JPRS ID: 10096 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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JPRS L/ 10096
4 November 1981
We~~~ Euro e Re or~
~ p
(FOUO 57/81 ~
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JPRS L/10096
4 November 1981
WEST EUROPE REPORT ~
(FOUO 57/81)
CONTENTS
- ENERGY ECONOMICS
FRANCE
Energy Self-Sufficiency Seen 'Inacceseible'
(Jacques Ferry; VALEURS ACTUELLES, 5 Oct 81) 1
Kinetic Energy Storage Wheel Uae Flanned
(AIR & COSMOS, 19 Sep 81) 3
_ POLITICAL
BELGIUM
Role of Spitaels in Steel Isaue, Government Fall
- (POURQUOI PAS?, 24 Sep 81) 4
SPAIN
Basque Communists Divided on Merger With Other Leftieta
(Ander Landaburu; CAMBIO 16, 28 Sep 81) 10
Business Interests Seen as Backing Calvo Sotelo in UCD
(Anxton Sarasqueta; CAMBIO 16, 21 Sep 81) 14
Suarez Vs Calvo Sotelo: Aasets and Liabilitiea
(Anxton Sarasqueta; CAMBIO 16, 28 Sep 81) 18
- MILIT~,RY
FRANCE
Nuclear War Civil Defense Studies Suggested
(AIR & COSMOS, 19 5ep 81) 23
- a - [III - WE - 150 FOUO]
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ENE~tGY ECONOMICS FRANCE
ENERGY SELF-SUFFICIENCY SEEN 'INACCESSIBLE'
Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 5 Oc~t 81 pp 39-40
[Article by Jacques Ferry: "The Nuclear Imperative"]
~Text] As a prelude to t~e discussion that is to take place
, beginning this Tuesday in Parliament, tr?e ~conomic and Social
Council, meeting in plenary session on Tuesday and Wednesday,
debated the energv record. The report that gave rise to a
draft opinion had been prepared by Rene Le Guen (the general
secretary to the CGT staff). The repc~rt was preceded by work
- done in the industrial section. The president of that sec-
tion, Jacques Ferry, comments here, personally and for VAL-
EURS ACTUELLES, on the national debate proposed by the gov-
ernment.
It appears to be a simple question: how can France's energy needs be met in the
~iext 20 or 30 years; and how can it be done so that at the same time she will ac-
quire total energy independence?
- But that question brings up two others: what criteria are to be used to determine
the needs that will have to be met by 1990 or 2000? How should we define national
energy independence?
Energy consumption is naturalty a function of the gross domestic product (PIB). But
it does not vary in proportion to the PIB. It is the result of the type of growth
and specific savings that are realized. In the 1960's, which were years of great
expansion and cheap energy, what was called the elastacity coefficient, that is the
relationship between the respective growth rates of energy consumption and the PIB,
was in the neighhorhood of 1. It has been around 0.8 for several years. How low
can it be made to go?
~ The answer depends both on the extent of realizabl~ energy conservation and the ex-
pected growth rate of the PIB. In this regard voluntari~m is of course indispen-
sable; nevertheless it does not remove all the uncertainties.
Does anyone really believe, to take just one example, that the most voluntarist pol-
icies, leaving aside their cost, wi~l lead to less than 0.4 in 8 years, as indicated
by the electoral program of the PS, the elasticity coefficient?
- ~1
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It is aiso necessary to agree on the idea of energy independence. To understand it
as a possible way for France to meet all of its energy needs without resorting to
importation comes under the heading of utopia. 4t least for a very long tim~.
Althougn it has increased slightly since 1973, the part played by national resources
in the total consumption of energy comes to barely 30%. With a deadline of a quarter
of a century, self-sufficiency for our cour_try is an inaccessible objective, as
spectacular as the results to be obtained by exploiting new energy sources may be,
including nuclear sources, or by increasing coal production.
Tn reality, energy independence means only as strong as possible a diminution, in
relative value, of importations, accompanied by greater security of supply, whatever
its origin.
To put it plainly, this means that priority must be given to oil, which is i.mported
in its totality at almost 2 or 3 percent, as much to save foreign currency as to
better diversify sources and quality. Currently, the oil we are importing still
comes, up to at least 70 percent, from the Middle East, Saudi Arabia alone accouslt-
ing for half of our total supply. It is not necessary to emphasize the ~isks of all
kinds that accompany such a purchase struczure.
Among the primary energy sources that can be substituted for oil, basically for the
production of electricity (the most significant share of the final energy delivered
for consumption), is nuclear e~srgy, which must be given priority.
For all kinds of reasons: the mastery of its technology that we have acquired; the
existence of important reserves of natural uranium in the national subsoil, which
are maximized by the superregeneration technique; its storage facilities; its utili-
zation cost, which is very much lower than the cost of coal and even farther below
the cost of oil and even farther than that below the cost of the new types of ener-
gy, whose marginal cost is becoming prohibitive.
ror all that, the nuclear choice does not rule the others out. In the first place
is coal, provided that sufficiently diversified importation channels are maintained
_ and that national production is resumed under technically and commercially accep-
table conditions. The sun and the biomass, among other things, can also contribute
significantly to our energy supply. There as elsewhere the field for discoveries is
immense.
This is no reason to surrender too quickly to the promises of a scarcely-explored
future; one part of public opiniQn, moreover, is deceiving itself, or being misled,
when it characterizes the French energy program as "all nuclear." In 8 to 10 years
nuclear energy will represe~nt at the maximum 30 percent of our total energy re-
sources.
It is still necessary that there be no additional delay in starting certain pro-
jects. Otherwise, neither energy conservation, which is probably already overesti-
mated, nor new energy sources will make up the difference. The difference will be
made up by imported oil and coal. Our "energy independence" will be diminished ac-
- cordingly.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 "Valeurs actuelles"
8946
CSO: 3100/32
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ENERGY ECONOMICS FRANCE
KINETIC ENERGY STORAGE WHEEL USE PT..ANNED
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 19 Sep 81 p 55
[ArticYe: "First Kinetic Energy Storage Device"]
~Text] The Natianal Center for Telecommunications Studies (CNET) recently began
usin~ the first kinetic energy storage device (accumulator) on an experimental basis
in its Rochefort-en-Yvelines telephone exchange. This device was developed by
Aerospatiale'~ Aallistic and Space Systems Division from the magnetic-bearing
reaction wheels it has developed for stabilization of satellitea (Spot, etc.).
It is the world's first such device.
The kinetic energy storage unit is installed in an underground tank near�the
telephone exchan~e. It consists mainly of a ateel wheel 40 centimeters in diameter
and 50 centimeters in height. The wheel weighs approximately 400 kilograms and
_ ror_atea at 12,000 rpm in a frictionle~~ mrr.ner, thanks ta its magnetic-bearing
suspension. In addition, the flywheel is housed in r~ small vacuun case. As thus
installed, the device can supply 3 KW for 20 minutes.
This kinetic energy storag~. device's advantages over chemical batteries are as
follows, according to Aerosp~tial~: pollution-free, m~re flexible and quicker
recharge, instant determinatiun of ~mount of energy actually stored, relatively
compact, no special maintenancc �required, ~a~d a service Iife of 10 to 20 years.
Aerospatiale now intends to expand its line of .such devices with units capable
of storing 1 to 2 KW for 10-15 minutes as emer~ency power sources for electronic
data processing centers. More powerful storage ue~its of 5 to 10 KW are also under
study. These kinetic energy storage devicea are be{ng marketed in France by
Thomsan-Auxilex, the supplier of the system'e electronics.
COPYRIGHT: A. 5 C. 1981
8041
CSO: 3100/43
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- POLITICAL
BELGIUM
ROLE OF SPITAELS IN STEEL ISSUE, GOVERNMENT FALL
Brussels POURQUOI ~AS? in French 24 Sep 81 pp 4-7
LArticle: "Gu~ Spitae~s: The Man of Steel"
LTex~ And there it is: Mark Eyskens' brilliant team has packed its
-
bags. We will hardly weep for it. In 5 months, it had offered us
only resignations and retreats, hesitations and widespread ossifica-
tion, with, as a final climax, a scandalous budget, completely
riddled with accommodations and lack of imaginatian, but also inspired
by a tax-minded, sterilizing spirit with a bureaucratic, socialist
tint. Implicitly: an end to freedom of enterprise and all social
. assistance.
- The hostility to the budgetary monster was surprising in its extent,
which drove the PSCVP[Social Christian Party] to revise the bad 3oke.
To its great surprise, the PS LSocialist Party~ did not succeed in
imposing its wishes, and from that time on, it tried to slip away.
A debate on the issues, in fact, would have brought to light its deep
conservatism, especially with regard to the well known production
costs and index reform, as well as its complete and voluntary aliena-
tion from the needs ~f the FGTB LGeneral Rederation of Labor of
Belgium1,
_ Always cold and realistic, Mr Spitaels has wanted to look for a more
sensational point of fall: the steel industry in an autonomist and
community setting. Following his upward dream, he chose to become
the first in the single Walloon. Which Walloon, moreover? The future,
in any event, will judge what was essentially a tactical, personal
step.
TheSe days Mr Spitaels is claiming to have act~d in perfect agreement
with his party. Tp be sure, nobody at the Office dared complain
either Monday or Tuesday, but how can one explain the curious fluctuations of the
Kernkabinet on Thursday, when a solution for the steel industry was accepted by
the Socialist vice-premier, Mr Mathot and by the miniater of justice, Philippe
Moureaux?
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Later, and after having been blasted by the president of the party,
they backed out without false pride. After all, it was just a
ruestion of habit for them. To Mr Martens IV's anguish, the vice
premiers, one of them the same Mr Mathot, had accepted a relative
modification in price-indexing. The Spitaelian ax took away all his
illusions on this subject.
Thus, we repeat, the desire for a split wa~, again this time, Guy
~pitael's prerogative.
In truth, the president of the PS seems to have caleulated perfectly
the risk of the undertaking. How could he not know that in the case
of a split, he would be isolated from the PSC LChristian Social Party/
and the CVP LSo~ial Christian Party~, and also frcm the Flemish
socialists? i~o matter, Mr Spitaels has now many other winning cards
on his side. Is he not comforted by the support of the Walloon uni~ons
who wish to cross swords, a question of stirring up a demoralized
rank-and-file? The Walleon Festivals will take a curious turn
- And then, he will have the satisfaction of also being supported by
self-administrating RW LWalloon Rally/ of Henri Mordant
So what: Since Monday, and with the political po~iticking, the
Belgians scarcely know what has happened, other than noting that the
gap between the two communities is widening more and more, thus
- making the task even harder for those who, like those in the PSC or
the Flemish socialists, are still trying to put up some ridiculous
- footbridge.
Having said this, the major turn taken by Mr Spitaels could perhaps
have the advantage of clarifying things definitiv~ly.
A last question, finally: what will happen tomorrow? What formula
can we think of in order to save the little we still have left? A
non-traditional government such as Henri Simonet wish?d for in
POURQUOI PAS? of 10 September? It is too early, and everyone does not
yet see clearly the extent of the wreck.
Elections, then?
To be realistic, this solution would be no less dangerous. Public
opinion, in fact, is fed up to the teeth with politicians' politics,
their schemes, ~nd their settlements of account~ The anonymity of
the polling booth could permit it to avenge itself cruelly on the
puppets of the Rue de la Loi by favoring to the hilt the makeshift .
and chance parties.
After all, would that not be justice? How can one accept without
_ revolt t.hese "partycratic" jokes, these demagogic defiances of which
all are capable and which have left this poor country in a complete
structur.al, economic, and social crisis, without even a coherent plan
f4r the 1982 budget? This scandalous exhibition will sooner or later
receive its just retribution.
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But we are not there yet, and the farce will continue in full swing
in the days to come. For these men, no lesson is ever profitable.
Nevertheless, it would be in their interest to read the following
pages, w~ere Paul Colson describes the financial mechanism of the
steel crisis. For his past, Jacques Schepmans is concerned with
_ another mechanism. The one that is stirring up Guy Spitaels
'~For 15 years I visited Ar Jek~ll. Today at noon I met Mr Hyde."
This is how an impudent socialist, one quite close to Mr Spitaels,
however, summarized the Sunday debate between the president of the F~S
and Leo Tindemans.
And, in fact, tense, fascinated by himself, dry as a stick,
Mr S~itaels presented the extraordinary picture of a cold demagogue.
To be sure, he was not wrong in letting the CVP know that the time
for compromise had long since passed, but behind his ~avonarde and
destroying angel act, it was easy to perceive other intentions.
Having arrived at a summit meeting of his "marketing" personnel,
Mr Spitaels was already preparing for a new leve~ in his frictional
ascent.
This confrontation was a most haunting experience. On the right, a
Tindemans still not calmed down from his million European votes,
opposite a Spitaels, fascinated by the results of the "Political
' Barometer"* and persuaded that, this time, he could take the liberty
' of doing anything.
�
A marvelous performance of a"political show" with these two men who
_ have or had evil advisers who led them into these demagogic excesses
, to which their basic personalities already made them so vulnerable.
On this Sunday, Mr Spitaels did not do things in a small way. Full
of the Apocalypse and hellfire, alternating with threats and sub-
' nationalistic chauvinism, he was exemplary.
He left nothing to chance. Not even blackmail. The community
aggressiveness was there, for the use of the voter, but also to
impress the Palais, where he has tried for so long to be thought of
as the highest recourse. This was very clever insofar as Lasken,
by definition, is somewhat traumatized by this kind of outlook.
Finally: Mr Spitaels took refuge in the old and always effective
trick, street blackmail.
This style of threat has always been part of the socialist weaponry.
� In 1950, in 1960, 121 short, each time that the socialists were
dismissed to obscurity, they caused strikes and demonstrations with
*See POURQUOI PAS? of 17 September, where our Barometer designated
Mr Spitaels as ~lister Wa~lonia.
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the temperament of a band of rioters who; having been assembled
from nothing, are even more formidable.
Today, with the gravity of a licentious sexton, Mr Spitaels is doing
the same thing. By pretending, of course, to ~3eplore it, and by
giving numerous warnings, he is succeeding in raising those specters
which will cause the socialists to be persua~ed to impose their law:
a community escalade descending immediately upon the followers of
separatism, and, as a bonus, the violence of social disturbances.
At least we are warned:
Let's be accurate. If, behind all this, this socialist condottiere
Lcaptain of a band of adventurer~ had no underhand~d, ulterior
motives, we would be quite satisfied to see the CVP, and particularly
Leo Tindemans, made fun of in this way.
It is true that today's Flanders is domineering, sure of itself,
brutal, and arrogant. It is true that for a long time the political,
as well as the financial, power has wanted to impose on Wallonia an
unbearable economic dependence.
But is the extreme radicalism of Mr Spitaels the solution? And how
can we not doubt his disinterestedness? Everything, in fact, proves
to us that the president of the PS wants to stir up, then exploit,
the steel crisis, in order to strengthen both his own and his party's
identification, which, moreover, have become confused in h~s eyes.
Let us analyze the tactics of this senator-mayor of Ath:
Mr Spitaels is now raging about the lack of respect for the promises
_ made regarding agplying the Financial Plan for the steel industry.
Correct: But why does he maintain a similar silence as soon as it
comes to applying the Social Plan?
Among the conditions for rectifying the steel industry, there were,
in fact, provisions for a release for 5,000 jobs and a decrease in
the total wages of 10 percent.
Between 1 January and 1 June 1981, personnel increased in Lieges by
- 73, and decreased only by 354 in Charleroi. As for the total wage
figure, it has not decreased but increased by 9 percent.
Thus, we bet that Mr Spitaels, while staying firm on his positions
and holding a sacred cow in addition, ought not to be unhappy to lay
today's failure at the door of the Flemish, the ~SC, the bankers
It will permit him to gloss over the troubling Social Plan and above
all not to have to confront Jean Gayetot or the happy Gillon, the
bridges of Walloon trade unionism over this slippery ground.
From this point on, the purety of socialist intentions, and also
their desire to succeed, leave us somewhat skeptical. Other examples?
7
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Whereas it had been agreed that the proceedings of the management
committee of Cockerill-Sambre would remai~ strictl~ confidential, so
- as to separate the purely economic factors from the political concerns,
the PS leadership was informed of these proceedings a~d called a
secret (sic) meeting on Thuraday, 10 Sept~mber of all the socialist
leaders. It was then--and under pressure from the "boss" of the
Lieges metalworkers, Mr. Gillon, wha kn~ows that if the steel industry
slows down, he will lose his power--that the PS made its decision to
demand that the produ~tion level be maintained at 8.5 million tons,
exactly as--it must be admitted--the gouernment plan specified.
From this point on, with ab5olw,te duplicity, the socialists pretended
to confuse production capacity and produetion level.
To be sure, everyone agreed that, for Cockerill-Sambre, it was
necessary to maintain the po~sibiTity of producing 8.5 milZion tons
of raw steel, in order to be ab,le to meet all requests, in case of a
cyclical revival.
Un the other hand, as a purely administrative matter, it was neGessary
to organize production in such a way that the industrial entity lost
the least amount of money possible, while still taking into account
the economic and social concerns. To lose the least amount of money
possible? When the socialists hear the words stabilization or reduc-
tion of finances, they brirng out their Spitaels. Which did not fail
~ to happen.
It was from then on a flight forward. Wanting to leave no stone
- unturned, the socialists pulled out all the stops. Attacking
. Mr Davignon, who looks at the problem on a European level, tombing
the European People's Party for being guilty of wanting to r.ationalize
the steel idnustry, calling upon the excited Anne--Marie Lizin to do
this, blaming the government for the deciaion of the Swiss banks not
to bring in the money to breath a little life into Cockerill-Sambre
until the end of October, these men from the Boulevard de 1'Empereur
are indulging in a frenzied mixture of conditioning public o~inion.
In truth, if it had not been the steel industry, Mr Spitaels would
have found something else. Let us simply say that today, these
circumstances seemed to him nnore favorable.
He is convinced, first of all, that his all-r�ound radicalism and his
_ constant ultimatums have a bearing on tn~ Walloon public. Our
Political Barometer has no doubt been able to reassure him on this
subject.
By causing a crisis that could lead to ea.ections, h~ thinks he has
- found the best combat ground. Thus he will do everythin~ ~o stir up
a community passion among the crowd.
By hiding behind the ~teel question, he will avoid taking r~sponsibil-
ity in the economic and social areas regard~ng the necessary
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financial s~abilization, government expenses, or production costs.
By making the debate into a passionate issue, he hopes to succeed
in erasing all those real problems to which the PS, in the spirit
o~ one-upmanship which it has now made its own, cannot give a
satisfactory answer.
Thus, this identifying image of an uncompromising Walloon nationalist,
of a Sainte-Genevieve facing the Flemish barbari~ns, and of an
unwavering protector of the trade unions can only, according to him,
strengthen his position as head of the PS and later (at least he
hopes so) as head of a Walloon state.
But wait: Would not an autonomous Wallonia, in the hands of an
unshared government, run the risk from then on of becoming totally
subject to these favorite fantasies of ttie socialists?
When Ni~ Spitaels attacks the bankers, he does indeed take the pre-
caution of rejecting the outright nationalization of credit, but .
It is now permissible to imagine a Wallonia that would humor the Rosenkavalier
undcr the pretext of autonomism. Therefore, Wallonia must seek out a desper-
' ately fragile balance.
= If we must wish it to be resolute, strong, aware of itself and its
destiny, and resolved not to yield to certain Flemish demands, as
a tho~oughly-understood regionalism would require, will it also be
able to spurn this intense adventure into which it is in danger of
being led by the confused ambition of one mar~ and one dominerring
party?
Mr Spitaels' spectacular offensive will, in any event, have had the
- advantage o� opening the eyes of some people as to the future of
this surprising, Spitaelian regional-socialism. And for that reason,
at least, it will not have been useless.
COPYRIGH~: 1981 POURQUOI PAS?
11550
CSO: 3100
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POLITICAL SPAIN
BASQUE COMMUNISTS DIVIDED ON MERGER WITH QTHER LEFTISTS
Madrid CArBIO 16 in Spanish 28 Sep 81 pp 31-32
[Article by Ander Landaburu: "Basque Communists, Unite!"]
[Text] The rapprochement between the EIA [Basque Revolutionary Party] and the EPK
[Basque Communist Party] was known, especially af ter their respective congresses
last spring. However, no observer anticipated such a rapid convergence process.
The unification of the Basque couanunists with the purpose of creating a new party
_ of the Basque "Marxis~" and "nondogmatic" lef t had the effect of a bombshell in
Basque political circles. ~
Events picked up momentum in 48 hour~. Thus, when the leadera of the PCE-[Spanish
Communist Party]-EPK were notified that the Biltzar Tipia--central committee of the
EIA--was to meet right away to plan a seasion of the Constituent Congress of the
projected political party by the end of the year, the secretary general of the
Basque communists, Roberto Lerxchundi, urgently summoned tha party's executive.
After several hours of discussion and by a vote of 36 in favor and 13 against with
one abstention, the communists decided to aak the patriots of the EIA for a stint
of negotiations with the firm resolve of helping create a new political group "out
of this party which we seek, one that will be an independent party, of a fully
sovereign Basque character, in order to establish the neceasary links with like-
minded political .forces in the whole of Spain and Europe."
This surprising document was sent urgently to the capital of Guipuacoa Province
where the EIA's executive met a few hours later. In the face of the communist re-
quest, it decided to postpone its Constituent Congress to a new date. In its reply
- the executive explained to the Basque communists that it did so in the face of "the
need to bring other forcea into the Constituent Congress of the Basque Left [EE]
for the creation of a clase party.that would be broad, of the massea and nondogmatic,
that would overcome in theory and practice ~he historic division between Socialists
- and communists in the working calss."
Even though it was executed in ite nea.rly final phase hurriedly, this agreement is
nevertheless the result of a long procesa of reflection within which both the ~IA
and the PC~-EPK have strived to overcome the historic division between nationalists
and communists. Following the elections to the Basque parliament in 1980 where the
unquestionable hegemony of the Basque right was brought out and, especially, the
large electoral abstention of immigrant woricers--potentially leftist voters--some
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of these organizations, together with intellectuals and independent professionals
brought up the possibility of creating a new dynamic to face this division and
fragmentation of the left in the Basque Country.
Accordingly, in their respective congresses held last spring, both the PCE-EPK and
the EIA alraady suggested the need to strive in this direction, as Mario Onaindia,
the head of the EIA, confirmed recently. "In this pro~ess the hiatoric divisions
between nationalists and non-nationalists and between Socialists an~ communists must
be overcome to endow this possible unity with a new dimansion that may be transformed
into the revised platform of a nondogmatic left."
On its part, ir. the Basque Communist Party congress, a faction dubbed "natio~.alist"
and headed by Roberk~o Lerxchundi achieved significant success in receiving a comfort-
able majority vis-a-vis the "working class" faction represented by thE veteran
leader Ramon Ormazabal and the head of the Workers Committees [G~C.00.], 'Comas Tuero~,
who follows the line of Santiago Carrillo.
It is with the two congresses that the rapprochement was initiated between t~ze :wo
parties which considered that the overlapping pointa in their political strategy
for the Basque Country were more important than the divergences. This overlap is
understood," Lerxchundi told CAMBIO 16, "in the sense that Basaue national fre~~dom
itself is linked to the emancipation of the workers."
Differences With the Adherents of Eurocommunism and the Workers Committees
However, in the parallel paths covered by the two political organizations these pFist
few months and now with the merger plan, there ia no agreement on everything. Thus,
the theme of Eurocomreunism and the labor union problem can become the ma~or issues+
of the forthcoming discussions.
For Mario Unaindia, Eurocommunism has failed to the extent that it has strived to
- struggle for democratic sc~cialism with a party tied to "Leninist or Stalinist
defects" even though he recognized later that the Basque Communist Party has recently
evolved considerably in this field, moving closer to the EIA's 1ine.
Neither does it escape anyone's notice that this process af unity or, fusion can have
important consequences in the labor union policy which both parties are promoting
now, one of them backing the Workers Committees and the other the STV [Solid~rity
of Basque Workers].
Both Onaindia and Lerxchundi avoided at this time coming out clearly on the issue
even though the secretary general of the PCE-EPK noted that "no one will neglect.
the securing of instrumentalities which the working class has acquired. In every
way, we shall avoid a break in the labor union movement and shall aim at defending
those means that would make it possible to secure unity without con�erting symbols
into patriotism."
No matter what the final result, the agreement between the two leftist parties has
generated for now an enormous degree of expectation in the Basque political world.
- Its impact has become evident,among all the other political groupings which, with
interest or concern, are very mindful of the progress in the negotiationa.
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In UCD [Democratic Center Union] circles, both in Madrid and in the Basque County,
the fact is viewed with interest and positi~~ely despite ideological differences.
For the Basque members of the UCD this convergence.can allow a significant explica~
tion of the Basque political process, a clarification. But above all, it is an
important advance in the pacification of the Basque Country.
In this respect a UCD parliamentarian from Vizcaya Province, on recalling the words
of the minister of interior, Juan Jose Roson, on his recent trip to Bilbao, told
this periodical: "For the minister and for the UCD here, a stabls Basque left is
fundamental and the key to peace. Both the truce af the police and militia and
the recent and constant charges or denunciations by the Basque Left against violence
are a major effort for the narmalization of life in the Basque Country.
- This plan for the merger of the PCE-EPK and the EIA nevertheless preoccupied other
important sectors of Basque political life, such as the Socialist sector and the
nationalist majoritq of the PNV [Basque Nationalist Party]. While the Socialists
refused to make declarations and went into a profound silence, thereby demonstrating
their surprise and fear before this new leftist pact which can deny them electoral
strength, the nationalists of the PNV, also preoccupied, stressed the Marxist
- character of the convergence and started to maneuver to prevent a sizable loss of
influence in the ELA (STV) [Solidarity of Basque Workers] trade union.
I, A place where this process is being followed with genuine interest is among parties
of the Basque left such a~ ANV [Basque Nationalist Action], ESEI [Basque Socialist
~ Coordinating Force], and others which, despite their scant electoral success,
continue to have influence 3n the cultural and intellectual life of the Basque
Country. These are typical parties that could see themselves become integrated in
this aggregating process spearheaded for the time being only by the Basque Communist
Party and the EIA.
` How~ver, this minieuphoria of some groups of the Basque left is not shared by all
the c~mmunists of the Basque Country. The challenge in the party was not long in
coming. The minority faction, called "unionist," loyal to the veteran of the
apparatus, Ramon Ormazabal, targeted its initial arrows at RobeYto Lerxchundi and
t~is allies .
While this f action, which en,joys no more than about 30 percent of the votes in the
party, does not represQnt the ma~ority, its influence continues to be aignificant
among the leftist fringe of the Estuary of Bilbao where Tomas Tueros and his
colleagues cont:ol the Workers Committees and where many former activitst have
always maintained a critical posture vis-a-vis anything 'that was redolent of the
Basque mavement.
For Ramon Ormazabal the decision and ti:~ document of his party's central committee
represent a flagrant infringe~nent of the a~reements o.f the Fourth Congress and "a
- deceit of the party's grassroots." Visibly disple~sed and pained by what he called
haste, the old communist leader no:ed that "in the preceding congress no one was
auth~rized to anticipate or promote the separation of the Basque Commui,ist Party
from its Spanish counterpart.
In this respect the critics in this faction have been nua~erous, strongly represented
among the left in Alava Province and in a group from Guipuzcoa Province headed by
Ignacio Latierro.
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Disciplinary Measures
War was declared between the two factions, and while the pro-Santiago Carrillo
faction of the EPK proposes the urgent need for a special congress with the purpose
of clarifying the positions in the party and seeing to what extent the steps taken
by the central committee for a convergence with the Basque Left or the EIA en~oy
support among the grassroots, the individuals connected with Roberto Lerxchundi
have announced that they will not tolerate lack of discipline and that they will
make the appropriate decisions when they summon the provincial committees.
On reasserting its posture, the central committee of the Basque communists plans
to move the process forward "no matter what." In this purpose it has been encouraged
by the historic Basque leader, Juan de Astigarrabia, who lives in Cuba today.
Minister of government of the Basque region in 1936, Astigarrabia was expelled from
the communist party at the beginning of the war because of his "nationalist
sympathies" even though he was subsequently reinstated. Today, according to PCE-
EPK sources, he would be prepared to return to the Basque Country and confront his
old party adversary, Ramon Ormazabal.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Informacion y Revistas, S.A.
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P:.~LITICAL
SPAIN
BUSINESS INTERESTS SEEN AS BACKI NG CALVO SOTELO IN UCD
Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 21 Se p 81 pp 31, 33
[Article by Anxton Sarasqueta]
[Text] The situation of the Democratic Center Union (UCD) and the government has
entered a delicate phase in t he vicious circle irt which the different centrist
_ forces are moving, without finding any way out of the crisis.
, The "war" being waged among c entrists has aborted the first moves by President
Calvo Sot:elo to solve the crisis.
Givcri this internal. situation, and the offensive by the opposition in the first �
parliamen~ary ~ebates, the hea d of the government has been forced to delay, the
press conference that he had p u~licly announced on 31 August for when he returned
' fr.om vacation.
Amid the parliamentary debates on such key issues as colza and NATO, and as the
kickoff of the electoral campa ign in Galicia approaches, the president is con-
' fronted with two immediate problems which will have a decisive impact not only on
his own future, but also on the collective political life of the country.
The problems are the government crisis, and the dilemma of whether Leopoldo Calvo
Sotelo will receive Eull UCD sup p o'rt when it comes time to take the reins of govern-
" ment and prepare for the upcoming general elections.
The members of the cabinet have begun a feverish race to present their respective
- r.eports on their activities, which is interpreted as an unequivocal sign of an
impendin~ cabinet shake-up.
Ministers such as Rodolfo Martin Villa, minister of territorial administration,
Educ~i~i~n Minister Juan Antonio Ortega, and Minister of Culture Inigo Cavero (the
latter bearing "Guernica") have done so in recent days; Minister of Public Works
~nd Urbanism Luis Ortiz will attain his principal objective this 21 September with
the signin~ ~f the Eramewor.k agreement on construction.
lt was Ortiz himself, in a conv ersation with CAMBIO 16, who interpreted the words
of the chief of gover.nment as m eaning a postponement of the shake-up to "sometime
soon."
'I'his crisis will undoubtedly be influenced (with the resultant tossing around of
names, which has already begun) by the inter.nal conflicts of Lhe UCD, and clearly
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by the resistance and opposition Calvo Sotelo has encountered among Suarez' follow-
ers and some men with Social Democratic leanings. '
Tt~e Duke Suarez emerged f.rom the shadows this week to state publicly his position
of continui.ty with respect to the tack that triumphed in the centrist congresses,
and witf~ respect to [.he pressure for change emanating from the president's office
and those surrounding him.
This is a struggle for change in the UCD, between the pragmatic elements who set
the pace for th~ transition of power, and the id~ological currents that are rising
up out of the ashes.
Liberals and Christian Democrats support a plan devised by Calvo Sotelo to place
the center in a liberal, r.ightist position. This support implies access to some
positions of power within the ~arty and the government, and the pragmatic elements
- such as former President Adolfo Suarez and other leaders in his area, who hold the
principal offices of the party, are reluctant to give up that power.
This confrontation, in view of the prospect of a Sociaiist victory predicted by
the latest opinion polls, has gone beyond the UCD's sphere of i.nfluence and has
sparked a strong reacti~n by an economic power within the business sector.
'fllus, usin~ the platform provided by his r.eelection as president of the employers'
association CEOE [expansion unknown], Carlos Ferrer Salat did not hesitate to make
a serious and severe warning to the government, its president and his party, assert-
ing among other things that if the centrist leader~s do not succeed in overcoming
"the illogical concept of the center as a mixture of disparate and sometimes oppos-
ing ideologies, we foresee an inevitable and quick electoral defeat."
Ferer Solat, who has no doubt that "many, many Spanish businessmen and their fami-
- lies, using their undeniable social influence, brought many of the voters to the
polls to hand (the UCD) its victory on two occasions," dialectically excoriated
the centrist leaders who "are trying to fill Socialist or Communist positions."
The attack by the CEOE president on those of the center-left has two targets:
Adolfo Suarez and Fr.ancisco Fernar~dez Ordonez,
- Thus no one was surprised at Adolfo Suarez' response to Ferrer Salat's idea of a
possible Socialist victory and the need for a swing to the right in the government
party.
The CEOE has the option, according to its top leader, of pursuing a liberal-con-
~ serv~ative political objectiv~. At the same time, Ferrer Salat is trying to uproot
the middle-of-the-road Socialists by accusing them of false moderation.
Bur_ Ferrer Salat's political rally is just the beginning of a formal offensive for
the reorganization of the right by party members and the business sector "in view
of the upcoming aueonomy and legislative elections." Hours later, after hearing
- this analysis in more measured tones, as befits the atmosphere of the Palace of
Moncloa, President Calvo Sotelo received repeated assurances of support from
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Ferrer Salat. At the same time, within the UCD a strategy was devised with two
objectives: to fence in Adolfo Suarez and his men, anel to strengthen the positian
of the chief executive as the undisputed leader of the center.
To bring together liberals, Social Democrats, Martin Villa followers, men who have
moved in Social Democratic circles, groups such as the so-called "young Turks" and
other. independents, and get them to back Calvo Sotelo, is one of the schemes afoot
to limit Suarez' influence on the executive committee and the party leadership.
It is within this context that one should consider, for example, the meetings held
recently between Marcelino Oreja, the government's current delegate to the Basque
Country and a prominent member of the Christian Democrat family, and the "young
Turks," a group which includes about 30 parliamentarians.
This operation involves drawing in relevant independent centrists through the gov-
ernment, a change in the distribution of government posts to provide incentives
for supporting Calvo Sotelo, and guar.anteeing at least neutrality on the part of
Agustin Rodriguez Sahagun and Rafael Calvo, party president and secretary general,
respectively. Either they have come under Suarist influence, or they have not had
enough authority to ensure rotal party support for the president of the government.
Martin Villa, a man who appears to be a key figure in tipping the centrist scales,
' has maintained a subtle position on the inclusion of independents in the govern-
ment, as a function of their names; he has a sort of wait-and-see attitude.
- The mechanisms being considered by Calvo Sotelo to ~urn the terms of influence
toward the groups that support the chief executive, involve achieving a consensus
among the centrist "barons" or, in a bolder move, holding a special congress.
Distinguished members of what was termed the "critical sector" at last January's
congress in Palma de Mallorca, made up oi Christian Democrats and liberals, are
betting on the latter alternative.
i Christian Democrats such as Jose Luis Alvarez, Oscar Alzaga, Marcelino Oreja.
' (some of them have expressly confirmed this to CAMBIO 16) do not believe the commit-
~ tees of prominent figures provide a viable solution, and are opting for a special
congress to be held before the general elections.
Three Keys
Nevertheless, during recent weeks the centrist "barons" have held intense negotia-
tions to achieve some points of agreement among the differ.ent tendencies. They
have ~~ot reached a definitive consensus, although in the words of a minister close
to Calvo Sotelo, there are promising signs.
But the Cinal soluti.on to the crisis in the upper echelons of the government party
will not be confirmed objectively until the results are in on the three key tests
that Calvo Sotelo will have to take during the next 30 days.
After the meeting of the political council of 18 September, the date selected for
the o(ficial r.elease of the results of negotiations among the centrist leaders,
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according to party President Agustin Rodriguez Sahagun, the regional elections for
the Galician parliament will be at hand, and sooner or la[er (depending on when
the NATO debate in Cor.tes ends) there will be a cabinet shake-up.
These events will determine the outcome of the centrist crisis, which i~ anxiously
awaited by all politicians because of its impact on democratic stability and on
all other forces.
Even the opposition 1~::~der, Felipe Gonzalez (see interview on page 34), recognizes
the political importance of solving the centrist crisis. After the most recent
meering of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) federal committee, that
party's secretary general reiterated the Soc:.alists' decision not ro force the
fall of the government and to maintain the pacts to cover the legislature until
the end, in 1983.
This promise not ta harass the government until the ultimate consequences (with
the exception of the dialectical confrontations from the benches in Parliament) is
really a margin of confidence which Calvo Sotelo can rely on to give him an
opportunity to turn to his party and repair [he cracks in the system created by
attempted coups and terrorist acts.
However, in the long range, the Socialist strategy is designed to undermine the
government. It is with~n this context that they have harassed sev~en ministers in
the colza and NATO debates, while trying to prevent changes in the cabinet.
COPYRIGHT: 1981, Infor.macion y Revistas, S.A.
8926
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- POLITICAL SPAIN
SUARE7 VS CALVO SOTELO: ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 28 Sep 81 pp 24-29
(Article by Anxton S~~rasqueta~
~Text] The Duke of Suare~ does no~ think the trajectory of his successor, Leopoldo
Calvo Sotelo, is c:lear; without great confrontatians, he has launched a discreet
- of.fensive against the current resident of the Palace of Moncloa. He did meet with
Calvo Sotelo this week in another effort to reconcile their positions.
~ Adolfo Suarez, who will turn 49 this week (on 9-25-81), has political aspirations
! Eor the 1987 elections. He discovered Calvo Sotelo as his successor, and now has
control over the party at local levels as well as within the party appar.at. He
-i wants to make sure tl-~at the current president does not deviate from the center
, left, where the decisive votes will be in the 1983 elections. Suarez, who has
~ gotten progressively further away from Calvo Sotelo, although the two maintain
appearances, is certain that the key to the political future lies in his hands.
~ With the control of a large part of the Executive Branch; with the support of
Party President Agustin Rodriguez Sahagun a nd Secretary General Rafael Calvo
I Ortega (known in political circles as the "Dynamic Duo"); with decisive influence
I in the majority of local and provincial committees in the party, Adolfo Suarez is
j r.onvinced that if the current structure of the party is maintained he will once
= agai.n become the key man in Spanish politics in 1983. According to a basic
I~ nnaly5is, rhe Spanish Sociali5t Warkers Party (PSOE) will not be able to obtain an
I ,~bse~lute m~~jority in the comin~; elections, and will have to govern with a sector
of the Democratic CenLer Union (UCD). That sector will be the one headed by
~ Si~arez, wirh 60 or 70 indispensable deputies who are loyal to the duke and not to
Calvo Sotelo.
Tt~e people of Arlaban, headquarters of the government party in Madrid, where the
leaclers of the UCD and what has become known as "the machine" can be found, are
convinced that the center is populist.
And they are convinced that populism is embo died in Adolfo Suarez, now a duke,
honorary president of the UCD and, for the past S years, executor of the
transition policy i.n the Palace of Moncloa.
Populism is not a definite ideol.ogy, but one which stems from the charismatic
figure of a leader.
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Today, between visits to Latin America and rest periods at his home in Avila,
- Suarez is ensconced in his law office on Calle Antonio Maura in Madrid, around the
corner from the historic Ritz Hotel and 200 meters from the Congress of Deputies.
With bodyguards situated in the cars parked by the kiosk on the street, and two
National Police officers g~arding the entrance at the front door, the former presi-
dent's office is on the first floor, decorated with modern furniture in light hues
and predominantly abstract paintings on the walls.
His personality, which embodies centrist populism, places Suarez at the service of
a political sector known as the center-left. According to Party President Agustin
Rodriguez Sahagun, he is assured of 20 percent of the vote, a figure which could
account for 50 deputies, one-third of the number r_he UCD currently has in the
lower. house. ~
The offensive by the rightist sectors of recent weeks, however, demanding that the
UCD and the gavernment take a step to rhe right to pl.ace the party in' a
center-right position and even form an alliance with the "great right," with
Manuel Fraga's party, has forced Suarez' men to define their situation at this
point in tt~e Spanish political spectrum known as the center-center. It is quite
undecipherable now.
Center-Center
_ Rodriguez Sahagun, at his press conference last week, stated that another result
of~ the scores of surveys conducted recently was that 23.5 peresnt of the
electorate would vote in favor of the center-center.
Suarez and his most loyal followers, such as former Vice-Presider~t Fernando Abril
and former Minister Rafael Arias, as well as the party "machine," have a majority
on the party's executive bodies (the executive committ~2e and the political
council) and thus control them. They defend that leftist area of ~the center which
barders on socialism and could at [imes be confused with it.
The fact that a recent survey indicated that the highest number of UCD voters were
between the lower.-middle and lower classes (see CAMBIO 16 No. 509), below the
Socialis~s, explains these intrusions into the left.
How~vcr, ir is generally a~;reed that Suarez was responsible for the UCD's victory
in the last electi~ns of 1979, thanks to his appearance on television a few hours
befor�e the polls opened with a message of terror in view of the threat posed to
the country by the possibility of the Socia3ist and Marxist "reds" reaching power.
So what is populism? How is populism applied in political practice? Can populism
represent the Spanish right in democratic institutions?
Along with the charismatic figure of Suarez, the self-made man, the brave man with
hard lines in his face, we have the voter who is over 30, low-income, Catholic and
very Catholic in more than 80 percent of all cases, and the party activist placed
in some job or professional post because of his loyalty to the party apparat.
There is a whole network of interests that in most cases stem from the administra-
tion and the old mac_hine of the movement, from top to bottom.
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= This political-social spectrum is equivalent to that of the Argentine Justicialist
movement led by Juan Domingo Peron until his death; ~r that of the Institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI) of Mexico. There is no equivalent in Western Europe.
The present UCD is not the modern, advanced right of classical lines that exists
in Western European countries.
~kctually, it is a far cry from the Labourites and Conservatives of England, or Lhe
German Social Democrats, much less the Christian Democrats of the land of beer and
sausages. It is even distant from the French farmer who votes for Mitterrand and
the Renault executive who goes for Giscard or Chirac.
When the issue of the UCD joining an ideological International, whether liberal or
Chri_stian uemocrat. has been brought up on a European level, Suarez has rejected
the idea, despite internal and external pressures. The current president of the
European Commission of the EEC, liberal Gaston Thorn, laments that the then chief
of the Spanish Government tried to convince him that the trend in Europe in the
coming years would be toward the center.
Spanish populism not only lacks a definite ideology, but it also manifests a
certain repugnance for all ideologies,.whether because of low levels of education
among most people, or due to other factors inherent in the social structure and
the environment, as well as the historical context.
Thus we have the paradox that the Spanish democratic right, which is included in
the two classical ideologies of Christian Democracy and liberalism, supported a
party and a leader that are in another orbit; a leader, Suarez, whom they later
abandoned and pressured fr.om all sides until he had to step down.
Some of the centrist "barons" who know Suarez best and who have worked with him in
his governments, say that one of his principal qualities is that "he knows his job
like no one else."
To know one's job means, in Suarez' case9 to k,now the workings of the administra-
tion inside and out, to spend more hours than anyone else studying political
adversaries, planning strategies, winning people with personal charm, and buying
loyalry. Audacity is one of his essential traits, which ~.xplains his surprise
move to legalize the Communist Party to set an example during the transition
period. His lack of commitment to a set ideology gives him greater room to
maneuver with his adversaries, which has sometimes provoked scorn and dis~ain
among them; such has been the case with people ranging from Felipe Gonzalez to
Oscar Alzaga.
_ Knowing his job led him to plan his departure from government while maintaining
control of the party, takin~ advantage of one of the maneuvers of his party adver-
saries, who were then known as the "critical sector." They advocated the separation
of the party presidency from the government presidency, trying to isolate Suarez
in Moncloa and control him from t.he party machine. Indeed, that is what Suarez has
done ~o Calvo Sotelo in trying to divert him from the center which embodies
populism.
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f3ut it is obvious that Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, because of his personality,
education, background and ties, is alienated from Suarez-style populism, despite
[he union that has kept them working together in the gov~ernment and the party in
the past few years. Those who know Calvo Sotelo in real life say that not orily is
he alienated from populism, but he feels a basic scorn for it.
Calvo Satelo is the person who today embodies the interests of the more or less
pr.ogressive right which treads the line between liberal and conservative. I:. is
- obliged to be more reformist than progressive in a country like Spain, which
remains aloof from the progress of the European powers.
On the extremes, liberals and Christian Democrats who support Calvo Sotelo
launc.hed a genuine oEfensive against Suarez near�ly a year ago, when the "critical
sector" began its operation and managed to defeat Suarez. Suarez and his men,
allied sometimes with the Social Democrats, have not given an inch in control of
the party, and have not been afraid to tell the Christian Democrats to leave the
party if they don't like it.
Two Spains
In the middle of all this, Calvo Sotelo is faced with the dilemma of having to
pre~are and lead a cohesive electoral campaign for 1983, with progressive rightist
features (rejectin~ the "great right"), and caming to grips with the possibility
nf a successful and forceful Socialist Party, as indicated by the polls. A right
witi~out Francoist complexes, 4!ith an unequivocally democratic image, economically
effective, and socially progr.essive, modern and imaginative. An ideological right,
not obscured by Suar.ez' populism. At the same time, however, it is certain that a
division of che party would mean the crashing defeat of the right.
Reconciling a11 those interests is the challenge that faces Calvo Sotelo in his
struggle with Suarez. This confrontation holds the key to the centrist crisis, and
sooner or later will force the current president to enter the political arena and
put his cards on the tabie.
Suarez is an avid player of poker and "mus" (Socialist Maria lzquierdo jokingly
calls him the "Mississippi Gambler"), and those who have sat at the table with him
assert that he plays hard and takes high risks. Suarez applies this practice to
politics, especially in pursuit operations.
This reporter has heard firs[-hand Suarez' ideas about the need to keep the
current political spectr.um, with Cwo large national parties and two other extremist
minorities, also on a national scale, such as the Popular Alliance and the
Communist Party. For Suarez, Co move these pieces toward a more accentuated
aip.irtisanism is to create tensions that are hard to contain, anci to return to the
_ two Spains.
Iiased on this analysis, and with the conviction that r.either Christian Democrats
nor liberals have the remotest possihilit~ of winning general elections on their
own, Suarez and his men feel they can be inflexible in many situations.
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He is also certain that in a minority system such as the present one, in which he
could without too much trouble garner that figure which represents over 50 depu-
ties, he could control the most valuable votes in Parliament. In de facto terms,
and from within, this party can become the linchpin that can tip the scales cine
way or another. The PSOE would need his suppQrt for a coalition government, as
, would the rightist parties.
Hoco will Calvo Sotelo react [o this situation? Will the backing of the Church,
capital, the Christian Democrats, the liberals, some converted Social Democrats
and the independents won over by the promise of a new plan or the guarantee of
power, in addition to the political capital he has built up during his time in
office, be sufficient?
_ The weakness of Spanish democracy and the threats posed by possible coups and ter-
rorism, demand that political leaders have a sense of responsiblity, which trans-
lates into avoiding radical stands that could become destabilizing factors.
This assumes some unity ~=ithin the UCD, and limits the risks of a falling out.
Calvo Sutelo's strategy for making a pact with Suarez involves reversing the
present terms of force, based on the support he has, and opening up the UCD to a
system of ideological currents (where he has greater support), bringing into the
party men of his ilk, from the economy, from the university. ..f who would
protect him before, during and after the elections.
The middlemen, possibly Rodolfo Martin Villa, Landelino Lavilla or Francisco Fernan-
dez Ordonez, can form alliances wiCh Suare2 if they do not receive the trust and
compensation they demand from Moncloa. This is particularly true of the present
minister of territorial administration, judging by the stance he took when he was
excluded from the president's intimate circle during tY,e crisis that led to the
resignation cf Fernandez Ordonez.
- This is a dramatic duel between two personalities, one of whom (Suarez) recalls
that he has won two elections and engineered the transition, and that his party
has ridden in his saddle and then named another successor.
Thus, Calvo Sotelo must use what he has in the present to play in the future.
In view of events such as the colza and NATO debates, the Galician elections of
20 October, and the general. state budgets, Calvo Sotelo will have to prove his
abil.ity to place his own men and set forth guidelines in three key tests in the
coming months: the election oE the centrist parliamentary spokesman, the cabinet
shake-up and the p