JPRS ID: 10313 JAPAN REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030022-9
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 22
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/ 10313
9 February 1982
, Ja an Re ort
p p
CFOUO 9/82)
F~IS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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IvOTE
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JPRS L/10313
9 February 1982
I
~
; JAPAN REPORT
~
(FOUO 9/82)
. CONTENTS
POLITICAL AI3D SOCIOLOGICAL
Japan To Endorse Disarmament TreaCies st UN
(ASAHI F.VENING NEWS, 1 Feb 82) 1
Japan's nSP Adopts 1982 Action Program
~KYOUO, 20 Jan 82) 3
Suzuki Diet Spe~ch Viewed as Evaeive
~ (Editorial; NIHON I~IZAI SHIMRUN, 26 Jan 82) 5
'YOMIURI' Hits.'Lackadaisical' Diet Proceedinga
(Edit.orial; ^~'HE DAILY YOMIURI, 31 Jan 82) 7
Suzuki Defenda Defense Spending Plan in Diet
~KYODO, 1 Feb 82) ......a.....~ 9
- MITI's Goals, Policiea, Administrative Methode Examined
(Tadahide Ikuta; CHUO KORON, 1981) 11
- ' MILITAIZY
'MAINICHI': Release Contents of Japan-i1.S. Arme Metnorandun~
(Editorial; MAINICHI DAILY NFWS, 31 Jan 82) 30
SDF Mapa Out New 5-Year Aefense Program
(JIJI, 7 Jan 82) 32
Briefs
View of Japan's Defenae Minister 34
S~IENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Reprocessed Plutonium for Light Water Reactor Power Generation
(MAINICHI SHIMBUN, 31 Dec 81) 35
- a - [III - ASIA - lIl FOUO]
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r~ux ur'h'ic:~n~ u5E uNLY
Strengthened Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Budget Examined
(DENKI SHUI~UN, 9 Jan 82) 38
Ultra High Performance In.~rtial Guidance System for H-1
Rocket Being Develope~
(C'!I~IITER DIGEST, Jan 82) 40
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YULITICAL AND SOCIOLI~ICAL
JAPAN TO ENDORSE DISARMEIMENT TREATIES AT UN
OW021633 Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NEWS in Enolish 1 Feb 82 p 1
[TextJ In response to the growing interest in disarmament in connection with the
second United Nations special General Assembly on disarmament in June, the govern-
ment will submit to the current diet ses~ion bills to approve the ratification of,
or Japan's participation in, three international disarmament treuties in non-nuclear
areas.
`The three pacts are:
(1) The treaty on the prohibition or restriction of the use of "certain conven-
tional weapons which may be deemed to be excessivelq injurious or to have indis-
criminate effects": Weapons to be controlled ~snder this pact include plastic
bombs, mines and booby traps which could cause injuries to the civilian population,
- and napalm and otii'er incendiary weapons.
Japan and 44 other countries, including Britain, France, West Germany, the Soviet
Union and China, have signed the treaty, which was adopted in 1980 by the United
Nations. The United States has not yet signed it, saying its disarmament policy
is still under review by the new Reagan Administration.
(2) The treaty on the prohibition of the production and stockpiling of "bacterio-
logical and taxic weapons," which was established in April 1972 and signed by 88
nations including Japan and the two superpowers.
(3) 'I'he tre:~ty ~n tl~e prohibition ot the use for military purposes of technologies
~u cuu5c natural haz~~rds such a:: earthquakes, tidal waves, sudden changes in the
currents oF the seas and other c�hanges in the natural environment, wh.'.ch was adopted
- in December 1976 and signed by the U.S., the Soviet Union, Britain and other major
countrtes. Tokyo has not yet signed it.
Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki has made it clear that he will go to New York in June
to attend the U.S. conference to appeal for ~i ban on nuclear and chemical weapons.
Japan has signed the first two of the above three treaties but has not yet ratified
them, and it has yet to become a signatory to the third one.
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'I'iie government fcels .Japan shautd become a party to the three treaties to give more
weight to its appeal for disarmament. With the U.S. conference scheduled in June,
- now is the best time for Tokyo to take such action. No objection is expected to
_ be raised by either the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party or the opposition parties.
Work is now being conducted hurriedly on coordinating the provisions of these
treaties and those of related domestic laws.
COPYRIGHT: Asahi Evening News 1982
CSO: 4120/139
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PO;,ITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICt1L
.TAPAN'S DSP ADOPTS 1982 ACTION PROGRAM
OW201145.Tokyo KYODO in English 1134 GMT 20 Jan 82
[Text] Ta%yo, 20 Jan KYODO--Japan's Democr:itic Socialist Party, the moderate No ~
opposition party, Wednesday decided its 1982 action program, stressing the need io~:
Japan to strengtYien the existing Japan-U.S. sec~irity partnership and bear greater
responsibility for i.ts own defense.
The plan, to be submitted to a DSP regular party convention scheduled to start
17 February, said the party would promote Japan's greater role in defense and
closer Japan-U.S. defense cooperation in concrete terms.
Such closer defense ties between Japan and the United States are needed particular-
ly in view of the current global situation which the party said is forcing Washing-
ton to adopt the "swing" strategy involving rapid transfer of forces from one area
to another.
Behind the DSP's thinking on defense is increasing world tension, the party's
advocacy of greater preparedness against what it calls the p1threat" from the
Soviet Union, and the party's receptivity to America's mounting calls for greater
Japanese defense effurts, observers commented.
The DSP action plan calls for a well-balanced Japanese defense buildup whils
promotion a peace strategy, sticking to the framework of the war-renouncing
constl.tution and paying due consideration to tl- ndition of government finances,
_ It urges Japan to make effective use of its defense budget and upgrade quality in
an effort to achieve its responsibility as one of the Western bloc nations.
The DSP plan declares that the party upholds the current security partnership
between Tokyo and Washington and calls on the Japanese Government to conduct a
general reassessment of the national defense progrum outline, adopted in 1976 as
a basic buildup plan.
The DSP proposes unified parliamentary action by the four moderate opposition
parties--the DSP, Komeito, New Liberal Club and United Social Democratic Party--
through a liaison between their diet policy and electio� policy committees.
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This proposal is ].ess amhitious than one for a more outright political alliance
of the four parties within the diet, advocated by DSP Chairman Ryosaku Sasaki
last June. Th~ former proposal failed to work.
The DSP also calls on the three other opposition parties to agree to run joint
candidates for the house of representatives in 39 electoral districts.
CSO: 4120/138
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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
SUZUKI DIET SPEECH VIEWED AS EVASIVE
OW311409 Tokyo NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN in Japanese 26 Jan 82 p 2
[Cditorial: "Prime Minister Suzuki's Speech Unappealing, Unimpre~sive"]
['Pext] Why are the government's policy speeches deli~vered at the diet so bor.ing?
We are not satisfied that U.S. President Reagan endlessly expounds changes of ideas
- or philosophy in his speeches and, thus, gives us the impre5~,ion that what he is
saying must still be given the finishing touches to be called concrete policies.
Frankly, in speeches by our prime minister, Suzuki, we cannot find anything to be
called a philosophy or any detailed explanations on policies.
We are sure that the prime minister has gov~rnment policies to dwell on but, per-
haps, because of the need to make prudeatial replies during diet interpellations,
he steered c1Ear of elucidating or expounding his policies in that important speech
in which he should have personally appealed to the nation. For instance, he did
- not even mention the question of an income tax re~iuction which, by its very nature,
wi11 be the focus of debates at the current diet session.
The question of a tax cut is not the only which the people wanted to know more about
but which was left untouched in the government speeches. In his speech Prime Min-
ister Suzuki did cite the implementation of administrative reforms and the elimina-
tion of economic frictions with foreign countries as the immediate, urgent tasks
facing Japan. However, he only put perfunctory words in order regarding them, thus
making us unahle to find what course the government is planning to take from his
speech. What we do find is the attitude toward administrative reforms that the
government will wait for the provisional survey council on administrative reforms
to come up with recommendations. Regarding the elimination of economic frictions
overseas, he did no more than "express his resolve" to settle the issue.
As far as administrative refornis are concerned however, what the nation wants to
learn from fhe government at tliis stage is what kind of Japan the highest person in
1 the administrative authority aspires to build through administrative reforms, or
the "philosophy behind the admtnistracive reforms" and a rough direction of the
reforms eyed by the government. This notwithstanding, the prime minister persisted
- with a posture of entrusting everythii~g to the deliberative council and only await-

~ ing its recommendations. Consequently, this means that political leadership is of
no utie.
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~ The prime minister's reference in his speech to the elimination of external economic
friction was too short. He said only: "It is Japan's obligation to contribute to
preserving and expanding free trade and making the world economy active" and "we
will voluntarily work out measures to further open up the Japanese market and strive
to make trade relations with ot}~er countries smooth." Does this suffice in making
other countries understard Japan's resolve and sincerity?
Nowhere in the govexnment's policy speeches can we feel the tension which we should
naturally feel for the nearing expiration of the time limit on the resolution of
this issue.
In the first place, speech is an act for conveying one's will to his audience and
f or influencing it. As a rule, the meaning in political science that violence is
the "last reason" is understood in conjunction urith this. However, prime minister
Suzuki abandoned the best opportunity to make the most of his speech. In Japan where
things are mostly done through behind-the-scenes maneuvers and dealings rather than
the utilization of the power of the public speeches, Prime Minister Suzuki is not
the only one who does not make the most of speech. However, we are afraid that
national interests may be impaired if teaders fail to say something timely which
should be said with regard to affairs invc~lving external relations. In this sense,
the prime minister's speech which is too ambiguous and too simple is open to ques-
tion in too many areas.
Tht portion of the policy speeches dealing with the defense question--which is
expected to be one of the focal issues at the current diet session along w~ith admin-
istrativz reforms, economic friction with other countries and tax reductions--seemed
as though it was bound with hoops two- to three-fold. In this we can perceive the
rulers' evasive attitude of giving consideration to the safe steering of diet delib-
erations first, instead of influencing the people through speech. This is regret-
table.
We believe the pr~me minister's concern lies in the opposition's criticism of the
~;overnment for increasing the fiscal 1983 defense budget by 7.75 percent over the
preceding fiscal year. Neverthc�less, unlike the general perception prevailing at
home, it has become the seed of international criticisms against Japan that Japan
is not spending money for defense. T~ c~ur regret, the government's policy speeches
only showed an evaslve posture in all areas.
COPYRIGHT: Nihon Keizai Shimbuneha 1982
CSO: 4105/53
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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
'YOMIURI' HITS 'LACKADAISICAL' DIET PROCEIDINGS
UW011030 'Pokyo TEI~ DAILY YOMNRI in ~nglish 31 Jan 82 p 2
[YOMIURI SHIMBUN 30 January editorial: "Diet Shadow Play"]
[Text] We are not only deeply disappointed but infuriated by the lackadaisical
proceedings in the lower and upper houses. We have ~o feel that the ruling and
- opposition parties are not delving deeply enough into such important national
issues as administrative reform, financial rehabilitation, income tax reduction,
defense and political ethics.
Prime Minister Suzuki is appare~~tly playing a safe hand, for his replies to inter-
pellators have been merely a reading of drafts composed by go~erinnent officials.
Where has the passion of political debate gone? How can we get to the core of
pzoblems when our representatives are acting out a shadow play?
The people are calling for a tax cut. But the heart of the problem is how to
- reconcile Einancial rehabilitation witlt a tax cut. All the parties urged the
government to carry out a tax cut, but none of them went into the matter in great
depth.
This omission is regrettable. But what the people deplored more was the premier's
hemming and hawing. He ducked the issue by saying that the government would con-
sider a tax cut if it was the national consensus, as if the matter had nothing to
do with him. This smacks of an eva.sion.
Soci~zlists Skimp A].so
The opposltion partics also showed inconsistency in questioning the government's
plans For administrative reforms. The people must particularly remark that
Socialist Party (JSP) Chairman ]'chio Asukata hardly toucked the sub~ect, which
concerns the people as much as a tax reduction. Perhaps Asukata became tongue-
tied because his ears were gttuned to union opposition.
As long .zs the JSP fails to lead, but is led, it can never become a national party.
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Meanwtiile, we sensed some subtle change in the premier's replies on administrative
reform. Although we do zot know yet the contents of the report to be compiled by
the administrative reforn. council this July, it is certain that the rec.ommendations
will be strongly resisted by various quarters.
The premier's duty is to break through such resistance, he should not be looking
far a way out in anticipation of difficulties.
~ther Evasions
When the debates focused on defense spending, the premier parroted the 1976 cabinet
decision that defense spending each year shall be set so as not to exceed one percezt
of the GNP [gross national product].
We have to be dissdtisfied when debates on defense focus only on percentage margins.
The core of the defense problem is a proper appreciation of the current reality that
a balance of power actually serves to maintain world peace and security.
- An objective assessment of the status ~~uo must be the basis for Japan to contribute
to disarmament efforts. We hoi~e for pc~netrating debates in the upper and locaer
house budget committees.
COPYRIGHT: The Daily Yomiuri 1982
CSO: 4120/139
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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL .
SUZUKI DEFENDS DEFENSE SPENDING PLAN IN DIET
OW011301 Tokyo KYODO in English 1156 GMT 1 Feb 82 .
[Text] Tokyo, 1 Feb KYODO--Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki said Monday he has "no plan
at all" of building up Japan's defense strength to the extent that it poses a
military threat to its neighbors.
Speaking at a house of representatives committee meeting, Suzuki noted that there
- are people who fear that Japan's defense spending may grow "unchecked" in the
future.
~ "Such fears are unwarranted," Suzuki said.
He also rejected as "absurd" allegations that his Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP)
is trying to put Japan again on the road of militarism.
This refers to an objection by opposition parties to the government-proposed 7.75
percent defense budget increase in fiscal 1982 to yen 2.6 trillion (dollar 11.7
billion) at the expense of educational and social welfare outlays, each held to
_ less than a 3 percent budgetary hike.
"We have no plan at all to pose a threat to our neighbors by expanding defense
strength," Suzuki said.
~arlier in the committee session, Suzuki said he wants the 1976 defense buildup
plan completed "a year or even 6 months ahead" of its target ~~~u~letion year of
fiscal 1987.
The plan maps out Japan's def.ense power in terma of number of tanks,~aircraft and
ground combat units. ~
But many LD1' diet members as well as U.S. Government officials mainta3:n that the
plan is outdated, saying it was compiled during the detente between the Western
and Eastern blocs and that it does not take into account the recent Soviet military
buildup in the Western Pacific.
- Concer.ning the government policy to hold its defense spending to less than 1 per-
- cent of the gross national product (GNP), Suzuki said in the committee meeting;
"GNP is subject to fluctuations of the international economy."
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Though he did not elaborate, the remark suggested that defense expenditures may
go beyond the 1 percent level in time.
The 1982 defense spending is expected to equal 0.93 percent of the GNP projected
in the fiscal year starting in April, up from 0.91 percent this year.
Last week, Suzuki said the government will keep its defense budget below 1 percent
of the GNP "for the time being."
= CSO: 4120/138
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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
MITI'S GOALS, POLICIES, ADMINISTRATIVE METHODS EXAMINED
Tokyo CHUO KORON in Japanese Fall Issue 1981 pp 187-204
[Article by journalist Tadahide Ikuta: "The Ministry of International Trade and
Industry: The Most Powerful Government Agency~s Secret"] .
[Text] Is The Ministry of International Trade ~nd Industry Necessary?
On 10 June, several middle-level bureaucrats of the Ministry of International
Trade and Industry (MITI) met in the Secretariat ~ s Planning Section chief's ~room
on the third floor of the new MITI building, beginning at dusk.
The youngest of them, Director Nonouchi of th~ General Affairs Section, Agency
for Natural Resources and Energy (who joined the ministry in 1956 and is presently
chief of the MITI Petro leum Department. Years in parentheses hereafter indicate
entry of officials into respective ministries), and Minister Tanaka of MITI
arrived late because they were attending a dinner for foreign guests. Meanwhile,
the others were engaged in an animated diacussion of such questions as. "what is
MITI?" and "why does a government aRency which handles industrial administration
such as MITI exist onl y in Japan?"
In addition to Nonouchi, six other participants were: Planning Section Chief
Kosuke Yamamoto (1959), Automobile Section Chief Shin~iro Nishinaka (1960) of the
Machinery and Inforniat ion Industries Buresu, Aircraft Weapons 5ection Chief
= Yoshihiro Sakamoto (1 9 62) of the same bureau, North Asia Section Chief Akihiko
Hayashi (1962) of the International Trade Policy Bureau, Technical Research
Section Chief Norikazu Matsuda (1965) of the Agency of Industrial Science and
- Technology, and energy planning official Katsusada Hirose (1966) of the Energy
Agency.
It is customary at MITI to begin lively shop talk while drinking beer after 7 pm,
but alcohol was omitted on this particular day. The reason was that Yamamoto
had rejected a proposal by one participant to "talk over beer."
- The discussion centered on each individual's experiences and continued late into
the night. The points emphasized could be boiled down into the following: "MITI
has an aversion to co ntrol:;, while ita forte lies in the promotion of pro~ects.
But the Diet and society demand the strengthening of various kinds of controls.
- Nevertheless, throughout its history, MI~I has done its utmost to free itself
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from exercising controls through licensing and subsidizing, and we MITI bureau-
crats are taking pains to administer without the use of controls" (Nonou~~hi).
Of course, the participants had high praise for MITI's role in Japan's economic
development and stressed the future expansion of that role. One participant
declared: "When I observe MITI as an ordinary citizen, dissociating myself from
my position as a bureaucrat, I still rate its existence highly." The atmosphere of
the discussion indicated a kind of narcissism concerning MITI.
Toward the end of the discussion, I posed ttte question: "How would you define
MITI, using an easily understandable metaphor?" While various opinions were
exnressed, Nonouchi used the metaphor of the firefighting system of the Edo
period and said it was like "the leader of the 'Me' squad." There was also a
comparison with the leader of the neighborhood mutual assistance system. In
other words, whenever a problem occur~ in the industrial world, MITI is seen as
the agency to consult for a solution to the problem.
Testimony of Concerned Outsiders
Several days later, I met a member of the Industrial Structure Council (Chairman
Yoshihiro Inamaya, who is also chairman of the Federation of Economic Organiza-
tions), the advisory organ of the MITI minister which plays an important role in
- draftinK policy for the ministry. When I explained the ^ontent of the above-
mentioned discussion, he responded with severe criticism.
While appraising MITI's achievements in devc~loping Japan's industries in the
export field and its flexible administrativ~~ posture in avoiding the use of such
authoritative powers as licensing held by tl~e postwar bureaucracy, the council
member said: "The term 'leader of thel~e sq~~ad' is a self-denigrating expression
- used by bureaucrats, but I believe that they have adroitly used the 'carrot and
stick' policy to maintain consistent control over industry. The difference lies
in their highly complex and complicated methods."
Tt~e council member went on to say that MITI's role in the development o� Japan's
economy cannot he ignored, biit it was due b,zsically to the astuteness of the
_ people ~nd th~ business enterprises, and evaluation of the true worth of MITI
prob~~bly mu~.t await the fu[~~re.
He also pointed out some dangerous sig~~s concerning MITI which preclude optimism,
such ~is its increasing adhesion to pol~tical parti.es like the Liberal Democratic
Party, from which it previously kept a certain distance, and MITI's impotence
concerning structural changes in the sl.uggish pulp and cement industries.
Sense of Crisis Among Y~un~ Bureaucrats
Incidentally, thEre is a strong sense of crisis among the younger bureaucrats. I
met a number of young assistant section chiefs (who joined the ministry in 1972-73)
of the various bureaus, who invariably said: "Section chiefs think only abo~:ct
associating with politicians and do not ser~ously study the industries,. so they
end up becoming naive optimists." "How can we give guidance to a business concern
which singlehandedly records sales totallin}; several tri]_lion yen? Also, within
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tt~e };uv~rnmeiit structure 1.tself, we oft:en penetrate the ~urisdiction .of other
ministries and agencies, but in moat cases we lose out.~' The assistant chiefs, who
have been given first-line management responsibility truly believe that the founda-
tion of MITI is unmistakably sinking. There is a clear gap between the previously
mentioned contention of the middle-level bureaucrats and the opnions of the younger
bureaucrats.
What is the actual state of MITI administration and its indsstrial policy? And
what are MITI's goal and direction?
MITI Is a Product of Japanese Soil ~
When LDP parliamentarian Yoshiro Hayashi, former MITI bureaucrat (his last post in
1950 was chief of the Industrial Machinery Section), visited France immediately
after the French presidential election, the newly elected President Mitterand's
special assistant reportedly said: "France would like ro organize a ministry like
MITI and embark on a full-fledged industrial policy." Also, the United States
_ has promoted the "MITI-zation" of the Department of Commerce since the Carter
administration. There is strong interest abroad concerning MTTI, and there are
some Japanologists who are making special studiea of MITI.
The reason is perhaps bec~ause they believe MITI has played a large role in Japan's
miraculous resur~ence aricl remarkable economic development. According to Vice
President Yugoro Komatsu of the Kobe Steel Corporation (administrative vice
minister in 1944), MITI was labelled the "notorious MITI" in the late 1950's by
the United States and European countries for resisting the liberalization of car
imports. Does this mean that their appraisal has changed?
The U.S. Commerce Department has 36,000 employees (MITI has about 14,000
employees). Its main functions are centered on compilation of stat3stics,
including industrial statistics, economic growth rates, direct overseas invest-
ments, and procurement of supplies and materials. In addition, it handles
licensing of exports to communist-bloc countries, but it handles very few so-called
policy matters.
However, due to administrative reforms late in the Carter era, there was a sudden
move to strengthen the fu~lctions of the Commerce Department as a means of building
U.S. industry. It was a notable turnabout from a laissez-faire policy to
government intervention i~i tra,de and industrial policies.
As the first step in the r.eform: 1) industrial protection operations (antidumping
and contravening duties) handled by the Finance Bureau were transferred to the
Commerce Department; 2) ttie bureau was expanded fio promote exports; and 3) the
control center for commercial attaches assigned to the State Department's overseas
missions was transferred to the Commerce Department. .
However, with the advent uf the Reagan administration, the tempo 3n the buildup
of the Courmerce Department slowed down. This is probably because the Reagan
policy of fostering the gr.owth of free enterprise is incompatible with an increase
in government controls. Cn addition, Americans.with outstanding potential have
traditionally aspired to employment with ma~or private enterprises or to the
13
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030022-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030022-9
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