JPRS ID: 10136 JAPAN REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070051-4
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 47
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 51
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/ 10136
- 24 November 1981
Ja an Re ort
p p
(FOUO 67/81)
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JPRS L/10136
- 24 NovE:mber 1981
JAPAN REPORT
(FOi10 67/81)
~ONTENTS
POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
LDP Factional Strife Updated
(SHOKUN, Nov 81) 1
CaSinet Reshuffle Focus of Political Activities
(THE DAILY YOMIUicI, 2 Nov 81) 15
Cabinet Reshuffle: Who Will Be Foreign Minister
(ASAHI EVENING NEWS, 3 Oct 81) 17
Fukuda-Tanaka Meeting P,eviewed '
- (Raisuke Honda; THE DAILY YOMIURI, 30 Oct 81) 18
Suzuki's Plans Ri.pening for Personnel Resuffle ~
(Takehiko Takahashi; MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, 11 Nov 81)......... 19
- Sonoda Faces Difficulty i.n Retaining Post
(Minoru Shimizu; MAINICHI DAILY N~NTS, 12 Nov~ 81) 21
Setback in Japan-So~~iet Ties
(THE DAILY YOMIURI, 1 Nov 81) ......................4......... 24
Socialist Party Convention Preparations Underway ~
(Editorial; ASAHI EVENING NEWS, 4 Nov 81).......,.... 26
MILITARY
Japan, Superpower Strategy Analyzed
(Ryochi Nishijima, et al.; THE DAILY YOMIURI, various dates).. 28
- a - [III - ASZA - 111 FOUO]
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YOLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
LDP FACTIONAL STRIFE UPDATID
Tokyo SHOKUN in Japanese Nov 81 pp 8fi-94
- [Round-table discussion: "Wha Will Come After Suzuki?" Anonymous partici-
pants (Dietmen)J
[Excerpts] [Question] What about the rumor of a change of government in Nov-
ember which has been whispered lately?
- [B] It tias already vanished like the dew.
[C] First of all, it is a distortion, no matter how interesting some try to
_ make the story.
[A] It has become cominon knowledge tk~at under various pretexts Zenko will
serve out his term at least.
[C] Until November next year, right?
[Question] But what about the case in which Prime Minister Suzuki suffers
an unlikel~y event like Ohira.
[DJ ~By no means would Nakasone be agreed to.
_ [B] Righ*_. I don't think Fukuda will be turned to either.
[D] Iri that case, perhaps Nikaido will be agreed on.
[A) It all depends an what the ~'ukuda faction does.
[B] E'ukuda will not say OK to Nikaido.
- [C] That isn't inevitable. The Fukuda faction would ~oin if Shinta.r.o Abe
is mad~ secretary general and then follows Nikaido.
- [Question] Could the election be won with a Nikaido government?
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~ [C] If the election can't be won wi,th a Nilcaido goyexnment, it can~t be won
_ with either Nakasone ox ~ukuda. There is no xeason why the electfon can'~ be
won with Nikaido.
[Question] But if "dirty" gov~rnment official Nikaido becomes prime minister...
[CJ There are no politicians who would say he is dirty.
[Question] That may be so in the world of professionals, but from the view
of the general voters, it would be distasteful for a dirty official to become
prime minister.
[C] Yet, Kakuei Tanaka about whom that has been written so much is now the
most popular with the people.
[B] Being popular and being supported are not the sam?e thing. If Kakuei
comes forth, people will be brought out, but the votes won't be bxought in.
_ [C] When it is seen that Dietmembers for who m the election is more important
_ than iife are joining the Tanaka faction in great numbers like the feces of
~oldfish, it means he is popular with the people after all.
Inviting Kakuei's Popularity
[Question] In short, would yo~ like t~ have Kakuei Tanaka come to give a
speech supporting your campaign when you are campaigning for el~ection?
[C] Everyone wants him to come.
[Question] But is the result clear from this past Tokyo metropolitan election?
[C] A metropolitan election is somewhat different. That is, the present
executiv~ committee wasn't very agressive. Therefore, the Tanaka faction
has taken responsibility for all the weak fellows. It is said that the rate
of the Tanaka faction's wins was small but the Tanaka faction had the great-
est number elected. It just says it took res�ponsibility for doubtful fellows
who were unable to have anyone care for them. If a public opinion poll were
conducted now on who should be the next prime minister, the answer would be
overwhelmingly for Kakuei.
(B] A que3tionnaire was given at the Surugadai Prep School on whom would ~
you most like to hear. The first would be Kakuei Tanaka and the second,
Ryoichi Sasagawa.
[A] He may place somewhere in a public opinion poll, but I don't think he
would be overwhelmingly number one.
[C:] No, no, There's no double he would be first, and I think he would be
far ahead of the number two person.
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[C~uPStion] What is it about hi.~ that makes you have auch expectat~ons of him?
[C] His strong politics. Because of the prese:zt poor economic situation.
[Questionl However, didn't Tanaka bring on extremely high prices of commodi-
ties, and that proved fatal to fiim?
- (C] Didn't the people understand it wasn't Kakuei's fault ~ut that Arab oil
prices went o~p?
[Question] Oil prices went up but in addition, he incited a speculation c-raze
with his "plan for the reconstruction of the archipelago" and that was reflect-
ed in the market.
- (CJ There is no other nation in ti~e world but Japan where prices didn't go
up that much even though 2 dollar oil went to 35-36 dollars. The people real-
ized that.
[D] However, Mr. C., once there was certainly a cry, Kakuei shuuld come
_ forth," when there was widespread economic depression,'but recently we don't
hear that. It is recognized that economic depression is not something re-
lated to the policies and judgment of one politician but is determined by
the international state of affairs such as the Arab question.
[A] Well, Kakuei's popularity comes from the fact that politics is not very
- inter.esting right now.
[B] That's right. There is no other attractive politician.
[A] So, tlaat is the responsibility of the new leaders. From the mid-40's
to the late 50's there were politicians who hore the expectation~ flf the
people, such as Ichiro Kono, Yasuhiro Nakasone and Hakuei Ishida. But now -
there is no politician with such popularity with the people.
[C] Don't the people have the feeling that only Kakuei has the vigor to do
what should be done for the country and speaks out, for example, on what
should be the relationship with the opposition parties and what should the
policies be.
[AJ Once there were popular supra-partisan politicians in the opposition
_ parties, suciz as Inajiro Asanuma. The present popularity of Kakuei is similar
to a Inajiro Asanuma style popularity.
- [B~ That's right. On the other hand, it is also like the strength of Ichiro
Kon~. Unfortunately, there is not even one other pers~?n besides Kakue~.
Michio Watanabe, Lone Wolf
[A] In .~ssence, I think it is Nakasone who should have the popularity now.
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~
. I
(Bl Somehow no populax'~ty has gush~d :foxth to h~m. ,
[A] Nakasone's popularity c~ne in the mid 50FS when he was a young officer. j
. ~
[D] When he was a leader of the young men. Yow tfiat tfie handsome fellow ~
with the young man's topknct has become bald, you can't very well call him
handsome. (Laughter)
[B] About the time he was the leader of the young men, this man was not ~
called an opportunist. '
[A] He wasn`t called that. He was someone who gave the image of being ex-
tremely militant.
[C) He was the most splendid when he was rampaging under Ichiro Kono. ~
[B) Next tr~ Kaku~ei, isn't it Michio Watanabe who is the topic of barbershop
political conversations?
[A] That's right. But won't the time come when the people gradually get
tired if his talk is simply interesting? Where is the difference between
Kakuei and Michio Watanabe?
[D] Watanabe doesn't have Lockheed! (Laughter)
[B] Kakuei Tanaka now has �allen from being "imperial adviser" to accused
defendant, and that is the literary, or historical, narrative of the mutabili- ;
ty of life. But in the case of Michio Watanabe, it is as though Hitotsubashi ~
University is making the talk interesting. ~
(.r,] Michio Watanabe's p~pularity came from his seeking a quarrel with tne
medical association.which was taboo; and as for where is Michio Watanabe's
- excellence, it is only his quarrel with the medical a~sociation.
[BJ One more positive point of Michio Wata:~abe is that he appears on TV ,
and speaks intelligibly on such subjects as public finance and medical insur-
ance, and makes politics familiar to the people. Quarrels and commentaries
---those two points, right?
[Ques*_ion] His services were greatly conducive to the zero ceiling decision
in this special. session on administrative reform.
- [B] I think so too.
[C] But he is, after all, just a lone wolf. He is not a person who will
move up. He is not someone who can gather together people and build up power.
- He is in the category of Monjiro Kogarashi and others; he won't be a Hidegoro
Omaeda.
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~ [BJ I don`t think that'�s quite r~.ght. He al~ays pulls togethex �ive or six
people. For example, Hirofu~i Muto and Ihei Och~...
[C J But it is ~ust because ~licfiio WatanaTie is finance minister tfiat stray
birds flock around accidently. ldakagawa has far more of the cfiaracter of boss.
[A] Oi~ yes, that~s right.
Rokusuke Tanaka, Prominent Political Fundraiser
[C] Nakagawa waged his own flesh and blood in this past election; at any rate
for 2 csr 3 supporters.
[B] Compared to Nakagawa, isn*t Watanabe too intelligent and cunnin~ and
causes others to exercise caution?
jC] Isn't it ~ust the opposite. I feel Watsnabe is a superior but ill-natured
person; Nakagawa is quite tr~a scoundrel but is kind-hearted. Therefore, al-
- though he won't be a Hidegoro bmaeda, he is svmewhat li[ce a Chu~i Kuriisada.
_ (D] Watanabe is too sharp. I don't think Nakagawa is sm,zrt, but somehow is
depP"ndable...
[Aj The latter is preferable as a politician's disposition.
_ [C] Everything has gone too well for Michio; he has never stood in a place
where the sun doesn't sine. Nakagawa was deprived of a possible role because
he opposed Ohira.
[QuestionJ What about his ability to raise political funds?
[C] If anyone would conquer the whole country with his abilit~ to raise funds,
it would be Rokusuke Tanaka.
[AJ Is he tha,, remarkable?
[C] Yes. In addition to that, this man is not especially skillful at speak-
ing like Michio Watan~be or Ichiro Nakagawa, nor does he have any star-like
qualities, but concerning his b~hind-tl:e-scenes political power and the like,
whether it is true or not, he has publicized that he set up two cabinets, the
Ohira cabinet and the Suzuki cabinet. (Laughter)
[B] At any rate, that is because he pulls together no lesa tilan 50 Diet mem-
_ bers.
[C] To look at him, he has no appeal at all. Watanabe has appeal in his own
way; Nakagawa has appeal in his own way. Compared to th~m, Rokusuke Tanaka
has new leader appeal neither in speech nor countenance. However, speaking
of the role he performed in actually moving politics, aside from whether it
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is true or not, duzing the ohj.za ar.d S.uzuk~, govex'nments, he was at the scene
where he can say, "I set up two cabinets." If he wasntt there, be couldn~t
even tell the lie. (LaughtexZ
[D] Concerning his ability to raise political funds~ I think whetfier he c&n
raise political funds or not w~ll determine fiis future when fie resigns as
MITI minister.
_ [A] Isn't Wat~nabe himself setting up a new to gather in money by using his
position as finance minister? ~
- [B] I rhink Nakagawa's and Watanabe's ability to raise funds will probably
= continue even after leaving their posts, but in Rokusuke's case, won`t he
fall noticeable when he leaves his post?
[CJ However, now it is only Rokusuki Tanaka whn is collecting money and giv-
ing it to every~ae in the Suzuki faction.
[D] I don't think that's true.
[A] At any rate, it is certain that Rokusuke Tanaka has started to stand
in the new leader section since he became MITI minister.
[C] The order of our conversation is reversed but as for the new ?.eader
champions, they are Takeshita and Abe, after all. Watanabe, Nakagawa and
Rokusuke Tanaka are below them. But it is simply becau~se Rokusuke Tanaka
i and Watanabe are by chance in the most fortunate positions that they became
subjects first, but if Watanabe aad Tanaka step down as ministers, they
would not have been su~ects of our talks far an hoc~r. On those points,
Takeshita is now in the most unfortunate situation.
[Question] Takeshita once tried to take arms against Tanaka. Isn't his
popularity low because that was unfinished?
[C~ It is outrageous for him to have taken up arms. Without Tanaka, Take-
shita doesn't sxist. Noboru Takeshita has meaning because of the Tanaka
faction. '
[B] Supporting the generation change theory, Takeshita set up the neo-liber-
_ alism research society together with Shintaro abe and Kiichi Miyazawa. That
incurred Kakuei's wrath.
[D] That's why he was made to scrub the floor. (Laughter)
[B] But that neoliberalism reseaxch society was significant. It seema that
both Tanaka and Fukuda held down that society in that format, but as a result,
the new leaders became finance minister and chairman of the Policy Research
Committee, and thus it can be said doors to various important posts were
opened. Witfiout that society, control by the elders, the so-called era of
the influential political leaders, would have continued.
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� , AL U! ~E ONL' i~
,
- Shintaro Abe's Favorable Tex~nps
[Question] .How about Ganri Yamashita ox Tokusaburo YCozaka c~f the Tanaka
- faction?
[C] Such persons can in no way he new leaders. Ganri Yamashita is a made-up
image. Kozaka is not even a topic of comiersation witfiin the faction.
[B] If some accident happened to Tanaka, up to 90 percent of the Tanaka
faction would stay ~aith Takeshita.
[CJ No, it would be with Ni~.aido. If something happened to Tanaka and
Nikaido, 90 perce.nt would go to Takeshita.
- [B] Almost no or~e would stay with Ganri Yamashita. Thirty percent would
follow Kozaka.
[A] What about Kanamaru?
[B] He is Takeshita's guardian. Don't more than half of the 90 percent
who w~uld follow Takeshita idolize Kanamaru's v2rtues.
[C] At any rate, because Tanaka equals Takeshita, Takeshita cannot survive
if he rebels against Tanaka. The way for Takeshita to survie is to earnestly
and loyally serve Tanaka.
[Question] Tanaka is looking after Takeshita thinking he's an excellent fel-
low. As for those in the Tanaka faction, they pretend to be following after
Takeshita because Kakuei is looking after him. But, should Tanaka have an
accident, isn't there the gossibility they would converge not on Takeshita
but on another?
[C] Just the opposite. Although Takeah~ta was more or less given a cold
shoulder by Tanaka, I think the maiority was sympathetic to Takeshita.
[B] Therefore, it resembles when the Sato faction dissolved into the Tanaka
faction an.i Fukuda faction, most went to Tanaka who had more or less been ig-
nored by Sato.
(C] Now, Ganri Yamashita is called a fine fellow by Tanaka. But no one
would follow him. Kakuei thinks Takeshita is the le~der of the young genera-
tion who seeks a quick change of leadership, and sometimes talks ill behind
his (Tanaka's) back---the rascal. Even so, he recognizes the strength of
the Takeshita-Kanamaru group and thinks he has to keep them close at hand
even while }~olding them in check.
[D] As for my view of the future, I think Shintaro Abe will certain~y be
the first among the present new leaders to assume political power.
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[QuestionJ Why do you say that?
[D] One reason is Fukuda~s age. No mattex hoGr~much he persists, Fuiwda
has only 3 or 4 years left. He is in the fortunate positi~on of hsving an
old boss. Secondly, he has no rival in tfie Fukuda faction. Thirdlys he
is neither a skillful speaker nor particularly sfiarp, but Tie stands above
others---shall we call him an absentminded young man or young leader---and
he has the personality to be a natural leader of others.
[A] Both Nakagawa and Takeshita are mini-Tanaka types. However, tfiey are
not, after all, men who can outstrip Kakuei Tanaka. Fort~na~tely or unfor-
runately, because Abe bQlongs to a different type of politician, there is
absolutely no way he can be compared to Tanaka. That is also to his credit.
[B] One more point. He doesn't give the image of being ~extremely sharp,
but he has a sense of balance. As far as the Fukuda fac~ion's course is con-
cerned, it is hawkish and to the right and it would not be strange if he ran
to the far right like Nakagawa. But within the Fukuda faction, he is a per-
son who gives a sense of security that he won.'t fly away fram th~ conserva-
tive main current.
Noboru Takeshita's Survival Path
[D] Contrary to other new leaders, he doesn't have to strain to bring in
money.
[Cj Ye:s, that's rignt. He doesn't have t~ make any effort at all. Kishi
is looking after him.
_ [B] Compared tc him, Rokusuke Tanaka is trying so.hard.
[C] Frantically. (Laughter)
[A] Nakagawa is also working hard.
(B] That isn't so for Takeshita or Abe.
- [C] Takeshita once tried hard, but now he has become very quiet. The road
- to a new life for T'akeshita is to be forgotten by the public.
~C] It is better for him to disappear from the topic of nFw leaders.
[Question] How is the relationship between Takeshita and Nikaido? For example,
in a situation wi?ere some accident happened to Tanaka, wouldn't th?~ Nikaido
f.action and Takeshita faction split?
[CJ No. No doubt, Nikaido would be the one turned to.
[B] However, that quiet strength of Nikaido has gradually came to shine.
After Zenko, it will be Nikaido, and after Nikaido, Shintaro Abe.
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[AJ Tf "dirty" Nik$ido hecomes pxiipe m~nisteac, ~ton't there he various txoubles
inside the LD~?
[C] "Dirty official" is a word used only by tfie~mass media and the opposition
parties. No one thinks Nikaida is a dirty of.ficial.

a
[Question] Didn't he get money from All Nippon Airlines?
[C] If he said he didntt get any money, then f~e d~dn't get any. (Laughter)
But if receiving money is 3irty, there aren't any politicians who are not
dirty. (Laughter) Moreover, as for fiaving received 5 million, if that is
dirty, I don't think there are any politicians who are not dirty. Mr..X,
if such is the case, then you are pitch black. (Laughter)
[Mr. X~ No, I am told I'm deep r~d. �
_ [BJ As for Ivikaido's personality~ he is a simple, gocd man. I have that
impression. A negative criticism of him is that he is wrapped up too much
in Kakuei's shadow. Finally, whether ~here is a Nikaido government degends
on how the public digests the problem cf Kakuei.
[A] Therefore, conversely speaking, given a situation where Kakuei Tanaka
has an accident and dies and a Nikaido government assumes power, or a situ-
ation where Nikaido takes over the gover~ent with Tanaka still alive, the
public would have strong opposition to the latter.
[B] I think that there is also a case where there would be an atmosphere
which allows Nikaido if Kaku~i is not around. A Nikaido government would
be easier if Kakuei is not around.
[C] Kakuei won't fall. He'll be around for another hundred years! (Laughter)
[A] But if Nikaido assumes power while Kakuei is around, won't there be
quite a bit of confusion? For e~cample, if Kakuei's tr3i1 3udges him innocent
and at the time Nikaido happends to be prime minister, it will seem that pol-
_ itical power controls even the ~udicial power.
[C] F.verything is being put in ord~r before that.
[D] Everything will pr.obably be put in order by the fall of next year.
Tokusaburo Kozaka's Limits
[Cj WelJ., it is common sense to say it will be either Nakasone or Nikaido
after Zenko, but depending on circiunstances, there is Kawamoto, a d3rk horse.
= After him, it will be the era of Shintaro Abe, Noboru Takeshita~ Rokusuke
Tanaka, Ichiro Nakagawa and Michio Watanabe. Oh, I forgot---we have to add
in Kiichi Miyazawa for the time being. Nikaido and Nakasone are of the san:e
rank. If Kr~kuei says Nikaido, it wi11 be Nikaido; if he says Nakasone, it
will be Nakasone. If these two are not possible, then Kawamoto or Miyazawa
will emerge.
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[A] I still thix~k Tokusahuro Rozaka ~s poss~hle.
(C] No, Kozaka~s bi.ggest minus po~nt ia that he doesn~t have the experience
of being on the bottom rung of tiie ladder. In iiis case, when he was a firat
and second year member, fie did not acquixe a sense of~how to regulate by
suffertng with his companions oa committees~ suf~fering in the deliberations
on the price of rice, nor in laying the groundwork here and there for electric
rate increases. He came forth from the outset saying, "I'll be a new leader," ,
and he is, so to speak, one of those wfio are recommnended from above to the
politic3l world.
[D] He is in line with Aiichiro Fu~iyama, Naoto Ichimanda and Tatsunosuke
Takasaki.
[B] In that sense, won't he follow the same fate as Shintaro Ishihara who
failed?
- [A] Kozaka cannot be called a candidate for prime minister if he is so afraid
and intimidated by Hamako.
[C] Each has suffered being on the lowest rung of the ladder. Rokusuke
Tanaka is now showily handling the position of MITI minister, but he has suf-
fered miserably at tfi e lowest rung in order to support the Ohira cabinet
as vice chairman of the Diet Policy Committee when Abe was chairman. So
each has his own suffering.
[B] The reason Miyazawa is not more attractive is that he became minister
while quite young and so he has not experienced the bottom rung.
[C] The-cefore, he has no sympathy from his companions. Takeshita, Abe,
Rokusuke Tanaka, Nakagawa, Watanabe, they a11 have the mutual experience of
_ the bottom rung. Therefore, a mutual feeling of fellowship exists.
[D] The reason Kozaka somehow isn't popular is because he came from the
financial world, and has a mean spirit of not wanting to be a repetition of
Aichiro Fujiyama. On the other hand, if he is in the mood or sp irit to
pour all that financial power into politics, saying it's fine if I am a .
repeat of Fu3iyama, I think he would become more popular because that would
- be transmitted to o~hers. I think there is no hope as long as he plays ten-
_ nis, cruises on yachts and worri~s about having his fortune dwindle.
- [B] As for someone in the New Liberal Club, the reason it is said that
Toshio Yamaguchi, rather than Yohei Kono, has gradually won trust is probably
because there is the feeling about him that he has suffered and scrubbed
floors.
[C] If Tokusaburo Kozaka ~oined the Suzuki faction, a little more could be
done. He ~oined the Tanaka faction even though he is older than Kakuei
Tanaka; isn't that political suicide?
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[B] The li~i,ts o~ hi.s poli,tical sense can he understood when one looks at
the .fact he ~oined the Tanalca #action.
Odds-on Favorite and Competitor in Priine Minister Race
[Question] If you were to buy a pariwutuel ticket in the post-Suzuki prime
- minister race, who would be the odds-on favorite, tfi~ competitor and the
, dark hor~e?
[C] Nikaido and Nakasone, 4 and ~i; Kawamoto and Miyazawa, 1 and 1.
[A] In terms of tfie significance of the post-Suzuki prime minister, it won't
be Rokusuke Tanaka, Nakagawr~ or Abe.
[B] Isn't Fukuda also about 0.5?
_ [C] I don't thi_n_k ~u,
[D] Aside from how long the Suzuki government will last, it will be Nakasone,
- 4; Nikaido, 3; and Kawamoto, 2. The reason Miyazawa is one is because there
- could not be a third generation prime minister from the Kochikai. But if he
became prime minister, I give him a 1 because he would do well.
[Question] What about successive victories and double entries? Far example,
next would be Takeshita.
[G] Then is would be Nikaido and Abe.
_ [A] Nakasone and Takeshita.
[B] I think Nakasone and Abe.
[Question] What about Zenko Suzuki's reelection in November next year?
_ [A] I think that has the strongeat possibility.
= [D] I think so too.
- [Question] If Suzuki should fall, what would be the hurdles besides health
reasons?
[C] If the Tanaka faction leaves him. ~
[QuestionJ Even if he gains no points politically, won't he continue as
long as the Tanaka faction is with him?
- [C] Right.
_ [A] Tanaka won't leave him. For Tanaka, he is the most convenient prime
minister imaginable.
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[D] Now he ~s good ~ox hoth the. Tanalca ~act~on and the Fukuda ~act~.on~
There is a strange sense o~ secuxity i.n tl~t.
[CJ There is another case. Af~ex Suzuki's reelection, Kakuei Tanaka would
be prime ininister. .
[A] He finally appearea: (I,aughter)
[B] That won*t happen.
[CJ If so, thase who have been subjects of our discussions would a11 fly
away.
[A] Kakuei him5elf is not considering sucfi a thing.
[D] What about his real intention?
[C] Only Tanaka knows that. However, because he intends to be active for
another 20 years or so, he would be a splendid post-Suzuki candidate. Right
now he thinks of nothing but having the courts declare him innocent.
[D~ Of course from his perspective, isn't his f2eling one of how do I live
the rest of my life if politics is taken away from me. Actually, it's quite
distressing.
[B] Seein.g him recently, I think he is getting more and more into a fascist
predisposition. Let's do our utmost so that such a person doesn't become
prime minister. (Laughter)
[A] If Suzuki continues another two years, hc,a old wi1Z Kakuei be. ~
[B] 65. He's still young, isn't he?
Zenko Who Made Politics Boring
[C] If Tanaka is reinstated, all the present new leaders would fly away.
Following him, it w~uld be the era of the new "new leaders."
[A] Should Tanaka be made prime minister one more time, the impression of
the new leaders would be that indeed they were negligent and extremely shabby.
[B] In such a case, what would the Nakagawa and Abe group do?
[D] Perhaps split the party.
[C] They aren't capable of such resolution.
~ [D] However, when they tried to form a reformed liberal party, they would
have left if Fukuda had not said, "stop.F'
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FOR ( :
[B ] No ~ they coi~ldn ~ t leave ~
[C] They can't teave, .lapan is a coimtry where Mitsuhide Akechi could not
take over the whole country. One will take power in the end if one waits
- faithfully for his turn within tfi e system. Therefore, Ieyasu Tokugawa took
over the country. There is no one in 2,000 years of history who has seized
political power from outside the system.
[D] What about Nobunaga Oda?
[CJ He took advantage c>f Ashikaga as "shogun." At any rate, insurgents have
all failed.
[BJ It means that the season of uninteresting politics will continue a little
while longer.
[C] One sees that when one reads newspaper articles on politics. There has
perhaps been no time as uninteresting as now.
[D] Yesterday when I went to the Ginza, there was talk of nothing but Motoko
_ Ito. ~
- (A] Politics isn't a topic. When it was a question of whether Tanaka or
rukuda, arguments about the political situation were barbershop talk, but
when it's a question of either Nakasone or Nikaido, it won't even become
a topic of barbershop political talk.
[BJ In the same way, whether it's Abe or Takeshita just won't become a topic.
- [C] On that point, the stars have all disappeared. Since Suzuki, the expec-
tations toward the prime minister have gradually lessened.
[A] Zenko made palitics boring.
[D] It's too bad but everyone supported him.
(C] Nothing is more fiindamentally uninteresting than politics supported by
everyone.
- (R] Since interesting politics lasted for eight years, we are now resting.
(D] We're tired. Tired from the 40 day dispute and the drama of dissolutian.
4Te were too artive for a year.
[A] 9't~e dissolution put a stop to everything. It was thought that ~ust
' couldn't be.�
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' [1;~ Won't ever,yonc~ stzzt to ~et hozed and hegin to gXow zestless again
;,r~und t-t~e .f:~ll ~~f next. ye~x?
COPYRIGHT: The ~hokun 1981 ~
9400
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~c~k ~NF~~ct:~t. t~~r c~nt.ti
POLITICAL AND SOCIOLUGICAL

\
- CABINET RESHUFFLG FOCUS OF POLITICAL ACTIVITIES
' Tokyo THE DAILY YOMLUItI in Lnglisti 2 Nov 81 p 1
[Text]
Actlvitics iii Jap~~n's Poli- bad terms ior muny years, litical vacuum within the
tical world 1re qutckly met at a' Japanese �restau- ruling party.
focusin~; o~i the expected rnnt iri Tokyo. This took One mistake by Suzuki in
cabinet r~stiu[fle toward i,he place while S~izuki ws~s out the cabinet reshuPPle will
~nd oP thl~ ~nonth, now that of the country to attend the endanger his post in the
Lhe ~ovei�nmc~it-proposed North-South summit in next LDP presidential elec-
omniUus aclministxative and Cuncun, Mexico, and touch- tlon scheduled for next flu-
ijscal reform bill h;~s been ed oPP a rumor that the Ta- tumn, the sources said.
upproved by l,he House oP nnka-Fukuda conference The most cruclal points in
Represental.ivcs, inPormed murked u thuw between the the reshufYle involve the
sources said Sui~day. two factions led by them. post of the party secretary-
The cont,roversial Uill on On October 29, Interna- ~~neral, followed bq the two
��htch Suzuki tiatd he would tional Trade axld Industry other party executive posts;
~take his ~~olitical lifc has Minister (MITI? Rokusuke and whether or not Admin-
been the main busi~tess of Tznakn exprPSSed his hope istrative Management A~en-
the presc:~~~. extraordinai�y to remain in the cflbinet cy Director-C3eneral Yasu-
durin a meetin~ of his own hiro Nakasone and Eco-
- Diet session. ~ nomic Planning Agency
To be carried out simul- faction on the ground that Director-General Toshio Ko-
taneously witli the cabinet it woiild help him win poli- moto would remain within
reshuf:le will be a new linc- tical battles in the future. the cabinet, since both Na-
i~p of th.rec key execntives The heuted race for cabi- kasone and Komoto are
of the rulin~;~ Liberal-T~emo- net posts, party executive leaders of the respective !ac-
cr;itic Party iLDP), wliose positions and the premier- tions.
l,rc~ident is Prc mier Suzuk! ship is reSected 1n as many The three executive posts
I~imsclf. ns 75 iund-raiaing partles a~ to be held by the three
Informect sources said scheduled irom now through mainatream faction led by
_ the~re w~re~ ne,~:ly 100 LDP the end of the year for LDP guzukf, Tanaka and Fukuda'
tti~~?i who �~crc quullfied for men. under an agreement already
t.he 20 cnbinet, posts, 1nd As far a~ thc cabinet re- arrived at between these
' t liey were :l Il'C~ICIY IIl il i1C:it- shuPPle is Concerned, it is a factioiis and most other
ed racc for I.hc pn~l.,. "sellers' mnrket," political members of the LDP.
Hesldes, t;~ctlcm leuders oriservers s~ld, giving a~liriost gut once the names of
~rit.htn thr I,DP a~re sl~a{~ing a Pree hand to Premier 8u- individ~aai candidates ior
up ~h~lr tit rutegy tu win zuki, but he must be very Lhe posts are mentioned,
il~c t.DP's ~~residentlul elco- careful ln selecting new there are bound to be con-
~lon which automat.lc:?ll,y cabtnet members. Rlets despite the aacord.
nromis~~s tl~e ~~render's ~~ost. Th1s arises frora the fACt In fact, Fukuda haa al-
�['1~~ c1~~~~Lio~~ !s tic�hed~iled to Lhat 8uzukl's pA4t is aup- ready indicated that the
bc l~eld ln .~utumn 1982. ported by a dellcately bal- poat of the secretary-gen-
't'hcse d~~v~~loprn~~nts R1th- anced all-party aetup which eral ahould go to tactiona
r~rE~ct mom~�nt-w~i oii OcLobcr wae realized following the other thsn tnat o1 Suzuki
.^.3 whr?~ f~~rmcr pre?niers unexpected death of Pormer to avoid unfair rule of the
Kalcu~i Tatiaksti nnd Takeo prime minlater Mas~yoshi party.
I'ukudn, wti~ h~ci Ucen an Oh1rA, which created a po- iJnder the circumstances,
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I~UIt OI~1~1('IAI, l!til~: ON1.1
informed sources said, Su- ed LDP president through
r,uki is considering appoint- the next election."
iiig Executive Board Chair- The Tanaka faction has
man Susumu Nikaido to the been driven into a tight
post, but thls is opposed by corner alter the Pormer
the Fukuda factlon on the wife of Toshio Enomoto,
~round t.hat Nikaido is Ta- Pormer secretnry of Tana-
- naka :s closest nide. ka, recently testifled in the
Suzuki faction members Tokyo District Court that
also op~osc Nik~ido's ap- her ex-husband had receiv-
pointment to the key poat. ed a~500 milllon bribe
They say that t_he coSers Yrom Lockheed Aircraft
- of the party would go under Corporation throu~Y Maru-
Nikaido'~ control, and beni Corporatl~n.
- moreover the next LDP Nevertheless, it is not cer-
= presidential elect,ion ~vould tain if the testimony will
- be run as Tanaka liked. really hurt the Paction in
The 20 members of the the forthcomirig reshuYfle
Suzukl cabinet comprise of the lkey cabinet and par-
- thrcc members each Trom ty posts.
- the Suzuki, Tanakn and Some observers believe
Fukuda Pactions, two each that Tunaka wouid do his
- frum tlie Nakasune and Ko- utmost to increase his fac=
moLo fa~ttons, one trom the tion's inSuence both in the
N:ikagawa faction, three P~rty and the cabinet in
wtio are not afliliated with desperate eftorts to main-
:~ny faction and three tain his prestige.
membe~rs of the IIouse of Indications ulso are that
Counciloi:s. Suzuki 1s expected to re-
The 'I'lnnkr fuctioii, tain both Nakasone and
~;hich has swelled to 105 Komoto within his cabinet
meiiibers, or ttie largest to avoid aiiy unrest within _
amonR the LDP factlons, LS the LDP. ,
crowded w~lth candidates Suzuki then wants to
struggling ta get u ca.binet tour the Middle East and
j~5t. visit Lhe US and China to
The struKgling is so in- strengthen his position be-
ter~se ti~at some Tanaka, fore the LDP presidential
f:iction members have even election, the s0urces sald.
called on tlie Suzuki iac- On Sunday, Komoto was
tion to refrain as much as reported to have decided to
possibe from trying to remain within the Suzuki
secure a cabinet payt, "if cabinet accepting Suzuki's
Suzuki wunts to be reelect- request to this effect.
COT'1'RICI1'[': 'CHE U~ILY YOMIUIZI 1981
CSO: 4120/53
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FOR OI~N'I('lAI. U~E ONI.I'
POLITICAL AND SOCICLOGICAL
CAIiTNET R~SfIUFFLL: WHO WILL n~ P'OREICN MINISTER
Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NEWS in English 3 Oct 81 p 3
[Text] The annual political game ister of internatioaal trade and Egyptian President Anwsr Sa-
of musical chairs gets into full industry. dat.
swing soon and there are four Those who bet on Sonoda A major burdle for him is
_ veteran conservative politi- to stay on the job say he has whether he wins a reeom-
cians already cmerging as Ja- been in his present post for mendation for a Cabinet porta
pan's next possible foreign only a few months+ Svnoda folio from the faction led hy
minister. bunglcd shortly after he re- former Prime Minister Kalcu-
Prime Ministcr Suzuki is ex- placed former Foreign Min- ei Tanaka. "
pectcd to reshuffle his Cabinet ister Masayoshi Ito with a re- But in the final analysis, it's
- after the end of the current mark that a communique did up to Prime Minister Suzuki
extraordinary session of the not meaa a nation's ~oreign to decide who he wanis to
Diet in mid-November. policy. have as his foreiga minister.
The firing and hiring of Diplofnacy , is not Prime, He must make the decision
Cabinet mini~cers is overdue Minister Suzuki's: fv;te~ $,il � e.~~S ~e follnwing into con-
for Suzuki. His predecessors has apecialized' during ttlast ~af ~eration: ~mphasis on policy,
normally reshaped their Cabi- his political caieer In Dehfnd= ' a~~ the foreign minister's
net makeup every 12 months the-scenes give-and-take poli= Post to person for hia service
or so. tical wrangling or in fishery to the ruling party, pick.a man
Suzuki became party presi- affairs, from the point of view of
dent and Prime minister in keeping factional balanCe or
the summer of 1980 following Abe, regarded as a' potea- choose t6e foreign minister to
the untimcly death of Masa- Ual conservative party leader, ~eck foreign service officers.
yoshi Ohira. has not served as fore~gn min- ~noda. and Esaki fit into
Some ministers, notably ~ster. the first cate~ory. They at0
heads of LDP factions, have Sakurauchi is reported to be generally beheved able to
been spared frnm the ax, but interested in getting a"Gabinet, tackle policy matters involving
many men in the 20-member post. Foreign Ministry officials Japsn's � relationa with ` thb
Cabinet barely have survived call him a top political figure United States, South Korea;
more than a year. rich in experience. the Soviet Union and the Mid-
- Foreign Minister Sanao Bureaucrats apparently are dle East.
Sonoda, a World Wac Il.para- more favorable to Sakurauchi Both Sakuraucbi and Abe
troop officcr who was brought than Sonoda, who tends to dis- could be ideal men for ttie
to his prescnt post after his play his strong personalit,yt, )ob if 5uzuki were to pick one
predecessor resigned in pro- Under Sakurauchi, foreign in appreciation for his secvice
tcst in May in a dispute stcm- serv+ce officers believc th~y t0 the party.
ming from the interpretation could reconstcuct the nation's However, if Suzuki were to
of a joint Japan-U.S. com- diplomacy guided by bureau- choose his foreign minister oa
muniyuc, may survivc, ac- crats. thc basis of factional power
cording to rumors flouting in Bsaki is said to be strongly balance, he could not easily
the politic:~l vineyard. interested in getdng back to give it to any one because he
But othc:rti say Sonoda may the "front stage," as he has would have to consider who
face thrce focs-ShintAro Abc, been awaq from any Cabinet gets other key cabinet posta,
chairman of the LDP Policy ministerial post for sometlme. sueh as finance miaister aad
Board, Yoshiu Sakur~~~chi, He recent(y visited th~ MITI minister or threo top
- I~UP secretiiry-gener~! anJ Middle East and flew to Cairo party posts.
Masumi Esnki, u formcr min- following thc assaasination of
COPYRI(:II'C: nsn~ii LVL'NINC NI.WS 1981
CSO: 41.20/53
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t~uk c~rh'ic~~ni. i~tii~ c~ni.~
POI.ITICAL AND SOCIULOGICAL
FUKUDA-TANAKA MEETING REVIEWED
Tokyo THE DAILY YOMIURI in English 30 Oct 81 p 3
[Articlc by Raisuke Honda in "Political Beat" column]
['fc.xt ] The ununuuunced and nnexpected mecL- a~ked Kimura to invite Tanaka and F'u-
ing of forin~~r pri~nc ministcrs Kakuel Ta- kuda to the luneheon. The two uttended
i~:ika ~nd T:~kco Fukuda :?stonlshed thc a party.held last summer in honor of Ki-
~~olitical wnrld, although I,here are good mura.
reasons on both sides to repalr their rup- Apparently with a-view tt playing
tured relations. down the aigni8cance of his tal)Ls_ with
The Tlnuka-Fukttda talks were really n Tanaka, Fukuda was quote& by h1a aides
surprise. 'The tuo have hfid very chilly ss saying: "I accepted Kimura's invits-
relutions :~nd have never met since Ta- ~on only because he toid me thati ~bhere
i~aka resi~;ned as premier under flre for would many attending the luncheon,: ln-.
his "moncy-power politics" in 1974, a1= CIuding Mr Tanaka I was really st~Tpi~Be.d
thou^,h the Tanaka an@ Fukuda factions only iour came to the mee~Sng, ~.b1?~ '~1ip-.
now serve as two separate mainstays of thing important ~wa~ tlle~?iNaed'' ~lt;t:, m~''
the Suzuki government. talks with Mr Tanaka" `
A little more than dozen years ago, Ta- Meanwhile, Tanaku is quoted ss~ saying
r. aka and Fukuda used to be called the he had never been told in . advunce that :
Fukuda would come to the luncheon.
two muin plllars .of the Administration of ~owever, there has been, strong pofltical
the late Eisaku Sato. attention paid to the Tana$a-Fukuda
Tanaka clid much for the long life of ineeting because it came only �a month
the SaCo cabinet through hls services ~efore the reshu8le � pf the Cabinet and
ii~ raislnR political funds for the Llberal- party �llneup scheduled for late, DTovember.
Democratic Party tLDP) flnU handling ~ I,pp Dietman weil informetl of the.
- other party atiairs. . party's interfactional relations' says: "The
Fukudc~, 'for his part, played an impor- meeting was certainly, a great boon to
tant role in helping f~rmulate and imple- Tanaka. To Tanaka, who is woxking all-
ment key policies of the Sato government. out to be reinstated in She polltica,l world
At the end ot the ~ato cabinet in 1972, deapite his current status as defendant in
however, Tanaka :icted contrary to the t~ie Lockheed payoPt trial,~ the taUss with
wishes of the late Suto who wanted Fuku- Fukuda, the strongest critic against Ta-
da to become his successor. naka's `money-power politics,' is certainly
When 'I'anaka ran in the 1972 preatden- a big step forwazd toward that goal:'
tinl election for LDP president and defeat- "Yot~ wonder why Fukuda agreed to
cd Fukud:~, they hucl a bitter falling out. have talks with Tanaka," he continued,
Why, t.l~en, dld tlie t.wo hold these per- "but Fukuda seems to have not yet given
- tion11 tiilks ofl,cr so many ycurs oP en- up the idea of taking the ;eins of govern-
. ,nlty? ment agaln."
I6 ls brlievccl Ll~a~ a senior member of "Ii so, it 1s only natural for Fukuda to
lhe Fukuda fuc~liuu, Mltsuo Setoyama, want to ~eet Tanaka to end their awk-
acted u~ '�(;o-bctwecn" for the Ta,naku- ward relations," +�he Dietman speculated.
- Fukuda rcco�c:iliation talks. Prime Minister Suzuki was reportedly
Accord[r~g to LDP so~irces, Setoyama ar- inPormed oi the Tnnaka-Fukuda taika
ranged thc Lalks between Tanaka and Fu- while in Cancun, Mexlco, Por the summit
kuda over luncl~ at a Japanese restaurant conference of rlch and poor countries.
- i~c:tir th~~ Dict building last Friday with Suzuki reportedly kept his composure
for?ncr Defc~nse Agenry dlrector-generul when hearing the news, saying only, "That
Tokutarn ioreign af- earty date.
iairs. [here is no chanc2 u( From the ~~ie~~poin[ of Ja-
Sonoda t~in~; ret~3ined. par. s relattons w~ith other coun-
(lu~cever. ~unodx enJuys the L^;es. two changes [oreign
spr~�i;il rur.tidence ot Prmle ministers u~ithin the space of
~lin~>ter ~uzuk? and is there- one ~~ear would be undesfrable.
[orc hupetul that the prime S~n~xia has ixen in the post
minlstcr ~cill continue to treat for onlv a little more than half
him t~vorabl~~. .1t the time ot a vear, and in [his sen~e it
the intraparty disputc aimed ��ouid be proper to re[ain him.
at 1'orcin~; the withdra~w~al oi ~ iie had :ormerly served a
Prlme ~linister Takc~ ~Ifki in tw~o-vear [erm as foreign min-
19;h. 5onoda and ~uzuki [ought isteri. However, it cannot be
side h~~ s~de in aliiance ~.cith 5u- denied [hat his statements
sum~~ ~ik~i~fo. nuw~ ch~irman o~~er the past six months ha~~e
uf ihc LI~P'~ Exccuu~~e Coun- raised many doubts as to his
cil 1'hr~~ ~~nn lhc ~1a)~. .~nd the.~ sultabllity.
~liki ('ahinet ~~as I~ircC~1 lu C~~
- si~n at !h< oth
APter the Soviet invasion oP Aighanistan, countries. 'This. latt~r group says that if
the Japanese Governmer.i fr~~~.e 1~1gh=1e~~I the ~oviet edu~ation mfnistcr a'trlVecl iii
uPficial exchanges of personnel with the ~ Japgri .with ��a' speclftC Visz, 'the 'Bovlet
Sovfet Union As part of its sanctione union woulii Y}a~e t,~een;-able ..ta�.�p~ve the
Ap'.,Q1I1SL LI1F1L t:uu;;try. SnRs:.~u:.:1 ~Ks ' aa,~ t....
Vw�ty tUC` iilgit-level BRCil+iil~c5 a'iiI wac r.rao3.i
~oviet troops still occupy Afghanlstati, the' oi that and that JAyan, too, should�b~eware .
.?apnnese Governme~nt cannot totally lfYt oi the U8' and Weat~Europe's positiVC con-
- the sanctlons. Ii the government lssues a '"t&dCa _with MoaCOpt. �
alplomntic vlsa for Prokofyev, talke be- The eltuatlOn,. ~,s�. complica~ed; by ~ the
tween him ar;d membcrs of the Japmnese ~ Yioatlle attitude o1 many.Liberat-Deii4ocrats
cnbinet will have Lo be urranqed, s.nd tY:e;~ and tYie unfavarable attftude , of t~'orsign.
rhis will be taken :~.g easlnR of the sanc- ;y~inistry officials :~toward So~nocia, w~o.. Ls
tiona. congidered an advocate , oY pro~o~fon, oi
The Sovtet Union probably intended to ' frl~ndsHip,with tt~e 8qviet U~ilcln.� Sonoda
flncl a wny to makc Jupfln lif~ its �sanctione w~nt~,oh'record sayln~ : tha~,. ttie ~,gos~l�ot
agatnst the Soviets. The Sovict Union says ~~pari.e$p mplomacy !s to ,pre,vent, ~)se ;UB
that Sonoda and C3romyko ~ig*eed to pro- and the'9oviet �,ynlQ[i;Srom, gofng;.#,o ,war.
mote Japnn-Soviet guvernmcr,t-level con- At the' $lttle o1.�~1e ~T,,C~pneral,~,~lesembly,

_ tacts. The 8oviet (3overnmen', is~ued diplo- he me'b'(~4oi~yko, and U8 8ecretary.of IBtiate
24
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i N�oK ~N~N�ic~~n~. u~i~: ur~~.v
Alexander Haig separately, :~n~ e~iber,- re- .
Lurning to Tokyo, he claimed, he ha~: seFv-
ed as a mediator .betweejn the two super-
powers. ~ ~ ~ �
Adminlstrative Me~nagement , Age~pCY Iii-
rector-C3eneral Yaeuhiro Nakaaor~e. crltlc~z-
ed 8onoda's forelgrt pqlicy,-:~b~r~'~t�;aa,i.~d,
~t a meeting oi -..the Liqera'~�Democr~tic
membera of the Tqkyo ~Q~t~qpoUtaan As-
_ aembly on October.e Z~, ; bhAt' ; 3apaA; .~v~ch
dependa on the U6 for its natidr:~l,~~ecur~y,
could not hope, to serve as. +.a t~iediRior
between the UB ansl the po4ler; t~,Ripn: ,
Sonoda and �Nakaaoise have , al!~,ya been
on bad terms.. Sonoda ~~was :griHed. bq . his
ioes in the Ilberal~Democratic;Par,t}n (3.~P)
u~ a~oint session o! sve L�DP pommibtees
on foreign, aecus~ity ,and obhea ;aSairs
Thursday for. h1s alip oi tongue on. J~~Sn's
iorelgn relations. , . ~
To Bonoda, ~ who i~ undeT a croaeflss of
- censures, the Pbreign Mintstry ie ,aold.
Mninetream ofriclals of the Pbreigm Min~
i~try attach top lmportance to JapatY�UB
. relations, and are worried about 8onods'a
pollcy. There is a atrong ' m~ood atnong
them to conslder 8onoda ah "invader" be-
cause Sonoda assumed the:past oi foretgn
mtnlster succeeding Mssayo~hi~ Ito, who
resiqned by assuming reaponsitafllty Sor the
Japnn-US ~oint statement.
Will Sonodu be able to remaln in the
cabinet as forelgn miniate: ovezcoming
such a bitter �mood againati' ~itr!? ' it de-
penda on Prime Ministbr 8u~uk1'e �~udg-
ment alone. The future of J'apanLSoviet
ielatiuns hinges on whether 8onoda re-
_ mains in the post or not.
COPYRIGHT: THC t)AILY YOMIURI 1981
CSO: 4120/53
25
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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
~ SOCIALIST PARTY CONVENTION PREPARATIONS UNDERWAY
Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NEWS in English 4 Nov 81 p 7
[Editorial: "JSP Conventiun"]
[Text] The Japan Soci~list Party has' started pceparing foT its
national convcntion in February 1982. It has drAwn up a draft
for the revision o~ "The Road to 5ociallsm in Japan," which
h;u hithcrto been a party platform in all but nad~e: 7tiis' 3r8ft~
which was drawn up after ledgthy debate, will be subtnitt~d, to'
the convention. There are also moves tn hold an el~ction of
the party cliairman, in which all the party members will parti-
cipate, prior to the convention.
The draft for the revision of "The . Road to Socialism"
takes an unprecedentedly realistic vIew of �the domestic and
_ internutional scenes, and is ckarly designed to eatablish a new~
coursc: for the 1980s, a course that' is far more realistic than� the
onc established 15 years ago by "The Road to Socialiatn:' Let
us look at the changes in the party's appraisal of 'the existing.
situation and at the steps it intends to't~ke to cop~ with this�
- situation. ' .
For instance. it recognizes the trends toward the mulri-
polarization and diversification of international relations sind'
shows signs ot trying to escape from .thf simple formula of
East-Wcst canfrontation. It also statee that pmblems with
regard to democracy are common to the soeialist countries and.
that this springs from political immaturity. In, the drive to
reform [he existing situation, t~e party, according to the draft,
will not restrict itself tv opposing the C~overnment'e policies,
but will encourngc thc fouadation of a democratic social~st state
by means of greater patticipation in papulac mov.emente; �
But in the process of arriving at this draf~, thera remein
siispicions about just how much debate there wus concerning
the implications of developments' fn Afghanistan and Poland.
In addition, despitc the fact that Uhe intellectuals who prepared
the draft had taken as broad a point o! view as posslble, it
scems that, when thc draft wus presented for diacuasion by the
party, the rightists and left9sts merel}~ bickered oVer it in terms
of their own narrow views.
In this de6ate, the main theme, which concerned the
socialist vision of the future, was carried over as a study theme
until tho end of 1982. Henceforth, .debt?te shauld not be con-
- fincd to rhe party; it is important that !he iaterest of Ohe general
public should be aroused. t' ~
26
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:t~
lfiis debate will he greatly affected bq the JSP's system
of lcadership, and the ability of its leaders. Since these factors `
are connected with the course the party takes, it is' only natural
- that there sho~ild be interest both inside and outside the party
concerning who will lead the party.
Recent~ly, there have been a series of pr~blems that� havc
- exposed the weakness of Asukata's leadership. , In additioa to
the waverings with respact to the `�`administrative. reform Diet"
and the split in the JSP's Tokyo Chapter, there is the lack of
consistency concerning the action policy for the U~per House
nadonal constitueacy electivn in 1983. Tht.pntty.Iei~dPxs firs~
decided on a policy of dividing the oon5tituency by iegion so
that candidatPs would get votes principally from the regions to
which they are assigned. In the face of strong opposition from
' ttie labor tinions, however, it seems that the leadera are now in-
clined to retain to somo extent the present formuta, by which
c:indidates get votes from labor unions.
7'he rightist factions wilhin the party, which' are dissatis~ed
with the present confused situation, are thinking of setting un
_ a candidate to oppose Asttkata. But observers within the party,
and particularly the letl~~t'g9etions that intend .to .continue .sup- .
pocting Asukata, believe that ehese moves are aimad eventually
at winning the post of secretary-general for. the'iight, and not
the chairmanship. If this is true, the factional politickir.g that
has been endemic ;n the party 1~as cleariy not been laid to rest.
'Perhaps the sclection of party leaden by maatte of com-
promises reached between factions cannot be hel.ped. But there
- is no serious debate in the JSP concerning what system of
leadcrship is needed so that the long decline in the party's
- strength can be arrested. It is only these fact3onel transactions
that are noticeable.
- "Che party should take a look a~ the changes in the environ-
- mcnt surrounding the party. In view of the laboi federations'
_ moves to form a unified front, the ciection pf S~e'JSP'.lesders
wi11 have greater significance than ever.
An clection in whlCh; ~ACtional considerali~as .are ~wltawed
too much play will create grudges att~l wilt futtheT re8uce the
energy of thc party. The party should consider a run-off vote
in an election in which all the party members participate. This
wulild be appreciated by the genera] public. (Nov. 2) ~
C;~t'YRICIi'I': ASAHI LVLNING NFWS 1981
CSO: 4120/53
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i
1
- i
- MILITARY
_ ;
I
;
~
~
JAPAN SUPERPOWER STRATEGY ANALYZED I
~ ~
- Tokyo THE DAILY YOMIURI in English 19,20,22,23,24,25,26,27,29,30,31 Oct 81 ;
~ [11-Part article by Ryochi Nishijima, Akira Saito, Tatou Takahama, Kozo Kumura, I
K~ichi Hamazaki and Yasuo Suzuki: "Japan and Superpower Strategy"] i
i
- [19 Oct 81 p 1] ~
- [Text] ASDF Must Destroy 30 Percent of Invading Enemy Aircraft ~
Tl~ere has been great They are in two-plane for- The~e were the assump-
upheaval in the .world, cen- mations. Take oS imme- tions on which the ABDF
tering on the Middle Fast, cilately and intercept." carried out a one-week com= i
nnd President Reagan ap- 8quadrons of flghters, al- prehensive exercise begin-
parentl,y wants to cope wil;h ready on atandby !n the air ning October 3. '
the situation wlth u display over the base, Sew north, A total oY 550 planes plus '
uf force. This has brought followed immediately ; bq 48,000 members of the ABDF
about a certain amount of F4EJs and ~'104Js on stand- were mobilized in the ex-
ucrimony from the 5oviet by on the grbund. ercise which was conducted
LTniun and other European An defenae mobilization also on the assttmption that
nations. order had only been issued the Us could not hel~ Japan
- dapan, too, has been pres- in the aft~rnoon of the pre- because it needed its planes
sured tu increase its defense vious dsy and the ABL~k+' was for op6rations in other
capubility and this hns pre- ttot fully prepared ior ac- areas. ' '
5ented the country with a tion. Japan's alr space is
number of difficult prob- goon the invading planes guarded by 28~rada~r statSons
- lems. were reported to have at- ~:cross the c,ountry, which
This is the flrst of n series tacked 10 radai aites in Hok- are linked to seven ASDF
in which The Yomiuri 5him- gaido and the Tohoku d1s- air bases, six Nike and eight
I~un will review JaPan's de- trlct in northern Honshu, Hawk ground-to-air ,nnissile
fcnse r~robletns as objeci,iv~- ~,nd then ground-to-air mis- unlts. There are a total oi
ly as possible.--Eaitor. sile bases. near the Chitose about 300 interceptors at the
* * * nnd Misawa air be~ses. . seven air bases. '
Ti]f Ti"ac~3ii1C, ~::':.j::itti~l~
- ro:u ot jet flghter p?2nes Another repol~t said that In tne froni une, guarding I
- ient the air at the Alr Selt- about three o! the ABDF northern Japan,, is the 8ec- i
Dcfcnsc Force tA6llP'? basc interceptora had been dam- ond' WlnB $tatfo7n~d at Clii- ~
aL ChU.ose, Hokknido, tn the aged and the nuinber of tose Air 8ase ' With 40 ~et
~�;u�]y mornlu~ of October e. damaged planes wuas increas- flghters, aomprising F104Js ~
An ordPr cxme du~vu from ing. ' nnd F4Es.
t l~e~ Northern , Alr D~~fense Thirty minutes later, a "A flghl',er-bomber sta- i
?1e~adquarLers in Niisawn, second wave of irivading tioned at a base in 8iberia's
.lumori-k~~i, whi~h com- l.~lanes-about the same Maritime Provlnce would
m:~nds lhe Second `"in~; ~t.:i- number ~s before--arrived, taka only about 20 minutes
tiot:cd a~ Chitose Alr R~se: meaning that the in�ading to cross the Japan Sea and
~~Morc thnn 40 ~~lunes of lorces had completely suc- this puts us under a great
;ni unldcnttfied i~ul�lonuitty ceeded in mounting a sur- strain, safd Ma~ C~en Tada-
,~ro ~tippro2chinR Wak!ctinal ~,rtse attack. yoshi Yoriekawa, commander ;
- ;i~ld Tobei,gu r?~d'~r altes. ' oP the.wlrig.
28
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Lt-Col Kyoji SiigishiLa, 44, leaves open the question of
commander of Lhe 302nd What, we earnestly hope is
5quadron of F4EJs, and Lt how Japan can e~ectiv~ly to cut. off a limb from the
Col Shingo Shiraide, 41, counter them. Sovlet Air Force in the F'ar
commander of t.he 203rd "The main question is- East. To enable us to fight
- .s',quadron of F104Js, both how aiany 8oviet planes t~he Soviets on an equal
~tressed, "We can't af~ord to cnrrying bombs are eapable footing, ~ the government
be defeated." of flying tio Jupan?" staPP must rebuild Japan's de-
Tlle air base was built 25 p~Cers remarked. fense capability within tiie
_ years ago anci pllnes st.a- "A maxlmum oP 800 of framework of the Japan-.
tloued there scrambled for Lhese planes would probably US security setup."
have tlus capability and 400 t1e exercise was a ar-
tlie 2,OOOth time last July pp
9. Tt appeared that the of them,� would be deployed .e~n y. d'esigned to determine
pilots at the air base were ~n a' liaiited invasion;' they Yiow lang the ASDF would
haunted by thc~u~hts of So- Said. be able tp maintain !ts lorce
vlet planes because .till ~ he �'In order to thwart their 'in order to . shoot ~down 30
scrambles have been caused pians," the staS' offieere percent of'a11`~uvading a.ir-
by Soviet airesaft. said, "we have to infltet as Craf~.
'~Tliere are vcry PPw case:; much dsmage as poesible carrieQ out , bn ;,b~e
of single-scated flghter on the invading planes at aseumption that ..$t~ar~se
lunes flying ovcr the Ja- the vety outset oP the con- g~ack was moun;tCd: after
P the~ IIS Air ~prce ad with-
pa,n Sea," sftid Yoneknwa. flict.
"We must shoot down at dra~an all its ai~ ~t irom
He snid 3oviet plunes tiy- least 30 percent oP the 80= JaAan to fiqht lt~t: f r npeTE~-
= in~ over the Japan Sea are viet planes in the flrst and tions elsewhere.
electronic reconnals5ancz second waves of an inva- IP the hypothet c~1: Wax
planes such :is TU16s and sion to mmke the Bovlets ArolongEd,' t. A13DF
TU95s as well zs IL38s de- ~bandon their invasion ~ouid suffer fl'om lack of
signed to collect informa- plans. staqing poWe,r einc it has
tion. They make an aver- �~Japan alone is incapa- only 300: inteTCeptor at its
age 220 Sights a Year ble of destroying all So- � disP~aI.
around Japan, lie added. viet military aircraft sta- ' Nevert~heleas, tlie recent
The Soviet Union main- tioned in the Far Eas~ Change ih the inf~ernati0nal
tains 2,210 aircraft in thc situatioa B~paxentlv com-
Far East reRion and this pelled the. ASDF to carry
out the exerdse. .
[20 Oct 81 p 1]
['I'ext] U.S. L'xp~cts Japan To Play Significant Role in War
The weather wus glorlous toward ths Philippines� vla
with the mercury hovering UYinawa,, ' ~
around 30 degrees cen- ~pst ~very: minu'ue,: the
ii~rade. It was still suinmer plant's captain, ; Lt - Qmdr
- in ~icl~iuwu t~nu ,;:.p:.;'~ riitu8kl S~tjli:l, '~OUld TiSpe'G
southwestern sea-lune wns annparicetiients � to the ~ir-
zs congested as the matn craft'B 12:, other crew mem-
~~a~~~ a~~~o~ in Tnkvn. tw.a.a ..w~1~ oa .'~.'R'ralvht.wr~
At 10.30 am, the O-owaehi, abont 3,000' mete~s, to ata~l
P2J antlsubmurine recon- board . ahead". or "Two
nlissance pir.ite of the Fifth freightere on the port side."
Air Wing oY the Maritlme Look'_ng down at� the sea
5elf-Defense Force (MSDF) . froat th~ spotter's seat in
Irfl Naha Alrport heading tha lore aection o1 t~e plane,
: outhwest. the watar was crowded with
Malntatning nn altitude of a large n~pmber o1 Japanette
cmiy 300 ~ietera ansl ciuis- frelghtars, t~nkers and tish-
1n~ 1t 250 kilometera, per ing bouts. The Shic}iari; a 2.~
huur, the plnr.e was seaa'ch- 9~~~-tpn Chknese surv~y ~ehip,
in~ far submarines sxlong wxs e'.eo r0e,ming ai~ounl4r
t he sea-lune that stretchee `;4P courae. it wilt not ,be
trom Jnpan's maln lsian~~s un ~~as~?- task Lo ~rotect ~ Rll
- ~9
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of them from enemy sub- The simulated esercfae },pg, Typ~ap}~_type nucle~T
marines in case of wnr; ' said ended wit;h ~ the captain dC-, g~p~rtne, ''Itiese ; actioris
Petty OfRcer 2nd Class HS- claring that the e~nii~i have ' grea,t~,q enhanCe,�
toshi Haraguchi who wns in aubmarlne had been' d~eat= $ov~et riaval~`power,
charge of weapons. royed. ~~~et i~ni :has a~o
Surveillance and identifi- The water belo~v ,tl#e 're' ~ ~~~ee~ed ,A1pha t;~c
cution of the ships below co~naissance piane~-~ppar-
were not the principal tasks ed peacefuT btit it` ~a9 nl~ar cleetrrpoW4xed at k,~,%~
of the aircraft. �Its inain this sea-lahe that tlis. .~'a= ~arines : tle~gited ~;to ~~te
- mission was antisubmarine panese 2reighter Ni~o and.de~:rog~ir8 ~sabma~.
a~ariare in which it hnd to Maru was annk on .Apx :.9 Urider the alrcums~ance~;
- locate, chase and destroy by the U8 POlsrla-t the ~II8 ~ is .being forced to ,
snbmarines with torpedoes. s~bmarine C3eorge Wa $~p uP its e8orta to
On lts return flight irom ton. The C3eorge Wae~i# : s~engt~en ita , eubmarine
deterr t capability.
?~4iyako Island, a flying dis- ton was loaded ~aith' ge~- ~
tance of 70 minutes irom lau~ched ba]]istic nnia8l~,es, ~ In the case of Japan, the
Oktnawa, it was announced: (SLBM) at the tinla paJ aAtisubmarine recon-
- "An enemy sub is passing In anothex incident; .~Y7rA` ~~~~e~'k~4~'a~~'~~~"'
through the area below." gutted,.a .6oviet sub ~ ~ " uled to be repfaced i"rom be-
This heralded the start of near ~OklliaWa in Aii t cember. by thC mofCe efl'ielent
~ ~ . . . ~ � ,
n slmulated antiaubmarine last year. . ~,s
~varfare exercise. The Qeprge W88111tigtOri 1~,~ ~ J~ r~,~ ">'~e' l~DF
The plane dropped smoke was being remodeIed , into ~~~'e L~Pplitb~,~ r~~,rlq
candles to demarcate the an attaek aub~,,lrtYae ,.at, ~ 8peoia1 ~o1nt Japan-US
urea where the enemy sub- Pearl ?iartior w~en ~ exercises o8 Kauai, one of
marine was aupposed to be resporfdtmt visiEbd ~ tp
,~~~;~qtb~ the Hawe,ilan Islanda, with
cruising. marine base op''~,hb"''~VS the, A~m, oi tralning the
~ ~-t., ~ F;�' ct'evdtf~tn, �ot the 'planes ir~
Then sonobuoys, which Forces PacifIc. s,
are used to detect under- Capt Williani $~t~;st~ ~1~e::t~$~ ~t,l~oming torpedbe�.
water sounds and transmit base commanders ,[~1iTti b}~ ei~xcises sy~t#~tr,e
them by radio, were all Polaz'!s IlS~BB~,~e �,t ' '~1l~ ~~:~aC'E �~11~~'; the. U~ "eR-
launched since the radlr been unloaded fY~my,:.:' l~dte J~psri to ~la~ a ~t~
Y
system aboard the recon- aubm~lrfne.,for the, u~eitwi; er tole~ 14i: 'any 91c~
' naissance plane was incapa- ing, � aB~Ht ~the 8ovlet{ nion'~
ble of detecting the pre- Other~ stibmarlnes~. at,:~'~ i ~ e~
Lhere= is~ a~. high ` ~ ;
sence of a submerged sub- base were' two Lp~'A~'?g tion oY ~osttet aubni~? in �
mnrine. type nuclear-powexgd'~e ~ ttie.beus~~,round J&p~ ~r
Crewmen aboard the including the O~laha, �dtid "
piane tried to deduce from the Patrick I#enry, vq$lcfi It ,ie' ''therefore ~apl~rent
the data provided by the carries poseidon. misslles. tha~t ia~t!'s defenee Gl~~;~he
sonobuoys and recorded hy Recently the ~OViet~ U~ Q1i oeel-~es ls nOt'on~ t,o~~qFb-
a computer the direction, deploye~1 loa ;~n e~- ~teot Japaueae shi~e bu~' 8~~so
_ speed and depth of the sub- mount~d~M1i~~.8~ to~;R}ay e~~~lgnitlaant role in .
marine. This wus needed in air~ '!'J nucle~r~ wa~riare
~ ~y:~ ~1~~
beYore homin~ torpedoes Sea ui". " ~ x~r~t involvfrig ~he LYB. ~
could be launched. launctYe~l~ ~ il~ea, '
30
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[22 Oct 81 p 1]
[Text] 'Chobetsu' Checks All Communications for Military Data
"Attention: Suriace-to-air ken), Miho (Tottori-ken),
missile spotted at 4 o'clock, TachitirAi (Fukuoka-ken)
uimed at this plane." and on Kikaigashima island
_ The US Defense Depart- in the Amami Islands. The
ment announced at 7 pm on Higashi = Chitose station
Ai~gust 20 (8 am August 27 maintains branch atat~on
Japan Timel that a missile in Wakka~nai and Nemuro,
had been flred at a US Air both in ~Iiokkaido. '
Force SR7 strateglc recon- 8ome of these sEations are
naissance plane whlle lt was responsible for monitoring
Pying near the Korean the., $pvl,et i'lnion wh11e the
Peninsula. The plane was rest Ypcus on China, North
not hit and returned safely Korea or other countries.
to base. ' Cttotietsu, which is based
"O~ir information gather- at CiSDF's regional head-
ing s,ystem is capable oP quarters in Iehigaya, Tokyo,
picking up these develop- hsa a wor]tfoiCe of 1,100.
menLS," DeYense Agency 8eventy percerit oP these
of~lcials said without ela- perbonnel are aeaigned tb
boration. regional stations or
� The system referred to is hranches, which operate on
a unlt of the C3round Self- a round-the-clock basis.
Defense Force (C3SDF) call- The intelligence personnel
ed "Chobetsu," un abbrevia- either monitor tranamis~lons
tion for "Chosa-Besshitsu." wlth e$t~hones or eoam ra-
Chosn-Besshltsu (literully dur dCxeen~.'� They are ex-
- a brunch for intelltgence) tremeiq proScient SA toreign
belongs to the 2nd Intelli- langua~es. ,
genc~e Sectton of the Intelli- All lniormatloh collected
- gence Depzrtment of the at these stations ia sent to
_ C3~round Staff Office. the headquarters at Ichiga-
Chobetsu has two mis- ya and thoroughly analyzed.
sions. One is to assess the For instance, the Miho
- military situation in neigh- station, located near Miho
boring countries by analyz- Air Base of the Air SeIP-
ing radio messages monitor- DePense FOrce (ASDF), is
ed in Jzipan und the other used exclusiveiy for areas
is to intercept und analyze covering the Korean Penin-
the rudlo cummunications sula. �
of atrcraYt, warships and The atation features a cir-
other vessels as well as mic- culur antenna with a total
rowave transmtsstona to de- of 36 steel toaiers, each 98
termine what military acti- meters tali, forming a cir-
yif.l~~.e :~re nndFrway in theae clp 150 meterr in dismeteT.
counCrics. Nicknamed a "cage Por
Thc Chobetsu section elephants," it has been in
matntains monitoring sta- use since . 1979. Employing
tioi~s at Higast~!-Chitose th0 moet advanced electro-
lHokkaido), K~tunato (Nii- nic apparatus and techni-
- qatn-ken i. Ohi (3aitama- ques, the station !s reported-
ly c9,pable of collecting all
information transmltted by
radlo.
A stmilar facility Ls main-
tuined at Higashi-Chitose to
monltor 8ovlet rsdio com-
31
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munications. The method employed in~
A greaL deal of classifled monitoring. the Slno-Viet-
information passes through namese dispute is also ap-
the Defense Agency's� hands Qlled to the Soviet Union
but Chobetsu's operations and North Kore~.
are considered top secret. The call number oi $oviet
- Outsiders are strlctly prohi- troopa stationed in the F'ar
bited from entering Chobe- Esst, areas where they are
tsu's regtonal or branch deployed, exercises and co~-
stations and not a single rnunications are closely
piece of lnformation gather- monitored daq and night.
ed by the unit is disclosed $nusual developments or
to unauthorized persons. suspension ~ of these com-
It might even be a viola- munications are always
tion of regulations even to closely examined to deter-
mention � that Chobetsu is mine whether or not an
engaged in gathering vari- emergency has arisen.
ous kinds of informution. Nonmilitary communica-
However, it was Chobetsu tiona, such as on railway
that must accurately pre- services and the daily life
dicted the start of flghttng oi the people, are also con-
on the Sino-Vletnsntese bor- aidered lmportant since they
der on February 17, 19'79. might indicate changes in
Chobetsu knew most o4 the milltary aituation. .
the "call numbers" ot ASDF pIanes also coIlect
Chinesc Alr Force units and inform&tion with the use bf
!t realized that, beginnfng in radar, .
Janulry 1979, these call Changea. ~h ireight ahlp-
~ numbers were being used men~s betv~een 'the 8o~itet
more often 1n southern Util,on atld Vietnam ~,~d .
China near the Vletnam betweet!' th'e 9ovlet. ittiion�
border. and Nor~$; I~oree are, mdinl-
tored � thro h, 'bbserba-
It wns alerted by the fact
that 700 Chinese planes, in- tlona" by . A~I6?~'iqmb; Beli-De-
cluding MiQ17s, MlC319s and renae 8'o~ee .(MaDF.) ship~.
the air force's treasured P'9s, A fQitii~i';~bexense^;Agei~ay , �
were in the area. Alr Sorce director,~gerieral said the.tn~~
untts had also been moved pori'~1at~on being eo~leCted
from the Sino-Soviet border couid not be i~ore c0lripiet~ ,
arca. or sec~irate and a-lnilitary
Based on this information satellite would have to be
Chobetsu concluded that employed to improve. on'it:
China had resoived to start However, `!1 the informa=
a war with Vietnam. Ten tion collected , by Chobetsu
days later. China delivered and otl~er' defense lorCe
what it ca]led a military utuLa ~ is not comparzd w:~h
"lesson" agalnst Vietnam. diplomatic and .politieal ' in-
Thts was one oi Chobe- iormation gathered by other
aonnnlnr I+ mldht at1nA ~~r~
tsu's maior achievemenis e~~�~~~ -ro--- ~r
and reportedly surprlsed the ae a wasted ePtort.
US.
32
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[23 Uct 81 p 1]
[Text] Washington Mesmerized by 'Threat' From Soviet Union
The Council on Forei~;n In a recent treatise, Ken- ~
Relations, which is housed "The people gradually
in an old three-story build- nan writes that during' the realized there was a 8oviet
- ing un 68th Street in New Aast SO years misunder- threat and this led to the
York, came into existence standing and mutual dis- inauguration, 01 the present
~0 years ago and prides it- trust between the Ui3 and administration. In this
F the Soviet Union never grew sense the Sovi~t threat ex-
se1. on being one of the Lo such un extent that both
most authoritative organs isted long before the pre-
- countrles had to pour all sent administration came
on foreign a~airs in the their energies into xrtilitary into being," a State De-
US. af~airs.
However, the so-culled partment o~lcial said.
"Soviet threut" has greatly It is not only Kennan that ~ important indication
influenced the council's way holds thAt oplnion.. Paul of President R,eagan's at-
of thinking. Wurnke, iormer dlrector of titude toward the Soviet
A typical example of this the Arms Control and Di3-
armament Agency, and Union is the fact that Pau2
in8uence was the compil~- Frank Church, former chatr-. Nitze, chie! negotiator for
tion of a booklet entitled man of the Senate Foreign the European nuclear arms
'~The Soviet Challenge" that Relations Committee, believe control talks scheduled to
a~as issued by the council that U3-8oviet coexiatence begin in , Geneva November
last May. depends on a resumption of 30, and Eugene Rostow,
Compiled after the sub- the 6trategic Arms Limita- director of the Arms Control
iect matter had been thor- tlon Talks (BALT). and DisarmAment Agency,
oughly dtscussed by the g~lt their voices are are both leading members
c~uncll's 14 members, in- droamed by the daily vocl- of the Present Danger
cluding former State De- terous clamor over the "So- Comanittee that came into
partment adviser Helmut vi~t threat." existence with Team B as
Sonnefeldt, the bobklet cov- ~ecretary oi Deiense Caa- the main promoter.
ers the "Soviet threat" ar Weinberger~ virtual~y The ter~n "Carterism" is
theory as iY it were in line p often heard in Washington.
with public opinion. makes it a rule to mentton ~though there is soma
the 9oviet threat in .the
One oP the most interest- difYerence in nuance, the
same context as the ~i111-
ing facts f~bout the book- term generally seems to
let, however, is that three tary expanaion oY the Nazis. mean "timid or cowardly"
"doves" left the council ~ust "The Soviet Un1on is be- toward the 9oviet Unlon.
before it appearecl. They having in the same manner The US wili pour huge
were George KenT~an, for- as the Axis Powers of Cier- sums of money into arma-
mer ambassndor t