JPRS ID: 9911 TRANSLATION TROOP CONTROL THROUGH PERT METHODS P.V. SKACHIKO, VI. M. KULIKOV AND G.K. VOLKOV

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400080023-4
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 23
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/ 10169
- 9 December 1981
West E u ro ~ R e o rt
p p
� (FOUO 64/81)
FB~$ FOREIGN ~ROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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NOTE
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JPRS L/10169
9 December 1981
WEST EUROPE REPORT
(FOUO 64/81~
CONTENTS
� ECONOMIC
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Pfeiffer To Replace DGB Chief Vetter
(Dieter Straubert, Heiko Tornow; STERN, 22 Oct 81)............ 1
FRANCE
_ Banks' Future After Nationalization Pr~jected
_ (Olivier Darronce; COMMENTAIRE, Autumn 81) 3
POLITICAL
SWEDEN
Conservatives Change Leadership, Seek To Heal Rifts
(Jonas Hultkvist; VECKANS RFFARER, 15 Oct 81) 14 ~
MILITARY
I TA LY
Defense Minister on Military Policy, Middle East
(Lelio I.agorio Interview; EUROPEO, 16 Nov 81) 20
- a - [III - WE - 150 FOUO]
- rnn nr~~n~ . ~ � +r.r~ .~~r~
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c ~ic vr r 1~,1t1L u5c, vivL:
- GENERAL
FRANCE
Briefs
- :DECE Purge 22
Code Section Head 22
SWEDEN
Business Organ: Government Broke U.S. Technology Pact
(Gunnar Hagtorn; `7ECKANS AFFARER, 12 Nov 81) 23
_ Business Organ Criticizes Datasaab in Technology Transfer Case
(Editorial; VECKANS AFFARER, 12 Nov 81) 32
-b-
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~ 1~ i~.. ..:,t. t~:..~.
Ad~~; sohn is tY?e ~bvic~us su~cessor in line with the party'r~ long ranse strater~y,
whose fati-~er is Carl Ailcit, Gosta Bohman's righthand man and regarded by many as
the most powertul fi~;ure in the party. Adelsohn has been skillfully launched as
such.
Many Questions
The strategy succe~ded--except for the seat in parliament. Ulf Adelsohn was at
times reluctant to follow the prescribed course and in 1976 he refused a seat in
parliament which went to Ander Wijkmaa.
Ttiere are still many questi~ns in regard to Ulf Adelsohn when he takes the helm of
tY~e party in a few days. Many people consider him indeed charming and dynamic but
too shallow. And in regard to certain questions crucial for the Conservatives it
is not kno~an where he stands. He has not expressed himself in such key questions
as defensz, security and equality before the law. As a key Conservative expressed
it, "there are many unknow~is in rega:d to Ulf."
On ttie other hand, he is believed to have the ability to attract younger voter
grours who do not hzve normal ties with the middle class environment. According
to the recently published re~.ort, "Swedish Voters," by the political scientist
Soren k(ol_mberg, the Conservatives have increasingly won the support of young people.
In the electiun of 1979, 20 percent of the new voters supported the Conservatives,
the highest f.igure since the 1956 election.
A rejuven~ition of the party's rank and file appears thus to be underway. This is
in co~iformity with tt~e rejuvenation in the party's leadership, where the 34-year-old
Georg Danell will be party secretary, and the 32-year-o1d Carl Bildz joins the
party executive board along with, among others, the 37-year-old Anders Bjorck, at
the same time that the older gentlemen, Steffan Burenstam Linder and Eric Kronmark,
first and second vice-chairman respectively, are putting on theiz hats and ].eaving
the stage.
Unclear Role For Bohman ~
T'he f.act that Lars 'I'obisson, the depar.ting party secretary, is only changing rol.es
in tl~e party presidium and will become first vice-chairman is to be seen as a
balance. The same ~oes for Ella Tengbom-Velander, 60-year-old councilwoman from
- Helsingbor~, becomin}; seconcl ~~ice-chairman, in accordance with the nomination list.
Bu*_ most imPortant oF all for continuity is that Gosta Bohman will remain in parlia-
ment for ~t least a y~ar and wi.ll be the party's chief spokesman, at l.east in
economic questians. ltis role in the party in the future is still uncertain.
"Gosta wil_1 never relax his hold on the party," says a person from the circle of
advisors araund Gosta Bohman. "Even if he sits in a boat out in the Sundskar
fishin~, he will want to participate in formulating policies."
_ A future problem will be how lilf Adelsohn will handle himself i.iz this situation.
Cracks in the ~dall
The party meeting will sl~ow oi.itwardly a well-pol.:ished facadc. That is absolutely
necessary for the election. But that doc~~; iiot rne~itt ttiat ti~ere are not cracks in the w~ll.
1-
r~S1R ~)f~'i~!('iA~~1. ~!56~. ~~1'+�_l'
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!tecently, five memb~rs of the Conservative Youth League in Vasterbotten were
c.~ishiered. They h~i~l, Cr~m the ultra-conservative viewpoint, critized the chairman
Gunnar Hukmark, somewha[ noteworthy in as much as Hokmark himself is one of the
mo:;t "dark bl.ue" individual.s. The result was that 15 individuals fxo~ the Vaster-
butten Conservatives refused r, allow themselves to be nominated for 1982 parlia-
~ mentary election.
[~Th~t first appeared to be a minor matter on the periphery quickly became something
more significanL. Even if the Conservatives in ~he North are very conservative--for
example they regard Ulf Adelsohn as a"typical liberal"--this is evidence that the
Conservative Yarty is not quite as homogeneous as the party leaders want to suggest.
Perhaps the most important question for the Conservatives in the next year will be
liow the party can, str.ategically speaking, capitalize on the lessons from the
Norwegian parliamentary election.
One can detect in leading clrr_les of the Conservative Party differences as to
w}lether tlie Norwegiau situation is applicable to Sweden. Thus, Lars Tobisson ~hows
a ~~ndency to cast a f;lance at Norway, while Carl Bildt warns against blindly look-
in~; at the devel.opment in Norway.
L~irs 'Tobisson said, "As party secretary I have always had the ambition to catch up
with ttie Norwegian Conservatives. But every time we thoughtwe were doing so, new
fi~;ur~~ have come from Norway showing that the Narwegian Conservatives are pulling
ahead."
" I.ars Tubisson points outS tlowever, that the ciifference today between the support
Norwegian and Swedist~ Conservatives enjoy in the electorate is not so great. The
NorwF~~;ian Conservatives received almost 31 percent in the election, while the
Swedish Conservatives, according to the Swedish Institute for Public Opinion, had
26.5 percent of the voter5. "But it is worth noting that center in Norway still
g~t 16 percent altogether. That is just about as much as the center here in
Sweden, ~lccordir.g to the most recent public opinion poll."
- I..ars Tobisson desirt~s to poicit out the similarities in the Norwegian and Swedish
~ situations, but he also wishes to maintain tnat the Conservatives (Sw) must try to
cuoperate with the center. "We won't win the elections by ourselves."
i:ncottra~iii~;
Carl Bildt is more careful in making comparisons with Norway. "Many in the party
make a comparison in order_ to encourage the party workers. But I think you have
to lool: at each country in itself. At the same time it should be noted that
Conservative gains are a comtnon trend in all the four Nordic countries."
Carl Bildt says in zddition, "The goal is partly to malce a better showing than in
the 1979 election, and partly to create a three-party government."
WY;at tactics should the Conservatives then follow up Lo the election in order to
attain this three-party coalition?
"TliF~re won't be any common platform," Lars Tibisson says. "But we won't go out and
hack ~it each other unnecessarily."
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i~~~t i: :?.~:i.,~
The ~oal_ which the rniddle class has in common is the struggle against social
democracy. "And thus there is room for compromises with the center," Carl Bildt
believes. "On the other hanci, we have no scruples against cooperating with the
Social Democrats if our views i:l basic questions coincide."
Taxes and llefense
But there are areas where there. can be no compromise:
One is the tax question. We cannot accept the governinent's agreement with the
Social Democrats about a reform in the marginal tax ln 1983, instead of 1982 as the
- Conservatives desire.
Another area is the ci~fense question. "Falldin in his letter to Gosta Bohman
established certain firm goals for the upco~ning defense resolution. But there is
a tendency :~itY:in the government, in the Liberal Party, not to attain them, and even
go fattier than the Social Democra~s. If that is the situation when the resolution
is presented, yes, then there wi11 be a struggle."
How willin~ the Conservatives are in general to compromise remains to be seen.
- Friction between the C~iiservatives and the center is increased by the fact that the
Conservatives this fali are preparing their own savings program, which will be
presented in November or December and which will be more austere than the govern-
ment's 12 million.
Thc Canservatives st~ppor.t in genexal the economy measures which the governmPnt
poiizted to in its economic crisis program. But the Conservatives in their own
program are intending to be tougher, for example, in r.egard to aid to undeveloped
countries, then the government. It is not unlike]_y that ona can end up under the
_ 1 percent goal.
Incompetent Social Democratic Leadership
= In addition, a Cons~rvative resolution during the autumn session of parliament will
_ resul.r in a tough examination of the government's policy of industrial support.
The Conservatives bel.ieve there is strong opposition to the flow of billions,
administered by the Department of Industr~. "ihe recently proposed and very criti-
cal. investi~;ation oE industrial support has the party's full support. The intent
- is to examiTie the situar.ions where the state has been forced to intervene to support
industry ancl may result in a motion in which the Conservatives will demand a com-
pl.ete end ro support Lor industries, such as the Swedi.sl~ Sugar Corporation and
S~oedish Petroleurn, or in some type of upper limit as to how much can be granted.
"It is, for example, Linreasonable to hand out 700 million kronor to an incompetent
management in Swedish Petroleum, while at the same time reducing the funds for
pensions by the same amount," Ca�rl Bildt says.
Accordin~; to Lars Tobisson, the questions the Conservatives will present in the
election are:
The economy. No to funcls, reciuce~ public expenditures, and lower taxes.
:7
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,
Schools. Education must be improved. Do away with "the indifferent school."
Sweden is in danger of falling behind internationally.
H~using: Home own~rs should not be threatened with elimination of the deduction
- rights.
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U1� Adelsohn (right, above), and his new party leadership: Georg Dannel (extreme
lef.t), fermer minister o� planning who will become party secretary; Lars Tobisson,
party secretary who will become first vice president, Ella Tengbom Velander (below,
leFt) municipal council woman who will become second vice president; and Carl Bildt,
his gray eminence, who is joining the new party executive board.
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ruK urri~~A~ u~r. wvL.
The Center in a Vise When the ConsPrvatives Grow
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1. Social Democrats
2. Communist Left Party
3. Center Party
4. Liberals
_ S. Conservatives
6. Election Results
_ A Norwegian pattern? During the seventies the Swedish political center has been
increasingly presseci between a stable socialist bloc and a growing Conservative
Party. Source: Swedish Institute for Public Opinion Polls.
COPYRIGHT: Ahlen + Ackerlunds tryckerier, Stockholm 1981.
6893
CSO: 3109/26
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MILITARY ITALY
DEFENSE MINISTER ON MILITARY POLICY, MIDDLE EAST
- PM191713 Milan EUROP~O in Italian 16 Nov 81 pp 9-11
[Int~~rview with Lelio Lagorio, Italy's defense minister, by Stefano Silvestri:
"Military Policy: Italy and the Middle East"~
[ExcerptJ [Question] The increases in defense spending are high--29 percent in the
case of the 1981 budget (with inflation running at 22-23 percent) and 34 percent for
the 1982 budget,
[Answer] This is only apparent. First, the major increases concern expenditure on
personnel, to whom the communists pay great attention and who in 1981 received in-
creases of 35 percent, plus a 60-percent increase on training and 27 percent on in-
frastructures. This year expenditure on personnel will increase by a further 35
percent, training 40 percent and infrastructures (barracks) 35 percent. As for
actual weapons, in 1981 we have kept below the inflation rate (with an increase of
only 7 percent). This coming year we are making up for that with a 24-percent in-
crease, but let nobody tell us that we have grandiose plans. In January 1981 the
stipreme defense council, at my suggestion, decided to postpone the modernization
- plan envisaged in the 1975 laws by 5 years, thus scheduling its completion for 1990
instead of 1985, because we do not have enough money and because some weapons, such
= as the new tornado fighter-bomber, have proved to be very expensive. So much for
- our supposed giantism. This is rather a policy of miserliness.
[Question] Perhaps the communists have changed because of pressure from the pacifist
movement. You once astonished the radicals by signing the referndum for the aboli-
tion of military courts. You would not join a peace march now, would you?
[Answer] Well, perhaps that is a little exaggerated. There are different roles:
mine is to help formulate an institutional government policy for peace, and I
believe that I am doing my duty well, first by taking the comiso decision and then
by attending the NATO meeting and being the first to propose--before the nordic
countries or the Germans started talking about it--the zero option, that is, the
offer to the Soviets to eliminate all long-range nuclear weapons in both the Eastern
- and Western blocs. And this has become NATO's position, which is something that I
am pleased about: it is a specific, not merely declamatory, political act.
[Question] So do you dislike peace marchers?
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[AnswerJ No. Peace marchers are always friends. Of course they can also become
allies when their marches are politically W2i1 orientated (as in Milan, not as in
Rome, I mean). As for the advocates of unilateral disarmament, I consider them
morally blameless but politically naive, and in any case they are in a minority in
Italy.
[Question] That does not alter the fact that Italy is now NATO's real mainstay. ~
[Answer] Yes. Without Italy's political stance the Atlantic Alliance would risk
losing the Mediterranean and Germany could slide toward neutralism. Our policy is
now the keystone in the system. I acknowledge this, but I do not understand why I
should be ashamed of it. On the contrary, NATO serves to maintain peace. Berlinguer
himself has said so several times, and perhaps he will say so again soon, if it is
true (though I certainly hope not) that we will have further general elections in the
Spring. Between elections he seems to forget it.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 R~.zzoli Editore
CSO: 3104/43
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GEN~:R.AL FRANCE
_ BRIEFS
SDECE PURGE--[President] Mitterrand has ordered [Pierre] Marion (director of the
- SDECE) to initiate an investigation within the service and conduct a purge.
Mitterrand believes that it was delibera~ely 3nd consciously misleading for the
_ SDECE to have caused the President`s office to believe for 3 days that Goukouni
[Oueddei of Chadj liad heen overthrown. [Text] [Paris ~ARIS MATG~i in French
20 Nov 81 p 90] /CUPYH1GIiT: 1981 par Cogedipresse S.A_/
CODF. SECTION HEAD--Bernard Guitton, mir~ister plenipotentiary and former secretary
of the Nortlt-South Conference, will take over as director of the code and mail
section in the Ministry of Foreign Relations, jText] [Paris i,E LETTRE D~
L'EXPANSION in French 16 Nov 81 p 5] COPYRIGHT: 1981. Groupe Expansion S. A.
CSO: 3100/132
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GEIVi~FlAi~ SWEDEN
i>USIN~~;S ORGpN: GOVERNMENT BROKE TJ.S. TF,CHNOIA('Y PACT
Stockt~oi:n VECKANS AF'F'ARr,R in Swedish 12 Nov 81 pp 36-41
CArticl.e by Gtinnar Hagtorn]
[Text] t~lh~t happened withi.n the board of Stansaab in the fall
of 1.9`77: To 4r}ia.t extent was Minister ~f Industry Nils G. Asling
in agreernent with it--and why did the government not see to it
that coritinual reportswere sent to the United States on the de-
liver~ies effected? (This was part of the delivery terms.) And
why do members of the board of Datasaab (formerly Stansaab) be-
little the irnportance of the so-calle d extractors to the aircraft
- control center in Moscow? The questi ons pile up. Gunnar Hagtorn
, of VECKANS AFFARER started looking into the matter via revealing
board rninutes and dozens of interviews.
The ne~otiati.on.- to merge Stansaab and Datasaab--both owned for 50 percent
i,y i;he state ~~nd Saah-Scania, respectively--were concluded in May of 1977�
Stansaab, at the time, had a Russian order fo r an aircraft control syst em
for Nloscow Airpart, among others, to an amount of approximately 320 million
kroner and signed in 1975.
i'he delivery presupposed an American license. The application for such a
l.i.cens~ hacl been submitted, ~~izt, in the spring of 1977, the license had
~til:l. not t,een ~;ranted. Efforts were made by the company as well as at
f~;ov~rtunPni; ZPVP.1_ {;O ex~edi~:e the processing of the license at the license-
~;rant-.in~; authori.ty of th~ 11.5. Department of Commerce. The license still
d nal- ~rriv~,. ~
In th~, fa]1 0l' ~1y71ti th~ matter had become critical. If the license was
not mranted :;ooi~, the delivery could not take place in time, and the
: y�tc~rn contra.ci;ed for would thus n~t be in operation in time for the
Olympic G~mes in hioscow in 1y80. Even worse: Stansaab now began seriou sly
lcaririfT that il; ~~ou1d not be possible at all to get the necessary license,
~nd tha~ the,y, therefore, ~,~ould not be able to deliver the sys~cem at all. '
At; ~tansaab, the vario~.is scenarios were a.nalysed (including the economic .
r.on:~FC~uences):
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a. No li cen,sc at all--with the result that the entire deal would fall
throi~~*~i.
t,. A]..imitecl 7.iceris~, subject to conditions, with the result that only
part o!' the ~,,ys~;em a~reea upon could be delivered.
c. `['hat; t.h~~ component;s which the Americans regarded as militarily
sc~nsit.ive, and lor ~.~hich they ~~rould not grant a license, could be procured
,~~t.~}iere.
Ir~ the ~torz~~;~~ roorns o� Stai;saab, a11 of the equipment was meanwhile ready
for� : i-~i.prrnrii, �.o tt!e ~ovlet iJnion--and was accumulating interest and
heavy burd~~�n on t:h~. liq~iiciity.
St~~riT~,~ P�1c~ti n~; ;~t. ~~ih i c}1 Chief Executive Handed Over New Limi~ed Li.cense
!',p~>1 i cat.i on
~1t a e;f;orrry ru~~etin~; of the board of directors of Stansaab on 15 September
1~377, it a.ppeared t~,hnt Uunnar Wedell, chief executive, in Ju1y of t~ie same
year, h,td 1lanciec: in a tiew and limited license application. In this applica-
tior~, the, t.o t;h~~ Americans, sensitive master radar stationsin ACC (Area
Cont,ro7. Ce;li:~:�r�j ~�~i.�h sr~veral functions had been omitted.
`i'tus inforr.~at:~oii ~�i~ls ~;ivei: by Gunnar Wedell, chief executive, in answer to
clirec', c~u~~~.tion fror1~ the .representative of Saab on the board, Pehr I-~ager-
- r;~n (at th~, t;i~.:~ chief exec~,tive of Saab-Scania). The reply had the effect
th~t La~;err.~an rF~~risi;ere~: his dissent in the minu~;es of `the handling of this
~~ntirF-~ liceri:;r~ m~tl;cr.' IIe pointed out that the chief executive did not
inforr~ the t~oard that certain functions had been omitted f-rom the license
a.pp 1 i cation, anc; that, t;he t~oard had not approved the action talcen by the
chic~f execut, i ve.
I F~i� .fw-~F;err.~an r;ent on to point out that the limited scope of the license
anp] ~ication 1�:01,1.rs. And, in order to guide aircraft which lack such equip-
m~rit, both pr�:i.rnary radar and the extractor for it are needed.
Lennart Lubecl�; adm~'~,r that it was'crystal clear' that the extractors were
ornit.ted bo~;}i iii ~-.he application and in the license subsequently granted.
b~lh;; do~~s Lenilart 1,ubc~ck then claim that the system would still have veen
aF~le to function, a cl.aim that is so easily refuted? He probably does
not ~�.~ant to a~]rni.t i;hai; the breach o.f license became a fact as soon as
St:an.>aab st.~~ri.ed dc 7.ivering the equipment in the late fall of 1977�
it m~ist be rlit'~'icul r t:o make anybody believe than a company deliver�s--
~n~ th;~t tY~t~ cuc,t.or;er accepts--a commodity which will not work. Two
possiriiiti.~,:~ :~h~~n r~ma~n:
(1} 1Jeit.her ~~t~n^.:~~~r. nor i,he Soviet (lnior. understood that a delivery
~ in ~rro7'c1~nC~~ ~:r:.':h �:he license ~rantecl would result in a s,ystem which
rio!~I.ri not u~or~: ~~nd~r Ru:;sian conditions.
z Stan:,~z,~l~ ;nt~n~iecl (~lrid ~nformed the Russian custo7~er accordingly)
t.o d,,1 iver ~::orkin~* eri---~~ven i f it ~iid no+ have the license for
_ .,i~ch :i sy ~t~:,....
l+c;.li::~T: !in~i~~r ~~�redi;~h Law, Board Bears 1;ltimate Re:ponsibility
T}i~~ i'ir�.rv't ori~~ of tIl(' alternati_ve~ ou~ht to bP discarded because of
it:, r~hslirdi I_;~--ar~d that is al.;o what happened. 2'hen remains only
~l_'tF~rna tive riiir.~l;~~r ~t~~o.
It, is ~T~ore cli e,`i cult; �o ascert:ain ~;~ith wriom ~�~ithin the company and/or on
thf~ o~~mer ;~~i~:~ l.~aab-Scania and the stat;;;) the responsibilit;,y rests.
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~I1I11.`;te.r of Industry Nils G. ~lsling has publicly pointed out that, under
Swedish law, t}ie board has the ultimate responsibility for the actions
of the compan,y--that is formally correct. But, in the present case,
this is less interesting seeing that it is not a question of a viola-
tion of Swedish law. It is more relevant to point eut the political
responsibilit,y connected with ~the state-owned enterprise.
As far as thP board is concerned, it is quite clear that the license
question was a matter for the board to decide. The matter was, indeed,
ciealt with intensively at one meeting after the other.
It has nct been possible to find any proof or signs that the board
dele~;ated the license matter to somebody further down in the company.
On the contrary, there are indications as well as clear proof that the
questi.on was dele~;a.ted to people higher up--and, first and foremost, to
the ,tate o~.mer side.
At the storm;~ r~eetin~; of the board on 15 September 1977, a letter was
- draf.ted to the Miiiister of Industry, Nils G. Asling. The idea was that
- the letter w~i~ to be signed by the chairman of the board, Arne Callans,
chiPf executi.ve of the Investment Ba.nk. The letter explained that the
license requested had not yet been granted by the Americans 'on account
of ~pecial circumstaiices.' Stansaab, therefore, was faced with 'big
problems.' Aiid if the license (it was here a qliestion of the original
license applic�ltion and not the one that had been cut) was not granted,
the board woiild have two alternatives only:
(1)'breaking the delivery agreement' with the Russians;
(?)'deliveriiig without a license or exchanging the components
which were subject to license.'
The latter al.ternative aimed at the possibility, if at all, of replacing
from elsewher~ ~he vital components and the software which the Americans
did I10~ want to ].~t t}ie Soviet linion have.
The iet,ter concluded w.i.th the statement that 'both alternatives go beyond
wliat ties wit}~in t.he field of respon~ibility of the board.' The board,
therefore, con5idr~red itself 'prevented from taking a decision without
havin~; heforc}iand obtained the government's views in the matter.'
However, the lF,tter never reached the Ministry of Industry--the explana-
tion bein~ that it l~ta.s never signed, nor mailed.
- A reason why t;tie 1_etter ur~s not sent was that ~:he alternative possibility
of' eYChan~;in~; i:tie 'sensitive' components had been left out.
Ir~ this situ:~tion, the only thing left for Stansaab was to back out of the
~ntire deal of ~~0 inillion kroner, take the losses from the equipment
r�eacJ,y for delivery and pay damages to the customer for breach of delivery
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un:l.~^s i:hF~ l.i cen:;r~ wa~ gr~~znted ' within the near future' ~according to the
board' ~ own lett~~r).
But, at the same tirne, all reasonable hopes of a license which would cover
the del.ivery in question had already been eliminated. This was brought on
by the company itself. At the same board meeting, the chief executive had
revealed that h~ had changed the license application so that it no longer
compri:ed a system that would function.
According to the minutes of the board, changing the license application so
that it would cover the delivery contracted for was never discussed. And
it was hardly to re hoped that the reluctant U.S. licensing authorities,
_ on their own, wot~ld extend the license beyond the scope of the application.
Stansaab Discus:~eci Wilf~.~l Breach of Embargo
If th~ board did not deliherately consider breaking the U.S. embargo, the
orily thiii~ left for it; to do would be to let the whole deal fall through.
- liowever, an int~ntional breach of the embargo was discussed by the board:
And it was not a question of a matter which could be quickly decided upon.
Several alternati.ve actions were discussed by the board. What was proposed
as the rnost expedient way by the chief executive was to start shipping
the completed equipment without license--officially calling it a'loan'
to tYie Russians until a license, if possible, could be arranged later on.
The chief executive thus stiggested that the board commit an absolutely
cl.ear breach of the embar~o by referring to the delivery as a'loan.'
The boar�d did not, on 15 September 1977, jump ~t the proposal by the chief
- executive, which indicates a certain instinct of self-preservation. But
it :is equally interestin~ that the board did not unanimously and flatly
rP,ject the proposal.. According to the minutes, only two persons commented
on th~ pz�oposal..
Lerinart L~ibeck ctated that the procedure would have 'extensive commercial
Folic,y and diplomati.c consequences,' and that the board, therefore, would
have to z~.~ait an an^~~Jer in the license question.
Go~ta F'a~erberp;:;t;ated that the political risks involved were considerable,
' f'or a~hi ch rea:;on the h~ard oiaght to cqntact the government in the matter.'
- ~lccordin~; to thP minutes, after having discussed the matter, the board did ~
a~~ree to 'writ~~ the government, explainin~ the serious situation of Stansaab '
and makirig ii; cl.e~ar thaL the company can no longer await an answer in the '
license question without serious economic consequences.' �
However, one thing the board could not agree upon was the formulation of 'the
lE~tter to the ~;overnrnent.' For that reason, it was decided to convene
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an ~ xtrnordinar�,y ;~~o~r~i rnei:ing 'the following Sunday at 10 a.m.'--provided
the 'ordinary memhers of the board do not by then agree on the formulation
OI t}1E ~.E'ttr'7'. ~
Cal l an~ ~nd Soder fir~ve ]3-i ~ ~3lanks in Their Memories in an ' Important' Question
Thr opinions s,~er~ i;hus ciivided as to what the ooard should tell and/or re-
p~~ect oi' the rninir,i:er� of industry and the government.
_ The fac1, tYiat 1:11!-~ ~natter ~~ras to be di_scussed only by the ordinary members
of the board, aiic3 i~liat. they were also to try to arrive at a decision outside
aC the bo~,rd room i.s, however, a clear indi_cation that it was a question of
very sen,it:ivF: i:;~uc~;- ~bout which the members did not want to have anythin~
wri f�tr�n ~in t}le nri nut.~:s.
Tl~:~ ~~xtr~~lordinar�;~ !;:t~e`in~*, of the board the ' following Sunday' never did
ta.~:~~~ p].ace--ar:d t.he ordinary board members thus clearly agreed on the
forr.~ul-~tion of ihe lef.ter to the minister of industry/government at an in-
formal'm~etir,g a`. Stan; which was not recorded in the minutes.
~+rn~~ C;~llans say:- };nat he cannot recall what decision was made--nor what the
- 1Ptt.rr i.o ':}le ~;overnment cont;ained.
Gunu~r S~der, th~n und?r-secr~tary of the Ministry of Industry, recalls that
tlle li ceiise is: i:P t�~~s t-~rolight up at that time by Stansaab in the r~tinistry.
fIe say~ i:hat hc~ r~,r;erobers that his coll.ea~ue in the departrrient, Lennart
I,ut~eck, p~rt:icipat:Pd iii the discussion, and that they were discussing legal
aspec~:s oi the license issue. However, GurLnar Soder does not recall any
det~~iJ.:-~, nor wha` ~_ieci:~:on was made.
_ 'l'h~ n~att er ~.~a~ r~*�rntr*ht, Up in the P4ini ~trv of Industry no+ j~_i~t in response
to l:ne 'requ~.,t' from t,he board 'r~ut also i;~ r~ncthel w,.,y. '^!hei1, c,~, lu October
1~;~?7, the Air,eri c~ir~ approved the limited license application, a number of
r~=�cil~ir~~ments ~ftcr~~ m.over, f'~i 1 ed to fulfill their own license condition--their
~;lizrani~ee to report to the United States on deliveries effected.
iint i l ~ crFd~ i~le Px;.~].anation has been produced, the Ministry of Industry--
i t;- h~~z~3 and ~i t:: chi e t' officials--will, against the back~rolznd of the
~bova~, ~~pe~r� z~s ~su:,pE~ct;ed, for ~ood reason, of directly or indirectl.y
~~ssi: r:in;T in the violation of the license ry Stansaab.
'~tit: seri.o~zs c~uestion., also ~iave to be directed to the board of Stansaab
as ~,~:el]. as to th~~ board under the chairmanship of Hans ~nlerthen i.n the
- mer~*ed Stansaahj Datasaab.
In st~~.d;,~ing ~-om~ l~o~rd minutes and intervie~r~ing a number, in several
i nstance~ , very .rf~1_t~ct~ilt, persons, VECKANS A~'FARER has beer able to
~lscertain, ~ri the cour:-e of less than a week, that Stansaab/Datasaab, under
the l~i.mited license ~~~hich the company itself had requested, simply was
not -i.n a posit,i.on to provide the Soviet Union with a reasonably functionin~
,~ircr~ft control s,y-stem. Arid that the brea.ch of license thus was a reality
: oon a:~ t~~~~ ~iel:i veri es started in accordance with the Russian contract.
- b~ih~jt, then, ir, i:}~e expl~nat_ion ~�~hy the board of Stansaab, which devoted
;-uc}i ~i ~;reat ~3e,~7. of time~ ancl so many efforts to the license question,
~id not discovc~r t}lls?
An~~ wh~t. is the reasonahle explanation for the fact that the new Datasaab
ho~:~ did not cven discover the matter once rumors started circulating
puk~] icly?
[t Y~ac been st;a~.nc3 tnat the chief executive of Stansaab and, later on,
- 'r,he chief execulive of Datasaab, around the turn of the year 1G77/78,
w~nt t;o ~'~ashiri~;ton for di~cussions 4rith the U.S. licensing authority.
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I!e is said to have returned with the message that the Americans had now
ca~zght, on and ~.,rcre ready to grant an additional license for the militarily
sen~i_tive eq~aipment which they previously, ior a couple of years, had
stubbornly refused to approve for delivery to the Soviet Union.
Again~t the back~round of the said per.son's previous actions in the
licecising question at Si;ansaab (where, to the board, he proposed, among
oth~r things, a deliberate violation of the license regulations), this
inf'orrnation cannot relieve the board of Datasaab of its responsibility.
COFY~IGHT: Ahlen & Akerl.unds tryckerier Stockholr,~ 1~81
~F, ,
CSO: ~>10~/34 F.ND
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