JPRS ID: 10180 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400080034-2
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• Document Page Count: 52
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 34
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/ 10180
11 December 1981
N~ar East North Africa Re ort
p
CFOUO 45/81)
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JPRS L/10180
- 11 December 1981
,
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
(FOUO 45/81 )
CONTENTS
AFGHANISTAN
Foreign Reporter Says ~Peace Is Not in Sight~ in Near ~liture
(Anthony Hyman; THE MIDDLE EAST, Nov 81) 1
IR.AN
'ASAhI' Interviews NIPC Official in Tehran
(Taheri Interview; ASAHI SHIl~UN, 24 Nov 81) 3
Mojahedin Leader Interviewed on Various Issues
(THE MIDDLE EAST, Nov 81) 6
IRAQ
Massive Development Problems in Nation Cited
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 2-8 Oct 81) 8
Tariq 'Aziz I7iscusses Relations With ~ance, ~iture Prospects
(Tariq ~Aziz Interview; AL-WATAN A7r'ARABI, 28 Aug-3 Sep 81) 11
ISRAEL
Hebron Mayor R.aps Increased Israeli Settlement,
(Patrick Massey; REUTER, 5 Nov 81) 27
SAUDI AR,ABIA
Saudis Reportedly Corrunitted to IIiplomatic Recognition of USSR
(Helga Graham; THE OBSERVER~ ]5 Nov 81) 29
TUNISIA
Ahmed Mestiri~s Personality, Career, Prospects I}iscussed
(Souhayr Belhassen; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 1~ Nov 81) 30
First Pluralistic Elections Evaluated
(Francois Poli; JEUPIE AFRIQUE, 11 Nov 81) 3b
- a- (III - NE & A- 121 FOUO]
t�~n nr.r.~~.. r. rcr, nwr~ v
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YII~IF~N ARAB REPUBLIC
Various Domestic, Foreign Relations Developments Reviewed
(AL-WATAN AI~-~AR,ABI, 9-15 Oct 81) 39
`AZ-WATAN AI,- ~ AR,ABI' in San' a, by Ahmad Habi z
A1-Sallal~s Return
Interview With Prime Minister
Brief s ~
. . YAR Rebels Ceasefire lt8
- b -
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AFGHANISTAN
FOREIGN REPORTER SAYS 'PEACE IS NOT IN SIGHT' IN NEAR FITZURE
London THE MIDDLE EAST in E~glish Nov 81 No.81 pp 27-28
[Article by Anthon~ Hyman]
[Text] ~1,}~ the approach of the third winter of in the police and army there are manY
WSoviet-imposed rule in Kabul, there officera who manage Lo send information,
eeems no real prospect of a settlement ~~~~~On tO ~e "enemy",
which oould bring peace to Afghanistan. I1' even aiding in night~attacks by the
anything, there is less chance than before guerrillas. Whether such help comes fivm
of the Afghan opposition coming to terrns ~h~~~ ~ntiment or from fears
of s in the future by the triumphant
~�rith the gabrak Karmal govemmeni. m� it is a significant factor in the '
Lightly-ermed guerrilla foroes have ~~a war.
proved their increasing eSectiveness in the the F{~~ government resorted
field against Soviet tr~oops - to the surprise ~~~m~. ~ a call-up of Afghan men
of many observers who exnec.ted Soviet ~n~y over a
sirpower and discipline to deal a sw~ift blow ~T of a million men who had already
to the resistance. Yet while firm oontrol of 9
towns and highways has eluded Soviet ~~T~ ~~~pts, it was a
' grasp, the Afghan guerrillas have also measure of the banlmiptcy of its strategy.
been unable to ~stablish their oontrol in d~~~B ~?Y of less than half its
the wuntryside, where they still resort to in~~ ~d failed to
ambushes and hit-and-run raids. It is a reoover its morale, in spite (or, indeed.
stalemate which is developing, in which ~~?e Pr~ence of political
tenacity will count for as much as courage ~'d ~~et o~'ioers plaoed to
and firepower in the long te~m. ensure the loyalty of Afghan units. The
The eftorts of the Karmal government to '~PW~ ~Y" ~~nded to defend the .
attract support by a shrewd mixture of mvulution is often unmliable in the field,
cono~iona and threats has largely failed , with the de~rri,e:s givinQ ovc~r fnwh
- because the Afghan public still see supplies of arma to the mojahcdin.
President Karn~al as "a Soviet puppet". Soureea of new wnscripts to rep~aoe
The People 5 Ikmocratic Party of Afghani~ deserters, the woundad or thoee who had
tan i PDPA i, small as it is, is s~plit by fieroe oompleted the'v terms had almast. dried up,
hatreds into two factions: Khalqis, who with eo much of the aountry out of aentral
- followed Pc~ident Hafizullah Amin ~killed aontrol, and eo many youtha liable to
when the Russians intervened in the last aonscription having fled to the mountains or
week of 1979?, and the smaller faction of into exile in refugee camps in Pakiatan and
pa~rhamis, follow~ng Karmal. '1'he present Iren. At least two and a half million
administration is riddled with sympathis- ~B~ ere now refugeea - almost one in
crs iactive or pas~ive~ with the c~position. six of the wtal population, oonstituting the
Many Afghans in responsible posts in 1~'B~ ~~8~ P~blem in the world today.
the civil administration hc~th in the capital The effects of the Afghan call�up have
and in the provincial towns co-operate with b~n P~Y ~~'?Ler-praluctive. ~Almast at
the very mojahedin ~Muslim guerrillasl once large numbers of a8'ect~ed Kabalis
whom they are Rupposed to oppnse. Likewise, chose to go into exile or join the apposition
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rather than faor mnsrription a eooond time tan, in the form of srnall su~ns, ~
uver. Among them were yc~unq civil amn,unition, food and other supplies when
servants in other respects loyal to the needed. The quantities of aid from the Gulf '
Karmal government, and other membera of states, China, E~~pt and the US ha~�e
the educated classes whose talents ar+e steadily increased. ~
badly needed if e reconstructior~ of Afghan The Afghan mojahedin rely on eas~�
society is eve~tually to suooeed. aooess. F~ Pakistan and Iran into the
Already at least half of the Afghan bo~er territaries of Afghanistan run
intelligentsia, by conservative estimates, oountle~s tracks which small bands of
had been killed or had left the oountry mojahedin croes and rn~oss at will.
si,.oe 1978, and a furiher large exodus The ability of resistanoe groups to mount
would cripple prospects for the future. sustained attacks on Soviet and Afghan
Although the call-up will undoubtedly army garrisons in the important western
bring in many thousands of unwilling city of Herat, and to the south in
~econd-time mnscripts - enforoed as it is by Kandahar, depends on well-0rganised ~
the shooting of those caught evading the operations lirilcing iocal guerrilla gmups
pres,~-gangs - the new army is hardly within the aties to centr+es outside
1ike1}� to prove any more loyal than the old. p}'g}lanistan: Herat to Khurasan and
As for the muj:shedin, problems exist but Kandahar to the Baluchi.gten Pro~+inoe of
morale does nut appear to be one of them. p~~. ~
The scattered ~uerrilla groups may be The North-West ~ontier of Pakistan is
l~ghtly armed, poorly fed on what especially crucial, because it gives ac~oess to
de~~astated villages can offer, wearing not the most populous and mast important
army boots but swathes of cloth around pi'g}~an pruvinces.
their feet - yet they enjoy the solid support These boiderlands are generally aor~h~ol-
uf the rural population of Afghani.4tan. led by tribes rather than police or a~my
Although nurthern and central regions unita. These tribes are mostly sympathetic
are isolated, and almost entirely dependent to the mojahedin but have oome under
on their own scanty i'esourcrs, the re&ions increa~ing pressure. Soviet gun.ghips ha~e
bordering Pakistan and Iran are in mined the barder trails.
constant wuch ~~th Afghan exile organisa- Pressure is being put on the Pakistan
tions across the borders. authoritiea too, by frequent strafiing of
There are bitter rivalries betvveen some border posts, es well as of Afghan refugee
of the Afghan parties and fronts ba.~d in camps, by MiG fighters.
Yeshawar, Quetta or in the Iranian cities of Yet even with the presence of eome
Mashad, Tehran and Tayabad (the district 50,000 troops and a powezful air foroe
of Khura.gan where there are as many as ba.5ed in Af~hanistan, Soviet forces are
300,000 Afghan refugeesl. heavily st~+etched. The Afghan borders are
Yet the various parties based in exile likely to remain pomus, whatever the
have efl'ectively channelled foreign aid poliaes in Kabtil - or in lslamabad and
Lhrough Pakistan and Iran into Afghanis- Tehran� ~
COPYRIGHT: 1981 IC Maqazines Ltd.
CSO: 4600/136
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IRAN
'ASAHI' INTERVIEWS NIPC OFFICIAL IN TEHRAN
OW280626 Tokyo ASAHI SHIMBUN in Japanese 24 Nov 81 Morning Edition p 9
[Interview with NIPC President Taheri]
[Text] Tehran Bureau, 23 November--President (Taheri) of the Iranian National
Petrochemical Company (NPC) recently granted an intervieGr to ASAHI SHIl~UN
Tehran Bureau on problems concerning the Iran-Japan Petrochemical Complex
Project (IJPC). During this interview, he h3nted at the feasibility of the
recent Mitsubishi proposal for scaling down the scope of the project.
However, he declared that an investigat{on of the war damage to the pro~ect
' is the first requisite. The following is a summary of the interview:'
[Question] What is your assessment of the Tokyo negotiations?
[Answer] The Iranian Governuaent position 3s that the Japanese side should come
' to Iran to search for the way which will enable the two sides to reach agreement
through a dialogue and complete the pro~ect. On the basis of the previous
negotiations (in Tehran), the Japanese side asked us to submit the results of
our survey on technical and econotaic problems, and we did submit them. But the
Japanese side demanded that the Iranitu. Government underwrite the whole cost
of the pro~ect on the grou.lds that the Japanese side was unable to make any
further investment. We countered by dema~id3ng that the Japanese side study the
results of the survey conducted by the Iranian side and, on that basis, visit
Iran to continue negotiations so that both sides can reach an agreanent to carry
on the pro~ect. Our assessment of the Tokyo negotiations will depend on what
move Japan will make.
[Questionl Judging that the pro~ect has already lost profitability, the Japanese
side has proposed a new formula ut?der which "Iran will underwrite all costs
whereas Japan will only provide technical cooperation." What do you think?
[Answer] We want to protest to our partnera by asking them on what basis they
are contending that the pro~ect is unprofitable. Since this problem was raised
during the previous talks, we proved this time that as far as profitability
is concerned, there is nothing to worry about. Then the Japanese side brought
up the probl an of damage caused by bombing. But without sending an investigation
team, how can they say the project has no profitability and will be difficult
to carry on? Don't you think it proper for them to first send an investigative
team to determine whether or not the pro~ect is profitable and whether or not it
is ~ossible to carry on t'Ze project?
3
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If the results of the investigation turn out good, the two sides should negotiate
on ~hat basis and complete the pro3ect by all means. Should the Japanese side
ask for compensation on the basis of the investigation, the Iranian Government
will be ready to comply. At any rate, investigation comes f irst.
[Question] The Japaness side is desanding a revision of the basic agreement
on the basis of the new formula. What is your opiaion?
[Answer] The Iranian Government's pasition is that problems can be solved within
the framework of the existing basic agreement. The Japanese side presented
some reasons for desiring to change the 50-SO ratio of investment sharing, but
these reasons are not reasonable at all in our eyes. They raised various :
questions about gas supply, war damage, water supply and housing, and we
have answered all these questions. Above all, we have assured them that Japan
will not be made to share losses from war dam.age, and we have also guaranteed
profits to them. We believe that problems can be solved under ~he exigting
agreement.
[Question] What do you th ink of the large gap between Japan and Iran in their ;
e~timates of the damage?
[Answer] This, too, stems from ttre f act that *_he Japanese side has not conducted
an on--the-spot investigation. On the other hand, the Iranian estimate does not
include th e damage done by the sixth bombing (on 19 October). In order to work
- out an estimate of the damage acceptable to bath sides, it is necessary for them
to send a joint investigation team. Dedicated to Islamic creed, the Iranian
Goverriment will do nothing which will cause its partner to incur a loss.
[Question] The Japanese side is thinking of reducing the scale of the pro~ect.
What is your comment?
(Answer] We have never rece3ved any such proposal yet. That is a pr~blem which
should be settled through negotiations according to our practice. If we find
this idea to b e in the interest of the Islamic Republic, we will act accordingly.
What is important is that the petrochemical industry ia lran's key industry and
that we should complete IJPC with our Japanese partners and establish closer
relations between Iran and Japan.
[Question] Just before your departure from Japan, you met with MTTI officia~s
to ask for Japanese cooperation. Did you attend that meeting with possible
government-level nego~.iations in the future in mind?
[Answer] MITI officials said that Mitsui is a private business and the Japanese
Government cannot meddle. But it is a fact that the MITI exercised its influence
in connection witt. Japan's exports to~the United States and its oil imports. I
- asked the MITI to exercise similar influence over Mitsui.
~l
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[Question] If its new formula propo~al i~ not accepted, Mitsui is reportedly
determined to go so far as to bring action in the international court in order
to suspend the project and withdraw from it.
[AnswerJ I have never heard of that. The Mitsui president baid that his
company's financial condition does not permit any further investment and he
does not want to sever Mitui's relations with us because of that. We feel
the same way. We hope that things will not come to that and we believe
that problems can be solve~ through negot3.$tions.
COPYRIGHT: Asahi Shimbun Tokyo Honsha 1981
CSO: 4106/27
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i
IRAN i
~
MOJA~DIN LEADER INTERVIEWED ON VARIOUS ISSUES
London 1'~ MIDDLE EAST in English Nov S1 pp 37-38
a~~~ua Y,.~,ia~~� one ot tnc mo.+", half a million ~althou8h this has n�'~
[Text j~~prouti~ men in the w~orld. Se~�eral ~vpped), while the citc~iladon of the
unita of French [~endarn~es Patr'o1 the erea Islamic Republican Pam's paper ~ae
amund the suburban ~~lla M�here he lives about 25,000. We also ha.'e a secret radio
w~cn furmer President Bani�Sadr in the station inside Iraa.
srr,all ~~llage of Auvers-sur-Oise, 37km Thus it is evident that che '�~iojehedin
fmm Paris. A boat also patrols the river are the mo~tpopular. the best or~ganised
Oise. and the numbecs of alI the planes and the mo6t disciplined political arganisa.
and helicopte~s w�hich fly over the villa are tion ~~t ,
checked by the poliae. Visitors muaC go .~a+oof
thmugh two checks by the gendarmes, and car~didacY at the pre~
a final conuol procedure by 1ze Renseigne? becaux he was afraid af the support 1 ~
menL~ Generau.x t,efore reaclun8 RalaH"s would get. ~
~illa. In aonclusion. a?e can say that in
Despite all these str~esses. Mas+~oud aon Iran there are two main
Rajavi, who looks surprisinBly young - he politi foe~. One is regional. in
~ is onlr 34 - is quite relaxed. On the daY Kuidistan; and the only othe~ one ahich is
The 1~liddle East int,en~ewed him~ he and not regional is the Majahedin: today nearly
e
Bani-Sadr had issued their '~rograma~e for sU the resistanee ia carcied out by our
a transitional government"~ which some organisation.
press agenaes had mis~nterpreted as the But we believe that o~
eithtowin8 the
proclamat~on ot a governn~ent-m-e~dle. ~ regime must be the arork of all the
But, as R$javi explained in the interview, organisations. Politicall~�. sinae 1965. we
"1 did not form a gov
ern ~
ethe N onal alone must govern the countnlie
~
e believe
declared the prograrnm
Resistanae Council, and of its future in demxrac~�. nd histon� has show~n that
trans~idonal, temporarY B'overnment 'This this cour~tr~ c.uinnt be ^~o~�erncd b~� onh�
govemment will be constituted in Irau." one group, hovueVer 3u~or?g it ia
O The ?1?iddle East: Can ~ ou explain the '!~e most imMrtant diPference betwee~
importance of the ;~iojahedin within the Nlojahe~din sind the Tudph ~pra:~lo~coH
the Iranian opposition' Do you hope W communisti p:irty i~ thet w�e believe in an
overthrow Khomeini's r~egiine and to organic, inhe~nt relationship 't~eh~'een
take over by yourselves? independence and freedom: ~ithout free~
C Ralarti I will give you a few figur~es. and dom, it ~s impossible to have independence,
vou can draw your own cnnclusions. Sinoe ~d without ~ndependence, it is impossible
20 June. Khomeini has executed more ~}~ave 6~dom.
~ 220p people of ~hom more than VGe are not monopolistic. we are not
1,800 were :~Iojahedin� ~nd this is onl~� the dictawrs. If ~�o~~ �~e. ~�ou arn obliged to lean
official figure. In realin� man}~ more on a foreign power because you lose the
~qojahe.iin w'ere executed but the}� had ~ rt of the people� 'I'his is our main
erenoe �ith the '~ionarchista and w~th�
refi~sed to ~ive their real names. di
AL;o, out of a total of 14-13.000 political 'Ndeh.
prisoners. more than 12.OOU are ?~iojahedin. 0 Can you te0 us w�ho are the main
As for our press. a feK� months ago our members of the ~Tadonal Resistance
newspa~r tifo~ahed had a circulation of Council"
. 6
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= f~'�r ~�~untJ~ r~~:i~~n . 1 c~+n ~i~�E ~~ou no ` Hov?� du ~~ou i~m�i~:~e y~w stru~;gle
nam~~- - a~ ~�rt. Maybe it ~~�ill be pc~ti~ible in a~ainst Khomeini's mgime'.
a ti�~~ ~�~~�k- VVe have a ~tratc~~ in three ~L�s~;~�s:
I~ t}u~ hunlist:~n Ih�incx�raa: :'arty first, vee had to brcak thF ~tmosphcm of
of Ur (.ha~.cmlou a m~~mtx~r? fear and terror. ln this, we have alnady
`~'l'e� ha~�e ahtia}�~ ~upported the internal ~uccE~ded. The second stage is the
- auton~~m~� of hurdistan within the organisation of big demonsuations, genera]
frame~�urk of the national intxFrit}� of lran. 5-trikes. Again, we believe that this regime
The 4iUY ha- prepared an auu,nom~� should faU thn~ugh the action of the people.
p;vit