JPRS ID: 10188 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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JPRS L/ 10188
15 December 1981
Ne~r East Nort~ Africa Re ort
p
CFOUO 46/S 1)
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JPRS L/10188
15 December 1981
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
(FOUO 46/81)
CONTENTS
EGYPT
Interview With 'Umar a1-Talmaseni
('Umar al-Talmasani Interview; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 25 Sep-1 Oct 81) 1
Former Nasirist Official in Exile Ca11s for Reconciliation
(AL-WATAN AL- 'ARABI, 23-29 Oct 81) 5
Task of Getting Nation To Renounce Israeli Link Reviewed
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 30 Oct-5 Nov 81) 8
Prominent Dissident Analyzes Domestic, Arab Causes of Rif`t
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 30 Oct-5 Nov 81) 13
Status of Prominent Female Detainee Reviewed
(Salma Fakhri; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 30 Oct-5 Nov 81) 18
,
IRA6~
Foreign Minister Interviewed on Conditions for Peace
(Sa'dun Hammadi Interview; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 2~ Sep 81) 20
Oil Minister lliscussed Policy, OPEC
(Tayih 'Abd-al Karim Interview; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, ~-10 Sep 81) . 26
- - a _ [III - NE & A - 121 FOUO]
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_ EGYPT
INTERVIEW WITH 'UMAR AL-TAIMASANI
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 241 25 Sep-1 Oct 81 pp 35-37
[Interview with 'Umar al-Talmasani by AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI: " Violence Will Not
Scare Us and Leniency Will Not Deceive Us;" date and place not specified]
[Text] When ~adat's policy was about to clash with the Muslim Erotherhood in
Cgypt, we went for a press interview with 'Umar al-Talmasani, the leader of the
Egyptian Muslim Brothe:hood and the chief editor of the magazine AL-DAWAT which
was confiscated. Today, the clash has taken place and al-Talmasani and his
comrades are in prison as are thousands of political detainees and leaders of
religious movements. The talk we had with him a few days before his imprisonment
forms the first line of defense at the new Muslim Brotherhood's tr.ial. This
interview is also the third most important 3ournalistic coup recorded with impor-
tant Egyptian detainees and fugitives since Ahmed Parghali and Lutfi al-Khwali.
[Question] Let us start by defining the Muslim Brotherhood's position as a"force"
among the opposition forces in Egypt. On what basis does this group build its
, opposition to President Sadat and his policies?
[Answer] Y es, we are in the opposition. Our opposition primarily focuses on
the fact that the existing system had neglected to apply in this Muslim country
God's laws "may he be glorified." For this reason our opposition is basically
aimed at the system itself and not toward obtaining power by changing Chose who
are in the government, or by replacing them. The Muslim Brotherhood do not
aspire for governing per se, and do not care who is in power. But what simply
and solely concerns them is the principles of governing. In our opposition, we
adhere to the righteous and pure Islamic system, without defamation or accusa-
tion...without slander oY seizing of opportunities...without abuse or suspicions.
We are objective and we do not concern ourselves with individuals. Despite that,
we know that this philosophy does not please the suthorities and does not even
- please their opposition. But when did we take into consideration either one of
them? We strive to please only God. We hope we are right.
What we really want, and that answers the second par~t of the question, is the
Korun as the source of legislation. We are requesting that the constitution and
the political parties be abolished. We are requesttng the boycott of ideas that
come to us from the West and from the communists, and which are alien to our
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reti~;ion. We are asking to resist and fight imperialism in every place. We
are xequesting holy war ".Jihad" against Zionism. That is a11 we want and these
are our requests.
Camp David is a True Evil
[question] Every one of your points is radically different from Sadat's policies.
I:ach point needs more clarification...what do you say about that?
[Answer] As for applying God's laws, "the Sharia" had talked about it. With
regard to our stand concerning the p arties in Egypt, we re~ect theia because
their piatforms are situational. Each party has a platform that changes according
to circumstances. In addition, these parties, in their struggle to get to uower,
aim for their own interests and for propagating their ideologies. They also
restrict their activities to only worldly matters. Our stand against imperialism
and Zionism is also very clear. It is enough that we opposed the peace ~reaty
with Israel from the outset and we think it is a pure evil fram ev~ry angle.
[Question] Then, you wholly agree that the Arab countries were right in boycotting
the Egyptian system?
[Answer] Indeed they were right in their boycott. But I have to say that some
Islamic countries erred in what was supposed to be done in handling the dan~ers
of that treaty. After that step it was necessary for those countries to unite.
If Egypt was thinking about obtaining stability through this treaty, Israel did
not have this in mind. What she had in mind was the breaking of Muslim unity.
Israel succeeded, and some of those countries helped her succeed. The Muslim
countries ai Q responsible for Israe?.` s success. Should we help her too? If the
Islamic, countries reconcile, unite and agree among themselves, that will undoubtedly
ha]t Israel and help Egypt to free itself from that treaty that helped Israel
in hurting Muslims and in continuing its antagonisms.
[Question) How?
[Ar.swer] Israel challenges us with uninhibited bo?dness. Look what Begin had
said! He said that bombing the Iraqi nuclear plant was only the first step in
order to strike at any development in any Islamic country. This means that he is
- not satisfied with protecting the "security of Israel" inside her borders, but
he is boasting that he wants to sLrik,e at the he art of the Islamic countries...
What did we do when we were faced with that impertinent bragging? Is it enough
to be satisfied by the Security Council condemnation of Israel....Should a
decision like that satisfy us?
The Syri an-Soviet Maneuvers
[Question] Then, how do you see the Arab situation now?
[AnswerJ I will talk to you about tangible and precise matters to explain this
situation. A couple of days ago, the newspaper published that an Arab country
- a military delegation to the Soviet Union to conclude an arm~ transaction.
What is the size of the arnry of that country, and what is their fighting capa-
bility? Who, in reality, is in charge of their technical military command?
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What is the confrontation capability of the~e purchased arms, and what is their
useiulness? Does communi~m sympathize with believers and as a result give them
the best of what it has or is it a way to circulate wealth "the billions" in
the East once and th~n in the West at another tim~? Is it not to prevent their
evil? But it wi11 not be prevented. Is it not to get their approval? But that
will not be gained. At the same time Russia derides Hafiz al-Asad by holding
ma.jor maneuvers near Latakiya. Lo you know why these maneuvers took place?
Were they to scare Israel? I wish they were. The reason for these maneuver.s is
to fri~hten the Syrian people.
Motto of the System
[QuestionJ Let us talk again about the Muslim Brotherhood...and about what is
going on in Egypt. What exactly happened to your magazine AIrDAWAT? Do you think
that it will be published again?
[Answer] What happened is that, on 29 July, people from the Bureau of Investi-
_ gation burst into the n~agazine office and confiscated papers. They also ordered
some workers to leave and take with them their clothes so that they could go
home. Then they closed the doors for about 6 hours and confiscated several copies
~~f. the last issue of August because they considered its contents offensive to
President Sadat and his policies. In reality, we are surprised by what took
place. Isn't that an abuse of the laws, freedom and constitution? Why was the
National Egyptian press silent about this aggression? They are pr~ising the system
for what is committed against the dignity and freedotn of the citizen. The vice-
squad sees and hears what is shown on television and does ncthing about it, even
though what is shown is corrupting the morals of the youths... But the Ministry
of Interior trembles at an article that is beneficial and does not corrupt or
harm. AL-AHR~1~I had the temerity to publish a cartoon that is heretical and an
assault on the constitution, and r.~body in the goverrnnent did anything about it.
All people know who is behind that heresy. If goverrnnent officials give it as
much attention as they give in pursuing the Muslim Brotherhood by various means
of spying and wiretapping, they would have spared this country the dangerous
consequences that are steadily approaching. But it seems to me that the motto
of the government toward tt~e Muslim Brotherhood is "any danger cotnpared to the
Muslim Broth~rhood is no danger."
tde Will Not Resort to Court
[Question] What will be your reaction toward governmental actions? Will you
resort to court?
[AnswerJ The Muslim Brotherhood exists with or without the magazine. Our call
will continue to get to people by every mean. Will we resort to court? This
will never happen...because God ~udges rightly between them and us. We will not
blame anyone, because we do not have the right to place blame. We are sure that
some of our officials demand a blind obedience...we refuse them what they want.
1.et everyone know that we are not the kind of people who become soft under entice-
ment, and we do not fear violence that frightens others...we believe what happened
to us had to happen, and what missed us could not happen to us. God values
everything. Thus what happened to us was a trial by God of us. Some used to be
suspicious concerning our stand toward the present system as an opposition, to the
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~point that some parties said that we support the present aystem by our opposition,
and that betwe~n the system and us there was a gentleman's agreement. God, may
he be glorified, meant to refute their suspicions.
Religious Incidents are False
[QuestionJ You are accused by the govermnent of being responsible for the recent
religious incidents. Wha[ is your opinion?
[Answer] That is a lie because we were the pacifying factor during the incidents.
During various religious incidents, the goverrnnent used to resort to us...and we
used to carry out our duty not for the govertmnent's sake, but because our religion
recommends us to do so.... I tell you that the convention of Islamic groups was
- the most important factor, with the help of God "may he be glorified," in ending
the incidents of "A1-Zawiyah A1-Hamra'." All people know that. Peaple felt it
even though officials denied it.... As for threats one day from here and one day
from there, nobody will feel their weight but those who are thr~atening. Because
not the weight of an atam can escape the Fye of God, the most high, whether on
~ earth or i~n Heavan.
[Question] There are diverse Islamic organizations which do not follow you.
How do you look at them when they call everyone who does not belong to them a
"sinner?" Is there any coord ination among all of you?
[A.iswer] Whoever confesses the two creeds, follows them, and performs his religious
duties is not a sinner, whether he belongs to an Islamic organization or not.
At any rate, we regularly meet with their officials to make onc work plan until
our goal is achieved.
To Whom It May Concern
[Question] If you are asked to say a word to anyone who is interested, what would ~
you say?
[Answer] I say chat every official in this country knows we?.1 that we are the
last people to conspire, plot, destroy, be sold, agitate, and provoke. In spite ~
of this, the investigation and intelligence bureaus concentrate on the Muslim
Brotherhood. Whoever believes we are not aware of it should correct his under-
standing.... We do not deceive anybody, at the same time no method did or will
ever deceive us no matter how gentle or compassionate it might appear to us.
I wish events would come to a head and close, confiscate, accuse, restrict and
try us. I wish that would take place. This is the melting of pure gold in order
to rid it of every impurity. We do not look forward to trouble...we ask God, may
he be glorified, for well-being. But if that is inevitable, people :;hould know ,
that for those whom Qadhayi and Assad could not alienate from th~ir religion and '
struggle, neither a hurricane nor the rage of storms, nor darkness wi_1 prevent
Y them from spreading their doctrine. ~"God hath purchased of the belie:�rers, their persons
and theix goods; For theirs (in return) Is the gaxden (of Paradise).i' Surah a1-Taubah; !
Section xiv: liT
COPYRIGHT: AL-WATAN AI.-'ARABI 1981
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EGYPT
FORMER NASIRIST OFFICIAL IN EXILE CAI.LS FOR REGONCILIATION
Paris AL-WATAN AL-~ARABI in Arabic 2~-29 Oct 81 p 49
/Article: "An Egyptian Opposition Voice Calls for Dialogue: 'Abd-al-Majid Farid:
- Let Us Give Mubarak a Few Months"/
/Text/ 'Abd-a1~Majid Farid, a leader of the Egyptian oppoaition abroad, who is
currently devoting himself full time to administering the Center for Arab Studies
in London, has an opinion on the latesz new developments in Egypt. In summary,
it is that the new Egyptian president must prepare to carry o~st a damestic recon-
ciliation witlhin Egypt. Howevar, the time for such a reconciliation has perhaps
not come.
We asked the man who worked ~or a long time alor.dsile Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir and still
is faithful tr~ his principles: "Through your icnowledge of the symbols of Egypcian
politics, do you believe that Husni MubaraY. will continue with the political plat-
form al-Sadat followed?"
He replied, "In principle, there is +~o one in the world who wholly resembles or
approximates another person. If wc accept thie supposition, th~ answer to the
question will be that Mubarak wi?1 not necessarily proceed with the same platform
and style that al-Sadat relied on in his overall treatment of damestic and foreign
political matters. It is tru~~ that Mubarak announced, right af~ar al-Sadat's
death, that hP would contint~e with thie policy and platfosm, but, in sgite of that,
I believe that it is still very early for the new Egyptian president to be putting
his notions for*.:~ and cryatallizing them in a specific direction, as far as foreign
or domestic s~fairs are concerned."
/,~uestion/ How is the opposition supposed to act while awaiting this crystalliza-
- tion?
/Answer/ My persona? opinion is that we must wait awhile. Waiting will give the
nek* president the ~~pportunity to work quietly, because he will be ~udged by numer-
ous foreign and dc;mestic factors. Not a long time will pass before everything be-
comes clear. After that, it will be possible for all the detachments of the
Egyptian oppositton to determine their position on Mubarak's policies and practices
on t'1e drnnestic and foreign levels. However, I stress that there are basic points
which will be the determining ones in this area, first among them Egypt's return
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' to Arab ranks. Mubarak musC find the way for such a return, because Egypt, by re-
turning to the Arab nation! will find the appropriate solutions to its political
and econamic problems in a better and more honorable maiuier for itself and its
history, instead of workin~ apart fram its Arab brothers.
Will It Allow It Or Not?
/Question/ But do you believe that the United States will allow a change in the
- course of Egyptian policy, especially since all evidence indicates the presence of
a concentrated, influential American presence in Egypt following al-Sadat's de-
parture?
/Answer/ Whether or not it will al.low it will be one of the basic challenges facing
Mubarak in the first period of hir; presidency, and he must find a solution to it
in the light of Egypt's interests, which are linked to Arab interests generally.
I know very well that the Americ,ans consider Egypt one of the basic pillars for
protecting their interests in t"r~e Middle East, principally the oil of the Gulf.
All the American research a.:~ studies we have in the Center for Arab Studies show
that American strategy in the Middle East up to al-Sadat's death was based on two
foundations:
The strategic alliance wiCh Israel.
A direct or indirect presence, with political and military weight in some countries
in the area, in the farm of military bases or joint facilities and maneuvers,
specifically in Eg~?pt, the Sudan and ~rkey. The Americana' alliance with al-Sadat
was essential to their strategy, as was their alliance w~ith the late Shah of Iran
as far as their interests in the Gulf went.
Continuing with his analysis of American strategy in the Middle East, he added,
"Perhaps that explains the state of real panic that occ:urred in American political
and military circles directly after al-Sadat's death, ~~specially since the n~w
American strategic plan in the region was in its f~.r~r,? stages, after ttie period
of review of its broad outlines had passed. If Lgypt in the new era continues to
pursue its forn~er line, that will greatly ease things for the Americans. This ex-
plains their extreme emphasis on the new regime in Egypt these days. I wonder if
Che Americans will continue to rely on Egypt as in the previous period, now that
it has became clear to them that the opposition in Egypt, with all its detachmanta,
has teeth and fangs and has demonstrated its effective influence on the course of
events."
In the course of the response he ssid, "It is necessary to spend a limited period
of time which might not be more than a few months for these aspects to be fully
clear."
The Killing Itself
/Question/ On the subject of the apposition, which detachment in it killed al-
Sadat?
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/Ans ~ In the first place it was al-Sadat who killed himself. I would almo~t say
that coaanitted suicide. It is a saying that violence breeda violence. A1-Sadat,
when he confronted the apposition with all its detachments, without distinguishing
between right and left, Moslems and Copta, when he shut down all the newspapere aad
ma,;azines that expressed differing opinions, detaining or transferring journalists
anc+ university professors from their places of work--when he did all this aad much
e1F besides, he was thus creating conditions and circumstauces by himself fram
which what occurred lately in Egypt hed to result, and because of which it occurred.
That is, a:.anfrontation of violence by violence, violence which reached the point
of assassination. So he is totally r~sponsible for killing himself.
/suestion/ Personally are you in agreement with what has happeaed, that is, the
assassination and liquidation of al-Sadat in the manner in which it h~ppened?
/Answer/ In principle, I am not in agreement with the idea of assaseination.
Assassination in itself does not end anythiag. That is a style which violates the
nature of the Egyptian people and it is a platform in 8gypt which ia new, except
for some limited stages in Egyptian hietory. If we review all the acts of political
assassination in Egypt, we will see that they occurred aa ~3 result of reaching a
stage of "total repression of the expression of divergent opinions." Therefore I
warn that continuing this style in the modern era will result in continued blowups
and major incidents in Egypt. On this subject, I hope that the new regime will take
this historic truth seriously, try to make a national reconciliation with the op-
position, and pur all Egypt's interests abave all interests or connections. This
is the only proper way to start a new stage in Egypt's history.
/Question/ Are you optimistic that there ia a likelihood thst the new regime will
proceed to take such a step?
/Answer/ In any event, this type of step cannot be carried out in 24 hours. Let us
take our time and wait.
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EGYPT
TASK OF GETTING NATION TO RENOiUNCB ISRAELI LINK REVIgWED
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI~'in Arabic 30 Oct-5 Nov 81 pp 18, 19
/Article: "The 'Sinai Grace Period' Is the Problem--8gypt and the Arabs, between
Subjective and Objective Factore!'/
/Text/ Since al-Sadat's assassination a few weeks ago, the question hae arisen:
will Egype return to the Arab nation? The anewers eo far have been numeroue, as
have the bets. However, no Arab official has contacted the new Bgyptian preaident
to propose auch a return, and the Bgyptian preeident himeelf ie waiting for the
Arabs to come back to Egypt and not vice versa, because it is they who ~roke off
relati.ons with it. In this letter from Cairo, an attempt is ma~de to interprez
this "waiting" and its subjective and objective reaeona. IndepemdeAt judgment haa
it that the Fez sumnit will repeat the Baghdad confexence's invitation tu Husni
Mubarak to put him ~eriously in contact with Arab solidarity.
After his return from the Egyptian president's funeral, Claude Cheysson, the French
foreign minister, surprised public opinian with a statement that set off a diplo-
matic bomb when he said "Now that al-Sadat ia gone, a major obatacle that had been
~ obstructing the restoration of Bgyptian-Arab relationa has been eliminated."
In spite of the violet criticiame that this atatement met i:1 America and Weatern
Europe, as it was considered a diplomatically inelegant statement in these circles,
Cheysson held to his position and continued to interpret it an~d justify it in ac-
cordance with his conviction that there would be no gocdin any efforts made for
the sake of peace as long as Egypt was isolated from the Arab situation.
Cheysson's statement is correct, but it is seriously deficient because he has taken
into consideration only the subjective factor, embodied in the peraon of al-Sadat,
who until the moment before hia assassination wae continuing to bet on Iarael
against the Arabs, Palestine snd Sgypt's Arabhood, burning all bridges between his
regime and the Arab nationaliet position. At a time when he was praisi:.e "Begin~s
honesty and nobility," he was describing all the Arab rulera in the vileet terme
principally imbecility. At the end, as an Arab prime minister esid, he apared no
one except Preaident Numayri, President Siad Barre and Sultan Qabus.
Ther.efore, the continued rule or doaninance of the stage by al-Sadat's personality
ruled out from the beginning any attempts, however covert, to'repair the bridgea
between Egypt and the rest of the Arab nation. �
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In this context, Claude Cheysson's first reading was correct, as wae his second
reading on the impossibility of arriving at peace by isolating 8gypt. The two
readings are correct, but when one pauses before these two points their inner
meaning collapses, and here Cheysson cames to appear as a person who is given as
an example in the Arab aituation of breaking up the facts by reading the verse of
the holy Koran that says "Do not draw near to prayer," then stopping on purpose
_ before the end of it--"while you are drunk."
The Objective Side
Cheysson, in his reading, neglected the Camp David agreement, which is the objective
side of the issue and is more important than the sub~ective one. In building
Egyptian-Arab bxidges, the Egyptian regime, which al-Sadat hae departed from and
which he left to his vice president, Husni Mubarak, i,asically cames up against the
obstacle of Camp David. This obstacle has been aggravated by the detention of
figures and leaders of the Egyptian nationalist movement, which is agaiast the
peace and normalization, becauee, while the issue of the detentions has an internal
side, no one ahould ignore that it has an Arab nationalist eide: no one can con-
siuer that Egyptian bridges could extend to the Arabs over the bodiae and the free-
doms of the domestic national movement.
From the moment al-Sadat vanished, the refrain of Egypt's return to Arab ranks has
been repeated. That is a refrain that characterized by a concealment of and de-
liberate refusal to see Camp David. The American end European press has written
that circles in the Arab league are atudying the possibility of inviting Egypt to
take part in the Fez suamit to be held toward the end of November, and that the
new Egyptian officials have agreed to take part in the confE:rence on condition
that it be poatponed till next year. However, the aecretariat general of the
league hastened to deny the American and Buropean press' notion anri declared that
no one had raised the idea of inviting the Bgyptian regime to take part or of
postponing the date for holding the conference.
Here the same refrain shifts to Rabat, in a new musical context. The American and
European press has reiterated that King Hassan the Second is seriously worki.:g as
a mediator to bring Egypt back ko the league after a long absence, and that to thae
end he sent his premier Matti Bouabid to Cairo to be his representative at al-
_ Sadat's funeral and to broach the plan with Husni Mubarak. However, the fact that
Bousbid did not appear in the funeral procession cancelled this refrain as well.
Finally, the refrain in the American and European press ahifted to Riyadh and took
the form of a Saudi formulation on the multifaceted efforts that are covertly be-
ing made to restore Egyptian-Saudi relatione to the atate they were in before Camp
David, as if nothing had happened: However, an official Saudi apokeaman hastened
to deny that any contact of that kind had been made.
Then came the role of Husni Mubarak, who, after he had asaumed the presidency,
announced that none of the "Arab frienda" (note the use of the word "friends" in-
stead of "br4thers") had got in touch with him on reauming relations, and that he
personally considexed that the resimo~ption of relationa had to come sbout through
the Arabs' initiative because they were the ones who had broken t~:air relations
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with Egypt, as a result of their opposition to the Camp David policy. Mubarak also
announced that he was loyal to this policy wh{ch the former president had drawn up
and paid for with his 1ife. He added that the restoration of relations with tihe
Arab "friends" was in nu event to be a aubstitute for peace and friendship with
Israel.
Thus the objective fact governing the poeition in the region has became clearly
crystallized: this is that the Camp David policy is what severed the relations bE~
tween Egypt and the Arabs, is what prompted the Egyptian army to assasainate al-
Sadat (one of the threa engineers of Camp David), and lastly is what is standing
as a stumbling block to the restoration of Egyptian-Arab relatione to their natural
course even though the subjective element in the rift has been eliminated.
The Regime and the People
However, this fact, simple and central as it is, interacts, following al-Sadat's
assassination, with a fact of extreme complexity. When the Arabe declared the
rift with Egypt and suspension of Egypt's memberahip in the Arab League, following
al-Sadat's rejection of the Baghdad conference offer, they were careful to make a
distincCion between the regime and the Arab people in Egypt. It is to be observed
that this concern and distinction were most intense following the 35-second opera-
tion that ended al-Sada~'s life, and the slogan "Glory to Arab Egypt and death to
traitors" was raised.
This concern assumed an intense aspecC, to the point where some Arab parties re-
corded a sort of despair over Egyptian popular movement against the regime and
_ belittled the weight of the nationalist oppoaition with all its parties. These
_ nationalist forces today are returning to the ranks of the Arab forces which have
continued to be careful to distinguish between the regime and the people and to
have confidence in the powers and the genuine nature of the people.
It appears, in following the course of events, that the new Egyptian pre,3ident is
basing himself on a policy of two contradictory linea--first, his declaration that
he would continue with the policy of Camp David, the peacz and the normalization
of relations with Eoypt, and second, a suspension of al-Sadat's attacks on the
Arabs, some aspects of which were obscene, and the opening of a dialogue with so?.~e
forces in the domestic opposition, in lieu of dealing with them through the agencies
of repression and the well-known Law on Impropriety.
Is the Opposition Plural?
Same observers nate that the positions of the domestic opposition over the new
president are starting to differ. The Socialist Labor Party, represented by its
head, Ibrahim Shukri, declared conditional support for Husni Mubarak in the course
~f the referendum on the presidency, and after that a meeting between him and Hueni
Mubarak occurred. After this meeting Shukri declared, "The current circumstances
in Egypt are delicate and sensitive," and said that he still opposed the Camp David
agreements but supported President Hueni Mubarak in confrontin.g Ist~ael, ending the
policy of erunity toward the Arabs, and promising release of dptai:~ed persons. He
was eager to define some of the points on which he supported the new preaident's
orientation.
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Wholly to the contrary, the National Progreesive Unionist Grouping, after its
emergency meeting chaired by Khalid Muhyi-al-Dia, its secretary general, declared
that Husni Mubarak's decision to proceed with the Camp David policy had coca~elled
~ the grouping to vote "no" on his election ae pres~dent. However, the party aecre-
tary went on, "Mubarak's press and television sta~ements following the referendum
on his steps, which were aimed at etopping attacks on the Arabs, rapidly ending
the investigation into the det~inees and relea3ing everyone whose guilt is not
proved, are statements which contain a poeition that deserves au~port." Nonetheless,
the new Egyptian president did not invite Khalid Muhyi-al-Din to meet him, and this
indicates a cl