JPRS ID: 10134 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/ 10134
23 November 198 ~
i~lorth Africa Re ort
N e~ r E~st p
CFOUO 43/81)
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JPRS L/~0134
_ 23 November 1981
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
(FOUO 43/81)
CONTENTS
s
EGYPT
Speculations on Ftiiture Political Scene After al-Sadat~s .
Assassination
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 16-22 Oct 81) 1
IRAN
- Khomeyni Fana~icism Seen Hastening Doom
(Abou Sameh; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 11~ Sep 81) 6
LIBYA
~ Former IJiplomat Accuses Regime of Misrepres~xitation
(~Abd-al-Salam 'Ali 'l~ylah Inte.rview; AL-WATAN AI,-~ARABI,
l~-10 Sep 81) 10
MOROCCO
5tatus of Opposition Examined
(Siradiou Diallo; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 7 Oct 81) 13
SAUDI AR.ABI.A
Egypt's Ghurbal Says No Break in Saudi Contacts
- (REUTER, 1 Nov 81) 17
TUNISIA
Opposition Leader Assesses Domestic Politics
(Ibrahim Tobal; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 12-25 Oct 81) 18
_ a_ (III - NE & A- 121 FOUO]
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EGYPT
SPECULATIONS ON FUTURE POLITICAL SCENE AFTER AL-SADAT'S ASSASSINATION
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI iil Arabic No 244, 16-22 Oct 81 ~p 34-38
[Article: "The West Created Him, and the West Laid Him to Rzst; Egypt Wants
To Forget"]
- [Text] The moments that stood betweer~ Anwar al-Sadat and life were the
actual celebration of the 6th of October anniversary. Those moments were
tantamount to "a ne~�~ crossing" for the Egyptian arm}~ which has begun
revealing its innermost secrets.
4Jhat are the questions that Egypt, the Arab world and the whole world are
facirig af~er dl-Sadat's departure from the scene? How will Egypt's new
presider_t, Husni Mubarak, handle what he inherited? Who are the heirs to
al-Sadat's regime? What changes are looming on the horizon?
~ AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI which has closely followed recent developments in
Egypt--in recent months we followed them hourly--and observed them from
inside the country and abroad, is opening today the Egyptian file from the
first crossing to the new crossing. It is trying to answer the questions
that are being raised by means of conducting a historical inquiry also
thraugh a series of articles. The title of the first installment in the
series is "Made by al-Sadat: Who Was with Him and Who Was against Him?"
The Egyptian event deserves more than a few pages devoted to it in a single
issue. We will rer_urn to it in future issues.
~ He was buried quietly.
It were as though Egypt wanted to forget him quickly.
Cold sweat poured down [the bodies] of senior officials who had gone to
Cairo t~ take part ii~ his funeral. Police security measures were more than
alarming.
The foreign guests who had come [to Cairo] to pay their last respects to
their former ally did not dare accompany him to his final resting place.
Tf~e distance that separated the procession from the burial site was less
than 1 kilometer. Nevertheless, they di.d not dare accompany him.
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'Che funeral was a western, military fw~eral. It was by no means a popular,
Egyptian, Arab tuneral. It began at 11:15 a.m. on Saturday with a brief
prayer 5ervice at the mosque of al-Ma'adi hospital before the body was
~ake~~ away ~from the hospital], and it ended with six military men and six
- civilians carrying the coffin on their shoulders to its final resting
place. Husni Mubarak, the new Egyptian president was among those men.
A1-Sadat's son, Jamal, as well as his in-laws and close relatives attended
the tuneral. Near the hospital, on oiie of the banks of the Nile, a few
teary-eyed meii and women were seen. Were they weeping for the man who had
' departed, or were they weeping for Egypt which wasted years of iT_s history
following a mirage?
Ttie cofFin was carried to a military ambulance and then to a helicopter
which carried it to al-Nasr Cit;~ where al-Sadat had been shot and where
he was buried. The city was built by Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir, al-Sadat's former
companion in the revolution, whose memory he had tried to obliterate during
the years of his administration. From the helicopter the body, wrapped in
the Egyptian flag, was carried to a military Jeep which proceeded slowly to
the site of the ceremony while six officers carrying the late president's
medals marched in front of a horse-drawn caisson.
In a question-filled atmosphere [mourners marched] to the beat of military
music which was followed by a funereal tune (Chopin's symphony). Jamal
Anwar al-Sadat, Husni Mubarak, "the heirs" to al-Sadat's legacy and Sudan's
president Ja'far Numayri marched in the funeral. Numayri walked directly
behind Mubarak. In the second row [behind them] French President Francois
N,itterand, conspicuously surrounded by bodyguar.ds walked amidst a large
grou;~ of mourners. Beside him was Menahem Begin who was surrounded by body-
- guards also.
On the same platform, wh?re a few days earlier the stunning operation had
been carried out, officials sat under the eagle of the Egyptiun Revolution.
Husni riubarak stepped forward to offer his condolences to the late presi-
dent's widow, who broke into tears. Her three daughters and al-Sadat's
sister were attending to her.
Everyth.ing took place amidst security measures that turned al-Nasr City
into an iron city which only Egyptians who had passes could penetrate.
Thousands ot policemen in their white uniforms were lined up to prevent
any "violation" and to observe pvery action that took place nearby or at a
dista~~ce. Meanwhile, hundreds of people gathered at a distu::Cey far. fr.om
- the barricades set up by the security forces.
A military band saluted the late president while Jihan al-Sadat was heard
sobbing loudly. A 21-gun salute proclaimed the death of a man and the end
of an era.
.IUUI'11d115CS counted eight heads ot state who came to mourn the president.
Among them were the heads of state of France, West Germany, Italy, Ireland,
Liberia and Sudan. The King of Belgium and the Duke of Luxembourg were
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there also. Among the heads of government who attended were Chancellor
Helmut Schmidt of West Germany, Calvo Sotelo of Spain, Menahem Begin of
Israel, Falldin of Sweden and Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore. Mrs Simone Weil,
chairperson of the European Council; Gaston Thorn, the chairman of the
_ European Commitree; and another number of European officials also attended
the funeral. It was the U.S. delegation that stood out among other delega-
tions because of the number of people in it. It included three former presi-
dents: Jimmy Carter, Richard Nixan and Gerald Ford. In addition, Henry
Kissinger, "the godfather" came to the funeral too.
What Will Happet~ Now?
After the Egyptian president was buried, all of Egypt, all the Arabs, in
fact, the whole world ~aas asking t:~e question, what will happen now?
The question is primarily an Egyptian question. Al-Sadat's legacy is a
burdei~some one. The Egyptian-al-Sadat experience had yielded, even before
the man was laid to rest, scores of dead and wounded and several hundred
new prisoners who were arrested in Asyut. In the meantime, all Egyptians
were seized by uncertainty over their feelings, beginning with officials
and including rh~ military establishment and the "heirs" themselves.
In answering the questio�, what will happen now, attention turned first to
Husni Mubarak whose "fate" brought him to the top of the power structure
atter members of the al-Sadat regime itself who had been vying for power
[dropped out of the race] one right after the other. 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman
dropped out; then Mansur Hasan dropped out; and then al-Sadat was over-
thrown and Mubarak remained in the forefront, ready to assume respon-
sibility for the period of transition.
Creatiiig an image of the period of transition with the possible surprises
it may bri.ng can be confined to making a few points, which in turn remain
subject to any shakeup.
--Aii announced Egyptian commitment to pursue the course which al-Sadat
pursued so as ta preserve "the gains" of Camp David with regard to the
evacuation of Sinai next Aprii. This commitment with which Mubarak inaugu-
rated his term in front of Washington and Tel Aviv was linked to the state
of emergency in Egypt; to the state of alert in the Sixth Fleet in the
east Mediterranean; to the joint militar.y rn~:.r:auvers that are to take place
suon; and to an invitation for M~barak himself to visit the United States
so he can be tested once agai.n. In addition, Mubarak was invited to visit
Israel which he has not yet visited.
Iilside the couiltry the new president is expected to make a series ot
decisions th~t will require first and foremost broad changes and reorganiza-
tion at the top of the military establishment. In this regard it is pos-
sible to imagine changes that will include the principal leaders, beginning
with Field Marshal Abu Ghazalah, the minister of defense; the director
of militar.y intelligence; and senior military leaders in the various corps
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of the army. The military figure who is a candidate to succeed Abu Ghazalah
[as minister ot defense] is Maj Gen Muhammad Nabih, present chief of
operations.
It has been noticed so far that Mubarak still appears to exercise almost
total control over the armed forces. However, he did not wish to start his
term by using the armed forces in operations to curb the violence that
Egypt had been experiencing in more than one city and one area. These acts
- oE violence neaked in the incidents of Asyut. Then the~e was an attempt to
seize the home of the minister of interior, al-Nabawi Isma'il and to hold
him as a political hostage in return for the release of detainees.
Mubarak's concern for not mobilizing the armed forces to confront the domes-
tic violence is principally due to his fear that these forces with their
various inclinations may join each other in solidarity and turn against the
regime. This is a state of lack of confidence in which the regime must
tread softly, in the aftermath of the shots that were fired on the 6th of
October.
If the Egyptian armed forces will see this radical cllange in their leader-
ship in the r.ext few days, the police, on the contrary, c�rill not be sub-
- jected to any changes t.o speak of. This is not because al-Nabawi Isma'il
rushed to declare his allegiance to Husni Mubarak in the first moments that
Followed the assassinatio~~ of al-Sadat, but rather because tl~e police
agency in particular has been prepared for years fo~ [operations] to curb
demestic unrest. For many months the police have proven their competence in
repressing secret and public religious and political organizations. The
police also proved their competence in pursuing the leaders of the oppo-
sition.
--Speaking of the opposition, al-Sadat's assassination and the reper-
cussions of that event will result in keeping detained Egyptian opposition
� leaders in prison for a long period of time where they will stay without
trial or hope of being released next April, which is the date that al-Sadat
had set for opening their files after he would have completed the Sinai
negotiations.
Since the activities of the Egyptian opposition parties (the Labor party
- and the Grouping party) are presently suspended, and the Liberal party has
declared its loyalty to Husni Mubarak, this situation will remain unchanged
for at least the next 6 months. The ruling party (the National Democratic
party), which nominated Mubarak for the presidency, remains tl-~e only politi-
- cal force on the domestic scene which is taking action without being
r,hecked. Mubarak is supposed to take action next spring to change the party
leaders whom he had no hand in appointing, sucli as Kamal aZ-Shadhli, the
secretary general of the party, who was appointed by Mrs Jihan al-Sadat;
Fikri Makram 'Ibayd; and Hilmi 'Abd-al-'Akhar. Mubarak knows a great deal
about the suspect deals and the operations in which they were involved as
middlemen.
--Regarding the "working team" which can assist the president, the name
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of Sayyid Mar'i is being proposed as that of the man who will more likely
head the new government if Mubarak does not want to keep that respo~~si-
bility for himself. 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman could have been a candidate had
it not bee~1 for the fact that his name is tied to the impoverishing "open-
door policy" which al-Sadat pursued. No change is expected in the presi-
dency of the People's Assembly [now held by] Dr 5ufi Abu Talib or in the
presidency of the Advisory Council [now held by] Dr Subhi 'Abd-al-Karim.
Both men are proteges of the First Lady; they were her professors at the
- university.
" Mubarak's desire to cooperate with Abu Talib and with 'Abd-al-Karim in
particular is ciue to the same rea~on that forces him to seek the aid of
Sayyid Mar'i in the next era. He wants to give evidence that he has not
d~viated from al-Sadat's policy and has not gotten rid of his men. He is
doing so to reduce the intensity of the struggle in the upper echelons of
power.
Ck~ief among the new names that are likely "to shine" in Mubarak's new
administratioi~ iG Maj Gen Sha'ban, Husni Mubarak's office manager. He is
a candidate for one of the sensitive positions in the cabinet. Another
candidate is Usamah al-?~az, present undersecretary of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, and a close [associate] of Mubarak. He is a candidate for
the position of minister of Eoreign affairs. [Another candidate] is Safwat
al-Sharif who is expected to assume the position of minister of infor-
mation, considering that he is first and foremost a constant friend.
Copyright: 1981 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI
8592
CSO: 4504/52
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IRAN
iS~iOMEYIVI FANATICIS~1 SEIIV HASTENING DOOM
Paris A~'RIQUE-ASIE in French No 248 14 Sep 81 pp 30-31
jrticle by Abo~i Sameh: "The Regime's Death Knell"
~ext7 Khomeyni has chosen to lean on a feudal-minded cler-
gy. I'rom this will spring the inevitable confrontation in
which the Iranian revolution will know those on its side,
a~id will reject those who cling to a medieval ideology.
A death struggle is henceforth clearly joined between the absolutist and
backward regime of Khomeyni and the opposition, which has shifted from self-
- defense to the offensive. There are serious indications that the Tehran
regime has set out on the path which must lead to its downfall. The at-
tempt which cost the lives of President P~aja'i and Prime Minister Bahomar
attests to the determination and strength of those who wish to have done
with a regime built on imposture.
UJithin a few weeks, "Islamic courts" have officially ordered the execution
of over 90Q persons, most of them OMPI ~ranian Kha1q Mojahedin Organiza-
tion7 militants.
This wave of legalized assassinations indicates bath the terrorist ideology
which animates the ftzndamPntalist clergy, and their distress.. The new minister
of justice Nlohamrned Ashghari has described those courts as "effective ins-
truments." He has declared to the r.ew~paper ETTAI,AAT that he plans to in-
tegrate the courts into his ministry. From the viewpoint of the present
leaders, th.at would lend more legality to the summary executions which
invariably follo~,r the quick parodies of trials given those arrested--in
certain cases after simple denunciation without proof.
Khomeyni, for his part, is content to multiply speeches in which such terms
as "saboteur," "counter-revolutionary," "hypocrite," etc., serve to desig-
nate a11 those who in fact oppose the unleashing of terror. Thus, in the
speech made at his residence on 22 August to a delegation of police offi-
cers, he asked that "the whole population mobilize against them." Raising
to highest pitch the frenzied fanaticism he represents, he has e~ca~tad;~t~o
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tiie rank of "heroine" a motkier who, having handed over her son to the Is-
lamic courts for being a marxist-leninist, was filmed for television with
her son just beiore he faced the firing squad. The viewers, aghast, saw
her saf to the youth o� 20: "You ceased to be my son when you left the path
of Islam, the path that leads to God, and I thanked God when I learned that
you wer�e to Ue executed! "
LTnder what pr~essures, threats, or blackmail was she led to bless her son's
agony? Sorneday, no doubt, history will tell us.
Fa.naticism
"lde are 36 million Raja~i~~ was the slogan chorused by demonstrators gathered
by the Islamic Republic Party for the mourning ceremony held at Tehran uni-
versity 1 September.
That fanaticized mob, alas! recalls that the disinherited people of Iran
has been canditioned over centuries by an idealizing and medieva? image of
Islam, and thai; today it is continually invited to regenerate the revolu-
tion with its blood, and to "raise up martyrs." It is virtually hypnotized
b~~ that appeal, which prevents it from becoming aware of the true facts in-
fluencing its daily life. To attain the kingdom of God on eaxth, the be-
liever, so galvanized, must then accept, as does the "Soul of God"--for that
is the me~siing of Khomeyni's given name, Ruhollah --that the country be en--
gizlf ed in a sea of blood.
We are thus witnessing the undoing--conscious or not--of a revolution un-
leashed in the last quarter century, by recourse to a Shiite ritual exalted
by tendencies nursed since the Middle Ages in the imagination of a people
doomed to misery, illiteracy, injustice, and the cruelest of despotisms.
Bani Sadr, a son of that people, has indeed tried to rise above those back-
tiaard trends, and--as feUr others have done--to set forth the problem, in his
books, in terms of opposition between "imperialism, on the one hand, and
;roung developing nations on the other.'' He was the first to pay for Khomey-
ni's fana~icism.
Bani Sadr particularly tr~ied to explain how the American superpower and its
allies have sought, through militarization of third-world countries, a solu-
tion to their structural economic crisis, so true is it that arms deliveries
to countries--oil producing or not--such as Iran under the Shah, or Saudi
Arabia a~ at present, is the only possible means of absorbing the oil income
of t!iose countries and rtiaximizing the power of the multinationals which dic-
- tate their will to other thiid-world countries and influence their economic
poJ.icie~.
The true Iranian revolution has never been the work of Ayatollah Khomeyni,
for. the masses vre"11 and truly rose up againsc an order at once royal and
imperial, which was always denounced not only by Bani Sadr, but also by an
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opposition very active since ~963. At tha~ time clarr.desti.ne organizations--
Khalq Fedayin and Moja.hedin, and dissident groups of t~e communist Tudeh
party rebelling against its "bureaucratic militantism," and known as the
Nationalist Progressive Nlovement, created conditions necessary for eff'ective
mobilization of the masses, the intellectizals, and the urban petty bourgeoi-
JZ.E �
The "White Revolution" of the Shah, decided on in the early 1960's under the
pretext of introducing technology and modernizing socio-economic structures,
meanwhile aggr�avated the condition of Iran's economic and industrial struc-
tui~es. The country had by therl become the Middle Eastern relay point for
the products of the multinationals. It has therebx been placed under the
direct management of the American military-industrial complex.
Ttie first consequence was destruction of the structures of the mercantile
lower middle class encompassed by the Bazaar, whose traditions go back to
the 1'Ith century, and whi.ch was traditionally ].in4ced to the parallel author-
ity imposed by t~ie ayatollahs ae early as the Middle Ages. The latter in-
deed derived all their power from taxes paid by Bazaar merchants. Tn addi-
tion to the tenth oi his income which all Moslems must pay into the Islamic
treasury, the Bazaar merchants cor.tributed. a fifth of theirs. This had set
izp the Shiite clergy as a veritable parallel institution. They had their
say in everything, from teaching in villages and towns to marriages and the
varied dealings arising fro~n the social life of most of the forsaken of this
world in Iran. The ayatollah even made Qom a rival capital to Tehran.
But the "White Revolution," by clearing the way for as: Iranian capitalism
dependent on the American multinationals, and by tra.nsforming the army into
an adjunct of the 6th Fleet with the intention of providing "the Gulf's
policeman" with the most sophistic~ted equipment, has been the source of a
social mutation fatal for the clergy. The merchants and people of the towns--
ruined, disinte~rated, and unable to compete with the products of the Amer-
ican metropolis--had no choice, short of rallying to their traditional aya-
tollahs, but to join the underground. In this way the resistance, in which
the Mojahedir have become preponderant because they have linked Islamic
p~inciples of socia.l justice to the necessary struggle for national inde-
pendence, has found among workers, peasants, and small merchants 1:housands
of allies and partisans.
Recover,y
Caught off ~uard, tlie Shiite clergy from that moment made the tactical
choice of allyin~ itself wi~h the revolutionaries. But until Khomeyni's
- arrival in Tehran, all mass demonstrations were truly revolutionary actions
~~rhose Islamic character, owing to Irar,'s culture, wGs tY;eir most striking
aspect. I-Iowever, from the moment of Ayatollah Taleghani's assassination--
and 'ne had served as the link between the traditional clergy and the revolu-
tionary movement, being on that account known as "the Red"--the die was cast.
Khomeyni chose to lean not on the popular revolution but on the members of
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a ieudal mir.ded cler~y. To tliat end he used his spiritual authority to re-
captuz�e the explosive subjectivity of the masses in revolt--most of them
illite7�ate--and to set up a dominant and dictatorial political party.
From t'rtat morner~t, the split took on the aspect of a conflict between revolu-
tion and r�eaction. It could only degenerate into the ruthless confrontation
which we now see. There is no doubt that in such conditions the Iranian re-
volution will know how to identify its friends, and reject those who cling
hopelessly to ~ !~edieval ideology.
COPY~.IGHT; 1951 Afrique-Asie
6~ 45
Cso: 46~9/5
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LIBYA
FOR~IER DIPLOh]AT ~CCUSES REGIME OF MISREPRESENTATION
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI iii Arabic No 238, 4-10 Sep 31 p 37
( Interview with 'E1bd-al-Salam 'Ali 'Aylah; date and place not specified:
"(,fashinhton Remains the Libyan Regime's Primary Economic Partner"]
[Text] 'Abd-aL-Salam 'A1i 'Aylah, former charge d'affaires at the Libyan
embassy in India is considered today one of the most active Eigures in
the Libyan opposition abroad. Following the announcement of the Libyan-
Soutn Yemen-Ethiopian treaty and after the two Libyan airplanes were shot
- down over the Gulf oE Sidra ~ae interviewed him about the dif.ficulties of
the Libyan regime and the opposition's reactions to Che new factors on the
sc.ene.
~Questi.on] ~dhat i.s the Libyan opposition's evaluation of the trilateral
treaty between Tripoli, Aden and Addis Ababa, and what are the effects of
that treaty on exisCing conditions in the Red Sea area?
[Answer] The conclusion of the trilateral treaty between Tripoli, Ade n
- and Addis Ababa aftirms the tact that the Libyan regime is involved in
the Soviet Union's pl~i~ in the Arab region. The prinr.ipal motive behind
this complicity with the Soviet Union is to hide the internal crises th at
al-Qadhdhafi's ~;roup is bein~ exposed to in governmei~t. A1-Qadhdhati and
h i s people hav~ t~een dr~ii nin~ the Libyan treasury, squanderin~ the
cuuntry's funds abroad and upsetting the status quo in the region in th e
interests of the Soviet Union.
_ [Ques[ion] Some ~�festern political cir.cles are saying that the treaty was
a respanse .to challenges Erom Washington and that the confrontation in the
air over the Gulf of Sidra may have been one episode in a lengthy serie s oE
[such] episodes.
- [Answer] This analysis [uf the situati.on] i~ tantamount to "verbal fra ud."
'rhe United States is the Li.byan regime's primary economic partner. This is
_ confirmed by oi1 sales tu Washington, by the freedom of U.S. firms working
in Libya and by the profits that are reaped and amass`d in foreign bank
not ~o mention those that are used in areas that benefit the Libyan peo ple.
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And here I wonder, how can the power of America be affected by small
countries like South Yemen, Ethi.opia and Libya? When the rulers [of such
nations] become i.nvolved in a strategy that goes beyond their modest capa-
bilities, they are gambling with the future of peaceful nations. Who told
. al-Qadhdhafi that the Libyan people want tu become involved in blood baths
- in which innocent people lose their lives to serve the interzsts of Soviet
imperialism? The incident of the ai.rplanes in the Gulf of Sidra is actually
no mare than an operation to distract the Libyan people.
Simplified Strategy
[Question] Ar~b diplomatic sources are saying that the Libyan president
has gi.ven up on the effectiveness of the Steadfastness and Confrontation
countri.es and that he decided to expand the "strategic compass" towards
Addi.s Ababa? Wliat do you think oE that?
- [Answer] This ~;eo-political perspective is as far as it can be from the
culunel's mind and Erom his ability to distinguish between what is white
a�d what is bLack in Middle East alliances. His strategy may be summarized
in selling the oil of his country to the United States of America,
receiving its price in hard currency and then turning to the Soviet Union
and purchasing From it complete arsenals of weapons for which he pays cash
because Moscow accepts only c.ash payments in hard currency. Then he
_ recruits slcinny African mercenaries in the army anc' sends them to the
Western Sahara, to Lebanon and to moderate Arab countries. Thus all the
variuus interpretations advanced by some analysts to add a few cosmetic
touches to the colonel's practices become invalid. To affirm the extem-
poraneous and affected nature of the trilateral treaty, let me ask, what
was the magic tool that enabled Aden, Tripoli and Addis Ababa to overcome
their thorny disputes with regard to the Eritrean questi.on? It is known
tha~ Addis Ababa never made a truce with the Eritreans despite its oppres-
sive attitude. The fact of the matter is that the Libyan president once
- a~;ai� i~nored all his ubligations, covered up all the existing problems on
t.he e~~rth and c~pened the treasury of the Libyan people to Mengi.sLu
Haile-Mlriam su he ~..an stand un his feet again. And here ~oo we hear the
o~d wurn-out tune about the treaty being the outcome of an awareness of the
serious nature of Ethiopia's location on the western shores of the Straits
oi Bab al-Mandab and an awareness of Ethiopia's new role in driving away
imperialism and i.ts influence in Africa. This is gross misrepresentation
and a serious obfuscation of facts and events.
~~~uestion] [It's been said that] the Libyail opposition has only one pers-
pective on things: it focuses on the regime's faults and ignores the fact
that Libya is a small country whose population does nor exceed 3 million.
The Libyans have turned themselves into a strong army, well armed and well
prepared. , '
[Anscaer] This scatement is one of the false statements promoted by the
spolcesmen of the Libyan regime to cover up the regime's domestic crisis and
to silence those who speak against the [ongoing] process of impoverishing
and starving ~he Libyan people. The Libyan people are living in a vacuum of
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economic and social sta~ldards. Furthermore, the number of illiterate people
in the ranks ot the population is growing. This is a deliberate objective
pursued by the regime to keep people unaware of its numerous flaws. In the
meantime al-Qadhdhafi empties his pockets to more than 100 organizations
and ~gencies in Beirut that receive monthly allowances from him. Is there
a tr.ansgression greater [hnn that of eliminating the opposition abroad out
of fear of them ai~d their continued efforts to reveal the truth?
- ~Question] Are you not afraid of being eliminated? There are numerous
precedents in this regard.
[~nswer,I I am not afraid of death. My guiding principle is to expose this
regime, and my death wculd be Eor the sake of the people I love. I ask
that they be sp~ired from the gli.ttering revolu~ionary slogans.
CopYright: 1981 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI
8~92
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MOROCCO
STATUS OF OPPOSITION EXAMINED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1083, 7 Oct 81 pp 20-22
[Article by Siradiou Diallo: "Morocco: In the Kingdom of the Un.expected"]
[Text] Morocco has not been spared far from it by the economic crisis affect-
ing nearly all the nonoil-producing countries of the Third World. Unemployment and
shortages, combined with a deafening refrain of labels, gave rise, in the Moroccan
kingdom, to the June riots, which were mercilessly put down. Trials and sentences
- decided upon and handed down in the shadows caught even the most s2asoned observers
off gaard. Such was the case of the trial of five members of the Political Bureau
of the USFP (Socialist Union of Popular rorces), which resulted, on 24 September
in Rabat, in the ~entencing of three of them, including party leader Abderrahim
Bouabid (JELi~TE AFRIQUE, No 1082), to a year in prison without possibility of parole.
Assuming that the time of pardon and oblivion is not, in spite of everything, so
far off, as some whisper, sunny days nevertheless do not appear to be right ahead.
Hundreds of political and trade union militants, members of supporters of the USFPy
are still ~:~rading before the courts, if not already sentenced to long terms in
Casablanca and the main provincial capitals.
And yet, in the midst of this wave of repression, it is less the arbitrariness than
_ freedom that strikes the observer used to the political mores in Africa in the
southern Sahara. Absolutely! The astonishment is first of all m:~nifested in the
court, where both attorneys and the accused make use of a freedom of tone, style
and n:anners which, apart from Senegal, has disappeared from the tropical scene at
the same time as tne colonial helmet and the white.uniforms of the cercles com-
manders.
Furthermore, the relatives, friends and militants authorized to attend the sessions
do not hesitate to express their opinions noisily. At the trial of Bouabid and his
. friends, their supporters massed in the courtroom applauded every speech by the
socialist leader, while nearly 200 lawyers from all the bar associations of Morocco
were anxious, dressed in their robes, not to conceal their szvere disapproval of
this "trial of opinion."
The same freedom can be seen, it would appear, in the opposition press. AL-BAYANE,
the daily newspaper of the PPS (Party of Progress and Socialism, communist) harshly
criticized the official policy and even challenges the government. During .the
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trial of the leaders of the USFP, that newspaper published the statements of
- Bouabid before his judges and numerous accounts of solidarity. In one of its
editorials signed by Ali Yata, secretary general of the PPS and a figure in the
international communist movement, it went so far as to state that "acquittal is
absolutely essential."
Bst while that ideologically advanced newspaper is free, the USFP press itself has
been banned since the blondy riots in Casablanca in June: "We are journalists re-
duced to unemployment because of the will of the people," explained.the colleagues
~ of AL-MOHARRIR (daily in Arabic) and LIB~RATION (weekly in French), with a humor
that in no way quite the contrary alters their m'ilitant convictions. Cur-
iously enough, while the newspapers are "arresteds" the journalists themselves
circulate "freely" (except for Karchaoui, editor of AL-MOHARRIR, arrested follow-
ing the 20 June riuts). 'They can even express themselves elsewhere, I was told by
one source close to the government, for everything here is as if it were not so
much the agents as the media that were to blame:
Moreover, while freedom of information is watched and limited depending on the '
whims and oreoccupations of the sovereign, freedom of speech is total. In the of-
fices, factories and on the jobs, civil servants and workers neither whisper nor
checlc their discontent. It is not rare for supporters and adversaries of the
government to come to blows over arguments, without fear of being called in for
questioning.
At home, whether they be amo~g friends or in the presence of a foreign visitor,
Moroccan intellectuals spend hours analyzing and criticizing the decisions of the
government, without fear of consequences. Evenings in Agdal, the residential
area of Rabat where most of the leaders of the USFP live, have nothing to envy of
the Latin Quarter. Lacking the Parisian cafes, the~comfortable salons of the
fillas and the apartments pro~~ide a framework, mint tca and tangerines at the same
type of encounters. Not only do they endlessly discuss the burning issues of the
day, but they weigh and analyze the men in government, going over their slightest
deeds ~nd gestures with a fine-toothed comb.
Nor are the leaders of the other African countries spared. How much is Nyerere
worth? What does Nigeria want? Bour~guiba is�a great statesman! Let's talk about
tiouphouet-Boigny. But the only one on whom there is unanimity in these circles
of freedom is undeniably Leopold Sedar Senghor. After listening to my col.leagues,
_ I believe that I better understand the love that the poet president feels for
Morocco, the first country wher.e he went aftcr he voluntarily gave up his office.
He 'cnows or undoubtedly feels that it is the only country in Africa where both
the government and the opposition have unbounded admiration for him. Paradoxes
Elourish here and at every turn of the road. While a police officer constantly
watches the headquarters of the USFP in the Agdal district, while plain-clothes
men are permanently camped in the cafe across the street, even having, it is said,
an apartment in the next building, members and visitors come and go freely, without
paying the slightest attention to the surveillance.
~~rhat is more, while with the sentencing of five out of the eight members of the
Political Bureau, the USFP was decapitated, its cadres still fre~ nevertheless
continue their feverish activity. They meet, debate and decide. They probably
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bring ir~~reased vigilance down u~on themselves. They keep the party machine in
operation, maintain the necessary connections with members and receive journalists.
They even sit on the terrace of the Hilton or the Tour Hassan in the company of
- representatives of the foreign press, warning their interlocutor about a given
customer sitting nearty, saying in the most relaxed manner: "He is a cop that
our movement knows, but what do you expect? He has to earn a living."
Nor does the government harbor any particular animosity toward the opposition.
While hiding behind the infallibility of His Majesty and while constantly referring
to quotes from some royal speech, the speaker admits with good grace the worth of
such and such a member of rhe oppositi.on. However, "they are not realistic,"
one hears. "They have to understand that they can't have the moon," we were told
by one high official, irritated by criticisms of the spiraling prices in recent
_ months.
Another minister told us that lle was not only surprised, but sincerely pained by
the sentencing of Bouabid and his friends. "Abderrahim is a good person and very
respectable," the minister continued. "Unfortunately, he let his troops drag him
too far. I hope that ir? the future, he will manage not to let himself go so much.
Furthermore, I am convinced that with his great goodness, His Majesty will not
be long in granting a pardon so that Abderrahim will regain his freedom, because
prison is not the place for a man like him."
In other words, the break between the government and the opposition does not seem
- to have reached the point of no return. "Of course, we are not far from the irre-
parable," admits Fathallah Oualalou, USFP deputy from Rabat and professor of
economics. "But," he hastens to point out, "we shall explore every possible way
to safeguard and, if possible,~consolidate the democratic experiment." We heard
the same language from Radi Abdelouahed, head of the sccialist parliamentary group
in the Chamber of Deputies, whom we asked whether his comrades.and he would resume
their place in Parliament for the session beginning on 9 October.
We know that the USFP, which has 14 deputies and which was opposed to the extension
of the legislature ratified by th.e 30 May .1980 ~eferendum, had threatened to boycott
the Chamber.
In that case, Hassan II replied, that group would declare its own illegality. "No
decision on our withdrawal from Farliament has yet been made," Radi told us, then
added: "In any case., we shall do everything to safeguard the democratic experime;,.t,,
of whose benefits and limitations we are well aware."
All Moroccans agree that this democratic experiment must be pursued, even if they
believe that it resembles a fragile plant that deserves to be protected and watered
with love and.delicscy. Naturally, government and opposition disagree on the nature
and content of democracy. The former believes that it is above all the expression
of the goodness and greatness of the sovereign, who was in no way forced to promote
it. The latter thinks that democracy quite naturally stems from the evolution of
_ the country and more particularly, from the struggles that preceded and hastened
independence.
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This difference i.n analyses and sensitivities naturally gives rise to different
forms of conduct, but everyone defends the democratic experiment. "It is something
deeply anchored in the spirit of our fellow countrymen," said Mahjoubi Aherdan,
minister of state in charge of posts, telegraph and telephones and declared cham-
pion of the Berber cause. "Democracy is in keeping with the spirit of tolerance
and openness that characterizes the Moroccan people," Dey Ould Sidi Baba, president
of the Chamber of Deputies, told us in his slow and barely audible voice.
Government and opposition ar.e also side by side in defending the sovereignty of the
kingdo~n. They also seem resolved to prevent Morocco from being cut off from any
part of its historic territory. All look as if they had been burned alive as soon
as the delicate problem of the Sahara is broupht up. �
The rloroccans believe that their country i_s the victim of a true conspiracy aimed
at gradually dismembering it, a conspiracy at the heart of which is Algeria, now
the scapegoat of all the evils afflicting Morocco. "Just look at the map of
Africa," says Aherdan, "and you will see that by swallowing up Moroccan terr'itory,
Algeria is like a pregnant woman."
Calmer but equally convinced, Dey Ould Sidi Baba, who looks more like an old retired
teacher than a political leader, uses pedagogy to show us the grounds for the Moroc-
can position on ~he Sahara. Opening a Larousse dictionary published in 1923, he
_ shows us a map of Morocco indicating that the kingdom, whose area is now 660,000
square k:i_lometers, had 800,000 at the time! He explains that Morocco was eaten
away by France and Spain. It is that philosophy, inherited from the colonial era,
Dey Quld Sidi Baba says, which pus'nes Algeria to act as it does. And, he concludes
- peremptorily, "We sha12 not let any more be taken away from us by anyone."
One USFP leader and not the least important one states that "the pro-Algerian
tenciancy of the French PS reflects both a mercantile spirit oil and gas oblige
and the guilt complex from which every French person suffers regarding independent
Algeria." Going further, he said that even in the supporC it gave the USFP at
the time oF the recent trials c~E members of its leadership, the French PS acted in.
an "offhand and irresponsible manner," demanding the release of Bouabid and his
friends. "The FrencY: have no right to demand anything from Morocco because our
countr~,~ is an independent, sovereign state!" '
It is an astonishing kingdom where, despite the controversies between the govern-
ment and the opposition, everyone joins together in a bloc as soon as it is a
question of the essential thing: the nation and its institutions. It is true that
Morocco is one of the few nations on the African continent which, having survived
the colonial intrusion, has remained faithful for 13 centuries to its monarchic
foundations, with pride but without excessive chauvinism because Rabat is without
a doubt the Afri.can capital whose streets bear the greatest number of names of
countries, heroes and martyrs on the continent.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981
11,464
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SAUDI ARABIA
EGYPT'S GHURBAL SAYS NO BREAK IN SAUDI CONTACTS
. JN011428 London REUTER in English 1315 GMT 1 Nov 81
[Text] Beirut, 1 Nov (REUTER)--Contacts between Egypt and Saudi Arabia have never
stopped despite the severance of relations betwesn Riyadh and Cairo, the Egyptian
ambassador to Washington said in an interview publ.ished tnday.
Ambassador Ashra Ghurbal told the Beirut weekly magazine MONDAY MORNING: "Let
me say that contacts between us and our Saudi brothers have never stopped. We
have had continuous contacts at all time." He declined to give details.
Saudi Arabia, along with most other Arab states, cut off ties with Egypt in 1978
because of the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement.
Asked about prospects for a rapprochement between Egypt and Saud~. Arabia following
the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat, Mr Ghurbal said he thought the
"misunderstanding" by the Saudi and other Arabs of Egypt's intentions was now
- beginning to clear up< "I look forward to that relationship being strengthened
continuously," he added.
The Saudi press has called on the Arabs not to force new Egyptian President Husni
Mubara~: into abrogating the peace accord wtth Israel and has said he should be
given a 1-year period of grace to set the Egyptian house in order.
Mr Ghurbal also told MONDAY MORNING he did not believe the tension between Egypt
and Libya and between Sudan and Libya would develop into an all-out war.
"We hope that (Libyan leader r1u'ammar) al-Qadhdhafi will see the light and simmer
down in his policy and his action," he said.
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TUNISIA
OPPOSITION LEADER ASSESSES DOMESTIC POLITICS
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 250, 12-25 Oct S1 pp 29-31
[Article by Ibrahim Tobal: "Bourguibism at an Impasse"]
[Text] [Text] In this article, Ibrahim Tobal, leader of the Tunisian Na-
tional Opposition Movement (MONT), a prestigious figure in the entire
Tunisian national movement and the author of numerous works and stu-
dies on his country, examines the regime's achievements and presents
to progressives in his country proposals that might serve as a basis
for a revolutionary alternative to Bourguibism, which is re~ected by.
the people as a whole.
At all times and in all places, the old palace formulas are definitely the only
responses that the Destourian regime in Tunisia is still capable of providing for
the economic, political, moral and cultural crisis through which Tunisian society
is passing. The king, queen and their courtisans amuse themselves and their
gallery, for whom only life at court counts.
As a result, the deeds and gestures of First Lady Wassila Bourguiba are the bases
for the analyses of commentators on national political life and diplomatic reporters
who spend most of their time on the lookout for his slightest movements, watching
over her meetings and receptions in order to learn who is now in favor and who has
lost that spot. She knows this and since she has more than one card in her hand,
she orchestrates scenarios of imaginary power only to destroy them immediately and
spreads the most unlii::ely rumors the better to deny them later. Finally, she
occupies the scene and the pack of social-climbing courtisans, while her husband
reigns and governs with the same arrogant scorn for his lauders, the same faith in
his star and the same vigorous subtle and selective repression aimed at his adver-
saries.
Bourguiba's facetious remarks and enigmatic phrases now take the place of "orienta-
tions," which are pompously reproduced as such in the headlines of.newspapers. If
he should wish to snap his fingers at the world and prove that his health is back
to normal, he shows off with a"vigorous dive" in his private swimming pool at the
Skanes Palace before television camex_as, like Mao crossing the Yangtze River or...
Idi Amin taking a bath fully cloted, under the amused (and gently mocking) eye
of his guests. This is vulgar childishness and outward serenity for idle tourists
who bring government down to the level of a circus, where the audience vies with
him in absurdity.
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This is the ~aay the government goes, while the drama of an inevitable succession
= continues, pitting, not the regime's cliques and clans against one another, but
all of the people against that same regime established by violence.
Lverything From Sourguiba
The so-called iactional struggles that one witnesses daily and those of which
nothing is seen actually serve only to veil the total paralysis of the government
in each of its component parts and taken as a whole, with the blockage stemming
from a political system imposed on the Tunisian people over 25 years ago.
The last cangress of the Neo Destourian Party, made to order for the new prime min-
. ister, Mohamed M'Zali, aimed to kill two birds with one stone: first of all, mak-
ing people forget another congress held 2 years earlier, a congress that confirmed
- th~ action of Hedi Nouira, whose 10 years in power ended with two blood baths (Jan-
uary 1978 and Januar}~ 1980); and giving M'Zali and his team a political machine ,
that could support and second the government in its task.
Actually, the po].itical ct?oices were made before and outside the congress, which
then had but to ratify them: just another way of making people believe that a page
ti~as being turned.
_ The brief period of time separacing the two congresses is less the manifestation of
internal quarrels within the party or the government (such quarrels are always
- swept aside when the perpetuity of the regime is at stake) than the result of
~ politi.cal ehhausCion, fea.r and confusion in the face of the unknown, an unknown
that is now being forged in the increasingly obvious meeting of the political opposi-
tion and the growing social opposition.
Consequently, the Destourian regime is at a.deadend, after having exhausted all the
traditional means to last, from petty tactical maneuvers of recovering the unde-
cided to the use of. the army against the UGTT [Tunisian General Federation of
Labor] demonstrators.
Is it not an ingenius idea that he proposes to us for emerging from the crisf.s?
. His idea can be sumtned up in three p~ints:
1) the establishment (against his will) of pluralism, which we see as a way of
- getting rid of bal]_ast before the ri~ing peril. That is why it remains limited,
seleci_ive and subject to review. It can deceive only the blind about the monopo-
listic ambitions of the Neo Destourian Party with respect to power..
2) the evalution toward an electoral list including more candidates than the num-
ber of seats L-o be filled, then toward freedom offered to political currents to
present their own lists, with the bonus promise of being recognized as such and
legalized if they passed the threshold of 5 percent of the votes cast; and
3) the release of political prisoners, stemming more from the fear of the same
perils and the desire t~ appease in order to remain than from a sudden awareness
of the ineffectiveness of systematic repression. Hawever, this attitude is not ~
general because Tunisian prisons are now overflowing with political prisoners.
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The release of cert~in members of the opposition was planned with a taste for
spectacle, but a spectacle for nothing insofar as no one is unaware that, far from
being the fruit of a presidential pardon, the release was the result of social
struggles that had never attained such intensity and of constant and effective
international pressure.
Naturally, the image of clemency that the government and its leader wanted to give
of themselves conceals great Machiavellianism. Of all these ups and downs, one
essential thing remains: Everything comes from Bourguiba and everything goes
back to him, no matter what is said about his sickness and distance from affairs
of state. He assumes direct responsibility for the repression and the massacres,
even if, like Pontius Pilate, he does not mj.ss a chance to wash his hands of them
and to find the necessary alibis. Nouira, Sayah and now M'Zali are but the execu-
tors of the master's will, in the good Destourian tradition consisting of distri-
buting roles in order better to manage the system's crises. Bourguiba's retire-
ment and the death of his reign will inevitably coincide, no matter who the heir
is to be. He knows this himself, repeating: "I am the systemi"
Basing a strategy on a future "continuator" means heading straight for failure,
in our opinion. For us, taking responsibility for what comes after Bourguiba
means impugning all pretenders from the regime, whoever they might be.
- Social Peace
This being the case, while the problem of the succession to Bourguiba at the head
of state and its different agencies constitutes the background against which the
internal struggles of the Neo Destourian Party take place, the crucial problems
affecting the Tunisian people remain whole.
The Nouira government, strengthened in December 1977 by technocrats, did not succeed
in mastering the economic and social crisis that raged. It was unable to make a
~,recise diagnosis oF the nature of the crisis and its political effects. Today,
the M'Zali government is getting mired down in the same morass. The causes are
attributed to the world economic ciepressio~, the frantic cansumption of the Tuni-
sian people (two-th_irds of whom are r,ow on the bcink of malnutrition) or...
meteorology. It has to observe, however, that neither the wage freeze (correspond-
ing to a clear cut in the purchasing po~�;er of the masses), nor the transit facili-
ties granted by the EEC to textile exporters, nor even the influx of petrodollars
from tourists from the Gulf dnd Saudi Arabia has helped solve the crisis.
M'Zali i.s doomed, in short-range terms, to make to "the good people" the same con-
fession of failure as his predecessor: "The day will come when those who have a
job, however minimal and po~rly paid, will be happy compared with those who have
no job at all."
This is a joyous prospect when nne realizes that Tunisia already has some 500,000
unemployed, real or disguised, that plans now being carried ~ut coldly leave
50,000 job applications unfiilfilled a year, that some 100,000 children are sent
away from the schools each year, while nearly 300,000 immigrant workers are
despite the temporary, and highly illusory, bright spot about to undergo the
fate of the immigrant Arab workers in Europe: massive deportation.
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F~iR OFFICfAl. ~,'SIF, t3'VL~'
1~1C' `~t1~t1Ct' i~~ t:ll(' ~~t�(1-~1~.'SLt~tll`l~li1 j)~)11t:LC~1~. L1Rc' 1S Cl?i11}~~CL(_~}/ C~Ui_ t0 t~ll' CORSCLOUS~
~~r~~.inizt~l rc;~isai c.~.~rkers t~~ let tnemselves be suh,jugated ~o the national snd
sc~cial. pl;lus. Ic-i '~:nucir~~ 1978_ t~he ; overnc~ent's objective ~aas to obtain, by hrutal,
hl.c,oc1�r repr~~ssion - caith the. help oE a pJ.i>t c,~reF~iLlv hatched hy Alc~l~amee3 Say;ili and
,1Lcial;~.ih T~erhat, but ~~~it1~ tl~~e hetievo.leiit c�umplicity c~1 Nouira, anc] rill. iitider i3uur-
;uih~:i's personal umbrell~i cahat it coulcl not obtain by polirical pressure on
UC'1'T le,~ders: socia:L pe~~r:e. In other wor.ds, the zeal of the movement for demands
and L11r? stif l~i_ng oE~ th~~ work~ r~' aspirat ion to the autonomy of tlzeir orgai~ization.
"'1he llCT~i' mu~t defr~=id ~�~ork more ~han workerr>." This watchword of H~di Nouira is
now taE:en from hii~ bv hi~ successors, ~al~use v~rbal liberalism poorly conceals the
desire to curb the trade union Federati.on, but gently this time, because the results
oL violence turned ~~ut to he mediocre.
"Ihis [rantic sear~�h f~~r "social peace" is but the required political pendant of
rhe er~~nomir l.ine 1=~~ 1.1u~.,red si.nce 1970 by the reqi.me and consists, under the aus-
~~i.re~ ~~ti thc~ i972 ~ind 1974 law~, oE makin~; Tunisia "a Fiscal paradise for for~ign
- i nvc~s tor:; ma inly I~ retlc!~ ~nd Wes t German, of giving more and more room to imperial-
ism ;:in~i ncocoloniali~m ar.ci oE hurry~ng the Tunisian economy into the world capital-
i.st m~rket throu~h i.ndustrial subcontracting and e~port industries closely con-
tr.olled by the mult ir~ati_ona_L firms.
'I~he e:ctenGion oE the c~~ar in Lebanon and the transfer of the headquarters of the
:1rab Lea~ue tc~ Tunis constituted a hisLoric oppot-tunity and an unexpected back.ing
Eor the Tunisian commecci.al. and Einancial bourgeoisie, which took advantage of it
to c~pen the doors t~o foreign banks, ~aith the aid of legislation. A proposed
society underlies tt~e t~hole: buildi.ng a"median society." It should be noted here
~ _nat rhe term~ c~ "ctass" tias be~n banned from the oEEicial political vocabulary,
malcin;_, it nec~essar~ti~ to guicklv invent this neologism in order to avoid talking of
a "mi.dclle cl~iss societv."
:ltter 1.0 years ot the N~~uira government and 2 years of the M~Zali government,
how i5 th~~ ?aboriuus ti-ansition going? It is defin~*p1y not blocked, but it is
niarkinF; time and ti.me inev:i.r.ahly plays against the c~mpletion of the regime's
~r~~nd dr~si;:;n.
- Tlie dc~l~i~.~s reY,i:~~er~~d .i.n