JPRS ID: 10186 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Sequence Number: 40
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/ 10186
14 Decernber 1981
West Euro e Re ort
p p
(FOUO 65/813
FBIS FOR~EIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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NOTE
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JPRS L/10186
14 December 1981
WEST EUROPE REPORT
(FOUO 65/81)
- CONTENTS
THEpTER FORCES
FRANCE
Gallois Interviewed, Voices Viewa on 'Zero Option'
(Pierre Gallois Interview; LA STAMPA, 1 Dec 81) 1
Briefs
Missile's Range Political 3
ITALY
Briefs
Reagan's Disarmament Proposal 4
F.CONOMIC
FEDERAL REPiJBLIC OF GERMANY
Metalworkers' U�ion Strategy To Combat Unemployment
(Heiko Tornow; STERN, S Nov 81) 5
ITALY
Svimez Report Cites North-South Economic Gap
(Nando Mazzei; IL SOLE-24 ORF., 25 Oct 81) 7
POLITICAL
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMe~?NY
Points of Disaension Setween xohl; Geiealer Noted
� (Ludolf Herrmann; CAPITAL, Nov $1) 9
- a - [III - WE - 150 FOUO]
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FRANCE
PS-Deputy, Government Relations; Economic, Foreign Policy
(Lionel Jospin Interview; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 17 Oct 81) 12
ITALY
Alleged Socialist P~an To Split CGIL Union
(IL MONDO, 9 Oct 81) 18
Drop in Union Memberahip, b~ Renzo Rosati
Anti-Inflationary Pact, by Lorenzo Scheggi
GENERAL
FRANCE
Ariane Launch Delay 24
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THEATER FORCES FRANCE
GALLOIS INTERVIEWED, VOICES VIEWS ON 'ZERO O1�TION'
PM031519 Turin LA STAMPA in Italian 1 Dec 81 p 5
[Interview with General Pierre Gallois by Paolo Patruno: "Zero Option Leads
Only ta U.S. Disengagement in Europe" in Paris; date rcot given]
[Text] Paris--"In Geneva the t~mericans are negotiating with the objective of
the 'zero option.' To pr.event the deployment of the Euromisailes, the Soviets
are offering a reduction in their nuclear weapons and perhaps a partial
�,aithdrawal of their SS-20's. But if the negotiations end with an agreement,
' Europe will have little reason to be pleased or to applaud. Because in any
case it is taking a big gamble." General Pierre Gallois, internationally
famous strategist, author of ~ dozen studies of military strategy and inter-
national relations and one of the creators of the French strike force under
De Gaulle, expressed in an interview granted to LA STAMPA all his reservations,
as a specialist, about the Ceneva negotiations and above a11 about European
policy.
[QuestionJ Why is Europe in danger?
[Answer] The problem is very simple: what specif ically does the U.S. zero.
option offer mean? It means that the United States will relinquish deploy3ng
its Pershing II and cruise missiles in NATO countries served by U.S. personnel.
In other words, Reagan is backtracking from Carter's proposal, correcting the
"imprudent" levity of his predecessor at the White House and in practice
. facilitating a disengagement from the E,iropean theater, It is absolutely senseless
and id9otic that European politicians immediately supported and applauded
Reagan's zero nption proposal.
[Question] But in exchange for the nondeployment of the Euromissiles the
United States wants to secure a similar zero option from the Soviets.
[Answer~ What, in fact, will the Americans be ab~e to ob tain, after many efforts?
Perhaps ttiat the US~R will reduce its number of missiles targeted on Europe a
littlP, perhaps by a few hundred? But it is certainly the older weapons that
will be put into storage. What about the SS-20's? The Russians might, as a
demonstration of good will, agree to halt their deployment, reduce their numbers
or pul~ them back a few hundred kilometers. Even deployed in the Urals the
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' Soviet SS-20's c~uld still hit the majority of main nerve centers in central
West Europe. So what will we have achieved? Eurepe would remain the ~TSSR's
hostage, with th e additional drawback of the U.S. disengagement.
_ [Question] Why have European politicians supported the U.S. zero option
proposal: why did they not insist instead on the deployment of the Euromissiles?
[Answer~ The European leaders, starting with Chancellor Schmidt, have displayed
great ignorance of the problem of their countries' security. They are chasing
public s~lpport and do nct want *_o be accused of bellicosity. But they would
do better to explain the real situation to people. They have been wrong from
the outset. They should have reached an agreeanent with the Americans to form
a fleet of 20-30 submarines deployed in the various seas and canstantly on the
move. Secrecy would have been safeguarded and the Euromissiles would have
retained the advantage of mob3lity.
[Question] So what is the choice now, Gener.al Gallois?
[Answer] In my opinion the zero option is inconsistent and su3c3da1 for us
Europeans, who would be its victims. By accepting it, the European leaders
are making their countries' future dependent an Russian good will.
f:luestion] In conclusion, is the choice between unconditional surrender and
- disaster?
[Answer] A disaster was a nightmare until 10 years ago. Now strategic changes
and weapons miniaturization have made this terrifying hypothesis less realistic.
There is still a possibility of a limited war, which could even be restricted
to a mere disarming action to neutralize military ob3ectives without hitting
the civilian populations.
[Question] So what can we expect from Geneva?
[Answer] As far a5 I am concerned, jt will be worse than the withdrawal of
thP Thor and Jupiter missiles from Europe under Kennedy.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Editr. LA STAMPA S.p.A.
CSO: 3104/53
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THEATER FORCES FRANCE
BRIEFS
MISSILE'S RANGE POLITICAL--The communique from the [President's office in the]
Elysee on 14 November, announcing the choice of the Hades tactical nuclear missile
for the years to come, included a figure underlined for the benefit of the Germans,
namely, the missile's range of 250 kilometers. The exiating Pluton misaile system
. has a range of only 100 kilometers. Stationed in France, it could hit only FRG
territory and the West Germans are quite aware of it. The Hades missile, however,
can reach the GDR from the Rhine. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French
- 23 Nov S1 p 19] [COPYRIGHT; 1981 "VEleurs actuelles"]
CSO: ~100/152
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THEATER FORCES ITALY
BRIEFS
REAGAN'S DISARMAMENT PROPOSAL--Rome--In an article in today's L'UNITA,
[secretary of the PCI Foreign Policy Studies Center] Romano Ledda recognizes
the major importance of the U.S. proposal, whose "philosophy reverses the
previous one: whereas before, rearmament was the precondition for any future
negotiations, now it is asserted that there is a desire to negotiate a compre-
hensive reduction of al? weapons." Nevertheless, the PCI representative identifies
"a fundamental contra3iction" in the U.S. President's speech. According to
Ledda, Reagan is placing himself in "a negotiating position that is neither
strong nor reas~nable" because it goes beyond even the Italian socialists'
stance--among tt~e most radical--on the zero option. Indeed, it aims not only
at the dismantling of missiles deployed since 1977, but also challenges the
previous situation which, Ledda maintains, was "by consent" recognized as
balanced. [Exc.erpt) [PM251551 Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 22 Nov �31 p 5]
CSO: 3104/52
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ECONOMIC FEDERAL REPUBLiC OF GERMANY
METALWORKERS' UNION STRATEGY TO COMBAT UNEI~LOYMENT
Hamburg STERN in German 5 Nov 81 p 242
[Article by Heiko Tornow: "'No Icing on the Cake'--Why the 1~fetalworkers' Union
Plans to Forgo High Pay Raises"]
[Text] Wolfgan Engelmann, deputy representative of the Metalworkers' Union in
Hamburg, had just explained his union's strategy for the impending contract
_ negotiations to the staff of the Kolben Schmidt firm in Hamburg--scanty percentage
raises but in return pensions at 60. The reaction surprised him. "For that
we'll strike, even on Christmas Eve!" To their union leader the metalworkers
announced willingness to strike.
"Pay pension" is the term that the Metalworkere' union seems to have used
successfully not only in Hamburg to mobilize its membership in spite of dire
economic progr.osis. In view of the alarmingly high unemployment--feared to
reach 2 million in the next winter--the metalworkers are urged to forgo parts of
their salary increase.
In return Hans Janssen, in charge of pay programs for the world's largest single
union, would like to wrest the following model from the industrialists of
Gasamtmetall: Metalworkers will "go on pension" at 60 instead of the current 63
years. The industry is to pay them 90 percent of their salaries. The employers
are also to pay social security contributions for them until the "paid
pensioners" qualify for their state retirement. At the same time the jobs
abandoned voluntarily by the older colleagues are to be filled by unemployed
younger workers.
Wolfgang Engelmann thinks that 70,000 younger metalworkers could take the place
of colleagues who retire early. But the Hamburg resident was given wrong figures
by the headquarters in Frankfurt--in an internal document of the Metalworkers'
union leadership a figure of barely 30,000 newly opened jobs is mentioned.
For Franz Steinkuehler, leader of the Stuttgart local of the Metalworkers' Union,
this figure is too low. Ne is agitating among union leadership and members for
a more comprehensive plan: In the future the workers reaching age 57 will work
only three-quarter time, at 58 only half time and should retire at age 59. The
union man has made calculations as to the benefit of this comprehensive
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suggestion for the labor market--67,622 jobs in the metal industry and 8395 among
steelworkers.
Steinkoehler also pleads that the pay pension should not be negotiated at the
same time as contract terms but later. The reason? The retirement policy is eo
complicated that the contract negotiati.ons planned for February 1982 would
unnecessarily be prolonged by it, and "we could be pressured for agreement."
That could mean that the union would be forced to make great con^essions in both
the salary increases as well as the paid retirement areas. However, Steinkuehler
wants to evoke just as few illusions about salary increases as union leader Janssen.
A shortening of the working life means that the firms would have to expend money
that will then not be available for higher salaries. Says Steinlcuehler: "Of
course we can't have that. That would be icing on the cake."
Opinions still differ about the ataount that metalworkers would have to give up
in their salaries in favor of early retirement. The Metalworkers' Union claims,
"Not even one percent of salary." The employers' union Gesamtmetall is talking
of 2 percent.
Behind the scenes union leaders are already talking about figures in a possible
contract: "We can be happy if we get to sign at 3.5 percPnt plus contract rates."
This would not even meet the inflation rate of 7 percent.
The employers still do not know how to react to the union proposal. Peter Stihl,
spokesman ~or the employers in Baden-Wurttemberg, last weekend flatly re~ected
the paid retirement. It would be so costly that pay increases for 1982 would
have to be "so unpleasantly low" that the union could not defend the contract
to its membership. Besides, pensions are a matter for the state and should remain
so.
On the other hand, the supreme federation Gesamtmetall praised the moderate tone
of the Metalworkers' Union. After all, employer representatives have already
calculated the benefits of a paid retirement for the firms. A younger staff is
more efficient. Besides, the employers could demand that the Metalworkers'
Union abandon its proposal for a 35 hour week in return for concessions in the
field of paid retirement.
The idea of paid retirement will be of concern for other branches of the industry
as we11. Even before mapping his own union's strategy Eugen Loderer, chief of
the metalworkers, obtained the approval of almost all members of DGB. Only the
Printing and Paperworkers' Union did not agree.
The other unions want to copy the paid retirement agreement if the Metalwork~rs'
Union's initiative is succ2ssful.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Gruner + Jahr AG & Co.
9240
CSO: 3103/99
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ECONOMIC ITALY
SVIMEZ REPORT CITES NORTH-SOUTH ECONOMIC C~P .
Milan IL SOLE-24 ORE in Italian 25 Oct 81 pp 1, 2
(Article by Nando Mazzei~
IText~ Rome--Industrialization and urban renewal arE ~he two main problems
imiolved in the issue of the South in this phase, aad these are the issues which
special intervention will have to concentrate on more in order to reduce the
persistent gap between North and South. The Svimez (Association for the Indus-
trial Development of the 5outh) 1981 report concentrates on these two aspects
of the situati~n in particular depth, pointing out that all the regions in
southern Italy are well below the national average in per capita production,
and only Abruzzo, and to some extent M~olise and Sardegna, show that they have
reached higher levels, above the average of southern regions, thanks to a type
of diversified industr.ialization with plants that have the lowest index of
sector3.a1 concentration, In these regions, according to the report, a trend is
developing which has already been encountered in the North and in the central
South in other decades, namely that of "an extension Cowards the South of the
territorial propagation of development." Farther south, in fact, one finds
areas in which intense urban and demographic concentration are a handicap to
development, or region3 like Ca,labria having the lowest index of industrialization
and production per capita or, finally, phenomena of regression like in ~aranto
and Brindisi, in Puglia, and Syracuse in Sicily. Ix~ this laat case, the diffi-
culties are due to a vast spectrum of factors, among which the difficulties of
large plants and the urban problem stand out, as we11 as demographic expansion.
These are becoming, more and more clearly, real obstacles to economic progress
and to the locaCion in these areas of new industries.
- It is with these obvious internal gaps within the area and with related prob~ems
that the policy for the South oi the 1980's will have to come to grips, inter-
vening not only at a national level but also at a regional level. Ttxe report
- emphasizes the impartance of industrialization to amass revenue, and insists on
rejecting as inadequate the suggestions of those who propose concentrating on
developing the tertiary sector and on deindustrialization as an alternative to
development. Only industry can guarantee the absorption of the excess labor
supply in the South (816,000 people, or 10 percent of the labor force, as opposed
to 882,000 in the Center and North, or 5.3 percent of the labor force). This
+ excess of labor wi.ll tend to continue in the South because uf the continuing
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expansion of the population of this area, despite the slower growth rate regis-
tered in recent years. Of course this stimulus to be given to industrialization,
especially sophisticated sectors, must not neglect the development of a tertiary
_ elite; but the report warns against the possibility of developing this type bf
tertiary sector in metropolitan areas like those in the South, because overpopu~
lation, scarcity of civic s4rvices and housing, their "operational failure,
unemployment, and urban det~erior.ation are phenomena which are strictly inter-
dependent and must be attacked jointly." Mere physica.l renewal is not enough,
the report warns, in this connection. There must be a social-urbanistic renewal
which makes it possible to find adequate solutions to the problems of employment
and unemployment through long-term intervention at a broad territorial level.
But to do this--in other words to do what policies for the South have not done in
the last decade--we must resort to ways of plaunin~ that link the political will
of the central authorities to that of local authorities.
As for the overall picture in the South this past year, the most significant data
in the report decry an increase in ~opulation, going from 34.9 percent of the
natioa's population in 1973 to 35.6 percent in 1980, and, for the same period,
an increase in the prop~rtion of the population employed in agriculture of from
41.3 percent to 46.7 percent and of those occupied in industry from 52.6 to 54.3
percent. For the same period, the added value of agriculture increased by only
0.1 while that for industry increased 0.7. Be~ween 1973 and 1980, bank deposits
increased froan 16.4 percent of the national tota~. to i7.6 percent, but jobs
diminished from 15.3 to 13.~ percent. In this past yea.r there has been a relative
contraction in private consumption, and a recovery in investment in absolute
values which does not correspond tu the rate of accumulation, however, which
fell in the South to 25.9 percent of the nationaZ average as compared to 29.5
percent in 1974. There was also a reduction in payments made by the state and
a 30 percent reduction in contributions made by the Cassa del Mezzogiomo (Fund
for Southern Italy) to productive sectors.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Editrice I1 Sole-24 Ore s.r.l.
9855
CSO: 3104/37
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POLITICAI, FEDEbtAI, REPUBLIC OF GEQMANY
- POIlVTS OB DISSENSION BETWEk.'N KOHL, GEISSLE;R NOT~D
Hamburg CAPITAZ in German Nov 81 PP ~4~ 15
LAA2`tiCle by Ludolf HeT'�'!!~A*+ni "Left Tur11,"~
~ex~ The SPD leaderehip trio ie at odde within itself = but
the CDII is not much better off. Helmut Kohl mu~t de~end him-
selP e~g~a:inet the attacke of hte own eecretary-general.
Opposition leader Helmut Kohl says he would rather not face the probleme confront-
ing Helmut Schmidt. For that matter, he does not need them beoause he hae probleme
of his own. The chanoellor ma.y be oonfronted Mith rebellion in the ranlcs but 3.n
- Kohl~s aase it is diaeension at the tap. Whenever he txiee to lay down opposition
etrategy, his marching ordere are thwarted by the very man who ahonld maintain a
relationehip of special.truat to the party c~airnoan.- the ~ecretaxy-general. Bat
Heiner Geiaeler, 51, doea not let a sitagle opportunity go by without underminiag
the authority of his peraonal friend, Helmnt Sohl. l~lhile the party ch,ai~man ie
atriving for harmor~y, Geiseler publicly ~a11e for "readinese to debate" aad an
- "opening for neer ideas." To ehow exa,ctly what ha mean~ by that~ he oY~era proof
of hie non-adherenae to the party line given out by goka]. in each and every medium
tha,t provides him With a fornm.
At the v~ery moment that the CAII/CSII domi.nated I.srid gov~rrvmente were prepariz~ to
introduae draft legielation in the Hnndeerat thb6t r?ould aurtail radicsil abuse of
the freedom of aeaembly, C:eiasler edviged the perty not to c~eate the impreseion
that it r?aa out to defend the sta?tue quo Mith the help of rubber bu7.leta aad re-
etrictions on t~he right to demonstrate. At the very moment t~hat young vote~e~
d3aappoiated by the coalition~s maohinations and the trealmees of the grovez~ment~
r?ere elowly turning to the CDII/QfiII, ths eaor~te~sy..,general oame out with the etate-
ment t~hat the trend againet the CTJU/CSII among yonng voters had not yet abated.
At the v~ery moment that the peace movement was even aausiag the SPD to hav~ eeoond
thou~ta, Geissler, the individualiBt Sxabiaa, wae trying to make the p~aaenike
in his own oamp :.ook better, calling Yors "~ore peaae, ffiore freedon from torae,
fe~+er r?eapone." He also adopted maverick positions on controvereial issuea which
had not been couated among those in whiah he had ar~r exg~~tiee before. Withon~
maah ado, he oame out againet arms ehipmente to 3audi-Arabia whoae g~avernment he
xeferred to w"uastable" and "lese than eerious." He revi~ted thi~ poaition later
but had by ~hen provi.ded fihe g~overnment, whiah had been nndeoided on the isaue,
with a mnch~eeded respite.
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More reaently, the prominent dmviationiet of whoa D~E)'PSCHE ZEITIIi~G eaid ia 1977
that he wae Milling to upeet "a~r emd all appleoas.-ta" ie trying to restrnetroa~s
the forei~ poliay orient4tion oY his party. &?hl vould lik~s to oes t~e govrrn~
ment g~o before the public by i~ss1P to e=plain the p~oblems t~e dstent~ po-
liay hae enoouatered. The perty leaderehip xae a11 tY1e a~ose smrp~is~d th~rsi~re
r~rhen a piece by Geiseler appear~d in the pnrty ~ s D~~OTSCB7~YD-iT~TIO]W-DI~fBT rhioh
Ba,id 3t was the CDII/CSU' e goal to enter into a ooatinuiag ezahou~g+e of id~eaa a~d
information with the So~viet lead~rehip. 'Phe tra'th ies ho~ov~r~ tha,t this ras not
eatirely unexpeated. Geiaeler had said several times p~iausly t~e?t the 01~U/II~IT
ehould provide Yor "more of aa open3s~g to the Saet."
gnother instanae xhen the differencee betw~en party ahait~a an~d seorot~y-
general becaane appasent wes during ths prep4ration~ for t}u Hambarg p~tty co~
grese in early November. Geiesler wanted to tura it into a yonth aseeab]tiy but
~ohl wan~ed to ae� the ].arg~e politioa,]. ieeu~ee debe~ted. gohl did wia o~tit ia th~'
end but forums for yonng people did ta~oa plsce aa ~rell ia t~hi.ah t~a p~rty x~s
sub~e~ted to public scratir~y.
Geisaler did not reatriat himselt to an.ah a,ttemtpts to nek,s the party abaiz~?
- aver into a figurehead who merely eYe~ntea ths poliaios of his sscretai.y-,g~sn~sral.
He went beyond t~at, looki~ng ior oppos~tunitiea to temt his strongth ags3aat t~.~at
of Helmut Kohl. Early thie yeouc~ the perty ahais~an had intor~sd t~ then p~rtr
me,nag+er tJlf Fink t~at he expoatad hin to step doma by t~e middle oi the ~ar.
Gefealer aountered by isauing a publio dsalaration of oonfidaaos on Finlc~s 'be-
half and the statement that Fink vonld et~r on the ~ob for as long a~ he ~aysd
Geiasler~s confidence. Ia fact, the labor lat+ does etipnlate ttist tha ~anmg~er
could only be diemiaeed by the sear~tary-,g~eneral; but if pa~rty loyalties ~rers
what they ought to be, there ie no qvsstiori aa to whoae wie~ea vov~].d bs reApea-
ted by the pa,r'ty hierarcby. ~
When Fink did etep down-and wes sent ~o Berlin as senator for eocial 4tfairs to
resolve the iseue-Kohl asked that the party me~ag~er~s pooition be abolished for
_ econom~r reasone. But Geiaeler once again mad~e uee oi hia prerogstiv~e and sppoin~-
ted Peter Radunski, head of the publie afYairs diri.sioa st party hsadquartaro~
as new party menager. In this case, a, comp~omiee we,s rea,ohed wi.th Badn~sld. hold- ~
ing down both ~obs eimultaaeouely.
In September, Geiseler aalled a press aonferenoe Kohl had e=p~ese]y aalaed n~ be
held to annonnce draft guidelines for the party oongr~es. Hy ~tu~ping the gan~
the secretary-,g~eneral oaused difYianlties for the p~rty whea snboeqwent ahax~g+ee
requeeted by the party presidium took on the air oi a palaoe r~volu~ion aga,inst
:e authore of t2~-., original draft.
Without a doubt, the arelatioriehip betwesn Helmat Kohl and hie eecsetary-g+eneral
ie in aha~mblee. It ie plain to eee #~hat the twA loaeer friends fro~m 8hiaeland-
Palatinate have different politiQal antecedente. Geiealer, whose Yather xorked ~
for the old Center Paz-ty, has remained a leftwing Cen~er Party politioian at
heart. Kohl, on the other hand, belongs to the enlightened aoneervative aamp--
a political orientatton ~he poetwar C~ d~veloped as ita mery orn oontribntion
to Gezma,n political life.
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This leaves the question unanewered whether a perty that aepires to taking over
the grov~s~m~ent cezt afford to laav~a its eecretary-~g+eneral flagrautly disregard the
v+ery precepta of party diecipline he ougi~t ia faat to nphold. As the ezecutor of
his part~r chairman~s policiee he aould aonceivably find his own viewa aonfliating
with them. But in snc,h a case, he would not rebel against ~hem but offer hie re-
aignation.
COPYRIGfl'1.': 1981 Gruner + Jahr AG & Co.
9478
Cso: 3~03/~33
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POLITICAL FRANCE
PS-DEPUTY, GOVERNMENT RELATIONS; ECONOMIC, FOREIGN POLICY
Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATFUR in French 17 Oct 81 pp 48-50
[Interview with Lionel Jospin by Albert du Roy and Kathleen Evin; date and
place not given.)
[Text] Today, the great debates for the Socialists are more
in the Parliament and in the antechambers of power than in
the somewhat deserted "old house." It is therefore on the
results of these 5 months of government action that Lionel
Jospin, first secretary of the Socialist Party, answered our
questions.
LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR: What do you think of Edmond Maire's statements?
Lionel Jospin: Two words: it is Edmond Maire's habit, before each Socialist
Party cangress, to assist us with his public advice. This time too, it must
be that. On the basic issues, I would like to recall that at this time the
nationalization battle against the Right and big business is beginning. Each of
us is freely choosing the place he will take in it.
LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: As first secretary of the Socialist Party, how do you
assess the new administration's actions 5 months after its installation? What is
going well? What is not going so well?
Lionel Jospin: I may lack objectivity: tnis government is my government. I
am not a member of it. But I am at its side, an actor and not a spectator or a
judge. The most important point is this one: the change in France really began
after 10 May. History has shown us so many parties who proclaim themselves
leftist when they are the opposition only to abandon all or part of their program
once in power. As for the Socialists, they are doing what they said they would
do on all the large issues. I well know that there are changes on some points, ~
such as on the energy problem. But they are moderate, and the reasons have been
given. In the end, I find that as f~r as the major social and economic problems
are concerned, based on which the Right was predicting our apocalypse, the govern-
ment is in control of the situation. We are still confronted w�~th unemployment
and inflation. But neither of the two evils can be attributed to us. And at
least we deny their inevitability. It can even be stated that the progress of
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unemployment is checked, and there is no side-slipping on inflation ~nd prices.
Finally, br~.3d structural reforms have begun--must we list them?--which will bear
their fruit in time.
LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR: Would you say, then, that the Socialists are not doing
any w~~rse than their predecessors?
Lionel Jospin: They are certainly doing differently. Furthermore, they are
doing somet-ing which does not show up in the indexes. They are re~Teating the
bases for true social cooperation in the fac~ cf the problems posed b}~ the crisis,
with the development of solidarity, of continuous dialogse between lab~r and
management, of decentralization of responsibilities and, in general, development
of social responsibility. But, let us be realistic, the situation is such that
we can hardly set victorious economic goals for ourselves in the short term.
We will be judged on the medium term.
LE NOUVET. OBSERVATEUR: No dark areas in this assess~,ent?
Lionel Jc~pin: I believe that there is a problem with the flow of information.
Primarily between the administration, the miniaters, thQir co-workers and the
parliamentary group. The work load and the work pace are such that the elected
officials sometimes feel they lack the time to participate in the drafting of
_ texts. They perceive them~ if I may say so, at the "finished product" level.
We would like to be informed at the "semi-finiehed product" level. I am dis-
covering that the parliamentary apparatus takes time. ::~wever, for our firsC
reforms we needed to go quickly. Things will go better in the future, I imagine.
There is also the problem of explaining our policy. The opposition speaks more
and does less. Today we tend to believe that our actions speak for themselves.
We should do a little more ed~~cating. And, concurrently, prevent some of our
officials from annotmcing project~ which are not yet decided upon, too early,
~ too quickly.
LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Must the Socialist Party, as happened in the debate on
immigrants, settle the possible disputes between its elected officials and the
administration?
Lionel Jospin: The party's executive board does not set itself up as arbitrator
between the parliamentary group and the administration. A matter is only referred
~ to it, hy *he president of the group, when there is a problem among the members
of Parliament. Then it is the executive board who decides. The Socialist
- Party is not a cog in the state wheel, it belongs to society. It must inform the
Socialist ministers of the state of opinion, of the views of its militants and
its officials. But it cannot constan~cly take the place of the executive.
LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR: What is the governmenC's ma*gin of freedom with regard
to the Socialist Party program?
Lionel Jospin: The government is not ~ust socialist. It is a government of
, union of the Left and even of a broader assemblage. This simple fact creates
a certain distance with regard to the Socialist Party. Furthermore, the govern-
ment is faced with the need to make decisions which weigh directly on the life
of the Frencr. and to measure their consequences accurately.
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_ LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR: Does this distance represent the margin between what is
_ desir~ble and what is possible?
Lionel Jospin: The government must realize as much of the desirable as possible.
For the moment it is applying the program approved by the people during the
presidenti~.l election. To go beyond that will only be possible after a demo-
cratic vote. Of course, the farther one goes, the more new problems can arise
for which this program provides no answer. The Socialist Party will have to
express its opinion more often.
LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: I~ it possible to foresee a split between the future
choices of the Socialist Party and those of the administration?
Lionel Jospin: Possible, yes. Probable, no.
LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: What is the status of your relationship with the Com-
munist Party?
Lionel Jospin: The Communist Party respects government solidarity as th~
essential. Having said this, it is obvious that it cannot renounce its own
existence, or autonomous expression. But it seems to me that its tone is
~ adapted to the new period. As we are, it is retaining its right to legitimate
criticism. Basically, our relationship is good enough, which is a pleasant
change from the previous period. But is it the sign of an in-depth change?
Only time will tell. For my part, I am not naive: I have forgotten nothing.
And I am following what is occurring in the Co~urtist Party with attention.
For example, the reasons for its decline, at le~st electorally. I did not know
that the causes were so distant.
LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Are you going to review the structure of the leftist
union municipalities between naw and 1983?
Lionel Jospin: The power ratio between the leftist partiea has obviously
changed. Drawing up the lists for the 1983 municipal elections is not yet on
the agenda. When the time comes, we will, as usual, take the realities into
consideration.
LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Contrary to the history of the Socialist Party since
Epinay, it seems that the next congress in Valence, at least in appearance,
must mark the disappearance of "political factions." Does this seem possible
and desirable to you?
Lionel Jospin: The answer to this question must not be institutional, but
- political. If the elimination of the factions is an ar_tuality, it is good.
If it is a fiction, it is bad.
LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: Recently, at Conflans-Sainte-Honorine, Michel Rocard
violently contested the new distribution of influence within the Soc:talist
Party?
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J
Lionel Jospin: Ttie problem will be brought up and settled in form and in sub-
stance within the party. The former "A" faction presented a text on political
orientation which I signed with other comrades. We heard from all sides: "We
are in agreement! We want to sign!" We made only one ccmdition: to have a
_ ma~ority within the directing bodies of the party (steering committee, execu~
tive board, secretary's office). In our discussions, no one, to my kaowledge,
has contested the fact that in a vote among the militants we would undoubtedly
have obtained clearly more than 51 percent of t:~e vote. If this had been con-
tested, it would have sufficed for each faction to agree to "count its own,"
which I supported. Throughout the party, the leaders discussed and the mili-
tants voted on the results of these negotiations. Tais is the reality. There-
fore, no grandiloquent ~catement!
LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR: Has admisston of the former minorities to the Socialist
Party's national secretariat been achieved?
Lionel Jospin: For some of them, it has. For others it is completely possible.
This will depend on the congress.
LE NOWEL OBSERVAT~UR: Let us go back to the evaluation. Do you feel that
the government has completed the nationalizations that ~aere necessary, or that
it should go further?
Lionel Jospin: Before going further, it must first succeed with the nationaliza-
tions. This success will be achieved if the rate of investment grows, leading
to an acceleration of technical progress, co gains in productivity, to the
modernization of these companies. This effort should cause a stabilization
and even an increase in the number of ~obs. It will contribute to our balance
of trade through a better response to the requirements of international competi-
tion within the framework of finar,cial stability. There is no doubt of success
as far as the nationalized companies themselves are concerned. Just look at
the results of the existing public enterprises.
The aim of the nationalizations is not to stand in the way of the development of
individual initiative and small and medium-size companies, but to support and
encourage them. Public management should also enable the growth of democracy
in work, and it will be necessary to pay particular attention to organizing
worker participation in the management of these companies.
LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR: Is there a risk that certain deputies will profit from
the parliamentary debate to go further?
Lionel Jospin: I don't think so. Since to have completed alrexdy the national-
izations which we are completing is a big event. In relation to the economic
policy and the ideological taboos which still dominate in the Western world,
it is a "split."
LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR: Regarding national solidarity, many were shocked to
see the Socialist Party oppose the participation of officials in the effort
against unemployment.
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Lionel Jospin: First of all, let us note that under the solution decided upon,
the officials are on ex~ctly the same level as the others: if their incomes
reach a certain level they ;aill pay the unemployment tax.
LL NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR: But when, as a tradeoff ~or their ~ob security, it
was a question of having them contribute to the UNEDIC [National Union for
Employment in Industry and Commerce], thus aligning them with the other wage
earners, the Socialist Party was opposed.
Lionel Jospin: It is true, we must avoid having Cwo workers' classes~ one
threatened by unemployment, and the other protected. But the Socialist's
traditional ,slogan is "the righC to work" and not "work is a privilege." And
- the tradition that I perceived in the union's action was respect for the
advantages acquired. The disadvantaged sre ~rogressively being brought to the
level of the advantaged and not the reverse. Our goal is to reduce the number
of unemployed, not to punish those w:~o are employed. I am adding a political
explanation to our position: was it the role of a Socialist g~vernment to do
what no rightwing government has dared to do in 23 years? Particularly winen
opposed by a category of French people who, in the large majority, voted for
the Left? In polittcs, I don't recommend masochism.
LE NOU~IEL OBSERVATEUR: Are you satisfied with the tax reform?
Lionel Jospin: There has been no tax reform. We have not had the time and
therefore we are still depending on an un~ust and failing tax system t~ finance
most of the budg~t. In this situation, the government has been comp~-1.led to
draw f rom certain categories which it would have been desirable not to touch
_ again. But all the new fiscal measures are going in the right di:_~~tton. Is
it necessary to mention the tax on wealth, the leveling off of tax reli.f
for dependents, the fight against tax fraud? And then we would have to discuss
expenditures. They mean: economic recovery, creation of jobs, reseQr~~h ef-
forts, social justice. There, the Right is silent. In-depth tax reform is
urgent in order to finance this policy more equitably. It must be conducted
seriously.
LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR: Do the President's statements on the East/West ba'lance--
or rather imbalance--conform to the basic beliefs of the Socialist Party?
Lionel Jospin: Yes, they are in agreement as long as it is well noted that
since the motion by the Metz Congress, the situation has changed: the invasion
of Afghanistan, the change in the American admtnistration, the Iranian crisis.
It is the facts which have changed, not our principles.
LE N~WEL ~BSERVATEUR: Doesn't this policy offen a pacifist sympathy within
the Socialist Party?
Lionel Jospin: I will say, as doPS Francois Mitterrand himself, that within
the Socialist Party what interests us is peace and not pacifism in itself.
Munich was, it seems, a victory for peacel All Socialists know that the danger
exists in the West, with a disorganized rearmament, as well as in the East,
with excessive military deployment. In Europe there is an imbalance which
~ favors the Soviets. Balance must be reestablished towards the lower end of t:~e
scale, if not it will establish itself at the upper end, which will be danqeroua
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for peace. Our policy must be ~onsidered in all its aspects. A step such as
the French /Mexican declaration on Salvador is a good demonstration that it is
not a matter of being Atlantic or anti-At~antic, but of a�firming principles
while proposing concrete solutions.
LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR: In taking sides on the political problems of the con-
tinent of South America, France is directly opposed to the United States. Can
this new attitude go beyond the symbolic level?
Lionel Jospin: The political, historical and cultural links between Europe
and Latin America are as obvious and of earlier existence thaa the economic
and strategic links formed between the United States and South America. Aad
ouer the past 10 years, the Socialiat Party has established privileged relations
with the democratic movements on this continent which are struggling against
dictators. Despite ~he different levels of development, these countrie~ are
very close to us. To accept the reality of dictatorship in their countries
is to accustom ourselves to the idea here. If democracy is reborn there, it
will be strengthened here. The United States wrongly places Latin America's
problems within the East/West contexC. For us and for the Socialist Interna-
- tional, whose leaders are not suspected of pro-Soviet tendencies, it is above
all a matter of autonomous economic and social development and of respect for
human rights. It is tragic to make a whole part of this continent, so rich
in potential, improductive through violence and terror. Europe must act.
LE NOWEL OBSERVAT:UR: What lesson do ,you draw from Sadat's assasi~nation?
Lionel Jospin: What struck me at the funeral service was that the Egyptian
people had to be held back. This is symbolic: to conduct a foreign policy
as original as his, President Sadat would have had to have had a domestic
consensus.
For his economic and social policy no doubt would not enable attainment of this
gaal. What also strikes me is that all the Western countries were represented,
but almost no Arab countries. His friends were there, but not his family.
The foYV?er considered Sadat a man of peace (this is also my opinion) the latter,
a traitor. Such a gap is concerning. But how can an area of understanding
be reestablished between a part of the Third World and ourselves? If Western
rationalism means massive imemployment, shantytawns, malnutrition, flagrant
inequalities, and outside interference, it will be re~ected. And this has
already begun.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 "Le Nouvel Observateur"
9693
CSO: 3100/101
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POLITIC~LL
ITALY
ALLEGED SOCIALIST PLAN TO SPLIT CGIL UNION
Drop in Union Membership
Milan IL MONDO in Italian 9 Oct 81 pp 12-13
[Article by Renzo Rosati: "The Desire Count"]
[Text] The first warning signal arrived, once again, from union membership.
A decrease in membership of 20,G~0 among Piedmont metalworkers and just as
many among those in Lombardy. In the entire Lombardy industrial sector, 40,000
members are about to leave the union. From north to south the decline follows
the location of the traditional bastions: 30 percent of Puglia laborers will
not renew their membership and, in Bari alone, 5,700 out of 10,000 will quit.
At the end of November, when CGIL [Italian Confederation of Labor], CISL [Ital-
ian Confederation of. Labor Unions] and UIL [Italian Union of Labor] will take
stock, one will find out, perhaps, that in spite of substantial gains among
retirees, 1981 has been even worse than 1980 which already was a bad year (the
CGIL alone lost 93,000 members among active workers, partially made up by
retirees) .
However, on a general overview of union strength nev~~r as full of uncertainties
as at the present time, tt~e decrease in membership i.s not the leading problem
worrying national and local officials; who, nevertheless, do nat underestimate
its effects, including material ones: Angelo Airoldi, FIOM [Federation of Metal-
lurgy Industry Workers] secretary from Lombardy, explains: "Our revenue will
be 2 billion lire less. As far as the general picture is concerned, this is
like saying tliat, atl of a sudden, Genoa FIOM would be closing down." "What is
happening," points out Agostino Marianetti, CGIL's number two man, "is not that
ti~e union is being re_jected, but that it is being increasingly criticized."
Ottaviano 1)el Turcc~, rLM [T'ederation of Metalworkers] secretary, remarks: "Lay-
offs, unemployment, wild economic crisis are the causes for the reduction in
union memhership. If we want to regain credibility, in addition to membership
we must look elsew}~ere, forgetting about the figures."
1.ook in wtiat direction? Rank and file and top management agree in indicating
member representation as the key question. The factory council mechanism, through
which representation is exercised, seems, in fact, to be ~ammed. And, according
to some, to have gone wild.
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The UIL, as it has been happening i.ncreasingly more frequently, has ignited the
powder. Massimo Mazzantini, Milan's UIL secretary, in a document on the rela-
tions between the factory and terrorism at Alfa Romeo, sternly accused the coun-
cils for failing to represent the members, for failing to nonitor their mood,
for failing to observe the biennial expiration of the renewal of the mandates,
and for failing to exercise any control over the rank and file and on them-
selves. "A state of affairs," concluded Mazzantini, "that not only places the
representation in a crisis, but that opens new space to terrorists."
Immediate and violent was the rebuttal of the CGIL and CISL. "Does the UIL,
perhaps, wish ta go back to the method of long lists, of internal co~ittees
like those of the 1950's?" asks Antonio Pizzinato, CGIL secretary for Lombardy.
"Factory councils are the labor union's backbone for unity," remarks Sandro
Antoniazzi, Milan's CISL secretary, "let's take any necessary initiative for
strengthening our relation with the rank and file, but let's be careful in avoid-
ing the councils' debacle."
The matter also involves southern industries. On Wednesday, 23 September, the
general assembly of factory councils convened at Brindisi's petrochemical plant
tu deal with the renewal of mandates: 105 out of 150 delegates deserted the meet-
ing. Three days earlier, at Taranto's ITALSIDER, a 2-hour strike called by FIOM
failed, not only because the rank and file boycotted it, but a large number of
union delgates as well. Giovanni Cazzato, Taranto's CGIL secretary, admits
that: "We have a very serious representatio:~ crisis. We have a 70-percent
rate of unionization, but at this point it is a theoretical figure, in view
of the fact that only 20-30 percent of the workers participate in meetings and
strikes.
The contrasting reactions among the three confederations and the various cate-
gories toward the proposals on economic policies introduced by Giovanni Spado-
lini's government, must be added to the decline in membership, to the matter of
factory councils and to the representation crisis. And, probably, many aspects
of the same problem are involved: the union model, born out of the 1968 and
1969 struggles, finalized by unifying mechanisms, solid and cohesive in the last
decade, is probably undergoing a crisis.
It is too soon to say that the union's unity is in crisis: certainly, the union's
dream of the 1970's is in crisis. The leadership and the rank and file, all
realize the immediate danger of this situation: that the spirit of confedera-
tion, the return to parallelism toward the parties intended as home base, in
other words, the desire to count may prevail.
There are those who believe that the only remedy to this danger, which would
truly cause the end of the union's unity, would be to listen directly to the
voice of the workers. It is an old idea of Giorgio Benvenuto, which the UIL's
leader is now reintroducing with vigor; Benvenuto told IL MONDO: "To exorcize
the fear of counting, there is only one method; make the workers count. Ask,
therefore, their opinion on the whole range of problems to be discussed:
whether to act on the automatic wage indexation or directly on salaries;
whether to favor contract renewals or to accept a partial pause in exchange
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for guarantees on severance pay and mobility. But it is urgent that voting be
reintroduced in the factories and on concrete proposals. Because of thi~ point
we don't know anymore what is the rank and file and who are the pPripheral
members."
Starting from these considerations, Benvenuto is about to launch an offensive
against the present factory council mechanism, "which now," he states, "is
just a caricature of what it should be." In support of the initiative, the UIL
cites the results of a survey conducted in 525 factories in the industrial tri-
angle and in Veneto. The resulting picture is alarming: each factory has its
own rules for the election of union delegates, the 2-year expiration term far
the renewal is seldom enforced, there is no record, either territorial or na-
tional, of factory councils. The same clause on union protection, prescribed
by the workers; bylaws, is applied at FIAT and Alfa Romeo under different terms.
Furthermore, the present composition of the councils no longer reflects the
structure of the labor force; according to the UIL's survey, 90 percent of union
delegates are laborers and, of these, only 70 percent are of the third level
(assembly line for metalworkers): "It is obvious," Benvenuto remarks, "that
there is a leveling at the lowest ranks, that, practically, workers have no
representation and that all this hinders any discussion on professior~alism."
What Benvenuto wants to accomplish on a large scale, someone has alreadv accom-
plished here and there. For example, a survey by the Pietro Seveso foundation
on FILM's [presumably FIOM] and CISL's metalworkers shows that 50.6 percent of
the members seek better pay and recognition of professionalism, that 68.8 per-
cent wuuld accept mobility, even if negotiated, that only 15.3 percent believe
that the union should not get involved with productivity. In appearance, ,slmost
the opposite of CISL's traditional line. Also party affiliations have been
changing: in 10 years, the DC decreased from 80 to 4~1 percent, the PSI rose to
22.5 percent from 11 ~ercent, the PCI to 18.5 percent from 5 percent.
It i.s in this multicoloracl picture that the desire to count and Benvenuto's
attempts of having the workers count are being injected. Until now, this last
proposal has been received by the other confederations with some diffidence:
Benvenuto is being accused of open gambling, namely without taking into account
the UIL's real dimension, of waving the referendum like a slogan without the
support of concrete contents and adequatz structures for its realization. How-
ever, greater con~ensus is becoming apparent, especially as far as the CGIL is
concerned. "Without doubt," Marianetti admits, "we are at fault in our rela-
tions with the rank and file. In general, union culture is at a standstill,
we have to start it in motion."
Anti-Inflationary Pact
Milan IL MONDO in Italian 9 Oct 81 pp 13-15
[Article hy Lorenzo Scheggi: "Anti-Inflationary Pact--Who Will Be the First
To Break It"]
['Text] If it is broken because of the government which breaks down, the union
does not break down, othenaise it breaks down." The interpretation of this
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politically union-oriented riddle, authored by Ottaviano Del Turco, FIOM-CGIL
adjunct secretary general, is not difficult. In a few words, it means that
what is still left of the union's unity is in the hands of Beniamino Andreatta,
treasury minister, and in those of Giovanni Marcora, his industry colleague.
It means, even more clearly, that at this point the union, after months and
months of polemics on the anti-inflationary pact, automatic wage indexation,
the dynamic of salaries, can manage to stay united only as far as rejection of
the government's measures is concerned. "But if instead of saying no, we should
say yes," many of the leading confederation officers told IL MONDO, "we would
arrive at ruptures that this time could be truly irreparable."
The truth is, in fact, that among the many issues at stake in this maxinegotia-
tion among government, unions and business, there is also the future of the rela-
tiuns among the CGIL, CISL and UIL, which seems now destined to follow predeter-
mined tracks on the basis of what the developments of the anti-inflationary pact
will be. The vi~ible solutions are, substantially, two. Both, however, are sub-
ordinated to a premise: the anti-inflationary pact, conceived originally as a
social pact, is by now mere fantasy. The communists, afraid of signing a blank
debit note on behalf of a government and a ma~ority to which they do not belong,
do not want it. Nor do many Christian democrats, for fear that layman Giovanni
Spadolini may make it where all their colleagues who succeeded one another at
Palazzo Chigi failed. But what are these two scenarios? How will the unions
react in one case or the other?
There is Neither a Pact Nor Traumatic Breaks
Giorgio Benvenuto, for example, sustains that "partial agreements may be reached,"
as an alternative. Several small agreements, Del Turco sustains, "so that nobody
can claim complete success or complete failure." CGIL socialists sustain that
"on the basis of several partial agreements it may be possible to obtain at least
some results which are not completely negative so that the union may consequently
honor the commitment of handling the dynamic of salaries, maintaining them
within the agreed ceiling of inflation, for the for.thcoming renewal of con-
tracts. Anyhow, one thing is certain: in this scenario we don't talk about
automatic wage indexation. Not only will tnere not be any agreement for its
substantial modification (a possibility that, on the other hand, has not been
suggested yet by any union), but not even the proposal of economist, Ezio Taran-
telli, supported by the CISL, will get through.
In this event, namely of partial agreements, the union front will see the CGIL
and UIL on one side and the CISL on the other. The first two, united in particu-
lar by the preoccupation of not creating too many problem~ for Spadolini,
is a common goal of all the political forces present in the two confederations,
including the communists in their own way.
This solution is not acceptable to Pierre Carniti's CISL on the eve of a congress
where instead there will be strongly reintroduced the necessity for an anti-
inflationary pact rigorously limiting investments, prices and tariffs and which
the union may be inclined to approve, agreeing to limit wage indexation in-
creases for a while. I~ is, therefore, against partial solutions, against the
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_ alternative of many limited agreements that Carniti spoke up during all the
trade congresses he attended this last week. "We will not sign phony pac'ts,"
he said in Termoli, at the home builders congress. "The truth is," one hears
from the other twu confederations, "that Carniti is ill-disposed because Spado-
lini did not include Tarantelli's formula in the economic program, with the re-
sult that he now finds himself isolated, since re lacks the political support .
which would have pushed forward a proposal *_hat now, instead, is dead."
One thing is certain: Carniti will not give up. Because he must show his or-
ganization that he is not the secretary general of defeats (the reduction in
the work schedule }ias not been ap~roved for the time being, nor the 0.50 percent
fund). ~And, in particular, because he musr show CISL's pro-Christian democrats,
and there are many, that he has no intention of giving Spadolini what he 3id not
give Forlani Qr Cossiga. Therefore, if the anti-inflationary pact does not go
through, Tarantelli's formula included, it is almost certain that during the
next few months we will see a CISL hypercritical of any government measure,
ready to fight the C:,IL and UIL.
Breakdown Among Covernment, Unions and Business
- This second scenario has two variables, depending on who causes the breakdown.
--The first: The breakdown occurs because the government, divided in its own
front, does not give in at all to union requests on prices, tariffs, taxes and
investments. It is the hypothesis already taken under consideration by Del
Turco: "If it is broken because of the government which breaks down, the union
does not break down." In this case there will not be any particular consequences.
"[iowever," they say at CISL in particular, "we will have lost a great opportunity
and we will find ourselves facing again the same old problems with the added
drawback of hurli_ng at each other accusations for the responsibility of this
failure."
--But there is also a second hypothesis: That the breakdown occurs because of
the union. What would happen in this case? According to IL MONDO, this was
explicitly discussed in mid-September by Agostino Marianetti and Giorgio Benve-
nuto, during a meeting with Bettino Craxi, PSI secretary, at the Socialist Party
headquarter.s. In the end, this was the decision taken: The socialists do not
want a crisis of the Spadolini government. Therefore, the socialist ministers
as well as the socialist union representatives, each at their own end, must work
so that breakdowns do not occur. They must continuously submit mediation propo-
sals, seek alternatlve solut~.ons which would not entirely jeopardize the negotia-
tions. However, ti~e breakdown could occur just the same, in which case if the
major reservations originate from the CISL, CGIL socialists will continue sup-
porting Luciano Lama and the UIL will move the axis of its alliances from the
CISL toward the CGIL.
Instead, if the CCIL communists cause the breakdown with the government, Agostino
Marianetti's socialists will not hesitate to declare war, perhaps calling a CGIL
congress on opposite ttieses. In this case, then, the alignment would see CGIL
socialists united, plus the entire UIL and CISL. Atid this would mean, in effect,
also tiie end of t}~e remaining union unity. And the unified f.ederation itself
would be probably swePt away. The communists, however, decided against causing
the breakdown, ~t least for the time being.
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MOR OFF(CIA1. US~: UNLY
- Wcll, what is goi.ng to be the winning scenario? It is too soon to say. It is
certain, however, that if the hypothesis, even the least tramatic for the union,
stiould occur, the fragments of union unity will be even further destroyed. And
then? Giorgio Benvenuto tells it straight to UIL national officers: "The CGIL,
CISL and UIL must establish a new unity pact: if we do not succeed, the union
runs the risk of being literally crushed."
COPYRIGHT: IL MONDO 1981
9758
CSO: 3104/28
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CEIV~RAL FRANCE
BRIEFS
ARIANE LAUNCH DELAY--A 10-day strike that has slowed down work at the Toulouse
Space Center where the European Marecs A satellite is being readied has resulted
in a 4-day poatponement of the launching of the Ariaue L04 on which the Marecs A
is to be the principal payload. Originally planned for 14 December, the launching
is now to take place on the 18th. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French
23 Nov 81 p 19] [COPYRIGEIT: 1981 "Valeurs actuelles"]
CSO: 3100/152 FND
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