JPRS ID: 10152 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400080006-3
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 6
• Content Type: REPORTS

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J~RS L/ 10152
2 Decernber 1981
Near E~st North Africa Re ort
p
CFOUO 44/81)
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JPRS L/10152
2 December 1981
I~EAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
~
(FOUO 44/81)
CONTENTS
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
Calls for Assassination of 'Arafat Discussed
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 9-15 O~t 81) 1
Report on Arab Economy Published
- (AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 11-17 Sep 81) 10
Briefs
Pro-Palestinian Radio 13
~ Plan To Assassinate 'Arafat 13
_ ALGERIA
European Aid Stresses Research, Education
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 16 Oct 81)...~......... 14
Briefs
Japanese Loan ~ 16
Cement Plant Contract 16
EGYPT
Interviews With Egyptian Opposition Figures
(Khalid Muhyi-al-Din, Rif'at Sa'id Interviews; pA,NORF~MA,
26 Oct 81) 17
IRAN
Khomeynx Expected To Fall in Months or Even Weeks
(Bouzid Kauza; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 12-25 Oct 81) 22
ISRAEL
Briefs
Trade With Nigeria 23
- a_ (III - NE & A- 121 FOUO]
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LEBANON .
Tensions in Cease Fire Period Describe8
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARAHI, 25 Sep-1 Oct 81) . 24
~ LIBYA
Oppositionist Exiles Plan Trial of al-Qadhdhafi
- (Ian Black; THE GUARDIAN, 6 Nov 81) 30
- SYRIA
Latest Ov~.~:rtures to Soviets Reviewed
(AL-'ARABI, 2-8 Oct 81) 32
TUNISIA
Sixth Agricultural Plan Sees Growth in Farm Revenue, Ample Seed
Supply
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 16 Oct 81).............. 34
- b -
, ~
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
CALLS FOR ASSASSINATION OF 'ARAFAT DISCUSSED
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 243, 9-15 Oct 81 pp 27-30
[Article: "The Question Is Dangerous and the Destiny of the Resistance Is
up in the Air; Who Put out Contract on 'Arafat?"]
~ [Text] There is no other explanation for what is happening in west Beirut.
There is a contract out on the head of the Palestinian Resistance. The
i numb~r of cars that were blown up by explosives between Tyre and Sabra
; exceeded 10 in less than 2 weeks, and the number of innocent Lebanese and
i Palestinian civilians who were victims of these incidents is now
approaching 1,000 dead ~nd wounded. Every street in the Lebanese capital
has been seized by a phobia, until further notice.
Information available to AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI from well-informed sources
indicates that there is a contract out on Yasir 'Arafat himself. This is
tecause, first, he symbolizes the Palestinian Revolution; secund, he sym-
~ bolizes the independence of the Palestinian decision; and because he is not
! sufficiently "restrained" in dealing with a few Arab parties.
I
= The major. attack with explosives on the offices and leaders of the
Pales.tinian Resislance and the Lebanese National Movement came at a time
when the so-called "autonomy" talks were being resumed in Cairo. They came
' at a time when Tel Aviv was launching a n;w trial balloon around a formula
I~ for a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation. What is actually being prepared
~ for the PLO, and who is behind these preparations?
AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI asked Abu Jihad, the military official in the organiza-
tion, this question. It was presenting the possibilities that were being
presented and discussed in diplomatic and political circles, besides an
interview with al-Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil, commander of the Lebanese
forces. In that interview al-Jumayyil discussed a Syrian position, a
Palestinian position, a variety of government positions and possibilities
for the future.
For several months political observers in Beirut and Damascus have been
relaying reports about lukewarm Syrian and Palestinian relations. In some
cases these relations reached the point of a confrontation in general and a
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confrontation between President Hafiz al-Asad and Abu 'Ammar, the chai~-man
of the PLO Executive Committee. Some sources of the Lebanese National Move-
ment affirm that the Soviets informed a nurnber of movement leaders that
= they were extremely anxious over what they called "the deterioration in
~ Syrian-Palestinian relations" and "the existence of plans in a few Syrian
- agencies to settle their accounts with Fatah in general and with Abu 'Ammar
in particular." "It is inevitable that in return there be Palestinian pre-
cautions to ensure an appropriate series of reactions." On the whole the
matter was quickly approaching "the brink of calamity."
It is noteworthy that throughout the past period this information was being
circulated in whispers behind the scenes. However, about 3 weeks ago,
especially after the assassination of Louis Delamarey the Freneh ambas-
sador in Lebanon, the information was made public and brought out in the
open. Louis Delamare, was the one who played a principal role in
arranging the meeting between Claude Cheysson, France's minister of foreign
affairs, and Yasir 'Arafat. The meeting took place in the home of Shafiq
al-Wazzan in Beirut, and it was followed by a se'ries of car explosions in
the western area of the Lebanese capital, especially near the offices of
Fatah. Ttiese incidents had been veiled in mystery, raising numerous ques-
tions comprising everything conceivable about relations between these explo-
sions and the leadership of the deterrent forces and some of the influen-
tial positions within that leadership as well. The leadership of the deter-
rent forces are controlled by the special forces (the Red Knights), and
they are immediately subordinate to Rif'at al-Asad, cor?~nander of the
defense companies.
The Independent Decision
Observers concur that the central point of the struggle is concentrated on
~ the extent of what is called "the independent Palestinian decision" upon
which Yasir 'Arafat insists on both the Arab and international scene.
- The struggle is taking place between two specific positions: the Syrian
position which is based on the premise that its relative power in the nego-
tiating process, currently underway behind the scenes and revealed by
Philip Habib, President Reagan's envoy to the area, is based on the fact ,
that Hafiz al-Asad controls both the Lebanese and Palestinian hands [in the
game] for bargaining purposes. Accordingly~ the liberation organization
would have to exercise strategic and tactical restraint in any action it
takes on the Lebanese, Arab and international scenes in the context of
what Damascus decides, considering the fact that Damascus is "actually in
command and has the final word." The [other position], the Palestinian
position, which was articulated by Yasir 'Ara�at, either in statements he
' made or actions he took, is supported by most of the principal Palestinian
leaders. That position states that the Palestinian decision cann~t be dic-
tated to the organization by outsiders whose interests are not those of the
Palestinian people and their revolution. Yt i~s imperative that a
Palestinian decision take the Lebanese equation5 into primary consideration
and that this be done in a comprehensive, natianal Arab context, not just
in the context of Syria's view, apart from the view of the rest of the Arab
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forces. Second, Syria has no right "to veto" the PLO's relations with any
other Arab country or the organization'~: right to take political and dip-
lomatic action on the world scene.
Witnesses who took part in some af the recent meetings of the Follow-Up
Committee in Beirut relate that the Syrian-Palestinian dispute brok~ out
between 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam, Syria's deputy prime minister and minister
of foreign affairs, and Yasir 'Arafat. T_he two exchanged angry words after
"the veiled threats that Khaddam made in the course of his discussion."
_ The point that brought the dispute out in the open revolved around the
question of who was to bear the responsibility for the lax security in
Beirut in general and in the national areas in particular and for the
rising transgressions and violations.
Each party held the other party responsible. Ho~aever, the ;natter did not
stop there: Khaddam hinted that the leadership of the liberation organiza-
tion was exceeding its political boundaries and capabilities and risking
the entire cause."
I
~ 'Arafat replied, "The Palestinian Revolution makes its independent deci-
! sions by itself. It does not take risks because risks are not part of the
' revolution's nature. The revolution is daring, and it challenges others
via direct and indirect procedures so as to attain its rights."
Witnesses explained this argument by saying that it was actually about the
organization's direct dealing with the matter of the cease-fire in the
recent Palestinian-Israeli war last July. The organization had dealt
directly without consulting with Syria and with UN Secretary General Waldheim
on the one hand, and with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on the.other. Provoked
by Abu 'Ammar's statements Khaddam exclaimed angrily as he~left the
meeting, "We shall see, Abu 'Ammar, how these procedures will let you
attain these rights."
The New Tune
Observers notice that government circles in Damascus and circles in Beirut
ttiat are royal to them are now strongly harping on the tune that "Abu
'Ammar is leading.the organization into a settlement with Washington via
. Saudi Arabia." They are saying that "Abu 'Ammar must be stopped and the
organization must be delivered from his dictatorial grip." Some leaders
of the Lebanese National Movement have affirmed that Damascus is measuring
"the patriotism and national~sm of every active movement in Lebanon" by the
amount of its "public criticism" of Abu 'Ammar.
It seems that events which have been piling up in the context of Syrian-
- Palestinian relations have led these relations into a crisis that cannot
_ be resolved unless the organization, under the leadership ~f Abu 'Ammar,
accepts the Syrian conditions. These conditions insist that President
al-Asad have the freedom to act on the Palestinian question on both the
Arab and international scenes. Since this is impossible, the 5yrian plan
requires that Abu 'Ammar be separated from the organization. That step
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would constitute a preliminary threat to Fatah. If it does not succeed, the
plan would proceed with an attempt to destroy Fatah from the inside, even
if that were to lead to the physical liquidation of a few leaders.
Observers report that ~he events began with what is known as "the Syrian
missiles crisis in Lebanon." It was later established that this operation
wa~ merely a deceptive operation intended to distract attention away from
the principal operation of bombing the nuclear reactor for which Israel
' was making preparations. When the Palestinian-Israeli war broke out after-
wards and the Palestinian Resistance displayed superb courage and ability
in resisting the Israeli attack from the sea and from the air, causing the
Israelis to turn back and inflicting heavy losses on them in the field and
inside Israel it~elf, Israel turned to the use of its superiority in the
air in intense air raids [against the Palestinians]. The Palestinian Resis-
tance asked Camascus for help; it asked Damascus to use the missiles it had
set up in Lebanon. But Damascus said that it would not be able to use the
missiles so as not to expand the range of the war at a time when it was not
prepared for such an expansion. Damascus also said that it was working
through its negotiations with Philip Habib on getting Washington to apply
pressure on ~Israel to stop the raids.
When the Resistance urged Damascus [to deploy the missiles], the reply that
came from Damascus was this: "The Soviets are tying our hands as far as the
missiles are concerned." The Resistance turned to the Kremlin on this ~
matter, and its reply was, Syria is the only country that makes the
decision whether or not to use the missiles." One of the leaders of the
Resistance described this situation as "a new Tal al-Za'tar" with a few
differences. "In the first Tal al-Za'tar," he said, "we were surrounded by
Phalangists who were protected by Syrians. In the second Tal al-Za'tar the
Israelis are bombing us from the air after they failed to shell us from
the sea and the land. [Meanwhile], the Syrians stand by and watch even
_ though their missile batteries were set up under the pretext of protecting
the Lebanese and the Palestinian people from the wanton aggression of the
Israeli air force."
The Advice of Damascus
The cease fire resolution reached by the liberation organization and Israel
in the context of the war that had broken out between them on Lebanese
territory followed. Both Kurt Waldheim, UN secretary general and Saudi
Arabian diplomacy exercised directly in the United States directly and
through U.S. envoy Philip Habib played an active part in bringing about
this cease fire.
The cease fire proposal had come about under the pressure of the losses
which the Palestinian Resistance had inflicted on the Israeli side. These
losses led to the evacuation of residents from 37 settlements in the nor-
thern part of occupied Palestine for the first time in the history of the
Arab-Israeli struggle. The number of evacuees amounted to 11,000 Israelis.
~ The liberation organization, under the leadership of Yasir 'Arafat, began
considering the cease fire proposal. Damascus advised the organization to
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reject the proposal, but the organization declined to take the advice,
seeing that the cease fire was limited to the direct war on Lebanese ter-
ritory. The organizati~n thought that the will and the interests of the
Lebanese people, as expressed by the Lebanese National Movement, must be
taken into consideration. The cease fire did not mean that the Palestinian
_ Resistance would suspend its actions inside occupied Palestine. The fact
that for the first time Israel was seeking a cease fire was considered a
victory for the liberation organiaation and for the entire Arab nati~on,
strengthening the organization's position on the international scene.
When Syrian aurhorities learned that the organization was likely to accept
the cease fire, it urgently requested that Abu 'Ammar come to Damascus,
even for a few hours of ineetings and deliberations with President Hafiz
al-Asad, before making the announcement. '
However, Abu 'Ammar was quick to announce on behalf of the organization
that "If the enemy honors the cease fire and declares it," he would comply
with the appeal for a cease fire which was made by the UN secretary
general. It was reported that 'Arafat made a point of taking the initiative
, and announcing the decision from his office in Beirut to emphasize that
' "the Palestin?an decision is independent." Therefore, he did not comply
with the request to delay the announcement until after he had met with
~ President al-Asad. He din that to refute entirely [any charges] that the
; "Palestinian decision was subject to the wishes of Damascus."
I, President Hafiz al-Asad strongly rebuked Abu 'Ammar later when he met him.
A1-Asad told Abu 'Ammar, "You are going way over your head." Abu 'Ammar
' replied, "My acceptance of the cease firQ signifies in practical terms that
~ I know precisely what my capabilities are and what the capabilities of my
~ allies are. In general, we have all won with this decision."
I The major political victory that the organization won in the international
; community as a result of its accomplishments in combat, which forced a
cease fire on Israel, caused as much irritation and anger in Damascus
I especially after Damascus tried to prod some factions of the Resistance
I to violate the cease fire. The forces of the organization and of the
'i Lebanese National Movement fiercely opposed Damascus and forced it to abide
I by the independent resolution of the Palestinian leadership. Ever since
that time "the new crisis of confidence" between the organization and Syria
b~came deeper, and Syria felt that it was no longer capable of manipulating
the Palestinian hand at will. This was the prevalent impression at inter-
national gatherings.
The Saudi Hand
- The crisis worsened as a result of a feeling in Damascus that Saudi Arabia
had succeeded through quiet diplomacy in opening an "invisible" channel of
communication between the liberation organization and the United States
of America. There were two principal indications of that.
The first [indication] was in the fact that for the first time Prince Fahd
announced a peace initiative in the area. It is based on the reformulation
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of a few UN~resolutions, and it rests on two central points: the first
is the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with Arab
Jerusalem as its capital; and the second is a guarantee of security and
peace for all the countries of the area. This means actual if not official
recognition of Israel. The organization, especially the leaderstiip of
Far.ah, represented by Abu 'Ammar and Abu Jihad, welcomed what was called
some of "the positive aspects" of that initiative.
Ttie second [indication] was evident in a documentary presented by the well-
known American NBC Network. It was a documentary about the PLO, and it
showed the organization for the first time objectively and sympathetically,
affirming by visual evidence that the prevailing U.S. view that the PLO is
a terrorist organization is not accurate. The PLO is an organization that
is striving for legitimate national rights. It brings together the integ-
rated economics, cultural, educational, health, administrative and civil
service agencies of the state that is being established. In addition, it
has its own security forces; all that it lacks is the land.
The straw that broke the camel's back came recently, according to one of
the ambassadors of the socialist countries in Lebanon. That was the mee-
ting that took place in Beirut between 'Arafat and ChEysson, France's minis-
ter of fore~gn affairs. Syrian authorities had urged Yasir 'Arafat after
the first signs of a French-Palestinian crisis had loomed on the horizon
regarding the protocol for this meeting--whether it should take place in
the home of the French ambassador in Beirut or in the office of the general
commander of the PLO's revolutionary forces--to hold the meeting in
Damascus during the visit of Che chief of French diplomacy to that city.
However, Abu 'Ammar, supported by Louis Delamare, the French ambassador
in Lebanon, insisted that a compromise over the crisis that had developed
over the location of the meeting be found sa that the meeting would take
place in Beirut and not in Damascus. Syrian circles viewed this as a ploy
to undermine Syrian clout in the area, a ploy in which both Abu 'Ammar and
the French ambassador, who lost his life a few days later in a premeditated
attack that was attributed to unknown persons, were participating.
Closing the Sea
Observers are holding a close watch on Syrian reactions to Abu 'Ammar's
statements and actions in which he insists on "the independence of the
Palestinian decision" and on his freedom to act [independently] throughout
the Lebanese scene and throughout the Arab and international scene as well.
So far observers are watching a number af these actions that are marked by
extreme candor. '
The first among these reactions was Damascus's sudden change~of heart about
- the measures it had previously agreed to in the meetings of the Arab Fol-
low-Up ~ommittee. The measures had been proposed to achieve security and
stability in Lebanon as a first step toward getting out of the crisis of
the fighting and the civil war and relieving the PLO of the burdens of this
fighting. Syria's representative in the Arab Follow-Up Committee had
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accepted the declaration made by al-Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil to President
Sarkis that dealings with Israel had ceased. He considered that declaration
satisfactor.y. But Damascus raised this issue again on the basis of the fact
~hat "it was a mere verbal statement that did not give adequate assurance~
that relations with Israel had been cut." Instead, Syria asked that the
ports and the shores which were under the cont~ol of the Phalangist party
be watched to ascertain that the relationship had been cut and that Israeli
weapons were not reaching Juniyah.
Observers say that [he Syrian regime knew beforehand that this demand could
not be met unless the observation included the entire coastline of Lebanon.
This is exactly what the Follow-Up Committee had concluded in its resolu-
tions. Damascus intez~ded to close entirely the s~a route by which
Palestinian weapons were directly imported so that the liberation organiza-
~ tion would have no other recourse but to import weapons th~ougl~ Syria.
Damascus would thereby regain its hold on the organization '"whose clout had
grown beyond what was necessary." Damascus would regain control over
Palestinian decisions; it would determine their directions and the scope of
their actions.
' The second Syrian reaction was manifested in thrusting t~e Palestinians
into a difficult situation that would cause new conflicts to develop
i between them and the public wishes of the Lebanes~e people regarding
- security and getting out of the maelstrom of war and its destruction. That
reaction was manifested in Damascus putting its ~clout behind the resolution
of the Follow-Up Committee to form a committee that would monitor and
prevent the imnortation of weapons to Lebanon by any Lebanese or non-
; Lebanese group other than the legal forces of the state. This forced the
! Resistance--and that was the purpose of thi's reaction--to declarP its oppo-
i sition to that resolution and to ask that it be exempted from implementing
it b~cause it was a liberation revolutior~ and because its battle with
~ Israel required that it confront Israel continuously and reinforce its
weapons constantly. Lebanon's president was also forced to reject the
~
i resolution because its implementation would mean in this case no more than
the formation of an Arab committee to watch over the arming of the
~ Phalangist party.
i
The third Syrian reaction was manifested in the fact that Damascus set
~ out to hurt the Palestinian faction that supported the independence of
i the liberation organization within al-Sa'iqah and to replace the leaders
of this organization with others who had been subdued. That followed the
arrest of Mr Majid Hasan and his placement under house arrest.
The fourth Syrian r.eaction manifested itself in making the Syrian milit~ry
organization, which was operating in Lebanon under the name of the National
Confrontation Front, the military alternative to al-Sa'iqah Organization
after changing its name to Arab Knights. This military organization tvould
be furnished with modern weapons and well-trained mili.tary personnel. Mr
Rif'at al-Asad, the brother of the Syrian president and commander of the
defense companies would be charged with the task of overseeing, directing
and planning the operations �or this org~nization. This organization with
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its distinctive uniforms has recently been deployed in sensiti.ve areas of
west Beirut. Its members were well armed with heavy weapons, and they were
stationed behind strong fortifications. One concludes from statements~made
by some members of this organization that it is making preparations for
playing a major role on both the Lebanese and Palestinian scenes. They say
that work is underway to turn this organization into a powerful "rival" for
Fatah to fight against Fatah and other organizations of the Palestinian
. Revolution when that becomes necessary. The purpose of that would be to put
the Revolution in its place and to force it not to go too far in playing
the.game of "the independent Palestinian decision."
The fifth Syrian reaction which is currently being implemented by more than
oile means is the attempt to pull the Lebanese rug from under the feet of
the liberation organization in Lebanon. A number of leaders of the Lebanese
National Movement told Abu 'Ammar and other leaders of Fatah in confidence
that they were being subjected to severe pressures from Damascus to support
its positic~n on the question of the independent Palestinian decision and
what is called "Abu 'Ammar's dictatorship" and "his playing with fire with
Saudi Arabia and with the Americans."
It is in this menacing and volatile atmosphere that cars headed for the
buildings and offices of the liberation organization and Fatah in the
western area of Beirut are exploding one right after the other in an
alarming, unprecedented manner.
Although IsraEl is being blamed for this, observers--even thvugh they are
not exonerating Israel--are raising numeruus questions about the fact that
car explosions are confined to the centers and locations of the deterrent
forces and Red Knights and to Palestinian locations which are believed to
be the locations of those supporting the liberation orgsnization.
In a discussion that took place last week in the capital of Lebanon between
a number of local diplomats and politicians, the ambassador of a European
_ country that has close relations with the PLO said, "My government has
information that there is a contract out on Abu 'Ammar." ,
A Lebanese politician commented, "What is new about that? Israel has been
trying to get Abu 'Ammar and his colleagues since 1965."
The ambassador smiled wryly and said, "Yes, but what is new here is that
Israel is no longer the only country that is calling for Abu 'Ammar's death
_ today."
Those who were assembled asked, "Who other than Israel is calling for the
death of Abu 'Ammar?"
The ambassador was silent for a moment, and then he replied, "That is the
question. Look for an answer to that question on the Arab side: Don't con-
fine your search to the Israeli side."
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The question is a serious question, and the answer is even more serious.
Not only is it serious for Abu 'Ammar in person, but it is also serious
for the existence and the destiny of the entire Palestinian Revolution.
Copyright: 1981 AL WATA1d AL ARABI
8592
CSO: 4404/86
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
REPORT ON ARAB ECONOMY PUBLISHID
- Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 239, 11-17 Sep 81 gp 60, bl
[Articl~: "A Dismal Si~uation Despite Slogans and Exaggeration: the Arab Econ-
omy Reflects Deepening Fragmentation and Development of a Sense of Provincial
_ Loyalty"]
[Te..t] Inter-Arab trade accounts for only 6 percent of total Arab exports and
10 percent of total imports.
Trade statistics and trends in economic cooperation do not reflect the Arab po=
litical zeal and slogans expressed in the exaggerations uttered by Arabs. In
the 1970's, industries were established within a narrow provincial structure.
The gap between the progress of the oil-producing countries and the backwardness
of those that do not have oil is increasing. All suff er from inflation and de-
creasing agricultural production.
A report by Dr 'Abd-al Muhsin Zalzalah, secretary general af the Council of Arab
Economic Unity, on economic progress and development in the Arab Nation during
the 1970's, is marked by optimism with regard to development. It says that the
past decade saw a tangible and fundamental.correction in the price of the region's
natural resource, oil, which resulted in the emergence of the Arabs' economic
clout throughout the world.
Accordin~ to the report, the decade of the 1970's afforded the Arab economy an
- excellent opportunity to consolidate great accomplishments in development and to
achieve a measure of self-reliance through improved productivity and tEChn~cai
capabilities, increasing control over resources and putting them to good use
locally.
The Arab view of the dimen5ions and nature of development problems and challenges
crystallized during the decade of the 1970's into priorities and goals for local
and pan-~irab development to put the Arab economy on the right path toward curing
development problems. During the past decade, the most important challenges
which still must be confronted in the 1980's were defined.
Nevertheless, the accomplishments in development which were realized during the
1970's were not in keeping with the efforts that were made, the options avail-~
able, n~r pan-Arab aspirations. The Arab economy still suffers from fundamental
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- problems. Preeminent amang these problems are those brought about by the frag-
mentation of the Arab Nation which has led to economic fragmentation.
_ Despite abundant conditions conducive to achievin~ an integrated Arab economy,
- the results of efforts that have been made in this direction are still small.
The Arab economy still suffers from slow progress toward an integrated economy
and scant attention to the achievement of Arab economic unity. This makes it
imperative for the Arab political will to enter as a decisive impetus to increase
attention to these goals. ~
A summary of the report of the secretariat general of the Council of Arab Eco-
nomic Unity, which was published in the latest issue of the organ of OAPEC, pre-
sents the features of Arab economic progress and the accomplishments of Arab de-
velopment. It includes the following indications on the Arab economy.
The Arab countries achieved a real growth rate in local gross national product
of only 7.3 percent in 1979, as well as in 1980. However, these growth Yates
include the large discrepancy between the oil-producing and non-oil-producing
' countries.
The relative weight of the GNPs of the oii~producing countries to the GNP of the
Arab Nation as a whole rose from 71.6 percent in 1978 to about 76 percent in
~ 1979, and to approximately 82 percent in 1980. This reflects the emergency of
~ the Arab oil countries as an important influence in Arab and international affairs.
; The relative i.mportance of the Arab mining sector in the GNP rose from about 48.6
percent in 1978 to about 53.7 percent in 1979, and 60 percent in 1980. The share
! of the manufacturing sector in the GNP fell from 8.8 percent in 1978 to about 8.1
~i percent in 1980.
t
~ The share of the agricultural sector in the GNP fell from 8.6 percent in 1978 to
~ about 7.1 percent in 1979, to less than 7 percent in 1980.
' Arab foreign trade has been marked by a decreasing proportion of inter-Arab tirade
compared with total foreign trade with the non-Arab world. This ieeflects the
' tenuousness of inter-Arab economic ties.
~I, ~he statistics indicate that the value of Arab exporte to Arab countries was only
6 percent of total Arab exports in 1980, while the percentage of Arab imports
I from Arab countries was only ~0 percent of total imports by the Arab nation as a
whole in the same year. This is in addition to the rise in oil revenue which
made up about 88 percent of the value of Arab exports in 1980.
The balance of trade for the Arab countries as a whole showed a surplus of $56
billion in 1979 and $9t~ billion in 1980, compared with $22 billion in 1978.
This increase is attributable to the large surplus in the trade balances of the
Arab oil-proc3ucing countries, which amounted to $66.6 billion in 1979 and is es-
timated at $105 billion in 1980.
The Arab countries showed a balance of trade surplus in 1979 estimated at about
$49 billion, compared with $9 billion in 1978. The non-oil-producing Arab
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count;ries showed some improvement in their total balance of trade inasmuch as
the deficit fell from $9 billion in 1978 to about $8 billion in 1979 due to in-
creased remittances sent home by citizens working abroad.
The level of Arab agricultural production has decreased in comparison with world-
wide agricultural production. While average world grain production yields 1.9
tons per hectare, the average Arab yield is only 1.1 tons per hectare. With re-
gard to wheat in particular, average yield in the Arab world ~.s 1 ton per hectare,
while the average worldwide yield is 1.7 tons.
In 1980, the shortfall in grain production amounted to about 3.6 million tons,
despite the fact that the Arab world includes areas considered to be some ot the
finest soil in the world for agriculture and grain production. The wheat short-
fall is a disappointment to the hopes for plugging the gap in Arab food security.
This shortfall amounted to about 8.8 million tons in 1975 and will rise to 19.2
million tons in the year 2000 unless the Arab countries take upon themselves the
task of f inancing huge wheat and grain production projects in the Sudan, Syria~
Morocco, and Algeria.
Arab industry is characterized by a local autlook. The industrial framework is,
to a great extent, devoted to the consumer industries which still comprise more
than 50 percent of the total Arab manufacturing industry~ Intermediate indus=:
tries make up about 25 to 30 percent of total Arab manufacturing production,
while industries which manufacture finished products comprise about 5 to 15 per-
cent of Arab manufacturing production.
One result of this industrial situation is the low Arab share of world industrial
output. Arab manufactured goods account for only 8 percent of a'..1 Arab exports,
while there is a clear increase in the Arab world's importation of manufactured
goods, amounting to 65 ~ercent of total imports.
All the Arab countries suffer from periods of inflation, the effects of which
have hit the least develaped Arab countries the hardest because of the rising
costs of imported goods and because of other economic difficulties from which
they suffer.
The inflation rate in the oil-producing countries was about 11 percent in 1979,
while it was about 16.8 percent in the non-oil-producirig Arab countries.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
9123
CSO: 4404/62
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
- BRIEFS
PRO-PALESTINIAN RADIO--The question of a pro-Palestinian "independent radio"
[transmitting station] in France has come up. Some emissaries of [Libyan chief-of-
state] Qadhdhafi are said to have offered 200,000 francs to the anti-Zionist
leftists who are ready to use it to "counter" Radio J, the Jewish community's
transmitter. [Text] [Paris L'EXPRESS in French 23 Oct 81 p 100] [COPYRIGHT: 1981
s.a. Groupe Express]
PLAN TO ASSASSINATE 'ARAFAT--Non-Palestinian sources have confirmed that prior to
his departure for the Far East, 'Arafat told the Fatah Revolutionary Council that
he had reliab~.e information about a plan supported by the Syrian security organs,
particularly the defense squads headed by Rif'at al-Asad, to assassinate Fatah
leaders. The assassinations to be perpetrated by Abu Nidal. 'Arafat was quoted as
saying: If I am to be assassinated, the responsibility will rest on the shoulders
of the Syrian. He added: The so-calle& Front for the Liberation of Lebanon From
Fpreigners, which recently carried out several bombings in Lebanon against Pales-
tinian offices and leaders, is receiving direct military and financiaZ aid from the
Syrian intelligence [Question mark as published]. [Text] [JN281056 Paris
; AL-WATAN ALO'ARABI in Arabic 23-29 Oct~81 p 21] /COPYRIGHT: 1981 AL WATAN AL ARABI/
CSO: 4404/120
.
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ALGERIA
EUROPEAN AID STRESSES RESEARCH, EDUCATION
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1875, 16 Oct 81 pp 2615, 2616
[Text] Early in October, the EEC member states decided in favor of a commitment to
finance two programs with Algeria as the beneficiary~.
1) A Program of Scientific Cooperation with the ONB;S [National Office for Scien-
tific Research] and a Teacher's Training Program (a grant of 4.3 million ECUs [Euro-
pean currency unit~ or some 26.2 million French fran:cs)--The Algerian Government
con~iders that access to science and technology is a: basic factor in the process of
economic liberation. The national policy in the field of research, already formula-
ted in the early 1970's, is based ~n th~ee pivotal points: the Algerianization of
~ research, the integration of research activities into the economic development, and
~ the planning of research to achieve the highest degree of cohesion between the ob-
I jectives of research and those of the economic and social plan.
~ The Natianal Organization for Scientific Resparch (ONRS) was created in 1973 and
~ since then efforts have been intensified in that field particularly in three direc-
tions--en~rgy, agriculture and housing. In the sphere of energy, the ultimate pur-
~ pose is to master nuclear technology, to study renewable sou~ces of energy (particu-
! larly solar energy), to develop and process hydrocarbons. In tYie sphere of agri-
culture, the aim is to secure a scientific base for the process of agr~c:ultural
development mostly b_y means of studies on arid zones. Witn regard to housing, the
priority goes to rural and urban planning, programs of "socialist villages," and so
I on.
I
The project is thus intended to increase the country's potential in scienti ic re-
search and to train higher education teachers following an integrated action which
' envisages scholarships in Europe to train research workers and teachers for higher
education (for the latter, there are provisions for 24 scholarships at postgraduate
level); exchange of research workers involving Algerian and European research cen-
ters and dispatch of experts; supply of scientific equipment such as fluorometers,
ionization chambers, measuring and analyzing equipment for hydraulic labcratories,
- for water treatment or for soil analysis, thermodynamic engines and so on.
Fi,ve research centers will be the recipients of the EEC's cooperation: the Nuclear
Science and Technology Center, the Center of Agricultural Studies and Research, the
National Center for Research on the Arid Zones, the University Center for Research,
Studies and Achievements and the Solar Energy Station. Three-month research scholar-
ships will be granted to some 160 trainees from these five centers. The purpose of
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exchanging researchers is to achieve mutual participati,on in the research work done
in the countries of the Community and in Algeria thus laying the.foundation for a
genuine scientific cooperation. As for the purpose o� sending experts, it is to en-
courage field activities, mainly activities involving new research, and to organize
training seminars.
Since the supply of equipment requires that this equipment be adapted to local condi-
tions (as in the case of the multichannel analyzer), there will be an international
call for bids in the EEC but the supplementary equipment will be the object of re-
stricted discussions.
_ 2) Training of Agricultural Managers (a grant of 4 million ECUs or 24.4 million
- French francs)--The purpose of this program is to train managerial cadres for the
state-controlled agricultural sector (self managed farms). This program is part of
the reorganization of Algeria's agricultural sector which the government decided to
carry out to boost production. The 2,000 existing holdings will be regrouped to
create 4,500 new farms, each managed by an agronomist. Under this program, the A1-
gerian authorities will be provided with educators and technical means required.to
train these managers.
_ The future managers will be recruited primarily among agricultural engineers recently
_ graduated from the Mostaganem Institute of Agricultural Technology. Prior to being
assigned to the production units, these engineers will attend a 5-month training pro-
gram: 4 months devoted to theoretical and practical studies and 1 month of practic-
al work in a farm. The training program has already been tested on a 6-month exper-
imental basis since December 1980. The outli~ied program forcusses on a management
and includes mana~ement of personnel and equipment, of supplies and buildings, pre-
paration and implementation of the farm's development plan, financing and accounting.
The basic traini~ng will take place at the centers of Skildda and E1 Khemis in two an-
nual sessions, each for a group of 200 engineer~. The training program requ3res the
recruiting of experts in the fields of agronomy and management and these experts will
be Algerians as well as Europeans. The project also involves the supply oF copying
machines and documentary materials which will be purchased after restricted consulta-
tion.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.
8796
CSO: 4519/27
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ALGE$IA
� BRIEFS
- JAPANESE LOAN--The Expoxt -Import Bank of Japan has signed a contract with the Algeri.an
company SONATRACH [National Company for the Transport and Marketing of Hydrocarbons]
regarding a loan of 13.36 billion yen granted to that company to purchase Japanese
goods and s,ervices for a project to improve a natural gas field in the district of
Zarzaitine near the Libyan border. The project is intended to improve productivity
in the Zarzaitine oil fields by recovering the gas to extract the heavy hydrocarbons,
processing 4 million cubic meters of gas daily. Most of the money will be used to
purchase gas separators and compressors from Japan. No interest rate has been given
i but, according to the Export-Import Bank, it falls within the limits set by the OECD.
The Export-Import Bank will provide 60 percent of total amount of this loan and the
~ rest will be supplied by seven commercial banks (Mitsubishi Bank, Dai-Ichi Kangyo
Bank, Sanwa Bank, Sumitomo Bank, Taiyo Kobe Bank, Industrial Bank of Japan, Mitsubi-
shi Trust and Banking). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
No 1875,16 Oct 81 p 2615] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 8796
CEMENT PLANT CONTRACT--The National Building Materials Company (SNMC) and the GDR
~ company Sket Export-Import signed a contract on 24 September this year to build a
cement plant in Ain Touta, governorate of Batna, capable of producting 1 mi.llion
tons of cement (with two production lines of 500,000 tons each} using the dry pro-
cess. The contract is part of the agreements between the Algerian and East German
governments and in particular the agreement singed in~ October 1977. [Text] [Paris
MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1875, 16 Oct 81 p 2615] [COPYRIGHT:
Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 8796
~ CSO: 4519/27
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_ EGYPT
INTERVIEWS WITH EGYPTIAN OPPOSITION FIGURES
Milan PANORAMA in Italian 26 Or_t 81 pp 97-103
- [Two of several interviews published under general heading "After Sadat": Inter-
view with Khalid Muhyi-al-Din, president of the National Progressive Union Party,
and Rif'at Sa'id, theorist of the Party: "After Sadat/2: Moubarak Is Pro-USA,
But..." by Giovanni Porzio. Interview with Gen Sa'd-al-Din al-Shadhili, former
Egyptian Army chief of staff: "After SadaL/3: We Will Ki11 Him Too" by Robert
; Fox. Places of interviews: Cairo and Tripoli, respectively; dates not given] '
~
, [Text~ After the death of Sadat., he is the only survivor of the historic group
; called ~h~ "Secret Organization of Free Officers," the group of military men who,
~ in July 1952, toppled Farouk's mo~narchy. At age 68, Khalid Muhyi-al-Din, former
~ right-hand man of Nasser, is the charismatic leader of che Egyptian Left. Presi-
i dent of the National Progressive Union Party, the only semilegal opposition
~ party that the repressive measures imposed by the late rais did not succeed in
' crushing, has undergone many arrests during the last several years for "subver-
sive activity."
Rif'at Sa'id, 49, theorist of the Progressive Union, which he he~ped found in
April 1976, was working as a reporter with Cairo's leading da.ily AL-AHRAM. In-
volved in the September wave of arrests, he was compelled to leave his newspaper.
He, too, is thoroughly f.amiliar with Cairo's prirs~ns: 2 months in August :979,
6 mor..ths in 1977--accused of naving taken part in the riots that shook th~e Egyp-
tian capital in January of that year--and 14 consecut^.ve years during Nasser's
presidency.
PANORAMA discussed with the two leaders of the Progressive Union the post-Sadat
outlook.
[Ouestion] In your opinion, what will be the immediate political consequences of
the assassination of the rais?
[Answer] Internally, an abrupt turn-on of the screws, with a reinforcement of
the police and the security forces. In ~he 2 days following the assassination,
b0 of our cadres were arrested in Cairo. The regime fears that the Left will try
- to take advantage of the power vacuum. This is why the succession process was
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accelerated, after which the government, having decreed a national emergency, was
able to order the Armed Forces to maintain internal security. But repression,
weapons and indiscriminate arrests cannot create a consensus, which is the only
true guarar.tee of stabiLity. The coidness with which the people received the news
of the assassination, and the lack of participation in the funeral rites, show
that it takes more than rnere silencing of the mass media and the press to dull
the awareness of the Egyptians.
[Question] Who are the killers and what motivated them to kill the president?
- [Answer] Sadat signed his own death warrant with the September repression.
Among the 1,500 persons arrested, there were members of our party, of the WAFD
[expansion unknown], of the Muslim Brotherhood, of the Coptic Church, as well as
= lawyers, journalists, university professors, communists and liberals. He shut the
door in everyone's face and in so doing he cleared the way for the violent groups
and the extremists. This is what gave birth to his assassination.. For a reli-
gious fanatic, the important thing is to act, to eliminate the person who repre-
sents evil, and thus to gain entry to Paradise. It will take time now to learn,
going beyond the identities of the actual executors, whether there was also a
. plot. There are questions to be clarified: Where have the munitions come from?
How was it possible to place two civilians in uniform among the troops that took
part in the parade? But what really counts is the ~esult: The $25 million spent
by the United States for Sadat's security actually served no purpose. Above all,
_ they did nothing to change the sentiments of a people ideclogically confused by
the turnabout in propaganda and slogans: Ti1e American and Israeli "enemies" have
become Egypt's best friends, while the Arabic "brotherhood" and the Palestinians
have broken off their relations with Cairo.
[Question] How could Sadat possibly have made the same error as the shah of Iran,
alienating .the goodwill of the religious circles?
' [Answer] In 1972, when he realized that in the universities the youth were being
attr3cted by the Marxists and the Nasserites, Sadat began to encourage ooenly the
more extremist Islamic groups. But the most fanatically religious among them
began to challenge the pro-Western change in policy and became dang~rous: the
- rais responded with the repressior~, extending it Lo th~ Copts as well to vest it
with an appearance of even-:~andedness. And this was another serious mistake:
The Copts are a discrim~nated-against minority in Egypt. But there are 7 million
of them, their Church is well organized and their spiritual head, Shen~uda III,
whom Sadat tried to exile, is a man of action, highly intelligent, cultured and
very popular.
[Question] What is currently the extent of the influence of the Islamic extremist
' groups in Egypt? A figure of 10 percent is quoted as representing their active
sympathizers in the universities.
[Answer] They are unquestionably stronger in the universities than elsewhere.
In general, I think their number is overestimated: The authorities consider it
fully in their interest to label the opposition as Muslim fanatics. But they are
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� dcfinitely well armed, weil organized and extremely effective. Somewhat similar
to che Italian Red Brigades, with the difference that the Red Brigades are iso-
lated from the masses.
[~uestion) Are they also active in the Armed Forces?
[Answer] Yes. All the persuasions and ideologies are reflected in the Egyptian
Armed Forces. Here, too, Sadat made a mistake. It was he who decided to politi-
cize the Armed Forces, appointing military officers to the top posts in his party
and his government.
[Question] What is likely to change in Egypt with the new president?
[Answer] Moubarek is tied to the United States, to its stra[egy in this region.
But no one can actually say he will b~ another Sadat. We do not know his think-
ing as yet; and in Egypt, the rais is the rais; he governs according to nis own
personal leanings. Moubarek, however, has never gone to Israel. Was this a
personal decision on his part or a concerted maneuver with Sadat? Until the
complete evacuatior, of the Sinai in April 1982, Egypt's policy will continue
, along a previously laid track. But thereafter? Camp David has definitely been
i torpedoed and Moubarek could seek a rapprochement with the other Arabic countries.
~ [Question] And would the United States allow that?
i
i
~ [Answer) That is precisely the problem. The United States is more involved in
I Egypt's internal affairs [han we, as Egyptians, can accept. The alliance with
-I Washin;;ton is a threat to Egypt's independence. This is the very basis of our
; opposition.
I [Question] What will be your party's course of action in the coming months?
~
_i [Answer] We have won the battle for the legalization of our party, even though
-i it is less dangerous to operate clandestinely in Egypt today. Now we say: We have
had enough of repressions and referendums.
[End of interview with National Progressive Union Party leaders, Khalid Muhyi-
al-Din and Rif'at Sa'id; interview with Gen Sa'd-al-Din al-Shadhili follows]:
I
' In this interview, Sa'd-al-Din al-Shadhili, former chief of
staff of the Egyptian Army,declares himself responsible for
the assassination and predicts for Egypt a wave of anti-
regime violence. ~
In 'Cripoli, PANORAMA met with Gen Sa'd-al-Din a~-Shadhili, 60, former chief of
staf.f of the Egypt.ian Army. General al-Shadhili claims to be "the real head
of the Egyptian opposition." Backed by Mu'ammar Qadhafi and by the countries of
the Resol.ute Fronr, the general expects to return to Egypt soon and is convinced
that much is due to happen in the next few weeks. Here are the thoughts of the
- man who toasted the assassination of Sadat.
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- [Question] You have said that Moubarek must change everylhing on pain of being
overthrown in the very near future...
[Answer] Sadat was a dictator. What we want instead is a democracy. How could
Moubarek have gone into a referendum withou[ having liberated the 5,000 political
prisoners, without having abolished martial law, after having actually instituted
new repressive measures against the officers and against the leading figures of
the opposition? What, in these circumstances, is a plebiscitary worth? Under
these conditions coe cannot allow Moubarek a respite. We will oppose him in every ,
way.
[Question] A struggle of short or long duration? -
[Answer] We shall begin imme~iately and will finish it when we have achieved our
victory.
[Question] In that case, do ycu intend to run for president?
[AnswerJ We shall decide together with the other opposition leaders what is to be
done. When democracy has been restored, we will select a candidate.
[Questi~n) Wha~ is your model of a democracy?
[Answer] It is the Western type of pluralistic democracy, with a parliament in ~
which all the parties are represented and with a president having little power.
[Question] In whom r.hen would the most power reside?
- [Answer] In a head of the government to be agreed by the majority of the parties.
- As you can see, this is far from being the Nasser model or the Sadat model.
- [Ouestion] And far from that of Qacihafi as well. Yet you live in Libya and you
- obtain help from Tripoli. Such backing seems to be incompatible with your
Western democratic ideas...
IAnswer] I am not interested in Libya. My only concern is Egypt.
[Question] Do you believe you have a following among the Egyptian ~enple:'
[Answer] I am convinced the vast majority of the Egyptian people would vote for
- me if they had the chance.
[Question] What methods of struggle do you intend to use against Moubarek's
regime?
[Answer] That is the problem. The only way to bring down an autocratic regime is
through violence. I hate the use of violAnce. But first Sadat's regime, and now
Moubarek's regime, have closed all avenues to a peaceful policy. Violence in
these circumstances thus becomes inevitable.
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~Ques[ion] Do you consider yourself, then, the responsible political head of
every violent action that is taking place in Egypt at this moment?
[Answer] Every form of rebellion is under our control.
[Question] Are you the commander-in-chief of the entire operation?
[Answer] I cannot reveal such details. Let me simply say that the struggle
against the regime is spreading among the people.
[Question] You are considered to be an anti-Western figure. Is that true?
[Answer] I am not against the West and I did not criticize Sadat on that score.
But the West must understand that it cannot want a democracy in its own house
and a[ the same time back the autocratic dictatorships of the Third World. This
is why the presence of so many Western leaders at the funeral services surprised
me so. They were mourning a servile agent and certainly not 3 champion of
democracy. For us, Sadat was nothing more than a traitor to his people.
[Question] How, in your view, do the socialist countries of Eastern Europe act
~ with respect to the Third World? They too back dictatorships. Do you not think
j so?
I [Answer] I do not wish to talk at this time about the socialist bloc. I want to
_i talk only about the Western powers. They backed Sadat and upheld an autocratic
~ political system, and were thus guilty of inconsistency.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Arnald~ Mondadori Editore S.p.A. Milano
- 9399
i CSO: 4528~3 '
I
I
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IRADT
KHOMEYNI EXPECTID TO FALL IN MONTHS OR EVEN WEEKS
PM290859 Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 12-25 Oct 81 pp 34-36
[Report by Bouzid Kouza: "Just Before the Curtain Rises"]
[Excerpts] Iran has just been given a new presidsnt. A"free and democratic"
election, the Tehran authorities claim after reducing the voting age to 15 and
mobilizing large forces to ensure 'Ali Khamene'i's "victory," It was an illegal
and rigged election according to the national resistance council which maintains
that the new president is not representative and which has just announced the
drafting of a government program applicable as soon as a government is formed in
Iran following the collapse of the reg~me--forecast by Mojahedin circles for the
next few months or even weeks.
The domocratic opposition led by the Mojahedin-e Khalq, which is gaining grounds
thanks to growing awareness and a determination which the suummary executions are
not destroying, is confronting inside the country a regime which has bludgeoned its
way into undivided power.
Better still, it has the initiative. Mojahedin organization leader Mas'ud Rajavi
told us recently: "After destroying the Khomeyni myth, the present phase of the
resistance movement is to develop the mass movement by occupying the streets and
not allowing the reactionaries any chance of remaining there. Moreover they have
realized that it is no longer possibl~ for them to mobilize, even by force and
corruption, the tens of thousands of supporters which the Islamic Republican Party
[IRP] could once bring onto the streets at any time. It is a joke to suggest that
a speech by Khomeyni can now mo~ilize 1 million people in Tehran. The famous
pictures shown by Iranian television during Raja'i's funeral are from the archives:
it w4s the demonstration staged after Bani-Sadr's election. Pictures of the
president of the republic could be seen."
What will the next stage be? Rajavi replied: "To use strikes to completely
paralyze the economic and administrative apparatus, which is already seriously
undermined by the incompetence, intrigue and deliberate sabotage of the IRP's
men." And he added: "The mass movement will be swelled by demonstrations, atrikes
and finally the people's rising until the regime falls. And rest assured that it .
will fall soon."
The Mojahedin leader sa.id that he thinks that "the Khomeyni regime's efforts to
emerge from isolation are doomed to failure. The reports which we have received
indicate that Khomeyni's fore~gn minister has not had a good reception. I thiuk
r_hat the steadfastness front leaders have expressed their disagreement and have
shown that they cannot be taken in...."
C~Y~2TG1?T: 1981 Afrique-Asie
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ISRAEL
BRIEFS
TRADE WITH NIGERIA--Israel has concluded a contract ~aith Nigeria ~to build three
hotels, a mill, an aluminum plant, and two water stations in this African country.
The value of the contract is $190 million. This deal is another indication of
the resumption of Isra~l's trade, economic, and technical activity in Africa,
thereby penetrating the Arab wall built in the 1970's to strengthen the boycott
- of the Zionist state in Af rica. These projects will be implemented by Solel ~
Boneh International, which is owned by the Israeli trade union f ederation, His-
tadrut. It is strange that, although Nigeria is the largest Islamic country in
- Africa, it did not prevent the conclusion of this deal with Israel. And this is
despite the fact that Nigeria~participated in the Islamic summit conference held
earlier in Saudi Arabia, which issued recommendations calling on the Islamic
countries to sever diplomatic and economic relations with the Zionist entity.
Sixty-eight percent of the sum will be provided by 50 Israeli and foreign banks
as a loan to finance these projects with the Nigerian government paying the rest.
The entiire loan will be guaranteed by the Italian goverinnent with the proaiso
that the Israeli company purchase~the necessary industrial materials from Italy.
[Text] [Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 239, 11-17 Sep 81 p 60] /COPYRIGHT:
1981, AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI/ 9123
CSO: 4404/62
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LEBANON
TENSIONS IN CEASE FIRE PERIOD DESCR'~CBED
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 241, 25 Sep-1".Oct 81 pp 28, 29
/Article: "They Are Terrorizing Lebanon fx�am tiorth to South To Sabotage Arab
Solutions and Shut Life down: The Massacrea during the Cease Fir~!'/
/Text/ Who makes up the Front to Liberate Lebanon from Foreigners which is setting
~ up booby-trapped cars and bombs from north to south, passing through Beirut, in the
~ course of the Lebanese cease fire? Why has this front become active now that the
"Arab Followup Cocmmittee" has managed to come up with limited security eteps that
have given promise of tangible relief in the political context? Who is harmed by
~ the calm in Lebanon? Who is anxious to thwart efforts to restore tranquility,
i whether Arab or non-Arab, through the kidnappings, killing and terrorization?
The capital of Lebanon was experiencing attem~ts to engender optimism in the middle
, ,of last week, and the newspapers were talking, even if with some caution, about
! "subsequent security steps along the avenue," after one of the main thoroughfares
~ between western and eastern Beirut, Museum Avenue, was opened up. Some observers
' went so far as to imagine a long integrated timetable of political steps to pre-
I pare the way for security steps, and vice versa, and to enumerate the priorities
~ in the schedules, which the Lebanese have learned by hesrt hecause of the frequency
with which they have read or heard them over the 7 years.
Then suddenly the first explosion broke out.
Thirty kilograms of TNT exploded at 0640 hours in the morning last Thursday in the
Lebanese Cement Company in Shaka. The targets were the company, the workers and
; truck drivers who arrive early to get a turn in the rush of customer applications.
The area that witnessed the explosion lies within the area of influence of former
President Sulayman Franjiyeh and the Ma~adah Brigade of al-Zaghartah. The result:
a few dozen killed and wounded. The signature: the Front to Liberate Lebanon
fram Foreigners.
On the morning of the same day, in Sayda, the capital of southern Lebanon, a
Mercedes-200 sutomobile parked in front of the headquarters of the joint forces
coa~mand in the center of the city. It was rigged with more than 100 kilograms of
TNT. At 0915 hours in the morning, 45 minutes before the hour for the meeting the
- , command was intending to hold, which was to consisC of about 40 security and polit-
ical officials, a terrifying explosion broke out, bringing down the aix-story
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camnand building; adjacent buildings within a radius of 300 meters col:agsed or
were damaged. The result: more than 200 killed and wounded. The signature: the
,Front to Liberate Lebanon from Foreigners.
The al-Silm section of al-Shiyah (the southern suburb of Beirut) was the thitd vic-
tim: explosives were laid in a car parked on a residen~ial street, as Shaka and
Sayda were declaring mourning for the victims of the first two exploaions, less
than 24 hours after they occurred. The result: six children dead or wounded. The
~ signature: The Front to Liberate Lebanon fxam Foreigners.
The fourth victim, and perhaps not the last, was a movie the~ter in western Beirut
(the Salwa Theater), in a congested common section. The bomb~ exploded fn the
theater, 35 people were killed or wounded, fire broke out, and the end of the
_ bloody week was "crowned" by the signature: The Front to Lib~.rate Lebanon.
The fifth explosion was observed in Txipoli at the beginning af this week. It had
as its target a gas tank in a crowded residential area. As luck would have it,
the charge was set off before the tank was filled and its losst~s were restricted
to the depot.
Thus the series of events encompassed Lebanon, fram south to no~-th, in less than
S days; meanwhile news of the state of terror western Beirut is going through has
increased, following the discovery of other charges on al-Hamra' Street.
- It has became clear that a single thread connects the five explosions and that
their purpose, and the purpose behind the slaughter that could follow them, i.s to
- undermine the state of optimism that had started to appear on the Lebanese horizon,
to thwart the efforts of the Arab ~ollowup Committee and to keep L~ebanon in the
vortex of infernal violence it is going through, as if life was ~~orbidden, and
calm was prohibited for the ordinary exhausted citizen.
Is, and Are?
But who makes up the Front to Liberate Lebanon fram Foreignera that h~s launched
- all these explosions in the areas of Syrian-Palestinian concentration? Is it a
, ornLn th~t is cooperating with the "Lebanese Front?" Is it an Israeli puppet
front that does not necessarily go through the Lebanese Front? Or is it the off-
spring of well-known disputes among certain armed detachments in western Beirut
and the areas that are clients of the Palestinians and the Lebanese National Move-
ment, hiding behind a"separatist" name in order to camouflage their real identity2
- Whatever this front may b~, the Lebanese coneider it criminal, because it has inno-
- cent pe.rsons as its target, and, beyond the innocents, the destiny of Lebanon.
- This is not the first time that roads in Lebanon have been opening up and that
Lebanese, Christian and Moslem, have resumed meeting one another--and now the
"fifth columns" have intervened to spoil the "melange" here, there and everywhere.
Lebanon today has more than 80 movements, armed groupa and armiea; that is, ix is
a diminuti.ve League of Nations meetiag in permanent fashion in order to trigger
the local, regional and international contradictions in the midst of the LebanE~se
people.
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- Does this mean that a symbol for Lebanese solutions has not yet appeared?
Perhaps. The resolutions of the Arab Follawup Com~ittee, and all the Arab resolu-
tions that have been taken since 1976, remain %mere/ ink on paper. Whenever cir-
- ~cumstances are propitious for an Arab meeting on Lebanon, contrary circumstances
emerge which eliminate them or dispel their positive effects. In this regard, a
former prime minister says, "Lebanon needs resotutions that can be carried out at
once. Do not be amazed to see any step in the execution stage failing when this
execution is delayed for more than 3 days."
Reassurances or Fantasies?
A review of the various resolutions that have been issued to deal with the Lebanese
crisis, but have not found their way to actual application, will in fact confirm
the truth of the former premier's conclusion in his analysis of the reason why the
resolutions that are adopted are not executed. Perhaps the best method officials
are following to arrive at actual application of their resolutions consists of
carrying them out swiftly and instantly. The proliferation of parties that are
active on Lebanese territory, their divers+e orientations and inclinations, and the
- growing number of people benefiting from the country's continued political, civil
and economic collapse call for strong authorities tbat know how to adopt decisions
and proceed to carry them out at once, before any group can catch its breath or
try to violate what has been already agreed upon.
The former premier's statement would not have been made had the wave of optimism
about relief that was unleashed by the reassurancea of the apening of the thorough-
fares between the two segments of the capital not started to dissipate. After
~ Museum Avenue was opened up, officials discovered that attempts were being made to
close it up again. They concentrated their efforts on strengthening security in
its i~nediate surroundings, considering that it was more important to manage to
keep that open than proceed to open other thoroughfares, especially since these
- thoroughfares would close with the first atteu~pt Co shuC them do~wn. Therefore the
"Followup Committee" ambassadors concentrated their attention on ensuring an ade-
quate cover to maintain a constant guarantee for traffic through the MusQUm gate-
way, acknawledging, as one of them stated, that keeping a given gateway open would
be more difficult than opening other ones (since one security agency official was
' unhappy with the obstacles that stood in the way of the continued execution of the
~ Followup Couanittee's resolutions and the opening of the other thoroughfares) and
pointing out that if tihe Museum gateway had not been opened up at the time, it
would not have been possible to open it up later, and the Followup Committee's
= resolution~ would have remained mere ink on paper.
For this reason, observers believe that apening the other thoroughfares should be
_ postponed until after the Arab Followup Committee meeting scheduled for 7 November,
and that it will be of no use for the government and the cabinet to insist on car-
rying out the execution of the resolutions before the date of this meeting. On
top of that, officials will face difficulty in ttxeir attempt to convince the parties
to the conflict to facilitate the process of applying the resolutfons. The issue
of acceptance or nonacceptance devolves now upon the army, which constitutes an
1 obstacle to all attempts to end the difficulty that has arisen. One fears that
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this issue will become a thorny problem threatening to thwart the efforts underway,
- and will not stop with the mere failure to carry out %the resolutions/ but will pro-
duce sudden lapses in the security situation.
It is well known that the national government is demanding that the arury withdraw
from its concentrated positions in Sodeco and the al-Sham Road extending up to
the museum and that th~ "Lebanese forces are demanding that the Palestine Liberation
Army which is concentrated in the same area be withdrawn, claim~ng that the two
armies took part in the fighting in the course of the incidents that started last
2 April. However, President Sarkis sees no benefit in withdrawing the Lebanese
army from its locations and insists that it remain where it is, considering that
there is no way to set matters straight and restore confidence to the citizens'
spirits except through recourse to the legitimate authorities' forces, foremost
amon~ which is the army. Although some parties are demanding that it not be
brought in, it is not logical to demand that it be withdrawn from the centers it
occupies.
Conditions and Further Conditions
Therefore, political circles are afraid that matters will become increasingly com-.
plex through concentration on the question of whether to keep the army in its posi-
tions or withdraw it fram them. This causes these circles to wo~er what positive
elements the Followup Comnittee built its evaluations on when it reassured people
~that broad steps had been taken toward relief. In this context the Saudi ambassa~
dor, 'Ali al-Sha'ir, says that he observed, in the course of his meetings with Col
- Muhammad Ghanim, the chief of the Syrian in~elligence forces operating in Lebanon,
and the higher coordination cocm?ittee that includes the National Movement, the
Palestinian resistance, the AMAL movement and the commander of the Lebanese Forces,
Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil, that everyone agreed that the roads and thoroughfares
oetween the two segments of the capital should be opened and were prepared to cax-
ry out all the cammittee's reso~.utions. However, this agreement and r~eadiness re-
mained mere talk, since the conditions and the countier-conditions that each group
set forth obstructed the opening of these thoroughfares, and could stymie Che reao-
lutions in light of what the co~nittee had in mind and the people antic~!pat2d.
It was no secr~t to ar.~one thp*_ the N~t~~~~l Movement set out a number o1f conditions
for execution %of the resolutions/, most imq~ortant of which were:
- First witl~rawal of the Lebax~ese axmy from its centers in Sodeco, al-Barimu
_ and a~-sarjawi, to be replaced by the domestic security forces.
Second, removal of all armed persons frvm lines of contact and thoroughfares.
Third, assumption by the Arab Detexrent Forces of the task of maintaining order in ~
the thoroughfares and lines of contact.
Fourth, rejection of the opening of the thoroughfares in stages, demanding that
they be opened at one stroke.
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When these conditions were pr~sented to the conmlander of the Lebaneae Forces,
Pierre al-Jumayyil, he expressed a number of reservations toward them, most import-
ant being the reservation a~n handing over to the I~eterrent Forces the security
:asks along the lines of cc~nt~act and the reservation on the issue of the Lebanese
a,rmy's withdrawal from the pnints in which it is concentrated.
Tt,,ese conditions and counte:rconditions only added to the Followup Coamnittee's in-
si,stence on eliminating all. t:he obstacles that might stand in the way of execution.
ThEw premier, Shafiq al-Waz::xn, joined in empbasizt.ng the committee's resolution by
say.ing "The government is ilerermined to continue carrying out these measures, since
opec?ing the thoroughfares ~Ls to be considered an initial step which will be followed
by the attainment of other r~:solutions related to c~versight of the illegal harbors
alon~; the Lebanese coastli~~e."
While an atmosphere of pes:siIIdsm on the subject of the opening of the thoroughfares
and hopes that the area of relief would broaden has :3pread in the past few days, an
officitil source has been qixoted as saying that the gc~vernment is determined to fol-
low up on the security stejas in prep~ration for the P:xpected reconciliation this
time anci ehat it will not l7esitate to eliminate every type of obatacle, that arises
to prevent that--be it pol:i_tical, geographical or civil. This security source went
on to sa;~, "Ask about the ~:?eople who are obstructing tl4e execution, and the people
' who are causing the public to feel fear, restoring the atmosphere of pessimism and
~ narrowing the room for hop