JPRS ID: 10294 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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ruK vrri~.~AL u~a u~vLr
- JPRS L/ 10294 ~
1 February 1982
- West E u ro e Re ort
p p
- CFOUO 5/82~
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JPRS L/10294
1 February 1982
WEST EUROPE REPQRT
(FOUO 5/82)
CONTENTS
~iEATER FORGES
- FRANCE
General Gallois Interviewed, Says Nuclear War Possib'_e ~
(Gallois Interview; LATITUDE AUJOURD'HUI, Nov Qi1........... 1
ECONOMI C
BE LG IUM
Troubles Continse for Cockerill-Sambre Steel Firm
(Paul Colson; POURQUOI PAS?, 10 Dec $1) 9
~ POLITICAL
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIkS
. ERRATUM: Soviet Peace Movement Ties; Msinformation
Ac tivi ties
- (Philippe Krasnopolski; VALEURS ACTUELLES, 1:~-25 Oct 81).... 13
~ - a - [III - ~ - 150 FOUO]
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THEATER FORCES FRANCE
GENERAL GALLOIS INTERVIEWID, SAYS NUCLEAR WAR POSSIBLE
Paris LATITU~E AUJOURD'HUI in French Nov 81 pp 19-22
[Interview with General Gallois, by Patrice Galand; date and place not given]
[Text] We wanted to have a talk with a world-famous specialist
on the development of the nuclear era techniques and strategies.
We reached the conclusion that today a nuclear war is within
the realm of possibility. General Gallois, disputed at +times,
expounds in the most prestigious hemicycles. Author of about
ten works, of several hundred articles translated into a number
of l~nguages, including Russian, he gave u~ +~he results of 30
years of reflection.
- ~Question] What great changes have taken place during this centurv?
~ [Answer] At least two in the field of my professional br.~anch. The f irst one is
political and social: the 1917 Revolution.
The second revolution is the advent of weapons of massive destruction~
[QuestionJ Before discussing the strategic aspects, can you explain to us what
weapons of massive de5truction are, in fact?
[Answer] It is a question of weapons that have a great destruction power per "unit
of fire." Possibilitiesthat th~y do not alway~ have have been attributed to them
and the dividends that they may bring in are often overlooked. There can be no
thought of having recoursa to them except in extr~me situations. They have si;;nifi-
_ cance only for protecting the territory of the country holding them and if that
country were as if held by the throat.
On the other hand, it has not been sufficiently realized that the atom could turn
~ war into an absurd act, at least between countries equipped with them, even in
unequal amounts.
f [Question] That idea is based on the principle that the final objective of war
for an aggressor is to profit from it. If everything is destroyed, there is no
longer any advantage in w~ging war: How have we reached this status quo of forced
nonwar?
~
~
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[Answer] Over the ages, men have confronted each other under different conditions.
In a first phast, combat took place hand-to-hand, usually at some distance from
cities and, when one party won over the other, he took possession of the human
and material goods remaining intact. A second period w.as entered with bombards
' at first and then heavy artillery. The combatants not only exterminated each other,
but they also partially destroyed their respective property. During World War II,
~e entered a third period with the combination of the bombing plane and the atom
bomb. At that time, they sought r~ot only to destroy the combatant, but they also
razed material property in the interior. Thus, a period was reached in which war
had become so absurd (because what was supposed to be conquered was destroyed)
that the status quo of forced nonwar became imperative.
[Question] Does not the de~~elopment of techniques throw that status quo open to
question?
[Answer] Unfortunately, it seems that it does. For several years now., we have
been in a fourth period characterized by the a~curacy of long�-range missiles. These
weapons can destroy traditional armed forces at their stations without having the
civilian population and the material goods of the attacked country suffer from
them. We have returned to a period in which nuclear war is again becoming con-
cEivable, because the coveted goods would be spared.
[Questlon] You present the Soviet Union as an expanding social system. What ma-
terial means has that country given itself?
[Answer] The Soviets have realized what the political and military implications
of the two revolutionary changes w~ere. They were the instigators of the first
- one. i?~ey were going to strive to master the second one rapi~ly. In 1949, they
- tested their first nuclear explosive. From 1949 to 1960, they modernized the ve-
hiclQS. During the decade of the 1960's., they deployed those weapons, and, st4rt-
ing in 1965, contrary to what is said everywhere, "parity" was achieved between
Russia and America, becauce, with nuclear weapons, "parity" is not numerical. The
- Soviets had "parity" as soon as they were potentially capable of making the terri-
tory of the United States undergo intulerable devastation; that is to say, capable
of wiping a number of cities from the map and of causing human losses that would
be counted by the millions. Starting at that time, with regard to America, the
USSR knew that it was unattackable on its territory and this resulted in a great
freedom of action for it.
_ [Question] Aow does SoviQt expansion occur?
[Answerj. It is the result of two processes: by means of territorial contiguity
and by means of discontinuity. When the Soviets expand ~y means of territorial
co~xtiguity, the Red Armiy usually goes into action after a polit~cal preparation
_ ada.pted to local circumstances. Thus, that was the case in Eastern Eur~pe between
1935 and 1947. That was the case in Hungary in 1956, i.n Czechoslovakia in 1968
and in Afghanistan in 1980. It ~aas a 12-year cycle. Political prepar~tion enables
the Red Army to intervene without encountering organized military forces in oppo-
sition. Th~ 'rliing~rian Army stayed in its barracks. The Czech Army did lik,ewise
and the Afghan Army was on the side of the invader.
.
2.
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At the time of the dispute between Vietnam--allie~ with Moscow--and China, the
;~d Army, which occupies a 6,00~-~k.ilometer border with China in the north, could
have created a diversion to alleviate pressure.by the Chinese on the Vietnamese.
The Red Army did not move, becaus2 it would have had to go as far as Peiping. This
was not conceivable. Therefore, there was no diversion.
[Question] Why such precaution~s?
(Answer] Because the Soviets cannot allow a defeat of theix Red Army. It has
a reputation of invincibili~y. It is the guarantor of the regime and if it should
suffer a serious setback, it is not sure that the system would hold aut. the large
number of non-Russian ethnic groups peopling that ~^~me.nse ~mpire might make it
brAak up. Some seven centuries of patient imperialist buildup would disappear.
Tha Soviet Zeaders are very aware of the value of the heritage given to them and
also what they have done themselves to expand still more the space under Rvasian
control. Th~y will not engage the Red Army, if they are not sure of winning.
[Question] Do you think that as soon as the Soviet~ invade a country by means
of contiguity they no longer abandon it that is why the~ do not take that risk
, before being certain of winning?
[Answer~ The irreversible nature of the operations engaged in by the Rusaians
by means of territorial contiguity is not understood by many Western leadera. In
Europe, for example, it is not conceivable that the Sovieta will bring their gi--
gantic armament into action and that, in the face of a miraculous resistance, they
will do an about-face. Consequently, strategies consisting in resisting with purely
traditional means in the belief~that, in the face of that resistance, Moscow would
not use its weapons of massive destruction, seem to me illusory and dangerous.
[Question] Zs not the asymmetry of intiative ~f the conflict a determining factor
in case of a conflict?
[Answer] The East has the initiative. The corollary of initiative is aurprise.
If the accuracy of the long-range missiles that it has is added to this, the USSR
has the means of disarming Western countries,provided only with traditional wea-
pons, at a distan~~ by means of a preventive attack. For the Soviets, war initia-
tive is in itself sufficien*_ to create a total situation. asycmnetry, because,~witih
_ today's weapons, the one who strikes first wins. Therefore, let us not talk of
numerical "balance." That makes no sense.
[Question] What means do the Westerners have to prevent all their armament from.
being destroyed by a surprise attack?
[AnSwer] In order to avoid the ~,rushing eftects of surprise aggression, there
is hardiy anything but constant mobility of the counterattack armament. But the
geographical situation asymmetry, added to the preceding ones, comes into play
here. If the Soviets can deploy SS-20 missiles on their territory whose population
density is, at times, from two to three inhabitants per square kilometer, the same
is not true for the Dutch and their 404 inhabitants per square kilometer. If Lhe
Soviets can deploy nuclear weapons with their warheads installed in the empty
- spaces east of Moscow, where there can be no protesters, the same does not apply
to the urban or rural complex in Western Europe.
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- [Question] Are not strategic nuclear submarines the last deterrence factor for ~
the We~terners?
[Answer] As a matter of fact, one of the means of avoiding destruction of the
- 6~est's defense weapons is to put them in constant mobility. But, when there is
~ not much territc,rial space, when the urban complex is very dense and also when
it is a question of deroocracies in which each one expresses his opinions and in
~ which each one puts up with protest, 'the sea offers a large-sized sure refuge with-
out protesters. In the West, this solution is not generally agreed to. It is
~ true that it is not practicable for countries that have only traditional forceso
They can merely deplore the vulnerability of their military apparatus to the op-
posing accurate weapons.
It is true that, since 195Q, France has succeeded in building five n~iclear sub-
marines (the Sovi~~ts launch as many every year) and the Defense budget has not
favored the nuclear forces, with expenditures on the order of 15 percent of the
total military appropriations.
[Questionl Are you not defeatist? President Carter wanted to meet the Soviet
SS-20 missiles with Pershing missiles or "cruise missiles."
[Answer] Whea President Carter tried to meet the SS-20 missiles with Pershing
missiles and "cruise missiles," he did not take into account the situation asym-
metry existing between the two opposing blocs. This asymm~etry is political, social,
military, stratEgic, geographic. Until the West realizes all the implications
of this asynunetry, it will put itself in a situation of inferiority and will pay
tribute to expressions like "detente," "balance of forces," "parity," and so an,
which have little signifi.cance in the end of the 20th century, if they had any
30 years ago.
Carter, by proposing his new weapons, and European poZiticians~by accepting them,
did no~ realize the political risks that they were running. To take an extreme
example, they forgot that it is not easy to shift cruise missiles on Dutch terri-
tory with their warheads installed.
[Questian] What is the advantage for the Soviets to have SS-20 missiles?
[Answer] Those SS-20 missiles will, perhaps one day, be combat weapons, but they
are already formidable political weapons. They work to the benefit of the Soviets
owing to the d.ivisions that they are creating within the Alliance. The deployment
of ~S-20 missiles led Carter to propose "cruise missiles" and Persining niissiles
to the European allies. This is already mobilizing Dutch and Ge,rman public opinion
against installation of the American missiles in Europe. Why would the Soviets
abandon an armament that gives them that great a political advantage? Militarily
speaking, the SS-20 is said to have, at present, an accuracy on the order of 250
meters at a range of 4,400 kilometers. Therefore, it might carry only extremely
small explosive charges.
_ [Question~ Can Che neutron weapon be ~~ffecLive against those w~eapons?
- ~Ar.swer] There is no obvious connectir~n betrae:en enha~ced radiation warheads and
missiles of the SS-20, 21 and 22 series. Of. ~~urse, if we had had the ~eutron
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weapon against Hitlei's Panzers, it might have worked wonders. Hitler invaded
Europe with tanks. That was 40 years ago. Today, according to the doctrine that
it f launts, the Red Army still thinks of the tank more as an occupation weapon
than as a front-breaking weapor~, as ~aas true of it 40 yearv ago. It might be gos--
sible that, in our age, the breaking weapon is also and even more so the ballistic
- missile used with the benefit of aurprise. Once the enemy has been disarmed, the
tanks in~ervene to occupy the terrain.
[Qt~.estion] Are our politicians aware of the evolution of these techniquea?
- [Answer] Not all. The error--normal, moreover--is to proceed by analogy with
the past. ~,or centuries, war was the opposition of chests to chests, cannons to
cannons, tanks to tanks, aircraft to aircraft, ships to ships. Today, and all
the more so tomorrow, technology is making other instruments available to staffs
and those new weapons are fashioning new strategies.
When we talk of establishing a strategic balance bet~~een the East and the West,
in Europe, which is something current, we disregard the present-day strategic situa-
tion. Because the West can only be on the defensive, it must have weapons capable
a~" being kept out of reach of an initial attack by the enemy. Those weapons may
- be very different from the opposing weapons. That is why there can be no numerical
or even qual3tative equivaler~ce between the two bodies of opposing forces.
[Question] Does your whoi~. theory re~ect a traditional war in Europe?
[Answerj A traditional war implies a large :~umber of personnel. In assembling
thpm, th? Soviets would lose the surprise effect. A salvo of SS-20 missiles can
be fire3 withov.t any indication of aggression. The Soviets know what the effect
of surprise is. They were victims of it in 1941. And then, they would be en-
gaged in a war of attrition, prolonged in time, that would enable NATO's mechanism
to operate. This is not to their advantage. Finally, if some 15,000 Russian tanks
were to facE 7,000 or 8,000 NATO tanks with their corresponding artillEry in Che
- Central European sector, in 48 hours no stone o~f the German habitat would be left
standing. The conqueror would reign over a desert and over traumatized and rebel-
` lious populations. They are too shrewd in the East not to take such prospects
into account.
[Question] What weapons can t:~ey use against Europe?
(AnswerJ You can best be answered by a quotation from Soviet works on~~strategy:
"The principle of simultaneous action on the entire depth of the enemy's disposition
and on the most distant targets in the rear is now, owing to nuclear weapons, esta-
blished on realistic, solid bases." ("Tactical and Operational Art").
In a book entitled "The Offensive," the following is read:
"...Because nuclear weapons are the principal means of destruction, they should
be used in every case to annihilate the most important targets. There targets
are, primaril}~, the enemy's means for nuclear attack, his troop concentrations
and especiall~ his armored vehicles, his reserves, particularly Cank reserves and
depots, artiZlery on firing position, bridges, points of ~assage, communication
~
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centers, control and command posts, in short every target in the rear zona, defensive
structures and still other targets."
[Question] In your assumption, you see~m to forget our American allies.
[Answer] In view of the fact that the American defense forces in Europe are de-
ployed in veryi~ieslofctheeother NATO countriesVwithoutuheavyslosseshsufferedaby
military fac~l
the American forces in Europe.
[Question] If such a selective nuclear attack were conceivable, how do you view
negoti.ation?
[Answ~er] It is conceivable, if not politically capable of being carried out. If
negotiation took place, which is hardly likely, the Soviets would negotiate directl.y
on the preventive di~hat~would f~obablyrspare theoUoitedrStatesAcontingentsng selec-
tivity of an action P
[Question] With what means have the Soviets provided themselves for their expansion
by means of discontinuity?
[Answer] That form of intervention required the addition of two new components
to their imposing armed forces. They were left a powerful land army by the 1945
~ war. It support~dttre~.cha:~ge v~ political regimes in Central Europe. Then, at the
- end of the decade of the 1950's, Admiral Gorshchkov was made responsible for setting
un a high seas fleet. A quarter of a century later, Admiral Gorshc~hkov finished
his work, because he is still in service today. He was sble to design and imple-
ment an imposing, modern fleet. The semilitarmptransPort andacommercialrtransport, .
It consists itself of two componen'ts: Y
Aeroflot, which is taela~reenumberlofethe sameWaircrafthas~the5militarygairstransis
- civilian fleet r~ses g
port. Moreav~r, it is comma~tded by an air marshal.
[Question] Is ti~ere not a basic di�ference in strategy between expansiar. by means
of contiguity and expansion by means of discontinuity?
[Answerl When the Soviet Union expands by means of territorial disccntinuity,
The ground is
the Red Atmy never intervenes in combat:with its compolnent units.
prepared by a political action. T'..e "sister" parties are mobilized. Organized
revolt or rebellion movements create internal agitation and, if it ia necessary
to support those movements by force, Czer_h, Cuban or other volunteers are the ones
who intervene. DeP~eainbu~nnohSoviet division, brigade orVairrsquadronVgoesminto
staffs are contribu ,
action. Why?
Undoubtedly, because the success of those di~tant operations cannct be gu~nntbut.
The Soviet leaders know that those undertakings ar~e r~s~'Thehahaveewithdrawn from
that they may also lose. They lost in Sudan, in ~gyp Y
Somalia. Well before the Indonesia affair turned out badly. On the other hand,
for the present, they have the upper hand in Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique and even
indirectly in Libya, Rho~tesia and still elsewhere in Africa.
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.
[Question] In view of what you hace just told us, is no~ the defense of the West
malad~usted to the circumstances?
[Answ~er] Not entirely adjusted, it seems. For over 30 years now, within the frame-
w~ork of NATO, the European countries have been invtted to stand guard with trad~-
tional armed forces, especiaily vulnerable, on the places where they are stationed,
to the new ballistic weapons deployed by the Soviet Arny. The NATO countries al-
locate consj.derable amounts of money to this form of traditiv~ial defense, very
similar to what it was a quarter of a century ago. At the same time, these Western
European countries, which depend on the outside world in matters of energy and
raw materials, are politically, economically and militarily absent from tl~ose regions
of the world in which, however, their destiny is at stake every day. Moreover,
it is likely that if the Soviet U~ion had not taken on, since 1917, the imposing
stature recognized in it today, the Western countries that depend on Middle East
oil would not have accepted so easily the increase in the price of oil. It is
true that they now know that, if they rose up against the behavior of the oil-
producing countries, the Soviet Union would immediately reap the benefit of that
way of acting and the producing countries would turn toward the Soviat Union to
ask it for protection.
[Question] What do you adivse for the i~e~ens~e~of France?
- [Answer] It has already adopted, since 1959, a more sensible military policy than
the military policies of most of its neighbors. First of all, it has to immunize
itself against war, turn its territory into ~ sanctuary, {.n order to have, more-
over, a certain degree of freedom of action. That was General de Gaulle's idea.
Th~n it would have to mobilize its friends, its allies--with similar interests--
in the practice of a policy of presence outside Europe, in order to contend there
politically, financially, technically and, in the last reaort, nuc~early with the
countries of Asia and Africa that have not yet aligned themselves in the Soviet
camp. Or even, in the manner of what has been done by the East, "destabilize"
the political and social systems that prove to be hostile.
[Question] Are you opposed to military service as it is at present?
[Answer~ The country seems to be attached to it--if not the young persons who
perform. it--and, therefore, it is a holdover in a military world in which the number
of personnel no longer plays the same part as formerly. Of course, it ~ustifies
' a structure to which the Command is attached. I note that Great Eritain, which
hasmore inhabitants than France, has given it up and that, instead of maintaining
550,000 men, it now keeps less than 350,000 men. The new weapons, without which
there r_an be no territorial immunity, do not need large battalions. With regard
to operations abroad, which can be carried out only with traditional forces, the
draftees cannot participate in them. Thosp operations can be conducted only by
career ~nen.
It is agreed that a professional army costs less than a conscripr army. This would
be~true with an equal number of pe.rsonnel. It is certainly less true with, like
Great Britain, a smaller total personnel force. Neither n~:~lear protection, nor
possible distant operations require more than half a million men under the colors.
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[C~uestion] Can France's nuclear power rival. with the nuclear power of the two
great powers.
[Answer] The term rival is not appropriate. What is involved is the amount of
damage that we would b~ capable of inrlicting in case of a total threat againet
us. What is needed is for thts "amount of damage " to be consistent with the value
of France's stake. At least, as estimated by an aggressor. It is true that, dif-
ferently fror~ what is often stated by politicians, France's reprisal weapons do
not apply only to their threat to large Soviet cities, but also to a number of
military and economic targets. That is true of the Kola Peninsula, a USSR critical
military bastion, and also of a number of industrial zones, like, naturally, force
transportation networks and energy irrigation [sic; possibly should read distribu- ~
tion] networks (oil and natural gas). In comparison with an intact America, it
is obvious that loss of those facilities would be a severe punishment, a punishment
to which a medium-sized power like France is, undoubtedly, not "entitled."
[Ques*.ion] We have a credible nuclear force that must, of c~urse, be modernized
constantly. Did we not demonstrate our capability of operating at a distance with
the Kolwezi og~eration?
[Answer] It is true that the desire to intervene was evident. But, in spite of
our sizable personnel force, and without doubt because of it, it was necessary to
"borrow" American and Zairian transport aircraft (the Zairian aircraft of American
origin) and that operation was successful only owing to the spirit of initiative,
to the courage and to the training of our men. But it is a question of a very
_ sma.ll nucnber of personnel, with no common measurement with the forces that we main-
tain for similar operations. Actually, we lacked, and still lack, the technical
means: long-range transport and support aircraft.
[Question] In conclusion, what future do you see for the West?
[Answer] It is rather gloomy, for lack of a great plan and the common will to
carry it out. That is necessarily true of a political body with a large number
of decision-making centers and with a number of internal rivalries and opposition
' kept alive by divergent interests. That is not the case confronting us, w�here
a lasting government authority, a complete independence fron~ a public opinion that
has no expression, enable the leaders to move their pawns on the world chessboard
without being hindered by the contingencies making up the normal activity of truly
democratic countries. We need an overall reflection, if an analysis of Soviet
behavior, especially since the end of World War II, shows that, on the contrary,
Moscow is devoting its activity abroad to the imp?.ementation of a great pol:Ltical
and social plan. And not without considerable success, it seems.
COPYRIGHT: LATITUDE SARL, DEPOT LEGAL, 4e trimestre 1981
10,042 ~
CSO: 3100/204
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ECONOMIC BELGIUM
TROL'BLES CONTIiJUE FOR COCI~RILL-SAMBRE STEII, FIRM
Brussels POURQUOI PAS? in French 10 Dec 81 pp 19-20
[Article by Paul Celson: "Headed for Bankruptcy?"~
[Text] As a case of decomposition, Cockerill-Sambre is axousing
a great deal of anxiety these da.ys. Some of it is justified, somz
less so. A not very encouraging example of what awaits a Wallonia
given over to its demons and its own forces. Long live public ma-
nagement and the politicization of the economic dossiers!
Catastrophe: A few months following the marriage of conver_ience between Liege and
Charleroi, there is a running battle going on. Catastrophe: Under pressure of one
or the other of our partners of the Ten, the European Community is frowning upon it
more. And what if it were to cut off our resources? Catastrophe: The Cockerill-
Sambre mammoth is losing 1 billion francs a mon+~h~ which means that an uncontrol-
lable outflow is being added to the permanent deficiency of the enterFrise. And~
lacking any settlemen~, time presses.
Package of Billions
And yet, everything in the dossier is not equally black. At the beginning of the
week, the Depaxtment of Finance auth~rized the Steel Industry Financing Company and
Belfin to borrow sums which should provide several breaths o#' fresh air to
Cockerill-Sambre. Thus, it is not only a question of covering the losses of the
compa.ny's accounts d?partment, but also of ineeting the needs for investments or the
repayment of advances for the first 3 months of 1982. This is good news inasmuch
as, alas, the Walloon steel men are living from reprieve to reprieve~ but it cannot
under any circumstances feed longer term hopes.
This week, Willy Claes, who deals with day to day matters at the Square de Meeus in
Brussels (Ministry of Economic Affairs), was to convey the Belgian government's
response to the questions from the Commission of the European Communities. The
_ granting of a package of billions of francs, of which the Walloon ste:~l industry
has the most vital need, depends on it. Citizen Claes has sometimes been ~.ccused
of a certain slowness in hurrying, and this has led to all kinds of suppositions
of a political nature. It is true that community distrust has poisoned the sim-
' plest relationships in Belgium between the people in the North and the peaple in
the South.
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� Whatever the case, the European mort.gage co~ald be temporasily l:.fted. But nothing
would be settled for a11 -that. It is fro~n the inside that the dossier is most sure
~ to rot. In the two just mergea basins~ there axe rumors of "urunerging~" a neolo-
gism in the form of a euphemism which saves the paxtners from openly talking about
divorce. But, isn't that what it is a11 about?
Cordial Disagreement ~
- Between Liege and Charleroi, distrust has taken a firm hold at all the levels of
- responsibility and management. Nothing works any longer~ not even axound ths union
table, and the most recent figures do not help ma.tters.
- As a matter of fact, the October results show much heavier losses in Liege than in
- Chasleroi: 4~65 million francs, before depreciation and financial costs~ for
Cockerill and only 8 million francs for the people of Chaxleroi. For Novemb~:r, the
Triangle triumphantly showe3 a profit of about 10 million fra.ncs while the ~nonthly
- balance sheet for the people of Liege dragged in the red. Liege has taken advan-
tage of this to accuse the people of Charleroi of being too numerous in managemen'c
positi_ons, which would explain why the Triangl.a comes out ahead in the confronta-
tion. Because henceforth it is a question of confrontation~ and no longer simply
one of cordial disagreement. ,
- Once the idea of a possible unmerging has been launched, there will be no lack of
fuel for the fir.e. They are sure to recall in Chaxleroi tha.t even the .~xperts of
Nippon Steel expressed the strongest reservations about the very short tez~m chances
of an operation like the one being considered between Cockerill and the Triangle.
"In our country, a merger takes years," they axe supposed to have stated.
And to add immediately t~.~,t~ in addition~ the matter had been handled contrary to
all good sense~ as the legal act of inerging preceded the clarification of the ar-
- rangements in the technical area.
Henceforth~ some people ~tated aloud what had only been whispered in the fall:
tha.t the act of inerging was first and foremost a political operation intended to
drain money more easily from the treasury to enterprises where the social (and
= electoral~ axgument carries weight. And Andre Cools wasn't he one of the "god-
- fathers" of the merger? will not contradict us.
Political Creature
Anotl-ier remask from those who advocate divorce is directed at the administration
and management of the business. It is no longer a secret that Jarques Vandebosch,
the president of the new entity, is being challenged within the Liege clan itself.
And by the representatives of the rank and file, which is the last straw for a man
_ of whom it is said straight out that he is first of a11 a political creature in
ctiaxge of implemex~ting "the socialist peace" at Cockerill-Samhre. Isn't it trua
that last Monday he had to cancel a meeting between the executive committee and
union representatives from Liege and Charleroi, because the latter had, without
- further ado,�refused to accept the invitation?
It is also true that the merged enterprise still does not h~~.ve a full time managing
~ director and could in the near future no longer even have an acting managing direc-
tor.
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- As a matter of fact, last week Thursday, during a meeting of the Sociallat Party~
, A1 ber~t Prere, who has been filling this position until the appointment of a perma-
nent replacement, announced that he would like to resign as soon as possible. No-
body is unaware of the fact ~ihat the former boss of the Triangle and President
Va.ndebosch are not on the best of terms~ that tbe latter has on occasion ancroached
~ upon the prerogatives of the acting managing director, and that the incompatibility
of temperament between the two men is not simply superficial, or even ideological.
- In short, they are not two of a kind.
Why is it taking so long to appoint a permanent incumbent to the position which
Albert Frere agreed to hold on a temp~rasy basis? The question ha.s been asked and
could get a rapid response. Appaxently Willy Claes has three candidates up his
sleeve, but cannot make up his mind to make a decision. Which.once again seems to
prove th~,t, through an ~xcess of caution, the little socialist man is dela,ying the
~ final solution to the difficulties of the Walloon steel industry. From there~ it
- only takes one step to see it as a political-community maneuver, a step which was
quickly taken.
Al1 of this tends to prove that the state of decomposition of the dossier is much
more advanced than is sometim~s ima.gined. It is lj.kely that the idea of urunerging,
or of divorce if prEfers~ will make more headway in the days ~,head.
Management in Fublic
Getting ba.ck to the overall cond.itions of the operation, certain people do not he-
sitate to criticize one or more provisions of the merger. Was it reasonable~ for
example, to include the mechanical engineering division in the overall package?
Was it wox�thwhile to include "Cockerill Engineering" in the merger? Wouldn't it
have been better to hold aside the cold-roll sector as a unit separate from the
group, as was done for Phoenix Works, or as Carlam and the Ruau rolling mills were
left in Charleroi? On the other hand, there sho~,~ld be no question of turning
Seraing and Chertal into subsidiaries.
As the situation has deteriorat~d over the last few months~ it is no longer fas
from being admitted that the pc~lit~cization of the dossier has devilishly complica-
ted matters to the point of making certain solutions difficult, if not impossible.
Well placed accusers have cha.llenged "the management in public" from which the
whole business is suffering. There is not a single decision w~ich can remain se-
cret long enough to be implemented, but is passed ~n to the party headquarters
where it becomes integrated into a tactic. For which the survival of the unit~
with its tens of thousands of workers, is not the main objPCtive.
Collapse
These days, the word "ba,nkruptcy" has been used, and it is true that the climate
between the two Walloon ba.sins has become more difficult. If, ultima~ely, this
bankruptcy does take place~ it will not be for several months, maybe a year, or a
year and a half ~ enough time so tha.t the responsibility for the collapse cannot bc
attributed to politics. Wouldn't it be better :Lf only the management were to
blame?
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The fact remains that a collapse of the steel industry wnuld be a tra,~edy for
Wallonia, a tragedy the scope of which would exceed the figure of job losses above.
And yet~ an additional 30~000 people unemployed~ that is quite something:
Before the irreparable happens in Liege and in Charleroi~ shouldn't those respon-
sihle as they should be called by na,me meditate on Nietzsche's words: "Do
not acctzse the other~ the defeat is in you." Evidently, the father of "Zarathustra"
is certainly not well read by our steelworkers
COPYRIGHT: 1981 POURQUOI PAS?
~3
cso: 3100/187
a
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POLITICAL INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
" ERRATUM: 7he following is a corrected version
of an article originally published in JPRS
L/10158 0= 3 December 1981, (FOUO 63/81) pp 7-9
- of this series.
SOVIET PEACE MOVEMENT TIES; DISINFORMATION ACTIVITIES
- Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 19-25 Oct 81 pp 54-55
[Article by Philippe Krasnopolski: "The KGB's Doves. How the Soviets Are Operat-
ing in Disguise in Euraae. By Manipulating the Aespectable Peace Movements Ani-
mated by Christian or Youth Organizations"]
[Text] "The pacifist movement...is regaining strength and spreading especially in
the countries of Western Europe. What are the reasons for this? On one hand, peo-
ple are greatly preoccupied with American policy; on the other hand, the pacifist
initiatives of the socialist countries have had their effect. Diverse pQlitical
forces have joined the pacifist movement: communist parties, major sectors of so-
cial democracy and of the ecology movement."
Mr Boris Ponomarev, member of the Soviet Communist Party Politburo and head of the
- "international relations" section, makes this observation in Che October issue of
' the "New International Review," one of the communist movement's theoretical publi-
; cations. It is also a balance sheet. A year ago, on 28 September 1980, tk:e World
Peace Council decided to organize a widespread campaign against rearmament of NATO
member.s and against the emplacement of the American Pershing 2 missiles in Europe.
This World Council has its headquarters i.n Sofia, Bulgaria. It is an organization
of obedience to the Soviet Union. In France, it is represented by the Movement
! for Peace, whose secretary general, :Ir Michel Langignon, is a member of the Commu-
nist Party.
rir Ponomarev can appreciate the work it has accomplished: Three hundred thousand
demonstrators "for peace and disarmament in Bonn on 10 October. Last April,
there had been only 25,000 protesting against the NATO sessions in the capital of
- the Federal Republic.
Other demonstrations are planned: in London on 24 October; in Brussels and Paris
on the 25th; a month later at the Hague.
oi
_ "The struggles waged by the pacifist forces of Western Europe are converging,
affirms the daily L`HUMANITE.
The culmination of the campaign will be a great international demonstration in
Brussel.s on 6 December, the eve of the NATO council meeting.
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l'Vn V~'P~t.~ML l.Jl`G VI~ILI
In Germany, the agents of the Soviet Union are moving forward in disguise. At the
origin of the rally are two pacifist organizations with Christi?n tendencies: the
"Action for Expiation" and the "Movement for Action in the Service of Peace." In
reality, the idea for this demonstration belongs to a Dutch organization, "End the
N Bomb," created in 1977 at the Netherlands CP's initiative and directed by the
International Relations office of the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee.
The decision for this was, nevertheless, made in Hamburg on 20 June during the
Church Conference, the synod of the German Evangelical Church, aft�.er an initial
demonstration had brought together 80,000 people in the city streets.
On 24 August, the plan received Che blessing of the central committee of the World
- Council of Churches, which met in Dresden in the GDR, and that of Mr Erich Honecker,
East Germany's head of state.
The small communist party [DKP] of the Federal Republic of Germany thus placed its
men.
One of the organizers of the 10 October demonstration is a certain Fritz Teppich.
He had already been at the forefront of the disturbances against General Haig's
- visit to Berlin on 13 September. In the sixties, Mr Teppich was a militant within
the APO, extra-parliamentary opposition, the German leftist movement.
Previously, he lfved in East Berlin, where he was working for the wesCern section
of the central committee of thP SED, the Communist Party of East Germany, before
becoming correspondent for ADN, the GDR's news agency, in the city's western sector.
- There he joined SEW, the SED's western branch. But he soon left this movement
(after a falling out with its head) to join the pacifists.
Another communist infiltrator is Mr Achim Maske, presently the secretary general
of the Committee for Peace, Disarmament and Detente. .He is a former leader of the
communist group, Spartakus.
A report of the Bundesverfassungsschutz, the Federal Office for the Protection of
the Constitution (the FRG DST [Directorate of Territorial Surveillance]), was for-
warded to Mr Schmidt. It reveals this communist infiltration of the pacifist move-
ments. According to this report, the European communists are supposed to have
drawn up a 3-year plan.of action against NATO rearmament, with 1981 being the first
phase.
For the first 6 months of 1982, this plan is said to provide for direct action
- against military installations in the NATO countries, such as taking over barracks.
On S August 1982 (the eve of the anniversary of Hiroshima), demonstrations are to
take place in all of Western Europe, accompanied by hunger strikes. At Christmas,
the churches are to be occupied.
In January 1983, the pacifists are to call. for civil disobedience (refusal to pay
taxes, etc.); strikes against industry are to be launched. Finally, again in
August, on the 6th, there are to be new mass demonstrationa. The Pershing missiles
are due to be installed in Europe in 1983.
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The report likewise sheds new light on last February's publication in the weekly
STERN of a map showing the site of American nuclear missile installations in the
Federal Republic of Germany. This document had been furnished to tfie ~ournal by
the BBU (Citizen Initiative for Environmental Protection Federal ~4ssociation)~ an
ecology movement, which in turn obtained it from the Communist Party of the FRG.
These documents were furnished by Section A of the KGB, the famous "di~information"
department. Thus, in June 1980, a"Pentagon document" began circulating in Great
Britain, showing the American atomic weapon targets in the Sovi~t Union and the
Warsaw Pact countries. But it also included the ones in the neuiral countries and
even NATO members (in the case of Russian occupation). This document arrived in
- the Netherlands the following December. Today it is being circulated among the
Scandinavian countries. A"pacifist" majority was ele~ted to the Hague last May.
PHOTO CAPTIONS
l. p 54. Mr Egon Bahr. One of the only German political figures, along with
Mr Willy Brandt, to receive praise from PRAVDA.
2. p 55. The ar;uments of German pacifism are summarized in the text of this
poster: "Bill fnr the FRG. Items delivered: packages of food,
Marshall Plan, Starfighters. Paid to date: loyalty to the alliance,
military bases. Balance due: battlefield."
COPYRIGHT: 1981 "Valeurs actuelles"
9475 ~
~SO: 3100/67 END
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