisions which could specifically block thz possibility for the
jou~nalist to inform himself."
It is therefore appropriate to "balance the judgment on each occasion when it is
a matter of discerning what was the good faith of tfie ~ournalist and what were
the intentions whieh could be attributed to him," EL MOUDJAHID adds. The news-
paper considers that the "Information Code," "like every law, is valued by the
quality of its application and the use whinh is made of it."
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982
517 0
CSO: 4519/97
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ALGERIA
nRIEFS
ALGERIA-SOVIET COOPERATION--Some 100 projects are being carried out in Algeria with
_ the aid of the Soviet Union, declared Semion Skatchkov, chief of the Soviet delega-
tion, to the 12th meeting of the Soviet-Algerian Standing Committee for Coopera-
tion. In an interview in the journal INDUSTRIE SOCIALISTE reported in an AFP dis-
patch from Moscow, Skachkov stated that economic and technical cooperation between
the USSR and Algeria "is helping to solve the most important problems" of the de-
velopment of the Algerian economy. Skachkov referred to the construction of a
630-MW thermal power plant at Jijel, a cement plant with annual output of 500,000
. tons at Djelfa, a spare-parts shop in the metallurgical plant of E1-Hadjar, as well
as the enlargement of the drinking-glass factory built at Oran with Soviet assist-
ance. He added that the Alrar/Hassi-R'Mel gas pipeline is "an important project"
in Soviet-Algerian cooperation. "The contract for the equipping of a section of it
has already been signed by the competent organizations of the USSR and Algeria," he
indicated. In the agricultural sphere, Skachkov confirmed that Algeria and the
- USSR had decided on joint construction of four irrigation dams in the northern re-
gions of Algeria. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
No 1886, 1 Jan 82 p 18] 11267
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris 1982
CSO: 4519/90
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IRAC~
~
PRESIDENT DEMANDS MILITARY SAGT~~ICE OF PARTY MENIBERS
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI Yn Arabic No 256, 8-14 Jan 82 n 23
/Arricle: "Saddam Husayn: Se1f~Sacritice in Cambat Is the Prime Condition fo~
Party Promotion"/
/Text/ The Iraqi People's Army's participation in the war is a phenomenon that
acquires special importance in the context of combat participation and party com-
mitment to combat. President Saddam Husayn visited a special People's Army train-
ing camp and spoke with the fighting men.
Every day the co~anders of the People's Army say goodbye to a detachment headed
for the battlefronts and receive groups coming in fram the front that have per-
fozmed their fighting role in cambat.
- Many are the groups of people who have participated more than three times in var-
iaus sectors of the front, and m.any fighting men still are pouring forth, along
with many other persons whose turn has not yet come.
The last 2 weeks, many camprehensive camp sessions were held involving a specific
type of fighting man distinguished by special chsracteristics that have attained
records which the Iraqi command has not announced.
These numerous large camps, which include ~remendous groups of People's Army fight-
ing men, are broken down among a number of Iraq's gavernorates. It is said that
there are thousan,ds of volunteers waiting for their turn to take regular training
_ in similar camps. These sre the type of fighting man to whom the special charac-
teristics apply.
A few days ago the president of Iraq, Suddam Husayn, accom~panied by Mr Taha Y':~sin
Ramadan, cocrnnander general of the People's Army, Samir al-Shaykhli, comnander of
_ the People's Army for the Baghdad region, and a number of officials, visited these
camps and was received with great enthusiasm.
The Iraqi president became directly acquainted with the conditions af the fighting
men and witnessed a number of their training exercises. He entered into open dis-
- cussions with them on traii~ing and proficiency in and the use of weapons. He also
talked to them about the sp'.rit of self-sacrifice and bravery by which the people's
fighting men mu~t be distin~~.ished.
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In this regard, the Iraqi president asserted to the fighting men that bravery and
self-sacrifice were the most prominent conditions for party promotion, and the
_ other well known conditions came after them. He said, "The spirit of sacrifice
_ will be a new cricerion that will go into effect in the party apparatus, because
the Ba'th means self-sacrifice; it means abnegation, bravery and initiative."
~ The Iraqi president greeted the fighting men of the People's Arnry with appreciation
for their high morale and their erithusiastic rush to volunteer to sacrifice them-
selves for the country and the Arab nation. He stressed that this live presence of
- the People's Army fighting men was the link between the two al-Qadisiyahs, the first
and the second, and stressed the people's inner strength and their vital persever-
ance throughout history.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 AL-LdATAN AL-`ARABI
_ 11887
CSO: 4404/224
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IRAQ
INFORMATION MINISTER CRITICIZES OPPONENTS, I:KPERIALISTS
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 256, 8-14 Jan 82 pp 20-22
/Article by Kamal Hasan Bakhit: "Latif Nasif Jasim Co AL-WATAN AL-~ARABI: The
Syrian Regime Supports Cooperation Between Tel Aviv and Tehran"/
/Text/ When a whole people stand in the front-line trenches and Che arnry realizes
- a miracle, the media cannot remain in a state of passive absorption; from absorp-
tion they ~ove to the initiative, and from the initiative to profound interaction
= with the conscience of the army and the nation.
Latif Nasif Jasim, the Iraqi miniater of culture and information, has realized this
combative pioneering achievement in the fighting media since the war began, as he,
in ~he uniform of the People's Army, has been in a state of permanent readiness and
extraordinary alertness. He is very strong and works wiChout commoCion in innaCe
solidarity with the struggle, keeping up with the unremitting daily acts of heroiam
in a11 sectors of the front, on the battle line as in daily life.
The Iraqi media today, with their agencies and organizaf~ions, are dynamic and do
not reat, are vital and do not let up, and are a true embodiment of the will of a
people who are fighting, building and singing, with blood and full vigor--building
domestic and national dignity and interacting with the world with the feeling of
people who are forging history.
AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI met with the Iraqi miniater of information and culture, and this
' conversation took place on the media, the front, development, Golan, the conflict
with Israel and the Arab media in the struggle of destiny.
I asked the minister, "What goals are expected of the festival of Saddam's
Qadisiyah, which your ministry ie organizing no~ Has it achieved them?"
He replied, "The festival is a spontaneous tactical aitu~tion that all social
classes and popular organizatione in the country have pursued warmly to express
the victories that have been realized in the period of war that has pasaed, espec-
ially in 1981, immortalizing the memory of the martyr.s of the new Qadisiyah who
- gave without limit and whom the state of martyrdom has placed in a lof~y, elevated
status which Preaident Saddam Husayn expressed when he said 'The martyrs are the
noblest of us all,' being entitled to conm~emoration and glorification." .
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He went on, The central observance is the 61st anniversary of the birth of our
gi~ant army, which falls on 6 December. Tt is also an occasion for saluting this
prominent event, this immortal day which took part in the immortal battles of 1948,
1967, and 1973, and, before those, in 1941, and the battle of al-Qadisiyah. These
interconnected events have made people concerned with culture, arts, ideas and
other means of innovation move spontaneously in festivals, celebrations and carni-
vals that sing of these glorious deeds and stress in a warm, vivid manner their es-
sential solidarity wiCh the heroic canmiander Saddam Husayn, fram the far north of
Iraq to the south, from east to west--children, old men, women, military men,
civilians, students, peasants and workers, all at their places of work, expressing
this condition, which we consider to be an unusual one, by mobilizing, fortifying
and massing ranks. This interaction stresses that these great people possess un-
limited powers of dynamism and vitality. The ,joy is a state that the people ex-
pressed in the first days of the war; we find ourselves in the 16th month of the
war, and this dynamic sta~te is increasing, becoming clear and deepening itself.
The picture today is riper than before. The songs are deeper, more involved, more
comprehensive. Such a state is rarely realized among any people."
- He added, "Our people are fighting, singing a:~d building a giant lofty edifice,
which you will witness and sense in all development institutions and all the in-
stallations of life.
"Therefore the festival of Saddam's Qadisiyah is a fesCival of victory. It is a
state of affirmation of the spirit of victory; it is a state of recalling the en-
tire sequence of events in the past that ha.ve elapsed in 16 months of war and are
still continuing. It comes as a culmination of. the heroic struggles and giant vic-
tories that our heroic army realized in al-Khafajiyah and recently waged in West
Kilan and Sumar, by which it turned the mountains and plains of Iran into graves
where stubborn arrogant haughty heads have been buried. Things will remain like
this until. they acknowledge all our rights to lar.ul and water and accepC noninter-
vention in our domestic affairs in accordance wi.~h recognized international cri-
teria, rules and laws.
"I as an individual taking part in this festival feel unlimited happiness because
every day I discover tihat there are unusual powers in these people, powers for
poeery, powers for drawing and all other c�reative arte, powers that must be used
and directed in the proper, full manner in the various areas of the media."
/Question/ What are the Iraqi media's most preininent approaches in the conflict?
/Answer/ The Iraqi media have not created a miracle. The miracle has been created
- by our heroic army, by our extraordinary commander Saddam Husayn, and by the loyal
masses of our people. The media have been and remain a reflection of this state
of affairs. They express this state, the state of victory, even if the expression
has sc~ far been incomplete. The heroic arn~y that is encamped on a front 1,200
kilometers long and 50 to 80 kilameters deep in Iranian territory is a matter that
was not easily realized. This state of mass upsurgence is a staCe that is not
often found in history.
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All that the media have presented is to express tl~emselves truthfully and in soli-
_ darity and convey the facts to the masses of the people and the world at a high
technical capability, through the living pictures of battle and by transporting
journalists to the battlef.ront and facilitating their arrival at the front.
By this description, I do not want to be humble ar to belittle the role of the
media. The media axe a basic c~entral means for mobilizing, fortifyi.ng and rally-
ing public opinion around any great goal. However, this time the battlP has been
greater than the volume of the media; no matter what mobilization and coverage we
have achieved, the battle is a greater and nx~re 3.rnnense truth than what we imagine
and what we have manage:l to convey.
/Question/ NoneCheless the media have managed to raise the morale of the fighting
men on the ~ronts and increase the cohesion of the domestic front.
/Answer/ That 3.s true. However, the morale of our people has always been high,
- and their adherence to their command has always been firm. Our people know every-
thing about their usurped rights to land and water and they know that they are a
people against wham aggression has been crnmnitted and that they are not the ag-
gressors. It is the Iranians who staxted bombing anci striking the towns of Mandali,
Zarbalmiyah and Khaniqin and Cried to blow up more than one place in Baghdad, ~om-
mit aggression against women, old men, children and goverru~;ent officials, and form
a secret party linked to them inside Iraq. Our people know and fully realize all
these and oCher matters. They are a proud people who are not happy to have anyone
interfere in their affairs, and they adhere to their rights in full. Therefore
they have been totally fortiEied and mobilized, and the media have just been able
to convey the facts to the masses.
The Dangers of Khomeynism
/guestion/ In the light of the new facts the :~ar has brought tarth in its 16th
month, how do you view the features of the coming stage polirically and militarily
on the regional level?
/Answer/ We had hoped that no one would coumit aggression aga~nst us or interfere
in our affairs, but the war occurred, and we achieved brilliant victories in it.
_ Since 28 September 1981, President Saddam Husayn has unilaterally suspended the
war in the hopes that the Persians would revert to their senses and their right
minds, but, ~n spite of all the appeals, all the stands and all the assertions of
peace, the Irani~ns' stubbornness has increased and they imagine that that is weak-
ness on Iraq's part. However, the appeals to suspend the war on Ir~q's part have
begun to assume great scope within Iran itself and many bodies have begun to ask
TChomeyni's clique "Why do you iasist on continuing the war at a time when Iraq is
declaring its readiness to stop it, in triumph, while it is strong and able to
continue?"
These appeals have therefore added a new problem to the series of the Khomeyni's
regime's problems, and Che proof is the pxoliferat~.on of staCeraenta that tell the
people not to listen to these appeals and other statements made by the
Iranian media.
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r'ux ur'r'1~~ u~L ULVLT
Our position on the state of war is not a tactical one, it is one of principle,
and it is one of principle on the atate of peace as well. It is a state we are
living through with a live conscience whose basis iP our rights in full to land,
water, sovereignty, noninterference in our affairs, an absence of aggressic,n
against us and the refi~sal to seek further rights by force.
~ Hcwever, Khomeyni the senile swindler, who has lost all the properties of civilized
man, does not understand this thinking. He is not just with his people, so how can
he be just w~th other peoples? Khauneyni has turned Iran in~o a slaughterhouse and
a great bloodbath. They boast that they have tena of thoussn,ds of prisoners, and
that they have executed 90 percent of the o~pposition, and we know that the current
Iranian opposition is what launched the revolution, while Khomeyni was living in a
subuxb of Paris.
When the ruler's position on his people takes this form, it is natural that he will
be more harsh and tyrannical with other peoples.
Exposed Cards
/4uestion/ Do you believe that indoctrination and preparation have been made avail-
able for the reat of the m~sLes in the various Arab countries?
/Answer/ We ~re carrying out indoctrination through an unusual media and cultural
effore. In the first place we are concerned with our own people because we are
waging ~he war in proxy for the whole Arab people and Are striving to indoctrinate
this nation about the dangers looming over us.
The recent events that have occurrad in Bahrain constitute serious additional proof
that the Iranian regixne does not want to stay within its bor.ders. Its aspirations
extend to all Arab terxitory, and what they are saying about "e~orting the Islamic
revolution" and other claims a Persian Oman, a persian Iraq, and a Persian Aden--
this all shows a deep-rooted resentment and backward mentality that is known for
its hostility to the Arab nation.
/Question/ What role is requested if the Arab media is to break the noose of the
blackout on the level of the authoriti.es and crystallize the popular Arab position
and move it forward?
/Answer/ Brother, we absolutely do not have any doubts on whether there gre any
sincere Arabs opposed to this war of ours, because we have faced an attack, and
this attack is threatening the independen~e of our country and threatening the in-
dependence of the Arab nation.
Our faith is firm that no sincere noble Arab can stand against us in this struggle~
' But for the cards to be shuffl.ed, and for Islam to be mixed up with Arabhood,
Arabhood with Islam, ancl Islam with nationalism, then with tr~e participation of
ehe Persiana in the liberation of Palestine, and other appeals, these are all
camouflages whose real nature time will lay bare.
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The greatest proof that the cards have begun to be exposed is the armaments cooper-
ation between Iran and the Zionist entity. This is materia~. proof, Rafsanjani has
admitted it, and the former president, Abol Hasan Bani-Sadr, has conEirmed it in
his capacity as the former cammander ganeral of the Iranian armed forces, In addi-
tion there are the documents which Mas'ud Ra,javi, the leader of the opponition
Mojahedin-e Khalq organization, has highlighted and published, and the crash of
the Argentinisn airplane. All this proof has categorically confiruaed that the
Iranian regime is collaborating with the Zionist enemy in a secret manner to destroy
the Arab nation.
- Nonetheless, in spite of the confirmation of the relationship, Ha�iz al-Asad is
still offering the Iranian regime tanks, artillery, missiles and military advicp
to help it keep on with the war and kill Iraqi soldiers who hastened to sa~~e
Damascus from falling in 1973.
There has been a change in the Arab media, and it is certainl.y an excellent trans-
formation. On the point that some Arab leaders are adopting a negative position,
I can say Chat there will be an accounti.ng for ever~thirig.
/guestion/ What news is there on the killing of Iraqi prisonere and the blowing
up of the Iraqi embassy in Beirut, with the caoperation of Syrian intelligence?
Was the intention in blowing up the embassy to cover u~ ~he annexation of Golan?
/Answer/ rirst, regarding the prisoners, this is a vile, immoral thing. History
will remember it for hundreds ot generations, because prisoners have religious
rights and 1ega1 rights. The Persians' venturing to kill pri~oners is expressive
of a state of terrible degeneration. It is a process which has removed the veil
they hide behind, wnich is Isl.am.
We are not surprisad th~a~ the Iranian regime has perpetrated such a vile crime,
because it slaughters children and women, even pregnant women. Isn't that in its
own rigtit a vile crime? We expect them to do more if they can; it is normal for
them to siaughter captured Iraqi soldiers who are fighting for the independence of
their nation and their usurped rigY?ts.
Second, regarding the blowing up of the embassy, the people who conf.essed to the
- abominable crime are the ones who set it of�, and we have enough evidence for that.
The people caho committed tha~ crime are accomplices of the Persian regime and the
Syrian regime's intelligence.
Third, we do not believe that the embassy operation was intended to secure the an-
nexation of Golan. For 14 years Golan has been under Israeli control--do you be-
lieve that a Syrian decree :ail.l bring back territory the enemy annexed 14 years
ago? Will it regain it by its ot~i decree? We believe, indeed have faith, that
land that has been taken by force can be reclaimed ~nly by force, whether or not
� the Zionis~ entity ~cknowledges that it has annexed it. The terriCory wi11 be re-
- claimed by force--true Arab force.
We stand severely against this tyrannicaZ Zioni.st decision and condemn it with all
our power, because the territory of the Golan is the equivalent of any plot of
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land in Palestine or Iraq; it is Arab land and does not belong to Hafiz al-Asad
or anyone else.
The Opposition and the War
/suestion/ Would an Iranian regime headed by Abol Hasan bani-Sadr, Mas'ud Rajavi,
Shapur Bakhtiar or the Iranian army be abZe to take a decision to end the war and
respond to Iraq�s legitimate demands?
/Answer/ We, as President Saddam Husayn said, are prepared to cooperate with any
party in th~ opposition in order to rid Iran of Khomeyni's clique.
We will welcame any party that comes and ia prapared to stop the war and negotiate
on the basis of Iraq's legitimate rights.
/Question/ Have any Iranian opposition parties respor.~ded to Presideut Saddam
- Husayn's appe~l?
/Answer/ I have no knowledge of that and I do not follow that subjecC.
/guestiQn/ Are thare any new Arab or internationAl efforts to resolve Che conf lict
_ between Iraq and the Iranian regime? Specifically, has Algeria declared its readi-
ness to make such efforts?
/Answer/ T have not heard about that.
/guestion/ In the international and Arab media, there are two ~ttitudes: one
stems from hostility toward Iraq, its experiment and its leaders, and the other
from the ally or friend's concern for Iraq, iCs experiment and its leadership.
- However, people are united in wondering about the extent of Iraq's losses and mil-
itary and economic exhaustion through the war. How do you cope with these wonder-
ings, especially ~s regards the iseue o� economic development?
/Answer/ We say that many people are pained by the victory and are p~ined by the
process of development and the continuous nature of thie process, as well as the
excellent international positian Iraq enjoys as a result of numerous factors,
- principal among them the abill.ty and genius of PresidenC Saddam Husayn, as a great,
magnificent figure in the nonaligned movement. All these factors intermingle and
+constitute a collection of grievances, a sta~e that in some aspects resembles
jealousy. However, we are concerned about our people, who are zealous over their
experim~an~ and are sacrificing themselves on its behalf. Day after day they in-
crease in pride and respect for themselves, their glories, their history and their ~
leaders. Day after day they see the land of Iraq cantinuously changing, the faces ,
of the Yraqis changing, and even the skies of Iraq changing, for the betCer and
for the preferable. This is the true situation we are going through.
- We also want Ixaq's brothers to be informed of this situ~==ion, to see it, and to
experience it, because it is basically their experiment, because it is the state
that we would like to become widesprer~d, not in the form of a horizontal extens:Con
but in the form of rays with a psychological, economic and social etfect.
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The efforts of 2 million Arab brothers in our country and in our midst is a staCe
of. affairs which we consider healthy and a mutual contact of principles. This has
all b~en created through a new e~eriment, the experiment of construction and the
experiment of development.
As to whether anyone wants to say that Iraq has lost much or little, I say that
everything is of little importance in the face of independence, the preservgtion
of dignity and the preservation af the soil. Development is of no benefit, billions
of dLnars accumulated are of no benefit, a strong army is of no benefit, if the
independence of the country is lacking and if the country is not beloved and is not
noble. What is the benefit of tremendous develop3nent if sovereignty i~ lacking?
WhaC is the benefit cf plans, principles and books if foreigners are tra~ling our
land underf.oot, or a portion of it., as is now happening in Golan, Palestine and
_ elsewhere? Why this blood, this effort and this suffering? It is for the salce of
independence and sovereignty.
What is the difference between Gaza and Sayf Sa'd, between Jaffa and the Shatt al-
'Arab, between Zayn al-Qaws and Golan? That is all the Arab territory which we
want to be sovereign, and we are saddened when any square inch of it is foreign.
We thank the people who grieve over our losses but we know full well what we want,
and that is enough.
/guestion/ How do you evaluate the Arab and internatianal Media?
/Answer/ The Arab media in general, except in rare instances, are responding to
us to the utmost in the war. The media of Ruwait, the media of the Gulf, the
- Lebanese media, the press abroad except for two publications in Lebanon that repre-
sent two political regimes, and some Lebanese papers that do not write because they
face deterrent pressure from the Syrian regime--however, we know that everyone's
- intentions are on our side and theix hearts are with us.
The media t~iat are intensely hostile to us are primari].y the Zionist media and the
American imperialist media. The international media which are nat suspect are
taking a f~ir. position ~nd on some occasions are neutral.
The Nonaligned Scrmmit
Concerning the nonaligned sum?nit, Che Iraqi minister of information and culture
said, "Preparations are reaching an end in the form of ha11s, villas, buildings,
staffs responsible for administration and translation, secretaries and companions.
Everything that is needed is fully ready. The conference will meet at its scheduled
time, with God�s permission."
Finally, I asked, "How do you interpret the broad mass rallying, the great love
that the Iraqi people feel for Presiclent Saddam Husayn, although the war ia enter-
ing its 16th month, and the fact that the domestic front is still strong and grow-
ing in strength with every day?"
He replied, "I wrote an article about that once in which I said that he is a
state, a symbol, a leader, a brother, a comrade and a triend.
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"Every Iraqi feels that Saddam Husayn is in his mind and in his conscience, be-
cause he is close Co him; every male anci female Iraqi is waiting for Saddam Husayn
to visit him and take breakfast, lunch or dinner with him, or drink tea with him.
"This state which has been created is an unusual one. Every day Saddam Husayn re-
ceives thousar.ds of telephone calls from citizens and answers them calmly and
patiently. He receives the hundreds of thousands of lettera the citizens send him,
and also answers them calmly. Saddam Husayn is in the village, the town, the
plains, the mountain, the �actory, the field, the school, the university, and in
every installatian in life.
"This state must be matchad by a state of 1ove, embracing and unlimited support
ex~ressed by the Iraqis in numerous forms and various ways.
"This should also Ue matched by the fact that Saddam Husayn is the son of the
Tigris and Euphrates, the son of ~axada, the sott of the Nile, the snn of our land
and sky. That is the ~ate that was created in the s~age when we were in the great-
est need of a knight and brave comu~ander to lead this nation from victory to vic-
tory, from triumph to triumph, fram glory to glory.
"Finally, let me thank you in ~erson and thank the m~gazine AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
and our brother Walid Abu Zah+:. I am happy that he has lost more than 15 kilograms.
This is further proof that AT~-WATAN AL-'ARABI is always experiencing a state of
v~'.tality."
COPYRI~HT: 1981 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
11887
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MAURITANIA
LOANS FOR G~RGOL NOIR PROJECT RATIFIED
~Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1886, 1 Jan 82 p 22]
[Artic.le: "Gorgol Noir: Ratification of Loan Agreemer.ts"]
[Text] On 29 April 1981, the Moroccan JOURNAL OFFICIEL published three ordinances
of 23 April relative to the loan agreements and the tax regime for the Gorgol Noir
project. The following agreements were ratified:
--the loan agreement and its appendixes signed in Nouakchott on 1 March 1981 by the
representative of the Mauritanian government and the Saudi Development Fund rela-
tive to the financing of a part of the Gorgol Noir project and involving a loan of
SRls 33.5 million;
--the loan agreement signed in Abu Dhabi on 6 November 1980 by the representative
of the government of Mauritania and the Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Develop-
ment relative to the financing of a part of the Gorgol Noir project and involving a
loan of 24 million dirhams from the United Arab Emirates;
--the credit agreement signed in Washington on 21 November 1980 by the Mauritanian
government and the International Development Association relative to the financing
of a part of the project and involving a loan of SDR [Special Drawing Rights]
11.4 million ($15 million);
--the loan agreement signed in Jeddah on 15 November 1980 by the government of the
Islamic Republic of Mauritania and and Islamic Development Bank relative to the
financing of a part of the Gorgol Noir project and involving a loan of 4.62 million
Islamic dinars;
--the loan contract and its appendixes No 44 [as published~ signed in Rnme on
24 October 1980 between the Mauritanian government and the International FiInd for
Agricultural Development relative to the financing of a part of the project and in-
- volving a loan of SDR 7.6 million;
' --the loan agreement signed in Tripoli on 6 October 1980 with the Libyan Arab Jama-
' hiriya relative to the finan~ing of a part of the Gorgol Noir project and involving
- a loan of $10 million.
Finally, Ordinance No 81-088 of 23 April 1981 establishes the tax regime applicable
to the Operation Gorgol Noir project. The companies to which contracts have been
awarded and their Mauritanian and foreign subcontractors approved by the adminis-
tration, responsible for carrying out the Operation Gorgol Noir project (F6umbleita
dam, the canal, the Gorgol Noir rice-growing area, and the administration and pro-
duction buildings), will enjoy, for the entire duration of the project, total ex-
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emption from the current-action tax and from all customs duties and taxes as well
as from any levy having the character of an indirect tax on the materials, sup-
plies, spare parts and tires necessary for carrying out the work. The materiel
necessary for carrying out the work will be placed under the exceptional tempo*ary
admission regime for the entire duration of the work and the time needed for reex-
portation of it. The foreign experts working within the framework of the project
will enjoy exceptional temporary admission of one personal vehicle per expert.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris 1982
11267
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MOROCCO
ARTICL~ EXAMINES S~IHARAN WAR STATUS
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1887, $ Jan 82 p 6%
[Arti.cle: "Will the Saharan War Change in CharactEr?"]
- [Text] Morocco has decided to put an end to the "outpost battle": the effort was
using up its troops. A regiment which had spent a long tour of duty in the i.so-
lated position of Guelta Zemmour seems to have become demoralized. On 13 October
it was found no longer fit for combat. The army general staff in Rabat did nut
think it needed to immobilize a new unit in this unsatisfactory mission. In the
course of November not only Guelta Zemmour, just barely reoccupied, but also Bir
= Enzaran, another fortif ied position ~ituated in the middZe of the desert east of
Dakhla, which had just undergone two prolonged harrassing attacks by the forces of
the POLISARIO Front, were evacuated.
This doiible disengagement was carried out under excellent conditions without
~ hostile forces intervening to make it difficult. In fact the weakness of the
POLISARIO Front is that it has no air force. Lacking such a force, it often does
not have a rapid means for the collection of intelligence. In any event it did
not learn of the withdrawal of the Moroccans until well after it was completed.
At Guelta Zemmour the defensive and logistical positions, already seriously
damaged in the cours~ of the November fighting, were totally destroyed. Bir
Enzaran,~whose defensive perimeter was much less extensive, on the other hand
- was abandoned almost intact, apparently with a certain amount of haste. However,
the Sahraoui state that the well was poisoned.
In leaving these outposts situated in the depths of the desert the Moroccan forces
have given up for the immediate future further raids in the eastern part of the
former Spanish Sahara. However, such operations no doubt did not f igure in their
plans for the moment. In addition they are no longer in a favorable position for
- an eventual exercise of the "right of pursuit" into Mauritanian territory. But that
is no longer a very current question. Following the Guelta Zemmour affair the
Moroccan forces had thought they had detected Sahraoui concentrations at Bir
Aydiyat, in Mauritanian territory, and the air force bombed them. However, it was
soon established that the Sahraoui were Iocated a few hundred meters away from
that point, on the territory of the former Spanish Sahara, territory which they
state they never left in the course of the movements and f ighting around Guelta
Z emmour .
22
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- On the other hand the Moroccan defensive deployment has not been really weakened
- by these evacuations. It is not true, as has beeu written at times, that Gi~e:ltri
Zemmour "pr~~tected" Bou Craa and Bir Enzaran llakhla. Tlie light Satiraoui
columns easily bypassed, at a good distance and most often without: even heing
" detected, ~hese positions, which were in no sense "unavoidahle routes of movt~r.~ent."
In the event the Moroccan Governmenr has simply given up a presence for presti.~;e
- purposes. Its flag has ceased waving in the middle of the Sahraoui desert. Out-
side the "useful triangle" of tT1e phospfiate mines of Fiou Craa, the traditional.
cap:itat of Smara, and the port of Laayouii, the Moroccan Government only cove.rs
the coastaJ_ enclaves of Boujdour, Dakhla, and Lagwira. However, it considers that
- this small change on the war map, although it serves enemy prop~lganda, provides
- tlie Moroccan general staff ~aith the highly valued possibility of achieving a sav-
ings in the use of its forces and the prospect oF regrouping them.
However, the Satiraoui, as might have been e~;pected, see things from another Pr~i~it
of view. According to statements made to ~L MOUDJ~iID (Algiers, 2\ovember) by
Ibrahim Ghali, Sahraoui defense minister, it was not so much Guelta Zemmour ~ahich
was the target in the middle of October but rather the Moroccan rorces groupeci
near Smara and Bou Craa. He said, "Lde made t}iem bring out forces camped witl~in
this 'useful triangle.' We forced them to regroup and we concentrated our tirc-
- power on them. Our objective was to wipe out a regiment of 2,000 men, earmarlcc~cl
to come to rhe support of the units located outside the 'useful triangle.
h1i11 Heavier Armament Increase the Scale of the righting?
The Satiraoui therefore pride themselves on having forced the Moroccans onto the
defensive. However, according to the Nioroccans, this kind of defensive deployment
is a victorious one and no doubt only temporary. Since the compLetion last spr.in~;
of "the defensive wa11" the Moroccan forces have stated that their deployment
has never been penetrated or even seriously attacked by POLI5ARI0 elements. The
latrer., for their part, have reported many acts of harrassment oF the "wa11," w}iic~h
no doubL have taken place at a good distance, and the she.lling of places like~ :nb
and i.emsseyed. However, it was alleged only once that they had made a br.each for
a period uf time at a goint in the Moroccan deployment. One of the last gre.:it
undertakings which the POLISARIO Iront claims, the taking of ttie post at Kheig
Afteita, 50 lan southeast of Assa, is located on Moroccan territory near tl~e
Algerian border, that is, in a region far from the center and not covereci by the
defense line.
To do more it would have been necessar.y for the POLISLIF:[U Front to have heavy,
very long-range weapons, capable of reaching not only the garrisons and strong
~ points of the "wall," but the concentration points of the Moroccan reaction units.
The Sahraoui are the first to admit that the best of their armament comes from
mater.iet seized in combat f rom the Royal Armed Forces and even say that they cli_d
not }lave SAM-6 [Soviet-mad e, hand held surface to air missiles) missi.les ~.it
Guelta 7~mmour. Will they now ask the Libyans and Algerians to obtain SovicL