JPRS ID: 10151 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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JPRS L/10151
1 December 1981
West Euro e Re ort
p p
CFOL10 62 /81~
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INF~'JRMATION SERVICE ~
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JPRS L/10151
1 December 1981
WEST EUROPE REPQRT
(FOUO 62/81)
CONTENTS
c~,ONOMIC
SPAIN
Some Europeans See No Li.nkage Between Entxy to NATO, EEC
(Peru Egurbide; CAI~IO 16, 5 Oct 81) 1
P OLI TI CAL
FRAN CF
Economy, Media, Government: Potential Benefits, D~ngers
- (ALain Peyrefitte; L'EXPRESS, 20-26 Oct 81) 7
Causes of CF~T-CGT''Permanent' itivalry Reviewed
j (Fr~deric Pons; VAI,EURS ACTL'ELLES, 26 Oct 81) 17
UNITED KINGDOM
Labor Party Leader's Performance Reviewed
(Edit~rial; THE TIMES, 10 Nov 81) 19
- GENERAL
FRAN CE
Credit Bank's Leveque Sees Nationalization as 'Tragedy'
_ (Jean Ma::lme I,eveque Interview; PARIS MATQi, 4 Sep 81) 21
Writer Shows CGT Aims To Dominate in Industriea STo Be
Nationalized
(Jean Fr.ancois Jacquier; L'EXPI~ESS r 25 Sep 81) . . . . . . . . . 24
- a - ~ (III - WE - 150.FOU0]
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ECONOMIC SPAIN
SOME EUROPEANS SEE NO LINKAGE BETWEEN ENTRY TO NATO, EEC
M~:~drid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish S Oct 81 pp 58, 59, 61
[Article by Peru Egurbide (Brussels); "Headfirst Into Europe."]
[Text~ The government considers that ~oinin& NATO is already an accomplished fact.
Its objective now is the plunge into the European Economic Community, that group of
interests which is much more closed and select than the Atlantic militiary alliance,
and against which Spain appears determined to sma~h itself once and again. No or_e,
starting with the Spanish leaders themselves, is interested in ~oining the EEC
under pressure, and the urgency of the government arises almost exclusively from
its wanting to protect its back in vi.ew of the parliamc~ntary debate on NATO.
_ But the only backs the French are inclined to protect are those of their farmers,
who a~e unable to compete in quality, price and even terms of payment. They con-
sider Spanish interests to be an internal affair of Spain; while they try to prove
that French interests are the same as those of the European Economic Community.
And so they use the veto on Spain as they please.
The secretary of state for relations with the Communities, Raimunao Bassols,
returned from the recent meeting of the EEC in Brussels with the conviction that
France had finally tilted toward the side of Spain. "France has definitely under-
gone a favorable change in attitude, althaugh later on in the negotiations they
defended their interests." But thP former Spanish ambassador to the EEC did not
take into account the voluble French ~'-II?Perament and only hours after his optimis-
tic statements the French minister of agriculture, Edith Cresson, was announcing
that the socialist ma~ority would veto the entrance of Spain into the EEC.
A French Government spokesman would later tone down her statements, but the gallic
Ministry of Agriculture left it very clear a~ the same time that admission was
linked to the protection of French agricultural products.
This was repeated almost word for word by the French president in his first presi-
dential statements regarding Spain last 24 September. "I am in favor of the
negotiations," stated Mitterand. "But Spain must realize that as far as France
is concerned this negotiation is based on a certa~!n number of economic, agricul-
tural, industrial and regional realities; and that it is not possible for the
problem to be resolved by the simple dec3sfon of the other nine members of the
Community." With these words the French president throws out a warning to Spain,
and at the same time deauthorizes the support which the Spanish cause has received
recently from countries such as England and Germany.
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In 3ny case, the positive results for Spain ccming out of the Council of Ministers
of the Europe?n Economic Co~unity which took place on the 14th and 15th of last
month in Brussels cculd come to be transformed into a new "spirit," more healthy
than the one that ravaged Spsnisli nalitical life in the early days of the transi�-�
- tion.
What wa.~ character=zed in Brussels as a"formal unblocking," a"moderate openiag,"
or a"taetical gesture" gave rise in Madrid to lofty statements like the one that
said, "France has lifted the veto that it held over Spain."
Not that the Spanish negotiators have lost their heads, beca.use it is a known fact
ti~at political "spirits" only circulate in relation to public opinion. Raimundo
Bassols reverted to diplomatic language last 21 September when he made a stopover
in Brussels on the way to London.
His statements were along the line of "the negotiation has become unblocked as
far as prin~iples go," or "the fact 1s that in principle the EEC has cancelled
- some mortgages."
After meeting with the president of the European Commission, the liberal Luxem-
bour~er Gaston Thorn, and with Vice Pres'.ident Lorenzo Natali, the Italian Christian
Democrat who is directly in charge of the negotiation with ~pain, Bassols admitted,
"I myself was not sure, and am not sure naw how far this opening goes."
It seems clear that we are faced with an "opening in principle," "moderate," which
- has no other result than a"forma~ unblocking" of the Spanish negotiation.
Domes*_ic Politicizing
Any emphatic assertion about ~he importance of the September Council, and the
perspectives which it opens for Spain, will have to be weighed, meanwhile, in the
balance of the campaign which the governmerit is carrying on with a view to the
parliamentary debate on Spain's joining NATO. The inclusion of the togic of the
EEC in this campaign can not be a simple supposition at the point, and even less
if one takes into account that it was Bessols himself who was in charge of placing
it on the table.
During the morning following the meeting of the Community ministers it was the
secretary of state who established the sound relationship between the negotiations
with rh~ EEC and the decision of the government to enter NATO. His f irst genuinely
affirmative response to the question of a~ournalist was later reduced to the level
of this official version: "The negotiations with NATO and the EEC are parallel
and separate topics, but they m~tually influence each other."
The secretary said, at another point, that although the news had not been published
� in any newspaper or mentioned in any speech, "it evidently is floating around in
the atmosphere," that the pro,ject of ~oining NATO had had an influence on the
Community's opening. He added, "A Western deci5ion, like the one the Spanish
Government is proposing and will submit to Parliament, evidently has an influence
on the decisions which the Western world must take towards us, for example, on the
topic of the EEC."
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Bassols statements were atypical, because they contradict both the doctrine
_ officially maintained by the Community, which Ireland belongs to, although it is
not a m~mber of NATO; and the ones which the Spanish authorities themselves had
been upholding. Indeed, Community circles very closely linked to the negotiations
with ~pain were caught by surprise.
What the secretary of state said, however, tallies perfectly with the political
project wnich Calvo Sotelo suggested, rather than formulated, during the visit which
he made to Bonn last spring, on the occasion of his first appearance as president
of the government. The stress on German support for Spain's joining the alliance,
and the conviction expressed by Schmidt that the agricultural negotiations with
Spa~n could be unblocked even before the reform of the Community was completed,
made it clear that the new cabinet was reversing the order of the foreign policy
_ priorities held by Adolfo Suarez and his minister Ore,ja: ~oin NATO, yes, but from
the EEC. For Calvo Sotelo, the road to the EEC lies through NATO.
The new project was shaped into a plan of attack during the Wagnerian party and
the Mediterranean cruise that served as a pretext for Calvo Sotelo's meeting this
summer with the German minister of foreign affairs, Hans Dietrich Genscher, and
with President Thorn, both liberals, who took leading roles in this new scenario.
It was, in fact, the Germans who were the best defenders of the Spanish cause on
the 14th, and they even introduced a document to unbZock the agricultural negotia-
tions. Thorn, on his part, has announced that next November he will make an
official visit to Spain.
Com~nunity Opening
It seems cleax that there has been an opening, and even that it has been brought
about through a change of opinion promoted by the countries most interested in
_ Spain's joining NATO. Great Britain is also supporting the Spanish cause, although
its actions are less visible because Gibralter requtres them to keep their dis-
tance. But it is more difficult to svaluate what the consequences of these circum-
stances could be.
The inclusion of the Spanish dossier on the agenda of the first meeting which the
Council held after the summer--together with topics as important to the EEC as
that of its own reform--was already a notable event. The negotiations with Spain
were blocked on the 14th by what was called the double lock: the one Giscard
brandished during the French elections, and the one which Andre Chandernagor,
Mitterand's new secretary for Community affairs, presented in a none too friendly
way to Perez Llorca when the Spanish minister visited Bruesels in July of this year.
The "Giscard blow," as is known, prevents the EEC and Spain from talking about
the agricultural sub~ect and about the budget--the most important topics of the
negotiation, which have hardly been touched upon--until the Community has cleared
up the internal disorder which Thatcher produced when, in the Council of Europe
meeting which took place in Dublin in 1979, she declarec: herself almost in sus-
pension of payments.
It was an election weapon which the former French president used in confrontir~g
his farmers, but it was based on a real problem, upon which the ma~ority of the
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countries of the Comanunity were in agreenent. The agricultural and budgetary
- negotiations with Spain, as Britain's Lord Carrington said when he acceded to the
presidency of the Councii of Ministers in July for 6 months, would not be able to
be completed until the uncertain process of the internal reform of the EEC was
well on the track.
What Chandernagor did was more serious, because he put up a barrier against the
present Spanish tax system, which began by blocking the negotiations on the subject
of the customs union, and ended, in successive statements by the Frenchman, in
becoming a brake on any possibilities of conversation--in short, the door was
slammed shut. But, as in the case of the reform of agricultural policy, the com- ~
plaints about the Spanish tax system do not come only from the French, and there
is substantial agreement on the sub~ect among all Europeans. These are complaints
which have developed as Community unrest has grown because of the tax ad~ustments
which the Spanish authorities make at the frontier on products which cross the
Pyrenees, with the investment of the commercial consequences of the 1970 frame-
work agreement favorable to Spain.
This unrest resulted in a demand, which is a firm position of the Community: Spain
must apply a Value Added Tax on the very same day that it is admitted to the EEC.
It is a point on which the Community will allow no concessions, and which the
Spanish authorities are refraining from confronting as non-negotiable for two
reasons: the re~ection which tax reform encounters among the managers, and the
advantages which Spain can extract from the present situation if the final negotia-
- tions are dealt with in a comprehensive way.
Differences of Opinion
It is known that the Spanish side upholds the official position that the period of
transition--or of gradual application of the contents of the agreement--should be
the same for all the subjects and sectors (dismantling of industrial and agricul- .
_ tural tariffs, common foreign tariffs, free movement of workers, etc.); but there
are suspicions that the EEC, which still has not expressed an explicit position,
would like to ad~ust the transition by sub~ects, and probably to allot 5 or perhaps
3 years for the free movemPnt of indusrrial products, 10 for that of agricultural ~
products, and 7 for that of workers, besides other regulations.
In contrast to this focus on sectors, which favors Community products, Madrid pro-
poses the final negotiation of one single package of ma~or questions, in which,
obviously, any concession on ~he IVA [Value Added Tax] could be used to balance
other subjects.
The next in-depth "round" in the EEC is set for 26 October, but the Spaniards want
_ to postpone it until November, for tactical reasons. As seen from here, the
Spanish appointment with the EEC appears irrevocably linked to the imprecise
calendar of Co~unity reform itself, whose next milestone will be the December
Council of Europe.
Vice President Natali said recently that the EEC is still maintaining that
_ 1 January 1984 I.s the day set for the admission of Spain. It is not a bad omen,
because they were already beginning to talk about January 1985.
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EEC and NATO Are Separate Topics
"If you want to see them as parallel, well, that's one view. But parallels are
lines which do nct touch each other, and the fact is that Spain's negotiations wiCh
the EEC and NATO do not influence each other, and will not influence each other."
This was the comment from a Con~nunity source who is very diractly linked to the
negotiations with Spain, when he heard about the statement in which Ra3.mundo Bassols
established a relationship between the two subjects.
Game of Interests
It ~:*as not a denial, and to the extent to which it reflects the official position
of the EEC, the comment in no way proves that that influence does not exist. In-
deed, it probably did exist in the case of the September decision, but the experi-
ence of Spain over the last few years demonstrates up to what point national
interests--especially economic ones--influence other types of considerations in
_ Community negotiations.
Francois Mitterand, for example, would like Spain to join NATO, as did Giscard
d'Estaing; however he only c~nsents reluctantly to the lowering of some barriers. .
Then, his minister of agriculture, Edith Craisson, apgarently thought it advisable
to use the case of Spain to put pressure on the Commission in approving the three
new agricultural regulations; she must have also confused the European Parliament
with the French Assembly, and she definitely kicked up a fuss. Looking at it from
more purely economic perspectives, there is the case of England, who, while it
supports the negotiatians wlth Spain, wants to freeze our textiles in the Customs
Union basket.
To Each His Own
Even the great German mentor has its weaknesses: the FRG has kept the social topic
blocked, because it has to do with the movement of emigrants. It, together with
Great Britain, is the country which is most opposed to the new regulation on fats
and oils, which would facilitate Spanish integration to the degree that it would
contribute toward reducing the almost structural surpluses of olive oil. It is
- true, ~n the other hand, that the regulation would harm the soybean multinationals,
for that is the oil the Germans use for cooking.
The Points of Disagreement
- Agriculture: Pending negotiation
Fishing: Pending negotiation.
- Special Resources: Pending negotiation.
Tax Coordination: IVA, taxes on tobacco, tax monopolies.
Customs Union: Textiles, steel, Canary Islands.
European Coal and Steel Community (UCSC): Steel aad scrap iron.
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EURATOM: Spanish guarantee of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Foreign Relations: Transition in gF~ner.aliz~d preferences.
Social: Free movement of labor force.
Transportation: Combined railroad-highway transportation.
- Legislative Coordination: Chemical and pharmaceutical patents.
Institutional: Final Negotiation.
' Regional Policy: Spanish statement lacking
Movement of Capital: Closed
Freedom of Establishment: Closed
Note: The first two points have hardly been dealt with, and depend respectively
on reforms of the common agricultural palicy and on the Community budget. Spain
has presented a document on fishing, but the subject is still awaiting the EEC's
_ resolution of the internal conflict which was created by the admission of. Great
Britain.
COPYRIGHT: 1981, Informa~ion y Revistas, S.A.
~ 8131
CSO: 3110/22
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POLITICAL FRANCE
ECONOMY, MEDIA, GOVERNMENT~ POTENTIAL BENEFITS, DANGERS
Paris L'EXPRESS in French 20-26 Oct 81 pp 152-166
[Article by Alain Peyrefitte: "B~nefits and Dangers in the Change of Government"]
[Text] Was Francois Mitterrand elected to establish a socialist
society or to manage the same society with other leaders and
another style? Is he going to follow the social-democratic path
carefully or break with capitaliam in an irreversible way? Which
of the two scenarios is the more probable? What cou13 the con-
sequences be of these two hypotheses for the Left, for the oppo-
sition, and above a11 for France and the rrench people? Here is
the answer by Alain Peyrefitte.
The Chances of a Consensus
In a classical democracy a change in government puts the ideas of the former o~po-
sition to the test of the facts: it purges the fantasies entertained by a group
of the voters who had remained on the sidelines of power. Honesty requires us to
recognize that when men so long in the opposition take the levers of command into
their hands, this could have positive aspects.
1. The democratic character of the Fifth Repu3lic is established. Beyond a doubt,
democracy is defined by the renewal of authority at regular intervals. Since 1958
our voters have develc~ped habits which have become a kind of collective second na-
ture. The voters would not easily allow interference to the rules of ths game.
Customs count for more than the laws. The beat criterion of a democratic regime
is the uncertainty about the results of an election. Francois Mitterrand had
tirelessly denounced the previous government ae "Caesarian" or "Bonapartist." In
fact, the results of the 1958 elections were somewhat overwhelming in character.
However, uncertainty made its appearance, beginning with the elections of 1962.
This increased in 1965, 1967, 1968, and 1969. In 1973 the Union of the Left
seemed about to win. In 1974 Valery Giscard d'Estaing was only elected by a nar-
row margin. In 1978 most forecasts predicted the defeat nf tl�~e government in
power. On 10 May, until 8:00 pm more than half of the French believed that the
. president in office was going to be re-elected.
We live in a true democracy. On the electoral scales the people as sovereign have
the power to place weights whose size no one knows in advance. The balance is
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even so sensitive that one cannot play with it: ~aith 1 percent of the vote shift-
ed, the gove~fnment changes hands.
As sovereign judges, the F'rench peer?e are not bound by anything: not ~y recogni--
tion for services rendered or even by their recent decisions. ~'h'heir ability to
forget should inspire some feelings of fear among those who hold power and some
hope among those who aspire to it.
The majority of the votera thought that most French, having become legitimists,
would vote again for the man who po~sessed legitimacy. Howeve~, at"the end of his
term of office, he no longer possessed legitimacy. This was an initial error on
the nature of the x-egime, believing in the "advantage of the government in power."
The advantage exists for local elections. For zhe presidential election, on the
' contrary, it is necessary to speak of the "han~icap of the government in power."
A terrible handicap! The French people respect the legitima~cy of their elected
representative for the duration of his term of office. How~ver, they do not give
him power~ they lend it to him.
:vfany supporters of Jacques Chirac believed, inversely, that if the president was
deEeated, the French people would turn to Chirac in the legislative elections, out
of fear of the Left. This was a second error regarding the spirit of our institu-
tions. The voters admirably accepted their own logic: it was nec:essary to give
- the new president a National Assembly which would make it possible for him to
- govern.
2. The solidity of the system was put to the test. It came out of it strength-
ened: a posthumous victory by its founder. Tne change of administrations took
place in an atmosphere of exemplary calm. We 3.ive in a country of laws. Francois
Mitterrand was elected in a regular f~.shion. The continuity of the state was as-
suxed. This government, which its op~onents af yesterday depicted as unable to
change democratically, lent itself to the change easily.
A half-presidential, half-parliamentary system, it seemed to the Left that it had
a vague, evil spell about it, which was an obstacle to the opposition's coming to
power. In reality, there are two ways for the opposition to take power. The
first way is r_o win the legislative elections: the president is then obliged to
call on a government which conforms to the wishea of the voters. However, he
retains the possibility either to diss~lve the new Assemblv or to put his own
position up for election. Tn either case, if he loses again, he must retire frum
the scene for good. This experiment has not yet been attempted. It is desirable
that this happen some day, and it is in no way impossible that it will happen in
the riext 5 years. The secand way, and the most decisive, is to win. the presi-
dential election. The legislative elections, whi~h take place fallow~.:ig the
presidential elections, amplify the success achieved. The voters offer the new
president the majority he needs.
It was unhealthy, over the long term, that half of the population should feel
eternally excluded from power; that a majority of the workers, the salaried em-
ployees, the government officials, the young people should imagine themselves
camped out at the gates of the city; that three-quarters of the teachers, research-
ers, artists, and other intellectuals should become embittered in a kind of ill--
tempered oppositi_on. A climate of du1Z revolt resulted from this, as well as the
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complete rejection of almost everything which the administratian in office did or
said. We can hope that at least some of those who have the task of molding public
sentiment will stop questioning the legitimacy of the government, the state, and
even the nation.
3. The Left opp~sition, by becoming the majority in the country, has joined com-
pany with our institutions. The Fifth Republi.c was born in 1958; it went through
its baptism by fire in 1981; it is now recognized by everyone.
Francois Mitterrand seems at ease as guarantor of this Constitution which he fought
against with such tenacity. He seems to wish to respect its spirit. The prime
minister contents himself with playing the music whose score the president writes.
- It is impossible to see how a future president, after four predecessors who all
will have carefully made the preeminence of their position prevail, could again
become a nonentity. Some people had predicted that, if Francois Mitterrand was
elected, that would Ue the end of the Fifth Republic. However, S months after
his election everything leads one to think that the new president will decline to
deprive himself of so efEicient an instrument provided him by a Constitution
adopted despite him.
We have thereforp just observed an event o� ~i�i~riary importance. Until 1958 France
had /never/ [in italics] known a regime which was both strong and democratic at
the same time, The victory of Francois I~itterrand can sanctify and strengthen the
first regime which has given France stability, while respecting public freedoms.
~ 4. The president, who has become responsible for all the French, has the duty and
the means to tear himself free from the pressure ~f his supporters, fron the dogma
of the "class struggle," even from his own proraises, in order to take into account
the interests of the nation and to unite it. That was the wager of General de
Gaulle on the presidential function. Wi11 this bet win?
After the struggle over the institutions of the country, what were the other great
battles waged by the opposition? There you see ti~at the thermonuclear experiments
have been resumed, the "an*_i-city" strategy has been confirmed, a new atomic sub-
marine has been launched with fanfare, the development of the neutron bomb has
been continued. For a supranational Europe and against French ambitions, chsrged
with ''narrow national~.sm," with using a veto right for the protection of our essen-
tial interests? Thus former pra~tices were perpetuated. Agair..st the policy of
independence regarding the two power blocs? Against our witYidra~,~al from N?,TO,
following whicl~ Francois rlitterrand carried on the assault, moving a motion of
censure against the government? And here he is conc.urring with it. Against the
ambitious program of construction af nuclear plants tn generate electricity? To
the anger. of the ecologists, who~n the PS [Sociall.st Party] had promised to block
the program, the new government has accepCed the program, by a two-thirds majority.
Did the opposition denounce the impotence of the previous government in dealing
with unemployment and the increase in prices and attack the bad excuse offered of
the present world crises? Now these two plagues are rapidly getting worse, and
the government blames...the world crisis.
Of course, the new government, out o� fear that its acceptance of the positions
of the previous government will be considered denials of its previous stsnds, must
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mask these changes of position by t.hE usa of spectacular symbols, which are re-
assuring for the make-believe world of its militant supporters: the halting of
construction at the Plogoff center, the abandonment of construction of the Larzac
center. However, reality imposes its implacab~e kind of logic, which they had
hardly thought of in the idle conversation in the oppo~ition committees.
There is where the principal virtue o.f the change of government lies. Only the
Left has the capacity, either by its conversion to the real world or by fts fail-
ure, to detoxicate its own supporters trom the poisons which they had swallowed,
whose results were little by little contaminating the entire body of the French
nation.
If the various acts of acceptance of the policy followed since 1958 increase in
the coming months (without covering them up by means of a few, expiatory sacri-
fices as props), it would not be impossible for France to come to resemble a soci-
ety where the extremes are reduced to nearly nothing and where the majority of the
French are in agreement on everything that counts. We could then s~e in the fu-
ture a periodic change in government between a"center left" and a"center right."
A very slight difference in the votes, as in the stable democracies, would be
_ enough to make the majority turn toward one or the other of the two large polit-
ical formations wnich converged on the essentials, beginning with the kind of
regime and society. Is this plausible or hopeless?
The Temptations of the Irreversible
What can �avor, today, the establishment of a national consensus, which has been
tragically lacking? It would be sufficient that the new government would choose
to be "socialist," as, for example, the Bonn government is, and not like the coun-
tries which liave "broken with capitalism," that is, up to now, the communist coun-
tries and only them. All the palls suggest that two-thirds of the French people
would like to see capitalism of production (market economy, pr:ivate initiative,
freedom to enter into contracts), moderated by a socialism of redistribution (in-
tervention by the government, highly progressive taxation).
'Lhat is the orientation which General de Gaulle, as well as his successors, had
chosen: that is, the "third way," between uncontrolled capitalism, which the
French people would not lilce, and collectivism, whose failure.no longer needs to
be demonstrated. France, under a regime ~,~here the "socialists" were in the oppo-
sition, thus became clearly more "socialist" than a country like the Federal Re-
public of Germany, where the "socialists" are in power. In our country the vari-
ous forms of taxes amourit to 43 percent of Gross National Product, while they
remain below 36 percent on the other side of the Rhine River. The French social
budget i.s more than one-quarter of the general budget, while in the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany it is less than one-quarter. The social costs paid by companies
represent o:~e-third of the sa].ary s~ructure in France, while in Germany they only
amoi~nt to one-fourth. In France the productive public sector, at the beginning
of 1981, accounted for 13 pcr.cent of gross domestic product, while in Germany it
only provided 6 percent.
We can therefore say that the Fifth Republic completed a social-democratic pro-
gram, but without deriving the psychological benefit from it, and in the midst of
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great political difficulties. In effect, these reforms collided with a Left which
rejected them, because it saw in tiiem so many "alibis" protecting capitalism.
The Left could therefore march boldly along the very road where the fir.st three
presidents only moved uneasily, because of the fact that the Left was the obstacle.
It would be enough for the Left to convert to capitalism without a second thought
in production and trade; for it to content itself with introducing socialism in
the distribution of revenue; for it to renounce the dogmas of the "class struggle"
_ and the "break with capitalism."
Is this dreaming? Well, it is the turnabout to which the German Socialist Party
committed itself at the Bad-Godesberg Congress in 1959. The German socialists
understood that they would have no call to lead a Germany deeply integrated with
the capitalist West and whose "miracle"--capitalist--was the object of admiration
of the world, if they did not repudiate the Marxist catechism. In France the
activists and many of the leaders of the PCF [Communist Party], the PS [Socialist
Party], the CGT [General Confederatien of Labor], and of the CFDT [French Demo-
cratic Confederatior. oE Labor] remain prisoners of an archaic and dangerously un-
real system of thought. Only the exercise of the responsibilities and the peda-
gogy which the president of the Republic could use wirh them might make the scales
fall from their eyes. In this respect two possibilities open themselves t~ analy-
sis.
In the first scenario Francois Mitterrand wou~d espouse capitalism and would move
along the "social-democratic" path. He would do this either on his own initiative
or under the pressure of events.
In the case of a voluntary cQnversion: rrancois Mitterrand would have secretly
chosen the "social-democratic" path. kiowevPr, he would be under the tactical ob-
ligation to assume respor~sibility for the various Marxist obsessions. How could
he make his allies accept the laws of a liberai economy? He could do this by
ostensibly making a sacrifice to some of their myths, by gestures appropriate
to maintaining appearances.
In the case of an involuntary conversion: Francois Mitterrand has not made this
choice; events will choose �or him. He will quickly understand that reality is
_ not in accordance with his dreams. One cannot at the same time proclaim European
and Atlantic soli-iarity and place oneself in comFlete contradiction to the letter
and spirit of the commitments made by France to the BEC, the European Monetary
System, the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development]. It
- will be impossible for Francz to remain in the Common Market, if it is the only
member to "break with capitalism," when all the mechar~isms of the Treaty of Rome
are the very mechanisms of capitalism. Many French who voted for Mitterrand c~id
nat think of "breaking with capitalism." On 26 April 1981 the five candidates
of the "Left" together only received 46.79 percent of the vote. And many among
them did not ask to "change society." Opposite them, the four candidates of the
government parties, quire determined to maintain a capitalist system, together
received 49.34 percent of the vote. The ecologists, who made up the difference,
were fighting agai,nst pollution, not against the mechanisms of a liberal economy.
Let us go farther along this line. When we compare the elections of 1978 and of
1981 (in the decisive round, when each deputy was elected), we note that those who
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voted for the Left, in terms of /valid/ (in italics] votes, went up from 48.57
percent to 55.30 ~ercent. From that it has been concluded that the wave which
elected Mitterrand by 51:75 percent of the votes was turned into a landslicie,
S weelcs later.
However if, like Francoi~ Goguel, yau look at tize percenLages in terms of the

~ /registered/ [in italicsJ voters, you see that from Nlarch 1978 to .7une 1981 those
who voted for the Left only went up from 40.05 percent to 40.08 percent. In other
words, the socialist and communist votes dl.d not change. "The spirit of the peo-
- ple of the Left," which has been so much talked about, was not sfiowri at all. It
was the votes of the moderates which were mi~sing, falling from 42.10 percent of
the votes in 1978 to 32.18 percent in 1981. This abstentionism caas the unique
factor in the great socialist victory in June. Were the moderate voters dis-
couraged by the divisions within the outgoing government coalition and equally
sc~ by their sudden reconciliation? Did they prefer to abstain in order not to be
involved in committing an act which would bloclc our institutions? The wave which,
since 1958, had carried the government ma~ority on its crest had fallen away under
it and left it on the sands. The wave bearing the Left to power remained at exact-
ly the same point as in the past. 'The voters did not give the Left a mandate to
change society: no more in 1981 than in 197$� The voters only allowed the Left
the power to do so, by the silence of one-quarter of the moderate voters.
The new power was e.lected by means of numerous ambiguities which, knowingly main-
tained for a long time, resulted in a more and more unhealthy climate. They arz
going ta be dissipated little by little by the test of events, thanks to the
change in government.
Must it be ruled out that Francois Mitterrand will give up tampering with the deli-
cate capiralist mechanisms, when he understands that he was elected not to carry
out a Marxist program but to manage the same society with other leaders and another
style? Hasn't he given instructions, as soon as the constraints of our trade bal-
ance were explained to him, to continue the sales of arms, which he den.~~unced with
indignation when he was ln the opposition? Hasnyt he stepped back from the pro-
posal to give the right to vote r_o the immigrants, when he has seen a poll in
which the French people m~ssively rejected this proposal?
Certainly, it would have been bettc~r for the Socialists to find their own road to
Damascus before entering into power. Each new defeat had led them to question
their beliefs. If. Francois Mitterrand had been defeated again iti 1981, a party of
the Left would probably have abandoned Marxism, as it had successively foresworn
its other utopias. This adaptation to reality would have avoided a lot of damage.
But Ls i t too late'?
'Chis first scenario wo~ild be the best for France--and the worst for the opposition.
It would assure ttie Socialists a life span which could reach, as in Sweden or in
Norway, several decades. However., over the long term, the first scenario would
permit the easy change in government of a"center right" and a"center left" in a
pacified democracy.
The second scenario presupposes that Francois Mitterrand persists in seeking to
"break with capitalism," and ta "succe~d where AllendQ failed." Won't he persevere
in his purpose of making France "the first country which will establish a socialist
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~
regime in freedom," thus creating a unique model in the wnrld? Only the idea he
has of himself is developing in view of this noble mission: until March he seemed
to place himself in position as the tfiird great French Socialist oi this century
aft~r Jaures and Blum. After March, the messianic spirit went up one level.
Francois Mitterrand, catching a glimpse of and then savoring victory, renewed his
ties with 1789 and began a revolution as historic as the first one, although not
bloody. He would be "a de Gau11e of the Left"; de Gaulle would then be no more
than a Mitterrand of the Right.
If the president continues along this path, will he avoid the obstacles? France
is such that it cannot be governed for very long without a majority. If the real
- country stops being confused with the 1ega1 country, the president will feel his
legitimacy slip away from under him, like a rug suddenly pulled away. Once the
first serious difficu~lties are encountered, a cleavage will develop within the
Left, between the supporters of the minimum program, who will probably protest:
- "We are going too far; the voters did not want that; we are no longer inspiring
confidence in our European partners"; and the supporters of the maximum program,
who will probably clamor: "Things are going bad because we are no* going far
enough."
It will be difficult for the president to stand still on the slopes. The socialist-
labor-communist movement will establish its fiefdoms everywhere. The neutrality
of the civil service, the impartial authority of the state, ~aill be destroyed. To
explain this bound for~aard, the official propaganda will try to find scapegoats:
the incompetence of preceding governments, the dollar (concerning whict? it wi11 be
asked if it is more pernicious when it goes up or when it goes down), the wall of
silver (of which it is forgotten that it is made of millions and millions of
bricks), the 200,000 big taxpayers--the modern version of the 200 famiiies--the
multinational firms, the PME [small and medium-sized enterprises], the merchants,
the craftsmen, the high government officials, the G~uncil of State, the Constitu-
tional Council. The powerful means which the Constitution gives to the state will
sometimes aggravate the damagc ~i~~e. That is, until the day when a strike either
by doctors or by police officers or by prison guards or by truck drivers (like in
- Chile) will serve to reveal the nation's loss of canfidence in the guver:zment.
Some ministers, some socialist and radical deputies will refuse to stand for an
inflation rate which has become intolerable, the level of 2 million unemployed
workers will be considerably exceeded, and existing policies will be 3een to be
incapable of resolving the problems of the time. The government will implode.
This second scenario is the best for the opposition. It should prepare itself to
take over when the 3 or 4 percent of the French people who made the decision in
the presidential election of 10 May wi11 have recovered from their illusions.
And their about face--perceptible even now--will cease to be compensated (and even
beyond that point) by the "technical supporters of legitimacy" (older persons,
women living alone), who are led by instinct to vote for the government in office.
However, this is the worst scenario for France.
A series of distur.bing measures taken, which go far beyond the social-democratic
option, even when seasoned with symbolic gestures, seems to indicate that this
second scenario is being put in place.
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1. The nationalization of prosperous industrial enterprises has not always had
solid economic justification. It will constitute a heavier burden on public fi-
nances than in any other Western country. The nationalization of almost all the
credit institutions wi11 estrange France from its partners in the Common MarkeL'
and will bring it several giant steps closer to the people's democracies. The
European countries where credit is nationalized are the countries of Eastern Europe,
including Albania and Yugoslavia. There is a single country like this in all of
the Americas, North, Central, and South: Cuba.
As a whole these nationalizations can lead in our economy to the leukemia of
bureaucratization and irresponsibility, which far the decision-ma.kers involves the
absence of economic sanctions. International confidence will be undermined. The
economy lives on anticipation: future nationalizations, instead of favoring dyna-
mism, already seem to be paralyzing it. The "recovery plan" adopted by the new
government hasn't made anything recover since it was auproved. On the contrary,
stagnation hds appeared. It is unlikely that the establishment of new controls
(to watch over prices or search out gold) and devaluation (whicti, it is feared,
will soon be followed by fuxther devaluation) will re-establish confidence.
2. The trade unions of the Left will use their power to support these nationali-
zations, of which they are no doubt the only real justification. Already, they
are infiltrating everywhere. In the ranks of the police, the courts, among teach-
ers, the universities, the government ministries, they are taking the key posts;
_ perhaps they are waiting to do Che same thing one day in the army. The govern-
ment is not really socialist; it is socialist-trade union-communist.
3. Four important ministries have been conceded to be the full property of the
~ PCF. The Party knows in detail the techniques of infiltration. Some 35 years
afterwards we are still suffering from the consequences of the passage of Maurice
Thorez through the civil service or of Marcel Paul through EDF [French Electric
Company]. It is worrying, for example, that the president of the RATP [Indepen-
dent Parisian Transport System] has beer~ appointed with sovereign power by the
Political Bureau of the Commun:.st Party. It is even more worrisome that this
g~actice, which was not even seen during the Fourth Republic, has not aroused any
protest. A long time after the socialist wave will have receded, the communist
mussels will remain attached to tt?e rocks.
4. They have applied the American "spoi7.s system" to an area in which it is never
applied in the United States, since there all the organs of information are inde-
pendent of the government. The witch hunt in the mass media, the taking of com-
mand by faithful henchman of the new government, the silence and terror imposed
on those who could provide another poir~t of view are perhaps even more disquiet-
ing than the economic problems. The damage which bad management causes, good
management can make good. However, the lethargy in which the French people seem
to be in the course of being plunged can have serious consequences on our liber-
ties themseZves.
Until 10 Ma;~, in the different radio and television networks, a balance had been
established. A majority of the journalists, producers, directors, cameramen, and
technicians felt themselves close to the Left. However, the management, appointed
by the government, had the role of creating, more or less, a"gentlemen`s agree-
ment." Today, without any control by administrative councils or by any body
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established by law, instructions to main~ain silence or to amplify given stories
are transmitted by hidden channels. "One must not talk" abour_ the worsening of
unemployment, of the attacks that have taken place in Corsica, nor of the repeated
refusal oi the court in Pontoise to instal7. Bidalou in office. "One must talk" at
length about the favorable reception of official statements--or about crises over-
seas, etc. The minority of journalists who do not feel themselves to be and do
not claim to be "of the Left" are lying low or censor themselves, when they are
not censored. Disinformation is taking root.
Beyond even the television networks and the state radio, the fears about informa-
tion in France are legitima.te. 1he radio stations in the area outside of Paris,
the NOUVELLES MESSP.GERIES in Paris, LE POINT, LES DERNIERES NOUVELLES D'ALSACE,
LE JOURNAL DU DIMANCHE, ~tc--will they fall under the influence of the government?
5. The assumption of control by the state of the media of culture worsens the
danger. The televised programs (serials, dramatic presentations, choices of films
"with a message") were often oriented in the direction of a philosophy "of the
Left." In the future this will be more and more the case. Here is the state, in
the process of controlling Hachette, Laffont, Nathan, Bordas. Won't editors of
books be required to work through the Tiachette distribution center? Georges
_ Marchais, whom a journalist asked if Solzhenitsyn could be published in France,
after a�~ictory of the Union of the Left, made this remark from his heart: "Yes,
; if he fin~~ an editor." In a mood of general indifference French book publishing
risks resembling, littlz by little, book publishing in the Eastern E~zropean coun-
trie~.
The logic of a socialism much more radical than social democracy is beginning, and
it wants to be irreversible. However, we must be on guard against two temptations.
One is believing that the failure of this experiment is inevitable "in 2 years.".
The other is to believe that the new government majority cannot be turned out of
office in less than several decades.
If the.prPVious government had not committed suicide by its divisions on 10 May,
it would probably have been kept in office until l~i'88. That is, it would have
retained office for the previ~us 30 years (at least). The ~olidity of our insti-
tutions and the respect for "legitimacy" on the part of the French people could
permit a socialist government to carry out its experiments for a long time, if it
is clever enough not to impose on the French people a society which they do not
want. However, we should not rule out the possibili.ty that the new government
majority "will ma~Ce stupid mistakes," nor that the former majority will one day
be missed.
The change in power which has worked in one direction could work in ttie othEr,
and without waiting for so long a time. Warning signs--,jokes and rum~rs, depart-
mental, municipal, regional, and European elections--will make themselves heard
quickly. The euphoria of some, the bewilderment of others will come to an end.
The new majority should not think 3t is eternal. The new opposition should have
the courage to commit itself to the long process of regaining positions on the
periphery of government. However, a turnabout will take place inevitably, when
the new teams are worn out or quarrel among themselves. Of course, this is on
condition ths~t the democratic game continues to be respected. However, we can
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believe that two institutions not yet conqueLed by the socialist-trade union-
communist government, the Senate and the Constitutional Council, will be opposed '
to changing the Constitution. And our people are sufficiently devoted to their
liberties as not to tolerate their being taken away. ~
Let the former government majority silence its quarrels. Let it know how to rec-
ognize its mistakes. Let it put the national interest before any personal ani-
mosity. Let it regain confidence in itself. Let it inspire new confidence. Let
it develop a doctrine and a strategy. Let it denounce any dec:ision of the govern-
ment which is filled with threats for the future, with the vigilance and energy
of Cato and Elder who repeated, "Carthage u?ust be destroyed." Above all, let it
find again and in depth the values which we expect to see it embody. Let it know
how to express them and to promote them. And the flowing tide which it missed
- last spring, for the first time since 1958, will bring it again to the responsi-
bilities of power.
Will the socialist e~cperiment last for a long time, due to a clever correction of
its gath, which will bring it toward s~cial democracy? Or, following on toward
the utopia of fundamental socialism, will it end by a sudden implosion, when it
encounters the shock of reality? In either case it will have had the great merit
of letting a good number of the French who put their trust in it to disabuse them-
selves of their illusions.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 s. a. Groupe Express
5170
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= POLITICAL FRANCE
CAUSES OF CFDT-CGT 'PERMANENT' RIVALRY REVIEWED
Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 26 Oct 81 pp 35-35
/Article by Frederic Pons: "The Doub]e Bid'~
/Text% The left is marching ahead, united, the band playing ~n front: the image
is Pierre Maur~'s. But here we have the CGT LGeneral ConfadQration of Labo~
and the CFDT LFrench Democratic Labor Confederatiol playing lots of wrong notes.
Two explanations: the internal difficulties of the two confederations and their
rivalry over the territory; the repercussions ~f a political game in which the
unions are playing the roles of both the relay and the outlet.
- On 15 October, at France-Inter, Edmond Maire delivered a vigorous criticism of
the Mauroy government. A three-point disagreement: an energy policy that is
deemed toa "productivist," and a dispute as to the recent government decisions
regarding nuclear energy; the system of administering nationalized companies,
which will lead to "nationalization"; and finally, the delay in working out the
"new rights of workers." Asking the government to "rectify the priorities",
particular]y on this last point, Edmond Maire stated: "The expression of trade
unionism, far from being an obstacle tc government action, is one of the
conditions of change. I have sounded the alarm."
"Edmond Maire wants to walk faster than the music," replied Mr Mauroy.
On 19 October, the two men dined together at the Hotel Matignon. But scarcely
h~d he left the table, when Mr Ma9re repeated, "We will not agree to march to the
prime minister�s pace, no matter how good it is.,"
By this move, the CFDT leadership intends to break awa~y from its wholehearted
support of the government for the past 5 months, and to reappear in the eyes of
_ the rank-and-file as a fighting organization. At Rerault, lately, unrest 'r~as
been evident among the CFDT members, who have been "trapped" dy the higher bids
made by the CG7. At the meeting of the national off~ce of the CFDT on 8 October,
some members alerted their leaders to the feelings in the workshops. CFDT and
government reports were discussed again at the national council of the trade
union confederations ~ahich met at the end of the week.
_ The struggle for influence within the Socialist party, echoed in the Valence
congress of the past few days, also explains Mr Maire's outburst. Within the CFDT
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_ Michel Rocard has many friends. Throughout the remarks of Mr Maire (who was
represented in Valence by Jacques Cherequey assistant secretary generai of the
CFDT), one can find what could have been the motion for the Rocard faction, if
- Mr Racard had chosen to present himself in ar+ autonomous manner. One indicat~on:
Mr Maire's sentence, ~vishing that in congress "they wo~ld discuss serious
matters, that is to say, in what situation the government will find itself a
year from now."
Mr Maire's speech must also be analyzed in the light of the internal unrest in ~
the CGT. The CGT's lasi confederal comrnittee m~et~ng, at the beginning of the ,
mvn~h, was rnarked by the official announcement af the replacement of Georges Seguy
b~i Henri Krasucki at next June's congress, and by the display of disa~reements .
within the confederation.
In addition to t~tie alarm~st ~epo~t by the ~reasure r, Ernest Beiss, on the fall iro ~
membership in the last 4 years, the committee heard two of its members, Jean-Louis ,
Moinot and Mrs Christiane Gi11es, both communist members, speak out against the
policy of the CGT leaders, especially with regard to the refusal for union unity of
action. A refusal that was ~ollowed by ~heir resignation on 15 October. ~
These troubles naturally lead to ex~ravagant promises, in order to remobi~lize the ;
rank-and-file: thus the strike movements at Renault or at the SNCF /Fr.ench
National Railroad CompanyJ, which also mean that the cor~nunist party is holding
its union ]ever under pressure until the day it ceases to consider its collaboration
with the socialist government useful. These troub]es are also leading Mr Maire
- i~to raising his voice: in such a way as to remind people that the CFDT is a
_ welcoming structure for workers which could be rejected by a trade unionism that
is too closely linked to a political party.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 "Valeurs actuelles"
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POLI~ICAL UNITED KINGDOM
LABOR PARTY LEADER'S PERFORMANC~ REVIEWED
PM101257 London THE TIMES in English 1Q Nov ~1 p 11
_ [Editorial: "Mr Foot's Leadership"]
[Tpxt] The serious question concerning Mr Michael Foot today, the anniversary of
his election as leader of the labor party, is not sartorial but political. It is
not a~atter of whether at the Cenotaph he looked like an out of woric nawy, as
cruelly suggested by one of his backbenchers, but whether he begins to look like an
ex-party leader. Making every allowance for the horrendous difficulties which he
inherited, Mr Foot's record so far 3s disappointing to his supporters and his pros-
pects are bleak. While the prime minister and her government are less popular with
the electorate than any cabinet predecessors in polling history, Mr Foot and her
majecty's opposition are totally failing to capitalize on this opportunity; he is
personally even less popular than Mrs Thatcher.
During his brief reign--though with origins and cause~ long before it--the Labour
Party has begun to disintegrate electorally and internally. So recently a mighty
political force, having won four in thQ Iast aix general elections and governed
- Britain for 11 of the past 17 years, it now trails far behind the alliance, and in
some polls behind the conservatives, the flow of defections fram labour shows no
sign of diminishing; were the left to tri.umph at next yeax's conference this flaw
would become a flood. Throughout this calamitous year, from his person~l humilia-
tion at the Wembley conference through the formation of the SDP to his party's
humiliation last month at Crydon, Mr Foot has never given any indication that he
grasped the true nature ofthe crisis facing him and the Labour Party. He seems to
believe that a leadership stance and rhetoric somewhat to the left of centre--a
weak mixture of George Lansbury and early Harold Wilson--is sufficient to hold the
party t~gether. This alone can explain why he recently used ~is casting vote to
defend the left's conL�rol of the key committees covering home policy and party
organization with such predictable results last night; why he is positively promot-
ing Mr Benn's membership of the shadow cabinet, and why he has been so reluctant to
fight extremist organizations such as the militant tendency which operate indepen-
dently within and against the official party organization, presented as a strategy
for unifying the whole party, it is in fact mere appeasement of the left.
Mr Foot seems rooted in his own experience of 20 years ago when he led a minority
left wing which was firmly within the democratic socialist mainstream of labour
ideals. Now the left is sectarian, intolerant, anti-parlianientary. It would pre-
fer to drive out the moderates in order to control a smaller Marxist Party than to
share pQwer in a bigger broad church party. It is well advanced in securing that
controZ changes in the rules for electing the leadership and for re-selectizg MPS
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have shifted power to party activists on the left. These latter number n~ more
than 50,000 over the country as a wk~ole and do not pretend to represent the views
of millions of moderate labour voters, but they have been able to take over the party's
organization because it is in fact rotten. Its individual membership has declined
precipitately to barely a quarter of a million--the worst ratio of inembers to voters
in any major p~rty in Western Europe. Its network of full-time agents has withered
to only a few dozen--ironically little more than the full-time network run by the
militant tendency. Indeed the stage has almost been reached when it is unfair to
imply that the various sects of the far left are insidiously infi~trating the Labour
Party: They are no~a openly joining it as their natural and conv:Lvial base of
_ operations. Moderate MPS are being squeezed out or leave the party just before they
are pushed; some others will get the message aP intimidation which was the true !
purpose of reselection and will, ~adly, play the left wing game to keep their
place at Westminister. Thus the PLP is itself slipping leftwards and the forces
which from enthusiasm or cynical calculation support Mr Benn renew their advance
after temporary setback at the brighton conference.
Mr Foot presides over this depressing state of affairs rather like a pilot on the
flight deck of his plane who has not 'been told that a hi-~ack js taking place. He
should pause a while from marching and declaiming agai.nst the sins of the prime
minister to take note that the most immediate threat comes in fact from his ~nemies
to the left. They may well destroy his hopes of winning the next election. If
he does win with them in control, he will be forced to govern--assuming, unlike in
the GLC, they condescend to allow him to continue as leader--on principles and with ,
prir~rities far removed from those which have guided his own distinguished political
lifF..
Mr Foot is not young at 68 and if he does not feel the urgency he is unaware or if !
to rescue his party and his reputation, he should hand over to another. Mr Hattersley,
Mr Healey, Mr Shore and Mr Varley (in alphabetical order) have each shown the necessary
courage. '
If he is prepared to fight, he has perha~s one more year, until the next conference
at the latest, in which to roll back the tide of extremism. He should launcla and
vigorously pursue a full enquiry into the activity of the militant tendsncy~ Prior
to the conclusi~ns of that inquiry he should oppose the endorsement as a parliamen-
tary candidate of *~r Patrick I~all or anyone else from that or similar organization.
He should campaign for greater parti~ipation by the membership in the affairs of
their constituency parties, including the operation of the principle of on,: man one
vote to which Mr Healey has ?~ece:ne a belated supporter. He should openly join with
those in the party and especially in the trade unions who are working to secure a
moderate ma~ority on the national executive committee. He should aggressively defend
the parliamentary party from all its detractors on the left. He should announce now
his total support for Mr Denis Healey as deputy leader and make it clear that if
Mr Benn successf ully contests for this po~t next year he will himself resign.
It may be tactless in view of past history to ask Mr Foot to emulate Mr Gaitskell
20 years ago by f ighting and fighting again to save the party which he and many
British citizens love, or once loved. But it is not too much to suggest that he
_ avoids the r.ole and mantle of Mr Kerensky.
COPYRIGHT: TIMES NI;WSPAPERS LIMITED, 1981
CSO: 3120/15 ~
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GINER.AL FRANCE ~
CREDIT BAN'~S~S LEVEQUE SEES NATIONALIZATION AS ~TRAGIDY'
Paris PARIS M/~TCH ir: French 4 Sep 81 p 47
~nterview with Jean Maxime Leveque, president of Credit Ccmmercial de
France, by Liliane Gallifet; date and place not specifie~
_ ~ex~~uestio~ What real change will nationalization bring to your bank,
since credit distribution anc~ private banks are already largely controlled
by the state?
f nswe~ For us, natienalization is a tragedy. One must realize the dif-
ference between private and nationalized banks. Power is not one of our
trump cards. As a medium size bank, wa must rank 110th in the world, 6th
in France. We are 10 times smaller than the Credit Agricole, 8 times smal-
ler than each of the nationalized banks. Our survival, and our prosperity,
we owe solely to the quality of service we offer.
~uestio~ Would not a nationalized bank offer the same service?
~nswe~ An innovative and competitive spirit is stimulated by the feeling
that you can rely only on yourself, and that no one will help you. That is
the key to our success. In recent years we have created jobs. Not so the
- nationalized banks, which by contrast have reduced their personnel, and we
have brought in $90 million in receipts. A private bank must perform better
than a nationalized bank. If in the last few years the two systems have
behaved similarly, that is beeause private banks drove national.ized banks
to pl~.,y the game of c~mpetition. To pour everyone into the same mold would
- be most harmful. The day we are n.atianalized, we ehall lose our sou1, and
t}ie day after, when the state--having nationalized '150 or 200 banks--amal-
gamates them, as is inevitable~ the CCF will disappear. We are fighting
for our life.
~uestio~ Is it not too late? The principle of nationaliza.tion seems
- definitively established.
~nswe~ The principle has been announced, but aince then an ever growing
number of people in administration and, I hope, in government, have been
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able to realize the faults in that principle. We are told, for example,
that better control of credit is desired. Why not then nationalize all
banks? Why spare the Credit Agricole, mutual banks, local banks, and for-
eign banks? Have we a particular taint which makes our destruction neces-
sary? Credit con~:rol, money creation--nothing will be settled.
The problem is much more complex than is imagined by the authors of the
project.
The Present Nationalization Project is Incoherent and Inapplicable
~ueetio~ In what respects will yokr activities abroad be affected?
jnswe~ I do not ask myself that queetion, but rather anothe~^: by what
right could tt~e French government take control of our affiliates? Our ac-
tivities abroad are carried on by foreign personnel, in foreign currencies.
That has nothing to do with control of credit in France. To take ~hem into
the project would risk ending up in litigious proceedings dangerous for
France.
~uestio~ You still hope to avoid nationalization?
jnswe~ Yes. I must pay tribute to Messr,s P~lauroy and Delors for desig-
nating a representative before each private banking group to gather further
information on the nature of the problems. Today, +he government is fully
aware of the realities concerning our bank, what we are, and what we have
achieved. I ar,t hopeful that such understanding will lead it to modify the
project. There is no shame in retreating when a measure is ill-conceived,
and considering alternative solutions. The pre~ent project is so incoher-
ent that it is becom~ng inapplicarle owing to the complications it entails.
I wi~h to believe in the goodwill and objectivity of those who are working
on it.
juestio~ Is natioxialization of the banking system, in your view, a res-
ponse to technical, or to political considerations?
jnswez7 Certainly not technic~l. Possibly political. In any case, there
- is no justification whatever. ThP government has often cited the need for
zltes~natives. But that aim must be curbed ~the moment it incites the com-
mission of an irreparable blunder such as destroying an enterprise useful
to the country. Reference has also been made to the precedent of ~945.
`1'r.~t was a very special time when the economy had been destroyed by the
war. `rhere was no constitution, no balance of powers, n.o foreign trade.
_ '.I'oday, France is entegrated into.a complex world economy, in which private
banks in no way constitute a political power. Let not our rulers in 1981
emulai:e the military who in 1939 were preparing for the 1914 war.
- ~uestio~ Re~arding compensation of your shareholders, do you fear they
will be robbed?
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, ~
~nswe~ There is great risk. You should be aware that for a number of
years France has developed principles of operation for the stack market.
If a group seeks to take control of another, it must offer a price much
higher than market quotations, and a method of pa.yment acceptable to the
- shareholders. The compensation plans now circulating do not respect these
principles. So the state would be the only entity not subject tc~ the law
it imposes on others.
- ~uestio~ The trend se~ms to be towards a form of securities redeemable
in a maximum period of 15 years?
_ ~nswe~ That is unacceptable. It would be repaying the shareholders in
spurious coin.
- ~uestio~ Will you still be on the job 6 months from now?
jnswe~ Surely not, if the bank is nationalized. It is heartbreakin~ for
me to imagine that all we have built in 18 yeaxs could be annihilated.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 par Cogedipresse S.A.
6't 45
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G~VERAL FRANCE
WRITEi: SHOWS CGT ATMS TU DOMINATE IN INDUSTBIES TO BE NAfiIONALIZED
Paris L'EXPRESS in French 25 Sep 81 p 1G6
jrticle by Jean Francois Jacquier: "Jackpot Tactics"
~ex~ With the pretext of putting its "muscle" at the
service of the government, the CGT is attempting con~
quest of "nationalizable" firms.
"The Socialists' power comes from the ballot box. But since the election
they no longer have any force in the field. We, in the factories, have the
needed muscle to make chan$e go forward." That reflection by Georges Gay,
CGT leader in the Pechiney plant at Gardanne (Bouches-du-Rhone) and Commun-
" i~t town councillor as well a~ deputy mayor, tells much about the intentions
of Georges Seguy's union.
Irlith the pretext oi putting its stren~th at the service of the new govern-
- ment, the massive CGT macYiine is starting up again. At its initiative;
most everywhere in France, we see an outbreak o~ localized conflicts with
- no apparent coiinec~ion except that they occur~ essentially, in nationalized
or national~.zable f:irms. Though its leaders deny it, the CGT pattern in
this sector appears systernatic. NIatra, Renault, Alsth~m-Atlantique (an af-
filiate of CGE (C~eneral Llectr.~.c, CieJ), Dassault, ANPL [expansion unkno~mj.
Cfiarboniiages de Frai~cC, Rhone-Poule:~c: on all fronts the battle is joined.
At Alsthom "the management's union-breaking p~.an" is denounced as "a real
provocation." At Natra, where the CGT is in the minority, the issue is to
obtairi total nationalization of the group~ At Dassault, owner compensation
is rei'used. The rniners, for their part, demand dismissal of General Manager
~Tacques Petitmengin, acctzsed of "sabota~ing" the revival of coal production.
_ !1t Renault, semi-ski.lled workers at Sandouville (Seine-Maritime) harass the
mana~;ement by work stoppages to obtain an assembly line slowdowil. But they
al.so demand the ri~ht ~:o participate in decision makin~, and an unprecedented
sYiop council has been elected.
Ttie scenario is everywhere the same: a pretext, a mobilization of the base,
and an appeal. to the minister~ concerned, to force him to take a atand.
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All these actions, pursued with great fanfare, aiin at a double objective:
to strengthen the position of the CGT, which is declining in the face of
CFDT inroads, and to occupy the terrain while awaiting final passage of the
nationalizations law and the promised definitic~n of new workers' rights.
They axe a means of obtaining in fact what the law has not as yet defined:
that is, a right to union oversi~ht in the choice of managers and in mana~~~
ment.
Thus, while Georges Maxchais and the PCF approve the government's policy
"without reservation" (see Jacques Roure axticle), the CGT offensive seeks
to expand the limits of nationalization.
The conflict which broke out '15 September at the Aluminium-Pechiney plant -
in Gardanne, ~urope's largest aluminum oxide production center, is quite
revealing as to the tactics employed. "A few weeks before the launching of
- the offensive," a worker relates, "CGT militants undertook a kind of indoc-
trination of the personnel, by plying it with tracts on nationalization."
Then the news began to circulate of a 30,000 ton reduction in aluminum ox-
ide production decided on by the manageraent of Pechiney-Ugine-Kuhlmann.
But the work force base hardly reacted, and nothing indicated a conflict.
On Monday 14 September the CGT, having the majority vote, asked the Force
Ouvriere--which had a majority of seats on the worker-management rommittee--
for its agreement in organizing a meeting with management. The F~J agreed.
But the very next day, entirely on its own initiative, without informin~
the FO--and thus forestalling the Socialist group which was just then be~in-
ing to learr.of the production cut--the CGT called a general workers' meet-
ing for 10:30, durin~ working hours and in violation of internal regulations.
Mana.gement's reaction was inevitable: ~t padlocked union premises. CGT
dele$ates, who had foreseen everything, then produced a motion calling for
token occupa~ion of the plant and had it adopted by the 60-odd workers
= present. Tn the hubbub, they caxried a motion ~f no confidence in manage-
- ment, which they accused of wishing to impede nationalization. They created
a provisional vigilance committee composed exclusively of CGT members, all
of them also FCF members (a scviet?). They asked Jean Le Garrec, secretaxy
of state for public sector expansion, to create a commission to investigate
the machinations of Pechiney Ugine-Kuhlmann, and demanded a freeze on all
decisions pending nationalizations. And that in the presence of the region-
- al press (FR 3, AFP, LA MARSEILLAISE), which had been advised.
Taken by surprise, the Socialist group--not wishing to be left behind--won
the support of the Bouches-du~-Rhone Socialist Federation, and likewise ap-
pealed to Le G arrec, who in the end gave his backing. The noose was closed.
7'tie CGT appeared the lone defender of workers' rights, and succeeded in
}ial~;in~ decieions by mana~ement, though the latter is not yet nationalized
and can boast of having the government's support. It had hit the jackpot.
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t
~"Phe Gardanne example has symbolic value," Georges Gay commerits with satis-
faction. "In nationalizable firms, there is a power vacuum. We must occu-
py it." That, at least, is frank.
COPYRIGHT: ~g8~ s. a. Groupe E~press
6~ 45
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