JPRS ID: 10239 JAPAN REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000500020008-6
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 8
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/ 1023g
7 January 1982
,
rl
Japan Report
(FOUO 1 /82)

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JPRS L/10239
7 January 1982
JAPAN REPORT
(FOUO 1/82)
(.ONTENTS
A POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
Prime Minister Suzuki's Strategy for Election
- (Takehiko Takahashi; MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, 9 Dec 81) 1
Suzuki's Choice of Sakurauchi as Foreign Minister Analyzed
(Minoru Hirano; THE DAILY YOMIURI, 6 Dec 81) 3
Two New Ministerial Appointments Examined
(Swadesh De Roy; iHE DAII,Y YOMIURI, 8 Dec 81) 5
Changes in Komeito Policy Examined
(Editorial; MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, 6 llec 81) 7
Ministers Still Split Over Defense Cost
' (MAINICHI DAIZY NEWS, 5 Dec 81) 10
Moscow Disappointed by Japan's Passivity
(THE DAILY YOMIURI, 8 Dec 81) 11
_ Tokuma Utsunomiya Criticizes U.S.-USSR Arms Race
(THE DAILY YOMIURI, 9 Dec 81) 14
r

SDF Pay Boost Not in 7.5 Percent Ceiling
_ (THE JAPAN TIMES, 2 Dec 81) 16
ECONOMIC
Japan, Singapore Strengthen Economic Ties
(Akira Kasuya; BUSINESS JAPAN, Nov 81) 17
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Role of Robots in Industry Viewed
(Shozo Hochi; BU5INESS JAPAN, Nov 81) 24
- a - [III - ASIA - 111 FOUO]
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- International Cooperation PromotPd Tn Boost Plant Exports
(Flimihiko Matsuda; BUSINESS JAPAN, Nov 81) 30
Chemical Industry Fiurt by Continuing Recession
(Akira Suzuki; BUSINESS JAPAN, Nov 81) 33
- b -
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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAI,
PRIME MINISTER SUZUKI'S STRATEGX FOR ELECTION
Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 9 Dec 81 p i
[Naqatacho Doings Column by Takehiko Takahashi: "Prime Minister Suzuki's Clever
Strateqy"]
[Text] There is a saying, "talk about
_ next year and the devil will,
laugh." The meaning is that
since no one knows what will
happen tomorrow, it is non-
sense to talk about neXt year.
The devil may IauGh but let us,
think for a moment about
politics next year. The biggest
political event scheduled for
next year is the election of the
Liberal-Democratic Party's
president. ,
Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki'
has strengthened his confidence
in holding on to the reins of
administration. He is thinking
about continuing to remain in,
_ the premiership by winning thp
LDP presidentioi election next '
year. The cabinet reshuffle and:
new appowtments of party
officials were steps taken for,
that purpose.
Susumu Nikaido has been.
appointed by Prime hiinister
Suzuki as the LDP secretary
general. Nikaido is a person on
whom the label of "a grey high
official" has been placed in
connection with the Lockheed .
incident. This may have raised :
eyebrows but in order for Prime '
Minister Suzuki to maintain the
= reins of administration. the�
i cooperation oC the Tanaka
faction, the largest in the LDP,
- is necessary. To refuse the.
Tanaka faction's demand that
Nikaido be made the secretary
general would have shaken the
foundation of the Suzuki ad-
ministration. Suzuki therefore
made Nikaido the party's
secretary general.
In doinb so, Prime Miaister
Suzuki kept in mind the
strategy of "turning misfortune
into furtune." If Nlkaido were to
assume the post of secretary
general, the Fukuda faction
would find it necessary to push
for the entry of Mutsuki Kato
into the cabinet. For a party
man, the post of secretary
general is much more im-
portant than a cabinet post.
`Grey OfticiaP
If Nikaido, a "grey official,"
were to be appointed to that
important post, there should be
no problem in selecting Kato,
similarly a "grey otficial," to
the lighter post of cabinet
minister. This was the thinking
that hau to come from the
Fukuda faction, considering its
internal situation.
Former Prime Minister
Takeo Fukuda must have
personally thought that Kato's
entry into the cabinet would be
inappropriate tor the time
being. Neveetheless, because
Nikaido became the secretary
general, it became necessary to
ask Cor Kato's entry into the.
cabinet. This demand was
made to Suzuki.
Prime Minister Suzuki ad-
vanced his strategy cleverly.
Suzuki said: "The party and the
cabinet are different. One who
is called a`grey official' can be
appointed a party official but it
is inappropriate for a 'grey
official' to enter the cabinet."
This was the reason given for
rejecting Kato's entry into the
cabinet.
This attitude taken by Prime
Mlnister Suzuki will bring him
big political benefits. In next
year's party presidential
election, if the Tanaka taction
were to enter someone as a
candidate, it would logically be
Nikaido. It is at such a time that
Prime Minister Suzuki's
strategy taken at this time will
dlsplay its effect.
Rejecting Rato's entry into
the cabinet while appointing
Nikaido as secretary general
was tantamount politicallq to
saying: "Mr. Nikaido, a party
post is the best that you can
hope to obtain. A person who is
called a `grey official" cannot
hope to become a cabinet
minister. Evea more so, it is
useless to think of the post of
prime minister. Public opinion
1
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will not al!ow it."
This is what Prime Minister
Suzuki indicated to the Tanaka
faction and Nikaido.
Under such a situation,
although the Tanaka factica has
such influential members as
Noboru Takeshita, Ganri
Yamashita and Shin
Kanemaru, it hardly seems
likaly that the Tanaka faciion
will be able to push one ot these
strongly in next year's party
presidential election.
Stronger Position
Tf so, the only thing that the
Tanaka faction can do is to.
. support Suzuki. ?t the 'Fanaka
~ taction, the largest within the
party, lends its support,
Suzuki's position will be
strengthened immeasurably. It
COPYRIGHT: The Mainichi Daily News 1981
CSO: 4120/93
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x,
AON
may be that no other eandidate'
will ~e forthcoming.
1n this way, Prime Minister
Sazuki is preparing the
structure, through the preser.t
persowel reshaffle, for next
year's party presidential
election.
Nevertheless, there is a
poasibility that an event wili
take place, that will cause "the
devil to laugh." This is the
verdict to be pronounced on
former Prime Minister Tanaka
in tite Lockheed case. If Tanaka
is found guilty and if he- is
subjected to imprisonment, the
Tanaka faction's aspect is
likely to undergo a great
change.
Needless to say, this will have
an importaat effect on the party
presldential election also. 2
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POLITICAL-AND SOCIOLOGICAL
SUZUKI'S CHOICE OF SAKIJRAUCHI AS FOREIGN MINISTER ANALYZED
Tokyo TFE DAILY YOMIURI i.n English 6 Dec 81 p 3
[Behind the Schemes Colwnn by Minoru Hiraao:

('Textl A ceremony 'marking the changeover~
the foreign ministership was lield ir. tha
Fbreign MinLtry hall Tuesday; the dap
following the cabinet reahuffie. Outgoing
forelgsL miniater Sunao 8onoda, who was
being succeeded by Yoshio 8akurauchi, told
the P'oreign Ministry sta8 that because he
wea out oi Japan tor 85 days of the atx
months he wae- In olSce, he had no time to
talk direct2y wlth younB ata8ers and he
regretted that. 3onoda was reluctant to
q111E h18 p096. . . .
The reason or reasons ior the' recent~
change� iri the ioreign aatniatership are
unintelllBible ta the people In three wgys.
Flrst, whY Waa Sonoda removed troab
office? Together with Chiei Cabinet Secre-
tary Kiichl Ddiyazawa, 8onoda supported
Prlme MinSater Suzuki's fareign policy to
eatablish. an independent course of actioa
on the basis � oi the spirit of- the war-
renouncing conatitution. For their unity,
the three men were cal:ed the 8uauld-
Miqazawa-s5onoda trio. It made the career,
o81clals of the Foreign Mlnistry acknowle-
dge the superiority of politics and at the
aame time, keDt a certain diatance irom
U8 President Reagan's hawkish foreign
pollry toward the 8oviet Union. The people
applauded 9onoda for resisttng Washing-
ton's presaure for tncreased defenee apend-
ing by Japan and ior irankly critic'sdng
South Korea'a requeat for ;8 billion In Ja-
paneee aid. -
Sonoda's outspokennesa toward the IIS
and 8outh Korea, however, invited crit!-
ciam irom some Liberal-Democrats, parti-
cularly those belonging to the Fukuda fac-
tion. Prime Miinlstei Suauki, who desirea
to be reelected LDP presidanE In the elec-
tion to be held aiter one year, badly needa
support from the Tanaka and Fukuda !ac-
tiona, the two biggest factiona In the LDP.
Pbr thls reasoii, he appotnted 9uaumu
Nllcatdo. ot Lhe Tanaka facLton, to the poat,
"Why Sakurauchi?"]
of LDP aeCretar9-.,6e...n..era1 deapfte" pdB
criticism and respected � the wiahea o1b~
Fukuda factlon In reshuSling hia ca `
in- ord~er to matntain., a balance betweeti~
the I+ukuda and Tanaka factlotte. As az
reauit, Shiataro Abe, a"prince" oi 04;
Fukuda fantioa, vraa appointesi interiia*1
tional trade and industry minister; and+
8skurauchi, tIiough oi the Nakasone tac~?
tion, aas. named toreiga miaister becauaba
of hU irlendly relatiuns wlth lormer pririkM
mialeter Takeo P'akuda. Some persoas ' ao
thstr 8uauld vlettmiacd *Sonoda tEo eneP1~
bis teelectioa sa'LDP pnaident.
1'h 91ie , w
~aa. Pkked as tha.,. nnW foreign . ~
3akurauehi had aucceasively served in' 4ti poats as internatlonaL tsade and' iad
miniater, agricuIture,.'iorestrq and- IIshe minister, constrnctton pniaister,
of � the LDP's poflcy. Hoasd and LDP
tazy-general, but hu: llttls experlenoe:;
the conduct of foreigaaaairs: One nqw.'
paper eaid that Salwsauchi, a m6n
domeatic politics, -dce&. not aeem to�
enough ability or- visiog aa foreign miniate '
and that 8uzuki'a words that he appoin the right man Sn. the rigtli post sounded~
emptp. � `
Aa ii to reinforce this criticiam, it Wsra
reported that 9akasauchi, when totd. tta$r
he had. been iniormalty, chosen aa Loreigni
minister, said that he Yaew noth3ng about:;
foreign aSaira. Also, aiter asauming o~oe~,
sa foreign miniater, ht said he hsd� neyer:
desired ta become� loreiga miniater.',�~�:,
At the said changeover, Sakureuch3'
he could not lmitate hia predeceaaor.,';~ `
"8ying foreign minieteA" and thst
would perform a eupportive role out and:
out without playing to� the upper gailery;
Sonoda and 8uanki are diametricatly;
diSerent In character. While Boaoda: looksi
-
into his listener's eyes when he apeaks;;
iSakurauchi speaka without emotion a4d..
3
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witfi d'owncsst dSee.� AcccrMglY, not onY3N
ioreignera but also Japaaew Snd it d!ffi-{
cult to� fathom his thonghts: 9onods has'
many enemiea but - Sakurauchi 'torged
somethia6 like unity in the LDP as secre-
tary-general: Adjectives used to describe
Sakurauchi are "colarleaa," "neutral and '
nonaligned," "without enemy," ' etc.
The third questioa is what Japan'a�
foreign policy is coming to. Sonoda has
disappeared irom the. Suauki-Miy.aaawa-,
Sonoda trlo. Moreover, to enlfat the sup-
port oi the Fnku@a iaction,. Suzuki muet: � '
respect P'ukuda's policy to attach im-,
portance to Jspaa's relations with Lhe U8; � .
- and Bonth Korea. The Foreign Miniatiry�
wfiich had awkwsrd relationr vith 8ono.da,:
welcomed 6akurauchi. The beat forelgm
miniater for Farelgiz Imnistry officials. ia a,
foreign miniater whom they can periectly
control. .
At Lhe IIrat conierence after- reshualing,
hia cabinet, 8uauld asa aalced which he
would chooae, lorelgn pollcy carved out by,
the Foreiga Ministry or torelgri policy in-
ltiated bq 16ys$swa. 8uzuki atreeeed nnity'
in loreign policy making, but the peop.le's
doubta atlll remain. '
COPYRIGHT: The Daily Yomiuri 1981
CSOs 4120/93
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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
TWO NEW MINISTERIAL APPOINTMENTS EXAMINED
Tokyo TFE DAILY YOMIt7RI in English 8 Dec 81 p 2
[Focus on Asia Colwnn by Swadesh De Roy:
[Text] Symbolism is often used In Oriental com-
munication; and quite a b1t of it is to be
found In Prime MlnSster 3uzukl's recent
choice of ministers for his second cabinet
in 16 months.
Externally at least, his selection o! Yo-
shio 3akurauchi as foreign ansl 9hintaro
Abe as international trade and industry
ministers, both regarded unlamiliar to the
tasl:s given them, perhaps symbolically
seeks to convey something that words tor
obvious reasons must not spell out.
A word ot warning though: Failure to
- correctly read it may lead tio dangeroua
misunderstanding.
F3oth men are well-versed with the rulin8
Liberal-Democratic Party's policies, both
having beea. closely associated with the
- � party's policy-making processes. They have
extensive government experiences too,
though not in the areas of their new re-
sFonsibilities. What perhaps they lack is an
"Amertcan background" to be recognized
- immediately ln Washington.
Observers were initially surprised; but
they knew better than not to read the
message which, when declphered, should
read somewhat like this: The neav govern-
ment 11ke aA the past ones conslders the
US as its prtnclpal and by !ar the most
important partner; but unlike so often In
the past lt does not propoae to exhaust
all its � talent munaging the probleais of
Japan-U3 relations, intending instead to
employ its resources so that other areas
of concern will not only be not neglected
but be adequately cultivated.
Sources In Washington, accarding to re-
ports, were surprised at these two appoint-
ments. Americans naturally will be closely
watching with some concern how the two
men handle the U8-Japan problems. An-
other report quoted an ASEAN source In
9outheast Asiu as having expressed doubt
"A Measure of Independence"]
!f the new loreign minister wilY support
A3EAN's position on Cambodia as before.
At the Brussels headquarters oi the EEC
offlcials were blunt: "What we need now
is action, not words" to improve trade re-
lations. And cotnments irom Seoul were
mild, limited to an expression of hope
that the new loreign minister and the
government would attend to the problems
of South Korea.
None !n China said anything. But the
,Chinese will be the flrst to meet both Sa-
kurauchi and Abe In about a week's time
in Tokyo at a ministerial conterence.
Sakurauchi has said he has na plans to
vlsit Washington in the next few months
and is said to preler the pending problems.
betweem Japan and the US to be tuckled
at officlals' level. Obviously, he believes his
time will be better spent on issues that
really need political handling. If he is
going to 3outh Korea next month the
message is he wants to start himseit, on
Asia like the prime minister himself did:
earlier this year visiting A3EAN capitals
before even flxing a date for his trip to
Washington.
He is also known ior his repeated sug-
gestion to the prime minister that the
freeze on sid to Vietnam be at least relax-
ed to allow humanitarian assistance to be
resumed. This may be the cause of concern
in A3EAN. But Sakurauchi's personal posi-
tian wili hardly alter a govemment po-
licy, though his known sympathies may
inSuence or prompt actions not neces-
sarily incompatibie with the oflicial po-
licy.
Sakurauchi Ls not alone when he sym-
pathizes with Vietnam's needs. Japanese
businessmen, intell?c,uals and critics are
opposed to economic sanction against
Vietnam. There is a growing clamor that
Japan begin to try and inSuence others
r
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rather than remain "prisoner" of its com-
mitment to America, China, or ASEAN.
If it is no longer to have "free ride" on
the US or for that matter anyone else,
lt should also not be grudged a measure
oY independence. This -may indeed be a
" new pollcy in development.
COPYRIGHT: The Daily Yomiuri 1981
CSO: 4120/93
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POLITICIAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
CHANGES IN KO:KEITO POLICY EXAMINED
Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in Enqlish 6 Dec 81 p 2
(Editori8l: "New Kcmeito Policy"]
[Text) The moderate opposition Komeito Party has
drastically changed its policy line which is now ap-
proaching that of the Liberal-Democratic Party.
Frankly speaking, we would like to ask the party:
"Where are you going?"
The party opened its three-day 19th convention in
Tokyo ar,d adopted its action policy and'basic policy
far the coming year. Since its inauguration 17 years
ago, the Komeito poiicy - line pendulum has swung
rapidly from left to right and vice versa. The con-
vention has disclosed that the policy line has now
made a drastic right turn. It may be a realistic policy
line but it has giveci us an impression that the
Komeito Party is now standing closer to the govern-
ment party.
The Komeito has made a drastic change in such
basic aspects as its foreign and defense policies and
also its concept on the possible formation of a
coalition government among opposition parties. On
foreign and defense policies, the party, ba5ed on the
idea that "Japan is a member of the'Nestern world,"
admitted the existence of thq Soviet threat and the
tensian on the Korean Peninsula, the virtual con-
stitutionality of the Self-Defense Forces and, for the
first iime, announced its support of the U.S.-Japan
Security Treaty.
On the iormation of a coalition government, the
Komeito shifted its emphasis toward a possible
aliiance with the Liberal-Democratic Party "as a new
choice" wdile adhering to its original idea to attain a
coalition among the Komeito, Japan Socialist and
Democratic Socialist parties.
In his opening address to the convention,
7
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Chairman Yoshikatsu Takeiri referred to the party's
new fareign and defense policies and said: "We can
no langer ignore the reality in our efforts to attain our
ideal." He thus criticized the unarmed neutrality
advocate6 by the Japan Socialist Party as unrealistic
under the present international circumstances. Dur-
ing the convention, some Komeito members express-
ed their doubt and anxiety on the advisability of a new
party stance on such important problems when
criticisms are being heard on the government party's
"shift to the right" and its military expansion policy.
In the representatives' doubt and anxiety, we
could perceive their impatience toward the new
policy. In short, �representatives sensed a con-
tradiction in Takeiri's determination to pursue anti-
war and peace-loviug policy line and the policy
change. We can share the common feeling. The
Komeito leadership did not answer the question:
"Why do you have to adopt the new policy at this
specific time?" VlFhat is prompting the Komeito Party
to side with the government party?
We can notice, in the background, the party's
deep attachment to political power. This was in-
dicated in the change of the party's concept on a
coalition government. The party can make a Gaoice
out of the three possibilities: a coalition amang the
Kameito, Socialist and Democratic Socialist parties;
a toalition among the middle-of-the-roaders in ad-
dition to the above three; and a new road.
The Komeito leadership seems to prefer the third
idea - a coalition with the Liberal-Democratic Party,
to the other two. The change in foreign and defense
policies has widened the gap between the Socialist
and Komeito parties, and narrowed the gap with the
LDP. Accordingly, the preparation has been made for
a coalition with the LDP.
We feel some apprehensions about the hasty
policy change of the Komeito Party. The ideal form of
coalition can be attained by a thoroughly ironed out
compromise whica will bring aboiit a common
feeling, and not by an easygoing union or arbitrary
absorption. Ciarification of difference with the part-
ner of a coalition is essential.
The Komeita's eritical attitudes toward the LDP
has become less clear. In his speech, Takeiri has
failed to refer to the app4intment of a"gr.ey official"
to an executive post of the government party which
became a target of public criticism toward Prime
Minister Zenku Suiuki, indicating Komeito's leniency
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= toward the LDF.
- We want the Komeito Party to h2ve another look
at the raison d'etre of opposition parties. VJe regret
that the sense of cleanliness and justice that the
Komeito once possessed has waned.
COPYRIGHT: The Mainichi Daily News
CSO: 4120/93
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POLITICAI, AND SOCIOLOGICAL
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MINISTERS ST'".,;.+ SPLIT OVER DEFENSE COST
Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 5 Dec 81 p 1
[Text] Cabinet ministers still
remained divided Friday
whether the proposed 7.5 per-
cent increase in Japan's 1982
defense spending should include
a boost in personnel expenses or
not.
At a meeting of the National
Detense Council, Defense
Agency Chief Suichiro Ito said
the general defense spending
increase and a personnel cost
hike should be two separate
things.
'�I think it is necessary to
achieve the current defense
buildup program at the earliest
possible date although I know
our national budget is in
trouble," Ito said.
If the government fails to
substantially increase its
defense spending, Ito went on, it
might '`undermine the cor-
nerstone of the Japan-U.S.
Security Treaty system."
The defense budget went up
7.6 percent this year.
Ito's view was shared by
Toshio Komoto, director
general of the Economic
Planning Agency, and Ichiro�
Nakagawa, chief of the Science
and Technology Agency.
Finance Minister Michio
Watanabe, however, said, "I
want to have the (proposed 7.5
percent increase in ) the defense
spending cut back."
-The personnel , cost hike
should be included in the
defense budget increase," he
added.
Defense Agency officials told
the meeting the personnel costs
of the 240,000-man Self-Defense
Forces (SDF). will go up by 2.4
percent or 57 billion yen (about
$265 million) next year.
The officials also said the
agency plans to increase the
number of SDF personnel by
1,909 and the reserve forces by
1,600 in fiscal 1982 starting next
April. '
A fleet of 17 P-3C anti-
submarine patrol aircraft and
43 F-15 jet fighters will be
purchased ahead' of schedule
during the fiscal year�to speed
up the current defease buildup'
program, the officials added.
Foreign Minister Yoshio
Sakurauchi later said, "I am in
favor of the separation" of the
increase in general defense
spending from a personnel cost
hike.
Iie said his idea was promp-
ted by percent U.S.
congressional moves for a
larger Japanese defense
budget.
The new Foreign Minister
apparently referred to a draft
resolution by Rep. Clement
Zablocki (D-Wis.), whicF called
on Japan to spend at least i
percent of its Gross National
Product (GNP) onnational
:iefense.
Japan's 2.4 trillion yen ($11.2
billion) defense budget in the
current fiscal year equals 0.91
percent of the projected 1981
GNP.
The corresponding figure for
the United States is 5.2 percent.
COPYRIGHT: The Mainichi Daily News 1981
CSO: 4120/93
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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
MOSCOW DISAPPOINTED BY JAPA11'S PASSIVITY
I Tokyo THE DAILY YOMIURI in English 8 Dec 81 p 5
(Report on a discussion between Dr. Georgi Arbatov, Soviet expert on Kremlin policy
And Dr. Christoph Bertram, director of the International Institute for Strategic
Studies in London)
[Text] This is the concluding in-
stalment ot a three-part
discussion between Dr Geor-
gi Arbatov, a Soviet expert
on Rremlin's US Policy, and
Dr Christoph Bertram, di-
rector of the International
Institute for Strategic
Stndies in London. The two
ezchanged views on global
nuclear thre2t.
Sazno Yamamotu, foreign
- news editoe of The Yominri
Shimbnn, acted as modera-
tor.
* * *
Yamamoto: On this op-
portunity oi welcoming two
authorities on international
- problems, Dr Arbatov and
Dr Bertram, we cordially
would like to ask you to dls-
cuss the current world situ-
ation, especially relations
� between Japan and the So-
- viet Union and Chinese-So-
viet relations.
Arbatov: Up to now, the
difflculty has been that Ja-
pan is a neighbor o! China.
- in addition, since the US
plans to make use of Ja-
pan's iacilities in the event
of a war with the Soviet
Union, we have to treat Ja-
pan as a military ally of
the US, in the same way as
the NATO countries.
- I also have to say that I
am much disappointed . by
Japanese passivity. Japan
did not respond to our pro-
posal that we meet to dis-
cuss mutual security ar-
rangements. I am not sure
what relation this bore to
the Chinese retusal to par-
ticipate. Anyway, Japan
should have been sufticient-
ly responsible to think about
participation. But don't
think we are anti-Chlnese.
We cannot envisage any
security arrangements with-
out China being involved.
Again.. at the 28th Party
Congress, President Brezh-
nev put forward some mod-
est confldence-building pro-
posals. There was no re-
sponse irom Japan.
Japan'a Reluctance
Bertram: But what do
you arant Japan to do in
addition to what it 1s al-
ready doing? It spends less
on defense that any other
lndustrialized country; the
seli-defense iorces are
under-equipped; they are
repeatedly pressurized by
the U3 to increase their de-
fense spending and yet
they have remained reluc-
tant to do so; they haXe a
constitution which prevents
them from becoming a
fully-8edged military power.
If there was ever a non-
aggressive country, it is Ja-
pan.
Arbatov: I am not blam-
ing Japan for be1nB agBres-
sive. I blame them ior be=
ing passive.
Bertrnm: If you were in
the situation of Japan with
four islands occupied by a
country which then calls
for conSdence - building
measures . . .
Arbatov: This ia a coun-
ter-productive example.
Bertram: Wouldn't one
important confldence-build-
ing measure be, 1or ex-
ample, to reduce ' the size
of the forces on those is-
lands, even to hold out the
prospect of their return .
The Japanese have verY
good reasons for not re-
sponding to Soviet over-
turea. The initiative must
come irAm the Soviet Union
if it wants Japan to da
more than it dces al.eady.
My second point concerns
Chlna. Soviet people olten
talk oP the "Chinese
threat." Yet why dces the
Soviet Union continue to
invest so ma.nY hiBhlY-
developed missiles a11d so
many highiy-equipped ' per-
sannel in a showdown with
a country which is still in
the process of economic
development and which is
militarily so backward that
it is virtually indefensible
against Soviet military
might.
The superpowers need to
recognize that, in today's
1W
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arorldr,'`"tIie,'y'"ff,thoE'yev'~e`vew
their owa security without .
taking into account the se-.
curity of neighborin8 coua-.!
tries. Military over-insur- ~
ance by the superpowers
means milltary under- aur-
ance !or her neighbors--.
whether they, be Pakistan,
Afghanistan, Turkey, Fin-
land, or Japen. !
Different Viewpoint
Arbatov: It's easy to 'ex-
ploit the Northem Territo-
ries issue as a polemical
gimmick. It is so difYicult to'
look at a sltuation from an-
other nation's polnt of view.
It is, ior example, very dii-
Scult for othere to under-
stand the paqchologlcal con-
sequencea of our own his-
tory oi "enclrclement."
The problem of China
cannot be so ettaily dismias-
ed. Although It doesn't
scare us to death, It makes
us concerned. A nation o1
one billion people � !s right.
on our border. It is carry- ing throuBh a. Arogram of :
moderniaation, avith help
Z;RnDC::tha ;U$,.:Arid. Westera;
FOR OFFICiAL USE ONGY
. . , . ~
Bertram: The . soviet;
Union is no longer the re- �
gional power it was at the ~
end oi the Second World
War and so. you caanot ex-.
plain ite preesnt policies in .
terms oi the histarical con-
text of that time. Is it not '
now time tor this super-
power to feel sufjftciently as-
sured o! ita own security to
be able to make more
generous gestures-!or ex-
ample, to� recognize that the
northern islands are im-
portant to Japan?
Arbatov: Achieviug strate-
gic pa,riCg has always, been
a condition oi being treated.
as an equa,l by the U8. We
have to come to terms with
the reality that many Amer-
icane regard us an illegiti=
mate chfld of history, as an
abnormalitp whlclx has to
be conrected.
Recognizing Reality-
Yamsmoto: Let us ask
the 9na1 question, Dr Arba- ~
tov and Dr Bertram, about,
your views on the prospects '
of whether the ongoing..
C3ene'vs .talks. . beLweea "ML"
US and the Soviet IInion ;
wiA actually help facilitate '
US-Soviet dialog for peace.
Bertram: As qou well.
know, US politica2 cultnre
involves a virtual� "cultural
revolution" every Pour years,,
atter which it takes six or7
seven months to come to
terms with the world. The
November 20th speech de-'
monstrated the 'Rearnin8
,
capability" which any new.
US pres3~erit'-S` to strive f
toward. The shiit lrom '
rhetorlc to realities has now
taken place fsnd we can
draw certain conclusions:
8rst, that the US people are
reluctant to support maf or
increases in detense apend-:
ing; second tha,t it has come,
back to recognition that,
negotiations are indeed es-
sential; third, that It now
recogn 2es the -Importan;
oi its allies.
Arbatov: When a super-
power reluses to recognize
any continuitiea in loreign
policy, it is extremelq dan-
gerous and represents a.
tremendous burdea for us.
;
,
i
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In particualr, - we lose -sa
u tlie_negottations' ena" fai
much time: new weapons ,
iailure, it will be a tragedy,
_ systems are developed and '
!or years to come. In par_
the nuclear club attracts
ticular, the negoWations
new members. ,
must involve reeognition by
Bertraat: The su
perpow-
the U8, and espectelly by.
ers need to be able to get
the 8oviet Union, that the
some
impression o! each
securitq interests oi other
,
other
's problems
. There is ai
countrdes are legitimate and ,
strong case for a personal'
have to be taken into ac-
meeting between the two
presidents. .
count.
Arbstov: Despite the way
-
_ For the Srst time since
the U8 administration . has
developed and the sad story
1979, the superpowers are�
of SALT, the 3oviet IInion
sitting down at Geneva ta
,
for ita part, wiil do what it
- deal with problema whicli �
aflect both each other ancY
ca,tt and a bit more. The-
thelr allies in western Eu-
U8 is now on a level of
responsibility which is call-
rope and those ia Asia.
ed for by its a~litaay might. ;
COPYRIGHT: The Daily Yomiuri 1981
CSO: 4120/92
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19
pOLITICAI, AND SOCIOLOGICAL
TOKUMA UTSUNOMIYA CRITICIZES U.S.-USSR ARMS RACE
Tokyo THE DAILY YOMIURI in English 9 Dec 81 p 5
(Paper given at the International Symposium on "Security, Peace and Survival" held
in Tokyo] .
[Text ] A paper given by Japa-
nese politician � Tokuma
Utsunomiya at a special
evening open session of last
week's international sym- �
paslum on international
peace and survlval prompt-
ed some of the most lively
debate seen at the s9m-
poaium. �
AlthouBh' snany of the
European delegates had
spoken out against what
they perceived as 9oviet ex-
pansionism, Utsunomtya was
one of the most outspoken
critics of the present arms
race between the Soviet
Union and the US.
Utsunomiya is a former�
member -01 the ruling Ldb-,
eral-Democratic PartY. He
left the party severa.l yeara
ago due to dilferences oi
opinion over rolationa wlth
Ohina azid Korea.
He has conslstently tagen
the view that Japan should
come to terms wlth these
two nations without neces-
sarily agreeing wlth what-
ever the V8. policY may be
toward ' the region at thv
time.
Utsunomiya h0 been a
irequent visitor to China
and was associeted with
the pro-Ch1na factian wlth-
in the I,iber&l-Democratic
Party.
Utsunomiya led the d1s-
eusgion wtth his paper on
'cMs1s management," in
which he polnted out that
whereas the II3 had once,
perceived China as a threat,
Japan, because of its geo-
graphicel proxim:ty to
China, was more immediate-
ly obliged to seek ways of
developing !rlendly . rela-
tions with. China.
Rapprochement
He went on to argue that
the seune rapprachement,
between the U8 and th,~
Soviet Unlon could eventu=
ally be poasible if both na-
tions did not place so much emphasis on a mutual arms
race. .
"It does not suffice. for.
us 'to lcok onTy "a�- miiltarY
assessments,,� ge said. "Th18
contalns a danger of over-
reaction. �
,,The US today seems to'
be dominated by the ten-
dency to believe that crisis
control, in other words the
maLntenance' of peace, can
only be achieved through
power rather than reason-
ing and bhat talks rtot back.'
ed by power- are out of the
question.
"In the present situation,.
the 8ovfet thre$t is em-
phasized beyond necessity
and the world appears 811-
ed with criaes� '
'�The same PeOPIe who.
were talkin8 about the Chi-
nese threat to the US,-no
lonBer do so.
"The same thing could
happen With regard to Rus-
sia. . . .
,,In view of our relationa;
wlth China in the past, I.
think anything can be i?n-�
proved.
"At the present time, Ja-
pan-China relations are ex-
treme)y good and it is' dif-
Soult to measure just how-
greatly this situation has;
contrlbuted to �peace in the,
Far East and the stability,
of both the Japanese and
the Chinese nations.
"It has even had an im-�
portant eSect on peace in�
Korea:"
'
A'rms Buildup~
Utsunomiya conceded'that
there had been a signiScant
arma buildup on the parti
of the Russians in the East
Asian reBion, but questioned
whether thls posed any im-.
minent problems !or the.
region, ~
"Recently there has been ,
talk of a Russia,n threat to
Japan," he said.
"But viewed irom�our
position, a threat is some-,
thing that exlats where
there is a wlll and a cap-
sbillty ,to invade another
country.
"A mllitary buildup is ap-:
parent, but it is not clear
tha~ 'WIMch a wlll eadsta in'
other countrles: "
IItsuaomdya cited the Ko-
rean peninsula as an ex-
ample of a relative absence
o! a. Ruesian threat o! in-
terierence ln the neaF fu-
turt.:_ . , . . .
14
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"Itt May thie year, I met
_ with Deng 81ao Ping," he:
_ said.
"Aeng saisi that American
policy v1s-a-vis the Korean
peninauia is very foolish.
"Fie said Kim Il Sung is
only eight hours flying time
to Moscow and yet he hasn't
been to Russia for eight
years. But ii the U3 con-
tinues its p:-esent posture
over Korea, it could drive
Kim II Sung toward Lhe
Rusalans: "
As a counselor oi the
Japanese Parliamentary As-
sodation for the Promotion
of. Internatlonal Disarma-
ment, Utsunomiya vaiced hia
complete support tor inter-
national forums wkiich pro-
vide an opportnnity Por dis-
cusaing disarmament.
,'8ome countries are be-
having as if they a*e living
in an armaments store-
house," Utsunomiya said.
'War is a competition in
mass murder, almed at do-
mination of other countriea.
"In recent years, in par-
ticular, the development of,
new weapons has added a
new dlmension to mase
murder, and modern wars:
bring cruel injuries and
death to countlesa non-
combatants."
Civilian Deaths
These sentlments were
echoed by Professor Shim-
pei Fujimaki of Tokai IIni-,
versity who noted that in
all wars since World War
II, civilian casualties had
surpasaed the death toU'
among milltarq personnel.
Fuiimaki, a former sec-
retary in the secretariat of
the Sncialist Party, said 95
percent ot those idlled in
future wars would be clvil-,
ians because of the nature'
of the weapons employed.
"When the war is' over,
those paying homage to the
war dead will be the forrner
soldiers," prafessor Fujimakt
said.
Utsunomiya's paper spark-
ed critical remarks among
other delegat^,s, particula,rly
ttiose irom Europe and Aus-
tralia.
Taking Sides
Foasner French represen-
tative to NATO Council,
Ambassador Francois de
Rose, said it was impossible
not to take sides morallq�
over the 9ovlet Union's in-
tentions internationaily.
"You can not condemn
those who by great cost do
what is necessary to prevent
the 8oviet Union from pre-
vailing in the world," De
Rose said.
"I don't believe in war--
because the risk is too great
-not becauae the Sovietv
have glven up their wlll to :
see thelr sqatem prevail !n
this world,"' he said:
Chrietoph: Bertram, direc-
tor bi the London-based In-'
ternational Institute !or,
�
3trategtc 8tudiea, said arma
control was not a favor one~
side did ?or the other. .
"A unilateral relusal tQ,
arm may be a perfectly legi-
timate positlon for a eoun-
try to take," Bertram ssid.
"But historical experience
shows that such deciaions do
not produce the same reac-,
tions lu othera, f'or tfie sim-
ple reason that other coun-
tries have di!lereat ways oP
seeing thinga."
Finland azation
Of Japan.
Australlan delegate PB,ul
Dibb, a senior research feI-
low at the Department o!
InternatYOna! Rela,tions at
the Australiai} Natlonal Uni-
versitq, said the 3oviet
Uuian's East As;an strategy
could concelvably lead to the
eventual Finlandiza,tion of
Japan.
"I am impelled to say that
iri the last decade, the. evi-
deace points to an unremit-
ting buildup in Soviet rnfli-
tary atrength," he said.
In cottcluding his contri-
bution to the debate, IItsu-
nomiya raYerred to recent
antinuclear demonstrationa
in Europe as a manifes*a-
tion oi an uncertainty re-
garding the U8, a country,
which "has oi course never
experienced nuclear warfare;
which is located acrosa the
Atlautic Ocean irom Europe.
as' a relative zone of salety,
and which is intent oa
achieving military superior-
ity over the 8oviet IIttiott,
even at the rlsk or turaing
Europe fnto a battleSeld,
and even in the worst case,
sacriScing Europe in a nu-
clear war. '
"Japaa's crisis control
must never go beyond the
lramework oi its peace. con-
stitution and its three non-:
nucisr prineiples," IItauno-`
miya eaid. .
"Since trie rationak ior-
the p=essnt globat war crisis,
is provided by emphasizing
the diSerences betweea th&
social systems of tbe US and
the 8ovtet Union, the prin-
ciple of mutual nonaggres-
sion and mutual nonizitRr-
ventfon among nations must
be reaffirmed anew by trans-
cending di8erencea in aocial
sqatema, race and� nliglon.
"This can be done by the
U9 and the Soviet Union. if
they only c!eclde to do so."
COPYRIGHT: The Daily Yomiuri 1981
CSO: 4120/91
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POLITICAI, AND SOCIOLOGICAI,
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
SDF PAY BQOST NOT IN 7.5 PERCENT CEILING
Tokyo THE JAPAN TIMES in Enqlish 2 Dec 81 p 1
(Taxt] .
Prlme MWetec ZeNto SuzulcI
lndlcated Monday - that the
plenned Increase ln pay ta^
derenee peiaonr,et ww noe be
Wcluded fn tlie 7.5 perCft
celllrtg on the g+ovvth of deteaeen
sPer,aa,g in aacd 19111L
in hfs dtst press con[erem
since the reebutrie of his:
CabineCIMonday. Stmiki ealdt,;
"u !s aochremeiy diitMultl 4
Dete~e Agerx.y ta Absocb the
paq raiae- for tts &nployees,
Lqcludtrjg Self-Detense - Pbrom
petsoanel.'aitdln the 7.5 per.
oe~t aeiltng.~�
Amid Vowing c,alls trom t1e
Unlted States and other
Western natbns tor an In-
creaaal Japanese detense role;
the agency la stubbornly,
e+estscuS the Ftnance Mtniacxy's
prmure that the pey- incresee
itwuld be aboorbed ln the 7r6,
percent W'owth allowed the
+~cY� ,
3uzukl sald that the Netional'
Personrwl Auth.,arity recom-
mended N:y .increaaes 'fot
Qovernment employees, in-
cludft defense service per-
sonnel. atter the agency ha6
made its budget pmposal tor
titeal 1962 early summer Lhid
yAar. But he stopped start of
cle9riy endoeetng the Decenw
AgencY's Poeltian.
"C11Ief Cabinet 3ecretary
Kifchl Mlyazawa explalned
latet to the presa. that Sauki'e
atatetnent meant that there waa
rw telltng pow much the detease,
budpc wouW be unw the
governmert comptetes com-
plLatlon o[ the. ttscal I982
budget.
The prlme minister alsa
recontlrniod hls posItlon durina
the press conterence that hls
government would not change
!ts pohcy of twldlrlg the defense
spendMg * below the level�
equlvalent to 1 percent of thei
pas natlonal product ( GNP ,
AskeO wfiy he had appolnted
3USUt'nU Ntkaldo. 8 suspected
n*iae-calcer In cne t,,ocw,eea
psyott sCandal who escaped
Ind{ctment, W the post of
secretary�general of the
Wberal-Democratlc Party,
8uzuid Juatifted hls chotce by,
raying: -
i'Mc. Nikaldo has made
seMous eftorts for the party as
chAtrman o the party
Eicecutfve Councll over the past
yeAr, always keeping public
opWon fn mind. I expect him to
discharge even greater
respornlbUlties as secnetary-
8enera!�"
He bluntly dismissed tbe
allegatiott th8t he had glven the
No. 2 poet Ifl the rulin8 PartY tg.
Nikaldo, *commonly' regarded-
as the proxy of tormer Prlme
Mlnister Kakuel Tarurka, to buy
the cooperation of the powertul
Tanaka tactlon In cuder to
ensure hls re-elc.~:tlon es LDP
presldent next autwnn.
Turning w forelgn attalrs, he
relterated that his government
regards South Korea as "one ot
the. closest nelghboring cmn-
trtes" In Asfa a[Id Intends to.
help that country lmprove the
llveiltwod of !ts people and
concrtbuce w lcs scabuuy.
But he decWed to comment
bow hts government wW handle
Sea~l's request tor. td Wllioo ta.
Japaneae loaus: .
In reply to a qtmeilon atlout
Japaa's euternal trade Issue,
3uzuld sald he would ahottly
adopt a P~ of nwaozu:
to remove Japan's taritt aud
non-tarltt barrlers. whlch
Unpede the now of coreign.
products inio the Japanead
market- .
He also retterated his patlcy
of advancingtNe implementa-
tlon of the 1979 Tokyo Round
multlIateral agreement on
taMit cuts by tWo years:
"I am not thWking of seeking
a second term now. and the (re-
election) Issue entkelY aiepends
on the wishes of all the rnitn8,
party members." Suzukl
Stressed.: ' . , . . . _ . . .
COPYRIGHT: The Japan Times 1981
CSOs 4120/93
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ECONOMIC
JAPAN, SINGAPORE STRENGTHEN ECONOMIC TIES
Tokyo BUSINESS JAPAN in English Nov 81 pp 31, 35, 39, 43, 46
[Article by Akira Kasuya, Director, South Asia-Ea3t Eurppe Division, International
Trade Policy Bureau, Ministry of International Trade and Industry]
[Text) ECONOMIC relations between Japan and Singapore are
becoming closer every year, and trade between the two
countries is showing stabilized growth. Private capital
investments are in a process of recovery on a moderate
scale.
Some pending problems naturally exist between the two
countries, such as the trade imbalance and the import of
specific Singapore products by Japan, but they can be
solved through mutual efforts and cooperation, and they do
not menace the permanent friendship between Singapore
and Japan.
Japan's position has again become the theme of heated
discussion concerning peace and stability in the Southeast
Asiatic region. Needless to say, a strong economic structure
for AS6.4N countries is essential for attaining stability in
Southeast Asia.
Japan must respond to Singapore's hopes in various
aspects uf economic cooperation now that Singapore has
established itselt firmly as a member of the newl; -
industrialized cuuntries (NICs). Singapore must receive help
and encfluragement to become the hub of strong collective
self�reliance aimed at fostering the economic expansion of
cuuntries in Southeast Asia and surrounding regions.
Singapore maintained a two-digit economic growth
recard in 1980 when almost ali industrially advanced
countries were suffering from the protracted recession. The
country's economic growth in the first half of 1981 seems
to have remained on the same high level. National produc-
tivity in this periud grew 6% over the corresponding period
. in 1980. At the same time, Singapore succeeded in curbing
the rise of commodity prices to 6%.
Such a favorable economic trend, in parallel with the
stability of the present administration, is continuously
stimulating fureign investments in Singapore.
The vulume of fureign investments in Singapore in the
first half of 1981 amounted to 70% of the amount for the
same period a year earlier. However, the incentive for
investments in the new sectors remained strong thanks to
the country's policy uf modernizing its industrial structure.
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The future is bright, especially for manufacturing indus-
= tries. Securing skilled labor is the greatest current problem.
- Singapure's guideline for economic independence,
mapped out with the advice of the U.N., has successfully
- passed the take�off stage of promoting transit trade and
tinancial business, and has entered the phase of actively
creat'sng or expanding various secondary nidustries with
high added value, including the petroleum industry. This
policy is embodied in the Economic Promotion Expansion
- Law, and specifically in various measures enacted to
encourage the inflow of foreign capital, including preferen-
- tial duties, which have proved extremely effective.
Most of these huge foreign investments, which accom-
_ panied the smooth changeover to heavy and chemical
industries, assumed the form of direct invescments in fixed
assets. Foreign enterprises including Japan't seem to have
_ accounted for 75% of the added value produced by all
industries in Singapore in 1971. These factors have enabled
_ Singapure to escape the common fate of newly indus-
[rialized countries - the accumulation of fareign debts.
Although soaring oil prices have increased the country's
_ trade deficit, they have simultaneously pushed up the
export revenue derived from c:il products. Singapore,
_ among non-oil producing nations, has attained an unusually
= high trade share with non-ASEAN countries, which climbed
from 53% in 1960 to 81% in 1979.
Hitherto Singapore has successfully expanded its eco�
nomy by avoiding trade conflicts with neighboring coun-
tries and specializing in oil�derived products with their
wide marketability. What implications the industrialization
of neighburing countries will have on Singapore remains to
be seen. Likewise, Singapore's contribution to the solidarity
of ASEAN community is of interest. These a:e decisive
faccors for making medium�term and long-term predictions
concerning the economy of this nation.
What is the attitude of Singapore to its medium-term
and lung�term economic prospects? We can read it in the
message of Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew commemorating
the National Day un August 9, 1981, in which he
emphasized 1) the importance of education, skills, working
mural, team spirit and higher productivity for the future
econurtiic development of the nation. 2) the importance of
. mutual couperation with the ASEAN Community so as to
achieve high and stabilized economic growth and 3) the
promutiun of industries with higher added value to trans-
Furm Singapore into the "information and brain center" of
ASEAN or Southeast Asiatic region as the target for the
1980s. According to Prime Minister Lee, the immediate
tasks of the natiun were the easing of the labur market and
- lugher productivity.
Along with its policy to modernize the industrial
structure, the government of Singapore is expected to carry
out steps for improving labor productivity and for higher
wages, as well as steps for encouraging foreign capital
intlow including tas reduction for specific equipment
investments.
In this article the,writer wishes tu make some predic-
tiuns concerning Japan's role in the creating of a high-
productivity society in Singapore mainly from the stand-
point of investments.
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~ Direct Overseas Investments by Japan
Fullowing is a part of the conversation which took place
when Singapore's Permanent Secretary of Commerce and
Industry visited the leaders of Japan's Ministry of Inter-
national Trade & Industry last summer:
S: "We expect Japan's assistance in making Singapore
the center of the information industry in the future."
~ J: "The information industry has an extremely wide
_ scope. The same thing can be said of software. Singapore
must decide first which sectors it will give priority to. That
data will serve as a guideGne for the future actions of
Japanese enterprises."
S: "We will naturally bear in mind your suggestion."
3: "Is Singapore interested in technology-oriented
' sectors other than the informacion industry'?"
S: "�Singapore is also interested in the technology service
industry including engineering."
J: "We feel that mutual cooperation in specific projects,
in which the assets of both nations can bs combined to the
highest advantage, may be profitable. The government of
Singapore is conducting a campaign to promote labor
productivity. We are wondering whether the entrepreneurs
themselves are switching their ihought patterns as quickly
as the government desires: '
S: "The guvernment of Singapore must act on the
assumption that entrepreneurs will foUow its intention."
As can be surmised from this conversation, ASEAN and
its neighburing countries are pinning an ever mounting hupe
un the rule of Japan in uverseas investments and in
particular, technology transfer as well as on policy aimed at
struc[ural reform through furnishing guidance and know-
how.
Direct overseas investments by private Japanese enter-
prises received a fresh impetus in 1972 through the
international adjustment of exchange rates. It was fullowed
by a periud of protracred stagnation unleashed by the uil
crisis and ensuing turmoil in domestic and overseas invest-
ments in late 1973.
Overseas investments surged up again in 1978 ref7ecting
the growing potential of enterprises for such ventures and
the ilt7uence of long�term management strategy.
_ The importance of developing countries in Japan's
overseas investments has increased further. When regional
- shares of direct investments are analyzed, the increase in
investments fcx transferring production bases, motivated by
less expensive labur costs, and investments for natural
resuurces development with comparatively high unit con-
cract amount is cunspicuous.
T'he change in shares by industrial sector and region,
highlighteJ by the uptrend in direc;t investments in the
manufacturing sector, indicates the extent of the inter-
natiunal activity by Japanese industries and their domestic
- structural adjustments. [t further points to the expansion of
� overseas investments through the direct incentive of
management diversification and internationalization center-
ing un develuping cuuntries.
- , Asia, and especially the ASEAN region, is highly
signihcanc as the receptacle for Japan's overseas invest-
ments, %`7 ut which flowed into this region from 1951 ro
I N7c).
Huwever, the progress of econumic development in
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newly industrialized countries of Asia and other regions, led
by Singapore, is causing fundamental changes in the
motivation u[ private Japanese investors. Various advan-
tages such as preferential duties and protective measures for
foreign investments by local governments are no longer to
be expected as in the past. For Japanese enterprises, foreign
investments have come to assume the same degree of
stra[egic importance as domestic investments. Future in-
vestments must be euided h}� hi�her reco�nition such as the
deepening of economic interdependence among nations.
- In this connection, business circles in Japan are analyz-
ing the positive and negative sides to foreign investments
from the standpoint of an investing nation. Japan's role in
pursuit of a fair international division of tabor on a world-
wide basis - with the emphasis on higher added value in
indiastry and trade - is being seriously discussed, reflecting
the higher share of manufacturing industries in the foreign
investment balance.
T'he recognition is gaining ground that private foreign
investments must serve as an important leverage for the
divisian of labor. An increasing number of Japanese
enterprises are accepting this point of view,
- Private Japanese Enterprises
The overall amount of committed investments in
Singapore during 1980 stood at US$690 million, down
33% from a year earlier. Investments by Japanese enier-
prises (commitment base) decreased from S150 million in
_ 1979 to $70 million in 1980.
The chief cause uf this decline was naturally the
intluence of the economic climate in Japan. At the same
time, it cannot be denied that the response to the
switchover in Singapore's industrial policy caused a con-
- siderable delay.
Positive implementation of a iairly drastic anti�protec-
tive policy by Singapore, based on the thinking that "only
free competition can strengthen the structure of enter-
prises," constituted radical therapy for creating a new
dimension in Singapore's industry.
Only enterprises promising high added value and clearing
this hurdle will have a chance in Singapore in the future.
Yet the feeling in general is optimistic.
_ Let us take as an example a Japanese electronic enter-
prise which has recently moved into Singapore. The
amuunts uf tixed assets and added value per employe have
increased 100% and 30%, respectively, compared with the
average figures uf the same industry in 1980.
Singapore's powerful campaign for higher productivity,
aimed at the growth of industries with higher added value,
appears to promise a steep economic growth. Capital-
intensive and technology-intensive sectors have become
- attractive for foreign investurs.
This trend cunforms to Singapore's basic policy of
liigher productivity and wages to break the bottleneck of
the chronic shortage uf labor. On the other hand, there are
some apprehensions about the inevitable tlight of a part of
its toreign capital during the transition period and the
possible implications in Singapore's economy.
The balance uf investments in Singapore by Japanese
enterprises stood at over 5500 million as of the end of
1980. Over 1,000 Japanese companies maintain at least
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lrprrsantativc utticrs in Singupure. ,Amung them, abuut
300 cumpanirs were registered later than 1978. The
- sdvance of Japanese enterprises in Singapore is apparently
maintaining a substantial level in spite of a slight setback in
1980. �
Eroken down by industry, manufacturing industries,
which are the most active, accounted for about half of the
enterprises that have moved into Singapore in the past four
years. Noticeable is the recent increase in the investments
_ by makers of electronic and electric devices.
This trend is ascribed to the wholehearted compliance of
Japsnese enterprises to Singapore's policy in chis sector.
Extensive local surveys have enabled the participation of
numerous medium and small enterprises as subcontractors
supplying parts.
These muves conform to the growth of supporting
industries around the nucleus or key industries in the
process of industrial modernization stressed by Singapore,
and are regarded as a desirable phenomenon. Against this
background, a sharp growth of foreign investments in the
form of full subsidiaries has become a conspicuous trend.
Whereas the percentage of m3nufacturing industries far
exceeds 50;"0 of Japanese investments in the Asian region
(in number of individual investments), this ratio is less than
34% in case of Singapore. In contrast; weight of Japanese
investments has relatively risen in service sectors including
trade, constructiun and engineering Compared with neigh-
buring countries in Asia. Thus things are moving in favor of
Singapore's national policy.
These facts show that dapanese capital is making a vital
contribution to establishing Singapore as an internationsl
business center. Observing macroscopically the desirable
effects which Japanese enterprises have brought to
Sinaanore bv their locatina in that country, we can cite
increased employment opportunities centering on manufac-
. tuning industries (some one-sixth of the workers in the
manufacturing sector being employed by Japanese enter-
prises) and growing revenue from exports. lapanese and American enterprises have offered oppor-
tunities to newcomers to the labor market. This may be the
reason why Singapore maintained a very low ratio of
unemployment during [he 1970s in spite of the oil crisis.
However, the creation of new employment opportunities
has ceased to be an urgent task for Singapore. In other
words, full empluyment has served as the direct motive for
Singapore's pulicy change regarding the induction of
foreign rapital.
As menciuned earlier, Singapore is seeking a way of
survival in the expurt market through fostering induszries
with higher added value while its neighboring countries are
~ rapidly catching up with Singapore by virtue of their
labor-intensive industries. Japanese investors have obviously
contributed in a substantial way in technology transfer to
Singapore, although this fact tends to be overlooked owing
to the difficulty of ascertaining details of such agreements.
Technological transformation has become a common
task for all develuping countries, and especially so for such
newly industrialized countries as Singapore.
Responsibil:ty of Japanese Enterprises
The changeover to products with high marketability is
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imperative for Singapore at present. Additional investments
and reinvestments for this purpose are progressing fairly
smoothly. As a whole, Japanese enterprises are endeavoring
to entrusc Singapore with the manufacture of certain types
of products and to make available automated processes to
Singapore for the production of diversified, reliable mer-
chandise of high quality.
Japanese investors are also working patiently to establish
harmonious management-labor relationships in multi-racial
Singapore. There have been inevitable minor troubles, but
deep-rooted antagonism has been avoided so far. Some
enterprises have given up investments mainly because of the
abolishing of preferential import duties and not because of
racial problems.
Such a normal state of investments, however, seems to
have arrived at a turning point. If the adequate growth of
sectors with lower maturity than the service sector is the
real task for Singapore, the acquiring country, then Japan,
the supplying country, must concentrate on changes in
sectors where technology transfers promise the most
oppurtunity. The risk can be alleviated by involving
Singapure's own capital
Japan should preferably encourage, at the same time,
Singapore's expertise in consulting and engineering sectors
among non-manufacturing activities, and actively extend
investments and technological assistance accompanying or
preceding such investments.
Conclusion
Singapore's import surplus against Japan in January -
June period, 11981, reportedly grew 24% over the same
period in the previous year. Singapore's exports to Japan
increased 6%. Japan has now grown into Singapore's No. 1
trade partner surpassing even Malaysia.
While we are not indifferent to the trade imbalance
between the countries, the growth of imports from Japan
can be interpreted as a sure sign that private Japanese
investments are being reflected in the growing trade volume
between Japan and Singapore. It is an indication of the
healthy growth of industries in the host country.
This observation is supported by the fact that Singa-
pore's exports to Japan, too, are siowly but steadily
increasing. Economic relations in general and trade relations
in particular between Japan and Singapore are expected to
become ever closer with time.
lapan's attitude on cooparation in Southeast Asiatic
countries was made clear in International Trade & Industry
Minister Tanaka's vision (the so-called "Tanaka Doctrine")
explained last fall, and the "Bangkok speech" presented by
Premier Suzuki when he visited Southeast Asia early this
year, emphasizing such themes as the solution of the energy
problem, increased exports of finished products and proma
tion of inedium and small enterpuses.
Japan is in a position to offer cooperation based on its
accumulated expertise. The Japanese govemment is imple-
menting steps for adequate counselling of smaller enter-
prises in various stages of development and for information
exchange among developing and industrially advanced
countries through various experts. The iinportance of
overseas investments by smaller enterprises is emphasized
since such investments mean a direct transfer of manage-
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ment resources and knowhow to the host country. Various
measures are being mapped out for the purpose af
encuuraging the cooperation of inedium and small Japanese
enterprises, including training and advisory businesses, in
this age of internationalization.
Singapore's expectations from direct private investments
have not abated a bit. The Economic Development Board
_ (EDB) of Singapore is fully aware of the difficulty of
assuring a smooth inflow of foreign capital into the nation
as in the past, beset as it is with soaring wages, intlation and
labor shortage.
Singapore, now committed to steep economic growth, is
making a total input for the induction of Japanese capital.
In this connection, it is interesting that an investment
= seminar is going to be held in Japan in November with the
- co-sponsorship of JETRO (Japan Export Trade Organiza-
tion) and EDB.
Japan has been somewhat behind other advanced
Western countries in overseas investments. However, the
- ' country has at last attained leadership in the fteld of
vanguard technology, and Japan's overseas investments in
advanced countries, centering on manufacturing industries,
are rapidly expanding, partly stimulated by the resurgence
of protectionism.
[nvestments in developing countries must be viewed
from a different angle. Using the receptive attitude of host
countries as a powerful incentive, such investments are
expected to grow in the future with medium and small
enterprises as the nucleus.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 The Nihon Kogyo Shi.mbun
CSO: 4120/95
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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
ROLE OF ROBOTS IN INDUSTRY VIEWED
Tokyo BUSINESS JAPAN in English Nov 81 pp 21-23
[Article by Shozo Hochi, Editor-in Chief, BUSINESS JAPAN: "Unmanned Factories
Relentlessly Producing Computer- Control led Products"]
[Text] exible manufacturing tactory (FMF) has been recently
N completed a[ the headquarters of Yamazaki Machin-
ery Worl:s, Japan's largest machine tool manufacturer based
in Oguchi-cho near Nagoya, and is now in operation. Many
people are visiting the factory to see how the new
unmanned system works, including a large number who are
coming from abroad.
A factory in which "robots produce robots" was
compteted by Fujitsu Fanuc Co. last year in Fuji City,
Shizuoka Prefecture and came into production from this
January. The factory is also attracting many visitors as the
tirst unmanned factory of its kind.
The factory that has been built as the first unmanned
f'actory adopting a full-fledged flexible manufacturing
system (FMS) in the machine tool industry has a floor
space of 3,790 square meters. Equipped with 18 machine
centers (MC) that can do various cutting operations and
two pallet�loader robots that carry work pieces, the factory
can process major parts of machine tools on an almost fully
automatic basis.
What the factory processes includes main cylinder bases,
beds and cabinets for numerically�controlled (NC) lathes,
and machining centers, the company's mainstay products.
The factory produces as many as 23 different items of main
- cylinder bases, and the total number of different iterns it
- pruduces amounts to as many as 84. The factory boasts of
its capability tu process such a great number of ditferent
parts.
Yamazaki Machinery Works has long been adopting a
two�shift work system, but here at the factory, a three-shift
system has been adopted for around-the-clock operation.
Qut unly six persons work the 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. shift and the
- 4 p.m. cu 12 p.m. shift. From midnight to 8 a.m.. no
human works at the factory, but automatic machining
- centers and pallet loader robots continue their programmed
muvements. Any abnormal operations of the machines can
be detected by various kinds of monitoring equipment such
as self�di3gnosing devices, and tool defect detecting and
repairing devices attached to each machining center.
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Though the average working hours of Japanese workers
account for less than 2,000 hours a year, an annual average
of working hours at the factory is expected to reach some
8,600 huurs, alrust 4.5 times. When compared with a
similar sized conventional factory with existing types of
machines, the factury is said to correspond in capability to
68 general-purpose machine touls and 215 workers. When
expressed as a sales price, the new factory is estimated at a
value of V-4,000 million. According to Tsunehiko Yama-
zaki, the company's managing director, when calculating
the factory's capability, personnel expenses, and other
expenses, the original investment can be returned within
two years. More than 10 inquiries for purchasing similar
plants frum the company are said to have been received.
As the above example indicates, the flesible manufactur-
ing system, combining NC machine tools, autu transfer
m:ichines, industriat robots and the software to operate
them, has entered the stage of practical use in Japan. This is
an achievement of the nation's highly advanced machine
industry which exports nearly 40% of its products. The new
tactory symbuli2es the tirst milestone toward complete
unmanned operation of factories. As for forgiiig machines,
along with the recen: advancement of technologies to
produce dice, those with pressing functior.;, with less losses
and safety mechanisms have been developed. Markets for
industrial robots, indispensable for unmanned operation,
are also rapidly expanding.
[mmediately after World War nobody could antici-
pate thst the Japanese machine industry, that had been
almost completely destroyed during the war, could grow
and develup to such a great extent. [n 1980, Japan's
machine toul industry claimed the third highest position in
the world in outpuc after surpassing the Suviet Union.
lapan started the production of industrial robots in 1967
with impurted robots as models and achieved the world's
. largest uutput ofV60 billion last year.
This outstanding achievement by Japanese industries can
be witnessed not only in the machine industry but also in
such tields as steel, automobiles and household electrical
_ appliances. Against the background of their No. 1 position
in the world, many industrial products made in Japan are
beging exported to almost all regions of the world.
This tremenduus achievement can be ascribed to the
_ dilligence and high educational level of the Japanese people.
Other factors that aiso contribute to this may include the
unity of tlie labur force, the lifelong employment system
and the homugeneity of the Japanese peuple.
But what we should not overlouk in this respect is the
f'act that the technological level of Japan's machine
' industry, particularly that of the machine tool industry, is
very high. When a trade problem developed in connection
witti lapan's rapidly increasing auto expurts, the president
- of a leading Japanese machine tool manufacturer said. "It is
yuite natural that Japanese-made cars are high in quality
and low in production cost. Japan's technology for produc�
tion ut transfer machines used in mass pruductun of autos
is mure advanced than in uther cuuntries:"
There have been some nuteworthy features in the
- development of the nation's machine industry since the
tirst oil crisis in 1973.
First of all. effores toward making not oniy automatic
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machine touls but also sutomating uther machines have
been extensive. Secundly, in coping with the diversification
of consumers' needs, manufacturers have changed their
views on itiass productiun and ceased to rely only on mass
production technologies. They have realized the importance
of developing various ways of pruduction to mee[ various
needs of consumers. Tliirdly, such new concepts as comput-
er-aided manul'acturing (CAD) and flexible manufacturing
systems (FMS), that are cumpletely different t'rom conven-
tiunal concepts ut production. have been introduced.
Fourthly and finally, the nation's machine industry has
become mure and more export-oriented.
These new trends indicate that the tinal target of the
machine industry is to achieve complete unmanned produc-
tion of maclunes and equipment.
One of the methods to achieve unmanned operation is
adopting NC machines. Such tools made their debut about
30 years ago. Now more than half the machine tools
produced in Japan are automated NC machines. The most
remarkable advantage of NC machine tools is that products
that are exactly alike can be manufactured regardless of the
"skill" of their operators.
T'he machine tuol industry used to be subject to
tluctuatiuns in business activities. But, thanks to the
appearance of NC maclune tools and general demand for
replacements of machines following the uil crisis, Japan's
machine tool industry has been drawing a constant upward
curve in output since 1975.
During the past several depressions, the machine tool
industry has been well able to compensate for stagnant
domestic demand with exports. Now, the machine tool
industry has rirmly established its foothoid as an export
industry by exporting nearly 40% of its total uutput.
Though there can be witnessed some declining trend in
order acceptances, the order backlog surpasses #300
billion. This means that the industry can continue full
operation for half a year without any new orders.
[t is furthermore expected that there will be large
investments in uther industries in plants and equipment
from next year on. The machine industry will be called
upon tu supply many of the required goods. Now the
nation's machine tool industry is un the crest of the wave
of FMS and automation.
Those in lapan's robut industrial circles regard 1980 as
the t'irst year of the widespread diffusion of industrial
rubuts. It was in 1980 that the total output reached the
V60 billion ievel. It is assumed that the market for robots
will rapidly expand.
Up until sortietime ago, robots were creatures only in the
world of the imagination, tiguring largely in science fiction.
Rubots will be producing robots on a far larger scale than
what is being done in the Fujitsu Fanuc faccory within a
few years.
Seiemun Inaba, President of Fujitsu Fanuc, says, "Mar-
kets fur rubots are within easy reach of our operation.
Markets develup first and then our development activities
fuliuw. In the case of NC machine tools and other
equipment, we spent mure than 10 years developing them
beforz markets were created."
As everyone concerned with the industrial robot indus-
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try ad�>its, markcu, tar industrial robuts precede what the
i: dustry can do at that time.
Unmanned uperation of a tactory becomes a reality
when robuts are cumbined with NC machine rools and
warh pieces are fed frum machine to machine by means of
autumatic transfer machines.
In the case of NC machine tuols, they helped che
rerovery of the machine tool industry which had been
suffering t'rum a lung�term depression. When a depression
lut the lapanase econumy in 1975, demands fur NC
machine tuuls became stagnant, but the uutput uf NC
machine tuuls started to iiurease spectacularly from 1978.
The uutput of industrial robuts has drawn a similar upward
curve over the past several years.
Until 1975, the output ot' industrial robots in Japan was
only Vl0 billiuii or so, but it started to show an upward
trend frum 1976 and its rising curve after 1978 indicates
huw rapidly denands for industrial robots will increase
t'rom nuw.
Fields in which industrial robots are extensively used are
mainly tlie autu industry and the electric machine industry.
Nevertlieless, along with the development oi "intelligent"
rubuts and [he expansiun uf their uses, the output of
industrial rubuts is expected to sharply increase as in the
case ot NC machine tools.
The develupment ut the industrial robut industry is must
likely to bring a yualitative change to the machine industry
in general. Tha progress uf FMS consisting uf industrial
robuts will free workers from undesirable working environ-
ments and simple operations, but could bring on the
prublem ot unemployment. But most of the people
concerned with the machine industry insist that there is no
such pussibility. Wurkers will be transferred to more
satistying work and ttleir wurking hours will be shortened,
they say.
In Japan, industrial robots are used extensively for
repetitive work in the auto industry. Spot welding opera-
tiun at Nissan Mutor's fac[uries is done by some 400
robuts, which cuntribute tu 90O/o of the cumpany's spot
welding operations on car bodies. Toyota Motor also began
using sput welsing robuts from last year. Kawasaki Heavy
Industries Cu. produced more than 1,000 Unimate spot
welding robots, with. 90% of them having been deliverad to
che suto industry. (n the production of arc welding robots,
Yasukawa Electric Works has a market share of,70% to
30%, most of which are destined for the auto industry.
Painting rubuts are nut so widely diffused yet, but Kobe
Steel Corp., which introduced technology from Norway in
1973, has so far suld more than 1,000 units, mostly to the
auto industry.
At the I9th International Symposium un Industrial
Robuts lield in Milan, [taly, in March 1980, a U.S. delegate
described huw indwtrial robots were diffused in majur
.;uuntries uf the wurld. According to the report, while the
U.S. lield 1,810 prugrammable servo-controlled point�to-
puint (PTP) robots, 345 programmable servo�controlled
cuntinuuus path (CP) robots, and 1.100 programmable
general�purpose nun�servo rubuts in uperatiori as uf Decem-
ber 1979. ;ind West Germany 300 programmable servo-
cuntrulled PTP robots, 150 programmable servo-concrolled
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('P robuts, 200 prugrammable general�purpuse non-servo
rubots, 200 prugrammable diecasting and mulding nun-
servo noboes and 5,000 units of inechanical transfer
eyuipment, Japan held as many as 3,000 programmable
servo-controlled PTP and CP robots, 11,000 programmable
general-purpuse nun-servo robots and programmable die-
casting and molding non�servo rubuts and 33,000 units of
mechanical transfer equipment. These tigures well demon-
strate that Japan has the largest number of various
industrial robots in uperation.
Accurding to another survey by a Japanese economic
research institute, industrial robots are mainly used in such
industries as transportation machines, electric machinery,
synthetic resin, metal products and general machines. The.
auto industry and the electric machinery industry assume
more than 60% of industrial rubots delivered. The number
ot indw[rial robuts delivered in 1980 wasestimated to have
reached mure than 75,000. One survey revealed that as of
December 079, 7,290 manual manipulators were in use in
Japan, while there were as many as 45,760 Fixed sequence
rubuts and variabie sequence robuts in uperation. There
were 2,410 play�hack robots and 1,340 "intelligent" robots
in use. Even two years ago, there were 56,800 industrial
rubots uf variuus types in use in Japan.
lndustrial robots can easily cope with changes in
products to be processed hy ch-.nging programs. This is a
revulutiunnry rule industrial robots can play in the modern-
ization of industries. When VC machine touls made their
aebut, tliay prumpted a large stimulus to plant and
equipment investments in the nation's nachine industry.
Plant and equipment investments assume a large weight in
Japan's gruss natiunal product, and their trends should not
be uverluoked when one [ries co see huw domestic business
activicies muve. Then wtiat int7uence will industrial rubots
give tu such plant and aquipment investments?
First of all, industrial robot manufacturers increase their
plant and equipmen[ investroent in order to increase their
uutput ut industrial rubots. Tiien, on the part of industrial
ruhut us::c, :.^.:::ease such investments Ey repi,icing
ubsulete iacilities with industrial robots.
Prices uf industrial robots range from some V-1 million
per uiiit co YI'_ tu Y13 milliun. Judging from this price
range, if a factory tries to fully use industrial robots,
amouncs to be invested fur such a purpose will range from
several million yen in smaU cases to Y-2 tu Y-3 billiun for
large undertakings.
Industrial rubuts also decrease enterprises' investments
in othzr plants and equipment. If the rates of operation of
tacilities are enhanced to 3 maximum puint by introducing
industrial robuts. enterprises du nut have to purchase
machines and equipment in addition to industrial robots.
Then thry can save muney for investment.
In [he case ot conventiunal types uf machines, they must
be either impruved or remodelled as new requirements
develup. Otherwise, new machines must be purchased. [n
the case of robuts, however, changes in programming are
usually sufticient when changes are demanded. Unlike
liuman beings, industrial robots demand no special lighting
nur airconditioning facilities.
Miniaturizatiun of industrial rubuts is also an important
subjecc matter to be studied in the 1980s. Their miniaturi-
28
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zatiun is expected tu cume abuut in the middle of the
current decade. Then, smali industrial robuts will be
efticiently arranged along the production line in a factury,
irnproving production efficiency to the maximum in both
space usage and uutput. Land is very expensive in Japan, so
a decrease in reyuired space for factories is a big advantage
fur management.
As seen abuve, industrial robots can both increase and
decrease plant and equipment investments. [nstallaciuns of
industrial rubots will have a great impact un che trend of an
industry's piant and equipment investments in the Future.
Japan's machine industry has achieved tremendous
results in che past three decades: it induced a great variety
ut modern technulogies from abroad in ihe 1950s, it
developed variuus applied technologies on the basis of such
induced tzchnologies through the 1960s and 1970s. and
nuw i[ is facing a new industrial revolutiun through the
~doptiun ut numerical controls and tlexible manufacturing
SV5I21T1S.
Indu,trial robots can be called the crystallizatiun uf the
must advanced industrial technologies. They can play the
mwt vital rule in the new indus�rial revoiution.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Z'he Nihon Kogyo Shimbun
CSO: 4120/95
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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION PROMOTED TO BOOST PLANT EXPORTS
Tokyo BUSINESS JAPAN in English Nov 81 pp 69-75, 81
[Article by Fumihiko Matsuda]
[Text J ACCORDING to sorrie experts, the
in fiscal 1979. This decline came as a
h export of plants, which, together
shock to industrial circles, for Japan's
with automobiles and household elec�
plant export industry had steadily
trical appliances, have formed the
grown since the start of the 1970s
t}uee main pillars supporting the Japa�
through the first oil shock, even while
nese expurt industry, has reached a
other industries were suffering from a
crisis point. Plant exports, which had
slowdown. Moreover, the industry had
steadily expanded to top S10 billion in
attained the $10 billion mark in the
tiscal 1979, decreased for the first
previous fiscal year.
time in fiscal 1980 to fall below that
There are various reasons given for
- level again. This was due largely to
this lapse in plant exports. They can
such factors as (1) the war between
be boiled down to the following:
Iran and [raq, which forced Japan to
(1) Worldwide recession slowed the
interrupt plant construction and sus-
demand for plants.
pend negotiacions, (2) cancellation of
(3) Japan's plant negotiations with
construction of large plants in China,
devetoping countries, its main plant
and (3) economic sanctions against the
market, were restricted by the unsta-
Soviet Union after its invasion of ,
ble political situatiun and accumulat-
Afgh3nistan.
ing debts and, therefore, increased
vow, huwever, it has been said that
country risk of these countries.
plant exports have passed the crisis
(3) Japanese plant makers did bad-
thanks to the urders received ffiis tiscal
ly in international competition which
year for plants for large�scale projects.
was intensifying among plant export-
Vevertheless, with increased cuuntry
ing countries. In particular, Japan's
risk and intensifying ;^!ernational
plant exports to communist countries
competition in the shrinking expurt
declined by as much as 70% as a
market for large plants, the outlook
consequence of economic sanctions
for plant axports remains questiona-
against the Soviet Union following its
ble. [n the fallowing paragraphs, we
invasion of Afghanistan, the canceIIa-
will cry tu outline the fucure prospects
tion of plant construction in China,
: and prublems of Japan's plant exports.
and Poland's accumulating external
According to statistics compiled by
debts.
_ the Ministry of International Trade
Considering the sharp decline in
and (ndustry (MIT[), licensed plant
plant expurts and the structural aggra-
exports (excluding heavy machinery
vation of the conditions affecting
- exports exceeding 5500,000 per case)
plant exports, it was obvious that
totaled S8,932 million (roughly equiv
plant-exporting firms faced a drave
_ alent to V2,000 billion) in tiscal 1980,
crisis. The government and private
duwn '_4.2~'a frurn $11,785 million
industries were considering joint ef�
(roughly equivalent to V2,600 billion)
torts to work aut measures to promote
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plant axpurts.
Huwever, the situation has reversed ;
itseli since the current riscal year
started. A preliminary report for the
first quarter of the year (the riscal year
begins in April) revealed that licensed
plant exports totaled S3,919,170,000
in value, a whopping increase of 51.7%
over the like period of the previous
year. Some people were optimistic
enuugh to remark that if this growth
rate was maintained, plant exports in
riscal 1981 could total SIS billion or
more. The truth, however, is that
among the orders Japanese firms re-
ceived during the first quarter of fiscal
1981 were such large-scale ones as
LNG plants from Indonesia and oil
retinery plants from Malaysia, and
these contributed greatly tg the overall
increase in plant exports. After negoti-
atiuns for a certain project are started,
it is usually several years befure urders
are actually placed. The bigger the
project, the longer it takes for it to
materialize. The orders received in the
current fiscal year are the outcome uf
negotiations which were started a long
time ago. Therefore, one cannot be
too optimistic about the trend of plant
exports. As many people have ac�
knuwledged, good performance in the
tirst quarter of the year dues not
necessarily mean a good performance
for the entire year.
The current plant export situation
was clearly foreseen by the Plant
Export Policy Cummittee (a private
advisory organ to MITI, chaired by
Renzo Taguchi, directur of the Japan
Federation of Nachinery Manufactur-
ers), in its report compiled in April this
year when measures to revitalize plant
exports were widely discussed. The
report says that, as the causes of the
plant export s(uwdown will remain
mostly unchanged, the uifticult situa-
tion will continue except for a tempo-
rary recovery in riscal 1981. Because
the report proved right as regards the
temporary recovery, we may as well be
prepared for difficult times ahead as
anticipated by the committee. What, then, were the gruunds for
predicting some improvement in plant
exports in riscal 1981'' First, the reper-
cussions of the second uil shock sub-
sided and many countries, in particular
developing ones, started to invest in
new energy sources and industrializa-
tiun. Secondly, in the Soviet Union
and East European countries, the
demand for plants became active as a
new five-year plan was started. New
economic plans were laid out for
Algeria and Nigeria, which were poten-
tial plant markets. There were new
moves to relax economic sanctions
against the Soviet Union. Thirdly, in
the oil-producing Middle East, another
plant export market, the war between
Iran and Iraq seems to have passed its
worst period and, with the political
stabilization of these countries, the
demand for plants for rehabilitation
projects was expected to become ac-
tive.
The above considerations were sup-
ported by MITI data on Japan's plant
deals with other countries. The num-
ber of such deals finalized during a
particular period is used as a leading
indicator for plant exports. According
to the MITI data, 1,488 export orders
for plants totaling S94,800 million in
value will be placed with Japanese
firms in riscal 1981.1Vhile the number
of orders remains much the same as in
fisca! 1980 (1,480 orders), the export
value shows an increase of 23% over
fiscal 1980 ($86,900 million). A big
increase is ezpected for orders from
the Middls East (165 orders, $19,900
million) and Southeast Asia (453 or-
ders, $20,100 million).
It is also estimated that plant ex-
ports will show an annual growth rate
of 34% in real terms over the next
five years (up to fiscal 1985). It would
be difficult for Japan, which has al-
ready grown into a major plant export-
er by obtaining a 10% share in the
world plant market, to increase its
share further. [t would be no exagger-
ation to say that the most the country
can do is to maintain its I O% share.
Measures to promote plant exports
are being studied by MITI and the
industries concerned. Specifically,
Japan intends to take the following
measures, after working out and imple-
menting measures to decrease country
risk and analyzing reasons for. the
country's setbacks in plant export
competition. They are:
(1) Adopting measures to avoid ex-
change risks.
(2) Establishing consulting, engi-
neering and project management tech-
niques.
(3) Strengthening the competitive
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power to export plants to resuurce�
industry as a whule has been working
related areas,
toward international cooperation. One~
(4) Expanding yen credits.
example is the cooperation of Japan,
(5) Technology trartsfer and other
as represented by the Ja an Machinery
forms of assistance to developing
Exporters' Association ~Director: Ichi-
countries.
ro Terao), European countries and
(6) Consolidating an international
moderately industrialized countries in
setup by organizing international con-
exporting plants to third markets. This
sortiums.
is an international exchange project
In particular, it is essential for thP
started in 1980 in which more than 10
Japanese plant export industry to ac�
countries, each represented by an in-
complish structural reforms to increase
dustrial organization, agreed to pro-
its expurts related to overseas re�
mote the establishment of an interna-
source-related projects. It is said that
tional cooperative setup. The partici-
the Japanese plant industry, which has
pating countries include Belgium
developed mainly in the area of chemi�
(FABRIMETAL), France (CEIF and
cal plants, falls far behind its counter�
FIMTM), the Netherlands (FME), Brit-
parts in other industrialized countries
ain (EEF), Spain (SERCOBE), West
in the area of energy and social engi-
Germany (VDMA), Italy, South Korea
neering. Now chat full-scale efforts
(Machinery Industry Promotion Asso-
have been launched in this area, it is
ciation), Brazil (ABIDIB) and Mexico
possible for Japan to promute exports
(CANACI, NTRA).
of plants and machinery and tools to
The Japan Machinery Exporters'
those countries where resource devel-
Association also sent a delegation to
opment projects related to energy,
West Germany, Italy and Spain to
natural gas, uranium, irun ore and
discuss international cooperation in
nunferrous metals are being carried
plant exports from October 11 to 19.
out.
When a similar delegation was dis-
Efforts at international cuoperation
patched to Britain in April this year,
have also been started. Because plant
British plant industrialists reportedly
negotiations for huge projects involv-
announced their plan to send a mission
ing over V100 billion wuuld involve
to Japan in November.
too great a risk to be taken by a single
At a time when intemational trade
corporation, it has become a common
friction caused by automobiles and
practice to form a consortium juintly
electronic parts is receiving wide pub-
with European or American plant
licity, the government and industrial
makers to sponsor such projects in
circles are greatly encouraged by the
third countries.
prospects of "frictionless trade" pro-
Apart from the activities of individ�
moted in cooperation with European
ual corporations, the Japanese plant
machinery industries.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 The Nihon Kogyo Shinbun
CSO: 4120/95
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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
CHEMICAL INDUSTRY HURT BY CONTINUING RECESSION
Tokyo BUSINESS JAPAN in English Nov 81 pp 82, 84, 85, 87
[Article by Akira Suzuki, Director, Chemical Products Division, Basic Industries
Bureau, Ministry of International Trade and Industry]
[Text] HE internatiunal ecunomy in
T1980 tluundered in recession ow-
ing to suaring uil prices and general
economic stagnation in industrially ad-
vanced cuuntries.
The Japanese economy continued
to muntain a moderate growth from
the previous year. The situation in tlie
first quarter was favorable under the
influence of the expansion experienc-
ed in 1979. But the economy began to
cool after the second quarter because
of declining domestic demand and the
reaction to the earlier demand up-
surge.
The cool surnmer in 1980 exerted
:in adverse i ,nfluence on pruduction in
manufacwring and mining industries.
But the economy recovered gradually
atterwards, mainly through the boom
in sales of automubiles and electric
eyuipment.
Tlie chemical induscry, huwever,
was affected tar more extensively.
After registering a peak in the tirst
yuarter, chemical pruduction and ship-
ment plummeted t'rom the level of
197y and did not shuw recovcry in the
Iatter half of the year. As a result.
pruduction (excepting pharmaceutic-
als ) dropped 4.3'7,, and shipmen ts drop-
ped 5.57r compareJ wilh :1 vesr earlier.
In particular, synthetic dyes, sur-
face artive agents and plasticiters were
hit hard by the recessiun in che textile
and huusing inJustries and the slump
ut' agriculture and tisheries due tu the
cool summer. Production, expurts and
impurts of principal chemical products
in 1980 are shown in Table 1.
Exports of chemical products grew
10.9% in dollar value over a year ealier
but dropped in volume.
Following is a brief description of
the main categories of chemical prod-
ucts in 1980.
Synthetic Dyes
The synthetic dye industry is plung-
ing deeper into recession, retlecting
Japan's slumping textile industry. The
demand for dyes as a whole has been
on a steady downtrend after a peak in
1972-73. The consumer preference
for thinner textiies, lighter color tones,
rhe progress in dyeing techniques and
the resultant economizing of dyes have
accelerated the decrease in demand,
[mported dyes have also contributed
to stagnatiun in the domestic market.
The recession of Japan's synthetic
dye industry is aggravated by soaring
costs due to high oil prices and by the
overproduction which necessitates the
lowering of product prices.
In order to rationalize fundamental-
ly the structure of the synthetic dye
industry, a rationalization cartel was
organized in January 1980 to carry
out concentrated production of dis-
perse dyes and sume cationic dyes for
synthetic textiles. A distribution sur-
vey was conducted for the purpose of
ratiunalizing and mudernizing the dis-
tribution structure.
1'he output of synthetic dyes in
1980 totaled S 1,4 15 tons, down 14~'0
from a year earlier. The production
decrease was ascribed to the reaction
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Table 1. Production, Exports and Imports of Chemical �roducts (1980)
Item
Production
~ �xports ~
imports I
Syntheticdyes
51,415
1861
16,391 (85)
10,513 (69) ;
IOrganicpigments
30,846
195)
9,513 i831 '
1,133(104)
Pigment resin color base
8,346
(84)
1,941 (86)
2? (73)
I Organic rubber components
45,596 (103)
1,1281100) ~
1,48' (90)
Plasticizers
406,947
(91)
19,067 1105) i
5.042(102) i
Surfartants (
475,174
(91) 1
60,454 183) t
9,603 (83) ;
Nute: Higuns in parenthrses are cumparisons in percentage with the previous }�ear.
to thr dernand upsurge in 1979 antici-
pating the rise of uil prices, s[agnating
personal cutisumptiun ;ind the cuul
summer of I080.
Almost aIl dyes registered a produc-
tion decrease uf abuut 101',~ compared
with a year earlier excepting reactive
dyes which maintained the 19791eve1.
On the uther hand, sultide dyes,
sulfide vat dyes, dirert dyes, mordant
dyes and acid mordant dyes recorded
productiun drops of uver 207r. Classi-
tied by type, the shares of disperse
ciyes and reactive dyes are yearly
growing, while those of sulfide dyes,
sulfide vat dyes and direct dyes are
decreasing.
Sume 16,397 tuns ot dyes were
exported in 1980, Jown I1`.*(" trom a
year earlier. Broken duwn by regiun.
Asia accounted fur 651; of axports
frum Japan. However, Asia's sliare is
decreasing. Exports tu Europe, and
North and Central America were on
the increase.
Main export destinations were the
Republic of Kurea, Taiwan, the 11.5.,
lndonesia, Hong Kong and Thailand.
Shipments to all regions excepting the
U.S. and Thailand dropped 10-20no
cumpared with a year earlier.
Particularly noticeabla was a 50%
drop in exports to China, which is
Japan's main overseas market. Ship-
ments to China had been growing
steadily in the past.
Classified by type, exports of reac-
tive dyes increased while naphthol,
t7uorescent whitening and sulfide dye
exports dropped considerably.
Imports in 1980 stood at 10,651
tons, down 3 1 % from a year earlier.
'Ihis drastic import decrease was
Table 2. Production, Exports and Imporu of Synthetic Dyes (1980)
Item
Production Exports
Imports V
Direct dyes
3,184 792
1,398
Acid dyes
:,288 ~ 648
1,564
Basic dyes
4,983 I 1,512
707
YIordant & acid mordant dyes
1,456 174
253
Sulfide 3c sulfide vat dyes
2,901 I 1,232
396
Vat dyes
2,373 i 1,207
274
Uaphthol dyes (pickling agents)
721 I 594
103 i
Naphthol dyes (developing agents)
3,007 1,529
215 �
Rapid dyes
209 79
0 j
Disperse dyes
13,643 5,061
2,363
Fluorescent dyes
7,513 ~ 762
808
Reactive dycs
4,710 I 1,216
1,539
Organic sutvents & solving dydes
3,114 1,023
750
Other dyes
1,313 567
143
7'otal
51,415
16,396 '
10,513
Comparison with previous year
86
89
69
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crused by surplus inventory in 1979
and slumping demand in 1980. Main
exporters of dyes to Japan were West
Germany, Switzerland and Graat Srit-
ain, which together accounted for over
70% of the dyes imported by Japan.
They still enjoy an overwhelming share
in the Japanese market, although their
share is gradually decreasing. Disperse
dyes, reactive dyes, acid dyes and
direct dyes occupied a large percentage
of imported dyes.
Table 2 shows production, exports
and imports of synthetic dues in 1980
classified by item.
Organic Pigmenu
The organic pigment industry had
been growing steadily in the past
several yPars against the background of
an expanding domestic market and
exports. However, the output of or-
ganic pigments in 1980 dropped 5%
from the 1979 peak of 20,946 tons.
The main cause of this decline was
that the production of printing inks
and paints, two principal consuming
sectbrs, were affected by recession.
Shipments to these sectors dropped by
2% and 4%, respectively.
Furthermore, exports of organic
pigments suffered from the tecession
in overseas markets, and Japan's inter-
national competitive power was weak-
ened by rising costs of fuel and raw
materials. Heated competition with
European pigment manufacturers also
was a factor.
The combination of these factors
caused the exports of organic pigments
from Japan to drop 16% in 1980 from
a year earlier.
Imports of organic pigments in
1980 rose 5% over 1979. Products
made in West Germany and the Re-
public of Korea made deep inroads
into the Japanese market. Table 3
shows production of organic pigments
over the past four years.
Organic Rubber Components
The organic rubber component in-
dustry is registering a nornial growth,
reflec:ing ? b4om in rubber products
for the auto industry. The output of
organic rubber components in 1980
stood at 45,596 tons, up 3% over a
year earlier and constituting the high-
est record in history.
Shipments for the manufacturers of
automobile rubber products such as
auto tire tubes, seat belts and anti-
vibration pads were extremely brisk
and covered� the recessed demand for
footwear. Exports stayed at nearly the
same level as a year ealier. Production
Tsble 3. Production of Qrganic Pigments
(in tons)
Year
ltem
1977
1978
1979
1980
Non-soluble azo pigments
4,601
4,881
5,340
5,024
Solubie azo pigments
4,465
4,720
5,348
5,294
Phthalocyar.ine
8,903
8,931
10,469
9,766
Lake
231
234
246 ~
245
Others
496
524
612 ~
517 ~
I Total
18,696
19,290
22,015
20,846
Table 4. Production of Organic Rubber Components
(in tons)
Item Year 1977
1978
1979
1980
Vulcanizing accelerators 14,688
T
16.985
18,137
19,005 1
Age resistors
21,070
22,526
23,214
23,798
I
Vutcanizing agents ' 151
165
189
228
Others I 2 ,177 ~
2,235
2,767
2,565
Total 38,086
41,911
44,307
45,596
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of organic rubber components is given
in Table 4.
Plasticizers
Production of plasticizers increased
with that of suft polyvinyl chloride
(PVC). The output of plasticizers in
] 980 decreased through low produc-
tion of PVC, which in turn was caused
by the cool summer and the reaction
to the demand upsurge in 1979. Pro-
duction stood at 338,004 tons, down
9% from a year earlier.
Classified by type, the output of
DBP and DIDP belonging to the
phthalic acid family dropped consider-
ably, whereas I?HP increased slightly
over a year earlier. Special phthalic
acid type plasticizers excepting DOP
registered some gains. Among other
plasticizers, the fatty acid category
increased somewhat while adipic acid
and epoxy types declined.
Exports of plasticizers with 19,067
tons stayed on nearly the same level as
in the previous year. Main export
destination was Southeast Asia. Com-
petition with American and European
makers intensified. Production of plas-
ticizers from 1977 to 1980 is shown in
Tabie S.
Surface Active Agents
Surface active agents (surfactants)
are used in all industries as auxiliary
agents. Recession and the especially
cool summer in 1980 put a period to a
trend of steady production growth
since 1975. The output in 1980 stood
at ` 475,200 tons, decreasing 49,000
tons or 9% from a year earlier.
Classified by ion type, anionic and
non-ionic surfactants dropped by 10%
and 12% respectively whereas cationic
and amphoteric types grew about 10%
each.
Demand in the main consuming
sectors such as the textile industry,
agriculture and forestry, and cleaning
decreased about 10%. Cansumption in
the following sectors increased in
1980: cosmetic and pharmaceuticals
717o), petroleum and fuel industries
3/0) and civil engineering construc-
tion and the ceramic industry 3%),
Exports, centering on Southeast
Asia, stood at 60,454 tons, down 17%
from -a year earlier. One of the reasons
for this decline is believed to be the
growth of local industries in the
Southeast Asian regions. Table 6
shows production of indiistrial surface
active agents over the past four years.
Table 5. Production of Plasticizers
(in tons)
(tem Year
1977
1978
1979
1980
Phthalic acid family
349,201
388,306
396,774 I 363,511
Fatty acid family
1,774
1,405
1,612 ! 1,773
Phosphoric acid family
5,287
5,047
5,274 4,884
Adipic acid family
16,679
19,626
21,802 19,299
Polyester family
6,300
7,143
8,486 ; 7,518
Epoxy family
13,207
11,999
11,178 I 9,933
Total
392,448
433,526
445,126 ~ 406,947
Table 6. Production of Industrial Surface Active Agents
(in tons)
91
Ye~
Item
1977
1978
1979
1980
Anionic
201,968
219,275
255,483
230,303
Cationic
22,634
23,759
23,046
25,980
Non�ionic
191,412
209,415
227,597
200,732
Amphoteric
7,500
3,558
3,067
3,253
Othersauxiliary agents
14,117
13,950
15,502
14,906
Total
437,357
469,957
524,696
475,174
COPYRIGHT: 1981 The Nihon K,ogyo Shimbun
CSO: 4120/95
END
36
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000500020008-6