JPRS ID: 10122 USSR REPORT MILITARY AFFAIRS

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/ 10122
18 Novernber 1981
USSR Re ort
p
MILITARY AFFAIRS
(FOUO 1 1 /81)
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- JPRS L/101'l2
18 November 198I
~ USSR REPORT
MILITARY AFFAIRS
(FOU~ 11/81)
CONTENTS
MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES
Book Reviews Costs of Pc.rsuing Arms Race
(Yu. Ye. Vlas'yevich; EKONOMICHESKOYP: BREMYA MILITARIZM~~
1980) 1
AIR DEFENSE FORCES
Book Excerpts: Air Defense Forces in Wartime
(P. I. Grekhnev, et al.; VOYSKA PVO STRANY V VELIKOY
OTECHESTVENNOY VOYNE, 1981) 3
CIVIL DEFENSE
Book Excerpts: Civil Defense Medical Service
(P. P. Babinskiy, N. I. Glebovj ORGANIZATSIYA I TAKTIKA
MEDIT~TNSKOY SLUZHBY GRAZHDANSKOY OBORONY, I980)........... 19
MILITARY SCHOOLS AND ACADEMIES
Book Excerpts: History of the Frunze Military Academy
(VOYENNAYA AKADEMIYA IMENI M. V. FRUNZE, 1980) 23
- a - [III - USSR - 4 FOUO]
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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES
BOOK REVIEItiS COSTS OF PURSUING ARMS RACE
Moscow EKUNOMICHESKOYE BREMYA MILITARIZMA in Rvssian 1980(signed to press 18 Jul 80)
pp 1-2, 183-4
[Table of contents and annotation of book by Yu. Ye. Vlas'yevich]
[Excerpts] Title Page:
Title: EKONOMICHESKOYE BREMYA MILITARIZM,A (Tt1e Economic Burden of Militarism)
Publisher: Mysl'
Place and year of publication: Moscow, 1980
Signed to Press Datz: 18 July I980
Number of Cnpies Published: 12,000
;Vumber of Pag~s: 184
Brief L~escription:
This book examines the costs of the two world wars in the 20th century and the
~ present arms race. It studies the causes of the increasing costs of wars, the sources
and methods for covering them. The poli~ies of imperialiets, who make a profit from
wars and the arms race, are disclosed. The active roie of the CPSU and the Soviet
state in the struggle ~or relaxing international tension is shown. A critique is
~iven of the views of bourgeois sociologiats on the arms race.
- Table o` Contents
Introduction 3
Chapter 1. Military-Ecflnomic Costs in Light of Marxist-Leninist Theory 7 ~
1. The economic costs of wars as an expression of the
interdependence of war and economics 7
2. Military-economic costs and the interests of diff erent classes 20
3. A critique of anti-Marxist conceptions of military=economic costs 26
~ 1
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Chapter 2. Economic Costs of the First and Second World Wars 39
- 1. Human I.osses 42
2. Material and financial expenditures 53
3. Material d~struction 68
- 4. Indirect costs of war 78
5. Sources and methods of covering costs of the world wars 87
Chapter 3. Economic Costs of the Present Arms Race 100
1. Social-political causes for the growth of military costs after
World War II 101
2. The influence of the scientific-technical revolution on the
volume and structure of military expenditures 114
3. Measures, dynamics and structure of expenditures for military
goals 128
4. Sources for covering costs of the arms race 143
Chapter 4. It Is Possible to Reduce the Burden of ~he Arms Race 156
1. The econamic expediency of disarmament 157
2. Factors that work against military-economic waste 170
COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Mysl", 1980
CSO: 1807/152
,
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AIR D~'ENSE FORCES
BOOK EXCF~PTS: AIR DEFENSE FORCES IN WARTIME
Moscow VO'tSKA PVO STRANY V VELIKOY OTECHESTVENNOY VOYNE i941-1945 - K~L4TKAYA KHRIDNIKA
(National Air Defense Forces in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945 - A Brief Chronicle~
in Russia.n 1981 si.gned to press 16 Sep 80 pp 1-9, 166-171, 263-267, 372-375
[Annotatio~.; table o~ contents, excerpts from three chapters, conclusion from book by
P.I. Grekhnev, N.Ya. Komarov(in charge of the group of authors), V.L. Manilov, I.N.
i~ikha.ylenko and F.P . Tka,chev, Voyenizdat ~ 40, 000 copies ~ 375 pages]
[Text] This book rev~als the heroic path covered by the Nationa.l Air Defense Forces
in the last wax. It gives a day-by-da,y account of the comba.t activities of the for-
ma,tions and units and cites brilliant examples of the valor and heroism demonstrated
in the fighting by the defenders of our homeland's air borders.
The book was written for the genera.l reader.
Contents Page
Authors' Ir.troduction 3
Nationa,l Air Defense Forces During the First Period. of the War 5
- Nationa.l Air Defense Forces During the Second Period of the Wax 166
Nationa,l Air Defense Forces ~izring tr,e Third Period of the Wax 263 `
Conclusion 372
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AUI'HORS' IPdTRODUCTION
More than 30 years has gone by since the erul of World War II, an e~ctremely important
part of which was the Soviet Union's Great Patriotic War. The remembrance of +,he
great feat performed by the Soviet people and theis Armed Forces in the morta,l engage-
ment with the aggressive fascist bloc is sacredly :preserved in the grateful memory of
ma.nkind, however. The Soviet Union ~.nd its army bore tr~e brunt of World Wax II, the
blood.iest war in history. The Soviet-German front was the ma.in, the crucial front of
the war~ and it was there tha.t the main forces of fascist Germa,ny and its allies were
- utterly defeated.
The great feat perf ormed by the Soviet people and their Armed Forces in World War II
was a result of thousandsof ba.ttles and en~agements on la,nd, in the air and at sea,
and in the reax of the fascist Germa.n forces. This feat was brought a~aout by millions
of people. Our memory of them is sacred. "...We think with pride and reverence,"
General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L.I. Brezhnev has stated~ "about the
people whose unprecedented heroism determined ~~he outcome of the grea.t battle waged
against fascism."1
= The victory gained by the Soviet Armed Forces over the armies of the fascist bloc was
achieved by the sweat and blood of fightingmen of all the services and branches of
~roops--�infantrymen, tankmen, a.rtillerymen, pilots and sailors. The National Air De-
fense Forces--that service of th~ ~rm~~a Forces prima,rily responsible f or the reliable
functioning ar.k the security of the fignting nation's reax area.--also contributed. theis
bit~ a considerable one, to the accomplisnment of that victory.
The authors of this book have used. inf ormation from archives and periodicals to show
the reader how the na.tion's air defense grew and gained strength, day after day, under
the Communist Party's leadership, and to ~ell about the mass heorism demonstrated by
the pilots, antiaircra.ft gunriers, fightingmen in the VNOS[air waxning] service and
~earchli.ght operators, about their courage and valor in the cruc~.a:l engagements with
the Germa,n fascist invaders. The authors have focused entirely upon the struggle waged
by the Nation,al Air Defense Forces against fascist Germa,ny's air forces and have not
dea.lt with wartime operations against militaristic Japan. Although operationa.l air
defense forma.tions were created in the ~ar East Theater~ they were not required to en-
gage in active fighting.
'I'he authors express ttieir gratitude to officers and employees of the Ma,in Staff, Na-
tiona,l Air Defense Forces, and the Central Archives of the Minist,ry of ~efense for
placing the needed materials at their disposal and also for their valuable suggestions
and a.d.vice on the contents of the book.
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`I~l~~~:yrLI, ~:F~.'\~y c~~F'i.:~~ u~~iI1~C; 'PHc~ 'rlRa`I' Y~Z~J~ U!~' '~ii~: 4~t~f~(~2 ~uue~ ly~t2-iti :Vove~e-
ber 1942)
The TJational Air Defense Forces made a worthy contribution to the setba,ck in the
German ~'ascist command's plans to tota,lly defeat the Soviet Army in the very bc~gin-
ning of t~.~ war with joint strikes by ground forces and aircraf't and to ga~n a victory
over the US~ as early as the fall of 1941.
3eginnin~ with the milita,ry ref orm(1924~/192~i the Nationa.l Air Defense Forces grew in
size under the Communist Paxty's leadership, their organizationa,l structure and tech-
nical equipment were improved., and their rela,tive size and. their role in the Armed
Forces grew. They developed especially rapidly during the years immediately preced-
ing tha i,r.aa,t Fatriotic War.
During tYie first period of the war the Nationa,l Air Defense Forces were set up for
the defense of individual facilities. The defense was ba,sed on two ma.in elements:
the creation of cover for important administrative-political and industria,l taxgets,_
as well as railway lines within reach of a likely enemy's aircraft~ and the crucial
concentration of personnel and equipment to defend the nation's more important facil-
ities with an all-round defense. In other words~ the na.tion's air defenses consisted.
of a number of centers of defense.
The nation's largest administrative-political and industria.l centers--Moscow, Leningrad
and Baku--ha,d the most powerful air defense systems. A full 42.4 percent of all the
medium-caliber antiaircraft batteries and up to 50 percent of the fjghter regiments
were concentrated there to defend them. Adequa,tely powerful groupings of Air Defense
Forces were also created in the T`ranscaucasus and the Fax Ea,st.
Fascist Germa,ny's treacherous attack upon the S~viet Union began with ma,ssive strikes
by Germa,n Fascist aircraft against airfields, laxge cities and railway junetions to a
depth of up to 500 kilometers. At the same time the enemy w~,s ma,king extensive use
of its aircra.ft in support of axmy groups on the main axes. The ways and methods by
which the :iiterlite air forces--the I,uftwaffe--were used. were not original or new:
'?'hey t~ad bsen emplo;~ed by the Wehrma,cht in the war against Pola.nd and other Western
r~ur.ope~,n nations and were known to the Soviet command. The troops ~nd rear facilities
were not reliably covered from the air, however~ because of a shortage of personnel
and equipment and the imperfect organization of the air defense system.
Ttie distribution of personnel and equipment among the air defense zones actually re-
sulted i.n a sca-ttering of these forces, which in the fina,l ana,lysis produced a weak-
ening of our air defense on the main operationa,l axes. During the summer~fall cam-
paign o~ 1941, however, steps were taken to ma,ss the air defense men and equipment.
B,y the end of July, for example, a grouping consisting of 585 fighters, more tha.n
1,000 medium- and sma,ll-caliber antiaircraft gunsr 336 antia,ircraft ma.chine guns and
618 a.ntiaircra.f't searchli.ghts had been created to provide a reliable aix defense for
r~o~ c ow , 2
In the summer and fall of 1941 the air def~nse forces performed. their most intensive
operations to cover the nation's largest centers--Moscow and Leningrad. Dozens of
f ormations and units(up to 700 fighters and 1~800 antiaircraft guns of various sys-
tems) n~lped to repel ma,~sive enemy air raids: their efforts being coordina.ted by a
single comma,nd r~sponsible for aix defense.
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The State Defense Committee passed the decree "On the Reinforcement and Strengthening
of ~ir Defense of the Soviet Union's Territory" c:z 9 November 194~1. In accordance with
- this decree responsibility for the air defense of important facilities was assigned to
the newly appointed commar_der of National Air Defense Forces--the deputy people's com-
missar of defense. Pxior to this the National Air Defense For~PG werP under the Main
Directorate of Air Defense Forces, the chief of whicn until July 1941 was Colonel Gen-
eral of Artillery P1.N. Voronov. All forma,tions and units covering aclrra.nistrative and
political centers, industrial, railway and other vitally important facilities in the
Soviet Union were under the command of the newly appointed. commander of Nationa,l Air
Defense Forces(the only exception were Lenir~rad�s air de.f'ense forces, which temporas-
ily rema,ined under the front commander). The a~r defense zones in the E~aropean paxt
of the Soviet Union were disbanded and used to crsate corps, division and brigade air
defense areas, which were essentiall~ tactical forma.tions. Fighter corps and divisions
detailed from the Air Forces to perform nationa.l air defense missions were first opera-
tiona,lly and then totally under the commander of National Air Defense Forces~ and Io-
ca1ly--under the commanders of corps and division air defense areas.
The centralized control of the Nationa,l Air Defense Forces from top to bottom made it
possible to resolve all questions pertaining to the air defense of installations,
promptl;~ and with flexibility~ and to extensively maneuver air defense men and equip-
ment. Interaction among tne main air defense forces--the fighter aviation and the anti-
aircraft artillery--improved sharply.
The f ormation of cozPs and division air defense areas ma,de it possible to improve the
reliability of air def ense f or the fron~tline railways and water routes of communication.
In 194~2 the ~oviet command be;an to build a defense f or lines of communication, combin-
ing specific-installation air defense of important junctions with a mobile def ense of
stages and trains en route~ enlisting ground facilities and figYiter aircraft to perform
the missions involved. Def ense maneuverability was achieved by usi.ng mobile antiair-
craft groups and air defense armored trains.
The railways and water lines of communica~,ion f or fronts operating on the Stalir~rad
axis were prcrvided. with the most substa.ntial air defense during the second half of
19L~2. Cover was pr�ovided by five air dafense fo~mations.
In addition to defending large centers and industrial areas, as well as lines of com-
munication for the fronts, the antiaiscraft axtillery ot' the National Air Defense
Forces, by order of Headqua,rters, S~xpreme High Comma.nd, was also frequently called
upon to perform missions for the ground forces. This was rzecessitated prima,rily by
the ina.dequate quantity of aniitank artillery. In November~December of 194~1, when
enemy troops were neax Moscow, three ant3.aircraft artillery groups were detailed out
o~ the forces manning the I~ioscow Air Defense Zone, whicki operated as paxt of the West-
ern Front on the Solnechnogors~:-Istra and Rogachev axes, as well as in the area of the
Moscow-Volga Cana,l on the boundary between the ist Assault Army and the 20th Army,
beating of'f fierce attacks by enemy tanks and infantry.
An antiaircraft artillery grouping was set up in advance at the Stalingrad Air De~ense
' Post, designed to pravide both air and anti.tank defense. The correctness of this de-
cision was confixmed by the entire subsequent course of events.
In the situation oi inadequate air support f or operations by the ground forces and
the fronts' sma,ll air forces, the air defense fighter aviation wa,s used in ma,ny cases
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to perform front aviatlon mis~ions. By decision of Headquaxtera, for example, maaiy
air units of the 6th Air Defer.se Fighter Corps were enlisted. for the conduct of front
operations in the fall and winter of 1941~42 :~ear Moscow. As a result of the partici-
pation bJ~ an air rorps of the ais defense forces in the ais operations our aviation
gainec~_ air ~uperiority for the fisst time ~iuring the wa.r and reta.ined it until the
ficst pha.se of the counter-offensive wa.s completed.
Our def~:~se of facilities immediately adja.cent to the frontline revea.led the need for
mo:.~e ext ar_: i�~re = nci -thorough coordina,tion of combat ogerations of the Air Defense Forces
with those of the combined-arms armies and fronts(fleets~ and with troop air defense.
The most ~enn~hy interaction between the National Air Defense Forces and the air de-
fense of the troops and naval forces took pla.ce during the heroic defense of Leningrad.
- The aix defense of the city on the Neva was an integral part of the overall system of
it~ defe:~se by all services of the Armed Forces and branches of troops.
In 1942 the Stalir~rad Corps Air Defense Area, like the Leningrad Air Defen:~e Army,
was ~emporaxily placed. under the operational comma.nd of the commander of the Stalingrad
- Fror.+ . This helped us to make more purposive use of the air defense forces and facil-
ities in accordance with the developing situa.tion.
The ta.ctics employed. by the branches of air defense forces underwent considerable de-
velcpment during the combat operations. The air defense fighter aviatlon began to
intercept the air enemy by means of radar. Views on the organization of ~he combat
formations of fighters for aerial comba,t were reconsidered. The pair of fighters be-
came the main element in the comba.t forma,tion. In the air ba,ttle specia.l attention
began to be attached to the surprise and the determinedness of an attack and to mutual
, support by the fighters in a battle.
Our experience in combatting enemy aixcraft was studied and summaxized., which enabled.
us successfully to resolve matters pertaining to the ma,ssing of barrage and accompany-
ing antiaircraft artillery fire by means of fire control rada.r at night and in adverse
- weather conditions. Proced.ures were worked out for firing at diving aircraft and at
aircra.~rt in a"circula,r" formation. Personnel of the VNOS units and subunits ma~stered
proced_ures for monitoring the air for enemy aircraft and guiding fighters by means of
radar.
And so, the first period. of the wax was a turning point for the Nationa,l Air Defense
Forces with respect to improvin~ both their organizationa,l struct~e and the methods
for employing them in combat. Interacting with the fighter aviation and antiaireraft
_ artillery of the fronts and fleets~ the Nationa.l Air Defense Forces prevented the dis-
truction of the na,tion's administrative and political and industrial centers and its
lines of ~ommunication by the Germa.n fascist Luftwaffe and inflicted. great damage up-
on the enemy. The enemy lost 4,652 aircraft in 194~1~42. A tota,l of 2,617 of these
were de~troyed by fi;hter aircraft and 2,03~ were destroyed b antiaircraft artillery,
antiaircraft ma.chine guns, VNOS and ba.rrage balloon subunits.~ The Nationa,l Air Defense
Forces also destroyed a considerable number of enemy tanks. Al1 of this helped. con-
siderably to create the preconditions for a basic reversal in the course of the war.
After April of 1942 the Germa.n fascist command no longer attempted to strike at Moscow.
Our homela.nd's powerful air ~.efense system provided a reliable shield protecting Moscow
ag~.inst German fascist air raids.
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- Tne operations oz t~e rtiational Air De.fense Forces were assessed primarily not by the
_ number of ene~~y air~ra.f't shci d~~rn but by tne number of citie~ and ~opulation centers
saved from destructior_ and t;y the ef�2ctiveness with which the uninterrupted function-
ing of front lines of co�~r,n~nic~.tio:~ and the na~ion's rear area was znsured.
Like the other sections o= tais chror~icie, zh~ first. section cites only the most typi-
cal corr.oat developments and the most i.~rportant events out of the life and the combat
work of t!-ie I�iational Air De.i ense ,orces . Described on a dail~~ basis they provide an
- adequately ; o;nple ~e ricture oi the enor~ous organizational work performed by the Com-
munist Part;~ to rou~e the ',~eY~rr.~a,cht, the r~:~ss heroism, courage and sta,mii~a, demon-
strated by the na.tion's air defense fiohters.
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T:-iE NATIONAL AIR D~:FFNSE FORCES DURING TI~ SECOND PERIOD OF THE WAR(19 November 1942-
Dec ember 194~3 )
The second peri ai of the Great Patriotic Wax went down in history as the period. dur-
ing which tY:e turning point was achieved in the military operations. The Soviet Union
itself deal~ the decisive defeat to the German fascist arrr.y. This showed the entire
- world the grea.t power and vital f orce c~ the Soviet society and the Soviet state sys-
tem.
The :nain iaission of the National Air Defense Forces continued to be the same as during
the f irst period of the war--to defend the nation's la,rge industrial centers, railway
junctions, bridges and communication lines neax the front. The active involvement of
the Nationa.l Air Defense Forces in the support of extensive offensive operations by
the fronts and their participation in the air blockade of encircled enemy groupings
and in the destruction of enemy landing groups were important missions.
The National Aix Defense Forces considerably increased their comba.t strength by out-
fi+ting the units with new eqliipment and by providing new f ormations. The number of
comba.t crews in the iighter aviation inereased 1.6-f old, medium-caliber antiaircraft
guns--l.4-f old, small-caliber antia.ircraft guns--4.7-fold, laxge-caliber an+iaircraft
ma,chine guns--�5.8-fuld and antiaircraft searchlight stations--l.5-fold. The fighter
units received aircraft of the latest design--La-S, Yak-7 and Yak-9 with speeds of up
to 670 kilometers per hour and carry~ng powerfu~. armaments(1 or 2 guns with a caliber
' of 20 to 37 mm and large-caliber ma.chine guns).`~ Radax was installed on the fighters,
- which sha,rply increased their comba.t effectiveness.
ilnits of ined.ium-caliber antiaircraft axtillery were reoutfitted. with 1939-model 85mm
antiaircraft guns. A'oa,ttery ha,d four 85mm guns, the PUAZO-3 antia.ircraft director,
the DYa stereoscopic range finder with a 4--m~ter ba,se and 24--fold mat;nification, which
ma,de it possible to determine a target's a.ltitude at a range of up to 50 kilometers,
- and the DShK large-caliber antiaircraft ma,chine gun. Antia.ircraft a.rtiilery subunits
received the SON-2 fire control radar~ which permitted the ba,tteries to conduct accu-
rate aimed f ire at night and in adverse daytime wea,ther conditions. Eight-gun bat-
teries were created to increase the fire power and the likelihood of des~roying tar-
gets, the PUAZO of which were synchronized. and linked with the fire control rad.ar.
The antiaircraft machine gun units were totallv reoutfitted with 12mm and 7mm laxge-
caliber antiaircraft ma,chine guns.
~
The VidOS and fighter units received the iirrproved Redut-43 and Pegmatit detecting and
vectorii~ radar sta,tions. This improved our ability to sea,rch for enemy aircrdit~ to
_ provide waxning of an air enemy and to guide fighters to the ta,rgets.
ri'he ~ntiaircraft searchlight troops received the first searchlight-control ra,d.ar--
a system consisting of detecting and tracking radar with a seaxchli.~ht--which made it
_ possible to illuminate targets at maximum rangP practically from ti~a "moment of fire."
The quantitative and qua,litative growth of the weaponry of the Nati~nal Air Defense
r^orces si.gnificantly increased. their comba.t capabilities, especiall~~r for ronducting
- combat in the dark. Because of its large losse~ the Germa,n fascist comlrand could no
longer count on carrying out successful air strikes against Moscow, the capital of our
homeland. Although the capital was within range of the enemy'e tactical aviation the
- en~~,-~ gave up its attempts to carry out massive strikes against Moscow. The ma,in
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['OR ~r FiC~Ai, ~i~i;: f'~JI,4'
efforts of the German fascis;, air forces focuse~ upon providir~ direct support for
combat operations b~r the ~round forces. The most active operations by the enemy avia-
tion durino the first half of 1~~3 were boii,bing attacks against ra.ilway lines of the
Bryansk, Central, Voronezh and Sout'rAern fronts, lines of communication for blocka.ded
Leningrad and the Kirovsk Rai? way , In June oi' 1.943 fascist Germany' s air f orc~s f or
the first time durirk; the war carried o~i t a number o~ large raids against targets in
the nation's interior. The Soviet air forces gained air supremacy at the begiilning of
the fighting near Kuxsk and the axpansion of oifensive operations by Soviet forces in
thQ summer of 194~, not~rever~ a.nd maintained. it unzil the end of the war.
Chan;es in ~tne nature of the Gerr^~.n fascist aviation's operations ma.de it necessary
to redistribute the ~fforts of the Naiional Air Defense Porces. The quantity of air
defense personnel and equipment detailed to defend lines cF communication near the
fron� was increased sharply. The defense of the nation's vitally important facilities
and areas was s+epped up at the 5ame time. Air defense was set up for facilities in
liberated territory, for which purpose new air defense formations were created. The
depth of the na,tion ` s air de~ ense ~aas increased. tio 1, 000-1 ~ 500 kilometers .
By decision of the State Defense Committee the Western and Ea,stern Air Defense F~ronts
were created in 9.y43 to irnprove control of the Nationa,l Air DefQnse Forces. The Lenin-
grad Air Defense Army and tne Ladoga D~.vision Air Defense Area rema,ined under the oper-
a-tional command of the Leningrad Front . The crea~;ion of front air defense formations
considerably i.~rnroved troop control and interacti.on with the fronts and fleets.
During the second period of the war the most intense battles against the German fas-
cist aviation were conducted by forces of the Stalingr_ad Corps Air Defense Area; the
I,eningrad Air l?efense Army anci the Lador;a .Division Air Def'ense Asea, which defended
blockaded Leningrad and ~ts lines of communication; the P~Iurma,nsk Air Defense Area dur-
ing the defense o_f tihe Port of Murmansk and the Isirovsk Railway; the Voronezh-
Borisoolebsk, Rostov, Ryazhsk-Tambov~ Khar'kov, Donbass, Bologoye and other air defense
areas, which were defending lines of communication at the front; and the Gor'kiy,
Sa.ratov-Ba.lashov and Rybinsk-'IarosJ_avI' air defense axeas durir.g the defense of
Gor'kiy, Sa,ratov and Yaroslavl' .
- The air. blucka.de o;: an encircled 3 ~0, OOU-man eneny groupir~ near Stalingrad was ac-
complished by forIr~a,tions oY the air ar~ies and antiaircra.f't artillery of the fronts
interactir~ closely with t~e National Air Defense Forces. Troops of the Stalingrad
Corps Air Defens~ Area took paxt in the aix blockade. Antiaircraft artillery units
of that i'or_mation became a. part of the antiaircraft artillery groups of the combined-
arms armies. I?uring the air olockade of the encircled grouping Soviet pilots and
antiaircraft gunners destroyed around i,?00 enemy aircraft, ~0 percent of them trans-
port planes or bombers.
Z`roops of the Leningrad Air Defense Army per~'ormed the main mission, defending Lenin-
grad against air strikes . Around half of the air defense units and forma.tions took
an active part in the breakthrough of the Leningrad blacka.de and in tY~e defense of
its lines of communication. Ra~ds on Leningra.d became considerably less intense dur-
in~; the second period and were ha,lted entirely bJ the end of that period. More tha,n
8, 200 enemy flights wera ma,de within the boundaries of the Leningra~. Air Defense
Army during the second peri~xi., which was 2~ percent of all overflights within those
borders by enemy aircraft during the war. A total of 136 raids were flown against
Leningrad, ma,inly at night, . Only 253 aa.rcraft reached the rity.5
10
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During the breakthrou;h of the Leningrad blockade five air regiments were detailed
out of seven air defense fighter corps to cover troops of the 67th Army. Our fighters
- paralyzed the enemy's bomber aviation. During the period. of offensive fighting corps
pilots flew more than 364 combat missions, engaged in 104 air battles, shot down more
- than 50 fascist aircraft and put 16 others out of action. During the time they pro~
_ vided support f or +he operations of the ground f orces the antiaircraft gunners de-
stroyed 30 aircraft~ 4 ba.tteries, 9 machine guns, 8 earth-and-timber emplacements and
as many as 300 enemy soldiers and officers.6
Troops of the Ladoga Division Air Defense Area provided air defense for lines of com-
munication o�rer Lake Ladoga, which carried the ma,in flow of freight for Leningrad and.
- the Lenin~rad F`ront , c overed the Tikhvin--Lake L~.cloga main rail line and, f ollowing the
breax-Lhrough of the Leningrad blockade, also the newly built railway linking
Shlisselburg with the Mga-Volkhovstroy rail line.
Troops of the i~urmansk Division(Corps as of October 1943~ Air Defense Area provided
air defense for Murma.nsk and the Kirovsk Railway.
- The enemy aviation made a gr~at eff ort to disrupt the operation of the Kirovsk Rail-
way. Especially fierce raids were carrierl out against railway facilities on the Loukhi-
Ka,ndalaksha section in December of 194~2 and during the first ha.lf of i94~3. The defense
- of the rail facilities was reinforced by decision of the air defense axea command, and.
tactics were frequently cha.nged to conf orm to the na.ture of the enemy air raids . The
norr~.a.l movement of trains and the uninterrupted shipment of good.s f or the Karelian
F~ont and ~the Northern Fleet were resumed. in Ma,y~June of 19~3 as a result of increas-
ing the qua,nt~_ty of personnel and equipment ancl improving the air defense of railway
facilities .
An intense struggle for aix superiority was la,unched. on the Kuba,n' in the spring of
1943. Troops of the Rostov Division Air Defense Area. and the lOsth Air Defense Fighter
Division played an important role in that struggle. These formations provided air de-
fense for lines ~f communication for the Southern and North Caucasus fronts and for
industrial installations in the North Caucasus. Troops of the Rostov Division Air De--
fense Area and units of the lOsth Fighter Division conducted especially fierce ba.ttles
~to defend the Bataysk and Rotitov railway junctions in Thaxch,May of 19~3. The fighter
aviation acquired extensive experience in conducting group aerial ba.ttles.
Forces of'the Ryazhsk-Tambov, Voronezh-Borisoglebsk, Kha,r'kov and Tu1a division air
` defense area.s, together with four air defense fighter divisions under their opera-
tiona.l comman~l, provided ais defense f or the nation's important facilities within
their borders and for lines of communication of the fronts opera,ting on the Kur.sk
axis. As support for the planned summer offensive in the axea of the Kursk salient
the German fascist command created a powerful air grouping on the Kursk axis. It
consisted of forma,tions of the 4th and 6th air fleets and included. a total of more
than 2,000 aircraft.7 Successful prepaxations by our fronts to break up the offen-
sive by the German fascist troops and to route their assaul.t groupings degended to
- a significant degree upon a reliable air defense for our rail lines. Headquaxters,
Supreme High Command, assigned. this task to the Nationa.l Air Defense Forces. Four
aix defense formations and four aix defense fighter divisions, interactin~ with air
arm~es and the antiaiscraft artillery of the fronts, ensured the uninterrupted func-
tior.ing of lines of communication for the fronts and inflicted large losses upon the
enemy aviation.
11
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In June of. 1943 ~he C~erman iascist avia~tion undc.rtoolc mt3~sivo r~j.ds a~airis-t tlii:
Soviet Union's industrial cities of Gor'kiy, Sa.ratov and Yaxoslavl`. The enemy
carried. out seven ma.ssive r.ighttime raids agairist Gor'kiy between 4 and 22 June,
with 64~5 bombe~s taking pa,rt. The raids were repelled by units of the Gor'kiy Corps
Air Defense Area and the ?4~2nd Air Defense F.;.gilt~r Division. The antiaircraft artil-
- lery and fi~;hter units perfor:ned uiider ereat pressur~ to repel the raids. They de-
stroyed 14 enemy aircraft.8
The enemy ca...rried out nine night raids a,b~.inst Sa,ratov between 12 and 27 June 19~,3,
with up to 420 bombers taking part. Jnits of ~the Saratov-Balashov Division Air Ue-
- fense Area and the il+~~;h Air Defense Figh~er D~ivision, which were deployed there,
operated successfully. The smoke-screenir~ of the enemy's intended. ta.rgets was high-
- ly effective. Durin~ the last ni~ht striIce not one of the aeriaZ bombs dxopped by the
enemy hit t~-ie target, since the crews of the enemy aircraft could not detect them.9
Units o~ the Rybinsk-Yaroslavl' Division Air Defense Area and the 14~7th Air Defense
Fighter Division perPormed smoothly and in an organized manner to repel two massive
raids a~ainst Yaroslavl', as weil as diversionaxy strikes against the stations at
Rybinsk, Konstantinovsk, Ivanovo, Komsomol'sk and Uglich. Only 32 of 110 enemy air-
craft takin~; part ii: tre raids against Ya.roslavl' reached their targets.
Durir~ the second period of the wax the National Air Defense F~rces were successful
on the whole in combatting the German fascist aviation and covered the enemy's tax-
gets in the rear, I?uring 194�3 they destroyed. 1,615 enemy aircraft.l0
,
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ivATIONAL AIR DEFr~N~E r ORCES DURING THE THIRD PERIOD OF THE WAR( January 1944--N~ay 1945)
Dusing the third period of the war the Nationa,l Ais Defense Forces conducted comba,t
operations in a, situation in which the Soviet air forces had total superiority over
the enemy avia.tion. The German fascist aviation was becoming constantly less active.
The comba.t capacity of the National Air Defense Force~ was increasing, however, and
they ;~ere cor_stantly at a high level of combat readiness. The nature of the enemy
aviation's operations and its tactics were altered. considerably, along with the drop
- in its activity. Its ma.in efforts f ocused upon sugporting the enemy's ground forces,
deliver~ng air strikes against attacking troops of the Soviet Army and destroying in-
' sta.llations and lines of communication along the front. The enemy attempted to make
up for its shortage of forces by ma.neuvering air forma.tions and units to the more im-
porta.nt sectors of the Soviet-German front. The enemy sometimes managed to concen-
trate laxge air groupings there, and the massing of air defense men and equipment
was required to combat them.
Nor was there any relaxation of the danger of strikes against individual, vitally im-
portant taxgets in the nation's rear~ which could involve heavy bombers(He-177, VW-200
Kondors) carrying a heavy bomb load and with a radius of operation exceeding 1,000
_ kilometers. There was also tr.e danger that the enemy would use a new weapon--the V-1
cruise missile, For example, the Germa.n fascist command intended to ma,ke strikes
against Leningrad with these unmanned missiles launched.from positions in Estonia.
The ma,in mission of the National Air Defense Forces continued to be that of protecting
large centers against air attacks. The air defense system for Mosrow, Leningrad, Baku
and Gor'kiy L:as further improved. Double or triple the 1941 level of air defense means
was detailed to defend such la.berated. cities as Riga, Vilnius, Minsk, L'vov~ Kiev and
Odessa. P~ore than 50 percent of the fighters and medium-caliber antiaircraft guns and
asound 70 percent of the antiaircraft sea.rchlights were concentrated for the defense
of the nat~on's most important political and ec~nomic centers.ll
� Air defense of the fronts' rail and water lines of communication continued to be an
importa.nt task of the National Air Defense Forces. The need to covEr them reliably
considerably increased the range of tasks of the Nationa,l A.ir Defense Forces. They
frequently covered lines of communication in the immediate rear and a number of cross ings
ha.d to be cove.red at the f orward edge(crossi s over the Kerch' Strait, the Dnepr,
the Vistula, the Oder and other bodies of water~. In addition, forma,tions of the Na-
-Lional Air Defense Forces covered airfields of the front and long-range aviation, trains
and riv~r vessels en route and coastal, sea lines of communication~ helped implement
the air blockade of encircled groupings(nea,r Korsun'-Shevchenkovs~iy~ Budapest, Breslau
_ and elsewhere) and battled sabotage detachments and bands opera~ting in the rear and air-
_ borne landing groups. At crucial points in the ba.ttle the air defense fighter aviation
was etilisted to perform the missions of front air forces on the ma.in axes, and the
antiaircraft artillery of the National Air Defense Forces--field a.rtillery missions.
A~ the Soviet Arm,y advanced rapidly to the west the depth of the territory defended
by the National Air Defense Forces increased greatly. The two front air defense field
f orces(Western and Eastern~ were replaced by f our air defense fronts--the Northern,
Cent.ral, Southern and Transcaucasus fronts--in 19~ to provide f or more flexible con-
trol of the National Air Defense Forces and closer interaction between them and the
f orces of the fronts .
- 13
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r'(~~ ~)i'1'~t X!~E ~ ~5~'. ~~"~I~..~
~h.sir~ the 1~+~~ :tii:i:er car.~,-ai~;~; ~}~r: ;ovi,et Arm;~ carried au~ dtv~.statin~ s~trlkes a~ainst
German fasci5 ~ i orces ne~,r :'~en : r~:,;r3~
~ a:~d _;ovporod. ~ in the xt~.ohti-Bank Ukraine and the
Crimea. IJurin~; th~ ca~~~pai~,n t1,e id:~~;.or!al Air De~ens~ Forces primarily fought the ene-
iny's aviation, wizicr ~,ras at ~en~p ~ing ~to disr-upi:, iail transport operations alon~ the
front. 1he most intense ba~tl~s a~;air.s ; t'r.~ ai~r e.i=~~y dur3.nE, tha.t period were those
fou~nL n;; forces of ~the L~~nin,Trad Air 1~~~�'^nse Army a.:id -'tiie kiev, L'vov and Vorth
Cauc~ ~u~, a.ir dei er~5~ a-re~.s . ~Moops af' ~::e I.eningraa 4.ii Dei ense Army took a direct
~,art i?~ -.!~P ofl er~.,ive = or_~ccs ci tne I,eni.n=;rad ~'~ont. Tize air defense fighter avia-
tion pro~.~ided air cover l'o;� t.i-,e com7at ord~_=s ci ot?r rifle form3,tion.s and made bombing
a-ttaclis ~apon erie;r~y ~ round for:.~es . r'art o~' thn a.rli,iaircraf~t a-rtillery was drawn upon
to provi~e artillery sup~ort f or th~ ofi e.ZSive b,y~ the Leningrad F~ont's 4~2nd Army.
Between ~~ar~u~.ry and Ap.r;_1. oi ?94~~, when Sovi_et f~orces launched their grand offensive
ir. the southwVst, i', becar~~e espaci~lly impo~~-tant -co provide air defense for the rail
lines of co_-~n~~~nicacio,~ of ~the Ukrainiar~ fruntsY ~ainst which a.he enemy ha.d concen-
~,rat::d ti~.~ ~0 56 percen~t o:.~ it.::~ con:aai airc~~.f'c(1,20~-1,4~~0 p~anes).12 Regarding the
disrupt.ic~ of communicatior~s ~ or those ironts as one oi its aviation's ma.in tasks, the
Germari fascist comma.nd a~�ran~ed r or more th~.n 4~~G bombin; raids against railway in-
stallationse
^1he Sovie~ c:~omr~~a,rid concent~.u;~~cl around 50 percenT ol' all the personnel arid equipment
of the i~iatiork.~.l Air I~fense Forces to cover ~ines oP cominunica-tion in the soutnwest.
Forces ai ~i:he Kiev, Kl:rsk, ?inar'kov, DonL~a.ss, L'Y~v anci Odessa air defense axeas of
tne 'rlestern Air Def~nse rron~. p7�ovided air defense ~ cr t~-,e rail lines of communication.
Upon encoun~}.;erin~ the power~ul ai.r ciefense the F'Z1eIfl~r a,1t~rPCt its tactics and switched
t~ air stri~es a.~;ainst trains en 7~oute. 'This ~~.Ct1C rras c~untercd. by providit~ direct
ecver for tr_ailis en route oy air delense oroups c~ea.-Eed i?Z adva,nce(1-2 srnal.l-caliber
~uns and 3-~- ~.ntiaircra.f' ~ mach~_ne guns pe.r train
Antiaircrart armored trains T~~ere assigned a large role in the covering of important
rail �acilities in liberated territor,y. We were most successful when we were able to
achieve the elGment oz su.~i ise in the u~e of ar_tiaircraft fire from armored trains .
Tlie crea~~ion ot a solid .rada-r ;le-cec-i;icn ~znd vecto~in~ i'ield for the fibhcer aviation
over va,st areas c~ras a-typical. feature oz ~l;he air defense for lines of communication
o~' the Ukraini~.ri fronts. The shilful a.prl`L~~ati~n of camoufla,ge procedures contributed
to the successful defense of crossin~;s on the ~Jnepr, whi.ch were hi~hly important to
the develapment of the offensive ~y forces of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts in the
Right-3ank ukra~.ne. ~or example, the enemy's lead b~mbers would mark the routes to
t.argets with flares to ~uid.~ ~Lhe;.r assault groups of aircraf~t -to them. In response
to this air defense fi~n~ters be:~;an. to drop ~lares along xoutes to false targets. The
use of camoufla~;e s~oke bombs frequei~tly forced the enemy to ha.lt, bombings of cross-
ings. 'rhe crosGinos camoufla.ged with smoke were not damaged. The Nationa,l Air De-
fense Forces regelled all attempts by -the enemg aviation to ha,It crossing operations
~ over the Dnepr and secured uninterz-upted operationa,l ~troop shipments for the lst, 2nd~
3rd and ~~th UIcrainian I~onts .
- In the sumrner~fall campaigr_ of 19~b1~- the Soviet krmecl Forces carried out the main strike
on the western sector. By d.estr.oyin~ the enemy front there our army cleared ii:s way
to Berlin. The role of' the i~iationa,I Air Defense ak,orces in covering lines of communi-
cation for the fronts and imgor~tant areas and .f'acilii.ies in the liberated territory
became even greater in this cam~,ai~;n. :During greparations fox and the condurt of the
Belorussian Operation .forces oF -the Norther~~ and Sou~thern Air Defense F`ronts
14
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reliabiy c::vered all railway junctions and bridges and almos~ all railway stations,
even the small ones, to a depth of 15n-200 kilometers from the frontline. Mobile
air defense ~roups continued to be used to grotect trains en route.
'I'he concentration of bodies of National Air Defense Forces to protect facilities along
the front made it possible to use the ~.ir defense mea.ns of the ground forces to cover
formations in the first echelon, which was important to the successful devElogment of
operati~ns.
The most intensive combat operations during the summer~fall campa,ign were conducted
= by formations of the Nationa~. Air Defense Forces covering taxgets in the zone~ of the
Baltic fronts(the 2nd Air Defense Corps~ and the Belorussian fronts(the 4th Air Defense
Corps anci. the 81st Ais Defense I7ivision) and troops of the Leningrad Air Defense Army.
Forwa.rd air defense units continued. to be maneuvered. to provide timely and rapid de-
fense of important targets behind the advancing troops in liberated terr9.tory. There
wa.s extensive ma.neuvering from the nation's interior of units and even formations of
air defense forces relieved of defend~ng taxgets which had become inaccessible to the
_ enemy's aviation. Air defPnse personnel and equipment were frequently maneuvered. a-
mong the air defense fronts.
I?uring the second ha.lf of 1944 the Soviet Supreme High Command took a number of deter-
mined steps to reinforce the air defense for groups of forces and installations near
= the front irL the theaters of military operations and to cover important economic axeas
in Poland~ Hungary and Romania. Five corps of Nationa.l Air Defense Forces were rede-
ployed outside the nation.
In the final campaign Soviet forces conducted a number of offensive operations, con-
cluding with the Berlin and Prague operations. Forma.tions of the ist operationa.l eche-
1on of National Air Defense Forces played an important role in those operations, their
main efforts coritinuing to focus upon providing reliable cover for lines of communica-
tion near the front. They also covered crossings on the Od.er, the Vistula and the
Dunay and areas of concentration of large groups of enemy forces, and defended a num-
- ber of important industrial areas outside the Soviet Union--Ploesti, Dombrau, Silesia
and others.
In the Berlin Operation the availability of extensive air defense personnel and equip-
ment made it possible to plan interaction between the National Air Defense Forces and
air defense units of the ist UI~ainian and the ist and 3rd Belorussian fronts not only
" for specific installations bu-t for entire areas of operation as well. Air defense per-
sonnel and equipment of the fronts covered the advancing troops~ while forma,tions of
Nationa,l Air Def ense Forces covered rear facilities of the fronts, lines of communica-
tion and cr.ossings over bodies of water.
Uuring the third period. of the war the Nationa,l Air Defense Forces successfully per-
formed their combat missions. They destroyed 1,04~5 aircraft, 618 of which were shot
down by fighters and 42r~ by antiaircraft artillery.13
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f~'0~2 ~~'~'i~`i%,.. 7;~"r: ~,....4'
C L'iiC:LU jI Oid
The combat acti.on o:' ~;lie ~;at~.~nal Aa.r Defense Forces dl.tring the wax was ~f great
operational ~.nd stra�.e~;ic imgortance and was an integral part of the overall efforts
cri the ~oviet Arm;~ ana :~ia:l~r to route tr:~ ~~:reri~:an fa~ci:;t lnvaders. They essentially
operated as a segarate br~~.n~h of t~e Ar..nec' `~o;~ccs. rrh.~t ex.tremely importani; princi-
ple of' milit~.ry ar-t th.~1t t~:?r~~ is 3.CCi7.E've;l thY~ot;~;n the joint efforts of all services
of tne ~rmed ~~,orce,~ ar:d ~c~?-_zn~:~~::; vl' irocr ~ rec~'_vr~c? practical confirm~,tion. The Com-
munist Party Centr~l i.~Jiilii1lGLC~~, ~.ne ~La'..~. L':.~?'en~e Co:nmittee and Headqua.rters, Supreme
Hi~h Cor.lmar!d, were tne :~.in ormanizers oi air defAnse for the Soviet State throughout
the en ~ire wa,r.
The 7:a.in r~ission c~l ;lie ~;a.:J_GPI,'3,1 Air_ T~l ense r orces i;hrou~hout the war consisted in
proteciir;~; la:roe adn~r.~~tr~t:~ve-political and industrial areas a,gainst air strikes.
At leas-'t na,l~ of all th~~ air dei'ense Personnel and equipment was involved in this mis-
sion. 1he air ciefeTise of tro;~ps atid_ iines of cominunzcation was an important task.
Protectin.~ the xear af the orcratin� iror?ts~supply bases, airfields, front crossin~s
and so iorth~ was or:e of ~i~e tas`r.s of ~he tira~~or.~.l ~1ir Defense Forces. Alon~ with per-
forming these r:~ain ta.sr;5 �he T1a'~~ional Ai.r Defense Forces also h~a,d to comba.t enemy tanks
and infantry, to tar:e ~,a.rc ~r. -~he b? ocxadir~; of encircled enemy groupings and the pene-
tratl.Ori O? ~E:~nC1S1_'!~ 7,0;7@~~ LO COVe~ na.val_ conVOyS~ ~O esco.rt ~~Oi~1~JeTS ci.Tl(j. cover air-
borne _land.in; opF~.ratior,.s o
~ascist :~:ermari,-~r's a:ir~~r~~ft i~d a relati.vely s~~v~.l?_ raclius of operation. It had few
long-ran.~~e boirib~rs and rlo strate~,ic ai.rcr~fi; a~; al~ . As ~t~ +.err.itory was liberated
the relatively SIfk'l.ll rarlius oi operation af' th~ Germa.n tascist av:iation perrn:.~tted us
to reliev~ entire a~.?, de~ e:iUe I'orn~ations f.rom the d.e:E~en~e oi tar~;ets which ha,d become
inaccessible to tile er~er~~y's aircraft and io redcPloy t.hem bel:ind the advancing forces
of the fronts. `I'his sort of op~;ra-tional use oF the Nationa,l Air Defense Forces was
warranted a~t the ti.m~~ .
~.zrin~_,- the s-~a.r yea.rs en2my aircr.a.i't are krio;an to tk~,ve ~.ae 3o~f 1 j7 fli~hts in areas
d~fer.dad by ~L-he ^ta~~ional rlir ~~e~ e!.se rorces. 1fie Nat'~onal Air Defense Forces destroyed
7~313 ~�~rcr~.~t. Tnis inc7_aded. j,930 ~.i-r~raft sr.o-`, down by fi.ghters in air battles and
238 destroyed at a,irfi~ldse ;~,65~ des~.ro~c~i. by a.it~_~.ircr~.ft artillery and 491 aircraft
destroyed by antiai~�cra,.~'~t machine ~~UI).S, armore~t t,ra_Lns, barra.ge ~:alloons and other air
defense means.~~' 'I'his ~.~as a.~i:~;rLiiicant contr'~.bution to the struggle for strategic air
supremacy. In addition �.he,y destroyed_ a consid.erable quantity of tanks and infantry,
ar-cillery and morL-~.r bacteri~s, The ma,in -resv.l-'t of the combat operations of the Na-
tiozial Air D�fense Force~, !~o-~ever; lay in ttie iact that they sa.ved. many cities, cen-
ters of popul.atior~, in~.astrial ente~~rises and_ rail lines of communication from de-
stx~zct:ion f':com ~the air. Tre enem,y did not succeed with its air strikes in disrupting
the fLUlctioning of the nation's rear or the supplyir~ of the front with everything
neccssary to conduc~; the war.
The combat activities of tlie ila~ional .P.ir Defense Forces frequentl.y took on the na-
ture oI' air defense operations, esgeci~.lly duri.n~ ~he strategic defense conducted by
the :~oviet Army and in -the stra.tegic off'ensive. This occurred in the bati;les of
;~oscow and T,enin~xad in 19t~1, the battles of Voro~zezh and Stalingrad in 19~2, during
the repelling of enemy a.ir st.rikes against Gor'kiy and Saratov in i943 and the de-
fense of lines of communication at the Kursk si;aging axea. A new axea of Soviet mili-
tary a-rt--~the opera{;iona,l art ~f the Na,tiona,l AIr Defense Forces--came into bein~ and
underwent development.
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The f ollowin; were the typical f eatures of the operationa.l art of the Nationa.l Aii
Defense Forces: the combat emplcyment of air defense formations and field forces ac-
cording to a single operationa.l pla.n; the creation of all-round defense of the na,tion's
large centers, economic areas and individua.l facilities, the preservation of which was
vitally important to the state; the extensive ma,neuvering of air defense formations;
centralized troop control; and close interaction with operational field forces of other
services of the Armed Forces.
The continuous quantitative and qua,lita.tive growth of the National ~Air Defense Forces
provided the ma.terial f oundation f or the creation and aevelopment of their operational
art. Thanks to the concern of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government and the
selfless labor of the Soviet people the Nationa,l A~r Defense Forces received. every-
thing necessaxy to successfully comba.t the fascist aviation. The level of their axma-
ment and the numerical strength of the Nationa.l Air Defense Forces almost doubled. dur-
in~ the war yeaxs.
Determined. implementation of the principle of centralization in the combat employment
of the Nationa,l Air Defense Forces and the creation oi a separate organizationa.l s-cruc-
ture were of exceptional importa.nce to tr.e development o.f. ta,ctical and operational prin-
ciples underlying their combat employment. This also accounted for the fact that tt~e
_ Nationa,l Air Defense Forces essentially became a sepaxate branch of the Armed Forces.
They had. strictly defined missions and a strictly defined. combat composition and cen-
tralized control from top to bottom. Such combat traditions as a high level of com-
- ba,t readiness, skill in the conduct of combat, speed of action and crea.tivity in the
seaxch for unfailing ways to perform the comba.t mission were born and became solidly
established.
By the end of the war the Nationa,l Air Defense Forces had four fronts, six armies(in-
- cluding one air army), 19 corps(including four air corps), 4~2 divisions(including 24~
air divisions) and five ~epaxate air defense brigades. Their arma,ment consisted of
around 3,200 fighters, 9~800 medium-caliber antiaircraft guns and more than 8,900
sma.ll-caliber guns, 8,100 antiaircraft machine guns, 5,4U0 antiaircraft searchlights,
1,~OG '~arr~e balloons~ 230 rad.ar detection stations and 360 fire control radax sta.-
tions.15
Political organs, party ar_d Komsomo~, organizaticns always played a l~,rge role in the
life and the cnmba,t activities of the National Air Defense I+'orces. Party-uolitical
work has been conducted in a flexible and purposive ma.nner, using diverse forms and
- methods, and this ha.s helped to make it highly effective.
Since the end of the Grea,t Patriotic War the aerial weapons of likely enemies have
undergone significant quantitative cha.nges. The National Air Defense Forces ha.ve
_ undergone constant development and now differ greatly from what they were during the
war. The modern National Air Defense Forces are qualitatively new f orces. Ground-
to-air guided. missiles and missile-carrying fighter-interceptors ha,ve become their
main weapon. Various automa.tic control systems and ra.dioelectror.ic equipment axe
extensively usecl.
The National Air Defense Forces are alwa,ys in a sta.te of comba.t rea.diness and axe
rel:iably ~uarding the air barders of the Soviet socialist state.
17
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FOOTNOTES
1. L.I. Brezhnev, "Velikaya pobeda sovetskogo naroda"[The Soviet People's Grea,t Vic-
tory], rloscow, 196~, g 4~7.
2. "Na strazhe neba stolitsy"[Guarding the Skies Over the Ca.gital], Moscow, 1968~
PP ~9 ~ 9 0 .
- 3. "Voyska.protivovczdushnoy oborony strany"[The Nationa.l Air Deiense Forces], Moscow,
196~, p 19z.
4~. Ibid. , p 196.
5. Ibid., P 206.
6. Ibid., pp 208-210.
_ 7. Ibid., p 232.
_ 8. Ibid., p 246.
9. Ibid., p 248.
10. Ibid., p z53�
1i. Ibid., p 258.
12. Ibid., p 260.
13. VO'fEi~1N0-ISrORICHESI{IY ZHURNAL, No 10, 1972~ p 28.
14~. Ibid., No 10, 1972, P 29�
1j. Ibid., No 4, 1975~ P~8�
- COPYRIGHT: `Joyenizdat, 1981
11499
cso: 18oi/339
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CIVIL DEFENSE
BOOK EXCERPTS: CIVIL DEFENSE P4EDICAL SERVICE
Kiev ORGANIZATSIYA I TAKTIKA MEDITSINSKOY SLUZHBY GRAZHDANSKOY OBORONY in Russian
(signed to press 16 Jul 80) pp l, 2, 68-69, 3-4, 67
[Title page information, annotation, table ~f contents, excerpts from Chapter 1--
"Tasks of Civil Defense", and List of Literature from book "Organization and Tactics
of Civil Defense Medical Service", by P. P. Babinskiy and N. I. Glebov,Izdatel'stvo
ob"yedineniye "Vishcha shkola", 15,000 copies, 72 pages]
[Text] This textbook presents the principles for the organization of civil defense
_ and its medical service in accordance with the program for training nurses of rhe
reserve.
It is intended for female students in higher educational institutinns of the
humanities and teachers of the Civil Defense departments. It can be used in training
nurses in questions on the organization and tactics of MSGO [Civil Defense Medical
_ Service].
CONTENTS Page
Chapter I. Principles of USSR Civil Defense "s
1. Civil Defense Tasks 3
_ 2. Organizational Structure of Civil Defense 4
3. Organizational Structure of Civil Defense of a City 7
4. OrganizatiQn r~f Civil Defense at Installati~ns of the National Economy 9
5. Basic Principles for Protecting the Population and Facilities of the
National Economy 11
Chapter II. Principles for the Organization of Civi1 Defense Medical Service
and its Tasks 14
1. Basic Principles in the Organization of MSGO 14
2. Leadership of tiSGO 15
3. Basic Tasks of MSGO 17
4. Organization of Medical Support 18 .
5. Types of Medical Assistance 23
_ 6. Sanitary and Hygiene and Anti-Epide~r,ic Measures Conducted in Centers of
Mass Contamination 23
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Page
_ Chapt~r IZI. First Aid and its Organization 26
l. Significance of First Aid 26
2. Formation of Civil Derense rledical Service, Rendering First Aid 27
3. Actions of Voluntarv Aid Detachments in a Nuclear Stricken Area 33
4. Acti_ons of Voluntary Aid Deta~hments in Centers of Chemical Contam-
ination ?7
5. Actions of Voluntary Aid Detachments in Centers of Bacteriological
Contamination 39
Chapter IV. Emergency Phys ician's Aid and its Organization 41
l, Volume of Emergency Physician's Aid in ~~arious Stricken (Contamina-
tion}Areas 41
2. Work of OPi�1 [First Aid Detachment) in Nuclear Stricken Area 44
3. Work of OPri in Center of Chemical Contamination 49
4. Work of OPM in Center of Bacteriological Contamination 51
S. Work of Nurses in Section~ of OPM 52
Chapter 5. Specialized Medical Aid and its Organization 56
l. Organization of Specialized Medical Aid 56
2. Duties of Nurses in Medical Institutions 65
List of Literature 67
Chapter I. Principles of USSR Civil Defense
1. (;ivil Defense Tasks
Under conditions of the ceaseless arms race in the i.mperialist states, the Communist
Party and the Soviet state are manifesting tireless ~~oncern for ;trengthening our
country's defensive might and improving civil defense.
The main task of civil def ense is protection of the population from all contemporary
means of destruction. The accomplishment of tr.is mission is a~tained by the shel-
tering of the population in protective structures, its dispersal and evacuation
from the cities and providing individual and medical protective equipment, and
training the population in methods of protection against weapons of mass destruc�-
t ion .
Civil Defense, which was created on the base of local air defense in 1961, is a
component part of the system of State defensive.measure5 which are accomplished ir~
peacetime and wartime to protect the population and the national economy against
weapons of mass destruction and other enemy means of attack and to conduct rescue
and emergency reconstruction work (SNAVR) in stricken areas and in zones of cata-
strophic flooding. Iz peacetime, Civil Defense forces are used in the conduct of
rescue work in areas of natural disasters and with big production emergencies and
catastrophes.
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_ All state organs, public and cooperative organizations, enterprises, institutions,
kolkhozes, and sovkhozes are required to accor~plish civil defense m~asures.
The basic tasks of Civil Defense are:
Yrotection of the population against weapons of mass destruction and other
enemy means of attack;
improvi�g the operating stability of facilities and branches of the national
econor~y under wartime conditions;
prctection of agricultural animals, plants,food, food raw materials,water sources,
and water-supply systems against radioactive, chemical, and bacteriological con-
tamination and the conduct of ineasures to eliminate the aftereffects of contamina-
tion;
conduct of SNAVR and rendering assistance to the victimized population in strick-
~ en areas and in areas of national disasters;
creation, training, and maintenance of civil defense forces in constant combat
readiness;
universal mandatory instruction of the population in methods of defense against
weapons of mass destruction and other enemy means of attack and in actions to elim-
inate the afterefiects of enemy attack;
creation and maintenance in readiness of Civil Defense command posts, equipment
and systems for warning and communica~ion, observation, and monitoring radioactive,
chenical, and bacteriological contamination;
warning the population of the danger of contamination and catastrophic flooding;
preparation and conduct of blackout ot fac.ilities af the national economy and
papulated places.
List of Literature
~ l. ~ltunin A. T. "0 teorii razhdansko oboron "
, , g y y[On the Theory of Civil Defense],
Moscow, Krasnaya Zvezda Press, 1974.
2. Altunin, A. T., "Formirovaniya grazhdanskoy oborony v bor'be so stikhiynymi
bedstviyami" [Civil Defense Formations in the Struggle Against Natural Dis-
asters], Moscow, Stroyizdat, 1978.
3. Gogolev, M. I., "Organizatsiya raboty sanitariiykh druzhin v ochagakh porazheniya"
[Organization o� the Work of Voluntary Aid Detachments in Stricken Areas],
Moscow, Meditsina Publishing House, 1975.
4. Gorelov, L. I. and Dubrovin, V. I., "Meditsinskaya pomoshch' i zashchita
naseleniya v ochagakh massogo porazheniya" [Medical Aid and Protection of the
Population in Areas of Ptass Destruction], Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1974.
21
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5. Yegorov, P. T., Shlyakhov, I. A., and Alabin, N. I., "Grazhdanskaya oborona"
[Civil DefenseJ, Moscow, VVsshaya Shkola Press, 1977.
6. Krotkov, F. G., editor, "rSeditsir?skava sluzhba grazhdanskoy oborony" [Civil
DeFense Medical Service], Moscow, rfeditsina Publishing House, 1975
7. Polyakov;,V.. A. and Khronov, B. M., "Khirurgicheskaya pomoshch' na etapakh
evakuatsi~ meditsinskoy sluzhby grazhdansk.oy oborony" [Surgical Assistance at
Stages'of Evacuation of Civil Defense rledical ServiceJ, rioscow, Meditsina
Publishing House, 196Q.
3. F:az'min, A. I., editor, "Rukovodstvo po travmaLologii dlya meditsinskoy
sluzhby grazh~ianskoy oborony" [Manual on Traumatology for Civil Defense Medical
Service], Moscow, ?~leditsina Publishing House, 1978.
9. Goli~:ov, S. N., editor, "Rukovodstvo po toksikologii otravlyayushchikh
v2shchestv" [i~fanual on the `ioxicology of Toxic Agents], Moscow, Meditsina
Publishing House, 1970.
10. Rybasov, A. V., "Organiza~siya meditsinskoy sluzhby ~razhdanskoy oborony"
[Organization of Civil Defense Medical Service], Moscow, Meditsina Publishing
House, 1970.
11. 7,akharov, F. G., editor, "Uchebnik dlya podgotovki sanitarnykh druzhin i
sanitarnylch postov [Textbook for Training Voluntary Aid Detachments and
Aid Stations), Moscow, Meditsina Publishing House, 1977.
COPYKIGHT: Izdatel'skoye ob'yedineniye "Vishcha shkola", 1980.
6361
C50: 1801/282
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MILITARY SCHOOLS AND ACADEMIES
BOOK EXCERPTS: HISTORY OF THE FRUNZE MILITARY ACADEMY
Moscow VOYENNAYA AKADEMIYA IMENI M. V. FRUNZE in Ruasian 1980 (signed to press 26
Feb 79) pp 1, 2, 5, 6, 262, 280
CTitle page, information on authors and editors, annotation, table of contents, au-
thors' introduction and concluding comments from book "The M. V. Frunze Military
Academy", Voyenizdat, 50,000 copies, 280 pages]
[Text] The M. V. Frunze Military Academy
A History of the Military Academy (Order of Lenin, Order of the October Revolution,
Order of the Red Banner, Order of Suvorov)
Signed to press: 26 Feb 79
Copies: 50,000
Pages: 280
Military Publishing House of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Order of the Red Banner
of Labor, Moscow, 1980
Board of Editors: T. V. Bel'skiy, P. V. Mel'nikov, I. M. Ovcharenko, A. I. Radzi-
~skiy, V. G. Reznichenko, A. A, Sidorenko
Authors: I. M. Ovcharenko (chief), N. S. Golovko, I. L. Gnedoy, V. Ye. Yerofeyev,
P. A. Zagumennyy, D. A. Ivanov, P. V. Ivanov, N. G. Ivanyuta, V. A. Karnoukhov, S. V.
?~ipitskiy, I. S. Lyutov, P. S. Matronov, Ye. P. MozzhukhiiY, N. A. Rakhmanin, B. V.
Panov, F. D. Sverdlov, K. I. Tikhoobrazov, A. P. Shurygin.
Illustrations selected by D. F. Lavrov
:he M. V. Frunze Military Academy is the first Soviet institute of higher military
education and training, and a center of military and scientific thought. It has
trained tens of thousands of highly qualified commanders, and has produced Marshals
of the Soviet Union, chief marshals, and marshals of branches of service.
This is the book's second edition. It relates the history of the academy, its role
in the preparation of military personnel, and in the development of military and
- scientific thought. It describes how the professorial and instructor s.*_aff and the
students participated in front line combat during the civil war and Great Patriotic
War.
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This edition has been supplemented with new material, in particular, with respect to
the role of V. I. Lenin in founding the acader~y, and on its development during the
post-war period. The book is intended for a wide circle of readers.
COPYRIGHT: Voyenizdat, 1980
Table of Contents
Authors' Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Chapter I--The Civil War and Military Intervention (1918-1920). 7
- 1. Born through revolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -
2. The time of formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3 . Wi th a book and a r if 1 e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4. Beginning the fiery years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Chapter II--The Years of Peaceful Socialist Construction (1921-1941). 52
1. The transition from war to peace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -
2. Military reform and the academy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3. Technical reconstruction of the Red Army and the academy. 84
4. On the eve of war . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Chapter III--The Great Patriotic War Years (1941-1945) . � � � � � � � � . . 118
1. Initial period of the war . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -
2. The year of the radical turning point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
_ 3. The concluding period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
Chapter IV--The Post-War Academy (1945-1953~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
1. New conditions, new missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -
2. Officer personnel learn from the generalized experience of the war. 172
- Chapter V--The Years of Energetic Scientific and Technical Pragress (1954-1970) 191
1. A new stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -
2. In step with time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
Chapter VI--On the True Path (1971-1978) . . . . . � � � � . � � � � � � � � 22~
1. Towards efficiency and quality in training techniques and procedures. . -
2. The scope of military and scientific research . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
3. The development of party and political work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
In Place of Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
_ Chronological Listing of the Most Significant Events in the Academy's History 263
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Authors' Introduction
This book relates the history of the first Soviet institute af higher military edu-
cation and training--the M. V. Frunze Military Academy; Order of Lenin, Order of the
October Revolution, Ordcr of the Red Banner, Order of Suvorov. For 60 years now the
academy has been preparing highly qualified military personnel of command and staff
profile for the Soviet armed forces.
The birth and entire activity of the academy are inherently related to the titanic
struggle of the Communist Party in creating and strengtheninb the Soviet state dnd
its army. The academy was established at the personal direction of V. I. Lenin and
his close comrades-in-arms, to include the distinguished statesman, Ya. M. Sverdlov,
and the famous military worker of the party, N. I. Podvoyskiy. In the beginning it
was called the General Staff Academy of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. It was
redesignated in 1921 as the Military Academy of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army,
and since 1925 has been known as the Military Academy of the Workers' and Peasants'
- Red Army imeni M. V. Frunze.
Over the period of its existence the academy has trained hundreds of thousands of
officers--ideologically liardened and dedicated to the Soviet people, possessing mil-
itary knowledge and skills on the level of the latest achievements in military sci-
ence. Students of the academy have taken part in fierce battles for the freedom and
independence of the Soviet Republic over the years of intervention and the civil war.
They fought with the Japanese militarists in the Lake Khasan region and on the Khal-
khin-Gol River, with White Finns on the Karelian Isthmus, led units [chast' and so-
yedineniye] and formations Cob"yedineniye] into battles and skirmishes against the
German fascist invaders and Japanese militarists during the Great Patriotic War.
Former students of the academy include such military leaders as Marshals of the Sov-
_ iet Union I. Kh. Bagramyan, P. F. Batitskiy, S. S. Biryuzov, S. M. Budennyy, L. A.
Govor.ov, F. I. Golikov, A. A. Grechko, A. I. Yeremenko, G. K. Zhukov, M. V. Zakharov,
I. S. Konev, P. K. Koshevoy, G. I. Kulik, V. G. TCulikov, R. Ya. Malinovskiy, K. A.
Meretskov, K. K. Rokossovskiy, V. D. Sokolovskiy, S. K. Timoshenko, F. I. Tolbukhin,
and V . I . Chuyicov .
_ Approximately 700 academy alumni have been granted the title Hero of the Soviet
Lr~ion for their able troop leadership on the fields of battle, for the courage and
heroism they extiibited in defending the Motherland.
In the post-war period, the academy has graduated new contingents of officers who
hold responsible posts in today's central and peripheral leadership structure, who
command units Csoyedineniye, chast'].
The academy has always been and remains one of the centers of development for Soviet
military science.
This edition has been supplemented with new material and documentation. The organi-
zational role played by V. I. Lenin in establishing the academy has been more fully
presented. His meetings with graduates and instructors of the academy are described
in greater detail, and more light is shed on the academy`s most recent period of ac-
tivity.
In writing this book, the authors have used works published at the academy, documents
from the archives, and the memoirs of former students and instructors.
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In Place of Conclusion
The ri. V. Frunze riilitary Aczdemy has traversed a great path. Behind it are 60 years
of creative striving, the heroic accomplishment and selfless labor of the professor-
ial and instructor staff, of students, workers and other employees of the academy.
Established by the Communist Party at the initiative and personal direction of V. I.
Lenin, the academy has trained thousands of highly qualified, ideologically hardened
officer cadre, who have devoted their entire being to the Motherland. Regardless of
adversity or the complexity of tasks they had to face, no matter what difficulties
they had to encounter, personnel of the academy have always been, and remain rallied
around the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government. The academy bears with
honor and merit the title of first Soviet academy for conmmanders.
- During the years of peaceful socialist construction, the academy made a significant
contribution to working out a number of major issues of military science and the
military art, and to accomplishing many practical tasks associated wxth building the
USSR's armed forces.
The Great Patriotic [dar was a severe test for the Soviet Union as to the correctness
of the basic directions, forms and methods of training command personnel for our
ground forces. Through heroic activity and capable troop leadership on the fields
of battle against a br~at?~ enemy, academ~ graduates showed the superiority of the
Soviet military over the war theories of Hitler's generals, over their adventuristic
strategy and tactics. Courage, a readiness for self-sacrifice and loyalty to their
military obligation--among many othex outstanding moral, combat qualities--were
demonstrated by our Red Army commanders in the struggle against fascism. Among
these commanders are a great number of academy alumni.
The post-war years presented academy personnel with important missions that had to
be fulfilled. This involved first of all the rebuilding of the entire training
process in conformity with new military requirements. This meant increased attention
devoted to matters of moral, political and psychological hardening of personnel.
Finally, it involved concern and attention paid to further development of military
science and the military art. The academy managed every one of these tasks, and con-
tinues to manage them successfully.
The strength of our. army and navy lies in the sage leadership of the Communist Party
1 and in its Leninist Central Committee. This is what comprises the base of the acad-
emy's successful operation.
The sacred duty af every general and officer of the academy, of every worker and
employee, is to be an active conveyer of Communist Party policy from this time for-
_ ward, and to follow all aspects of its directives.
History of the academy continues.
COPYRIGHT: Voyenizdat, 1980
9768
CSO: 1801/308 END
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