JPRS ID: 10138 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070053-2
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 53
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/ 10 ~ 38
24 November 1981
Sub-Saharan A~rica R~ ort
p
FOUO No. 750
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JPRS I,/1013a
24 November 1981
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPO~T
FOUO Np. 750
' COi~TENTS
ANGOLA
South African Strategy, Aims Analyzed
_ (Achille Lollo; AFR.IQUE-ASIE, 12 Oct 81) 1
War in Angola Seen Directly Pitting West Against Corrmiunism
(Roger Holeindre; PARIS MATCH, 16 Oct 81)
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
Paper Describes Reasons ~ench Aid Essentia~ in Maintaining
. Stabilit3~
(Jacques Latremoliere; MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERR.ANEENS,
9 Oct 81) 7
EQUATORIaL GUINEA
President Discusses Progress Made by His Regime
(Nguema Mbasogo Interview; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 14 Oct 81) 1Lt ,
GUINEA
Briefs
Cash Restraint Advocated 7-7
Dispute With France 17
MADAGASCAR
Briefs
I:conomic Plight 18
MO'LAMBIQUE
Regulatibns on Cashew Marketing for 1981-1982 Detailed
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 9 Oct 81) 19
Briefs
- Maputo Milk Consumption 20
- -a - [III ~-NE &A-120FOU0]
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SEN~AL
RND ~eader 1}iscusses Party~s Objectives, Ideoingy
(Ginette Cot; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 12-25 Oct 81) 21
= SEYCHELLES
= Rene Wants Stronger Ties With ~ance
(Albert Rene Interview; AFRIQUE-,4SIA, 12-25 Oct 81) 27
i
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ANGOLA
SOUTH AFRICAN STRATEGY, AIMS ANALYZED
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 250, 12 Oct 81 p 24
[Article by Achille Lollo: "Pretoria's New Plans"]
[Text] In its official statements, the government in Pretoria insists it has made
a so-ca:tled total withdrawal of its troops from southern Angola. And yet, on
_ 18 September, Gen Charles Lloyd, commander in chief of the forces stationed in
Namibia, had to send emergency reinforcements to South African troops attacked by
the Angolan Army particularly uni.ts of the "Namibian territorial forces,"
trained according to the pattern of the Rhodesian Selous Scouts in order to
enable the armored battalion accompanying the lst Motorized Infantry Colamn and
the Buffalo 32 mercenary battalion to return to safer areas close to the Namibian
= border. Since the launching of the Angolan counteroffeusive, the latter had in
fact been in difficulty and risked remaining in the Xangong~ region, where they
' were surprised by the attack of the FAPLA [People's Araned Forces for the Liberation
of Angc~la] and cut off from their rear guard.
As we had announced, the Ar.golan Army had, by using guerrilla techniques, succeeded
in escaping from air reconnaissance and in going around the advanc~ posts of the
South African Army, who had prepared to defend the occupied territory by concen-
trating around six centers, transformed into strongholds.
According to General Geldenhuys, strategist of the war, the South African troops
were capable of halting the offensive which the FAPLA woulc~ more than likely have
launched following the criteria of traditional warfare, with the aid of the Cuban
Army.
Actually, following a distribution of the tasks of defending southern Angola, the
Cubans were in charge of holding a support line immediately south of the capital of
Huila Pr~vince, and only the FAPLA undertook this bold counteroffensi.ve in Xangongo,
Mongua and Ondjiva. Small but multiple columns of the Angolan Army were penetrating
the regions occupied by Pretoria between 18 and 22 September, forcing the invaders
to engage in close battle and making the intervention of the South African artillery
and Air Force impossible. From 20 to 22 Sept~mbPr, with the arrival of contin~ents
sent to the aid of units almost completely encircled by the FAPLA, these forces of
occupation, exhausted, began their retreat tc~ the south. They were then going to
have a general withdrawal and concentrate in the regions of Cuamato, 40 kilometers
from the border, Calueque and Namacunde, closer to the border.
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These positions, which the Soutl-~ African A~y will not give up �or a long time,
stiZl enable it to keep the city of Ondji'va, as well as the entire province of which
this city is the capital, in a state of total insec~rity, while preparing for a
second counteroffensive from a favorable position. That is what the Angolan min-
ister of defense, who has just publicly denounced the military plan that the
South Africans will follow, foresees.
This time, Pretoria's army allegedly intends to clear the way .as far as C+uvelai,
200 kilometers from the border, still preceded.by intense bambing, then gr~ west as
far as Tchibembe, already used as a target by the planes during the first offensive,
and east, as far as Nehone. Thus, a front line at the 16t1~ parallel, which marks
the boundaries between Cunene and Huila provinces, would be establishc.d.
It is therefore a question of creating a buffer zone in southern Angola, totally ~
surrounding Cunene. In that province, despite the tactical victory of the Angolan
Army, wtiich has conside.rably redur_ed the so-called "vita2 space" which General
Geldenhuys intended ta keep, the situation has not changed a great deal, with the
obvious exc:~ption of the aid that may finally be taken to the martyrized people.
The same threats weigh on the enti~re region. g~st without, a dou~t, the Scuth Afri,
can plan of strategy has been substantially upset. Pretoria, whose intentions of
"internationalizing" the conflict in order to make it move toward a"confrontation
between blocs" are now obviuus, hoped that at least, if there were an Angolan
counteroffensive involving combat, the Cubans would participate in it, which would
have permitted Brand Fourie, South African deputy minister of foreign affairs, who
on 20 September met with the American Chester Cracker in~Zurich, to t~lk of the
fighting between Pretoria's a~y and the Gtibans. This would have facilitated the
demand, previous to any negotiations on Namibia, for the withdrawal of the Cubans
from Angola. Pretoria would then give free rein to its expansionist and destabil-
ization plans for Angola.
Under the Wing of the Pentagon
At the same time, other moves in the same direction were to see the light: The
engagement of the armies of tlie reactionary regimes of Central Africa alongside
the South African forces would be the last "find" employed by Washington, in
- other words, the "Africanization" of the destabilization of the progressive regimes
in southern Africa. This information, made public by a Portuguese weekly, gave
rise to the denial of one of the countries involved: Zaire. But the memory of
the latter's aggression against Angola, carrying out a p.lan already conceived in
Washington and executed jointly with South Africa, is still too recent to allow
the denials to bury thi~ new~affair so soon, especially since we know that many
Zairian generals have not digested the defeat that their traops suffered in 1975-
1976 or the disappearance of their protege, the FNLA, from the political ~cene.
It would therefore not be surprising that South A.frica would once more try to
emerge from its isolation by appealing to certain African countries.
~ Pretoria also has another trump card for trying to~internationalize this conflict:
its insertion into ttie Southern Atlantic Alliance (SATO) which, bringing Chile,
Argentina and Uruguay (Brazil has increasingly kept its distance recently) together
into the same "anticommunist" front, is making great progress under the protective
wtng of the Pentagon.
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The Angolan leaders are very aware of all that is at stake. The organizational
secretary of the MPLA-Labor Party, Lucio Lara, emphasized at a m~eting in Benguela
- that "it is the Angolans who repulsed the Sauth African aggression. Through South
Africa, it is imperialism that is threatening Angola directly."
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Af rique-Asie.
11,464 .
CSO: 4719/126
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ANGOLA
WAR IN ANGOLA SEEN DIRECTLY PITTING WEST A~AiNST COMMUNISM
Paris PARIS MATCH in French No 1689, 16 Oct 81 p 65
[Article by Roger Holeindre]
[Excerpts] The AnRola~Namibia war can no longer be considered as an inter~African
- conflict; it is instead a direct confrontation between the West and communism.
The ~outh African soldiers have found irrefutab le proof of the strong Soviet and
East German implantation while meticulously searching the terrain they have occupied
in Angola in the course of operation "Proteus." A total of 4,000 tons of Soviet
material has been seized or destroyed and SAM 7, SAM 3 and SAM 6 have been discov-
ered.
T-34 tanks and more than 200 new vehicles have been brought back to Namibia,.as well
as an. impressive quantity of heavy equipment, ranging from amphibious tanks to
Stalin organs launching 122-mm rockets. Classic artillery and anti-aircraft artil-
lery are similar to those used by the ~OI,~SARIO units against ~iorocco. Nume~ous
Soviet and East German spouses accompany their in~truCtor or advisor husbands,
which tends to prove that theira will be prot.racted stays.
A vast radar system was deployed along the ~order with ~outh Africa, but i~ seems
--and there is proof of that---that only the material serviced by Earopeans ensured
a continuoss watch.... ~
On the other hand, the launching pads of ground-to-sir missiles serviced aolely by
the communists from "brotherly countries" created problems for the attacking air
force.
The South African and Namibia~n soldiers found b uried defense lines, whoae conception
~ and execution leave the impr~ssion that Asiatics have served as inatructors--perhaps
even North Vietnamese, the Unly serious ussrs of the French officer's manual, chap-
ter "field fortifications." It is indeed in this manual that Giap~s men h~d found
all the necessary inf~ormation for the trench and undergroia?d war around Dien Bien
Phu.
According to the South Africans, there is the threat of a large-scale war exploding
soon in the southern part of the continent. Gen Charles Lloyd, commander of the
South African and Namibian forces on thetingolan border, has ~uat declared: "We are
necessarily preparing ourselves, militarily and logist~,ically, for a clagsic war
on the Angolan frontier.,:.."
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Whatever the logical and humanitarian reasons for the condemnation of gpartheid
by the ma3ority of the world's governments, one must neverthe~~ss ad~nit that Sauth
Africa will fight for what it considers its right to live.
Today, the Namibian problem is closely connected in the undergx.~und war opposing
South Africa to the Soviet Uni;,n by way of Angola.
" The Soviets, the socialist bloc powers and Cuba help the SWAPO, based in Angola
and fighting against South Africa, which supports not only the legal Ngmibian Govern-
ment it partly controls, but also, within Angola itself, Jonas Savimbi's UNITA, with
- the latter gi~ring a great deal of trauble to the troops of the Luaada government
established with the help of the Soviets and Cubans. In 1981, the Maruist Angolan
Government is controlling less than 2 million people out of the 6 million inhabi-
tants. Its army, the FAPLA, is on t~e alert everywhere and many of the garrisons
are only re-supplied by Soviet aircraft. Jonas Savimbi is accusing the Luanda govern-
ment of having engaged in the war against South Africa and Namibia solely to make
_ people forget about its colossal internal problems. The potentially rich drained
country cannot even feed its own population, while under the Portuguese it ex-
ported cereals, meat, coffee and fiah in large quantities. The armed opposition
imFi:tes the responsibility for this state of affairs to tt~e "disastrous economic
policy based on the Soviet model." The South African army, by far the best--trained
and equipped in Africa thanks to its specialists who kno~w how to take tl~e utmost
- advantage of the available sophisticated materiel--which i.s certainly not the case
in othex African armies--has no intention of displaying moderation. Moreover, its
le~ders, applying Israeli tactics, ar~ very explicit on the sub~ect: "We shall
strike a11 the way into Ethiopia if necessary! We are already feeding one-third
of Africa; what more do they want of us? We are white Africans. Is it a crime if
we want to stay, defend our country and not disappear?... Wherever the white minor-
ity dealt without genuin~ guarantees and without preserving the authority over mili~
tar,~ resuurces, it has tieen swept away. We are not fighting against our blacks
within the country, we are fighting against enemies without, those who, abetted,
armPd and paid by the Soviets, threaten our freedom and our v~ry existence as a
nation."
Events in Zimbabwe provide serious arguments to thase blacks and whites in Namibia
who do not want the rebels to be considered as representative of the population.
With the departure of the whites from Zimbabwe--at the rate of nearly 10,000 a
, month--the country will be faced in a couple of years witlz the same fate as the
countries forming the "front line" against South Africa. These countries, formerly
prosperous, with excellent soil, sun and water, are today auffering from famine.
On 4 percent of the tillable land in Africa,the South Africans grow more than a
third of the continent's harvest.... Mnreover, the black populati:.:.i, every time
it finds credible leaders, rises up arrd fights against regimes imposed by the "fair-
minded" thinkers of Europe and the United States. If Savimbi is fighting--and fight-
ing well--in Angola, in Mozambique the National Resistance Movement already has
- 4 to 5,000 anti-Marxist fightera in the bush and is giving a lot of trouble to local
authorities and to the KGB men: it seems that, de.spite the deployment of inen and
materiel, relations between the Soviet, East Germans, Cubams and the civilian-
population are r.ot always idyllic.... On the whole, the So~rie~s are hated hy the
Africans, whom they call "black asses."
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The Soviets' "fraternal" help i~ very, very expensive.... The USSR has been suc-
cessful in obtaining all the fi;~hing rights in Mozambican and Angolan waters. As
in all the African countries it "protects," and where it has also gotten hol~ of
the same maritime rights, its fishing fleets depredate marine resources, wfth ~ess
than 40 percent of the results of this anti-ecological massacre finally reaching
the tables of the socialist countries.
It is interesting to know that these somewhat special "fishing fleets" steam around
as veritable little squadrons directly connected to Admir8l Gorshkov's navy g~neral
staff .
As for the Cubana, whom the East G~rmans characterize as "poor soldiers" and "clowns,"
they are accused by the population of having totally sacked the country. This as-
sertion seems to be borne out by impartial observers. AI1 of the movable goods left
behind by the departing Portuguese, as well as civilian vehicles, have most left
= fox Cuba....
The most a~tonishing revelations Lncovered by operation "Proteus" in Angola are those
related to intelligence. Mountains of documents prove that African Marxist move-
ments have found support in unexpected quarters: they are financed by the Ecumeni-
cal Council of Churches with headquarters in Geneva.
In recent years, the main beneficiaries of this incredil~le largesse are the SWAPO
and the black South African terrorist groups. These organizations also receive
funds indirectly from the UN, the UNESCO and other so-called "charitable" movements
that solicit funds in large European citiea to aid the "hungry people of the Third
World"!
Such funds reach in the millions of dollars. Let us add, in conclusion, that ~rom
the documents seized, it appears that Guadeloupe, Martinique, Reunion and New Cale-
donia are still considered as countries struggling against French colonialism, and
needing support in shaking uff this terrible yoke....
COPYRIGHT: 1981 par Cogedipresse S.A.
CSO: 4719/172
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CENTRAL AFRICAN ~tEPUBLIC
PAPER DESCRIBES REASONS FRENCH AID ESSENTIAL IN MAINTAINING STABII,ITY
Paris MARCHES TROPICAL'X ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1873, 9 Oct 81 p 2543-2546 ~
[Article by Jacques Latremoliere]
[Excerpts] David nacko'~ statements after his ouster by Gen. Andre Kolingba have
intrigued rrench readers and television viewers som~iwhat. Smili~g and tongue in
- cheek, the former president of the Central 9frican Repubii~c was obviously trying
to make people understand that the coup d'etat that had ove�rthrown him actually
stemmed, even if it had taken place in keeping with the rules governing the genre,
_ from a semi-official arrangement. Consequently, the natural question was precisely
wt~o had thought up the scenario and against what.
Dacko scarcely refutes the accusation that he was not or?ly the co-author, but also
the true beneficiary, f rom his standpoint at least. Suffering from asthma and cir-
culatory problems, he certainl~ aspires to rest and freedom from ends of months made
painful by the suicidal demands of civil servants and the delays of financial backers.
His unselfishness he was known to make up the sums out of his own pocket means
that he will hardly miss the precarious charms of power. Finally, he ~an only take
p].easure in the excellent trick playe.d on his adversaries, from Patasse to Goumba,
- placing bayonets between their ambitions and the levers of governmEnt.
Nor is it impossible that Dacko may have taken a certain satisfactian, tiuged with
bitterness, it is true, in showing France one of whose governments had brought him
c~ut of. exile fairly willingly what the consequenc~s would be of the inadequate and
irregular financial "followup" given to the change in regime it had decided upon and
carried out after so much hesitation. This relative satisfaction is joined with
that of thwarting the tendencies that were manifested within the French left in favor
of the :~an who, out of all the Central African politicians, nevertheless seems to be
l~ast suited to take over after him: Abel Goumba.
In other words, no strictly political factor much less a French dac~eestic politi-
cal factor infl~~enced the support given at the outset by France to David Dacko.
In fact, this teacher of the classics the spiritual heir of Barthelemy Boganda,
who had made him minister of interior in the last government formed before his
death is and remains a leftist democrat. One may dispute the timeliness of the
multiparty system, quite unusual in Africa, that he sponsored in 1980, but not the
fact that it was the expression of a sincere conviction, as witnessed by the impar-
tiality of the 1981 presidential elections, in which he wan but 51 percent of the
- votes. The preferential popularity which Got~mba seems to en~oy in certain quarters
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probably stems from inadequate information, but also from a Manichean a~gebra ac-
cording to which the friends of our enemies are our enemies as well, and their
enemies our friends. Enthroned by Giscard d'Estaing, Dacko remained suspect.
If we bring this out, it is not in order to question Goumba's qual~t~es. Did past
squabbles with Dacko, his imprigonment and a 17-year stay in Europe, first of all,
to comFlete his medical studies, and then in Africa as regional head of the World
Health Organization, influence an itinerary that took him more to Marxist countries,
such as Benin or the Congo, than to others? Judging by his vocabulary and friend-
ships, one imagines that he would be rather disposed to appealing to the East, which
ciid not endear him to Giscard d'Estaing, bt~t which should not make him much more
sympathetic to Mitterrand or most of our African allies. The truth is that, aside
from all political considerations, Abel Goumba cannot reasonably hope, without out-
side help, to govern the Central African Republic for the simple reason that over
SO percent of the country's population was barn after his departure, he did not re-
turn before 1981, comes from a minorit~ ethnic group in the Grimari region in the
eastern region of the country, and the ignorance c~ncerning his name is not made up
for by any tribal inEluence. The score of 1 percent th~r. he won in the presidential
elections is on an exact par with his credit. ~
Dacko's smile before [he French television cameras is not therefore without justi-
fication. General Kolingba's coup d'e~at not only permit: him to solve his health
problems, but also to cut off any suggestions of a"national union" government, re-
introducing Goumba on the political ~cene and gently beginning a change in his favor.
Dacko has repeatedly maintained that if it were a civilian who succeeded him at head
of state, he would almost infallibly be led to seek support in the communist zaorld.
This would very likely have been true of Goumba, but even moreso of Patasse, whom
neither his services under Bokassa to whom he owes his career and for wham he
was minister of agriculture, prime ministPr and minister of the coronation nor !
his Libyan commitments nor the dubious origin of his funds have prevented him from
winning 38 percent of the votes in the April elections. It would not be any more ~
desirable to see t.he other candidates surge forward since a11 of them were, to some
extent, the aides and accomplices of the former emperor. The most capable among
them, Maidou, was one of the few to be involved in the process of ousting Bokassa,
- but he has not succeeded in getting rid of the "Mr Denial" label pinned on him for
a long time to come by Bangui lycee students (Maidou, then prime minister, offi-
cially denied the massacre of young people that was the basis of Bokassa's depar-
ture).
Aware of the exceptional decisions required by the economic and financial situation,
but with little taste or inclination for the style of government they demand, Dacko
remains faithful to himself, yielding to othe:s of whom such a style is norma113~ ex-
_ pected. Jean-Pierre Cot recently told the diplomatic press associations and the
F.ur~~frican press "tt~at a military government was always an admission of failure."
- This is in fact often true. However, it is admirable that a chief of state would re
reco~nize such a failure and his inability to remedy it. It would appear that this
- moderate homage was Dacko~s due.
Civil Service, Budget Deficit and Debt
The restoration of normal road and river traffic, a solution to the fuel supply prob-
lem now the task of Central African Total Management (TOCAGES), a~oint venture
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in which Total Afrique holds 49 percent and the Central African Republic 51 percent,
in place of the American Transworld Oil Company, which had obtained the concession
from Bokassa the withdrawal of one-fif th of the army cadres, and finally, the
f.inancial rehabilitation of national companies constituting one of the old regitde's
- open wounds, are all operations to put on the positive side of the ledger of the
retiring president. Unforturtately, when a countxy is in the state of decomposition
which is that of the Central Afric~n Repub lic, its successes barely emerge, here
and there, from a morass of deficits and b ankruptcies,whose overlapping is such that
seen from one angle, any truly positive act ion might have aggravating effects from
- anotY:er. This is the case of the rehabilitation of national companies, obtained
with the cooperation of our technical assis tants and the support of the French
- Treasury but which, resulting �in several thousand layoffs, makes the job situation
- even more critical during a period o� disinterest in farm work and the increasing
urban concentration linked to it.
The expansion of the Central African civil service obviously constitutes one of the
current anomalies. Put at some i,000 government employees and officials in 1960,
_ 11,650 in 1966 (655 technical assistants, ~ncluding 558 French, 5,227 Central Afri-
can employees, 805 contractors and 4,953 decisionnaires [translatiQn unknown], with
pay then representing 53 percent of the op erating budget), and 14,000 in 1973, the
a number is now about 25,000, of which 23,000 are actually paid. Nothing in the na-
tional production or r.evenue justifies such an increase. Since 1977, that income
has been declining 5 percent annually. The figure is expected to reach 6 percent
in 1981 and 7 to 8 percent in 1982. Since Dacko came to power in 1979, an addi-
tional 1,000 officials have been recruited (it was actually a matter of eliminating
the excessive firings decreed by the preced ing regime). The average level of
salaries has risen 20 percent. Whether fa ir or not, these measures have naturally
aggravated a situation characteriaed by an annual cost of 21 billion CFA for govern-
ment employees, when the amount of budget receipts (allocated receipts excluded) is
only 17 billion!
- Dacko's government has been criticized for not striking when the iron was hot,
immediately after his return, following an operation identical to the one used to
repair the injustices of the previous administration in order to clean out the
elements of the civil service that had been introduced according to the whim of
_ the former emperor and in much larger prop ortions. By encouraging part of these
- elements to go back home, the operation wauld have relieved the constant pressure
exer.cised on the government by Bangui government employees and would have been
beneficial politically. Unfortunately, it is not certain that the national employ-
ment situation would have been improved or that the "detribalized" persons would
have be~n put back to work...A closer examination reveals, in fact, that from 1977
to 1980, the overall number of wage earners in the public and private sectors
remained st~ble, with the increase in the number of public employees mainly stemming
from r_hose cast out of the private sector. Since January 1981, civil service hiring
has been frozen, but the overaZl number of wage earners has dropped 2~ percent.
It should be noted in passing that cutbacks on European personnel by enterprises
have not been made up for by any hiring of Central African personnel.
As catastrophic as the situation of the civil service might appear as a symptom of
poor economic health, it has only an indirect effect on government finances. The
"ends of month" that caused Dacko to lose so much sleep were and are still almost
entirely covered by the French Treasury. In 1980, the budget def icit amounted to
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_ 8 billion CFA francs, a figure to be compared with the 7-billion-CFA franc subsidy
paid by France during the same fiscal year. In 1981, the initial deficit was
7 billion also. It will in fact reach 11 billion by the end of the year, a pheno-
menon due to the uncontrolled spending and the 5 billion francs in arrears from
- 1980, while the 25-percent in.crease in receipts that might be expected from infla-
tion and increased fiscal pressure finally comes down to 10 percent. Actually,
tax proceeds drop as taxes increase, even though applied to such reliable resources
as hydrocarbons, industrial and couunercial profits and wages.
Consequently, in 1981, the 4 billion CFA francs from the International Monetary Fund
and the 3 billion from France only cover the budget deficit announced and not the
real deficit. The difference: 4 billion, must be found from a letry of 500 million
out of the credits allocated by the FAC [Aid and Cooperation Fund], 500 million
as an extra payment from the special drawing rights (3.9 billion CFA francs instead
of 2.6 billion), 400 million from the modification in the Central African Republic's
ceiling with the Bank of Central African States (BEAC), an additional subsidy of
1.2 billion recently requested from the French Government, and finally, by a one-
month delay in paying government employees, which will have to be made up in one way
' or another. In addition to the government's distress resulting from the hole to be
filled are those stemming from the insufficiency of Treassry funds resultin.g
from the delays with which certain payments have been made and of which Paris is
not always aware. For example, the agreement on the last two payments of ;.he French
subsidy, planned b~fore the departure of President Giscard d'Estaing, was not signed
~intil 10 July and the funds were not made available to Dacko until 17 July, only 3
3 days before the Le Cl~b Cinema attack.
In 1982, lacking a new IMF program and a balancing subsidy from France, the Centr.al
African Government should, in the worst instance, have to face. A joint mission
from the two organizations will take up the problem in.October in Bangui. But it
is clear that at an average budget level of 28 billion CFA francs, the term "re-
balancing" appears to be only a euphemism.
The service on the debt largely maintains the budget deficit. The conventional
public dei~t is SS billion (wittiout considering the opening of a 7-billion CFA franc
_ credit for Bokassa by South Africa, for construction of the Inter Continental. Hotel;
some 3 billion were actually invested, without any positive result, it would appear).
It is less ehe level of the figure, considering that of export receipts 30 bil-
lion), that makes itsseriousness than the 18 billion in arrears whose weight it
bears. The consolidation granted in June by the Club de Paris attenuates the burden
by setting the percenta~e of arrears to be paid in 1981 at 3, 4 percent for each of
the following three years and the rest in 6 years. In addition, there is the iuter-
est on overdue payments wfiich only certain creditors have given up: This was the
case of Yugoslavia but not Switzerland. The 1982 payments are heavy, as the result
of pc~c~rly studied short- and medium-term loans. The receipts of the Autonomous
Amortization Fund, which manages the public debt, are also down (the tax on beer
consumed, which is one of its resources, has had its proceeds drop lS percent in
one year). Actually, only the cancellations of debts by France and the Federal
Repub:l.ic of Germany seem likely to provide some relief, sufficiently soon if they
want to prevent the worst, to the jamming of government departments and the entire
economy.
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Moreover, in order to draw an accurate picture of the tinancial situation of the
Central African Republic, one should take into account, not anly the unfortunately
unrecoverable sums squandered by ~ioka5sa, but also his misappropriation of public
funds put into Swiss accounts, enabling tt~e Prince Regent and his family to lead
a high life in Geneva or Paris. Their amount is estimated at 50 b::llion CFA francs~
not including the crown, sceptre and solid gold necklace for the c~;ronation which
nave mysteriously disappeared. The sale of a few chateaux purchased in France by
the former emperor will perhaps make it possible although this is not certain
_ to recover a small part of the sum. The rest would be enough to pay off most of
the public debt. Although there is little talk of this and while it is unknown
whether this situation gave rise to the international measures it would justify,
financially speaking, this is the most overwhelming evidence of the "Bokassa
scandals."
To the amounts devoted by France to ttie restoration of puelic services, one must
add a 5-billion CFA franc subsidy iz addition to the budget, including l billion
to compensate merchants who were the victims of the Bangui lootings in 1979, 1.4
billion to pay the debts of the joint venture~, 1.3 billion for those of the
national firms and the rest to pay Central African counterpart funds not put into
- international projects or to set up a national fund to replace the Development
- Bank which disappeared in the turmoil. Furthermore, the FAC allocations continue
to be paid on thP approximate annual basis.of 80 million French francs, including
60 million for technical. assistance, 6 m~llion for scientific research, 8 million
for training and cooperation, 2 million for military equipment and some 10.7 mil- ~
lion for aid to strictly economic investments.
It must be observed that these means taxen as a whole did not check the constant
drop in agricultural, mining and industrial production. The benefits that can be
expecte~ from the construction of infrastructures will come in the long run, but
- the malady undermining the Central African economy seems to justify vigorous, ~
rapid remedies. The dismantling of the old private sector and its replacement
by an inoperative national or mixed economy sec~or did not lead to the economic
takeoff on which people had counted, once the administrative machine was somewhat
back on its feet. Urban concentration is growing worse. (One wage earner supports
an average of ten persons in Bangui.) Paradoxically enough, at the same time, the
bush is returning to a subsistance economy, which is improperly understood in the
affirmation that "Central Africans no longer want to work." They are actually
_ working in a different world and the slow impregnation of the domestic economy by
- the market eccnomy, which constituteG the essential economic element of the colon-
ial achievement, has slowed down or disappeared. In areas where cotton is grown,
it was the area of the cottonfield which, the second year, determined that of
sesame, peanuts an,~ finally, that of manioc.
It is now necessary to reco~mence an evolution that tooks decades of efforts and
~ one notes with concern that it is not enough to set up a::cales near the cotton-
field or to present encouragement to peasants in the fo:Ym of imported products
to develop their activity. The Central African Republic's cotton harvest totaled
- 50,000 tons in the best years. It is now only 18,000 tons, representing 25 percent
of all exports still. SOCADA [expansion utiknown], set up by the new government with
the aid of the FAC, long-term loans from the Central Fund for Econamic Cooperation
and technical assistance from the French Company for the Development of Textile
Fibers, in order to f.ace t~e deficiencies of the UCCA (Central African Cotton
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tTnion), seems to have overestimated the possibili.ties of relaunching cotton, inas-
much as the program it set up would only be pro�itable over 40,000 tons. Seasonal
loans applied for were twice as high as real needs. Either the programs should be
rpduced or they should be co;~tinued with losses for a few years in the four prefec-
tures of Guham-Pende, Ouham, "economic" Gribingui and Ouaka. The STABEX [Export
Stabilization Fund] payments should facilitate the effort, on the condition,
naturally, that they go into the equalization funds and are not simply bud.geted, as
has been the practice in recent years.
The bo~st given to coffee production by the 1974 boom has had a somewhat prclonged
effect, despite Bokassa's confiscation of the profits of the Support Fe~nd. Since
_ that time, the old age and poor maintenance of coffee plantations, thefts from
the tree affecting nearly 40 percent of the crop and finally, the drop in prices
= dealt a severe blow. This year, the tannage exported should not exceed 7,500,
compared with 14,000 in 1978-1979.
For its first phase, the establishment of an oil palm plantation at Bassongo
received a loan from the African Development Bank. Poor operating conditions
affected a profi[ability visible only over 4,000 hectares. Nevertheless, resur.ip-
tion of the affair is being studied with the support of the Agricultural Bank and
the contribution of Belgian capital.
The Central African Republic OWES its trade balance surplus to diamonds. Bokassa's
_ expulsion of European ent~rprises reduced production by half (400,000 carats in
1974; 250,000 in 1980), a drop which was not remedied by the drop in prices in
_ April 1981. This is official production, it is true, and does not take into account
- the smuggling organized to the East by Muslim merchants who have largely monopolized
the local market, imposing their prices on producers, while i~: Bangui itself, a
purchasing office and the gem cutting shops are controlled by Israeli Americans.
- Actua.lly, the cottage industry, now the only form of mining, is very inefficient
and covers only already known deposits, meaning the halt of all prospecting. The
action of COGEMA [Ceneral Nuclear Materials Company], subsidiary of the French
Atomic Energy Commission, r~mains linked to the granting of permits in Mambere an1
Sangha. Despite criticisms of principle of which it is the target and which politics
has deliberately sharpenpd, it would appear to be the only organi~ation able to
get production back on its feet, given the current state of affairs.
= Oil prospecting is at a minimum. Conoco is operating in the Chadian border region,
closely following progress in research in neighboring countries. As for the
- Bakouma uranium, its extraction does not appear to be ~ustified by current process-
ing techniques. It is postponed until better times.
From this gloomy picture, one must absol~stely not infer that the Iim~ted but real
resour.ces of the Central African Republic are inadequate to er~sur~ the support and
development of the population. Sixteen ,years of looting and incompetent management
have led to contradictory reactions of "lumpen proletarization" and domestic paral-
ysis that cannot be dissipated by the mere rehabilitation of putilic services, even
of development organizations or communications networks. It is in the field of
_ human activity and customs that action must be taken, which could be very slow and
certainly costly if one wishesta speed up the necessary rate of treatment. Under-
standing this, Dacko preferred to resign, hoping that his departure would bring his
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successor the international understanding so often refused to him and, at the same
time, freedom from the hurden of his own mistakes.
General Kolingba may provide the favorable conditians the'country needs during its
recovery. One of his first actions will be to have the Council of Ministers pass .
a bill drafted several months ago and prescribing the retirement of all civil ser-
vants with 27 years of service and encouraging withdxawal from the civil service
through the institution of the special l~ave. Likewise, he may help to change the
defensive attitude of the commercial and industrial sectors, an attitude they have
been prompted to take in the past and which partial indemnifications have not helped
- dissipate.
The fact remains that the change itself cannot be brought about without outside
_ financial help. For having openly intervened in Central African politics in 1979,
France, a contrari o, admitted its responsibility for the process of deterioration
that has affected the country since 1966. It must now.assume it without quibbling,
the enemy of effectiveness. The financial efforL� needed for a rehabilitation, not
only of the administration, but of the economy as well, is an estimated 15 billion
~ CFA francs a year, renewed for S years, not including the FAC allocations which liave
other objectives. It is up to the French Government to decide whether stability
in this region of Africa is worth that price.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.
11,464
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EQUATORIAL GUINEA
PRESIDENT DISCUSSES PROGRESS MADE BY HIS REGIME
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1084, 14 Oct 81 sLpplemen#, pp 102, 103
[Int~rview with Col Nguema Mbasogo, president of Et~.uatorial Guinea, by Noel
Ngo~io Ngabissio, on 22 Sep 81, place not given]
[Text] T:~ose who met Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo the day
after the coup af 3 August 1979 will reriember a young officer,
age 36, shy and ill at ease at the intere~t he evoked in a
pack of international journalists who were~�.aurious to meet
"the man who felled Tiger Macias." Today, the president of
the Supreme Military Council has gained in assurance and
can put on a convincing performance. Disdainful as always of
the constraints of protocol, he gave us a very informal inter-
view, without requiring tt~at the questions be submitted to him
beforehand.~
[QuPStion] ~ao years ago, ~quatorial Guinea got rid of the Macias dictatorship.
Today, people are surprised that democratic institutions have still not been put
in place...
[AnswerJ One of the biggest problems our continent has is excessive haste. People
want to go entirely too ~ast, even with respect to democratization. The army of
Equatorial Guinea liberated the country from an unprecedented dictatorship. Our
number one concern, mind you, is for a rapid return to democratic life, with
guaranteed freedoms. But some prerequisites are essential, without which the word
democracy would have no meaning. I know that some leaders put up an instiltutional
facade to give themselves legitimacy and strengthen their hold on power. You see
what happened in Central Africa. I am not interested in make-believe. I want to
start at the beginning, from the base.
- Village councils, the result of completely free elections, are presently being set
up, and they in tu rn will elect regional councils. We will do the same thing in
the municipalities. Soon afterward, a constitutional com~nission will be named to
- draw up a draft constitution to be submitted to the people of Equatorial Guinea in
a referendum, before 3 August 1982. Then, free elections will be he1d.
[Question] Will the constitution recognize the principle of multiple parties?
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[Answer] The constitutional commission will draw up the document. I have not told
them what to write. The people of Equatorial Guinea will have the final decision.
[Question] How would you describe your own record in your 2 years as~the head
of state?
[Answer] These last 2 years would have not been satisfactory, or even very sub-
stantial, one must recognize this. There have bean defi.ciencies, due tu a criti-
cal shortage of manpower, particularly in the agricultural sector, and due to the
fact that worthwhile ties of cooperation have not been forged with the outsidP
world. Prices have shot up; inflation rose to intnlerabl~ levels, while we were
forced to keep wages down. The cadres responsible for financial matters and plan-
ning were not up to bheir task. These facts a~e deplorable, because Equatorial
- Guinea has resources that should enable it to move rapidly toward satisfactory
development.
[Question] You have not gotten as much foreign aid as you expected?
[AnswerJ I am not saying that. We are appreciative of the organizations and coun-
tries that have supported us. The IMF provided us $23 million; unfortimately, this
was at the cost cE the devaluation of our currenc;r, and inflation was the result.
- We are on the right r~ad with the EEC. Spain has provided us with 10 billion
pesetas in emergency assistance.
Today our cooperation with that country should start covering the whnle range of
our relations, it should become more pragressive and better planned. You have
- seen that Spanish missions are in our cotmtry right now; others are getting ready
to come, to review the various aspects of our cooperative relations with the authori-
ties of Equatorial Guinea.
- [Question] Some political trials have recently been held. Equatorial Guinean
dissidents exiled in Spain have spoken of machin~tions. What is that a11 about?
[Answer) The trial of which you speak was a public one and the international press
was invited. You did not come. For us, it was a simple matter. A citizen of
Equatorial Guinea who was living in exile asked t~ return. Not only were the doors
opened wide for him, but once he was here he treacherously took advantage of the
loan facilities open to all those who return to invest: 200 million bikueles
(around Fr CFA 200 million). The bulk of that sinn was used to corrupt some
soldiers and work toward the destabilization of the regime. He very clearly re-
ceived his just deserts.
[Question] You criticize the international press for not having attended the
trial. But your government has sometime$ confiscated newspapers, especially
Spanish ones!
[~lnswer] We have never confiscated your wpekly, JEUNE AFRIQUE, despite articles
which were, let us say,...sometimes very harsh with the regime in Equatorial Guinea.
If the minister of the interior, as his right, banned three Spanish papers
(INT~RVIU, DIARIO 16 and CAMBIO 16) it was because they persisted in telling lies
about our country. Everyone knows that they are in league with Guinean dissidents
in Spa~n. Journalists may be free to co~nent, but their facts must be correct!
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[Question] What do you want most for your co~try today?
(An~swer] Your question is a very important one. What I want has three aspects:
real democracy, respect for human rights, prosperity, and finally self-
sufficiency. We want more than anything else to establish a real democracy where
the big decisions are made by the people in a totally free forum, and where him?an
rights are guaranteed. We also want to see a rapid rehabilitation of the infra-
structure needed to provide citizens oi Equatorial Guinea with what they need in
terms of health, education, food. Finally, we want our country to be able to
develop using its own resaurces, especially agricul~ural r~sources. But we know
that all that remains only a pious hope if the people of Equatorial Guinea, both
the cadres and the laborers, fail to keep in mind the fact that abov~ all they must
be self-reliant.
COYYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981.
9516
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GUINEA
_ BRIEFS
- CASH RESTRAINT ADVOCATED--In a speech broadcast by Guinean radio, President Ahmed
Sekou Toure recommended a reduction in the number of bills in circulatian. The
Guinean chief of state asked for greater restraint in the use of the money-making
mar_hine because, he explained, the mass of bills now in circulation is "clearly
higher" than the total amount of currency issued in 1972 (when the syli was created)
and April 1981 (after the change in monetary symbols). This inflation in the mass
of bills also results from the introduction of fake sily notes issued by counter-
feiters and has the effect of depreciating Guinean money and of contributing to
inflation in the country. Sekou Toure also asked private merchants to set up re-
gional unions in order to combine their means and solve problems linked tu their
profession. Finally, he asked for the systematic closing of "bars and cheap res-
taurants," whic:i in his opinion are "places for the depravation of the morals" of
- young G~iineans. [TextJ [Paris MAFtCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
Ko 1874, 9 Oct 81 p 2564] [COPY:;IGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981) 11,464 .
DISPUTE WITH FRANCE--Approved by the French Cabinet in July, a bill concerning
application of the French-Guinean agreement of 26 January 1977 relative to settle-
' ment of the financial dispute between the two countries is to be submitted to
Pa~-liament during the fa].1 session. The bill, which would considerably simplify
the task of the indemnification commission, should make it possible to complete
the distribution of the compensation. [TextJ [Paris MARCHES TROPI~AUX ET MEDITER-
RANEENS in French No 1874, g Oct 81 p?.564j [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris
1981) 11,464
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MADAGASCAR
B1tIEFS
~CONOMIC PLIGHT--Didier Ratsiraka is urgently seeking 1 billion dollars to deflect
the consequences of the economic crisis bEfore the 1982 elections. Shortages have
_ increased over the past ye ar to the point where, in the cities, there are no longer
- lengthy lines in front of the stores since there is not anything to purchase. [Text]
[Pari~ JEUNE AFRIQUE in Fr ench No 1086, 28 Oct 81 p 43] [COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique
GRUPJIA 1981]
, CSO: 4719/214
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MOZAMBIQUE
REGULEITIONS ON CASHEW MARKETING FOR 1981-1982 DETAILEA
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET I~DITERRAKEENS in French No 1872, 9 Oct 81 p 2587
[Excerpts] A ruling from the Office of Secretary of State for the Cashew Crop
establishes regulations applicable to marketing in Mozambique for the 1981-1982
season. The purchase of cashews can be made by private concerns, government firm~,
cooperatives and other structures that might be interested in the future (plant
representatives, for example). All must be registered with the provincial delega-
tions of the Ministry of Domestic Co~erce so as to be able to obtain bank credits.
The minimum price to be paid to the planter-collector is S meticais per kilogram,
whatever the purchase place. The purchase price to be pa3d by industry, at the
entry-to-the-plant stage or by plant representatives ar_ the entry-to-storage stage
is set at 7,500 meticais per ton for Type 1 and 7,200 meticais for Type 2, not
including bags. Middleman prices to be paid by retaiiers and warehousemen will be
set by an agreement between them. Price schedules have been set up to take trans-
port costs into account.
In order to receive reimbursement for the tr.ansport cost, merchants must present
to the plant or plant rep~esentative their registration card from the provincial
directorate of domestic commerce. For th~ir part, plants must keep a record of
= merchants.
_ Marketing of cashews frorn provinces in northern Save will be planned by tt?z National
Cashew Enterprise-Mozambique Cashew. No merchandise bought by the plants can be
sold or surrendered Uy them without previous authorization from the company, after
notification of the provincial governments.
In order that cashews might be delivered to the plants, the latter must take the
necessary measures by setting up receiving stations working 24 hours around the
- clock. Plants mugt pruvide the necessary personnel to rapidly unload trucks in
the order of their arrival. New or used bags furnished by middlemen will be given
back to them cr paid for at the new price minus 25 percent.
Seven ports are considered as shipping ports for this season: Mocimboa da Praia,.
Pemba, Quelimane, Pebane, Nacala, Angoche and Beira.
COPYRI(,HT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.
I
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MOZAMBIn~
- BRIEFS
MAPUTO MILK CONSUMPTION--In order to meet the needs of the population, Maputo
should tiave 44,000 liters of milk a day, but the local dairy does not have the
capacity tn meet such needs. It puts out only 30,000 liters a day. Furthermore,
as a result of the lack of packing materials, the plant can furnish only 20,000
_ liters of stabilized milk that can be k~pt for long periods of time (in packages)
and 2,000 liters of pasturized milk (in bottles),or half of the daily needs.
_ Mozambique hopes to be able to make up its shortage by means of the delivery in
October of 230 tons of milk from the UN World Food Program, after receiving 500 tons
f'rom Sweden in August. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDtTERRANEENS in French
No 1874, 9 Oct 81 p 2587] ~COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11,464
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SENEGAL
RND LEADER DISCUSSES PARTY'S OBJECTIVES, IDEOLOGY
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 250, 12-25 Oct 81 pp 25-27
[Article by Ginette Cot: "On the Side of the Opposition"]
[Text] Trying to grasp the personality of e~ch of the opposition political parties
that have just achieved legal status in Dakar is certainly not an easy task, espe-
cially since, if one wants to outline a presentation, one can only, for the time
being, go by speeches, programs and declarations of intentions, awaiting a confron-
tation with the true circumstances in order to be able to ~udge the real practice,
the importance and impact of each of the basic components of the new political
scene. Furthermort, at first sight, the objectives and fundamental analyses seem
to support one anot':~er. Consequently, the concern of those who ask "What good are
so many parties?" is not totally without legitimacy.
The six organlzations that have just been allowed to come out into the daylight are
not completely far from it,.espECially in the case of their leaders unknowns
in Dakar political circles. And yet, their semi-legal status did not permit them
to reveal the extent of their real dimensions. It ie obvious that their entry on
the official scene has considerably modified the political structure previously
~ in place and it is bound to have an effect on all participants in the proces~.
Furthermore, while it may well be a source of confusion, this broad range of par-
ties (alongside the Socialist Party in power, there now exist nine opposition par-
- ties) nevertheless bears witness to a rich political tradition that has remained
vit31 despite past vicissitudes.
The rivatry that this diversity implies and the confrontation of ideas, proposals
and practices it presumes should lead to an overal.l, detailed, far-rEaching and
. conrrete search for suitable ways and means of bringing the country out of the pro-
tound crisis in which it has been plunged in the 20 years after nominal indepen-
dence.
One can retort that this is not completely new. Most leftist organizations xiot re-
cognized at that time with t}:e exception of the RND [Democratic National itally]
had since 1978 been in a context of flexible concertation, called the Coordination
- c~f the United Sene~nlese Opposftion (COSU) and built around a common program whose
' strateKic task was to work EQr the victory of the democratic national people's
revolutiun, a program that has inspired the proposals of certain new parties.
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Bilateral concertations also took place between different organizations, when
there was not joint work behind a precise task, as was the ca~e between the old
PAI-Senegal [African Independence Party] and the self-management socialists
united behind Mamadcu Dia, which since 1978 have published a sophisticated political
- monthly, ANDE SOPI.
And yet, as we know, the ostracism of the old government concerning the underground
_ leftist organizations erected a kind of wall bQtween the latter and the legal
opposition parties. The new situation created by the establishment of the multi- .
_ party system can only lead, by lifting the obstacles, to an expansion of debate and
_ concertation, its first visible consequence. At the same time, in t~e emulation
necessarily created by the new dynamic, one can sooner or later expect a clarifica-
tion. It is in fact in the confrontation with circumstances, the daily, overall
- stru~~;les, tllat the real concerns, the sincerity and effectiveness of each, will
- appear.
Uncertainties and Instability
Tn this sense, it c:an be said that the hour of truth has come, not only for re-
cently recognized parties, but for all the elements of the new political scene uj
well, elements that are.now facing greater responsibilities. At the same time,
one can also expect that sooner or later, perhaps moFe constructive and more repre-
sentative reclassifications may come about. This hypothesis is all the more pTau-
- sible because with the exception, naturally, of the Senegalese Republican Movement
(MRS, conservative) set up by Boubacar Gueye and which appears to be a kind of
accidant of history, if not an ironic challenge nut before the old system of imposed
currents of thought, everyane in the opposition is on the left, a left that can be
- defined as ranging from the moderate left to the extreme left. Furthermore, while
~
the controversy often remains lively between the different organizations in this
sector and while the political debate is marked by a certain parochialism, the unity ~
of the patriotic forces constitutes a concern that is unanimously shared or at ~
least proclaimed by everyone.
However, it will still be necessary to define the lines of demarcation, the bases I
of a possible alliance, and to know the ~n for such a union front. As one could
see in the months preceding Senghor's dep,. :re, during which the unity of patriotic
forces appeared to be an urgent task bui~ ~;-~~,n talks in that direction dragged on
and on, unless there are stimulating event~s, it will not be an easy task.
The uncertainties and instability or the situation add to the complexity of things.
Naturally, the change in persons at the head of state did not mean a radical change
in regimes, far from it. Nevertheless, many things have begun to be altered and
the innovations in style, action and government projects cannot fail to force the
opposition to an approach and an adaptation consistent with them.
Now tlien, despite the ever greater difficultiea in daily life confronting the
majority of the population, difficulties that point to the possibility of an explo- .
sion of anger fr~m the people, nothing indicates that the "state of grace" which
the new government has heretofore en~oyed will disappear. Consequently, it is not
surprising that perplexities are emerging and that speculation is rampant.
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"Is the RND going to break up? Is the PDS slowing down? Is Mamadou Dia's Peo-
ple's Democratic Movement, only recently formed, going to disappear? Has what
former President Senghor called the 'crypto-personal opposition,' referring to
- Cheikh Anta Diop and Mamadou Dia, moved over to make room for an Abdoulaye Wade~-
Abdou Diouf duel? Will the COSU collapse and ANDE-SOPI disappear? Will some be
tempted by a dangerous surge forward and others by capitulation?" All of these
rumors, which were circulating in Dakar in August, cannot simply be explained by
the well-known fondness of the Senegalese for political games, any more than by
deceptive measures, each aimed a phenomenon universally observed at all times
and in all places at "pulling the covers over to one's side." But they defin-
itely expose a certain malaise, if not a climate of confusion and embarrassed
expectation in which everything seems possible.
Finally, as one may have felt at the time of the Gambian affair and of the sus-
picions and verbal attacks aimed at the opponents of military interv~ntion in Ban-
_ jul the democratic achievement made official in April, one which constitutes
the first experiment of its type attempted on the contin~ent, still appears to be
very fragile. The annoying and troublesome adventure that has just happened in
the PDS, several of whose members and leaders have been apprehend~d, an affair
whose outcome must be known before the exact gignificance can be weighed, shows
that anything can still happen.
On this shif ting terrain, one can therefore try on~ly to get a fix on a specific
moment of the Dakar political situation. How do the rerently recognized parties
' view the new situation? How are they original? What are tF.eir differences and
objectives? How do they stand on the problem of unity? ~'hese are the questions
- that we shall try to dnswer.
Serene Style of RND
Formed in February 1976, the Democratic National Rally (p.ND), which was the object,
during its fight for official recognition, of all kinds of trials and harassment,
is without a doubt one of the movements tha~. enjoy the broadest potential audience,
- not only because of the political honesty of its.leaders, its worthy conduct, its~
serene style totally lacking in braggadocio and demagogy, but also because of the
realistic intelligence of its program, which is rooted in the socioeconomic reaYity
of a country in which religious f eelings play a predominant role and the phase of
liberation and the rise of th~ nation is far fr~nn being over, a country which aims,
relying on the organized and politicized population's own strength, at the estab-
lishment of "an independent, sovereign, democratic and popular state."
We also know that it was essentially in order to bar the way to the RND which, as
its name suggests, intended to be the rallier of the country's patriotic forces,
that the controlled multiparty system was imposed 5 years ago, which contributed
more than a little to its prestige.
Following ofticial recognition, the RND, through its secretary general, Prof Cheikh
Anta Diop, defined the objectives of the policy he intended to follow during this
p}~ase in this way: "Consolidating the democratic openAng so that it will become
a continuing searc}~; forging national unity above and beyond the divergencies of
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ethnic groups, religious denominations and specific brotherhoods; creating the
right political conditions that will enable the entire Senegalese nation to face
the humiliating challenge of neocolonialism; and showing by deeds that the RND is
- coriCerned only with the task of building the nation."
It was undoubtedly these concerns, along with his acute awareness of the country's
grave economic and social situation, that caused Prof Cheikh Anta Diop, at a press
conference held by the RND in Dakar on 10 August the first public manifestation
of the movement since its l.egalization to take up sub~ects rarely touched upon
at political meetings of this type: energy problems (see L'ECONOMISTE DU TIERS
MONDE, No 56, October 1981); the need for African nations to move toward a federal
system of they want to.emerge from their situation of underdevelopment and depen-
dency on other countries; and finally, the promotion of national languages as an
indispensable factor for a true demo�racy and the blossoming of the country's human
potential. ,
"We could have held this conference in an abstract language," the secretary general
of the RND explained. "We could have ~traced the history of our movement and re-
called the fight it has waged. But everyone knows that. The important thing, in
our opinion, was to propose concrete alternatives. We intend to emerge from the ~
field of the traditional abstractions."
And yet, f:om there to thinking that the RND intended to duck the current questions
was but a step that some took. However, the surprise does not stop there. Exposing
the key to his approach, meaning that any opportunism, any complacency aimed at
~aining facile popularity is obviously absent, the secretary general of the RND re-
� sponded to a question and, at the same time he made the responsibility for the.cur-
~ rent crisis relative, he made a particularly calm evaluation of the action taken
by the new Senegalese president: "I believe," he said,�"that we must have the
courage to say everything positive in the action of this government. It is repug-
nant to us to give the impression that we engage in opposition for opposition's
sake, Parties can form openly, exit visas have been d.one away with, and I cannot
say that everything is negative; that would not be reasonable. Furthermore, we
must also consider the deep difficulties that are nearly out of the control of our
small countries. The government compass is beginning to tremble precisely because
of this impossible situation in which we find ouraelves.and also because of the
political options chosen lon~ ago. We will never be able to emerge from this
situation until we agree to certain profound reforms. . In the last eight months,
things have happened that are.apparently neg~ative, but we mttst not forget that the
farP reserved fer all our isolated nations is cltYOCiic indebtedness, dependency on
foreign financial backers."
Constructive Opposition?
Is it tl~en a question, as some would think, of a blank check given ta the new govern-
men~? The rest of the speech belies such an interpretation: "If we do not change
economic credos, Cheikh Anta Diop continued, "we shall get further and further off
course. Tlie IMF is often within our walls and assigns very astringent solutions
to us that bother us. When the Senegalese Government is humiliated, I am also
~iumiliated. I suffer morally, personally, from the humiliations we endure. Under
such conditions, it is quite obvious that we shall find a solution only by changing
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structures. What the government should perhaps have done was to draw up a balance
sheet of our liabilities, say: 'Look at the abyss. That is our.financial and eco-
nomic situation. It is catastrophic and it demands a national effort. We are
going to examine under what cond,itions the nation will agree to these efforts.'
But if we try to steer the ship of state as well as we can while not breathin$ a
word about all of this, that is when we shall engender difficulties like those we
now face. Having said that much, there are things undeniably positive in the
;overnment's action and the opposition is the first to admit it, so that it jai11
_ be clear that we are not practicing a policy of 'Get out of there so I can get in.'.
It is repugnant to us to be in the race for power for power's sake. The RND has
- already said it: It is interested only in the task of building the nation and will
prove it by deeds. What concerns us, at a time when the countries on the continent
are being destabilized, is to strengthen national cohesion. As for the government's
action, we judge it with a freedom that proves that if tomorrow, the government
acts in a harmful way, we shall say so. However, we must admit that the political
futurE is necessarily uncertain, under the conditions in which we work, if they do
not agree to the reEorms that we recommend."
It is understandable that such lucid language, breaking with the style of the tradi-
tional pamphlets of an.y opposition party in general, may have irritated or intrigued
some persons and that, once cut apart and with its nuances removed, it could give
rise to interpretations and speculations that are hasty, to say the least. For
example, the government press and the Socialist Party took advantage of the oppor-
_ tunity to hail in the RND, which not long ago was the object of violent attacks,
the coming of an exemplary constructive opposition: Some co~mmentators went even
further, suggesting the possibili~ty of the establishment of a governm~nt of na-
tional union between the PS and the RND. However, for the time being, nothing
- supports such a hypothesis. Moreover, as if a test question were being put to
- him: Was the RND willing to participatQ in the reforestation campaign decided upor.
by the government? Cheikh Anta Diop responded in the negative: "If there were any
peril, we could rise up together. Today, on the spur of the moment, they cannot
ask us to go plant trees. We must create the conditions that will enable the Sene-
galese nation to rise up as a ~ingle man."
_ The fact that this approach may have given rise to debat~ and questions within the
RND itself is not surprising. The Democratic National Rally, as its secretary
general recalls, is not in fact a monolithic party, but "a rallying of inen and
women from all political backgrounds who have come together to do what is essential,
that is, bring about beneficial changes in the direction of the interests of the
majority. It is at one and the same time our strength and our weakness."
Other speci~ic traits of the Democratic National Rally deserve to be pointed out.
The RND is not concerned with creating ties with other countries. "All the pro-
gressive parties in the world could, a.priori, be our allies," Cheikh Anta Diop
says, "but we believe that an extroverted attitude is not a good political educa-
tion. We want to be free at all times. We shall concentrate on our country's
conditions and we intend to derive all our strength from the Senegalese masses."
As for kiiowing what ideology the RND claims as its own, the secretary general
states: "We apply the mass political line defined at'our congresses. For six
year, alttiough they tried to impose one on us, we refused to stick a label on
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our foreheads, out of dignity and in order to set an example, because it was not
in keeping with the idea we had ef political freedom, of the freedom of man and
the deep~r meaning of political action. Why should we now agree to accept a
label?"
For Cheikh Anta Diop, in fact, given the current situation of the African countries,
"the class struggle constitutes a phrase more than a'real condition. That may be
an aspiration," ne believes, "but no political party can truly try to conduct its
action based on the interest~ of a single class."
Its vocation as a rallier of patriotic forces, which the RND chose as soon as it
was formed, and its rejection of any hasty action that might be short-lived undoub-
_ tedly explains its attitude to the problems of unity with other opposition forces,
which criticize it for sometimes tending to "go its own way."
At the time of its founding, the RND proposed to other leftist groups all of
which were then illegal to form the Democratic National Ra11y, while at the
same time continuing to develop their own organizations with complete autonomy. '
"We imagined that solution because we knew that the political struggle waged to-
gether is sincere only.if all are committed to the same extent," Cheikh Anta Dio~
says. "They replied with a refusal, but the RND is completely at ease in speaking
of its relations with the other, opposition groups. We remain constantly available
to respond to any appeal, when it is a question of concerted action. Unity in
order to promote greater political, economic and cultural independence will, come
about. Al1 that we can get together, we shall. But unity will come about through
vigorous action and not around a bargaining table. Nor does anything ~ay that
there can be no mergers. By dint of rubbing elbows, understanding one another and
explaining our positions to one another, we shall perhaps finally pose the question
of what does, in the finally analysis, really separat~ us. The thick wall of pre-
judice could then begin to erode away until it finally collapses."
I'or the time being, and while awaiting a greater clarification of the.situation,
the RND goes about extending its base, which remains very uneven depending on the
region, f~r different reasons, the least of which is not material difficulties.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Afrique-Asie.
- 11,464 ~
- CSO: 4719/124
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SEYCHELLES
RENE WANTS STRONGER TIES WITH FRANCE
PM091031 Paris AFRIQUE-ASIA in French 12-25 Oct 81 pp 9-12
[Part I of interview with Seychelles' President Albert R~ne by Somon Malley:
"Seychelles Has Not Ceased to be Target of Imperialist Destabilization Attempts"--
date and place not given]
[Excerpts] When we turned to the sub~ect of Franco-Seychelles relati.ons [Albert
Rene's] reaction was clear and categorical. How could this statesman, who was
particular.ly close to the leftwing labor leaders in Britair~ when h~ was a young
lawyer in London, fail to be happy to see "comrades in arms" in the Elysee,
Matignon, the Quai d'Orsay and the National Assembly? He has many personal friends
wi thin th~ Fre:~~h lef t and maices no secret of his hope to meet with them soon:
"As soon as the results of the second round of the May French presidential election
were announced I sent a congratulatory message to President Mitterraxsd from Tripoli,
where I was making an official visit, and I informed hi.m of the 3mportance we
attach to the development and intensification of fruitful cooperation between our
- two countries based on mutual respect.
"We always followed h~s stances on international policy issues closely when he
~ was PS first secretary, pspecially those on cooperation between the industrialized
and developing countries and toward those struggling for their independence, and
his concern for peace and greater justice in the world.
"We were particularly moved by the cc~nten~, of his opening speech at the Paris
conference on the least developed countrieg in which he hoped, like us, that in
North-South relations 'the sgirit of shared responsibility might replace distrust
~ an~ ~nciif.fe~ence,' and that global negotiations might be started. 'Helping the
Third World is helping yourself overcome the crisis'; President Mitterrand's apt
expression strikes me as very true and is an excellent expression of that necessary
shared responsibility."
But what hopes does the Seychelles have of th~ new cooperation and development
policy announced by the Mauroy government and which Jean-Pierre Cot intends to
- implement?
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"We hope it will strengthen and consolidate the cooperative relations between our
two countries, based on mutual respect and reciprocal interest," President Albert
Rene replied. "As far as principles are concerned, the approach taken by a new
French cooperation policy, more especially in Africa, coincides with ours and
opens up the prospect of a vast potential to be exploited. The initial contact~
at ministerial level and especially the recent meeting between our foreign minister
and [French External Relations MiniaterJ Claude Cheysson open up prospects in which
we place great hope for the mutual benefit of our two countriea and our two peoples."
What about the Seychelles' ~ecurity? The Seychelles regime, which is one of the
favorite targets of American y.mperialism, which wants to make Diego Garcia a
powerful base for aggression, is also facing all kinds of attempts at destabiliza-
tion, sabotage, plots, m~rcenaries....
Ttie Seychelles head of state has no illusions about the abandonment of these
machinations against his regime owing to the very fact that it is progressive,
anti-imperialist and that it defends socialist options: "The destabilization
_ a~ttempts," he stressed, "are not over. They are the sign that the revoluiionary
process is continuing in the Seychelles and that it is upsetting some people.
The forms may change, become less brutal and more insidious, but the ob~ective is
the same: to stop the process of building a new society in the Seychelles or to
divert it from its path. Moreover this impreseion as to the forms these attempts
are taking must be altered in view of the apartheid regime's now direct inter-
vention in the internal affairs of the countries ~in the region. The examples are
increasing?y numerous.
"In the division of roles among the imperialist powers it certainly seems that our
_ region is being placed in its [the apartheid regime's] hands more than in the past
in order to relieve the other powers. That is a rea~l danger which we must watch
- carefully.
"But in face of the threats hanging over our country, its security depends primarily
on its defense forces, which are, at the same time, working for its development.
_ In addition to these forces there is the people's mobilization, especially through
the people's militia. We are also developing cooperation with the progressive
countries in the region and, on the military plane, our forces have, on several
occasions, carried out joint maneuvers with the Tanzanian and Madagascan forces
to test the level of coordination and their operational capability."
, [Rene c~ntinues] "With regard to aecurity in the Indian Ocean region, our position
has always been clear. It must be ensured by the countries in the region, which
do not threaten anybody's interests, or marine navigation or the oil supply routea.
The real threat, on the other hand, hangs over our countries, our development
eff~rts, and our peoples through this foreign ~ilitary presence.
_ "Thus, in this specific sphere, the logic of our argument leads us to demand the
withdrawal of all foreign military forces in the region, the dismantling of the
- military bases and an end to the facilities granted to them. Our demand applies
to all foreign forces, irrespective of who ttiey are and without any exception."
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And what does President Albert Rene think oE the plan for a conference on the
demilitarization of the Indian Ocean? What progress has it made? How does he
viPw the development of relations between the Seychelles, Madagascar, Mauritius,
reunion and the Comoro Islands?
The Seychelles head of state thinks that prepara~ions for the Sri Lanka conference
on the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, scheduled for the end of the year or, at
latest, early 1982 and which is to be held ~~nder UN auspices, are making no progress
and that the blame for this rests with some great powers for whom peace and
~ peoples' peace of mind are not sub~ects for discussion.
"We are continuing," he said, "our efforts and consultations to ensure that this
desired peace is established and that the specter of intervention against the
peoples is removed by demilitarization and the dismantling of the foreign bases
in the region. As far as our region is concerned, we strongly advocate close
_ regional cooperation among the Indian Ocean countries despite the different social
and political systems which characterize their respec'tive situations. That is our
viewpoint on interstate relations, and we do not believe in interference in other
states' internal affairs. Of course, in view of our progressive options, our
_ interparty relations give priority to relations with the parties in the region
which are struggling for progress, national and social emancipation, and the right
of the peoples to self-determination--which, in our view, goes hand in hand with
the as yet uncompleted decolonization proce:~s."
The more aggressive policy pursued by Washington since the Reagan administration
took office is still one of President Albert Rene's main sources of concern.
The adventurism, the race for the most destructive weapons and the cold war which
the United States has launched herald a sit~iation which is particularly explQSive
since the progressive Third World countries are one of thE~ most immediate objec-
tives of its aggressive policy, especially following its decision to train, arm
and f inance the Angolan, Mozambique, Khmer snd Afghan cou~~terrevolutionaries,
among others, to ~,ncrease its support for S~uth Africa, t~~ try to overthrow
- al-Qadhdhaf i's regime by force and to regari all liberati~~n movement fighters as
"terrorists." Can President Albert Rene think of or suggest anything to counter
this American offensive?
"We think,'� he replied without hesitation, ''that we must present a united front
thr~ugh more regular consultations and discissions among progressive countries at
a time when some administrations are basin~ their international relations policy
on increasing aggressiveness. ~y leaning :oward nationa] liberarion, any struggle
f~r ~i~st~re anci equal,-ity StrikPG thPm gc ai1;~art ~nrl tn ~iF~ ~r,n~Pmn?1 3t1~ p~'Omgts
- them to resort to provocation and direct intervention. In face of these dangers
we must adopt a better coordinated strategy of struggle and show effective and
constant solidarity among the advocates of progress and pE~ace, the better to with-
stand this new offensive."
Our interview was not over. Other question:~ came to mind~ Polisario, Namibia,
South Africa, Israel and its aggressive policy against th~~ Pal.estinians, Lebanese
and Iraqis, the invasion cf Angola, the fut.ire of southern Africa and also the
evolution in the Seychelles' internal situar.ion sincE~ the revolution of 5 June
1977....
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Afrique-Asie
CSO: 4719/201 E~ID
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