JPRS ID: 10331 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030040-9
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 57
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 40
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/ 10331
18 February 1982
Near East North Africa Re ort
p
(FOUO 7/82)
Fg~$ ~OREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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JPRS L/10331
_ 18 February Yg32
- NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
(FOUO 7/82)
CONTENTS
EGYPT
Excerpts From Book of Prominent Leftist Lutfi al-Khuli
(,AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, various dates) 1
I RAQ
Iran's November Offensive Discussed
- (Kamal Hasan Bukhayt; AL-WATAN AL--'ARABI, 18-24 Dec 81)..... 52
- a- [III - NE & A- 121 FOUO]
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EGYPT
EXCERPTS FROM BOOK OF PROMINENT LEFTIST LUTFI AL-KHULI
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 16-22, ~3-29 Oct, 5, 6-12, 13-19 Nov 8~:.
[Article: "Chapter From Lutfi al-Khuli`s New Book: 'A1-Sadat Political School and
Egyptian Left'; A1-Sadat: Those With Him and Those Against Him"]
[16-22 Oct 81, pp 48-50, SS-56]
[Text] AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI will, as of this issue, publish in series a chapter of
Lutfi al-Khuli's new book which will be publiehed shortly under the title of "A1-
Sadat Political School And The Egyptian Left." In this chapter, the author answers
a large iiumber of perplexing questions that continued to accompany al-Sadat from
_ the time he assumed power in Egypt after President Jamal. 'Abd al-Nasir's death to
the time when all political forces with their various inclinatians, united against
his domestic, Arab and internationa? policies and the time when he f inally fell
with the bullets of a fedayeen [commando] group of the Egyptian army.
� The series deal in succession with al-Sadat's tactics in insuring his assumption of
power with the unanimous consent of all the national and progressive forces in 1970,
with his managing to gain exclusive control of power -in the face of the early
opposition forces whtch pref erred to confront him from within their positions in
the regime's bureaucratic agencies, without the participation of the masses. This
is what became known as the so-called "centers of power" which were headed at the
- time by 'Ali Sabri, the vice president of the republic, in his capac ity as the
"head of the ruli:.~ *Tasirist group." The series also deal with the causes and
motives for al-Sadat's manipulation of Egypt's policy from the July 1952 rev~luti~n,
from the Nasirist line, from pan-Arabism, from the Qalestinian issue and from the
position of nonalignment to what became known as the May or al-Sadat revolution,
= to the open-door'economic policy, to alignment with the United States, to antagoniz-
ing the Arab national movement and to concluding peace with the Israeli enemy.
Lutfi al-I!huli--by observing and analyzing a number of events to which he himself
was a witness or in which he was a participant, events most of which are revealed
for the first time--foll~ws carefully the movement of events in Egypt from the
early 1970's to answer. the big question c~ncerning the emergence of the new,
harmonious and fundamental national opposition force from its posit3nns in the
socio-political street against al-Sadat regime. This emergence led ta intensifying
the comprehensive confrontation between the two sides in a manner which made the
pol.~.tical observers record the confrontation very carefully, e~pecially in the wake
- of the large-scale campaign of arrests launched at the beginning of last September.
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t'U[t L/1'f 1V1HL UJL V~~1+1
This is the "extrsardinary" event which led to the estrangement between the regime
and all the vital forces in the Egyptian society. This 3s also the ~vent which
opened the door to numerous expectations, the most promi..ant being the comparison
oetween al-Sadat regime in Egypt and the shah's regime in Iran.
Lutf i al-Khuli, who is known for his national and progressive political activity
throughout the past quarter century, had concentrated, with the aid of the editorial
staff of AL-TALI'AH magazine wh~se chief editor he was from 1g55 to 1977, on
studying al-Sadat's political steps with all their details and dimensions and
studying what al-Sadat had told him conf identially in the numerous meetings be-
twesn the two men whiciz continued until 1975. In dealing with "al-Sadat
- phenomenon," al-Khuli has employed the instruments of objective analysis as a
researcher in a political labaratory and has ended up crystallizing the concepts,
gbals, and technology of what he calls "al-Sadat political school" and its move-
ment which constitutes a retrogression from the march of Egypt's national and pan- '
Arab history. In this study, al-Khuli had expected a1=Sadat to embark after the
October war on concluding a separa*.e peace with Israel under the auspices and
~ support of the United States. This expectation came a full S years before the
pcace was concluded.
In the same method and inside the political laboratory, al-Khuli has also dealt
with the phenomenon of the comprehensive opposition to al-Sadat regime--opposition
launched at the outset by the leftist forces with their various intellectual
sources.
Lutfi al-Khuli was the chief edii:or of the Egyptian .~L-TALI'AH magazine which al-
Sadat shut down in 1977 in the wake of the well-known popular uprising which
covered all of Egypt on 18-19 January of that year. He is a member of the Central ,
Secretariat of the National Progressive Unionist Grouping Party and a member of
the 100-man committee of the National Coalition Front. Last March, i~e was elected
a member of tti~e Journalists Union Council and k~eaded the committee to defend the
press and unicnist liberties. He was banned from writing and publising in AL-
AHRAM as of 1976 even though he is a mem5er of ~he Editorial Council, a political
commentator and the man who founded the paper's Opinion Page in 1962. President
al-Sadat ordered his arrest as part of the campaign which he had launche3 against
his opponents a month before his assassination. But al-Rhuli escaped arrest be-
cause he happened to be abroad at the time for heart freatment. A1-Khuli has been
arrested morE than once and he has written numerous political and literary books.
When President Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir died in September 1970, the part of the regime
flo3ting on the ~urface of the Egyptian arena consisted of a number of "legitimate
institutions in which the main positions were held by personalities that had been
always eager"to declare their full abidance by the July 195~ revolution with i~ts
- Nasirist concept and course that were e~.~~�bodied in the 1962 National Action Charter
and the 30 March 1968 program.
None of those personalities had been known to hold an~opinion or a position,
stated or implied, conflicting with the position or opinion of Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir
until the time of his death. If it so happened that one of them declared a posi-
- tion on an issue before 'Abd a1-Nasir had made his decision on the issue (and this
rarely happened), then the individual involved quickly changed that position to
make it compatible with the opinion on which the "chief" had decided.
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It so happ~ned thar_ when Washington declared in 1970 the so-called "Rogers initia-
tive" to solve trz Middle East crisis, '?.bd al-Nasir had been preparing to visit
th~_ Soviet Union. He preferred at the time to delay declaring his i~osition toward
tk~e initiative until after the end of the visit. But Anwar al-Sadat, the then vice
president, hastened--in the face of urgent questions raised during meetings of the
Socialist TJnion--~;.~ declare Egypt's rej ection of the initiative, replying on the
general line followed by 'Abd al-Nasir in his relationship with the United States.
But as soon as 'Abd al-Nasir decid~ed to approve the initiative, Anwar al-Sadat
changed his position, continuing the p2rformance of his duties as vice president.
At the top of the institutions left hy 'Abd al-Nasir's regime emerged the "presiden-
tial institution, which, upon the death of the "chief," belonged temporarily to
al-Sadat in accordance with Article 110 of the constitation in t~is capacity as the
sole vice president. Since his sudden appointment to the position on 10 December
1969 until a new president was to be elected within a period of no more than 60 days.
, Under the canopy of the presidential institution lied the leadership of the Arab
Socialist Union, the sole political organization ruling the country. This leader-
~hip was embodied in the Supreme Executive Committee formed of Husayn al-Shaf i'i,
'Ali Sabri, 'Abd al-~iuhsin Abu al-Nur, Dr Mahmud Fawzi, Dr Labib Shuqayr, Diya'
Dawud and Kamal Ramzi Istaynu, in addition to Anwar al-Sadat who succeeded 'Abd
al-Nasir to the chairmanship of the committee and the chairmanship of the Counc~l of
Ministers (the executi.ve authority) after 'Abd al Tlasir's death.
Within the framework of the Arab Socialist Union leadership, the union's organiza-
tions in each of the two governorates of Cairo and al-Cizah in particular occupied
a special place because of their "massive popular membership" which w~s r~latively.
active and effective on the Egyptian political arena in comparison to the Socialist
Union organizations in the other gover.norates. 'Abd al-Ma~id Farid, the secretary
general of the presidency, was in charge of the Cairo organization while Farid
'Abd al-Karim was in charge of al-Cizah organization.
The People's Assembly (the legislative authority) emerged within these in~titutions.
All its members belonged to the Arab Socialist Union and its speaker was Dr Labib
Shuqayr.
The "armed forces i.nstitution," if we may use the phrase, came under the direct con-
trol of the late President Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir after it had been purged of the
elements produced by the conditions and complications of its defeat on the hands
of Israel while under the command of Field Marshal 'Abd al-Hakim 'Amir who pre-
ferred to commit suicide after his abortive coup attempt. 'Abd al-Nasir had
focused ~he greater part of his time and his efforts on rebuilding the armed farces
and preparing them, with massive aid from the Soviet Union, to "restore what
Israel had usurped by force," assisted by Lt Gen Muhammad Fawzi, the minister of
war and the general commander, and by Lt Gen Muhammad Sadiq, the chief of staff.
tieirs of Becision
In addition to all this, a number of personalities that had gained an influential
position in making and implementing the political decision held important posi-
tions in the structure of the regime as a result of their presence within the
3 narrow circle of trust surrounding the late President Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir. Foremost
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among those personalities were: Dr 'Aziz Sidqi, the deputy prime minister and
minister of industry; Mahmud Riyad, the deputy prime minister and minister of
foreign affairs; Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal who held the position of minister of
information in addition to that of chief editor of AL-AHRAM; Atnin Hi+.waydi, the
minister of state; Muhammad Fa'iq, the mi.nister of state for foreign affairs;
Sami Sharaf; the minister of state for presidential affairs who also held the
position of director of the late president's off ice for long years; Muhammad Hafiz
- Isma'il, the chief of intelligence who replaced Salah Nasr who had held the posi-
tion for long years and who had been relieved from this position after participating
with Field Marshal 'Amir and Shams Badran, the minister of war during the 1967
war, :in the coup attempt in the armed forces; and Maj Gen al-Laythi Nasif;, the
commander of the republicar., guard which had turned into a military force, with
resources exceeding its traditional f:uiction as a mere guarc? force, and into a
force trained to confront and fight any coup attempt.
The "judiciary authority" retreated to a corner of the society after the fe.~.~::-~~,us
battle which had taken place between itself and the leadership of the Arab Socialist
Union over the so-called po~iticization of the judiciary and its transformation
~rom an "authority" to a popular "utility" as a result ot the statements made and
position taken in the wake of the defPat by the Executive Council of the Judges
Club, headed at the time by Counselor Mumtaz Nassar who was also the deputy chair-
man of the Appellate Court, or. the need to amend or abolish the laws restricting
the liberties. The statements and positions also condemned a number of ineasures
and actions taken by the security authorities which undermined the rights and
liberties of the citizens. The battle was managed on the side of the Socialist
Uni.on by 'Ali Sabri, the then union's secretary general, tlie NluhaBUnad Abu Nasir, the
[minister] of justice at the time. Because the battle intensified to the degree of
an actual strike by the judiciary--something which threatened the regime's stability
and prestige in the wake of a terrible national defeat--the late President 'Abd
al-Nasir formed a committee under the chairmanship of Anwar al-Sadat to examine
= the tense situation and to propose decisive solutions for it. The committee ended
by rec~mmending the dismissal of nearly 200 judges in~the general prosecution ori
the grounds of the3r disloyalty to the regime, according to the regime's general
political and social criteria. President Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir approved the recom-
mendation and issued s law implementing them on 31 August 1969. This is the law
which the majority of the country's intellectuals called the "~udiciary
massacre" to reflect the dark shadows which it cast over the "regime's democracy."
It seemed from observing the movement of the visible events in the period following
'Abd al-Nasir's death and unti]. May 1971 that the "regime's heirs" had clung to
unity and solidarity and had overcome the differences within the.ir ranks on the one
hand and had fought, on the other hand, any endeavor to expand the "inheritance
circle" including them by adding to it other outside elements. They declared their
~ firm resolution to enact the rules of the regime's legitimacy, as stated by the
~ existing constitution, in the transfer of power to a new president and ~ new govern-
ment within the framework of the "Nasirist regime" without any change and through
a collective leadership that continues the march "on the path of the immortal
leader Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir, relying on the Arab Socialist Union organization and
the Peopl~'s Assembly and adhering to the slogan of "no voice above the v~~ice. ~f
the battle ur.til all the traces of the 1967 aggression are eliminated." Th~y all
condemned, in one form or another, all the voices that had risen at home and abroad
to speak about either the presence of conflicts among the "legitimate heirs" or
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about the presence of 3 terrible vacuum in the wake of the absence of 'Abd al-
Nasir with his leadership and his historical weight--a vacuum which the "legitimate"
heirs could not f ill by themselves.
As soon as 'Abd al-Nasir was laid to rest in his grave,. the Socialist Union hastened
to declare the organizational steps for the transfer of power from Anwar al-Sadat,
the i~terim president, to a constitutionally elected president. It was decided
to bring up t.he issue of nomination of the new presldent before the Supreme
Executive Committee on 3 October 1970, to summon the People's Assembly tu an
extraordinary session on 7 October to ratify the nomination and to conduct a
referendum on ttie president of the republic on 15 October so that the People`5
- Assembly may, if the rasult of the ref erendum is positive, meet on 17 Ociober 1970
in order, that the president may take the oath of ofFice beicre it.
This is why a general impression was left in the country that the "collective"
lead.ership which had inherited 'Abd al-Nasir's ragime was united." This imprESSion
was helped by the consideraY,ly quick tempo of the transfer of power and by the
u~ianimous consent on a single candidate �o r the presidency, n~me'_y Anwar al-Sadat
who was projected to the masses as the only man among the Revolution Command
Council members selected by Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir as his sole vice president under
the terrible conditions prevailing after the 1967 defeat. The Socialist Union
_ agencies, especially the organizations of the Cairo and Alexandria Governorates,
organized dozens of "popular processions" to the residence of the sole candidate in
al-Tahirah Palace to declare their absolute support for him as the succes:~or of
Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir, as leader of the procession and as head of the state.
Image and Reality
Before the sun of 1970 had set, the new regime established itself atop the society
in the form of a"Nasirist regime" not different in form, in slogans or in persons
� from the regime existing until 28 September 1970, except for the absence of the
person of Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir by reason of death.
At the presidential office and in the Socialist Union leadership, Anwar al-Sadat
settled down as president and declared that his program is the same pragram which
'Abd al-Nasir included in his proclamation of 30 March 1968. 'Aii Sabri and
Husayn al-Shafi`i became his vice presidents and the Socialist Union Supr~~me
Executive Committee remained as it had been previously without any change even
thuugh one of its members, namely, 'Abd al-Muhsin Abu 3i-1V~~r, b~came secretary
general instead of 'Ali Sabri. The People's Assemhly maintained its previous
condition under the speakership of Dr Labib Shuqayr. Dr Mahmud Fawzi, President
Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir's assistant until the president's death, bPCame prim~ minis-
ter and selected his cabinet members from among the personalities which held the
main positions in the regime after the ].967 def eat, excluding Muha~mmad Hasanayn
I~ayka~., who by his own choice, preferreri to leave the Ministry of Informatian to
devote h~s t{me to his original work as ch~ef editor of AL-AHRAM.
Thus, the image floating on the surface of society seemed calm and stable, com-
bining in harmony all the so-called "legitimate heirs" of Jamal ~Abd al-Nasir.
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t~t deep inside, the conditions were the complete reverse of the outwardly image.
Latent conflicts stirred in various forms among nurierous axes, entangled by
in*rinsic and objective complications, within the circle of t?1e so-called
legit~mate heirs. These are the conflicts which Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir used to
- settle or suppress with deterrar.t and restraining measures which reached the
point of punishment at times. With the disappearance of.'Abd al-Nasir, the con-
flicts revived but with caution dictated by the sudden death of the "chi~f" which
took all concerned by surprise and without their being prepared on the one hand
and without the heirs having the experience, on the other hand, to exercise power
directly and not through or under the sY~adow of the "teacher." Each axis, and at
- times onE part of the axis acting against the other parts, tried to gain tiune and
supporters in an effort to gain sole contral of power.
The phrase "~he others" was not confined at the time to the numerous axes within
the circle of the Iegitimate heirs but extended to include the historical le~ders
of the July revolution who, in the name of national unity and of f illi.ng the vacuum
left by the absence of the revolution leader, tried ro~participate in power. The
phrase also extended to the movements of the ri~htist and leftist forces in
society witk~ their various currents and their efforts to push the post-'abd al-Nasir
regime in their direction.
Foremost among the axes involved in de~:p conflict was the so-calLed Presidential
Advisory Committee which the president had formed after the 1967 def eat and after
foiling the coup attempt led by Marshal 'Abd al-Hakim 'Amir. 'Abd al-Nasir relied
on this committee in running the country's internal affairs and in supervi:sing
the activities of the Council of Ministers, which the presi.dent himself headed, in
accordance with the instructions he issued. The president thiis began to relieve
~ himself gradually from the burdens of internal executive action and its daily
details and to devote the major part of his efforts and time to rebuild the armed
forces and to manage the international diplomatic battle against Israel and the
United States of America. This coimmittee, shrouded in secrecy, consisted of
Sha'rawi Jum'ah, the minister of interior; Amin Huwaydi, who held the position of
minister of war, of chairman of the general intelligence and of;minister of state;
Muhammad Fa'iq, the minister of state for foreign affairs; and Sami ~haraf, t.`.ie
president's information secretary and the minister of state. 'Abd al-Nasir used to
surpise the committee every now and then by includ~ng Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal,
~ the minister of information and chief editor of AL-AHRAM, in its activities.
Another axis was developing within the leadership of the Socialist Union (6
mil.lion registered members) and o~ its main and assisting organi2ations, such as
' the People's Assembly, the trade unions, the press and the information media.
This axis was developing under the leadership of 'Ali Sabri and wa~ gaining its
weight from its actual ruling power in each of the Supreme. Committee and the
Central Committee. Prominent members of this axis included Sha`r~wi Jum'ah (who
used to take part in the meetings of the Supreme Executive CommiCtee in a special.
capacity even though he was not a member of this committee), `Abd al-Muhsin Abu
al-Nur, Dr Lab~b Shuqayr, Diya' al-Din Dawud, 'Abd al-Majid Farid and Hafiz
Badawi. This axis exercised its power by organizing popular demonstrations under
slogans which it determined for those demonstrations and by having the "required
decisions" issued without much difficulty by the various leadership bodies of the
political organization.
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Parallel to this axis, another axis, imluding the leadership of the so-called
Vanguard Organization, was formed. This axis was closest in structure to the
formula of a socialist party with secret cells entrusted to exert efforts to guide
and lead the Socialist Union from within by way of a"trained socialist cadre," on
the grounds that the Union--a vast and broad alliance co~prised of the people's
- working forces, including the nat~onal capitalism, was a slow-moving body. This is
how the idea emerged on the need to form the Vanguard Organization so that it may
lead the Socialist Union slowly but suraly through the complex phase of transftirma-
tion into socialism. 'Abd al-Nasir had called secretly for formation of the Van-
guard Organization in the mid~-1960's so that it may include the socialist elements
from the various currents which accepted the National Action Charter as a course
and as a central starting point in the phase of transformation which 'Abd al-Nasir
had est~nated in 1962 would require 10 years, ending in 1971-72. Thus, membership
of the Vanguard Organization was opened to the leftist Nasirists and the communists
who had dissolved their independent and undergxound organizations in the mid--1960's
and joined membership of the Socialist Union individually.
'Abd al-Nasir himself continued to supervise with enthusiasm the formation and
management of the Vanguard Organization, assisted by 'Ali Sabri, Atimad Fu'ad and
Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal. But 'Abd al-Nasir's enthusiasm turned quickly lukewarm
as a result of domestic and external conditions, especially~because of the efforts
demanded by the process of rebuilding the ariued forces in the wake of the 1967
defeat. However, 'Abd al-Nasir continued to maintain the Vanguard Organization as
a source of information on the tendencies and movements of society's socialist
forces at1 as an agency entrusted with "revolutionary" tasks in confronting the
"conservative forces" in the regime and in society whenever the need arose to deter
those forces. This was done in such a mai~ner to make it seem as if it emanated
from the popular base below and not as mere administrative measures imposed "from
above." Upon 'Abd al-Nasir's death, 'Ali Sabri, Ahmad F`u'ad and Muhammad Hasanayn
Haykal had been removed or had set themselves apart from the Vanguard Organization
leadership which was concentra.~ed in a central secretariat controlled fundamentally
by Shar'rawi Jum'ah, Sami Sharaf, Muhammad Fa'iq and Hilmi al-Sa'id, the economic
advisor to the president, assisted by two or three Marxist elements, such as Ahmad
Hamrush and Mahmud Amin al-'Alim.
But the most dangerous axis was embodie~d in the Military Committee to rebuild the
a nned forces and to prepare them in the relatively long range to lau~ch a compre-
hensive war of reprisal against Israel and prepare them in the short run, not
exceeding 1972, to implement the "Granite" pYan calling for crossing canal,
storming the Bar-lev line and proceeding forward in the Sinai to control the passes.
''Abd al-Nasir focused his energies in this co~nittee, assisted by Gen Muhammad
Fa zi, the minister of war, and Lt Gen Muhammad Sadiq who succeeded Gen 'Abd al-
_ Mun'im Riyad to tt:e post of chief of staff after the latter's martyrdom, in addi-
tion to a limited number of commanders of the armed forces.
In addition to this axis, there rose the Republican Guard axis whose forces had
been strengthened to the point of being able to launch offensive warf are, thus
exceeding the lines of a conventional guard force. 'Abd al--Nasir supervised this
axis through Sami Sharaf, the presidential secretary for information and the minis-
ter of state~ and Maj Gen al-Laythi Nasif, the guard commander.
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It can be said that there were two other axes, each of them revolving fundamentally
around a distinguished personality which ~:ad gained special weight as a result of
special talents which it employed intelligently or as a result of holding important
positions within the narrow circle of trust surrounding Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir, thus
becoming able to kn.ow the regime's secrets and to participate partially or com-
pletely in making the political decisions.
The first pessonality was embodied in Anwar al-Sadat who had been selected by Jamal
'Abd al-rlasir from among all members of the July Revolution Command Council as his
sole vice president on 20 December 1969 on a sudden decision which had the impact
of lightning on everybody. This decision continued to be hard to understand or
accept by the other axes. However, those axes agreed on assessing this decision
as one which led to forcing an "intruding" element on the relations of each of
them with the president who had started experiencing severe physical, psychological
and n~~rvc~us pains as a result of a degenerating heart disease and of diabetes in
his exhausted body and as a result of the interaction of these ailments with the
pressures of the defeat and of the abortive coup attempt led by 'Abd al-Hakim 'Amir,
'Abd al-Nasir's lif elong friend and comrade in struggle. The coup culminated with
'Amir`s suicide and with the trial of his partners who had occupied sensitive posi-
tions and had enjoyed the "chief's" trust, such as Shams Badran, the minister of
war, and Salan Nasr, the director of intelligence.
Thus, al-Sadat moved suddenly, and in less than one year 6efore 'Abd al-Nasir's
death, from the rear and dark positions in the regime to the spotlights of the for-
ward positions and he came to be trusted by the "chief" with official or popular
. positions which, by their nature, had been previously the monopoly of this or that
axis. He came to have a hand or a finger in every place and replaced the "chief"
in running the country's affairs whenever the latter was on work or treatment
trips abroad, including the duties of heading the state, the Socialist Union and
the Military Committee. The Vanguard Organization's leadership committee was the
only axis which al-Sadat could n~t penetrate. A1-Sadat had pa:ticipated in the
Vanguard Organiz~tion at the outse~ but he soon tound hfmself excluded from it when
he and other prominent figures of the regime were ~�ousted silently from the organ-
ization upon its reorganization in the wake of the defeat.
A1-Sadat wasted no time or effort from the moment he entered the circle of power
when he was appointed v~ce president. Quietly and silently, he began to form a
~ "socio-po~ttical" base upon which to rely inside and oatside ttae regime in con-
frvnting all the other axes which considered hi.m an intruding e~ement to be rid af
or reduced to minimum size as soon as possible.
In the SociRlist Union, al-Sadat took charge of the Political and Foreign Relations
Committee. In this capacity, he proceeded actively to hold periodic organizational
meetings in the various governorates of the republic and formed the so-called
"political club at the central headquarters of the Sor_ialist Union in Cairo" where
he met weekly with members of the Socialist Union and with its committee officers
to answer, in the name of 'Abd al-Nasir, whatever questions he raised, after
reaching agreement with 'Abd al-Nasir on the broad lines of the answers. In this
regard, al-Sadat was able, without clamor, to rally behind him leadership elements
of the political organiaation tied by interests to the baurgeoisie despite the
socialist slogans they were raising. This is in addition to rallying some liberal
elements which had become upset with the sequestration n?easures and with the re-
strictions imposed by the "regime's leftist axes."
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In the government agencies, al-Sadat was able to win over to his side the elements
hostile to the "regime's leftist axes" which held i.mportant positions in the power
structure, such as Maj Gen Ahmad Isma'il who had been the field commander of the
Suez front and who reaped 'Abd al-Nasir's wrath in the wake of thP IsraPli raid
on the front's modern radar at the end of 1g68 (Isma'il later became the minister
of war and the general commander of the armed forces during the October 1973 war);
Maj Gen Muhammad Sadiq, who was occupyiz~g the position of chief of staff of the
armed forces (.later became minister of war before being dismissed by al-Sadat prior
to the October war); and Maj Gen Kamal Hasan 'Ali who later became minister of
war and minister of foreign affairs.
A1-Sadat infiltrated the People's Assembly also and was able to form secretly
within it groups loya? to him, led by Hafiz Badawi and Mahmud Abu Wafiyah in
Lower ~gypt and by Ahmad 'Abd al-Akhir and Yusuf Makkawi in Upper Egypt. Al-Sada~
also proceeded to strengtlien his relations with and to spread his protection over
groups of the new class er.gaged in the sphere of contracting, wholesale tr_ade and
agricultur.al. investment, such as 'Uthman and Ahmad 'Uthman, Muhammad Shahin and
others.
Thus, when 'Abd al-Nas~r disappeared and the wheel of the stru~gle f or power turned,
al-Sadat's personality seemed to appear tonely and with no sLpporter on the national
political arena. But behind the scenes, the arena was crowded with groups, eager ta
conceal their identity to the last moment, which supported him strongly.
The second personality was Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, the journalist, as he likes to
- describe himself always. But all the Egyptian, Arab and foreign observers and
politicians who had close contact with 'Abd al-Nasir's regime were unanimous in
describing him as the "regime's number two man" who holds no off icial positions and
who doesn't sePk them so thst he may not become a party to the ongoing struggle
and may not reduce his weight to the size of the position he holds. There are con-
flicting opinions and positions on Muhaimnad Hasanayn Haykal's rise [background].
But his opponents agree with his friends ;.hat t~e is "the most cap~ble and brilliant
in the sphere of the Egyptian and Arab press and that, if Haykal has benefited
from his closeness to 'Abd al-Nasir, then 'ASd al-Nasir benefited in return from
Haykal's journalistic professionalism and intelligence.
Haykal had started his journali~tic life in Muhammad al-Ta~i'i school in AK1iIk
SA'AH and then moved to the ri,~htist school of AKHBAR. AL-YAWM (j~Iustafa and 'Ali_
Amin) before rebelling against it in the wake of the July revolution and becoming--
with visible and invisibl.e support rrom 'Abd al-Nasir with wham Haykal's pen and
experier.ce were intrinsically and objectively tied--chief editor of AL-AHRAM ir
I956. Haykal developed this paper from a distinctively local newspaper with a
daily circulation of 60,()00 copies to a paper with a weighty influence at the l.~cal,
Arab ancl international lE>_vels and with a daily circulation of ~nore than one-half
mi.llion coPies.
Ilaykal became not only 'Abd al-~lasir's closest adviser and confidant but also the
"daily debator" accepted by 'Abd al-Nasir without any formality or sensitivity.
With his famous weekly article which he used to write under the title of "rrankly
Speaking," which was quoted profusel~~ by all the international wire serives and
in which t~e revealed and analyzed the direction o.f the wind in the movement and
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thought of the regime led hy Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir with his Arab and international
weight, and with his rebuilding of AL-AHRAM Establishment to make it the most
- advanced and serious information agency in Egypt, the Arab homeland and the Middle
East area--an establishment that includes political, economic, cultural and
journalistic research centers and specialized ma;;azines and an establi.shment crowded
with prof essional, intellectual and political capabilities from the various inclin-
ations, beginning with the liberal right and ending with the Marxist left--with
- all this, Haykal, as an individual and as an institution, was able to attiain an
independent and strong position inside the regime and in society vis-a-vis the
other axes, with whom his relations ranged from the relations of a truce to the
relations of secret and open conflicts.
The formula which governed Haykal's movement, and which was accepted by 'Abd
al-Nasir, was that of abidance by absolute support for 'Abd al-Nasir with relative
freedom in criticizing the regime, its institutions and its leaderships. The
implementation of this formula left all the local, Arab and internat ional political
sources with the impression that Muhammad Hasanayn Aaykal did actually represent
the position of the "number two man" in the regime without being involved in
assuming an open official responsibility. Perhaps this is what motivated 'Abd al-
Nasir at the beginning of 1970, according to what many obs ervers find most likely,
to appoint Haykal as the minister in charge of information, despite Haykal's
objection, while retain.ing his position as chief editor of AL-AHRAM.
Outwardly, all tYiese axes stood united and shoulder to shoulder under the banner
of "completing 'Abd al-Nasir's procession with its political, social and economic
dimensions, especially in whatever pertains to continuing the process of the
socialist transformation of society while purging the process of the negative
aspects caused by the 1967 def eat, waging the battle against Israel to erace the
traces of the 1967 aggression and realizing the Palestinian people's legitimate
rights through building the unity of Arab action and through alliance witti the
Soviet Union,"
But under the surface, conflicts ~~ere raging by varying degrees among the
various axes and even within each axis, as revealed at the end of 1971 by the
investigations in the case known as the plot of the centers of power" against
- "al-Sadat's legitimate authority." it was proven then that there had been no
trust and no un~.ty of thought or of action, not even at th ~ tactical levels, among
the axes which had been in agreement on not enabling ai-Sadat to attain permanent
power, or at least not to attain sole control of power. The crisis of trust among
those axes reached the point where they were watching each other's movements,
spying on each other and recording~ the telephone calls exchdnged by members of the
same axes to use them as future incriminating evidence when one axies, or a part
of an axis, gains the power. These are the recordings which fell in al-Sadat�s
hands and which he used against those who had recorded them.
Initially, the struggle crystallized between two main f igures: 'Ali Sa}>ri
and Anwar al-Sadat. 'Ali Sabri considered himself, objectively and subjectively,
the person more strongly entitled and the fitter to succ:eed Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir to
pnwer and viewed al-Sadat as an intruding element on the revolution and the
Na:;irist experience--an element belonging to the counterr evolution which seeks
ulti~ately to liquidate Nasirism. Sabri also believed ttiat if "misfortune" had
led a: -Sadat to the position of vice president which he occupied until the death
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of 'Abd al-Nasir, this did not require the Nasirists to submit to the outwardly
formalities of legitimacy without its essence, else such submission would mean the
end of all the Nasirists. But the other axes, excluding Haykal's axis which pre-
ferred to take the position of outwardly neutrality while harboring in fact
hostility to 'Ali Sabri, agreed tliat it was impossible to practically separate the
formaltties of legitimacy from its content, else rightist or leftis~ f igures more
. dangerous than al-Sadat would be afile to exploit the separation gap and sneak
through it to seize power. Moreover, those axes had never at ar~y time truly wel-
comed the transf er of power to 'AIi Sabri because they were filled with doubts re-
garding his intentions and position toward them. They pref erred Anwar al-Sadat
who seemed to them to be weak and to be courting their friendship and their
participation in the power. Consequently, they were confident that the foreseeable
future would ultimately move in the direction of their gaining the sole contrel
of power, especially since they were in full control of all of the regime's main
political, information and security agencies, in addition to their success in
establishing an alliance with Lt Gen Mufiammad Fawzi, the minister of war and the
general commander of the armed forces, who seemed to be the strongman of the mili-
tary axis.
As for al-Sadat, he used the tactic of the "weak and isolated chief" who would
have no power and no authority without the support and participation of all the
axes, excluding the axis of 'Ali Sabri. Al-Sadat had shown his personal dissatis-
faction with dealing with 'Ali Sabri because of the latter's personal ambitions .
and of his dictatorial tendency which destroys the spirit of collective action
which he, al-Sadat, wanted to prevatl in the relations among tfie officers of the
new regime as a single family. Despite this, al-Sadat did not object to meeting the
demand of those axes for the appointment of 'Ali Sabri as vice president, just as
a gesture of honoring him and ~~ithout giving him any powers, exactly like Husayn
al-Sahfi'i. A1-Sadat was thus able,from the first moments to isolate 'Ali Sabri,
the thinking and planning m~nd behind the opposing axes, and to paralyze Sabri's
ability to move and maneuver.
In his movement on the stage of the events, al-Sadat was careful.to appear as if
he was an indiv idual by himself and a limb cut from a tree, without supporters and
_ without any force behind him. He was able to conceal his real r~lations with
many of the regime's pockets and forces, such as Mamduh Salim wh~~ was at the time
the Governor of Alexandria and one of the most outstanding political security men
serving under Sha'rawi Jum'ah, the minister of interior; Ma~ Gen Muhammad Sadiq,
the chief of staff of the armed forces and the most prominent member of the
Military Committee; and Maj Gen al-Laythi Nasif, the republican guard commander.
Sami Sharaf, the director of the president's office, the minister of state and
the man with influence in more than one axis, had continued to be conf ident of
his sole control over the republican guard until he was shocked by the reality when
he was arrested by Maj Gen al-Laythi Nasif personally on the night of 14 May 1971.
A1-Sadat was not content with this but proceeded to create the first of his
political electric shocks, which have become one of the characteristics of his
political movement, when he arranged, with the support of the otfi er axis, an almost
public confrontation between "Haykal's axis" and "'Ali Sabri's axis," at a meeting
of the Socialist Union's Supreme Executive C~mmittee.
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Dr LaUib Shuqayr, the People's Assembly speaker and ~nember of the Executive
Committee, had reviewed at one of the committee's me~atings an article which Haykal
had written in AL-AHRAM under the title of "'Abd al-1lasir Is No Myth" and in~~which
he had criticized some people (~neaning 'Ali Sabri ar~d the other axes allied with
_ him) for defying !Abd al-Nasir as if he were a god and for instating themselves
as priests in his temple who are solely entitled to decide who is Nasirist and who
is not. Haykal stressed in fiis article that 'Abd al-Nasir is a historical leader
produced by the popular struggle which~had realized accomplishments under his
leadership and that, consequently, 'Abd al--Nasir, with fiis intellectual thought
and his heroic struggle, is the puiilic property of all the people, without any
need for distinguished middlemei~. Dr Shuqayr concluded his review by charging
Haykal with demeaning and debasing the status of the immortal leader and of the
Socialist Union and by dema.nding that Haykal be tried politically.
The trial demand was one of the links in the chain of the ferocious struggle
among the axes for power. Through this demand, the Socia~.ist IInion leadership axis
sought to realize more than one goal. Tfie f irst goal was to entrench its position
vis-a-vis the other axes, even the axes allied with it, as a ma~or force in the
regime and in society with the right to level charges, to try and to convict. The
second goal was to release a test balloon in order to find out the dimensions of
the strength of each axis, especially of al-Sadat axis, in comparison with the
strength of the Socialist Union leadership axis. The third go.al was to int imidate
whoever contemplates, be he an individual or an a$is, adopting a vacillating,
neutral or opposing position toward the "legitimate heirs of 'Abd al-Nasir."
The fourth goal was to destroy the Haykal axis and to gain control over the
sophistic.ated information outf it (AL-AHRAM) with its eff ective influence.
A1-Sadat hac*ened to respond to the demand without any discussion. Iii the
Executive Committee's subsequent session which was set for the tria? and in which
the members were scheduled to discuss among thecaselves in detail the cfiarges made
against Haykal and to issue their verdict, al--Sadat surprised all those present
by inviting Haykal to attend the session and to defend himself on the grounds that
i~ is illegal to try a def endant in his a6sence, especially since the defendant
was o:~e of the closest people to 'Abd al-Nasir and since the charge was that of
debasing the status of 'Abd al-Nasir himself.
- Haykal defended his views of and his position toward 'Abd al-Nasir, living and
dead and man and leader, with a strong logic supported by documents and proven
events witnessed by some of the committee m~bers themselves. One of the proofs
cited was a personal wish by 'Abc~ al-Nasir--a wish reflecting his confidence in
the defendant--that Haykal write his biography if he was to be assassinated or when
he died. Haykal was able to win over to his side significant number of the mem-
_ bers, led by Dr Mahmud Fawzi whohad always enjoyed the respect of the overwhelming
majority of the regime's "legitimate heirs." A1-Sadat took the position of a
- neutral judge and recommended, with the approval of the ma,jority of the committee
and the silence of its minority, that the trial dossier be closed without a sen-
tence and that Che case be considered as if it had never existed.
Thus, al-Sadat realized more than one goal from his ~irst electric shock within
the framework of this trial. The first goal was that of aborting all the ob.jectives
planned by the axis of the Socialist Union leadership, and by 'Ali Sabri in par-
ticular, through conducting this trial, The second goal was that of appearing as
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the fair and neutral judge who is eager to investigate objectively and in the
pres~nce of the defedant the charges made by the parties to the regime against
each other, all on the 6asis of the principle of the single family and of collective
leadership. The third goal was that of creating a split between 'Ali Sabri's
axis and the other axes all~zd with it and of sowing the seeds of doubt among their
ranks regarding the soundness of tfie tactics of 'Ali Sabri's axis and of its
hasty decisions in leading the struggle for power. The fourth goal was that of
driving Haykal's axis from the position of neutrality to the position of actual
alliance with al-Sadat axis and of encouraging the otner elements and forces in the
regime vacillating because of their fear of the might and influence of the axes
controlling the regime's main political, information and security agencies to move
to the positions of supporting al-Sadat axis after having proven its ability to give
Haykal's axis actual protection.
Thus, the struggle among the axes went on in the form of attack and retreat and of
- below-the-bett blows exchanged within the closed walls at tfie top of the regime's
struct~ire. But upon the disappearance of 'Abd al-Nasir and because of it, the
Egyptian arena was broader and more complex than the ability of any of those axes,
whether individually or in partial alliance with others, to absorb and control
the various and conflicting socio-political forces surging on the arena and pene-
trating, by varying degrees, the walls of power through the movement of the struggle
of the axes and the calculations of each of them.
Each of those forces proceeded from the various positions it occupied in the
society's and the state's class structure after 18 years of the revolution's
victories and defeats to try, with relative i:idependence, to assert its positions,
to secure its interests and to exert pressure in order to exercise its right to
participate in power, presenting directly or indirectly its conditions for allying
- itself with this or that axis. The common denominator in those conditions, what-
ever the nature of the political or social forces presenting them, w~s that of
democracy and of putting an end to the security agencies' violations of human
r ights .
The first movement by those forces came from the group of surviving leaders of the
= July revolution who had disagreed with 'Abd al-Nasir for various reasons and who
had been ousted from the regime's power circle. But cetitacts had been resumed
between those leaders and 'Abd al-Nasir in the wake of the 1967 war and of the
_ terrible defeat it produced. The contacts were intensified during the last months
of 'Abd al-Nasir's life with `Abd al-Latif Baghdadi who, along with his colleagues
Kamal al-Din Husayn and Zakariya Muhyi al-Din, preaented 3 memorandum to Anwar
al-Sadat, in his capacity as the interim president, proposing re-formation of the
Revolution Command Council under al-Sadat's chairmanship and suggesting that th~
council assume the task of calling on the penple to elect a constituent assembl}
to draw up for the country a constitution def ining the quality and course of the
new regime on a democratic basis and in accordance with the principles of the July
revolution. Ultimately, the new president of the republic was to be elected on
the basis of this constitution to take power over from the Revolution Commar.d
Council.
Of the surviving members of the Revolution Command Council, Husayn al-Shaf i'i, who
was a participant in the regime, Hasan Ibrahim, who had abandoned political life
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[or cummcrclal business, and Khalid Muhyi al-Din, who had re~ected the idea al-
together as constituting a deviation from the legitimacy of the existing regime
which he respects, declined to sign the memorandum.
This movement caused strong confusion to the calcula~i~~n~ of all the axes. This
confusion was further intensified by what was known about the dialogue between
Jamal 'Atid al-Nasir and 'Afid al-Latif Baghdadi--a dialogue which had almost
achieved specific results. 'Abd al-Nasir himself had made references to this
dialogue at the meetings of the Socialist Union ~xecutive Coffinittee in the wake of
the defeat. To deal with the regimeFS shortcomings and gaps--shortc~~mings and
gaps revealed by the 1967 war--'Abd al-Nasir brought up the idea of the formation
of an opposition party from the sons of the July revolution inside and outside the
Socialist Union to represent the "other opinion." 'Abd al-Nasir nominated for the
purpose 'Abd al-Latif Baghdadi and Ramal al-Din Husayn for being always frank in
their opposition without afiandoning the principles of the July revoluti~n or
involving themselves in any coup attempt against the revolution. When the Executive
Committee opposed 'Abd al-Nasir's proposal almost unanimously on the grounds that
the country was not yet ready to put it into implementation, not to mention its
perils to national unity in confronting the defeat and preparing the army and the
society for the war of revenge against Israel, 'Abd al-Nasir shelved his
proposal. But he continued his contacts and dialogue with Baghdadi on the possi-
- bilities of cooperation between them. Reliable information, confirmed by Muhammad
Husanayn Haykal, had asserted that 'Abd al--Nasir was about to appoint 'Abd al-Latif
Baghdadi to the pasition of vice president in charge of managing the domestic front
- and preparing it for the war while the president devoted his efforts to the process
of rebuilding the armed forces as quickly as possible. But death snatched 'Abd
al-Nasir before he could issue his decision.
The axes of the Advisory Presidential Committee, or the Socialist Union leadership
and of the Vanguard Organization leadership hastened to stage a counter-movement
under the "banner of legitimacy" to foil the endeavor of "tfiose who disagreed with
'Abd al-Nasir when alive and who want to usurp power from the revolution's legi-
timate institutions after his death." The members of those axes rallied behind
Anwar al-Sadat as interim president and as sole candidate for tha presidency in
enactment of the constitution. They shelved their doubts about one another and
their hidden conflicts with one another, considering that restoration of the
Revolution.Command Council represented the i~inent and urgent danger that would
deny the P1weak al-Sadat who is isolated from the regime's main agencies" the
position of president of the republic.
As for al-Sadat axis, it exploited the movement of the Revolution Command Council
group to whip the other axes into speeding up the steps for nominating and elect-
ing him a constitutional president of the republic. While declaring his rejection
of the proposals of Baghdadi and his colleagues, al-Sadat did not sever his con-
tacts with them but proceeded to manage the dialogue with 'Abd al-Latif Baghdadi
- for future cooperation between them after election of al-Sadat to the presidency.
There was another force with weight in the regime and in society. This force was
- embodied in the group of nationalist technocrats and managers who grew up and
developed in the process of the large--scale industrialization of the counrry and
of building the public sector as leader of the development plan and as the base
of Egypt's economic independence in the Nasirist esperiment. Leading this group,
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which owed its expertise and its distinguished positions to the July revolution,
was Dr 'Aziz Sidqi who had been entrusted by Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir with setting up
and managing the Afinistry of Economy and with building the public sector from
_ 1956 until 'Abd al-Nasir's death in 1970, excePt for aae year during which
Sidqi held the position of the president's adviser for industry. Dr 'Aziz Sidqi
expressed the strength of this force when he underlined his support for the
legitimacy represented by Anwar al-Sadat on the grouads of al-Sadat's declaration
of his abidance by the July revolution and by the 30 March program, especially its
democratic dimensions, which 'Abd a1-Nasir had proclaimed in order to deal with
the negative practices of the regime and to put an end to the violations committed
against the citizens' rights and liberties. This constituted a direct reference
by 'Aziz Sidqi against the axis of 'Ali Sabri wit'~ whom he had been in constant
disagreement from the days of 'Abd al-Nasir. Sidqi also stated his opposition to
the attempts of those "who rebelled against 'Abd al-Nasir while alive to return to
power after his death." This was a reference against the movement of 'Abd al-Latif
Baghdadi and his colleagues. 'Aziz Sidqi concentrated on protecting the gains of
the engineers, managers and wo4kers who built the public sector and referred to
their right to share the power in ~..rder to guarantee the continuity of the path
chosen by 'Abd al-Nasir for planned development under the leadership of the public
sector.
At that der_isive moment, this force elected to stand in the midst of the struggle
with al-Sadat axis against the other axes because it doubted its own ability to
_ act individually and independently on the one hand and because, on the other hand,
ir do~lbted that it could perform its econo-political role if power were con-
- trolled by 'Ali Sabri and the axes allied with him in view of what it had suffered
- from the bureaucratic and punitive security practiCes of these axes--practices
from which this force had been saved by nothing other than the direct intervention
of 'Abd al-Nasir. All this at a time when this force viewed al-Sadat as a solitary
and powerless personality which needed ties with partners to share the power with
him without the complexes of past experiences and without the fear of any of the
partners pouncing, after lurking silently, on the presidency or on the public
sector's leadership of the national economy--the mainstay of the political power
in society.
But all these struggles, with their varying degrees and levels and with their
various faces, continued to be governed essentially by the relations and conflicts
of the forces with which society was throbbing and by the degree of each for.:e's
qualitative and quantit~ive capabilities, its organizational resources and its
means of movement ~midst the masses.
[23-29 Oct 81, p~ SO-53]
[Text] The true dimensions of the events being witnessed by Egypt at present
cannot be understood without a calm reading of the recent history. Lutfi al-Khuli,
who has been known for his progressive national political activity as well as
for his journalistic activity in the past quarter century, has written a book
which will be published under the title of "A1-Sadat Political School, And The
Egyptian Left." Before al-Khuli presented his book for printing, AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
acquired from him the copyright to a chapter of the book which is tantamount to
an observation from within of the circumstances which ca~.rried Anwar al-Sadat to
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power from the time of Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir's death and until all the political
forces with their various inclinations united against al-Sadat's domestic, Arab
and international policies and until he fell finally with the bullers of a
f edayeen [commando] group of the Egyptian army.
In the first part (previous edition), al-Khuli dEalt with what he called "the war
of the axes" which carried al-Sadat from the shadows to the top of the Advisory
Presidential Coimmittee, the Socialist Union leadership, the Vanguar.d Organization
leadership, the Military Comanittee and the republican guard. A1-Khuli also dealt
with how the struggle crystallized between Anwar al-Sadat and 'Ali Sabri through
the trial of Muhamma.d Hasanayn Haykal, all within the framework of the political
forces ruling Egypt and the framework of their capabilities and conflicCs.
In this part of the series, Lutfi al-Khuli defines what he calls the "rightist
lines" and the "Ieftist lines," the eruption of struggle between the "centers of
power" after 'Abd al-Nasir's absence and al-Sadat calculations in that phase.
It can be said that upon 'Abd al-Nasir's death, the social struggle movement
crystallized at the popular level between two main axes: An axis to the right of
the regime and another to its left.
Each axis consisted of a number of forces with varying social and intellectual
roots. But upon the death of the historical personality which had played the
d ecisive role in def ining society's course throughout 18 years, those forces agreed
upon a minimum limit of "general political concord" which governed their movement
vis-a-vis the other axis.
The rightist axis combined the ciholesale merchants, the contractors, the rich
farmers and the upper segment of the bureaucrats which were called at the end of
'Abd al-Nasir's era "the new class" at times and the "reactionary party" at others.
Those forces had, especial].y in the wake of the 1967 defeat and through exploiting
their positions in the state and in some public sector organizations and through
their mostly parasitic practices, acc unulated a capital exceeding the needs of
their luxurious lifestyles and one which they wanted to exploit in private and
independent investment free of nationalization and sequestration, of the restric-
- tions of the state laws and of the domination of the public sector. The right
was strengthened when it was joined by the prominent military bureaucrats who had
_ been ousted from their distinguished positions in the large-scale purging opera-
tions necessitated by the need to liquidate the elements loyal to the abortive
coup attempt led by Marshal 'Abd al-Hakim 'Amir and the elements which formed an
obstacle in the face of the steps to rebuild the armed forces technically and
socially in the wake of the 1967 defeat. It was natural that the rightist axis
would be also joined by the old capitalist elements which had been harmed by the
nationalization and sequestration decisions and which had been lurking in active
exploitative pockets in society which they had concealed under such perfectly
camouflaged masks that they had been raising Che slogan of socialism and "had been
joining the Socialist Union membership enthusiastically." This is in addition to
the "protection shields" which those capitalists had created through marriage
relationships with ma.ny elements of the f irst and second ranks of the July revolu-
tion. This rightist axis with its numerous forces was able to attract various
groups of intellectuals with li6eral inclinations who had continued to undermine
all the positive accomplishments of the Nasirist experiment by exploiting the
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intelligence and security agencies' restrictions on and violations of some human
rights. The 1967 defeat, which had created in all the classes a deep wound
bleeding sweeping anger at an~i comprehensive criticism of the negative practices
of the regime, gave those liberal intellectuals the opportunity to speak with a
loud voice which had its tangibl~ impact in society.
The right, with its growing parasitic nucleus, had a finger in political formula-
tions of various kinds and at various levels. In addition to the underground
organizations of the Muslim Brotherhood, there was~~.a number of political islands
lying hidden under the skin of the government, information, People's Assembly,
Socialist Union and even the Vanguard Organization agencies, especially in the
rural areas and in the small towns (such as the information groups, led by Musa
Sabri, Anis Mansur, Muha~ad 'Abd al-.Tawad, Saf iyah al-Muhandis and Himmat
Mustafa, and the ralitical groups, most proaiinent of which were 'Abd al-Qadir
Hatim group, the Upper Egypt deputies group led by Ahmad 'Abd al-Akhir and
Yus!if Ma.kkawi and che delta [Lower Egypt] deputies group, led by Ahmad al-Qasabi,
MuhaL~nnad Shahin, Hamid Mahmud and Mahmud Abu Wafiyah). This is in addition to the
contr~acting and land speculation sector ('Uthman Alunad 'Uthman), the chambers of
commerce, the social a~.4 arh?~tic clubs, the writers and women's federations and
a number of professional unions.
The "general political concord" of the rightist forces crystallized in five funda-
mental lines:
First, to block tiie path practically in the face of continuation of 'Abd al-Nasir's
march after his death while raising, at the same time, the slogan of "continuing
on 'Abd al-Nasir's path" so that all the forces resisting the attempts for the
seizure of power by those who consider themselves the heirs of 'Abd al-Nasir or
leaders of the July revolution, whether individually, allied with each other or
in alliance with the leftist forces, may join ranks safely under the canopy of this
slogan.
Second, to exploit religion in instigating a campaign against 6he Nasirist experi-
ment on the pretext that it is an atheist Nlarxist socialist" experiment which
has plundered the people's property under th: name of nationalization and seques-
tration and which has violated the peopl e's dignity and liberties and the sources
of livelihood that God has given them and under the pretext that correcting those
- conditions was no*_ dictated by religion alone but also by the spirit of belief
in the Jul.y revolution--a spirit completely lacking since the early 1960's and
since proclamation of the National Action Charter.
Third, to act under the banner of democracy and of guaranteeing liberties and tl~e
supremacy of the law to enable the rightist forces to gather and organize their
scattered lines and to inf iltrate into t he main positions of power, exploiting
in this the masses' urgent demands for democracy--demands which had not yet
~ crystallized in specific formulas even though they had been vacillating between
developing the Socialist Union to become a progressive national alliance compris-
ing certain political forces and currents, and not ~ust a mere i~essel for the
quantitative gathering of citizens, and abolishing the oneness of the Socialist
Union as a political organization and replacing it by the multi-party system.
- The rightist forces were inclined, with some reser.vation, c.oward the latter
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option so that they may act compatibly with their pressures for releasing the
freedom of the private sector to independ.ent investment and to unlimited growth
and fox putting an end to the public sector's leadership role in developing the
national economy.

~
Fourth, to open the door before foreign and Arab capital to invest in the country
without restrictions and to give this capital incentives to participate with the
private Egyptian capital on the grounds that this is likely to make it possible
for the country to overcome its economic crisis and ~ts technological backwardness
emanating from the so-called period of economic and political isolatic~ci to which
the Nasirist experiment, with its atheist communist di.mension, had led, especially
with its comprehensive development plans and the inevitability of the socialist
solution. This is in addition to exploiting the fundamentai changes occurring in
the Arab world as a result of ~he accumulation of oil revenues 3n the regitnes
described by the Nasirists as reactionary at times�:.and as conservative at
others--regimes with which Egypt's relations had ranged from open hostility to
silent alienation.
Fi�th, to make the political and intellectual preparations to put an end to the
continuation of the Arab-Is~.caeli conflict, the main economic, military and human
burden of which falls on the shoulders of Egypt when Egypt has no direct interest
in this conflict and when it is pushed to contribute the ma3or share under the
pressure of the Arab countries generally and of the Palestinians in particular
just for the sake of helping. This burden turned Egypt from the richest Arab
country at the outset of the conflict to the poorest one in the wake of the
1967 d~feat. Now that the attempts to settle the conflict with the force of arms,
whose source has been the atheist Soviet Union, have failed, reason dictates
the need to look for a non-military solution with Israel by way of the United
States which supplied Israel with all the means of strength and protection that
made Israel always the stronger party in the conflict with the Arabs. This is
scmethi.ng which necessitated reconsidering Egypt's international relations to
reduce the ties with the Soviet Union as much as possible and to resume building
strong bridges with the United States, especially with the disappearance of 'Abd
al-Nasir who had poisoned the walls of friendship with the United States.
This is insofar as the rightist axis, which gathered its old and new remn.ants in
a minimal degree of organ~zation over a specific program and whiEh started to move
rapidly and flexibly, wagering all its strength on deciding the power struggle
in favor of al-Sadat, is crncerned.
As for the leftist axis, it c~mprised the largest number of the productive working
forces. The Nasirist experiment had destroyed many of the shackles of exploita-
tion and repression from which these forces had been suffering in the pre-July
1962 society--a society described as the "one-half percent society." As a conse-
quence, millions of citizens converged on the political and social action arena
�or the first time. In addition to the right of work and of safety from the
tyranny and exploitation of capitalism, the Nasirist legislation had guaranteed
these forces positions with influential quantitative weight in the political
organization (Socialist Union), the People's Assembly (legislative authority) and
in other popular councils. The fundamental option~ of the Nasirist experiment,
especially in the 1~60's, Urought about the birth of new qualitative groups with
a revolutionary spirit on the political and social action arena which was filled
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by the production forces with their enormous numbers of millions. These new
qualitative groups were embodied in the small farmers who benef ited from the
agrarian reform, the public sector workers and nationalist technocrats whose fate
was tied to the sector and the intellectuals who rose from poor labor and peasant
- roots, who benefited from free college education on the one hand and from the
spread of the socialist thought platforms on the other, in the wake of proclama-
- tion of the National Action Charter and who started to spread in the various
spheres, beginning with the village school and ending in the nuclear reactors,
the state's civil service apparatus and the armed forces.
The leftist forces ha~l emerged in numerous positions of control in society and
had been concentrated mainly in the cooperative associations, the rural youth
centers, the information and culture agency, the labor unions, the Socialist
Union's bases and some of its central or leadership structures, such as the
Central Committee, the Youth Organization and th2 Socialist Studies Center, and
in the secret Vanguard Organization. Those forces had also stormed the army bases
when many university graduates from among the sons of peasants and workers were
conscripted in the army both as soldiers and as officers.
It can be said that upon 'Abd al-Nasir's death, the phrase "leftist forces" was
embodied generally in two distinctive currents, even though one of them had
always moved under the banner of 'Abd al-Nasir and acted under his leadership.
ThP f irst current was the Nasirist left which was formed amidst the Nasirist
experiment and its successive phases, beginning with the phase of "cooperative
_ socialism" in the 1950's, to scientific socialism with its oc~m Arab quality and
as defined by the National Action Charter in the 1960's and ending with "Arab
socialism." The Nasirist left proceeded, out of necessity at the outset, from
- positions hostile to the Marxist thought and the Egyptian communist movement. But
in the mid-1960's, this ]eft reached the point of co-existing with the Marxist
thought and the cemmunists by defining the points of agreement on the~issues of
- the inevitability of the socialist solution, of c].ass struggle, of planned
economic and social development, of liquidating the reAmants of capitalism and
_ of parasitism, of bolstering the political and economic independence, of Arab
nationalism and the issue of liberating the Arab homeland from imperialism, neo-
colonialism and Zionism and rebuilding its unity. The points of disagreement
continued to revalve over the issue of democracy and of formulating it in a class
alliance of the people's working forces consisting of the workers and the farmers
instead of the superficial quantitative alliance between individiaul citizens
in a flabby bureaucratic political organization dominated by the thought and
interests of the petit bourgeoisie under false slogans of socialism. The points of
disagreement also involved theissue of the need for the alliance to be led by a
vanguard socialist party that is public [legal] and that has set features and a
set program to offer the masses and a party whose movement is subject to the
control of the organized masses. This is in addition to the independence of the
unionist and student movement and of the popular organizations and their initia-
tives and to releasing the freedom of expression and of dialogue for all the
national and progressive forces.
The second current is the Marxist leftist current which is older than the Nasirist
left and whose history dates back to the second decade of the 20th century. This
current adhered to the Leninist-Marxist philosophy in its ideas and in its
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movement to change the conditions in Egypt in favor of the worki.iig class and its
allies, the farmers and the revolutionary intellectuals." The Marxist-Leninist
philosophy, with its international strength, es~ecially in t he wake of the Soviet
revolution's victory in 1917, had begun to invade the minds of the "intellectuals
rebelling against the shackles of colonialism, backwardness, social oppression
and political repr~~ssion in the Arab countries" and had begun to transfarm them
from "utopians" to "scientific people" and from "adventurers" into "revolution-
aries." But the predominant characteristic of those intellectuals cantinued, for
a long time and until just before the inception of the July revolution, to be
governed on ~he one hand by their petit bourgeois roots and by the weighty posi-
tions which the intellectual elements--some of them Egyptianized foreigners of Jew-
ish origins--held in leading the Marxist movement. Historically, those elements
contributed the major effort in transmitting and translating the Marxist-Leninist
thoughr. into Arabic. On the other hand, the participation of the urban and
rural working class in this current's organizations was weak. Thirdly, this current
did not have the ability necessary to develop a formula of Leninist Marxism
_ acceptable to the Egyptian reality and a formula to which the massps could respond,
whether in terms of the language of address or in terms of the movement's tactics
and strategy. Fourthly, the constant campaign of violent repression launched
against the underground marxist organizations by colonialism and by the secular
and religious reactionaries had been intensified on the grounds that the organiza-
tions were illegal and constituted a form of atheism. Finally, there were the
widespread and blind accusations ~f.lackeyhood among the members of the Marxist
movement and organizations whenever disagre~nent of opinion among them intensified.
Theq resorted to these accusations instead of solving their disagreement through
dialogue within the organizational principle known as the prir,ciple of democratic
centralism.
All these factors combined with the difficult circumstances of underground action
and with the complex and backward economic, political and social conditions to
obstruct crystallization of the class struggle in a healthy manner and to cause
the phenomenon of fragmentation and of d~vision to dominate the Marxist left at
the outset of the 1950's and to turn this left into a mere force of expression"
instigating, inciting and encouraging the crushed masses to"bring about change
- with the ideas which this left was offering instead of being a"political force"
with quantitative and qualitative influence and with weight in the process of
change iteelf.
As a result of these conditions and even though one of the numerous Marxist organ-
izations with which the movement abounded, namely the organization known by the
name of the Democratic National Liberation Movement [DNLM], had firm relations
with the leadership of the Free Officers Organization before it set off the July
1952 revolution, this organization was not able to maintain and develop those
relations and to take an actual part in power. On the contrary, that relation-
ship was quickly destroyed before the end of the first year ofthe Free Officers'
assumpCion of power. The Free Officers sent the leaders of the DNLM and ma~}y of
its cadres, along with the leaders and cadres of the other organizations, to iail,
excluding a number of pexsonalities who were tied to 'Abd al-Nasir by personal
friendship or who had come to occupy positions in the structure of the new
authority and who had come to put their loyalty to the authority over their
].oyalty to the DNLM which had embarked on a struggle against the authority.
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The tragic dimensions of this situation become evident when we know that the Free
Off icers Organization's relationship with the DNLM defore the revolution was
supervised by Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir personally on the one hand and, on the other
hand, by Ahmad Fu'ad al-Qadi who became chairman of the Board of Directors
of the Bank of Egypt throughout 'Abd al-Nasir's era and who continued to hold
the position during al-Sadat's era, and by Ahmad Hamrush, the officer who became
- the ct~ief editor of the first magazine issued by the Free Officers and known by
the name of AL-TAHRIR and then of ROSE AL-YUSUF in which he continued to write
during al-Sadat's era. A1-Qadi and Hamrush supervised that relationship by virtue
of their being in charge of the army section of the DNLM. This is in addition to
the presence of two original members in the Revolution Co~and Council who were
close to the DNLM, namely Yusuf Siddiq who commanded the f irst c~nfrontation force
which seized the headquarters of the royalist regime`s chief of staff, and Khalid
Muhyi al-Din. The first was relieved before the end of the first year of the
revolution and the second was cotnpelled to resign because of the events of March
1954 concerning the nature of the democratic national authority which the revolu-
tion was to set up in place of the defunct regime.
The truth is that the 1952 revolution, which took the form of a"military
coup" and on the strength of an armed national political organization which had
entrenched itself among the armed furces' ranks under the name of the Free
Officers, came as a surprise to all the political forces and parties at the time
~~ven though everybody had known before 23 July 1952 of the presence of the Free
Officers Organization, had read the secret pamphlets which the organization had
been issuing and had supported strongly the organization's inclinations which
were hostile to "colonialism, the royal palace, feudalism and the exploitative
capitalism" and even though relations of varying degrees had been established
before the eve of the revolution between a number of the political forces extending
from the extreme right (the Muslim Brotherhood) to the P.xtreme left (the DNLM
of. the communist movement) [and the Free Officers].
The Marxist left's view of the event was "generally" based on its being a military
coup. In the Marxist literature accumulated in light of the internat3Ana1 exper-
iences in Europe and Latin America, a military coup is always a coup in the
interest of society's most reactionary forces. The Egyptian Marxist left in its
entirety was not able to deal with the "phenomenon of the military coup" in light
of the conditions and of the given facts of the Egyptian reality and was unable to
consider this phenomenon was a new formula of the national revolution--a formula
- unprecedented in history and a formula which could be used as a measurjng stick,
with the exception, to some minds, of the Peronist experiment in Argentina, but
only to a degree.
_ But within a period not exceeding the first year of the revolution, the predominant
opinion in the DNLM was inc~ined toward supporting the "military coup" in order to
preserve the movement's relations with the Free Officers Organization and on the
basis of analyzing the coup as one that carries limited natiDnalist and progres-
sive ideas and tendencies which must be supported in order to overcome the other
vacillating elements in the revolution command who are influenced by their ties
to society's reactionary for.ces.
F3ut the other organizaCio*_is of. the Egyptian communist movement, led by the
rgyptian Commiinist Party, took a stance of fundamental opposition to the "1952
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military coup" as a coup which aborts the popular capabilities escalat3ng toward
a revolution in the interest of all the reactionary forces and of the U.S. neo-
colonialism. To prove this, the Egyptian Communist Party offered as evidence a
number oi indications embodied in the establishment of good :relations at the out-
set between the Revolution Command Council on the one hand a:id the Muslim
Brotherhood and the U.S. Embassy in Cairo on the other in contrast to the
Council's hostility toward al-Wafd Party with its national influence and its
broad popularity, in the strict regressive mPasures ~~*~t which the Council con-
- fronted the strike of the workers of Kafr a].-Dawwar textile plants and in the
immediate ~ilitary trial which the Counc~y held for party leaders--a trial which
concluded with the execution of two of those leaders, namely workers Khamis and
al-Baqari, in September 1952.
Thus, the atmosphere between the revolution command and the Marxist left, including
t