JPRS ID: 9909 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400080021-6
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 21
• Content Type: REPORTS

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.
JPRS L/ 10167
8 December 1981
Sub-Saharan Africa Re ort
p
FOUO No. 752
FBIS FOREIGN B~ROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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NOTE
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Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
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JPRS L/10167
8 December 1981
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT
FOUO No. 752
CONTENTS
ANGc1LA '
Soviek Military Presence Examined
- (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 2 Oct 81) 1
Briefs
New Town 3
Increased Transportation Means 3
Details of Oil Find ~ 3
CONGO
Briefs
Increase in French Itesidents 4
GABON ' ~
Full Specturm of Country's Economic, Social L~fe Reviewed
(Francois Gaulme; MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS,
. 30 Oct 81) 5
French Government Assistance for 1980 Reviewed
- (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 16 OCt 81) 10
Briefs
- Cultural Agreement With Philippines 12
GHANA
Kpong Dam Scheduled To Go Into Operation in 1982
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 2 Oct 81) 13
MADAGr.:iCAR
Rice Cultivation Developments Reported
(AFRIQUE-ASIL, 9-22 Nov 81) 14
' - a - [IrI - NE & A - 120 FOUO]
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MAURITIUS
Organization of Elections Planned
(Devi Tolval; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 9-22 Nov 81) 17
MOZAMBIQUE
Continued Reports of Increased NRM Activity
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 2 Oct 81) 19 ,
Briefs
High-Quality Production 21
Portuguese Housing Cooperation 21
Cooperation With France 21
SENEGAL
PDS Secretary Discusses Party's Pro~ram
(Abdou]aye Wade Interview; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 28 Oct 81)......... 22
Financial Bac~cers Make Up Deficit Facing Nation
(JEUNE AFRIQUE, 28 Oct 81) 27
Briefs
PDS Seeks French Arbitration 28
TANZANIA
Salim Discusses UN Secretary General Candidacy
- (Salim Ahmed Salim Interview; JEtTN~ AFRIQUE, 28 Oct 81)....... 29
ZIMBABWE
Mugabe Broadens Contrul Over Party
(Sadio Lamine Sow; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 4 Nov 81) 31
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ANGOJ..A
SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE EXAMINED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1873, 2 Oct 81 p 2521
[Text] ~he Soviet military presence in Angola is governed by a treaty of friendship
and cooperation signed for 20 years, on 8 October 1976, by Nikolai Podgorny and
Agostinho Neto, then the respective presidents of the USSR and the People's Repub-
lic of Angola. At the time, Podgorny, now replaced by Leonid Brezhnev at the
head of the Soviet state, emphasized the "fundamental importance" of the agreement,
without revealing the contents.
Since that time, indirect references made by both sides to the military clauses of
the treaty have scarcely provided a more precise idea of the actual Soviet commit-
ment in Angola.
The joint Soviet-Angolan statement published on 22 December 1979 in Moscow, follow-
- ing the visit by President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, reaffirmed "the legitimate
right" of the Angolan Government "t-o use every possible means to defend its terri-
tory" in the face of the South African aggression.
On 2 September, the tlmerican State Department reported the presence of 2,700
Soviets and East Europeans in Angola, adding that the question would b~ taken up
at the meeting of Secretary of State Alexander Haig with his Soviet counterpart,
- Andrei Gromyko.
For his part, the South African miuister of foreign affairs, Roelof "Pif" Botha,
stated at the sa~:e time that the Soviet engagement in Angola was "comparable" to
~ the level of the USSR's engagement in Afghanistan.
However, these claims were denied by Angolan President Eduardo dos Santos, who
said on 9 September that there "was not a single soldier from East Germany or the
USSR in Angola."
- On 21 Se;~tember, the Soviet Government organ IZVESTIA stated that the USSR gives
only technical aid to Angola including in the military field a~d in no way
participates in the fighting, thereby attempting to deny the statements of the
South African Government to the effect that Soviet military men are allegedly
J directly involved in fighting in Angola against Pretoria's forces.
The Soviet newspaper writes: "The USSR supplies multifaceted aid to Angola, in
keeping with the agreements signed between the two countries. It is helping to
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sCrengthen Angola's defense capabilities. But Soviet personnel present in the
country provide only technical advice and instruction for Angolan national cadres."
IZVESTIA denounces those who try "to exploit the death of two Soviet military spe-
cialists and their wives and the capture of a mechanic by South African forces at
the time of their attack on Angola" on 2 September.
On 19 September, the USSR filed a request, through the official agency TASS, for
the immediate return of the bodies of the four Soviets killed in the operation and
= the release of the mechanic held by Pretoria. .
Angola is reportedly negotiating military aid with several African countries, ac-
cording to riozambican sources. Those countries are presumably Algeria, Libya,
Nigeria, Tanzania and Mozambique. Their support could take the form of the sending
of troops and artillery units in the future. It is stated that these troops do
not constitute an "inter-African military force" and would remain under the control
of Angolan authoriti.es.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.
11,464 ~
CSO: ~~i19/135
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ANGOLA
~ BRIEFS
NEW TOWN--A new town, Lucapa, which will one day become the capital of the Angolan
province of Lunda-North, is under construction. A few buildings out of the provi-
sional total of 540 have been built. 'Phere are plans for an administrative zone
in the south and a residential area. in the east. Regarding services, Lucapa will
_ have a supermarket and an industrial bakery. There will be a medical center and
- a recreation center. The construction area is about 590,000 meters square. The
population will be approximately 2,500 inhabitants. Construc~ion o~ the electrical
- infrastructure is the task of the Electra Company. Water supply problems have not
been solved. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1873,
2 Oct 81 p 2521] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11,464
INCREASED TRANSPORTATION MEANS--Thirty Daf trucks were to go into service at the
beginning of September in southern Angola in order to provide hauling for~baraic
commodities. They will make it possible to improve the distribution system in
cities in Benguela Province which do not have enough vehic].r~s. Provinces in the
interior will benefit also. Before these new vehicles were to go into service,
- the domestic commerce transport enterprise had only seven trucks operating out of
a total of 12G. The others could not be used for lack of maintenance and spare
par*_s, but also "because of their careless use by.certdin drivers." [Text]
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1873, 2 Oct 81 p 2522]
[C~PYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11,464
DETAILS OF OIL FIND--During its first operational drilling on Block 3 off the coast
o� Angola, "Palanca No 1," ELF-Aquitaine Angola [Gasoline and Lubricants Company of
France] found on an area of 145 meters a pocke~ of oil at different levels of the
lowE~r Pinda. Tests made revealed remarkable productivity. The first, made between
2,725 and 2,735 meters, produced oil with a density of .83 at a rate of 600 cubic
meters a day with a pipe 1.9 cm in diameter. The second, made later between 2,646
and 2,656 meters, produced oil of the same quality at a rate of 330 cubic meters
a day with a pipe of .95 cm in diameter. One or several more test drillings will
be necessary to evaluate the importance of the discovery. ELF-Aquitaine oper~tes
on a shared production contract concluded with the National Fuel Company of Angola
- (SONANGOL), which holds mining rights. This shared production contract on Block 3
_ was concluded on 1 August 1980 between SONANGOL and a group headed by ELF-Aquitaine,
the operator, and including Mobil, AGIP [Italian Petroleum Enterprise], Nafta-Gas
and Ina-Naftalin. Exploration expenditures and the cost of future development
are borne by the group as follows: 50 pPrcent for ELF, 25 percent for Mobil,
15 percent for AGIP and 5 percent for each of the Yugoslav partners. [Text]
[Paris PiARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1875, 16 Oct 81 p 2647]
[COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11,464
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CONGO
BRIEFS
INCREASE IN FRENCH RESIDENTS--Over the last 6 months, the number of French living in
- Conoo has increased by some SO percent. At the Pqinte Noire consuZate alone, for
example, 1,500 new names have been added to the 2,903 French nationals registered as
of 1 January. Attracted by the oil boom, the new expatriates, a large percentage ~f
whom are coming from Ga.bon, are mostly found in trade, the construction 3ndustry arid
public works. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1086, 28 Oct 81 p 43]
[COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUP.TIA 1981] 9516 ~
CSO: 4719/174
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GABON
FULL SPECTRUM OF COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC, SOCIAL LIFE REVIEWED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1877, 30 Oct 81 pp 2730-2733
[Article by Francois Gaulme: "Gabon in Search of New Impetus"]
[Excerpt] Major Trends in Economy
The Gabonese economy is based on petroleum.~ile output: continues to drop stead~-
ly (with the monthly average d~eclining from 714,383 tons for the last 4 months of ~
1980 to 604,625 tons for the first 4 months of 1981), the dollac rise enables us
to look forward to an increase in petroleum revenues which s~iould come to 276
million francs CFA [African Financial Community] for all of 1981 although exports
in terms of volume dropped 27 percent with 1.8 million tons during the first half
of the year, as compared to the last half of I980, in a situation of declining
demands. .
The petroleum companies, headed by Elf Gabon and Shell Gabon, devoted more than
- 60 billion CFA to prospecting in 1980. While the upper la.yer of the subsoil is
well-known today,.the knowledge of the deep layers is only beginning to take shape.
The use of robots will perhaps make it possible to exploit marine deposits that
cannot be reached with divers. Worthwhile indications point to specific hapeful
areas at least in the country`s southern part.
The other two activities characterizing the Gabonese economy involve lumber and
mining; they did not report good results during the first half of 1980. There has
been a crisis in Che lumber industry since.1974 and Asian competition as well as
stagnation in the construction sector in the developed countries do not promote
any recovery. The SNBG (Gabon National Lumber Company), which holds the lumber
sale monopoly, is studying recovery measures. The enterprises expect a recovery
�or the second half on the basis of orders received especially ir. Africa.
The manganese situation reached a critical point at the beginning of the year; for
the first four months of 1981, compared to the l~st 4 months of 1980, production
dropped 50 percent and exports declined 57 percent. In February and 1~Iarch, the
_ output drop was 80 percent (for equipment maintenance). There was no reversal of
~ the trend in April. CFCO [Congo-Ocean Railroad] carried only 161,136 tons of
- minerals to Pointe-Noire lastJuly, as against.198,354 tons in July 1980.
The crisis on the world uranium market has caused a drop in the exports of COMUF
[Franceville Uranium Mining Company] since October 1980.
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The economic recovery anticipated at the end of 1Q80 did not make -itself felt in
the industrial sector with the e~cpected force. Prospects however are good in the
textile industry or in the food industry (in spite of the production cost problems
facing tfie SOSUHJ Sugar Refinery). The chemical industry is stable. Ciments du
Gabon improved their situation due to a resumption in public works construction
projects although the situation here is still rather timid as of the beginning of
the year.
Trade, on the other hand, has been growing constantly since 19P.0. During the first
half of 1981, sales increased 17 percent for consumer goods and 18 percent for
capital goods. The annual price rise on imported products, on the order of 15
percent, promotes an increase in the business volume of the enterprises.
However, the cost of living in 1981 is expected to reveal a steady increase of
between 9 and 12 percent due to a reduction in profit margins and competition.
While the job market in general terms reports a certain dip for the first half
(down 4 percent ~ompared to 1980), the number of civil service personnel exceeded
the estimates by 11 percent last June (23,4$1 civil servants as against the antici-
pated 22,259).
The growth of the money supply is reasonable. It is on the order of 12 percent
and follows the rate of inflation. We note The creached anmaximumiof1151 billions
economy after June 1980 (12 billions CF~). y
in February 1981; this expresses a desire to invest. The determination on the
part of the government to.get out of debt in February also was expressed by a
surplus of 3.billions CFA.in the banking system. Net foreign assets again became
positive last November and did not drop below 22 billion: CFA during the first
quarter of 1981.
The imbalance between interest rates at Libreville (10-15 percent) and Paris (20
percent) is the anly current monetary problem. It promotes capital flight and
should lead to a reversal of the trend toward an increase in domestic loans oTiserved
over the past 2 years. Local banks as a matter of fact cannot refinance themselves
under current conditions.
Customs statistics for the first half of 1981 show that the value of imports has
doubled (126 billions CRA as against 66 billions for the same period of time in
1980); this perhaps is due to a speed up in customs declarations, combined with
inflation in the supplier countries. Gabonese exports should be something like
550 billions in 1981 (up 5 percer~t compared to 1980) and the balance should remain
mostly positive.
The government is determined to continue its austerity policy in 1982, as President
Bongo recalled recently.
The 1982 budget should be a repetition of the bu~get for the preceding fiscal
- year. The estimates for 1981 point to a total spending volume of 404.5 billions
CFA, including 135 billions for investment expenditures. During the first half of
1981, there was a tendency toward exceeding the allocations provided for the
operating budget (especially the personnel expenditure 3tem). On the other hand,
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in the development budget--which is being carried ou~ at a slower pace--the com-
pletion of products for the production sector points to the incomplete utilization
of allocations by the end of the year.
The Future ~
- In this situation, government thinking at Libreville is currently centered on the
preparation of the five-year plan. The important thing above all is to continue
along'current lines.
Priority will be given to the completion of the trans-Gabonese railroad which the
chief of state considers to be his major project.
The first section (185 kilometers) between Owendo, the port of Libreville, and
Ndjole, on thn Ogonue, became operational early in 1979. Since then, 72,OOQ
passenger~ ~Zave taken the trans-Gabonese railroad and 312,000 tons of freight
. were shipped (',ZCluding 57,000 tons of lumber and 175,000 tons of clinker) in 1980.
At the end of September 1981, figures of 69,000 passengers and 238,000 tons of
freight, including 46,000 tons of lumber, were recorded since last January. It is
estimated that the total traffic volume for FY 1981 wi11 exceed 80,000 passengers
(up ZO percent compared to the estimates), with freight traffic remaining at 300,000
tons. Ttie lumber shipped from Ndjole is stilled carried by water to Port-Gentile,
rather than to Owendo by rail.
Line construction work is curren~ly continuing at ~uch a rate that it is ex~,ected
that the tracks will reach Ayem (kilameter ~arker 265) so that, within a few
months, it will be possible to ship logs by train from the forest operations in
rhe Otoumbi Region and from Ayem (see map).
The Ndjole--Booue section (140 kilometers), now under construction, is considered
the most difficult part of the line. It includes 18 engineering structures and
follows along the valley of the Ogooue. The railroad should reach Booue at the
end of 1982, with operation possible as of the beginning of 1983. Work will then
be continued on the Booue--Franceville section and it is estimated that the rail-
road will link Libreville to Franceville over a distance of 670 kilometers at the
end of 1986.
The transportation sector--whose importance has been underscored by the fact that
the minister in charge, Mr GeorgQS Rawiri, had since 1980 also been first vice
premier, is not confined in its dynamic development to the construction of the
trans-Gabonese railroad. Maritime transportation also reported more sa~isfactory
results than in the past; during the first half of 1981, the "Aldabi" (15,000 tons),
- chartered by SONATRAM (N ational Maritime Transport Company), made two profitable
round-trips. The coinpany is currently thinking of purchasing ships. CNI (Inland
Navigation Company) is carrying 250-400 passengers per week on the Ogooue River
and the Fernan-Vaz Lagoon. It has just lost a coaster which used to provide service
from Port-Gentil to Mayumba. For urhan transportation, SOTRAVIL (Libreville
Transportation Company) for the first time is hopeful of creating a real mass
transportation system in the capital. Its motor pool consists of 76 buses and is
expected to grow further; every day since the start of the 1981 academic year,
18,000 students must be transported.
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Another dynamic area is agriculture. It became a national priority in 1980.
- Until that year, agriculture's share in the budget was negligible. Today it is
12 billion CFA. A certain number of big projects is being continued, such as tre
oil palm project near Lambareze (Agrogabon), beef cattle ranches at Tchibanga and
Franceville. The rubber cultivation project in Woleu-Ntem is in the financing
phase now (see "Gabon" heading). The coconut planation plan, which the goverrm:ent
wants to launch, is still in the study phase.
- Rice production, with the Japanese technical assistance, has experienced difficul-
ties regarding water supply and the poultry raising project at Boumango (Upper
agooue) is getting started slewly. While the fruit tree and food crop program
in Franceville, aided by ti~e French FAC (Aid and Couperation Fund) is coming along
nicely, it is regrettable that the authorities decided to stop the ~evelopment of
the banana plantation at Ntoum which, on 100 hectares of plantains intended for
human consumption, constituted a unique experiment in the world. With Gn output
of 300 tons during the first quarter of 1981, SATEC (Technical Aid and Cooperation
Company], after many difficulties, attained the planned objectivES here, of course
at a cost largely exceeding the orioinal estimates. The plantatioti is to be taken
over by SONADECI (National Industrial Crop Development Company). ~
W`e are inclined too easiZy to forget today that Gabon's wealth essentially was
agricultural until 1914. The discovery of the properties of okoume and the triumph
of lumber after World War I ruined the coffee, cocoa, and vanilla plantations which
had looked so promising at the end of the last century. Rice cultivation, as well
as sugar cane, cotton, and peanut cultivation were to be developed in Gabon start-
- ing 1850. Due to the lack of capital and especially manpower, vast and perfectly
viable projects never saw the l.ight of day. Without plunging into the agribusiness
field, modest agricultural rum production enterprises as well as citrus fruit
plantations and enterprises producing various food crops are quite feasible today
caith a minimum of encouragement in the coastal area which is currently neglected.
Quite a few resources have not yet been exploited. The trans-Gabonese railroad
would certainly promote agricultural development to thE extent that it would make
it possible to overcome one essential obstacle which is the transportation of
products. Fishirig is also due to develop considering the local potential both in
tl~e. ocean and in sweet water. (Some population groups in Gabon traditionally pro-
duce chewing cane, sugar cane wine, and even distilled alcohol wit;~ very simple
means. The production of agricultural rum in Gabon was contemplat~_d starting in
1880.)
For several years we have been struck by the great increase in individual initia-
~ tives in the agriculture field. The markets of Libreville, in the past offering
only a f ew bunches of bananas, cassava, and pimentos, are now well supplied.
Cameroon planed an important role in supplying the capital in recent years but
local products are increasingly available. There are two factors which permitted
thiS phenomenon; a larger number of Gabonese farmers decided to produce more than
just for their own family co?.^umption; citizens were persuaded to sell agricultural
products on urban markets. This movement must be developed in secondary population
centers.
The government knows that it can only at its own risk ignore the profound aspira-
tions of tt-ie people. By emphasizing production investments in the plan draft,
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it made it lcnown that the easy times were over and that a prestige policy designed
to boost national pride was not the best response to the country's wishes.
Greatness undoubtedly was necessary and nobody would deny that Air Gabon, a national
company, for th~ first time, today justifies its creation or.that the big construc-
tion projects in Port-Gentil, especially those deaigned to restore a town built
1 meter above sea level, were not really useful.
But Gabon must not be a showcase for foreign visitors� and a return to the locai
values is being felt today after the brush with modernism. The young people es-
pecially no longer allow themselves to be impressed by big buildings which are not
sui.ted to the climate or by easy money. The young people love the traditional
- life style of a happy country which had hardly any shortages and which had been
living a sweet and pleasant life since the beginning of time in a formidable na-
tural environment. The enormous progress made over the past 20 years in the field
of ediication and training produced a generation that knows what it wants, a genera-
tion that wants to express itself and to try to achieve as much as it can. One
- must only fear that there will be too many supervisory personnel very soon and
not enough qualified intermediate-level personnel. This new generation, which
did not experience colonization, undoubtedly will have objectives as different
from those of the preceding generation which, characterized by the opening to the
~aorld, differed from the modest aspirations of the men in charge during the first
few years of independence. The Gabon of tomorrow will perhaps be reconciled with
the Gabon of yesterday in order to guarantee a better future in a harmonious com-
_ bination of the past and the present.
- COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.
5058
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GABON
FRENCH GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE FOR 1980 REVIEWED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAttX ET MEDITERRANEENS in~French No 1875, 16 Oct 81 p 2637
[Text] French government aid to Gabon in 1980 totaled 670.9 million French francs,
distributed as follows: nonrepayable financial aid, 294.1 million; repayable finan-
cial aid, 376.8 million. Total: 670.9 mil.lion. .
The nonrepayable financial assistance essentially includes charges for technical
personnel.(231.3 million francs) and subsidies from the Aid and Cooperation Fund
(FAC) for investment projects (44.3 million).
Repayable financial aid includes loans from the Central Fund for Economic Coopera-
tion (CCCE) for a sum of 178 million francs and the increase in the outstanding
debt from commercial commitments guaratiteed by the French Insurance Company for
Foreign Tra~e (COFACE), amounting to 198.2 million francs.
As counterpart funds, Gabon made a transfer in 1980 of a lump sum of 183.6 million
francs, which total includes the Gabonese contribution to spending for technical
- and medical assistance (113.9 million~francs), partial repayment of the postal
debt (36.2 million) and the annuity (pri-~cipal and interest) from Zoans from the
Central Fund (26.2 million).
In 1980, technical assistance in personnel provided by France rose by 2.4 percent
in personnel (monthly average of 700 technical assistants) and 11 percent in
spending. The Gabonese contribution rose by 16.8 percent. ~ ~
~dith the exception of 1975,.when substantial aid was branted for the Transgabonese
Railroad, FAC subsidies reached a record level in 1980.
Likewise, the CCCE commitments rose sharply because of a loan to the Gabon Power
and Water Company (SEEG) for expansion of the Poubara Dam.
The situation of the outstanding commercial debt guaranteed by COFACE registered
an increase of over 5 percent. The year was marked by a strong drop in losses
(unpaid debts and bankruptcies) and a moderate resinnption in guaranteed commercial
affairs. Finally, the rehabilitation of the Gabonese commercial debt was begun.
On 31 December 1980, Gabon's postal debt to France was 36.2 million francs.
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- Also at the end of December 1981, for loans granted by the Central Fund for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and which were the object of repayments in 1980, the remainder
, due by Gabon amounted to a total of 148.2 million francs.
Finally, the outstanding debt of COFACE for Gabon at the end of December 1980
- represented 3.9 billion francs, including risks on repayment annuities not due.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie P aris 1981.
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GABON
BRIEFS ~
CULTURAL AGREEMENT idITH PHILIPPINES--On 17 September in Manilla, the Philippines~
and Gabon signed a cultural cooperation agreement aimed at promoting the exchange ~
of researchers and education between the two countries. The document was initialed
by the minister of foreign affairs of the Philippines, Manuel Collantes, and the
Gabonese ambassador to Manilla, Theophile Issembe. According to the.agreement,
scholarships will be granted mutually to students from the two countries. [Text]
[Paris MARCH~S TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1873, 2 Oct 81 p 2509]
[COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11,464
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GHANA
KPONG DAM SCH~DULED TO GO INTO OPERATION IN 1982
Pari~ MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1873, 2 Oct 81 p 2505
[Text) It is estimated in Ghana that the Kpong hydroelectric complex will go into
operation in March 1982, on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the country's
accession to ir,dependence.
On 14 September, President Hilla Limann officially presided over the startup of
the first generator at the Akuse powerplant. Startup of the second was planned
- for the end of the month, while the last two should go into oper.ation before the
- end of December.
The project, the country's second-largest after that of Akosombo, work on which
began in November 1977, is thus on the way to completion, although a little behind
schedule. The official opening was originally planned for 1981.
The delay was caused by the increased construction cost and the need to find addi-
tional funds. Originally estimated at $175 million in foreign exchange and 75 mil-
lion cedis in local money, the project was rFappraised last year and another
_ $20 million and 75 million in credits were added (see MARCHES TROPICAUX, 19 Sep-
tember 1980, p 2297).
It should be recalled that the Kpong comple~:, built 24 kilometers downstream from
Akosombo (912,000 kilowatts), should increase the installed capacity of the Volta
River Authority (VRE1), which now has a capacity of 160,000 kilowatts. The recipient
of different types of international aid, the project, for which the consulting
engineers are Acres International of Canada, should also make it possible to develop
some 7,000 hectares of land through irrigation.
After Kpong, Ghana is in principle to build a third pro~ect: the Bui. This pro-
ject, designed by the Soviets, like Akosombo, before the 1966 coup d'etat, was put
aside for several years and not taken up again until 1976. However, its financing
- is apparently still uncertain, despite the interest it has aroused in the Ivory
Coast and Upper Volta and the special ~ttention given to it near the end of last
- year by the European Economic Community, at the time of the Brussels visit of
Dr Amon Nikoi, then minister of finance and economic planning (MARCHES TROPICAUX,
24 October 1980, p 2595). The amount of money to be found at that time was put at
over $630 million for all the work, including the relocation of people living in
the area.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.
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MADAGASCAR
RICE CULTIVATION DEVELOPMENTS REPORTEA
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 252, 9-22 Nov 81 p 44
[Text] The ways of progress have their own built-in contradic-
tions. This is particularly true of a peasant society that
has too long been left to the forces of the past.
Industrial development of Toliary (ex-Tulear). These words sound rather disagree-
able to the ears of certain persons who grabbed the monopoly on "business" in the
southern part of Madagascar. But, for the inhabitants of the south, only indus-
trialization could now give their region a different appearance, a region which
for so long had been given over to poverty; this is the only way to bring down
that barrier which still cuts them off from the evolution of time--something which
they truly desire.
Nevertheless, so long as the projects did not materialize, most of the region's
people had the idea that these initiatives were nothing but empty words to charm
the population preparatory to whatever election campaign was scheduled, as in the
days of the old fanjakana (administration).
- In deed, is not conceiving democratic progress apart from the development of wealth
--according to the old criteria--a notion that does not jibe with good common
sense? How can one uplift a people if one does not eliminate its poverty and if
one does not improve its material living conditions? And by what means should one
multiply consumer goods without importing them if one does not increase the means
of production as such?
To be sure, while industrialization is now well underway in the south, one must not
forget that agriculture remains one of the economy's foundations.
Tlie south is a relatively populated region but it periodically suffers terrible
droughts. The water problem, rice supply, and the search for new rice cultivation
areas are still the main concern of the government here.
~ The fact is that the province could avoid the drought if several rivers which cut
through the region were to be brought under control. But the irrigation systems
are insufficient and the canals, made in an entirely too archaic style, leave
numerous cultivable areas devoid of tfie necessary water.
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Lach Year, canal dredging operations raise countless difficulties. This is rather
astonishing because, since the arrival of water is vital for them, the peasants
should have understood that it was in their interest to mainta~n those canals.
Since the elimination of the so-called "liter usage" tax in 1960, it is up to each
" village to maintain a portion of the ma~n canal.
~ To understand the reasons for these difficulties, we must look at the general con-
text of relations between the administration and the population, we were told by
- Guy Hanicotte, a graduate of the Madagascar National School of Social Advancement.
The definition of tasks, their distribution, and the penaltiesimposed for failure
to perform services sprang from the development decision of the RI7M [Democratic
_ Republic of Madagascar.J since the villages signed a fokonolona or dina agreement
listing a series of prohihitions:
It was agreed, for example, that a person who refuses to work without good reason
must pay a fine, that it is forbidden to cultivate up to 4 meters from the canal's
banks, that it is forbidden to cross with carts anywhere else except across a
bridge, to wash laundry in the canal, etc.
- Reluctance
But, in spite of the positive effects of these prohibitions, which were adopted by
common agreement among the villagers themselves, persons hostile to the government
did not hesitate to put pressure on the peasants to violate these regulations.
But there are also other causes of difficulties in spreading modern agricultural
methods in the south. Life-size experiments, permitting the development of better
rice cultivation techniques and methods applicable to each area and the determina-
tion of the operation's social-economic results it seems were not conducted with
sufficient strictness.
The reluctance of the peasants can also be explained by the fact that they are~above
all~ranchers, accustomed to engaging in dxy crops such as beans (tsaramaso), which
is also a cash crop for them, corn (tsako), which is planted on the same soil as
beans, and cassava (belahazo) or sweet potatoes.
The First reaction of the villagers thus was to consider rice cultivation as a
local subsistence crop, that is to say, a crop designed to meet family needs at the
least expenditure in terms of work to be done.
As for the transition from the rancher mentality to the farmer mentality, it is
taking place only progressively and there is no use hoping, in this context, for
the rapid development of intensive rice cultivation aimed at the market.
But it must also be admitted that this reluctance is due to the people's long~-standing
distrust of government officials as a consequence of the multiple vexations suffered
during the time of the old regime. It is this rancor which persuaded the villagers
to reFuse to follow the advice of the technicians. The peasants are thus persuaded
that the agricultural country agent would make more money for hi~self if the in-
lir.e rice planting areas were to be increased. As a result they decided not to
plant rice in-line so as not to increase the salaries of the fanjakana country
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agents. Someone also made them believe that the country agents were only there
to give orders. It is therefore useless to improve their wages by followino their
advice. Even the elimination of the beef cattle tax in 1972 did not help any.
The peasants held the long-standing conviction that the fanjakana existed only to
collect taxes. If there were to be no more taxes, there would be no more fanjakana.
Consequently, there was no reason to fear the sheriff or any government off icials.
However, many farmers who did not pay their taxes for many long years escaped into
the forest or into other regions out of fear of the local police. Some lived from
hand to mouth; others left the farmland they owned and the farms were used by those
who remained.
The extreme interest of the inhabitants in animal husbandry, to the detriment of
agriculture, obviously creat~s big problems for the current leaders when it comes
to food supplies. Distribution continues to be difficult due to the fact that the
villages are very far from the major highways. Sometimes products are diverted by ~
troublemakers. But the destination villages are unaware of these activities and
the food supply officials are blamed for the situation.
The current administration is stepping up efforts to convince the peasants that
their own interest is alsa the interest of the national as a whole and viceversa.
The land must nourish the country and help pay for foreign investments. The prac-
tices of yesteryear, the paternalist gifts, can no longer be used in a country
which has chosen the socialist way of development. Those who benefit from govern-
ment aid must be aware of the na~ional importance of what they hawe received.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Afrique-Asie
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MAURITIUS
ORGANIZATION OF ELECTIONS PLANNED ~
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 252, 9-22 Nov 81 p 34
[Article by 7evi Tolval:"Hurricane Distress"]
~ [Text] How the current administration seeks a pretext to delay
- the elections scheduled for December against the background of
the weather situation.
"I expect to organize the next general elections before 31 May 1982. I hope that
they will be held during a period not troubled by natural cataclysms," Mauritian
Premier Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam declared recently. It is known that the National
Assembly's mandate ends on 27 December and that observers had expecte~ general
~ elections prior to that date.
In deciding to postpone the election, the Mauritian premier implicitly confirmed
_ that legislative elections, held in the context of the current balance of forces
on Mauritius, would mark the end of his rule.
The dean of chiefs of state of the Commonwealth countries does not intend to yield
to the current opposition leader--premier in an Mr~1/PSM [Mauritian Militant Move-
ment/Mauritian Socialist Party]--Aneerood Jugnauth who has returned from a visit
to the United States in response to an invitation from the United StaCes State
Department.
In a climate of economic and social crisis without precedence--27 percent infla-
tion this year, 55,000 unemployed, in other words, 13 percent of tfie active popula-
tion, renewed 20-percent devaluation of the rupee--the Mauritian right, which is
divided, would ha~re had to fight a lef t united around the coalition formed by the
I~II~IM and the PSM whose ~ptimism is well known regarding the outcome of the voting.
Certain Western foreign offices favorable to the regime in power at Port-Louis are
_ drawing the same conclusions. But the stakes in~rolved in such an election--which
entails the risk of bringing to power yet another progrzssive regime in the Indian
Ocean--makes it necessary to navigate very carefully to avoid the reefs.
It is this line of reasoning which has been adopted by the principal allies of the
regime in Port-Louis, specifically, the United States and South Africa whose sub-
versive agencies, the CIA and the BOSS [$ureau of State Security], are particularly
active and are permanent parties in this election constest. Against the background
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of an unfavorable balance of forces, the important thir.g is to play foi ti.me, to
delay the voting, to gain time in order, if possible, to bring about a climate
more favorable to the regime in power, and, as the case may be, to play along with
certain emergencies, if necessary invoking emergency measures.
"I am afraid that a climate of fear and violence might take hold in the country
as the elections approach. In that case, anything might happen," he said, thus
announcing in a barely veiled fashion his intentions as to the coming elections.
The administration in power must create conditions for a psychosis favorable to the
postponement of the elections which it cannot win and, by legal means, it must
extend the session of parliament which is S years, pending the arrival of better
days. (During national emergencies, it may be extended for a period of 6 months
on two occasions and in case of war it may be extended for a duration of one year
~n five consecutive occasions.)
_ As part of a strategy which is aimed at maintaining tension and broadening the ~
election contest from here on in, the roles have been assigned, it is said at Port-
Louis. Gaetan Duval will be the orchestra conductor. He gave a hint as to the
provocation in September, at Piaine-Verte, when a demonstration, organized through
Port-Louis, spilled beyond the boundaries of its initial route and would have
deteriorated had it not been for the appeasement efforts made by the Mauritian
progressive circles.
Is the current premier's Labor Party conniving with Duyal? That cannot be ruled
out, emphasized certain Mauritian politicians who recall that Gaetan Duval switched
to the opposition on the eve of an election contest, as he had done on the eve of
the 1976 elections. It is also noted that this "opposition" tends to develop
- "commonalist" reflexes that promote splits in Mauritian societS~, not over a poli-
tical undertaking or a society project but along ethnic lines. Everything will
probably be done to bar the way to the ~/PSM coalition and the new experiments
- of independent economic development, social progress, and democracy which it pro-
poses to concluct. That is the real cause of worry, the only reason for postponing
the elections under the pretext of worrying about the hurricane.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Afrique-Asie
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' ~ MOZAMBIQUE
CONTINUED REPORTS OF INCREASED NRM ACTIVITY
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1873, 2 Oct 81 p 2522
[Text] Kept at a low level until June, the activities of the National Resistance
- Movement (NRM), which is opposed to the Marxist government in power in Maputo, ~
inten~ified and expanded i.n September. Mozambican authorities claim that South
Africa supports the organization, set up in 1975, and the Ministry of Defense in
particular indicates that Pretoria's air force is dropping weapons at fairly regu-
lar intervals.
The Mozambican Army has engaged in fighting against the movement in recent weeks
in Chicualacuala Province, in the border zone where Mozambique, South Africa and
Zimbabwe come together. However, there is no information on how many troops are
involved. A little further north, near Chimoio, in Manica Province, along Zimbabwe,
six towers that supplied power to the port of Beira were blown up at the beginning
of September. ~
Shortly thereafter, on the eastern coast of the country, NRM saboteurs attacked
a powerplant near Beira. Foll.,wing this sabotage, electricity had to be rationed
in Beira, but the activities of the country's second-ranking port were able to
continue thanks to backup facilities. ~
Also in the coastal regien, some 200 kilometers south of Beira, the district of
Ilancul in Inhambane Province was partially placed off limits to civilians because
of the presence of "pockets" controlled by the NRM. Sawmills had to shut down.
Road convoys going to or coming from Beira can cross the zone only under military
escort.
The insecurity created by the NRM has caused over 1,000 Mozambicans to flee to
Zimbabwe, preferring to leave the vicinity of Espungabera (central region), where
at night they had to obey the insurgent and during the day, the Mozambican Army.
In order to fight the rebellion, Mozambican authorities are reduced to applying
methods tried by the Portuguese before independence: Protected villages are now
beginning to make their appearance in Mozambique.
In June, authorities claimed to have confined the movement to its sanetuary of
Espungabera, a mountainous and isolated area along the Zimbabwe border. Today,
however, the activities of the movement have spread to several regions of the
_ country.
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In t1u~ ev~~s uf obs.~~rv~~rs, tt~~~ NRM is n~~vertheless far from be~oming dangeruus Co
the regime of Presiaent Samora Machel. However, it worries authorities, who are
sensitive to the impact of the rebel operations on the country's economic activity.
Transport is often affected by sabotage at a time when Mozambique is trying to ~on-
vince its neighbors to use its ports rather than those of South Africa.
~ Put at some 3,000 men in June by the Mozambicans, the members of the NRM have re-
portedly increased in number substantially since that time, but no one can give
precise figures, although the South Africans estimate the number to be over 10,000.
This increase in personnel of the opposition movement is due, Mozambican sources
believe, to the infiltration of elements trained in South Africa. The latter mainly
come from the South African transit base of Phalaborwa, an immc:nse military camplex
' located near the ultra modern air base of Nielspruit, close to the Mozambican border.
Quoting prisoners or defectors from the NRM, these sources state that the Mozambi-
cans, Zimbabweans from the former Rhodesian Army, Angolans and Namibians undergo
intensive training in a camp near Durban, where they are taught by white Portuguese
mercenaries or farmer Rhodesians. Once their training is finished, they are sent
_ to'Mozambique via Phalaborwa.
However, observers believe that the NRM also recruits its members from the popula-
tion itself, taking advantage of the discontent due to the country's economic diffi-
culties. It has a good propaganda tool with Africa Free Radio, which reportedly
broadcasts from a station in South Africa.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981
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MOZAI~IQUE
BRIEFS
HIGH-QUALITY PRODUCTION--The National Precision Industry (INAL) does not work for
the Mozambican market, but for exporC. This is the only industrial unit specializ-
ing in the manufacture of water meters, pendulums and alarm clocks. Its production
is of high quality: At an international call for bids recently issued by Zimbabwe
for the supplying of water meters, thanks to INAL, Mozambique came in second after
the United States and its production was chosen because of the existing transport
facilities. The company has also received an order for 15,000 water meters (3 cubic
meters per hour) from Angola. At the beginning of September, Iraq stated it was
ready to buy all types of pendulums and alarm clocks made by INAL from Mozambique.
The order amounts to 1,000 units, to be delivered by December. [Text] [Paris
- MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1875, 16 Oct 81 p 2647] [COPYRIGHT:
Rene Moreiix et Cie Paris 1981] 11,464
PORTUGUESE HOtJSING COOPERATION--Within the framework of cooperation agreements ~nade
- with Mozambiq~ae, Portugal will begin to build 5,000 housing units next year, for
technical assistants from all countries working in Mozambique. The housing will
be spread throughout the national territory. They will not be prefabricated houses,
but rather, traditional structures of brick and cement. Mozambican personnel will
be on the Portuguese construction crews. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1875, 16 Oct 81 p 2647] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie
Paris 1981] 11,464
COOPERATION WITH FRANCE--French Minister of Cooperation Jean-Pierre Cot will go to
Maputo before the end of the year to join ~rith the Mozambican Government in signing
an economic cooperation agreement. During his visit, Cot is also to tell Mozambi-
can authorities of Paris' desire to establish a new policy in its relations with
Maputo. It will be recalled that France was represented by 18 enterprises at the
recent International Fair in Maput~. Cooper~tion between the two countries is al-
ready established in aeronautics (UTA [Air Transportation UnionJ trains Mozambican
pilots in Toulouse) and in the automotive field, with Renault Industrial Vehicles
training mechanics specializing in the three makes it distributes in Mozambique
(Renault, Berliet and Saviem). The two countries recently signed an agreement
= on cartography. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERREENS in French No 1873,
2 Oct 81 p 2522] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11,464
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SENEGAL
PDS SECRETARY DISCUSSES PARTY'S PROGRAM
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1086, 28 Oct 81 pp 18-19, 20
(Interview with PDS [Senegalese Democratic Party] Secretary General Ahdoulaye Wade,
by Sennen Andriamirado, date and place not given]
[Text] The secretary general of the PDS has not returned to Senegal since the accu-
sations were made against his party (J.A. No 1085).
Mr Abdoulaye Wade is in Paris. Relaxed in public, sometimes nervous in private, he
has a certain charm. His face gleaming, a man of sweeping gestures, with a malicious
- laugh, highly articulate, he does not defend himself. The advocate turns into the
attorney general, and levels an indictment against President Abdou Diouf's team.
[Question] Sir, why did you not return to Senegal, where your party is accused of
threatening the security of the state? Are you afraid?
[Answer] Afraid? Afraid of what. I am not afraid of being arrested. .
[Question] But you have not returned to Senegal, contrary to what you announced 28
September in Paris at a press conference.
[Answer] I was actually going to return to Dakar. But on the eve of my departure
(scheduled for Thursday 1 October--Editor's Nate) the party leadership asked me to
stay, and then to remain abroad to tell the international community about this con-
- spiracy being hatched against our party.
[Question] But on Thursday 1 Or.tober PDS militants were waiting for you at Dakar-
Yoff airport.
[Answer] In fact, the party had initially planned to oLganize a welcome for me as
is customary. But the demonstration was banned and the airport was surrounded by
police.
- [Question] But your militants came and you were not on the airplane. Also, on 1
October, I was on the phone with the number two man in your party, Fara N'Diaye,
who told r~e he was expecting you that day.
[Answer] That is correct
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[Question] But he did not tell me that the party wanted you to remain in France.
- [Answer] The national secretariat, after having discussed it, asked me to launch a
campaign of clarification abroad.
[Question] The PDS is facing some very serious accusations. Some militants in your
organization have testified they brought arms into Senegal and took courses in urban
guerrilla warfare in Libya.
[Answer] That is what the Senegalese Government maintains. But it is false. Nei-
_ ther Amadou Fall (Mr Wade's bodyguard--E.N.) nor poudou Camara (parliamentary deputy
--E.N.) have said they carried out or organized "destabilization training in Libya."
I have just learned (15 October--E.N.) that the Dakar constabulary reportedly col-
lected some weapons in an armory on Lamine-Gueye Avenue several days ago. I am not
sure about that information, but I hope that they have not been buried somewhere so
that later they can be "discovered" and blamed on us!
_ [Question] Doudou Camara has admitted organizing military training courses.in Libya.
[Answer] Doudou Camara said that he had taken it upon himself to organize a training
course for PDS "gorillas" in Libya.
[Question] You say that as if you wanted to disclaim any responsibility.
[AnswerJ I assume moral and political responsibility for the initiative that was
taken of sending people to get training abroad in how to provide for my protection.
The PDS takes responsibility, regardless of what group made the decision, the condi-
tions, or the circumstances.
[Question] Do you continue to maintain that you were not fully informed about these
training courses?
[Answer] To make a comparison, I would tell you that our party is set up like a
government. If the minister of national education decides to send people to take
. training in London or Moscow, the prpsident does not necessarily know about it in
detail. But he takes responsibility for it.
[Question] In the case at hand, the trainees were of a particular sort. They were
your bodyguards.
- [Answer] Our national convention (the equivalent of a congress) gave Doudou Camara
responsibility for taking care of party security,--and I am saying the security of
the party, not just of the secretary general. He chose to give the bodyguards train-
ing in Libya.
[Question] But do you really need bodyguards?
[Answer] I was the victim of several attacks. I have received death threats, Party
= leaders thought it was necessary to train effective bodyguards, recruited from among
the militants.
[Question] But you said that Amadou Fall was not in the PDS...
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[Elnswer] Fall, that is something else. He had offered to train my bodyguards--I
have had four of them for 7 years. But I told him that I would not need him until
1983, when it would be time for elections. However, then and there, I:.id ask him
- to prepare a paper in which he would give me his ideas about security for me. That
paper exists.
[Question] Where is it?
[Answer] I fear the comrades may have destroyed it. I had read it beforehand. In
the first part, Fall gives the number of henclimen necessary, talks about their train-
ing (exercises, gymnastics, etc.). In the final part, he talks about shadowing par-
ty leaders...
[Question] Because you wanted to spy on your comrades?
[AnswerJ To prevent betrayals, he told me. The report exists. I told Fall to get
together with my henchmen and show them how to position themselves around me.
[Question] Why should Libya have been chosen for their training? Why not somewhere
else?
- [Answer] (Laughter) For sure, if Morocco had been chosen, there would not have
been nearly the outcry!
[Question] Are you certain that your henchmen did nothing more than take a course
for bodyguards?
[Answer] I am going by what they said during their interrogation. Not to what Fall
has reportedly said, but what the other 5 said: they took a course for thugs.
Full stop.
[Question] Who paid for the training?
[Answer] It was free.
[Question] Who paid the airplane tickets?
[AnswerJ I do not want to go into details. The preliminary hearing is still going
on. I do not want to interfere with it.
- [QuestionJ You do not want to answer.
[Answer] The judicial inquiry will come up with an answer.
[Question] You yourself were in Tripoli early in September....
[AnswerJ So what? That is no secret. Everyone knew~it. I met with journalists
there. I gave 15 interviews. I chaired meetings.
[Question] Did you see Qadhdhafi?
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[~~a~.�~r) But if I w~int to ~ae Col ~adhdhati tutaorrow, I wil.1 s~e him. My rela-
tions with Libya are normal. When Senghor was in politics, I went to Tripoli. I
saw him before, and I returned to see him afterward. (A silence)..Senghor under-
stands me. Diouf does not understand me.
[Question] Have you seen Abdou Diouf since he became president?
[Answer] We have met twice. The first time was several days after Senghor's depar-
ture; he made a big statement about democracy. He told me that he would make sure
that the 1983 elections unfolded without any irregularities. I ask no better. The
~econd time, in Ar.gust, after the events in Gambia, he gave me the same spiel: "Have
faith in lli. Everything will be democratic." Myself, I want to see it. Those peo-
ple do not want democracy.
[Question] Do you miss Senghor?
[Answer] People do not understand the political and intellectual game that was play-
- ed between Senghor and me. His personality pu.t him above the conflict. Diouf does
not understand that.
[Questiot~] Were you not hoping Senghor would name you prime minister and heir to
power?
[Answer] That is not true. My ambition is not to become president of the Republic
- of Senegal--but if it happens tomorrow, I will serve. My ambition is for Senegal to
be a democratic country. If, tomorrow, Majhmout Diop, or Cheikh Anta Diop (respec-
tively the leaders of the African Independence Party and the Democratic National Ral-
ly---E.N.), or even Abdou Diouf is elected president,~I will be the democratic opposi-
- tion. ~
(Question] Abdou Diouf is already president!
[Answer] Thanks to a constitutional coup! He was not elected! You know very well
that I have~always contested his legitimacy!
[Question] What are you calling for today?
[Answer] We are for social-laborism, which is center-left, combining elements of
moderate socialism (which is particularly opposed to nationalizations) and progres-
sive liberalism.
[Question] What a combination!
[Answer] If you cannot understand it, that is your problem! But it is a fact. It
is not a combination. I reject the Western typology of political currents. We are
against inequalities, against the exploitation of man by man; but we are for a multi-
party s~stem, and for freedom of opinion.
[Question] But Senegal already has a real party pluralism.
[Answer] I do not want the PDS to be restricted to a role of eternal opposition,
destined to serve only as a safety valve for the party in power. My enemies do not
want to see alternation. I think that conditions for the pursuit of normal political
activity no longer exist. That is the real reason for the machinations concocted
against us.
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[Question] Because you still maintain it is a conspiracy? You are not guilty?
[Answer] Guilty of what? I am not guilty, and I am not afraid of being arrested!
[Question] But you do not want to return to Senegal.
[Answer] I tell you that my party entrusted me with a mission abroad! If, tomorrow,
it tells me to come back, I will take the next plane.
[Question] Are you not afraid that during your absence your top deputy, Fara N'Diaye.
will take your place?
[Answer] People have tried to divide us. They have not succeeded.
_ [Question] Since you contend that the conditions for normal opposition activity no
longer exist, what are you planning to do?
[Answer] I am up against people who do not want democracy. I am therefore thinking
- about ways ~o continue the struggle.
[Question] While remaining abroad?
[Answer] One can struggle abroad just as one can struggle within the country. But
it is no longer possible to engage in a dialogue with the PS. We will carry on the
struggle by other means.
[Question] With arms, for example...
[Answer] Oh, no! That is completely out of the question! There are other ways.
[Question] What?
[Answer] Use your imagination.
[Question] But for now? What do you intend to do?
[Answer] Today, since the departure of Senghor, and even though I do not speak in
the name of the now-retired president, it is I wha represent Iegitimacy. I received
20 percent of the votes in the elections. While Abdou Diouf has never had a single
vote.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981.
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SENEGAL
FINANCIAL BACKERS MAKE UP DEFICIT FACING NATION
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1086, 28 Oct 81 pp 20, 21
[TextJ Senegal has found the money it needed to get through the year. The figures
speak for themselves. Once again this year, Senegal will only have sold about half
as much abroad as it purchased from abroad. The difference is about Fr CFA 100
billion. As its financial reserves are very thin, it must be borrowed.
Two important international meetings to resolve Senegal's financial problems were
held in Paris--first on 12-13 October with countries that have.money loaned out to
Senegal, and then on 19-21 October with countries and institutidns which might loan
Senegal the cold cash to carry out the projects called for in its development plan.
- After those two meetings, the problems might be considered resolved, at least for
a fe*~ moc~ths. Especially if France discreetly makes up for any shartfa].ls.
Indeed, the most difficult part was the laborious negotiations last spring with the
International Monetary Fund [IMF]. Those negotiations were concluded 16 September
with a loan of 105 million SDR's [Special Drawing Rights], or Fr CFA 40 billion.
Bankers and high officials understand that the IMF requires countries like Senegal
to take strong economic recovery measures in exchange for its loans. An agreement
with the Fund is equivalent to a certificate of good behavior. Assisted by private
French advisers, the government in Dakar was able to turn this to advantage by pre-
senting itself as a poor but virtuous country during the meetings in Paris.
- At once the creditor countries in the Club of Paris agre~d to reschedule over a 9-
year period, with a 4-year grace period, the Fr CFA 22.6 billion Senegal was to pay
back this year. The private banks are expected to do the same thing in November on
their own loans. Finally, the countries and institutions that are already finan-
cing a very high percentage of the projects in the development plan seem amenable
to the idea of going even further. The very unusual meeting was called to persuade
- the financial backers to pay all the cost of the projects. The SenPgalese state,
which no longer has the means to finance a development budget, cannot pay its share
(or "counterpart") in the projects.
The bankers and friends of Senegal are thus agreeing to redouble their efforts...so
long as the IMF gives its ~lessings. Fund experts will be ~returning to Dakar in
December to make sure that, following the increase in the price ef gasoline, sugar,
value added tax...that the patient continues to take his bitter med3.cine.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981.
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SENEGAL
~ BRIEFS
PDS SEEKS FRENCH ARBITRATION--Abdoulaye Wade would like the PSF [French Socialist
Party] to arbitrate his disputes with the Dakar government (see p 18). This is be-
cause of the ties between the Senegalese PS (in power) and its French counterpart.
- [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1086, 28 Oct 81 p 43] [COPYRIGHT: Jeune
Afrique GRUPJIA 1981] 9516
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TANZANIA
SALIM DISCUSSES UN SECRETARY GENERAL CANDIDACY ~
Paris JELNE AFRIQUE in French No 1086, 28 Oct 81 pp 30, 31
[Interview with Salim Ahmed Salim, by Jean-Louis Buchet, date and place not given]
[Text] [Question] We hear talk that Africa is not united behind your candidacy,
and the nonaligned are even less so. There is even a possibility of Latin American
candidates.
_ [Answer] Raising doubts about our unity after every ma~or discussion is nothing new.
When the OAU [Organization of African Unity~ speaks with one voice aft~r a long dis-
cussion, someone says right away: "it was a hasty decision, Africa is divided."
It is contemptib le and ridiculous! Besides, the minutes of the meeting where the
decision to support my candidacy was made clearly show that I have the support of
the OAU in its entirety: those known as "moderates," those known as "progressives";
both French-speaking and English-speaking; Arabic-speaking and Portuguese-speaking.
It is the same among the nonaligned, who did not support me at the beginning.
However, one must not think that 100 percent of the nonaligned countries are for me.
None of their decisions get 100 percent support. Anyhow, the one which concerns me
has not given rise to objections. The facts speak for themselves: there is only
one declared Third World candidate, proposed by Africa and supported by the Arab
League and the nonaligned, in other words two-thirds of the members of the U.N. As
for the Latin Americans, they will only be candidates if there is an impasse. I do
not want to speculate about that.
[Question] You have a majority in the General Assembly, but it is being said this
is not the case on the Security Council, especially as regards the United States...
[Answer] I have no reason to fear that I lack sufficient support on the Security
Council. I have no reason to think that a country is really opposed to my candidacy.
I have no indications about any hostility f rom a permanent member.
[Question] People are also saying that the international situation favors Mr Wald-
heim.
[Answer] That is specious. Who says that in 5 or 10 years the situation will be
any less tense? If it remains tense, are we going to have the secretary general
serve for life? The world is changing, the United States has a new president, France
does too...So it is ridiculous to claim that the U.N. secretary general cannot be
changed. I will go even further: it is not right to maintain that any one person,
whatever his role and merits, should have a monopoly on wisdom and talent for bring-
ing about peace and compromise.
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[QuestionJ What could an African secretary general bring to the U.N.?
[Answer] I am African, I am from the Third World. My experience anci attitudes are ,
from Africa and the Third World. But, if I am elected, I will not be an African
secretary general. I will not be a secretary general of the Third World. I will
be the successor of Kurt Waldheim, and I will bring Third World know-how, experience
and sensitivities to the position. But I will also consider the legitimate inter-
ests of all the members of the U.N., including those of the great powers. My past
' and experience will help me, and help the U.N., resolve the problems of Africa and
the Third World. And I do not accept the notion that I can be accused of bias on
these questions just because I am African. On that basis manq people would have to
be disqualified, starting with Europeans in regard to East-West issues.
[Question] Can the position of the secretary general be made a more effective one?
[Answer] Wtioever holds the posttion, there are limi.ts to what can be done. The
secretary general is guided by the decisions of the General Assembly and the Secur-
i.ty Council. He must be sensitive to the interests of the North and of the South,
the great powers and the other countries. He must be familiar with and understand
these limits. Without using it to justify inaction. He represents the moral auth-
ority of the U.N. at least~. ~
I also think that it is necessary to take steps to insure that the UN does not appear
to be on the sidelines of major world events. It must regain the confidence of pub-
lic opinion and the governments. That is the challenge for whoever heads the U.N.
during the next S years..
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981.
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ZIMBABWE
MUGABE BROADENS CONTROL OVER PARTY
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1087~ 4 Nov 81 pp 50-51
[Article by Sadio Lami.ne Sow: "The Danger of Power"]
[Text] After having gQtten rid of the hard-liners in his party,
Robert Mugabe has a free hand--for better or worse.
Nothing has changed in the office where Ian Smith had been sole commander: sitting in
that office, Roberr. Mugabe, prime minister of Zimbabwe, on 12 October was waiting
for his health minister Herbert Ushewokunze. Crossing the threshold of Government
House in Harare (ex-Salisbury), the minister had no doubt that he would emerge a
few minutes later minus a job. Mugabe as a matter of fact did not hestitate to dis-
charge tiim, accusing him of holding "a position that is difficult to reconcile
with the policy of reconciliation with the whites." ~
Herbert Ushewokunze was the last representative of the "hard-line" group in ZANU,
the party of the prime minister, which held the majority in the Chamber, after the
- departure, from the Mugabe cabinet, of his friend Edgar Tekere, former minister of
vocational training who resigned on 11 January 1981. "This decision obviously
shocked me," said the former health minister, "but I suppose that scapegoats do not
have the right to defend themselves."
From here on in, Robert Mugabe is the sole.boss of a formation which is totally
devoted to him. Will he benefit from that to promote the establishment of a single
- party (although accepting certain tendencies w3thin it) for wfiich the former
guerrilla chief never concealed his preference? Possibly. The reason given is
hardly original: Zimbabwe must not scatter its forces at this stage in its exis-
tence. Moreover, Mugabe still is suspicious of ~is former ally from the heroie
days, ZAPU chief Joshua N'Komo; he suspects him of not playing the democratic game
by rejecting the verdict of the polls. The prime minister furthermore believes
him to be responsible for the increasingly pressing wage'demands of lower-level
civil servants who are very closely linked to ZAPU; during a demonstration in
Harare on Monday, ZO October, 700 petitions were presented from teachers and nurses.
As for Ian Smith and his party, the Republican Fron~t, Mugabe accua~s tfiem of
opposing his program for the Africanization of cadres by all means. The complaints
made by both sides against the prime minister indicate clearly that they are entire-
ly opposed to the single party.
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For N'Komo, ZANU--which has seized all of the means of courmunication (newspapers,
television)--is solely responsible for all domestic politica~l tensions. The same
- protestations come from Ian Smith who is increasingly becoming the spokesman for
the traditional recriminations of the whi~es against the heavy taxes and social
policies of the new regime which are wrong, according to them.
As a matter of fact, the departure of the whites, especially to South Africa,
Australia, and Great Britain, continues at a disquieting rate. Of course, among
them there are those who could not remain lower-level civil servants in the
- administration and the police under Ian Smith, secretaries and farmers who were
in the red. Out of 8 million inhabitants in Zimbabwe, the whites today represent
2 percent of the population, in other words, a total of 160,000 as against 200,000
at the time of independence in April 1980. But Robert Mugabe must above all--with
success, for the time being--prevent the departure of 4,000-5,000 white farmers
who provide 80 percent of the country's food and a by no means negligible share of
its foreign exchange earnings coming primarily from trade with South Africa.
Now, relations between Zimbabwe and its all-powerful neighbor, always rather
mediocre, continued to decline in 1981. More specifically, this has been happening ~
- since the election of President Reagan � in the United States who encourages
South African raids into Angola and Mozambique. Of course, Pretoria is not yet
involved in open warfare against Z3.mbabwe but the threat of a real economic blockade
remains. This is true above all to the extent that the Harare--Beira (Mozambique)
railroad--which enabled Zimbabwe no longer to be dependent on its exports for the
"southern route" to Port-Elizabeth--remains closed as a victim of sabotage actions
- by the anti-Marxist guerrilla fighters of the MRM [Mozambique Resistance Movement]
(the Mozambican UNITA [National Union �or the Total Independence of Angola]).
Pretoria for its part can only rejoice over the difficulties of the young Zimbabwean
army which Robert Mugabe is trying to arganize. Springing from the merger of the
two guerrilla forces--the ANLA (armed branch of ZANU) and ZIPRA (ZAPU)--it has
since 7 August 1981 been commanded by a white, Gen Sandy McLean, with the help of
= British advisors. Only one elite battalion is commanded by about 100 North Koreans.
While the objectives of integrating this army have been practically attained,
_ rivalry between the old guerrilla fighters of Mugabe and those of N'Komo is far
from over. This is a difficult kind of coexistence which, after 1981, led to
_ violent clashes, causing several hundred dead at Bulawayo, the country's second
largest city. The new army with its 70,000 men is still a very motley one, with
dissonances which reflect those of the political chessboard. Moreover, many former
guerrilla fighters who have returned to civilian life and who are unemployed for
the most part are increasingly expressing the discontent by organizing acts of
sabotage in certain barracks.
Robert Mugabe, who is said to be pragmatic, runs the risk of soon having to prove
to his army that he does not lack firmness. .
- COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981.
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