JPRS ID: 10106 WEST EUROPE REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070021-7
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 21
• Content Type: REPORTS

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070021-7
F()R OFFIC.IAL USE ON1.Y
J~RS L/10106
9 November 19a1
West E u ro e Re o rt
p p
(FOUO 58/S 1)
~
Fg~$ ~FORElGN BROADCAST INFORMAT~ON S~ERVICE
FOR OFFiCIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070021-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070021-7
NOTE
JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign
ne~aspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency
transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language
sources are translated; those from English-language sources
are trar_scribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and
other characteristics retained.
Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets
are supplied by JYRS. Processing indicators such as [Text)
or [Excerpt) in the first line of each item, or following the
last line of. a brief, indicate how the original information was
processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor-
mation was summarized or ext~acted.
Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
enclosed ir. parent~eses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the
original but have been supplied as appropriate in context.
Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an
~.tem originate with the source. Times within items are as
given by source.
The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.
7
COPYRIGI-iT LAWS AND REGUI.ATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF
' MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIR~ THAT DISSEMINATION
- OF THI~ PUBLICATION BE RE~TRICTED Fi~R OFFICIAL USE ONI,Y.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070021-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R000400070021-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
JPRS L/10106
9 Novemb~r 1981
WEST EUROPE REPO~T
~ (FOUO 58/81)
~
CONT~NTS
Th'EATE~2 FORCFS
FRANCE
I~lodernization of Nuclear Weapons Planned
' (Pierre Mauroy; AIR & COSMOS, 19 Sep 81) 1
POLITICAL
F~ADT CE
Detailed Analysis of Presidential, Legislative Flections
(Alain Lancelot; PROJEGT, Sept-Oct 81) 1+
- a - [III - WE - Z50 FOUOj
F(1R !1G'~i('T A T i fC~ l1Ni V
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070021-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400074021-7
~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
THEATER FORCES FRANCE
P10DERNIZATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS PLANNED
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 19 Sep 81 pp 40, 64
[Report on Pr.ime Minister Pierre Mauroy's speech to the Institute for Advanced
National Defe.T~ise Studies in Paris; date not specified]
[Text] Pierre Mauroy, prime minister of the Fr~nch Government formed this Jun~,
spoke at the opening session of the 34th class of th~ Institute for Advanced National
Defense Studies (IHEDN). He outlined, fur the instit~.ute's civilian and military
auditors, the principal points of France's defPnse policy.
Recourse to a Genuine People's Mobilization ~
The prime minister opened his remarks by st~ting that "for a government, defense is,
like the threat, a comprehensive matter and cannot be examined solely from the
military viewpoint....
_ "A divided country is a weak country. To have Frenchmen take active responsibility
for thei.r security, they must feel themselves bolstered and protected by the fact of
being part of the nation....
"Before being able to ask citizens to assume their resgonsibilities to society, the
latter should guarantee their rights, and foremost of all. their right to work.
"Extended and r.~ore thorough deliberation on natioreal. compulsory mi"litary service, its
substance and its length, must incorporate particularly these established principles.
Beyond the fact that our nuc].ear deterrent force cannot be the sole guaran~ee of our
defense and that it is essential for our three traditional military services to have
sufficient well-trained and well.-equipped personnel, national compulsory military
service is one of the expressians of national solidarity. It is through such
service that the unity of the Frencn people can and must show itself, unity that is
indispensable to the effectiveness of our defense policy.
"Although the present conjuncture precludes our reducing the length of compulsory
military service in the immediate future, there is still a need to make such service
more efficient. This term of service, during which each citizen fulfills, of course,
~ a duty but also exercises his right to learn the profession of arms, must b~ a period
of genuine instruction and training. And inasmuch as this is a right vested in each
citizen, there is no reason for women to be excluded therefrom in the name of a
historical tradition. Hence the women's voluntary service should be encourag~d.
1
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070021-7

APPROVED F~R RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070021-7
FUId OFFIC'IAI. l1SE ONI,Y
"A more substantial military service of truly operational character would make it
- possible to face the problem of territorial defense dynamically by having recourse
to a genuine peopie's mobilization."
~
Independent Military Policy
After having emphasized that "France intends to remain loyal to i~s allies, thP
foremost of which is the United States of America," and that it also "abides by all
of the treaties which produced the TrTestern Europezn Union," the prime minister
reminded his audience that "France's policy is by no means neutralist," that "any
isolation is impiacticable," and that "aggression against France does not begin when
the enemy penetrates i.nto our national territory."
- He did point out, however, that "France ~i.ntends to retain its independence in making
_ military choices a.nd decisions. The instrumentality of this decision-making
- independence is the nuclear deterrent. If General de Gaulle was able t~ follow an
independent military policy which resulted in making France withdraw from the North
Atlantic Treaty's integrated military organization, it is because he chose t~ give
the country a nuclear capability. It is true that research in this field had been
initiated much before General de Gaulle came to pbwer.
"The government assumes full responsibility for continued implementation of that
choice. In fact, the country's military posture gives it no other means of recourse.
"Induced to seek an independent military defense system, our country has established
a powerful nuclear force for which it is indebted to no one. This gives it a
specific role in the world and particularly in Europe...."
Anticities Strategy
' Prime Minister Mauroy added: "French strategy remains, therefore, a strategy whereby
the weak deters the strong, in other words a strategy which can only be anticities.
It is essentially hased on thE capability of inflicting upon even the most powerful
aggressor damage deemed greater than the stake which the country's vital interests
represent to hirr~. This strategv is made possible by what.is called the equalizing
power of the atom. Yet thi.s deterrence must also be credible, that is to say
actuated in the liighest degree by an unshakable political will buttressed with a ~
clear and averred doctrine as well as with the existence of sufficient forces and
weapons to compel the ad�?ersary to so reckon with them that he forgoes his attack.
"A strate;y is not immutable, however, and must adapt itself to changes in thr~ats
and technologies. It is certainly quite out of the question for France to adopt,
like the United 5tates, a strategy of deterrence compris~ng a varied and complete
range of responses that could be adapted, according to the situation, to different
possible levels of aggression....
Complementary Tactical Nuclear Weapons
"Despite continous adaptations and moderni.zation, the strategic nuclear deterrent
may prove to be inadequate by itself alo:ie or may be circumvented. To avoid this
circumvention, conventional forces enhanced by tactical nuclear weapons now
complement the strategic nuclear deterrent. Tactical nuclear weaponry's role is to
2
FOI2 OFFIC[AL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070021-7

APPROVED F~R RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070021-7
FOR nFFI('IAI. IiSE ONT.ti'
restore deterrence :i[ the strategic level. Its employment would serve notice of
the President of the Republic's determination to take extreme measures and resort,
if need be, to antip~pulation nucZear weapons.
"Hence it is not a question of using tactical nuclear weapons to win a battle, ~ut c+f
credibly brandishing, through them~ the strategic nuclear threat in the event the
aggressor, wPre, in spite of everything, to start an armed conflict in the European
theatPr. In addition, the presence of ~hese weapons in our conventional forces
compels the enemy to disperse his forces to reduce their vulnerabi2ity to nuclear
attack, thus reducing his offensive capability.
"For 7 years now, the army has been equipped with Pluton [surface-to-surface missiles]
for which a successor will soon have t~ be found. The navy, with its carrier-based
Super Etendard aircraft, and the air foree, wzth its Jaguar aircraft,,and soon its
Mirage 2000's armed with the medium-range air-to-surface missile, also have a
tactical nuclear capability.
"As is the case with our strategic forces, we shoiild ke2p abreast of technical
advances by periodically ada~ting and modernizing the weapons and delivery vehicles
of our tactical nuclear arsenal."
Continued Study of Neutron Weapons
Mauroy recalled that "the United States recently decided to arm itself with enhanced
radiation weapons, the so-called neutron bombs. Furthermore, the Soviet Union,
according to its very own statements, is thoroughly capable of producing such we3pons.
These developments must alert us. Neutran weapons are tactical nuclear weapons for
the same reason as the others. They pose, therefore, a threat of employment on a
battlefield that could extend to Western Europe. As far as we are concerned, it
would not be rational to renounce a priori acquiring a weapon that could increase
our deterrent capability. This capability still has to be given more thorough
study. That is why the government has decided to continuP the studies on this
subject."
COPYRIGHT: AIR & COSMOS 1981
8041
CSO: 3100/44
3
FOR OFFICIAL USE UNLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070021-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000404070021-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
POLITICAL FRANCE
DETAILED ANALYSIS OF PRESIDENTIAL, LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS
Paris PROJET in French Sept-Oct 81 pp 915-939
[Article by Alain Lancelot, Center for Studying French Contemporary Life of the Na-
tional Political Science Foundation]
[Text] Just as after each election*, A. Lancelot analyzes here
in detail the results of the presidential and l.egislative elec-
elections: 7 weeks of elections threw political France in con-
fusion. After that "calm revolution," the socialists have many
trump cards in their hands, but they also have to face up to
considerable risks.
On 21 .3une 1981, the French people entered summer af.*_er having upset from top to
bottom their ipadership and their political representation by a revolution as calm
as the one governing the change of seasons. Who would have believed, 2 months
earlier, that Mitterrand would make a fool of Marchais in the first round, would
beat Giscard d'Estaing in the second, wouJ.d' elect to the Assemb~y'~u absolute ma-
jority of socialist deputies and would finally admit communist ministers in the
government without causing this prodigious series to give rise in the nation to
anything other than congenial enthusiasm or genuine uneasiness? Who would have
said that Fiterman would sit very naturally in D'Ornano's.chair without g:ving
rise to anything other than curiosity, without the slightest appearance of the
shadow of the smallest "chaos"? French democracy is definitely more adult than
was thought. The political myths on which we have Tived grew terribZy old over-
night during the last few weeks. A great administration is asserting itself.
Without:lo$ing~our reasori ~for~r~:]:~l that and falling from one mythology into another,
on hearing the new ministers bring up for any reason whatsoever or for no reason
at all the 10 May "liberation" and condemn the "old regime," we find the same ir-
z�itati.on as we found in the face of "C~S = SS" [State Security Police = Schu~tz-
staffel] in May 1963. In order to arrive at a more fair evaluation of.the situa-
tion, we shall do our best to observe some scientific detachment. The exact ex-
tent of the change that came out of the ballot boxes can be derived only by an
* For the last important elections., see PROJET Number 88 (September-0ctober 1974),
Number 126 (June 1978) and Number 138 (September-October 1979).
. ~
- FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070021-7

APPROVED F~R RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070021-7
FUR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY
impartial analysis of the fluctuations in the voters during the 7 weeks of recur-
rent elections through which France has ~ust gone.
First Round: 26 Aprii
'The 1981 presidential election is the first one occurring at its n..~rma.l time since
1965. That is to say that it was preceded by an interminable campaign: Since
the 1978 legislative election--in spite of the apparent dist~action bf~~the.I979
European election--prepara~ion for the presidentia? election polarized France's
entire political activity. On the right, announcement uf the first serious can-
didacy, Michel nebre, it is true, only dates from 30 June 1980. But then a Chirac
candidacy aimed at taking on speed. It had been predic.table since the "Cochin
call" in Decemt~er 1978, if not since establishment of the RPR [Rally for the Re-
publicJ in December 1976, although it was not to become official until 3 February
1981. Meanwhile, Marie-France Garaud also entered the ring as a candidate on 23
October 1980, undoubtedly without giving rise to as many illusions as as Debre
- on the deterrent effect of this ~iecision on. Chirac's candidacy. With regard to
Giscard d'Es~aing, he announced his candidacy officially on 2 March 1981, but no
one never seriously doubted his desire, a* the age of 55 years, to renew his term
in off ice.
On the left, th2 candidacy of Marchais, announced on 12 October 1980, had been
foreseen as lon~ as Chirac's candidacy on the right. The same logic applies: at-
- tempt to restrain, if not to upset, the restoration of balance that occurred to
the benef it of the party most in the center in each of the two large coalitions
~ contending for the government of France. On the other hand, more uncArtainties
surrounded the noncommunist and the extreme left candidacies.
With regard to the noncommunist left, the problem was less that of a radical left
candidacy--finally settled on 28 February 1981 by the nomination of Crepeau--than
a problem of identity of the socialist candidate: Michel Rocard or Francois MiC-
terrand? Rocard dates from the evening of the second round of the 1978 legislative
election and con~tantly held the fiPld captivating interest of the media and
prancing at the head of opinion polls, but he pledged, in the Metz Congress, not
- to seek the party's nomination against Francois Mittexransi. Mitterrand maneuvere.1
without declaring himself. He had opening of the nomination procedure within his
party delayed until autumn 1980,allowing his young competitor to put himself for-
ward on 18 October by means of the unfortunate "Conflans call," in order better
to make a fool of him a few days later by seeming to respond to the requests of
friendly federations. Francoi~ Mitterrand, who announced his candidady on 8 Novem-
ber and who was nomiaated on 24 January 1981 by a unanimous special congress of
= his party, regained abundantly the image of a'winner' in the eyes of public opin-
ion by replacing Michel Rocard, who had forbidden himself from opposing him. The
old fighter won a decisive "primary" without striking a blow, giving him new po-
litical youth as if he had taken over the youth of the discarde3 challenger.
On the extreme left, division between the fortnations still raised the same problems.
Ariette Laguiller and Alain Krivine wanted to represent their separate Trotskyite
families. Huguette Bouchardeau intended to speak for the PSU [Unified Socialist
Party] and Roget Garaudy had become spokesman of the new "social movements" a long
time ago, close to the ecologist movement in which there were a number of candt-
dates for nomination: Brice Lalonde, selected by the 15 June 1980 "primaries,"
5
� FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070021-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070021-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Jean-Claude Belarue, and even Jacques-Yves Cousteau. But all those candidacies
ran up against the new provisions governing p~esidential elections since 18 June
1976, stipulating that ~o one can be a candidate, if he has not obtained the signa-
ture of 500 elected officials ~members of Parliament, d~artmental coun;:ilmen~
mayors) belonging to at le~:~= 30 departmen~s or overseas territories. These striCt
regulations rejected A. Krivine in the far right and the two extreme left candidates
who announced their candidacy on the same day, 11 November 1979: J~an-Marie Le Pen,
nominated by the National Front, and Pascal Gauchon, nominated by the New Forces
Party. In addition, it dissuadEd Roger Garaudy, Jean-Claude Delarue and even--if
~ we believe the press--about 60 other more or less freakish candidates from having
a chance to present their ideas during the great April-May 19$1 election meet.
A Negative Campaign
Four features of the election campaign of the 10 candidates finally a~proved by
the ConstiLutional Council merit b~ing pointed out: 1. this campaign contributed
practically notring: everyt~hing had been said and repeated since 1978; 2. it was
- dominated by unernployment and inflation: all the outgoing president's adversaries
claimed to do better [han he and he himself promised to make the struggle against
unemployment the first of his priorities; 3. consequently, the campaign was more
_ negative than positive: the nine "anti-Giscard" candidates criticized the eco-
noniic and social policy of the Barre government, which they accused of having made
the crisis worse, and Giscard d'Estaign assured that t'he policy of his successors
would be still worse; 4. aside from the "little" candidates who often contr~buted
a certain amount of freshness, the campaign prize list gav~ the advantage to Chirac
- and Mitterrand over Giscard d'Estaing and Marchais. Chirac's campaign was definitely
the more dynamic and the most inventive one, although this invention cc~nsisted
in importing the topic of less central government authority dear to Reagan. Mit-
terrand's campaign had effective discretion. Under the sign of "the calm force,"
the socia.ist candidate was careful not to put himself forward too much and he
carefully smoothed out all his personal or political rough spots. Giscard d'Es-
- taing's csmpaign, condemned to repeat presidential or governmental speeches,
lacked a little wind and conviction, disillusioning those who e~:pected miracles
f-rom entrance in the race by the office-holder. With regard to the cauYpaign of
Marchais, it was content to repeat a well-worn "act" in which irony was mixed with
brutality on a background of simplistic demagoguery that was beginning to tire.
Apparently, nothing very new, consequently, when destiny gave the three traditional
knocks and the curta:~n was.r.aised~on26 April on the first tableau of an "election
- drama" about whict, it was not yet known whether it would involve two or four acts.
But as early as the evening of the first round, surprise was in the contest. Some-
thing budged, as is shown by the results given tn table 1[next page].
If we adhere to great trends, the change was certainly limited in comparison with
the three previous elections:
etxo o~itan Presidential Legislative European Presidential
-~r-airce 1974 1978 1y79 1981
Participation 84.9 83,3 61,1 81,7
Left 46.1 49.8 47.5 47.3
Ecologists 1.3 2.2 4.4 3.9
Center and right 52.6 48.0 48.1 48.8
- 6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070021-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000404070021-7
FOR OFF[CIAL USE O1~ILY
rn o~ o o v a.-+ ~ r. ~~~~,o'
O O O~ r'f O r'1 r'f 00 N W 00 f~f
~ CO ~ ~ N.-~ lA ~l1 N tD P'1 ~ f~ 01
pp .-r N V N ~ ~
~ 01 N 1~ lA 1~ 1~ M N� O 1~ O~ Q N OD .r f'f ~
~f~ pp f~ l0 ~ ~f1 ~11 N ~D ~ M tf7 M a N N N
~O CO O 1~ Qi O c'f O~ Oi CO N O CO GO l0 f~
~ 00 ~O N 1~ M f0 .r t0 lf1 N 1A t0 N lA ~D t0
~ Q1 tO f~ M l6 N 1ll O R Q~ N N N Cp CO ~
[-1 t~1 ~ll ~ ef O ~O f'1 ~t ~[1 t0 Y'f .~r N N Q e7 f+f
~o rn~c rn e n ~ ao ~n a
^7 N N ~ n'~ '
u7 tD O O ~ t!l Ml O~ ~O 1~ O ~'f
~ O P') ~O lA O 01 00 1~ M 1n M et O ~ lA ~I1
~ ~ ~ ^ N p ~ O pp N ~ ~ N N ^
~
~ ~ t~
M'I O~ V lA T Y'1 N Q+ a0 f"f N O N ~ 1l1 f~ at
~j ln O~ ~O M ~f/ O~
a o v ~r, i. n oo i. ~o ~n o rn n a a w
~ N rn c.~ co m-~ v a c., e.i o
th O~ f~"1 Q~ .r N ~ N 1~
ti
~
N
w
'd
~
O
PG
N N I~ O 01 M N M ~ N O ~Q ~D ~D 1~ ~O
~ N O n O~ N OO C~1 M 1~ l0 t!1 ~D O1 rn c~ ~o i. er
'rI lO ~n .Y O T~++ O n'1 O ~O tA N O uf
G4 Cl " ~ ~ c~ ~n ~
N
~ pp ~p
~n V ~D ~G Nf ~O O~ O O~ t0 00 M 00
~ ; ~ I~ >0~31 15 70! 26Q S1~J5
� Gt~cerA 0'[~t~~nq 1/ 219 OSI ~1,11 7S~ 0)1 72.22 71 ~2~ 19.6E 1~ 6~2 706 18.2~
Key:
1. Registerpd 3. Blank and void
_ 2. Voters 4. Valid votes
The 10 May results (table 2) show that this strategy paid off. F. Mitterrand,
who was beaten by 344,399 votes in metropolitan France in 1974, won this time over
V. Giscard d'Estaing with a lead of 1,322,854 votes. In number of votes, each
of the two candidates exceeded, in the second round, his potential in the first.
V. Giscard d'Estaing abtained 301,055 votes more than the total for the right ~nd
F. Mitterrand 2,073,498 more than the total for the left. Therefore, the some
1,118,000 ecologists. were not the only ones to arbitrate. Mobilization of ab-
- stentionists also played a part. In fact, abstentionism dropped by 1,676,475 units.
. But, in view of the duplication�-easily exp~$inable--of blank and void ballots,
the number of votes cast increased only by 1,256,591. By addiag the number of
these new votes cast and the number of ecologist voters,, we obtain a total of
2,374,823 votes theoretically available to each of the cwo camps. According to
national. statistics, 87 oercent of these potential voters seem to have cY~osen the
left.
This calculation shows up very well the size of F. Mitterrand's victory, even though
- it is naturally unrealistic. In fact, it would assume that discipline was perfect
in each camp and that all the voters in the first round also voted in the second.
Both conditi~~~~ ~r~ f.~ise.
The increase in participation certainly does not facilitate analysis af ti?e elec-
tion discipline by often masking all or part of the bad reports. Often~ but not
always, at least on the right. While F. Mitterrand obisined, in votes and ~.n per-
centages, better results that all the left in every departm~nt, the situation was
much less ur.iformly favorable for V. Giscard d'Estaing.
- Giscard in the Second Round, Compared With Total for the Right in the First Round
- In % In vot~s
Setback Setback 16 departments
Setback Progress 78 departments
Progress Progress 2 departments ~
1~+
,
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070021-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400074021-7
I~UR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY
As might be expected, the 16 unfaithful departments all belong to J. Chirac's .
strength areas; especially in the Limoges re.gion. La Correze is almost caricatural
in this respect, because V. Giscar�d d'Estaing di~ not even get the number of votes
in ~he second round that J. Chirac obtained in the first. In order to detect aigns
of infidelity on the left, it is necessar5~ to drop down to the c~r~unal leve~ and
carefully s~a~r.~t~ among the communes with a strong communist implantation. Thus,
traces of disconCent are found ir. Ivey, Villejuif or Ar.cueil. But anly traces.
Essentially, discipline worked well on the left and F. M.itterrand owes his success,
in the fcllowing o�rder, to communist discipline, an increase in participation,
a transfer of Chirar voters and tY;~ carryover of ~he ma~ority of ecologist voters.
~ The postelectoral poll taken by SOFRES [French Opinion Polling Company] confirms
these conclusions and makes it possible to make a credible appraisal of the trans-
- fers from one round to the other.
' First Round Vote Second Round Vote Abstentions
' Mitterrand Giscard or no reP1y
Marchais = 100% 92 2 6
_ Lalonde = lOQ% 53 26 21
- Chirac = 100% 16 73 11
Map 5: Presidential election: second Map 6: Departments in which V. Giscard
' round, 10 May 1981, deparments d'Estaing did not obtain, on
. in which V. Giscard d`Estaing had 10 May, the total number of
� a ma~ority rightist votes on 26 April
\
"
5 6
Owing to these contributions, Francois Mitterrand brought the total number of left-
- ist votes up to a level never attained since the establishment of the Fifth Repub-
lic. How is that explained? FirsC of all, the modification of the.body of voters
- must not be overlooked. From 1978 to 1981, there were an additional 1,056,102
registrations in metropolitan France. But, in that same period, mortality struck
around 1,515,000 persons of voting age. Therefore, new registration amount to
= around 2.57 million persons, mostly young persons about whom polls show us that
almost two-thirds of them voted for the socialist candidate.. Even if ~ae agree
that these new registered voters may have abstained more than than their elders
(or. the order of a fouz�th), they did not contribute less than 1.2 million votes
to F. Mitterrand compared with only 700,000 to his opponent, hit, on the other
hand, more than proportionally by the death of elderly voters.
15
Gnp n~~zrr ~ T ~ ~c~ /lAii V
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070021-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400074021-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Added to that is the effect of the mobilization of abstentionists. Almost 88 per- .
_ cent of the registered voters voted on 19 May 1974 and over 83 percent on 12 March
1978, while only 81.7 percent voted on 26 April 1981. Therefore, there was un-
deniably a reserve of potential leftist voters, ln view of the second round within
- abstention. On the basis of the second round in 1974, this reserve might amount
- to 1.9 million vo*_ers, approximately. At least3 1.6 million were undoubtedly mo-
bilized to ensure F. Mitterrand's victory on 10 May.
There remains the transfer of voters who voted for Chirac, Debre or Garaud in the
first round. Apparently, a conversion more difficult to explain is involved. Nei-
� ther J. Chirac's "para-Reaganism;'nor M. Debre's historical De Gaullism, nor :
- M. F. Garaud`s antisovietism leads to a choice of F. Mitterrand rather than V.
Giscard d'Estaing. But political space is not one-dimensi~~nal. rk'~nY voters who
J voted for the three archeo- or neo-Gaullist candidates in the first round essen�-
tially expressed rejection of the outgoing president, accompanied by a preference
for rPplacement rather than for rotation. When replacement failed, a considerable
part of those favoring replacement chose a change whPn faced with a choice between
continuity ahtl~ change. Because aspiration to a change was very strong in the
spring of 19tS1. The prospects of seeing the same man a~nd, without doubt, basically
the same team, stay in office 7 more years, that is to say a total of 14 years,
seemed truly intolerab?e to many. De Gaulle himself was able to rem~in in of�2ce
only 11 years and his supports dropped, during ~.hat period.. from 79.2 percent to
46.8 percent.
_ Moreover, the French people ended up by believing that the crisis was made worse
rather ~han attenuated,by the policy of the Barre government. This opinion is not
shared by most of the foreign experts, but the voters do not search for their rea-
sons in economic periodicals. When the RPR ~oined in ...the~. concert of critics.
of the ~pposi~ion, the government's.economic policy appeared to the majority of
the people to be an inadmissible failure. Under those conditions, reele~.ction of
N. Giscard d'Estaing promisedto be diff icult. Deterioxation of his personal image
result.;.ng from unworthy campaigns, but also owing to the accent~xatian of certain
defects (taste for political "gadgets," inability to open himself up tc~ question,
selection of a flattering following) were to do the rest. Seven years ago, Che
article that I wrote for PROJET ended as follows: "If the new team fails, there
is no longer any other solution than rotation and opening up--so desired and so
feared-,~c,f;~ socialist ex~eriment. For V. Giscard d'Estaing, replacement time is
also time for sureease."
Worsening of tlie crisis, abandonment of the reform prospects at the beginning of
the 7-year term to the benefit of an ultraconservative orientation centered on
security, the mortal split kept up by the ambition of Jacques Chirac and his
friends prevented this surcease, extended by a miracle in 1978 by the suicidal
division of the opposition, from being renewed for 7 years. But, all in all,
history might well be more merciful than poliCics toward Giscard d'Estaing.
3 At least, because the new 10 May voters were sti~.l maxe_.numerous than it seemed,
owing to the fact that some 26 April vot~rs abstained in the second round.
A. Lancelot, "Replacement and Surcease, Analysis' o~~ the. Resus~~s o�:.-~h~~Ma3~.-.19Z4
Presidential ~lection," PROJET, No. ~ 88;~ September�-0'etober '197~,~'pp~ 94~1~i~958.
16
,
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070021-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070021-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Maps 7 to 10; Legislative elections. Voter movements from the first 1978 round
to the first 1981 round.
7. Pressure of abstentions and void ballots greater than 11 points.
8. Falloff of the PCF greater than 5 points.
9. PS-MRG gains greater than 13 points.
10. Falloff of the right greater than 6 points.
.
I~I
4
_ `
~
~
7 B ~
~Y~
~
~
9 ~o
Upsurge of Socialism in the 14 June Legislative Election
The el~ction of Francois Mitterrand changed the f.a.cts of the electoral situation
from top to bottom. It is an understatement to say that hope changed sides. From
then on, legitimacy has been illuminating the socialist movement with its incompar-
able light and this movement has been benef iting fully, from then on, with the
majority logic of the institutions of the Fifth Republic.
_ When he was inaugurated on 21 May, in the rejoicing of a youth that was hardly
recognized in the previous administration, F. Mitterrand became "pr.esident of the
Republic." On that same day, he appointed P. Mauroy prime minister. On the next
day, the National Assembly was dissolved and an almost exclusively socialist
17
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070021-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R000400070021-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
governrdent was formed. The content may change; the forms remaim. An experiment
is starting, but the Republi.c goes on and the logic of stability works, as always,
in favor of tite presidential trend. A socialist vote means giving the president
th~ means for fulf illing the mandate with which he has just been entrusted. It
means l~yally trying the experiment. A vote for the outgoing majority, means ki11-
ing change before it has hatched and immediately bringing a political crisis to
the heart of the institutions.
Now, the change immediately proved to be positive for the greatest number. If
the stock market collapsed and if the franc was threatened, that did not affect
the French people immediately. The same does not apply to the distributive mea-
- sures adopted by the ministerial cabinet on 3 June. The increase in the SMIC [Inter-
occupational Minimum Growth ~Tage], the minimum old-age benef it, family allowances,
the housing allowance seemed to be the pledge of the government's desire to imple-
ment another economic and social policy and they gave the poorest ~raction of the
population the impression of a real oxygen flask. In the belief that only "the
rich will pay," the French people were discovering the good side of the restart.
A good side that is all the more sensible since the rotation was accomplished with-
out the slightest crisis, the slightest street movenent, the slightest false note.
The "chaos" always announced, the "May '68" catmly predicted by the right, did
not show up. The socialists were bathed in a state of grace. The right was legal-
- istic and the PCF was trying to save its assets in the legislative election.
The prospects nf the election evidently domir.ated the period. The Socialist Party
approached them with a communicative faith that was barely tarnished by a few in-
clinations toward anti-Rocard pettiness in the investitures. It played up fully
the presence of the socialist government. In my district, the socialist candidate
and his alternate pledged, in a prof.ession of faith of the purest Radical-UDR [Union
of Democrats for the Republic] style. "to be the interpreters of the aspirations
(of the voters) and of the vital needs of our region with our minister friends,
several of whom came recently to discuss with you." The PCF, in turn, was con~~:
stantly putting itself before the eyes of all in the new majority. The time when
Marchais threatened, in a high-pitched voice, not to "go along for a free ride"
seemed very rem~te! Jospin, who replaced Mitterrand as first secretary of the
PS when Mitterrand announced his candidacy, took note, not without irony, of this
new attitude at the opening of negoti.~,tions between the two parties. He said:
"We appreciate the new tone that you have adopted, the prudence of your remarks,
at times even the quality of your silence." On 4 June, an agreement was concl~ded
that stressed the convergences, confirmed the automatic desistance needed for "es-
tablishment of a coherent, lastir~g ma~ority," but it says nothing about participa�-
tion by communists in the future government. "Starting at that time (victory of
a leftist majority), a new meeting will be necessary." Marchais asked for no other
- corunitment and his candidates almost forgot to indicate their party's name on their
posters on which they presented themselves first of all as candidates of the left
union majority.
On the right, the election strategy was played in the few days f.ollowing F. Mitter-
rand's victory. On 11 May, Giscard d'Estaing, forgetting that he had Chirac's
name applauded the week before when he needed his rallying, denounced "the pre-
meditated treasonable acts" that led to his defeat, and Lecanuel seemed to echo
him by advocating generalized primaries within the outgoing majority, contrary
to Chirac who proposed, a:? the other hand, a single candidacy. The initial
18
~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070021-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400074021-7
N't~R OF'FICIAL L?SF, ONI,Y
position of the Giscard followers was undoubtedly not very realistic. It under-
estimated the discredit suffered from the 10 May defeat and the desire for unifi-
- cation on the part of the outgoing UDF [French Democratic UnionJ members who were
not very anxious to fight on two fronts. Very quickly, the need for union overrode
resentment. Chirac and Lecanuel signed a pact "of union for the new majority'~
- on 15 May, calling attention of the two parties of the outgoing majority to the
common principles and announcing a unified campaign. The primaries will continue
to be the exception, 86 off icially, or in less than one out of five districts in
metropolitan France.
- This decision, together with the conditions of consultation that ~eft little time
for the small parties to seek out spokesmen and little hope for the irregulars
because it was so obvious that the PS was well favored, contributed to reducing
the total number of candidates: 2,648 in r.?etropolitan France compared with 4,184
in 1978. This lack of spirit of cotrtpetition also characterized the campaign.
Everything had been said and no one paid any attention any longer to party speeches.
In the field, on the other hand, a number of socialist candidates felt inclined
to stir up enthusiastic interest.
~ The PS More Alone Than Dominant
The 14 June results (table 3[next page]) show that they were not mistaken.
In spite of an increase in abstentions, the socialist victory is impressive. In
comparison with 1978, the PS-MRG [Socialist Party~Left Radical Movement] pro-
gressed 12.8 points to the detriment of all the other parties and movements. The
- ri.~ht lost 4.9 points, the Communist Party 4.5, the extreme left 1.9, the Pcolo-
gists 1.1 and miscellaneous left 0.4. No need for comment on the setback of the
small parties. It is explained in part by the decrease in the number of candidates,
which declined from 1,034 to 498 for the far left and f.rom 241 to 172 for the eco-
logists. On the other hand, let us review the principal movements.
The upsurge in abstentioni.sm puts it at a level that it has exceeded bnly twice in
legislative elections since 1875: in November 1962 and exactly 100 year~ ago,
in August ].881. This reminder suggests two explanations. In 1962, th~ legisla�~
t~ve electiontoo~.place after a dissolution in the aftermath of the referendum
on election of the presider,t by universal suffrage. The increase in absten.tion
expressed both in some a feeling that the essential act had been raised in the
referendum and in others the difficulty of choosin~ between the deputies of their
traditional parties, who continued their "no" campaign and the Gaullists who asked
them to have their "yes" respected. Taking into account the respective differences,
the same motivations may have been brought into play in 1981, with th~ vote for
F. Mitterrand taking the place of the "yes" vote in 1962. The 1881 precedent brings
up another situation, the situation described by Andre Siegfried as "appeasement,"
when the demoralized right no longer even dar2d oppose i:he republicans. Is it not
possible that this was the case 100 years later and does the victory of the left
not express still more the demobilization of the ribht rather than its rallying
to the president's party?
To tell the truth, it very difficult to answer without proceeding to make a very
detailed analysis. A study by department shows, in fact, that no simple explana�-
tion takes into account the great increase in abstentions. This did not a�fect
19
FOR OFF'ICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070021-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R400404070021-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~
N N ^ N M d O 1~ 1~ M M l!'f
y,~ O M ~D O O M'"'w c~ a0 t w O CO 00 t~f N
41 O ~ N ~ O ~ �r M O ~ ~ N N O ~
~
JJ
1-1
c0
a
41 ~ r~. M ~t N 0 ~ ~ ~ ~O M O N N f~
~ ~ M Ol Ol cT t0 ~ lMA O~l ^ t~0 00 ~D U) ~ tn '
u'~ O O
(n O N 01 M 00 r+ ct ~A N tt .-1 O 01 M O d
fd H ~ ~ ~ ~p p~ M lD M O M 1~ M a?' p1 Op ~
N M iP ~ M r+ O ~ N O N Op N f~ pp ~
i-i ~o ~n O ~n ~ ~ ~ ~ ~n p ~
~ M N N I
o I .
M ia Cd O I
r"~ r"~ r'1 w ct c") N M O GO ~N
~ A.~ O 00 M ct vD f~ 00 O ?A 1~ O ~ o oC > ~ ~
~ c o.~n ro x x c~ v~ � o u o c. x o ~ �
H rr > d m W W a d O 1- W ~ Q.' C W ~ .
~ ~ i"~ ~ ~ ~ ~ i"~ ~ ~ ~
N M~7 ~ ~O 1~ 00 C~ O~
v v ~ v v v v ~ u ~
U ~
2~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070021-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000404070021-7
rQR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
especially those departments:in which Giscard d'Estaing did not receive the full
number of rightist votes. On the contrary, it was probably less pronounced there.
Therefore, the assumNtion~:oncerning the difficulty of the moderates who probably
votpd for Mitterrand does not seem to be verified, at least at this analysis level.
- The same is true of the hypothesis of a massive transfer of the right. The map
_ of abstention gains only partly confirms the hypothesis of losses by the right.
Just as it only partly confirms the hypothesis of communist losses. The vote~
lost by tne right and PCF seem to have been distributed in variable proportions
between the socialist vote and abstantion, in accordance with a logic that eludes
- an analysis by dep~.rtment.
: The communist setback confirms the breakup of the presidential election. It even
aggravates it, in fact, because national statistics on voting are more misleading
for legislative elections than for a presidential election. In legislative elect
tions, account must be taken, in fact, of the local implantation of the candi-
dates. As was predictable; the 86 communist deputies recovered part of the votes
~ lost by G. Marchais, especially in the Parisian region. Moreover, the deteriora-
tion continued in votes and in percentages.
Votes cast G. Marchais % Votes cast PCF ~ Index
27 PCF seats
Paris region 1,836,617 429,781 23.4 1,543,366 532,400 34.5 147
_ 59 PCF seats 3,736,089 973,681 26.1 3,227,838 1,102,605 34.1 131
provinces
388 other 22,931,929 3,009,487 13.1 20,051,861 23,680,020 11.8 90
districts
' Outside the districts well-covered by the PC~ and its elected candidates, the set-
back was, therefore, considerable in comparison with 1978. One-third of the com-
munist voters defected and a good part of them voted for the socialist candidates.
Because the were bearers of "real change" and because the presidential election
revealed that the communist king was naked, his voters felt freed from a faithful-
ness of habit more than of conviction.
The setback of the UNM [New Majori~y Union] did not reach the same proportions
- as the PCF setback, bur it was severe. The UDF and the F.PR together obtained
43.9 percent in 1978. In 1980, they totaled 40.1 percent, or a 9-percent loss.
The ~a~ne of single candidacies, favoring the outgoing ones, solidified the strength
relationship between tne two formations. The RPR represented 52.1 percent of the
total, compared with 51.3 in 1978.
The single candidacies were blamed for preventing the outgoing majority from ob-
taining all its votes--owing to resentnnent between its two components--and from
spreading over its frontiers. This pro~cess was hardly justified in view of the
results. The calculati~n of votes that I made in the 86 districts in which pri~
maries were held shows that this formula does not necessarily make it possible
to "rake wider":
21
FUR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070021-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400470021-7
FOR OFFI~CIAL USE ONLY
Primaries and Single Candidacies on the Right
1978 i981
Votes cast UDF + itPR % Votes cast UDF + RPR y Index
$6 primaries 5.,128,019 2,173,346 42.4 4,684,8i7 1,738,256 37.~ g~.9
Altogether 28,105,239 12,337,301 43.9 24,323,065 9,948,397 40.1 91.3
In addition, single candidacy enabled the UNM to have 99 deputies elected as early
as the first round in metropolitan France (and 1 overseas) or almost two -thirds
of its 156 deputies. Directly hit by the wave of change and caught on the wrong
foot by the logic of the majority institutions of the Fifth Republic, the outgoing
majority could hardly expect better.
The socialistupsurge remains. It was absolutely general in comparison with 1978,
although unequal in extent depending on the department:
Socialist Upsurge in Percent of Votes Cast
Number of Departments
Gain less than 5% 2
Gain from 5 to 9% 17
Gain from 10 to 14.9~ 59
Gain from 15 to 20% 18
The gains were especially massive south of the Loire (16 departments out of the
18 in which the gains exceeded 15 percent), especially in the southwestern quarter
(9 departments). ~n the other hand, they were generally a little less strong in
the traditional s`~ength areas of the right, in the west and in the east, or of
the PCF, in the Parisian Basin. There, undoubtedly, the PS ran up against absten-
tion. Altogether, the Socialist Party was more alone than dominant. The PCF and
- the righthad been, at leasttemporarily, discredited and demoralized by the presi-
dential election and the PS was in a pasition to embody both change and stability.
It had become, if not the wheels of the instituions, at least the "fluid" needed
for their operation, just like the Gaullist movement after 1962.
The Socialist Victory in the Second Round: 21 June
The last act of the 1981 "election drama," the second round of the legislative
election, confirmed the movements of the first round and gave the PS alone an ab-
i solute majority of seats in the Assembly. Because 156 deputies had been elected
in the first round (154 in metropolitan France and 2 overseas), the second round
involved 332 districts on 21 June. On that same day, they voted for the first
~ round in three overseas districts.5 Altogether, the results of the second round
- appear in table 46 (next pageJ.
5 One was filled in the f irst round, two others are disputed. They would vote an
28 June for one and on S July for the other.
6 Save for err~r or omission, because I calculated them myself on the basis of
the results published in the press. In this table:(just as in table 3), I put
deputy from Polynesia lst under miscellaneous left. He belonged to the UDF in
the previous legislature, but he seemed to drawiclose to bhe PS between the two
rounds.
22
~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070021-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070021-7
~~OR OFFICIAL IISN: UNI.Y
Table 4: Second Round
Metropolitan Overseas Overseas
France (320) C12) 2g June Total (334)
21 June and 5 Ju1y .
) ]nstrit.s 25 082 269 100 648 307 100 59 215 100 25 789 791 100
~ Votantc 18 836 491 341 831 35 690 19 214 012
Abstent~wic 6 245 7I8 24,90 306 476 41,27 23 525 39,72 6 575 719 25,49
~ 3~ Blan~s et nul; 502 323 2,00 10 077 1,55 609 1,02 513 009 1,99
Cx~rir~ht 18 334 168 100 331 754 ]00 35 081 100 18 101 003 100
1 22F 551 6,70 75 369 22,71 1 303 920 6,97
7; - htiti; 9 073 314 49,48 IB 768 23,74 9 152 082 48,93
~ r) ~ Utvcr~, qauchc 122 3A5 0,67 11 075 5,14 15 A15 43,94 154 B15 0,83
UDf 3 753 607 20,41 44 498 13,41 2 486 7,08 3 800 591 20,32
p~'H 4 lcb 732 22,36 83 591 25,19 17 180 48,97 4 201 503 22,46
~ 6~ Divers droitr 55 519 0,30 32 453 9,78 88 U32 0,47
Comparison with the First Round in the Same Districts
Metropolitan France (320 Total (334)
First Round Runoff First Round Runoff
~ 1~ Inscr~ts 25 102 610 100 25 082 269 100 25 813 250 100 25 789 691 100
~2 ~ Yotants 11 130 039 18 836 491 18 O50 584 19 214 012
Abste~~t~~~r~s 7 312 631 29,36 6 245 778 24,90 1 762 666 30,01 6 575 179 25,49
~ 3~ Bianc~ et nuls ?44 716 0,97 501 323 2,00 252 536 0,91 513 009 1.99
~4~ Expriru,�, 17 485 263 100 18 334 168 100 17 798 048 100 18 701 003 100
~ EKtr~nu qauche 231 911 1,32 - - 236 241 1,32 - -
- PC 3 176 686 18,16 1 220 551 6,70 3 239 201 18,20 1 303 920 6,97
f'ti - Mi~i~ 6 509 942 31,23 9 073 314 49,48 6 557 909 36,84 9 152 OB2 48,93
~ 5~ Divrr; q,iuchr 128 469 0,73 122 385 0,67 176 610 0,99 154 875 0,83
lu~lny~st~~s 207 300 1,18 - - 208 196 1,16 - -
Uur 3 282 912 18,77 3 753 607 20,47 3 350 189 18,82 3 800 591 20,32
Rf'~l 3 50? 253 20,06 4 100 132 22,36 3 539 554 19,8E3 4 201 503 22,46
~ 6~ pivnrs itroftc 3A1 016 2,18 55 579 0,30 423 838 2,4i 88 032 0,41
~ 9~ Cxtr~inr Arnitr 56 914 0,32 - - 57 3I0 0,32 - -
Key:
1. Registered 6. Miscellaneous right
2. Voters 7. Far left
3. Blank and void 8. Ecologists
4. Votes cast 9. Far right
5. Miscellaneous left
In order to interpret them suitably.., account must be taken of the distribution
of candidacies and of desistance agreements. I shall do this by confining myself
- to metropolitan France. In 10 districts, one single candidate remained in the
- race (6 PS, 1 Left Radical, 3 PCF). The evdlution of votes was uninteresting there
and it is better to discard them to examine the remaining 310. These included
- 309 duels and 1 triangular election (CDS-RPR-PS.,~Bas-Rhin 4th district). In the
duels, the PS entered 263 candidates, the MRG 12 and the PCF 34. The RPR en~ered
164 and the UDF and the mi~cellaneous "ma3ority" 145. That explains the very un-
even results of the various parties in table 4. If we regroup by u~a~or political
divisions, the evolution of votes between the two rounds (310 districts) is as
follows:
23
F1DR OFFICIAL IJSF ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070021-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070021-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~ Second Second Differ-
Round Round ence
w Registered 24, 334, 742 240 314s 383
Abstentions 7.,138, 276 29. 33 5~22,142 24..35 - 4. 98
� Blank and void 236, 351 0.97 370,137 1.52 + 0.55
Left 9,681,03Q 57.08 10,112,185 56.11 - 0.97
Ecologists 205,749 1.21 - 1.21
Right 7,072,826 41.71 7,909,918 43.89 + 2.18
Overall, the decrease in abstention--comparable with the decrease observed between
the two roundsof the 1962 legislative election--benefited the right very slightly
more than the left. Actually, 255 of the 309 singls candidates of the UNM improved
the total percentage obtained by the right iii the first rourid.
But the left showed tha~ it was very disciplined, although a distinction must be
made depending on the label of the candidate remaining in the race for the runoff:
Tata.l % Le::t % Left Ca~didate Index
_ 1st Round 2nd ~ound
276 PS-MRG 55.96 55.69 99.5
34 PCF 65.99 59.58 90.3
= The socialists practically filled up the left 4ind hardly suffered at all fr.om th~
greater participation, while the communists lost in b~th areas. But those losses
- were light. The socialist vot~rs had the graciou,:ness not to penalize the PCF
= still more.
- That kind of discipline Ied to the election of a new ~inequalled;ahamber in which
the PS has, all by itself, an absolute majority, like Lhe iJDR in 1968. The fol-
_ lowing is actualZy the result in seats:
Outgoing Elected Total Difference
= t~fetropolitan Overseas
France
PCF 86 43 1 44 - 42
PS-MRG 117 282 6 ?85 +168
_ Miscell~neous left ~NT 2 3 2 5 + 3
[expansion unknown])
RPR 155 83 5 88 - 67
WF 119 60 2 62 - 57
Miscellanenus rig!it (Ni) 12 6 1 7 5
. 491 474 17 491
The changeover, foreseeable on 26 April as a consequence of the dQUble setback
of the Conununist Party and of the outgaing president, achieved on 1~ May ~y the
_ election of F. Mitterrand and accelerated on 14 June by the socialist upsurge,
?~as confirmed resoundingly on 21 June. The ma~ority logic of Che institutions
of the Fifth Republic entrusted all powers ir. thos~~ who had fought most bitterly.
2~+
FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070021-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R400404070021-7
FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY
~ That kind of victory gave the socialists considerable assets. The most obvious
ones pertain to those institutions guaranteeing the authotity and stability of
~ the new government. But there are others pert~ining to the sociology of the voters
and to the renewal of the persons elected. With regard to the sociology of the
voters, Mitterrand stated, very rightly on the day of his inauguration, that "the
- golitical majority of the French people have just identified themselves with their
social majority." In fact, the ma,~ority af France has been on the left for s~veral
years, owing the deep-seated r_hanges undergone by French society in the la5t 25
years: urban developmetit, placement on a steady wage, dsvelopment of the tertiary,
or services sector, massi.ve entrance of women on the labor market, together with
a school population explosion in secondary and higher education, de-Christianiza-
tion and diffusion of antiauthority ideology in every cell of society, have led
to decisive blows at the traditional social and moral bases of the authority of
the right. To tell the truth, the left probably would have Won as early as 1974,
if the haste of the campaign and the changing of the guard within the ma~ority
had not been able to create a belief i~n change by the center. It would have won
in 1978, if the communist blocking had not prevented it once more.~ The PS, which
= gathered 44 percent of the blue-collar votes, 45 percent of the votes of the white-
~ collar workers and middle level executives and 38 percent of the votes of upper
level executives, became, by far, the dominant party of active France and can ~ase
- itself on its representative organization. It is also t~e ~arty of the youth.
- Forty-five percent of persons under 35 years old aoCed for it on 14 June and the
massive entrance of its deputies in the National Assembly made the ~ssembly's age
- drop. We can bet that these }oung men and these young women will be able to make
~ a new voice heard thera, the voice of thei.r generation.
In contrast with these assets, the risks are also consid~_rableo The vote by the
- French people did not make t!:e res�.ra~~:~~ of thp internat3.ona1 economic situation
disappear. By promising them the early end of unemployment ~nd the high cowt of
living by means of a political change, Car~didate Mitterrand certainly did not make
the spirit of responsibility progress much and he did not make a decisive contribu-
tion to democratic education. Undoubtedly, it was good election warfare.
But perhaps there is something more serxcus. The socialists, who had been ex-
cluded from goveinme.nt authority ~or too many years, are approaching r.ealities
wir_h the distorted point of view of an ideolgy and a good conscience not very
~ favorable for calling into ques~ionf for fertile doubt, or even for real plural-
ism. By wrongly interpreting the appraval vote of the French people as ratifi-
cation of a program that does not have its counterpart in any developed country,
- they are running the risk of legislating beyond what is demanded and of settiiig
up a system too heavy for the nation's vitality. In this connection, the "sociology"
- of the newly elected persons ~~nay raise 3 problem. Roland Cayrol estimated that
58.7 percent of the socialist deputies are edu~ators. The education and profession
~ See the collectivc~ bu~k of the CEVIPOF jexpansion unknown] on the 1978 election:
J. Capdevielle and others, "France de gauche, vote a droite" jLeftist France
Votes for the Right], Presses of the National Political Science Foundation, 1981
25
FOR ~FFICIAT, iJSF, ONI,Y
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070021-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/42/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070021-7
FOR OFFICIAL U~E ONLY
. of these teachers predispose them still more, unfortunately, to ~iving precedence

� to the system spirit, strengthened by a morality very short of good intentions,
over taicing realities into account.e If these realities oppose the "im~cortal prin-
= ciples," there will. always be some heir of "great ancestors" on the socialist bench
who will advocate flight forward, a break with capitalism and a hunt for scapegvatg.
Still deeper than that, France risks goirg from the disadvantages of an excessive
liberalism to the disadvantages of an equally excessive egalitarianism. A country
- that sacrifices equality to freedom for too long loses its morality. A country
that sacrifices freedom to equality for too long loses its morale and its vitality.
The orly protection against these contradictory risks is alternation, or rotation,
whose principle is never to be stopped de�initively. Necessary yesterday, it will
without doubt still be necessary tomorrow.
COPYRIGHT: CERAS, 15, rue R.-Marcheron, 92170 Vanves. 1981
10,042
- CSO: 3100/981 END
8 With regard, at least, to those who are not experienced in administering local
affairs.
26
FOR OFFiCIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070021-7