JPRS ID: 9831 LATIN AMERICA REPORT

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• Sequence Number: 12
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/10097
4 November 1981
~ Ja an ~e ort
p p
CFOUO 64/81)
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JPRS L/10097
4 November 1981
JAPAN REPORT
(FOUO 64/$11
CONTENTS
POLITICAL AT3B SOCIOLGGICAL
Expert on the Current Political Issues
(Takao Iwami; USHIO, Aug, Sep 81) 1
_ LDP Split Predicted
Nikaido's Maneuver Examined
Komeito Reverses Policy on Security Treaty., SDF
(JpS, 16 Oct 81) 15
Japan-PLO Relations Reviewed
(Minoru Hirano; THE DAILY YOMLURI, 18 Oct 81) 17
'AKAHATA' Editorial Supports 'Arafat Visit
(JPS, 12 Oct 81) 19
Issue of Northern Territories Analyzed
(Takuo Hayashi; MASNI QiI DAILY NEWS, 11 Oct 81) 21
Governmc=nt Reforffi Have Been Watered Down
(Teruo Tsutsumi; ~iE JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 13 Oct 81).......... 23
'MAINIQiI' (hides Japai~ ~ocialist Party
(Hideo Matsuoka; MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, 13 Oct 81) 25
JSP's 'Disgraceful' Situation in Tokyo
_ (Takehiko Takahashi; MAINI QiI DAILY NEWS, 14 Oct 81) 27
'JAPAN TIMES' on Suzuki's 'Headache'
(Minoru Shimizu; TIiE JAPAN TIMES, 22 Oct 81) 29
Miyamoto Addr~sses JCP Activist Conference
(JPS, 8 Ucr 81)
33
_ - a - [III - ASIA - 111 FOUO]
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r'ux ur~r'tc:tEU. usr: UNLY
~
= iN~ynmoto Addresses Antiauclear Rally
- (JPS, 22 Oct 81) 35
Thirty-Year U.S.-Japan Security System Reviewed
(CHUO KORON, Aug 81) ...............t............................. 37
Reform Panel at Odds With Government Over Tax Inerease
(ASAHI EVENING NEWS, 19 Oct 81)...........~ 49
Briefs
Reform Plan Poll 50
MILITARY
Interviews With Japanese Defer.se Experts Reported
(MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, various dates) 51
Japan Needs 'Rejection' Power, Masamichi Inoki Interview
Defense Sharing Pulitically, Michio Royama 3interviEw
Will To Resist, Hiroomi Kurisu Interview
Wiadom To Face Reality, Yonosuke Nagai Interview
Keep No-Nuke Policy, Sabuxo Kugai Interview
E CONOMIC
Financial Difficui;.~as of Maruzen Oil Com~any Discussed
_ (Akihiko Morita; EKONOMISUTO, 15 Sep 81) 57
. i
- SCIENCE AND TE(~iNOLOGY
Steady Progress Seen in Biotechnology
(Toshihiko Katsuro; SHUKAN TOYO KEIZAI, 3 Oct 81) 64
_ Recent Export Deals, Inquiries From USSR Discussed
- (NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, vari,ous dates) 70
Butadiene Plant
Large Welding Robots
Bulldozers
Dump Trucks
Wire Rope
Dump Truck Order to Isuzu
Anticorrosive Agent
Trailer Trucks
Defense Industry Predicted To Grow Rapidly
(HIKKAN KOGYO SHIMBUN, 16 Sep 81) 78
Development of Linear Motor Car Updated
(Yasu~hi Ariga; SHUKAN ORU TOSHI, 4 Sep 81) 86
Diversified Operations of Kobe Steel Described
(Yoshio Onishi; SHUKAN ORU TOSHI, 4 Sep 81) 90
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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
EXPERT ON THE CURRENT POLITICAL ISSUES
LDP Split Predicted
Tokyo USHIO in Japanese Aug 81 pp 134-137
[Article by Takao Iwami, Mainichi Shimbun reporter]
[Text] Points to Consider in Predicting the Life of the Suzuki Cabinet
The political world is rather active this summer. After Prime Minister Suzuki re-.
turned from his European visit, the Tokyc Metropolitan Assembly campai.,r! went into
its final phase. Early in July, the interim report of the Second Extraordinary
Administration Study Committee was published and the dispute over administrative
reform became more pronounced because of this.
In July, there was the Ottawa Summit. Witho~:t the re~3ting time usual during sum-
mer vacations, the government is likely to keep movin~ at a rapid tempo. "Ad-
_ ministrative reform" and "defense" will play the ma~or surface rolea in this
changing situation. But the durability of the 5uzuki government w311 be discussed
with the same frequency.
Talk ot Suzuki's reelection, which once seemed certain, has not been heard much
recently. Predictions of a sho~t duration for the gotrernment has emerged, but
- there is no telling yet what will happen. There are wany unknawn factors such as
- how well Suzuki will carry out adminiatrative reform, how he will get through the
reshuffling of personnel expected in the party and the cabinet in November, and
who the successor would be if the life of this cabine~ is cut short.
A11 that is certain is that Suzuki is facing a crisis after one year in charge
of the government. It is difficult to tell which way the wind will blow with the
_ information at hand.
_ The ma~or newspaper opinion polls for the first part and middle of June showed
the following results with re~~ect to the Suzuki gover.nment. Asahi showed 36 per-
cent supporting and 39 percent not supporting and Yomiriri ahowed 37.6 percent
supporting and 42 percent not supporting, both news~ape:rs giving the caution
signal of the rate of lack of support moving ahead of t:he rate of support. In
the Mainichi, the supporters ~ust barely had the edge, 33 percent ta 31 percent.
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All three polla agrPed in showing a growing trsnd of non-support. The uproar sur-
rounding former Foreign Ministes Ito's resignation and "Reiechauer shock" are pro-
bably the causes of the lack of con~idence in Suzuki. However, the changes in num-
bers are not large enough to predict the fate of the government.
Along with the debate over the future of the Suzuki government, another thing
that must be r_onsidered :is how to interpret the movements inside the LDP.
Attentian should be paid t~ the recent stocktaking with respect to the "40-day
battle," the serious political battle between former prime ministers Ohira and
Fukuda which shook the LDP in October and November the yea.r. before last.
Yohei Kono, the former representative of the Shin Jiyu Club which supported Ohira
in the Rukuda-Ohira battler recently said this. "The internal split in the LDP
was advancing and itswas detinitely an opportunity to end the single-party leader-
ship system of the LDP.
- "Because the opposi*_ion parties had been in the position of perpetual opposition,
they were unable to take advantage of that valuable opportu~ity and they let the
chance slip by. We werE the only onea who swung our bat and there were only four
' of us. The chance was lost and the LDP returned to their absolu=e ma~ority of
Diet seats. However, it continued to be unstable internally and there definitely
- will be a second and a third chance. After letting such a good pitch go by, the
other opposition parties must be thinking to themselves, "Darn it, we should have
- ~wung.
"That was shown by the recent movements of the moderate parties. T;:e}- may have
come to a dead end theinaelves. Of course, that kind of opportunity would not re-
sult in an upset with ~ust one hit. But if it recurs, a more deflnite mo;~e will
take place. Even if they failed that time, they can probably meet the ba11 squarely
the next time around.
"I was very disappointed last time, but I did not despair or give ug hape. We
have only been organized as a party for 5 years. The Social Democratr~ have worked
as an opposition party for 22 years and the Komeito for i7 years, so there w~re
differences in sensitivity on that occasion. What is important from now on is to
continue being alert and reacting quickly. The LDP sits there like the Great Buddha
of Nara but it is now engaged in the Uig ~ob of changing a system built up over
_ 56 yeaYS. They do not at all think that they can do this in 3 years or 5 years.
They must work persistently over a long period of tiu~~. After making one try,
they must begin preparing for the next effort."
It is not yet clear what really happened on the occasion spoken of by Kono. On
the surface it seems that the abnormal aituation, in which both Ohira and Fukuda
named themselves as the leader, ended when the four membere of an oppoaition party,
including Kono, voted for Ohira. But this was or.1y an irregular alliance between
conser.vatives. Behind the scenes, there was ~rantic maneuvering for alliances
between parties. Both Ohira and Fukuda acted with the idea of forming a new
party with a coalition between conservative and moderate parties.
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Political Re~ctructuring Announced by Tanaka
Some statements about that event have gradually emerged. For example, the recent
statements of former prime mi~isters Fukuda and Tanaka printed in the SHUKAN A9AHI
- come close to telling the real story.
- First, Fukuda replied as follows to an interview in the 5 June issue.
Questlon: "I taave heard that there were people around you who maneuvered to form
a new party."
Fukuda: "There was such a move. According to those people--I don't know if they
succeeded or not--they made some overtures in the direct~on of the Social Democrats
and the Komeito."
Question: "Did you ever think it would be all right to go along with that?"
Fukuda: "No, I didn't. Because I believe that I myseZf, represent the mainstream
_ of the LDP and also the mainstream of Japan. I could not mc~ve so lightly to split
the party."
Question: "In that respect, you are different from form~r Prime Minister Miki
who acted together with you."
Fukuda: "Well, I don't think that Mr. Miki seriou~ly planned to split the party.
But some such thing may have flitted in and out of his mind."
In short, Fukuda admits that the Fukuda-Miki-Nakasone alliance carried out some
maneuveriug for a new party including the Social Democratic Party and the Komeito
on the assumption that a catastrophe was in the offing because o� the Ohira-Fukuda
standoff. What about the Ohira-Tanaka aide? Tanaka spoke as follows two weeks
later in the 19 June issue.
Question: "Fukuda admits that in the middle of the '40-day battle' there was a
movement amang the anti-mainatream factions to split the party into two parts."
Tanaka: "This happened right in broad daylight. I suppose it was some sort of
daydream. We have to think that. Becauae if they ever thought of doing it again,
thL results would be terrible."
, Questi4n: "Is it true that Mr. Ohira Chought of ~oining together with the Komeito
as a cauntermeasure."
Tanaka: "It is a fact that rir. Ohira thought this deep down inside. He thought
that it was improper to run a government with one party relying on power alone.
In that he was somewhat different from me. At the end of the Kishi adminiatration,
when the Ikeda cabinet was being formed, the Diet was besieged and the~e was an
argument that the LDP ehould retire. Mr Ohira seriously proposed this. I asked,
'How can you run the Japanese government with such a weak-kneed attitude2~
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Question: "So, did Mr. Ohira plan to retire after the loas in the general election
the year before last?"
Tanaka: "No, not that time. He did not think of the LDP as or..e party. Down
deep he thought that those wi*_h the same policy ideas should ~oin together and
that it would be all right to divide the party into two. But that time, the oppo-
nents were. unable to act."
Putting th~se two statements together, we get a scenario where the "40-da,y battle"
stopped ~ust ehort o~ a party split and a sudden restructuring of the golitical
landscape.
The response of the Komeito and Democratic Socialist Party ie not known, but it
was apparently not as simple as the usaal view of Ohira-Komeito and Fukuda-Social
Democrat alliances. Both parties ffiade contact with Fukuda anZ Ohira but neither
party could make a decision. The Shin Jiy;i Club, which wae smaller and mare flex-
ible, wen~ with Ohira.
WiZl more ~vents like rhe "40-day battle" occur as predicted by Kono? In the same
interview, Tanaka made a statemeiit with great import.
{ Question: "Will such a daydream occur again in the future?"
Tanaka: "A daydream wi11 not occur. It will be done resoiutely and in the open."
Question: "If a restructuring of the political system is carried out boldly, in
the open, what kinds of battles and alliances do you think will occur?"
Tanaka: "There probably will be a political restructuring. It will occur when,
in connection with such things as the Rieachauer atatement and the La Roque state-
- ment, we reconsider, together with the people, the true state of the Japan-U. S.
Mutual Security Treaty. And when we really make an a.ttempt to break down the min-
istries. The kind o� administrative reform I am thinking of is a reduction in the
total number of personnel. Create twice the present number of bureau chiefs,
three times the number of section managera, 10 times the number of subsection mana-
gers, and cut the total number of personnel in half. In oth~r words, change the
present pyramidal structure to a trapezoid. The party that agreea with this is the
Democratic Socialist Party."
Question: "The Democratic Socialist Party also agreea on the defense issue."
Tanaka: Yes, the Denocratic Socialiat Party agrees on defense too. The Komeito
agreea on domestic affairs."
On this occasion, why did Tanaka repeatedly mention the Democratic Socialist Party?
Was he strategically trying to give the impreasion of an emphasis cn the Democratic
Socialist Party because of the frequent rumors of a close connection between Tanaka
and the Komeito? Or has he seriously begun to think o� the Uemocratic Socia~ist
Party as a possible partner. His true intentions are unknown.
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Split Between Status Quo Faction and Reform Faction
The thing that should be noted, rather tha~ how much distance there is between
Tanaka aud the Social Democrats or the Komeito, is the fact that Tanaka clearly
stated that there "will be" a restructuring of the political system related to the
~ssues of the securi`ty treaty and d~fense and administrative reform. There is some
_ logical contradiction with his previous criticism ~f Ohira's coalition idea. How-
e~er, we must pay attention when the po~aerful man who controls the largest faction
in the LDP says there will be a restructuring.
It ie not clear whether the Tanaka ataltement indicates that the tendency toward a
split in the LDP is growing stronger or whether it assumes a coalition between
the LDP and the Democratic Socialiat Party and the K,omeito. Judging from t`he
drift of the statement, it seems to imply the former.
If that is the case, Kono's prediction of anoth~r "40-day battle" is not ~ust a
premonition. There maq be a real posaibility.
The Aemocratic Socialist Party is making an urgent appeal to other moderate par-
ties, because it believes the internal conflict in the LDP will become acute
wi*_hin the year. According to part~? chairman Sasaki, "The Suzuki cabinet will
probably be badly shaken after the Tokyr~ Metropolitan Asaembly election."
Permanent advisor Kasuga has his eye oa the possibility of an internal conflict.
"There will certainly be voices inside the LDP saho will question whether the LDP
_ government is satisfactory under such conditions." As a preaupposition, he seems
to think that a political battle over Suzuki's succeasor is imminent. Any past
strategies ior reatructuring including those taken during the "40-day battle,"
were all carried out concurrently with changes in the 3.AP government. Battles for
- political authority within the LDP are the beat opportunities for inducing and es-
calating disturbances from the vantage point of the opposition parties, who are
itoping for a polit~.cal restructuring.
In line with Kono's statement, many of the Democratic Socialist Party members re-
flected on the "40-day battle" as follows. "We threw away the chance of a life-
time. If we had sprung into action at that time, there would have been a violent
upheaval in the polltical situation. The double election where the LD~P won a huge
victory would not have taken place and the DemocXatic Socialist Party could have
- partictpated in the government." The Komeito has sa far refrained from making a
statement. All of the moderate parties are ready to move energetically and not
lose the opportunity the next time that troubles mount up fnside the LDP.
However, how much of a foundation is there within the LDP for carrying out a politi-
cal restructuring in connection with "mutual aecurity and defense?" One source of
information is a poll of LDP Dietmen on the three anti-nuclear principles. An
ASAHI SHIMBUN poll was taken, dividing the Diet members into hawks (98 Diet members
comprising the Asian Problems Research Council) and dovea (67 Diet members belong-
ing to tt~e Asian and African Problems Research Council and the International Par-
liamentarian Arms Reduction Committee). "The results were as follows. (1) Less
than half of the hawks but 64 percent of the dovea though that the present government
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policy of maintaining the three anti-nuclear principles is satisfactory. (2)
28 percent of the hawks but only 16 percent of the doves felt that "port calls and
transit" should be excluded from the requirement of prior consu].tation."
Viewed by faction, the SuZUkf and Komoto factions both favor maintenance of the
status quo, the Fukuda, Nakasone, and Nakagawa group are strongly in favor of re-
vising the three principles; and the Tanaka faction is close to the average posi-
tion of the entire party.
The MAINICHI interviewed 43 officials connected with security and foreign po?icy
organs. Only 12 (28 percent) of them were in favor of inaintaining the etatus quo.
31 (72 percent) were in favor of reyision. This ie just the reverse of the 61 per-
cent of the ern.tire party (according to a MAINICHI poll) in favor of the status quo..
We can see that the idea of revision is concentrated among the group of Dietm~n
connected with aecurity and foreign affiars which includes many hawks.
In a~oint meeting of relat+~d committees, research groupa, and special committees
of the LDP held right in the midst of the Reischauer ~tatement uproar (2 June),
the reviaionist doctrine appeared again as followe. (1) It ie common knowledge
that U. S. warships carrying nuclear weapona etop at Japaneae ports and pass
through Japanese territorial waters. The government's reply is a lie. (2) The
three anti-nuclear principles ahould be revised now. (3) A welcome party should
be given for the Midway which is protecCing Japaneae sea lanes.
This three-way internal division of the LDP into hawks, doves, and moderates
should become much sharper in the coming debate over nuclear policy. The recent
flareup of the constitutional revision debate also aplit inta three campa--one
for the statua quo, one for r.evision, and a third for an independent moderate posi-
tion.
However, when faced with the specific choice of "what to do about port calls and
transit," it is expected that the moderate faction will not be able to maintain
its position and the three-way division will gradually polarize into two opposing
camps. There is no data from a poll asking Diet membera about both the three anti-
nuclear principles and the constitutional problem at the same time. However, it
is likely that the LDP would be divided into two widely opposing groups--one for
the status quo and one for revieion.
Will the Opposition Parties Foment Internal Diaturbancea?
Previously, there have been two tendencies in the LDP concerning aecurity and
foreign policy. At the time of the Mutual Security Treaty renewal 21 years ago,
there was a positive and a negative faction. However, because there was no other
po;.itical party with the ability to govern, the matter wae ended with the reaigna-
tion of the Kishi cabinet while the aplit remained hidden inside the party. If
the party hsd been unified in s~pport flf the treaty renewal, Kishi may have been
able to hold his ground in epite of fierce outside resietance. Even though the
resignation was made in response to outside action, it was atrongly urged frr~m
inside the party as well.
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Then on the occasion of the normalization of relatians between Japan and China,
the party was again divided into a group promoting the narmalization and a group
advocating caution. Normalization was 3ust barely made possible by the great re-
versal in international diplomacy when the United States moved ~cl,oser to China.
The exertion of outsi~e pressure, exp~ressed in the terms "based on the understand-
ing of the United States," was a big factor. Inside the party, Tana.ka's political
power was effectively utilized. This was ~uet after Tanaka had acqutrsd power by
force of numbers. We should not forget the effect of the new government's momentum
and the s~ipport given by the opposition parties.
If the cautious faction l~d by Fukuda had continued to resist (and a plan to leave
the party and form a neW party was considered at the time), a spliz may have oc-
curred. However, it was apparent that they wo~ild fall into the position of ~ minor-
ity party. In the end, in the midst of eituational changea, tt~e conflict was kept
inside the party just as it was at the time of the sec~rity ~reaty renewal.
After the normalization of relations between Japan ahd China, Mr. Ohira, the foreign
minister at the time, made this public statement. "The iaside of the LDP is like
oil and water. Eventually, there will grobably be g sp11t over policy." This
analysis of the LDP could have been behind Ohira`s coaiition idea. And it seems
~ that Ohira's prediction has begun to take on the laok of reality.
There may not be an upheaval this year as the Social Democrats hope. It would
seem that Kono's statement that "They do not at all thi~nk they can do it in 3 years
or 5 years" is more on target. At any rate, ~t ie certain that the spli.t in the
LDP has grown to the point where it cannot be healed simple by internal ad~ustment.
This can be said because the LDP would almoet certainly have s~lit during the
"40-day battle" if either the Aemocratic Socialist Party or the Romeitn, or both,
had been able to make a commitment.
Both Ohira and Fukuda extended an invitation to botb. parties. This was hindered
mainly by the vacillation and calculating of the two parties. Hbwever, the re-
sistance of both parties in relation to at least thfs issue is weakening. After
repeated experiments, the ability of the c~pposition parties to respond has become
more sophisticated and they are even making moves to initiate internal trouble in
the LDP. ~
Even so, there is still a deep-seated fear that a party split would lead to tragi.c
results and a desire for self-protection, a desire to continue in the position of
siding with the ruling party. So without a strong atimulus, a audden change is
unlikely. There is no way to know whether the politicai battle to determine Su-
zuki's successor will become the occasion for such an event. However, there is
certainly a movement, growing much atronger than before, to turn it into auch an
occasion.
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Nikaido's Maneuver Examined '
Tokyo USHIO in Japanese Sep 81 pp 236-241
[Arti:le by Takao Iwami, MAINICHI SHIMBUN reporter]~
[Text] What Was the Influence of Tanaka's Arrest?
_ We can still recall the intense heat of the summer 5 yeare ago. On the morning
of 27 July, 1976, a epecial edition of the MAII~IICHI SHII~UN appeared with the fol~
lowing lead-in. "The aymbol of mnney politics, former prime minister Rakuei Tanaka,
hae finally been arreatied. The Special ;Cnvestigation Department of the Tokyo Dis-
trict Public Pros~cutors Office, which has been inveatigating the Lockheed Incfdent,
issued a summons to former prime miniater Kakuei Tanaka (57)--member of the House
of Representatives, Niigata Third District--at 7:26 AM on the 27th. After inve$-
tigation, Tanaka was arrested on suspicion of violating the Foreign Exchange Law.
at 8:53 AM of the same day. On suepicion of receiving 500 million yen from Maru- .
beni with receipts made out for pieces and peanuta...."
The headlines of all the newspapers were lurid. "The World Ia Shocked." "The
Political World in Panic." "Rotten Smell from Money Politica." "LDP Thrashing
About in Stor.m." ~
The title of the MAINICHI editorial for the next day, the 28th, wae "The Problem
of Tanaka's Arreat and the Conservat~ve Position." It eaid, "This tells us tl~ist
- we must conduct an overall accounting and examination of postwar p~litics. The
LPP has had its central core shot out. How can it cope with this situation?
The future fate of the party will depend on the manner of its response. Determina-
tion and effort by the LDP, as well as the other political parties and people in
power, is r~quised for a ma~or cleanup of preseat politics. The Tanaka arreat
- should be takea~ as an opportunity for political reform."
The ASAHI editorial was entitled "The `Tanaka Arrest' and the Corruption of Power."
It argued as follows. "The party custom by which the politician with the largeat
faction of Diet members geta the higheat poaition of power, the party cuatom of
using money to build up a private army for this purpose, the practice of neglecting
organization with roote among the people and depending on corporate contributions--
all these practices are now under indictment. This problem cannot be entirely
attributed to Tanaka a.s an individual. We can say that certain elementa of a
conservative crisis have been growing etronger over a number of years and have come
to the surface in the ahocking form of the Tanaka arrest. A radical reform of
the LDP is urgently needed to eliminate the odioue connection between moz~ey and
politics."
There seemed to be a premonition of the approach of a big ground swell that would
cause the sudible crumbling of the old order. Also, coming 30 yaara after the war,
there was the intimatlon of an end point in time.
The powerful Kakuei Tanaka, who had juat resigned from his poat ae prime minister
had been arreeted for a ~rime committed during his term as prime minister. Fur-
therr.iore, Tanaka was the moat powerful leader of th~ Liberal Democratic Party
which had dominated most of postwar Japaneae politics. Not only did he have the
negative image of a politic~an who attained power by financial influence, he
aeemed to repreaent the hasty, hard-driving rebuilding of postwar Japan.
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For better or worse, the image of pnstwar Japan was concentrated iii this rare type
of leader, Tanaka. The reason that Tanaka's popularity does not decrease even
after the time he has spent in the position of an accused criminal, must lie in the
uncanny resemblance between the Tanaka personality and the personality of postwar
Japan, frantically grasping for economic success.
It is for this reason that Tanaka's becoming a criminal made a deeper impression
than the fact of receiving a S00 million yen bribe of which he is accused. Just
as the MAINYCHI editorial atated, the central core of the LDP "has been shot
away." And as the ASAHI editorial atated, above and beyond Tanaka the individual,
the nature of the entire system that has aupported the LDP should have been under
indictment. It seemed that the LDP was faced with a crucial decision of travelling
the same road to destruction or radically reforming the party from the inside.
~Jhy Has Political Reform Become Impossible?
But what happened? 5 yeara have paesed quickly since that summer. The LDP has
continued to hold power urithout changing a bit from the time when the Lockheed
scandal was exposed. It has even secured a safe ma~ority. Was the impression of
coming to a turning point that we felt 5 years ago simply an illusion? In the
5 years since the Tanaka arrest the ruling power has gone from Miki to Fukuda to
Ohira to Suzuki. In the laet period of the Miki government (September 1976) and
of the Ohira government (October 1979), the LDP came close to splitting but in
both cases this was c.suaed by political infighting within the party rather than
by a conflict Qver party reform.
As a result, tired of the wear and tear of political battling, the party took
- short rest periods under Fukuda and then under Suzuki. However, these were only
b~rief periods of waiting for the next round of political batties, and the present
movements in the LDP include the same political infighting. I do not mean to di-
rectly criticize the fighting for political power. These battles are probably in-
evitable, but along with these political squabbles, the LDP, invol'ved a8 it was
_ in the Lockheed scandal, ahould have ma~e a serious attempt at political reform.
However, none of these governmenta did anything in spite of the slogans they pro-
pounded. The "logic of numbers," by which the faction with the largest number of
Dietmen gained the most power, continued to have top priority. The system under
which all sorts of things are ~ustified by numbers remained unchanged. Any po-
= litical cleanup or reform wae totally buried under the "logic of numbers."
The only differ.ence with the past ie that the function of the "logic of numbers"
is somewhat changed. The Tanaka faction has auperiority of numbers, but it cannot
wield power directly, so it must content itself with the poaition of kingmaker.
The three governmente of Fukuda, Ohira, and Suzuki were created only with the ap-
~ proval of the Tanaka faction and they crumbled when they ran into Tanaka's veto
power.
P~ztting it another way, without the "consent of Tanaka," no new policy of politi-
cal reform can be unciertaken. The situation might change if a powerful faction or
man cane along who could take power without the support of tihe Tanaka faction.
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But right now, there is no such strong opposing power and the real situation ie
that any faction aiming at powex_ sust be sensitive to Tanaka's feelings. A
Tanaka faction leader has this to say about daily political operations as well as
political power conflicts.
"If a problem arises, it is always the Tanaka faction that goes into action. The
other factions make a lot of noise but we get things done in a straightforward ef-
ficient way. That meana Noboru Takeshita, Shin Kanemaru, Takao Kameoka, Tatsuo
Ozawa, and all the rest of us. When anything happene, we all get together. We
act naturally, supported by the conservative mainatream awarenese that there is no
- one but us who can get things done. Mr. Tanaka, who is directing us, has a deep-
lying, strong sense of responsibility and a sense of the nation characteristic of
himself. Even though he is accuaed of a crime, he is the only leader in the LDP
and in Japan who can take action to solve difficult problems. There are others
implicated in the same 500-million-yen scandal who the party will have nothing to
do with."
This is not necessarily ~n exagg~ration. The Tanaka faction has frequently mo-
bilized its army-corps style energy and responaiveness. This has not only had
the positive aspect of a problem-solving capability. It has been applied to all
areas such as the manner of carrying out political.reform.
If we look onl.y at the one year since Suzuki took power, we see that the special
commiCtee for aircraft import atudy, which aerved as a stage for purauing the scan-
dals related to aircraft, was su~arily aboliehed, and the ethics committee which
_ Prime Minister Suzuki promisPd to establish in its place has somehow disappeared.
There is no proof that all of thie was done at the Tanaka faction's instigation but
there is no doubt that it reflects their desires.
However, it is obvious that the political reform of the LDP must start from the
"Tanaka problem." As the MAINICHI and ASAHI editorials cited earlier atated, the
Tanaka arrest is more than a problem related to Tanaka as an individtia"l. It is
heavily linked to defects within the LDP and the political. system itself. All
politicians, including thoae of the opposition parties, should have thought cleeply
= about how to cope with the Tanaka problem and continued to experience inner dis-
cord during the last 5 years. The Tanaka problem is the problem of every indivi-
dual politician. Everyone knows that Tanaka was not the only one to mix money
and politics. Every politician to one degree or another is tainted with the prac-
tice of using financial ~nfluence in the political sphere. In order to reform
this system, it is f~.rat neceasary to deal with the Tanalca problem or else cover
up everything and let it go. Everyone knowe that they must chooee one or the other
course.
But what has happened? Everyone has fal.len silent. The opposition parties are
no exception. They vacillate before "our own Kakuei Tanaka" and cannot cope with
the "Tanaka problem" which stands in front of them. Everything moves at Tanaka's
discretion.
- The situation has been turned upside down. A political reform cannot poeaibly
take place unleas the criminal defendant Tanaka decidea to under~ake a reform.
This ie the most difficult part of the "Tanaica problem."
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The Background of Nikaido's Appeal far Restoration of Honor
The Tanaka faction has expanded its power even further since last year. Recently,
it contains 105 Dietmen from both the upper and lower houses. Tanaka himself says,
"There are even more. There arz probablq about 130. That will become apparent in
thE next election" (19 June SHUKAN ASAHI interview). So ~ore will probably be added.
, `1'his phenomenon could not have been ima~ined 5 years ago. When Tanaka was arres-
- ted, some people left the Tanaka faction. It was a common sense view that it
would decline. Why did the oppoeite occur? Tanaka saga, with great confidence,
"It is because they trust me. I believe it is because of very strong friendship
and complete trust. This should not be overlooked. If it wer~ not for that,
they would not go along with someone on hia way to hell. The wife and children
- of a person going to the gallows have nothing to hope for. But I think that a
person in a public position would not join my group unless he had confidence in
me" (from the same interview).
However, the secret of i.::~ expanaion of the Tanaka faction is not that simple. It
cannot be singled out as this or that and is probably a gravitational pull resu].t-
ing from many factors. In ar;y case, it continues to eapand steadily. We should
not forget that this increase~t the Tanaka faction's power of intimidation and
leads to further expansion.
Recently, the Tanaka faction has begun to move toward taking over political power
rather than 3ust having a kingmaking function based on its large numbera. At
least, it has taken such a pose. In the fifth year after Tanaka's arrest, this
is a momentous change. This appeared in extreme form in the appeal for restora-
tion of honor by Susumu Nikaido (chairman of the party executive council). Ni-
_ kaido is an influential man who is in a position representing the Tanaka faction.
If the faction were to put up a candidate for party president, the faction has
_ prettly well reached internal agreement~that it would be Nikaido. However, as
everyone knows, Nikaido is still seen as one of the "gray of�icials" in the Lock-
heed incident. Even though he was able to attain one of the three party leader-
ship positions, it is said that t:~ere is a barrier to his even taking a cabinet
position. Therefore, proof of innocence is a prerequisite to actu~lly, making
Nikaido the prime miniater.
However, this is not a simple matter. According to the data submitted to the
House of Representatives Special Secret Lockheed Research Committee by the Minis-
_ try of Justice and the Public Prosecutors Office on 2 November, 1976, Nikaido was
involved with the "30-unit receipt" in the Lockheed incident. In the first part
of November 1972, when he was serving ae Tanaka's Chief Cabinet Secretary, he
received 5 million yen in cash from Hiroshi Ito, senior executive managing direc-
tor of Marubeni (at the time). This was compensation for acting to get the Tris-
tar aircraft accepted. However, his official authority could not be proven and he
was not indicted. At the same hearing, Nikaido and five other "gray ufficials"
took 10 minutes each to defend themselvea. Nikaido entirely denied the truth of
all accusations. Since then he has used every available opportunity to appeal for
- a restoratior. of his honor. Even when Hori and Nadao were serving as speakera of
the House of Representatives, he asked for "an opportunity to defend myself."
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The appeal he has submitted to present Speaker of the Aouse Fukuda has the same
content. (1) My identificat3on as a"gray official" is due to one-sicled informa-
tion. I did not accept any money. (2) The parliamentary procedures which, in
spite of this, one-sidedly announced my name in public at the Lockheed special
cemmittee hearing in November 1976 infringed on my peraonal rights and honor.
_ (3) Becauae a similar case, not just related to myself, ma.v arise in the future,
the Diet should reevaluate the status of government inveaCigations in the light
of human rights and the constitution. (4) I would also like to have some action
taken concerning myself.
There are three reasons behind Nikaido's present action. Firet, coneidering the
gradual emergence of a cabinet reatructuring and post-Suzuki movement eapected
toward the end of the year, Tanak,a and the Tanaka faction are planning to recover
power both in name and in fact. As a beginning, they want to put Nikaido in the
- cabinet or nominate Nikaido for party president. Restorat~.on of honor is an es-
sential step for this purpose. Second, the conditions are right for the side ~
- receiving the appeal. The LDP has a stable majority in the Diet so the resistance
of the opposition parties can be stopped. The Speaker of the House of Represen-
tatives, Ha~ime.Fukuda, whe holds the key to the handling of this matter, is close
to Tanaka and ~oined together with Nikaido 5 years ago to dump Miki. Mototoshi
Yamashita, chairman of the Standing Committee �or House management, is also a
leader of the Tanaka faction. Suzuki, waiting in the background, with the pre-
diction of a short life for his cabinet circulating around, must be worried about
how the Tanaka faction will proceed as he sees that conditions are ~ust right for
them.
- Third, the judgment on the All Nippon Airways route in the Lockheed trial has been
delayed becauae of thE sudden death of the pzesiding ~udge. The Tanaka faction is
reported to be certain of the innocence of the defendant, fcrrmer Transport Minis-
ter Tomisaburo Hashi.moto. The Tanaka faction thought that if Hashimoto were exon-
erated, it would have the same effect as proof of Nikaido's innocence. Since the
judgment expected this spring has been postponed a year, it will not coincide well
with political moves, so some other action tnuat be taken.
The 'Tanaka Prob?em' Is Not Just the Assessment of an Individual
On 14 July, in the midst of the controversy eurrounding Nikaido�s appeal, the
prosecutor's final statement was presented againat Hashimoto and others involved
in the All Nippon Airways route.
Furthermore, in this statement, the Public Proaecutors Office mentioned Nikaido~s
name ten times. In the part concerning the 5 million yen gift to Hashimoto, they
clearly stated the following as a related fact that could be affirmed by evic~.ence.
= "Also, former senior executive managing director of Maurbeni, Hiroshi Ito,
handed a package containing 5 million yen in cash to Susumu Nikaido in the Chief
Cabinet Secretary's official residence."
In the opening atatement at the first public trial 4 and 1/2 yeara ago, the Public
Prosecutors Office did not use Nikaido's name, although he had received funds from
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Lockheed along with Hashimoto and others, because they had come up against the wall
of "official authority" and could not prosecute him for the crime. The fact that
they used his name in the closing statement probably indicates confidence on the
part of the Prosecutors Office. At the same time, it renewed the impresaioa of
'~grayness" that had been fading in the pub~ic mind. However on the same day,
Nikaido submitted another statement to Speaker Fukuda. It asked for the proper
handling of the following three iseues: (1) method for reatoring honor to persons
who rights have been infringed by the conducting of government investigations,
(2) the issue of the legal concept of not punish~ng only because of suspicion and
- the actual practice in Diet politics of implying suspicion to get results in gov-
_ ernment investigations, and (3) the problem df inveatigating the truth or false-
hood of government reports relating to the Crimiaal Procedure Code, Article 47.
The previous appeal focused on washing Nikaido's own dirty clothes. Perhaps be-
cause of the prosecutor's closing statement and consideration of the protest from
the opposition partiea who are to help the LDP regain power, the present etatement
= presents more general problems of the status of government investigations and the
legislative system.
Speaker Fukuda accepted the statement and asked questions of House Management Com-
mittee Chairman Yamashita. It will be formally taken up by the committee on
- 4 August with no reference to Nikaido's individual problem. So it seems that the
statement will be entered into the Houae Managemen~ Committee minutes as a refer-
ence document. Nikaido's agparent aim is to have an "assertion of innocence"
entere~ into a public document of the Diet to cancel out the "recognition of sus-
picion" in the minutes of the special Lockheed co~ittee. Right now, the Socialist
Par.ty is totally opposed to entering the statement in the minutes. Even if it is
entered, the "suspicion of grayness" indicated by the prosecutor's closing state-
ment wi11 not be reduced by an argument about the facts. In fact, it will have
the opposite effect in the public eye, giving the impression of an attempt to blur
the suspicion.
However, the political world moves by a different logic than ordinary society. If
the problem of the Nikaido statement is aettled as planned, the voices.within the
LDP protesting the appointment of Nikaido to a cabinet position may disappear. In
spite of bei..ng tainted underneath with the ehock of 5 years ago, the "Tanaka prob-
lem" has followed the course described here. People are aeeking Tanaka's support
by word and deed but there is no criticism of Tanaka to be heard anywhere.
The Marubeni route part of the Lockheed trial is proceeding separately and grad-
- ~ ually approaching the climax. The entire political world is holding ita brea~h,
waiting to see what the effects of ~he ~udgment will be.
Tanaka is completely confident about the ~udgment in this trial. "There i~ no
possibility of a bad result. It will be settled this year (Does this mean the
conclusion of the trial?). I believe it will be settled. I am being tormented
from an idealistic position for a lack of discretion. You (the media) have de-
cided I am a bad guy. Please don't give me a hard time. There are a lot of people
who think that Mr. Tanaka is a good guy. There really are" (SHUKAN ASAHI inter-
view).
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However, the "Tanaka prr,blem" goes beyond whether Tanaka is a good guy or a bad
guy. It is the larger iseue of how Japanese democracy can aurvive a scandal like
that of the Tanaka arre,st which has never been experienced before.
Looking back with this in mind, we can see the last 5 years as retrogressive ra-
ther than ~ust a blank. It is not difficult to understand the secret of Tanaka's
rising popularity inside and outside political circles. There are certainly great
- expectations of Tanaka as a leader. And one cannot deny that Tanaka is a very
able and charismatic pol3tician. Howeve�r, the "Tanaka problem" muat be considered
separately from all such personal evaluation. In this fifth summer, the humidity
is getting worse.
- COPYRIGHT: Ushio Shuppansha 1981
9651 ~
, CSO: 4105/251.
~14 �
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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
KOMEITO REVERSES POLICY QN SECURIT'Y TREATY, SDR
- OW161045 Tokyo JPS in English 0913 GMT 16 Oct 81
[Text] Tokyo, 16 Oct (JPS)--The Komei Party on October 14 held an enlarged
central executive co~nittee meeting and d~cided on a dratt basic policy and an
action program, both of which are to be submitted to the 19th congress in
December.
- On these draft resolutions of the Komei Party, the October 16 issue of
AKAHATA carried an editorial entitled "Elaboration of the Ko~ei Party Line of
Following the LDP Policy."
~ The draft resolutions of the Komei Party to be presented to :Lts congress
indicate that the Komei Party has arrived at the final stage af elaboration
of the pro-LDP policy which has been promoted over the past ~rears: the Kot~ei
Party has turned rightward in its policy toward the security treaty and the
self-de�ense forces, and also turned to the line of propping up the Chon Tu-hwan
regime in its policy toward the Korean Peninsula.
The important point of the Komei Party's draft resolutions is that the resolutions
actively evaluated the Japan-U.S. security treaty for the fir;;t ti.me in the party's
, basic policy, saying that the treaty is playing a deterrent role in maintaining
Japan's security to some extent. The Kome~ Party has also approved that the
self-defense forces are "constitutional," saying that the SDF "have many elements
to meet the Komei Party-proposed capability of preserving the ter~iCorj?.
It was not long ago that the Komei Party criticized the Japan�-U.S. security treaty
for being "a dangerous military alliance which involves Japan in a war which
has no relation with Japan and involves the country in the U.;;. strategy toward
" Asia" (basic policy, 1978). The party also charged that "undE~r the military
alliance system cal:Led Japa*?-U.S. security treaty, the SDF arE:~ completely enrolled
- in the U.S. nuclear strategy and are going to make clear that they will bear
a part of defense," stressing "there is a strong suspicion th