JPRS ID: 10085 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060062-3
Release Decision:
RIF
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
36
Document Creation Date:
November 1, 2016
Sequence Number:
62
Case Number:
Content Type:
REPORTS
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060062-3.pdf | 1.86 MB |
Body:
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060062-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
JPRS L/ 10085
30 October 1 1
= Sub-Saharan Africa Re ort
p
FOUO No. 745
Fg~~ FOREI~N BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060062-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060062-3
NOTE
JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign
newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency
transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language
sources are translated; those from English-language sources
are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and
other characteristics retained.
Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets
are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text]
or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the
last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was
_ processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor-
mation was summarized or extracted.
- Unfamiliar names rendered phoneticall}~ or transliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the
original but h~ve been supplied as appropriate in context.
Other unattributed parenthetical aotes within the body of an
item originate with the source. Times within items are as
giv~n by source.
The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.
COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE T~iAT DISSEMINATION
OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FO$ 0~'FICIAL USE ONI.Y.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060062-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/42/09: CIA-RDP82-40850R000400460062-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
JPRS L/10085
30 October 1981
SL'B-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT ~
FCUO No. 745
CONTENTS
INTER-AFR.ICAN AFFAIRS
Activities of West African Central Bank Reported
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITEFtRANEENS, 18 Sep 81) 1
Problems Facing African Tim~eY� Production Reviewed
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 28 Aug 81) 3
Briefs
African Railroads 5
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
- Nation's Recovery Said To Depend on Unity of Sound Forces
(Ginette Cot; AFP~SQUE-ASIE, 1l~-27 Sep 81) 6
Brief s
Goodwill Mission to Paris 10
= Japanese Relations 10
Demand fc:~ Constitutional Restoration - 10
CHAD
Political, Military Situation Seen as Laxgely Positive
- (AFRIQUE-ASIE, 11t-30 Sep 81) 11
Brief s
U.S. Involved in Destabilization 12
COMORO ISLAN~S
Opposition Seen StrengthenEd by Paris's Negiect of Abdallah
(Sadia Lamine Sow; JUENE AFRIQUE, 16 Sep 81) 13
- a- [III - NE & A- 120 FOUO]
FOR OFFICiAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060062-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R400440060062-3
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
CONGO
Briefs
FAO F`inancing Agreement 1~
NIGERIA
Oil Production Down in August; Favorable Prospects for Eaxly 1982
~MARCHEv TROPICAU% ET MEDITERRANEENv~ 18 Sep 81) 16
_ British Loan for Abuja Federal Capital Proje~t
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET I~IEDITERRANEENS, 19 Sep 81) 18
SENEGAL
Briefs
IDA Agricultural Loan 19
TANZANIA
Economic, Financial Situation Reportedly Remains Serious
(MARCHES ~ROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 18 Sep 81j 20
� Political, Economic Conditions at Time of Nyerere~s Visit to
France
(Dax~iel Joussan; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 28 Sep-11 Oc* 81) 22
Brief s
Nyerere's Paris Visit 2'j
Educational Reform 27
Belgian Transport Aid 27
UPPER VOLTA
New Regime's Chances of Su.ccess Examined; Imprisonment of
Officials Questioned
(Siradiou ]}iallo; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 23 Sep 81) 2$
ZAMBIA
Brief s
Wheat Program's Problems 32
IMF T?~gotiations Cnntinue 32
- b -
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060062-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000404060062-3
~OR aFFiCIAL USE ONLY
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
ACTIVITIES OF WE;ST AFRICAI~? CENTRPiL BANK REPORTED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1871, 18 Sep 81 p 2379
['rext] West African Development Ba~k Fiscal Year 1980
The West African Development Bank (BOhD) was established in 1973 by the six member
states of the West African Monetary Union (UMOA): Benin, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta,
- Niger, Senegal an~l Togo, and their issuing institution, the GJest African States
Central Bank (BCEAO), for the purpose of promoting the balanced development of the
member states, and implementing economic integration in West Africa by financing
development projects on a priority basis.
A total of 25 billion o� an authorized capital of 34 billion CFA was subscribed by
the end of September 1980 by the 6 above-named states, the BCEAO, France and the
Federal Republic of Germany (with a unit share of 1 billion CFA for the 2 share-
holders). The main office of the BOAD is located in Lome, and operations were be-
gun during the 1975-76 fiscal year.
During its 1979-8~ fiscal year, the BOAD began /16 studies/ [in boldface] for national
and regional prajects which involve a total of 230.1 million CFA.
For the same fiscal year, investmenr_ decisions involved nine pro~ects amounting to
5.2 billion CFA. Thus, since beginning operations, the volume of BOAD loans and
shares has risen to the financi.ng of 34 pro~ects for a total volume of 16.9 billion
CFA.
Investments during the last fiscal year involved rural development (27 percent of
the total), industry (17 percent), energy (39 percent) and telecommunications (17
percent). The financing is broken down as follows:
Senegal:. Back-up of the investment in well-digging groups in the Thies, Diourbel,
_ Kaolack, Tambacounda, Matam, lr''Dioum and Ziguinchor regions, for a long-term loan
(13 years) of 580 million CFA, which represents 70 percent of the cost of the pro--
gram.
Electrification of 7 new districts of Kaolack, through a long-term laan (11 years)
of 430 million CFA, or 70 percent of the cost of the pro~ect.
Togo: Development of village waterpower by canstructing drilli:ng rigs and pumping
equipment, with a 13-year loan ef 634 million CFA, which repres~nts 80 percent of
the projected costs.
1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060062-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/42/09: CIA-RDP82-40850R000400460062-3
FAR OFi~[CIAL USE ONLY
Construction of the secon~ ~roduction facility of the~Benin Brewery Company at Lama-
Kara, for which the najority of the cap~.tai is held by Togolese nationals, with a 12-
year loan of 708 million CFA, or 33.5 percent of the required investment.
Expansion and modernization of the Lome overhead-underground telephone lines system,
by a 15-year loan of 900 million CFA, which represents 33 percent of the program.
Benin: A loan to the Farm Loan National Bank of 180 million CFA for a term of 7
years to finance fishermen-craftsmen cooperatives. The BO.AD assistance represents
58.4 percent of the projected costs.
Expansion of the diesel generating plant of Parakou through the purchase and instal-
lation of 3 nPw units with an 11-year loan of 585 million CFA, or 80 percent of the
project.
- Uppex Volta: Taking a 200 million CFA share of the capital of the Farm Loan National
- Bank, or 15.38 percent of the capital of 1.3 billion CFA of that nrganization.
Expansion of the diesel generating plant at Ouagadougou through the purchase and
- installation of 2 new units by a 13-year loan of 1 billion CFA, which represents
32.19 percent of the projected cost.
P,side from the capital which has already been subscribed and paid (4.1 billion CFA
to 30 September 1930), the BOAD has at its disposal donations from the member states
~ (3.7 billion) on the balance sheet at the end of September 1980, with commitments
for long-term loans written for 6 billion CFA.
Mr Pierre-Claver Damiba ts chairman of the board of the BOAD, whose board of directors
_ includes representatives from the six member states, from the West African States
Central Bank, from the treasury of France and from the Federal Republic of Germany.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.
9174
CSO: 4719/34
2
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060062-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060062-3
� FOR OFF'ICIAL USE ONLY
INTER-AFRICAN AFFA'~:~25
PROBLEMS FACING AFRICAN TIMBER PRQDUCTION :''i1IEWID
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MIDI~ERRANEENS in French No 1868,28 Aug 81 p 2236
[Excerpt] In many African countries, one of the priarity problems requiring a
solution is the obvious exhaustion of their natural forestry resources as a
= result of their increasingly high rate of poFulaCion growth and extensive
farming. '~he system of shifting cultivation has proved to be dang~rous for
forest conservation as well as for the sustained soil fertility even when the
land is allowed to lie fallow for long periods of time.
- This situation has resulted in efforts to find and to 3mprove the methods of
~imultaneously growing trees and foad crops, methods which have proved to be
~ffecti*~e. Now, attempts are being made to perfect systems of agriculture
and silviculture which could sPrve as models for the dual purpose of produc-
ing fast-growi.ng species of valuable wood alongside perennial crops such a~
coffee, cacao and bananas, while care is take.n of restoring and maintaining
the fertility of the soil.
With this in mind, two kinds of actions are being considered. One is based on
a short-term rotation period (between 5 and 15 years) and can be used in areas
of very high population growth where the natural fdrest has disappeared almost
entirely and where there is a shortage of timber. It consists in planting
fast-~rowing species, such as eucalyptus, which will be used to make poles and
as firewood. The other action, based on a longer rotation p~riod (between 30
and 50 years), makes it pos~ible to grow coffee and cacao crops but gives pri-
ority to species such as the limba, framire, samba, obeche or wawa.
Another problem arising also in Africa is the concern created by the very low
productivity of the natural forest in that area which has led a number of
' countries to request a study on the possibility of increasing the yields
through effective methods of forest replenishment (either by the method of
regrowth under cover, by the method of gradual clearing of the cover or by
clear-cutting) and thrdugh the genetic improvement of quality species.
To increase the volume of the "timber material," many countries have planted
artificial forests with 1oca1 species and the chief purpose of these experiments
is to identify and select the f.ast-~rowing species. But the planting programs
have revealed an important element: the relationship between the properties
of the wood and the requirements of final utilization.
3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060062-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060062-3
~OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Particular attention has been given to a species which grows naturally in
Sierra Leone and Zaire and is known under different names (samba, obeche or
wawa) but has been ~xploited so heavily that it has disappeared from the
natural forests. This species is currently the object of planting programs
in the Ivory Coast, Ghana and Nigeria. Having found a simple method of pro-
ducing clones propagated by vegetative means, it is possible to consider trans-
ferring stocks to the h�lnterland beyond the natural forest area.
There is a third problem drawing the attention of African countries and now
being studied. Countries with an increasing tendency to process their own
timber on the spot, so as to increase the value of their products whenever
_ possible, are very interested in finding adequate processing methods for com-
binations or groups of species. The need to find ways of seasoning the wo~d
which can be applied to every possible combination of species and the need to
- perfect methods to protect the timber from perishable species, both pervious
and nonpervious species, is something obvious in that context.
A characteristic of the African tro~ical forest is the great variety of its
species, many of which are not known or hardly used. With the traditional
co~on species becoming more scarce, it has become necessary, as we know, to
study the possibility of using and marketing spe~ies which up to now were lit-
tle known or little used, and some of which were not exploited because some
- of their properties made them commercially unsuitable or undesirable. Since,
for the time being, it is impossible to solve that problem by suitable methods
of silvi~ulture or by improving the quality of the trees, efforts mus~ be
directed to solving it as best as possible at the processin~ stage (experi-
ments in sawing, planning, seasoniag, impregnation and so on).
Another characteristic of the African forest is that after the trees are cut
down much logging debris is left in the forests or at the sawing location.
There is much wastage in the varieus stages of logging, transportation, secon-
- dary processing, manufacture of the finished product and final utilization.
Undoubtedly, this large amount of wasted material considerably reduces the
productivity of the forestry industry. Technological progress has been
achieved in the utilizati.on of the debris to manufacturP by-products (chip-
board, plywood, wood pulp, charcoal and so on) but one still has to solve the
problem of finding economic ways of gathering the logging debris.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981
8796
- CSO: 4719/19
~
FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060062-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060062-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
BRIEFS
AFRICAN RAILROADS--The Higher Council of OFERMAT (French ~oope~ation Office for
Railroads and E~uipment) is s~heduled to meet in Paris on 20 and 21 October
this year. This meeting, held every 2 years, is a gathering of national repre-
sentatives of the various railroads from French-speaking African countries
which have signed cooperation agreements with that agency. The purpose of this
minisummit--~which will be chaired by Jean-Pierre Cot, French minister delegate
to the minister of external relations for cooperation and development, and by
Charles Fiterman, French minister for transportation--is to bring the OFF.EtMAT
- partners together and tak~e s~ock of the situation with regard to current activ-
ities and future projects. Jean-Pierre Cot has emphasized the fact that this
meeti~g "~ffers a very good opportunity for an exchan.ge of views between France
and the French-speaking African countries on question~ of transportation and
_ equipment." The 20 October mpeeing will take place at the headquarters of the
International Railroad Union (UIC) and will be attended, among others, by the
general secretary of the African Railroad Union (UAC), Adama Diagne (Senegal).
This meeting will make it possible to underline the new guidelines of the
French policy regarding France's cooperation with developing countries and
more particularly tha lines along which the development of land transportation
will be directed in Africa. [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 247
31 Aug-13 Sep 81 p 53] [COPYRIGHT: 1981 Afrique-Asie] 8796
CSO: 4719/19
K
FOR OFFICiAL USF. ONLY ~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060062-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060062-3
FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY
C~NTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
s
NATION'S RECOVERY SAID TO DEPEND ON UI~ITY OF SOUND FORCES
� Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in r~Y�ench No 248, 14-27 Sep 81 pp 13-14
[Articl~ by Ginette Cot: "The Military Traneition"]
[Text] The burc~2nsome heritage left to Central Africa by the former Giscard
;:egime was dealt a decisive blow by the departure of David Dacko froffi the
political scene in Bangui, on 1 September last, and the substitution of his
cabinet by a Military Committee of National Recovery headed by Andre Kolingba,
the chief of staff of the Arm~d Forces who was recently promoted to the rank
of general.
Whatever version is accepted--that David Dacko himself resigned for healtt~
reasons as he has indicated, or that he was compelled and ferced to do so by
the military to whom he gave full powers when a state of emexgency was pro-
claimed following the bomb attack of 1!~ July this year--everybody realizes
the significance of the bloodless coup. And it was with a general feeling of
relief that the Central African people and the leaders of the opposition par-
. ties received the news.
A Powder Keg
This was no surprise at all. David Dacko, who was brought back to power in
Bangui riding on the trucks of the paratroops which carried out the "Barra-
cuda" Operation on 21 September 1979, was the ultimate symbol of the process
of colonial reconquest initiated by Giscard's former French Government in that
country implanted in the heart of Africa and ruined by 20 years of dictator-
ship during which its national wealth, both in terms of human and material re-
sources, was squandered. Neither the democratic process hastily launched
last November, nor the presidential election of March 1981, w~hich was unani-
mously contested and only gave a narrow ma~ority to the ousted head of state
~(tn spite of the support he received from the administration and from the
barracuda troops), succeeded in eliminating the stigm~ attached to Bokassa's
successor right from the very beginning. This situation ~ras compounded by the
fact that, as soon as he took office, David Dacko--who xeportedly was forced
- to return to power against his wishes--gave the impreasion of being not so
much a chief of state as a puppet manipulated by his French advisers and proved
that he was incapable of br.i.nging even the sJ.ightest improvement to the situa-
tion in the political, economic or social spheres.
6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060062-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R004400060062-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
We know that in October 1979, the former head of state--who had little incli-
nation to establish a dialogue--prevented an opportunity to start bu3lding a
national consensus when he scuttled the roundtable scheduled tv bring together
all the country's political movements and leanings. ~We know that lat~r he
~ tried to challenge at every opportunity (particularly in March and July this
year) the multiparty system which, apparently, he had been forced to accept
under protest. As for the economic and social situation, it merely deterio-
rated to such an extent that prospective financial backers avoided the coun-
try. The constant strikes, the general absenteeism from work and the farmers'
refusal to pay taxes or to plant cash crops--all signs of the population's dis-
satisfaction with the deterioration of living ~o,nditions--contributed to
aggravat~ a situation always characterized by cases of corruption ~nd embezzle-
ment and by an ever-increasing decline of moral standards (gangsterism, r~b-
beries, prostitution) which had reached unprecedented propnrtions.
- As the months went by, Central Africa became a powder keg whe~e the worst--as
proved by the bombing of 14 July--could be expected.
This is why the opposition parties were calling for I~avid Dacko's departure
as an absolutely necessary preconditi'.on to any normalization of the situation.
It is known that on the day after 10 May this year, the Central African people
celebrated with ~oy the fall of the GiscaLd regime in Fra~ce, a fall which, in
their view, would inevitably soun3 as well th~ knell of the Dacko regime in
Bangui.
Although Mitterrand's France--which truly intends to apply the principle of
noninterference in the internal affairs of African countries regarding its
relations with that continent--refused to engage in any operation reminiscent
of the "Barracuda" ad~enture, it nonetheless expressed displeasure for the
repressive measures taken by the Dacko regime after the 14 July bomb attack
- and the regime was, in fact, forced to back-pedal (this is how in mid-August
it lifted the measures banning and suspending the movements headed by Dr Abel
Goumba and Ange Patasse and promised to hold "soon" the general and municipal
elections which had been previously postponed). At the same time, some of
the demands mac:e by th~ opposition were listened to in Paris. For instance,
after the departure of Mr Serre, the French adviser to the presidency in
Bangui, the former ambassador, who was deeply involved in some of the scan-
dals associated with the "Barracuda" Operation and its consequences, was re-
placed by a new ambassador, Francois Couturier, the first diplomat appointed
by Frar.cois Mitterrand. The network of "overseas voluntary service members"
dispatched by the former French regime was being dismantled and the green
berets integrated into Dacko's presidential guard to which they were attac:~ed
were recalled. As for the "b~rracuda" troops, recently renamed "units of
oper.ational assistance in Central Africa," they were restricted to their
camps and, as we know, remain there with strict orders to intervene only in
the event of external aggression or to protect French citizens. All these
developments indicate that the "de-Giscardization" of the situation is under-
way and this process should make it possible to clear the scene and help the
Central African people to take their fate into their own ha~~~is.
. 7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060062-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/42/09: CIA-RDP82-40850R000400460062-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE QNI.Y
Unknown Factors
It is not surprising for the C2ntral African Army, reorganized and reequipped
over the last 2 years, to have taken tthe driver's seat when one knows that the
- opposition of David Dacko (including the more or less convincing last-minute
- adherents) was slaw to agree on a common program of government. Alsc~ when one
knows that the Provisional Political Council (CPP, which included the PPO-PT
[Ubangui Patriotic Front-Labor Partv], the MLPC [Centr~l African People's
T.iberation Movement], tt~e PRP [People's Revolutionary Party] and the GIRA
[Independent Group for Reflection and Political Action] respectively headed by
Abel Goim?ba, Ange Patasse, Henri Maidou and Francois Pehoua), whose initial
objective was to fight against vioi.atlons of the rights granted by the new
constitution, did not make a move ir~ that direction until recently, when it
w3s jostled by what was happening.
Of course there are still mar.y unknown elemenf.s and, understandably, the forraer
parties of the opnosition to David Dacko are adopting wait-and-see a[titude
until they know more about the intentions of the new leaders whom people hope
- will rule only temporarily.
In any case, the transfer of power took place on 1 Septe~mber under conditions
which augur well for what is to follow--~here was no sh4oting, no arrests and
not even the slightest show c~f force.
As for the h3stily spread rumors that the United States had a hand in the
events, rumors chiefly grounded on a simple visit which the Amarican ambassa-
dor paid to the new head of state, they seem to be thE product of those who
want to create alarm rather than to be based on facts. Besides, in the first
statements he made, Gen Andre K,olingba, who described those rumors as "utterly
false," clearly called for maintaining privileged relations with France which
has also been asked to pay the salacies of the Central African civil servants
for, at least, 1 year thus allowinb him to "have his hands free to reorganize
the rountry and lay down the foundations of its economic recovery."
To gut the economic mach~nery back an the right course and to restore "order
in business activity seem to be the ~hief concerns of the npw head of etate,
who explained the army's intervention in the following terms: "During the
last 6 months, the scene was one of sterile arguments and violence which
severely tested our patriotism, with blatant violations of democracy and un-
acceptable challenges to our reason, our honor and our rights. It is out of
respect for the constitution, freely created and adopted by the peuple, that
until now the neutral and apalitical army haa maintained a wise silence in the
face of the distress calls issued by the Central African people."
- But when he announced that the constitution and political parties had been sus-
pended, General Kolingba indicated that the army would rule "until the right
time when conditions are met to hand over to civilians the powers of the state."
The duration of that transition period will depend, he explained, "on the poli-
tical parties and their leaders. For the time being, let them keep quiet and
stay in their corner. When order is restored, I will see what can be done to
hand power over to them."
8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060062-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400064462-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
To what conditions and what order is he ref~erring? The question remains
unanswered.
A Page Has Been Turned
However, in an interview broadcasted by Radio France Internationale, the
French minister for cooperation and development said that Fra:~ce "was not re-
assured but remained attentive." He explained that what had happened on
1 September was "a problem of domestic nature" in which "France must not get
involved although it is concerned by all this," and taking note of the wish
for cooperation expressed by the new leaders in Bangui, Jean-Pierre Cot
pointed out: "A military takeover is always a defeat for democracy. The
constitution is suspended. We always regret to see a democratic process in-
~ terrupted. But, of course, we are not in a position to judge the situation
on behalf of the Central African people." ~
A lot will undoubtedly depend on the ability of all the sound forces of Cen-
tral Africa to put forward ideas, to get reorganized and to unite behind vital
objectives if thi~ new phase, ~ust initiated in Bangui, is really to be the
beginning of a revival process in that ravaged country. Let us definitely
turn over ~ne of the darkest pages of African history ever written by suc-
cessive French regimes until 10 May 1981.
- COPYRIGHT: 19 81 Afrique-Asie.
879 6
CSO: 4719/25
_ 5'
FOR OFFiCiAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060062-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R004400060062-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
� - BRIEFS
GOODWILL MISSION TO PARIS--A Cent~ral African "goodwill" mission headed by the
- minister of foreign affai.rs, Lt-Col Jean-Loui;; Gervil Yambala, arrived on
13 September in Paris where it gave to President Mitterrand a message from the
_ President of the Military Committee o� National Recovery (CMRN), Gen Andre
Kolingba. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No
1871 18 Sep 81 p 2392] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 8796
JAPANESE RELATIONS--The Japanese Government has decided to recognize the new
- Central African regime. Japan's Foreign Affairs Minister Suna~ Sonoda ex-
plained in Tokyo, on 8 September, that he would ask Akio Akada, the Japanese
- charge d'affaires in Bangui, to -convey to the new Central African head of state,
Gen Andre Kolingba, Japan's wishes to maintain friendly relations with the Cen-
tra.l Afi�ican Republic. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in
French rIo 1871 18 Sep 81 p 2392] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981]
8796
DEMAND FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RESTORATION--The Association of Central African
Workers in France (ACTF), in a communique issued on 8 September, calls for the
immediate restoration of the constitution which was suspended on 1 September
by the new Central African head of state, Gen Andre Kolingba, and called for
the tormation of a National Union Government. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX
G'1' MEDITERRt1NEENS in French No 1871 18 Sep 81 p 2392] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux
et Cie Paris 19 $1] 8796
CSO: 4719/18
10
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060062-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R000440060062-3
FOR OF'FICIAL USE ONLY
CHAD
POLITIGAL, MILITARY SITUATION SEEN AS T~RGELY POSITIVE
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 248, 14-30 Sep 81 p 46
[Text] The normalization process continues in Ndjamena where the Chadian
branch of the Bank of Central African States (BEAC--Institute of Issue) re-
opened its doors an 10 June and air traffic between the Chadian capital--
which has been cut off from the w~orld since the last war ended in December
1980--and African and Furopean capitals is due to resume any time now.
This normalization is taking place in all spheres of activity and more particu-
larly in the political sphere. As a matter of fact, there is no further ment~on
of political leanings or factions in Chad. Interrupted by Hissein Habre's
"bid for power" which led to a long fratricidal war, the process to reunify
within the Chadian National Libpration Front [FROLINAT] all political and
military forces which claim to adhere to the ideas of that organization, re-
sumed Zast January on a sounder basis and has reached an irreversible stage.
After several meetings, a political platform containing eight points of the
Front's initial program in an updated and improved version and new statutes
were adopted until the time when they convene a congress of the unified
FROLINAT.
This, together with the new national army now being formed, an army where the
best fighting forces o� the former political factions are merging with troops
of. the Chadian Armed Forces (remnants c~f the former government's army),~is the
most important event registered in Chad in recent months and represents the
- best saf eguard for the protection of peace, independence and territorial inte-
grity in the country.
- I~eanwhile, it is noticed that the first contacts between the GUNT [Transitional
- National Union Covernment] and the new French Government have been positive
ones.
According to some sources, it has been implied that any French move remained
linked to the issue of the Libyan troops' presence in Chad.
. But these reservations appear to be a minAr question. I~ it not a fact that
= the question of the Libyan troops' presence is an artificial problem? Parti-
- cularly since it is known that in Nd~amena and in Tripoli what they want is a
f inal normalization of the situation. The only thing that complicates this
problem is the threat hanging over Libya and Chad as a result of the military
preparations taking place in Sudan (with Egypt's backing), a country har'aoring
the remnants of Hissein Habre's FAN [Northern Armed Forces].
COPYRIGHT: Afrique-Asie 1981.
8796
CSO: 4719/26
11
FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060062-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400064462-3
FOI~ OFFICiAL USE ONLY
, CHAD
BRIEFS
iIS. INVOLVED IN DESTABILIZATION--The incursions of Hissene Habre's armed
torces near Irika and Guereda in east Chad near the Sudanese borders again
confirm what we have written about unceasingly in these columns: because
of Egyptian-Sudanese military and financial support--whose main supplier is
America--remnants of the FAN [Armed Forces of the North] manage to cross
Chad's borders to try and disturb the security of the coun~try's eastern
regions. Guided by rem~te control from Washington, Cairo and Khartoum aim
to destabilize the Chadian government in order to overthrow it and replace
it with another government under orders from western, especially American,
strategy in the area. When all is said and done, the incursions of Habre's
mercenaries did not do very much damage. Contrary to Sudanese press statements,
the liead of the Chadian diplomatic corps, Ahmat Acyl, who was recently in the ~
border areas, was not wounded. Although Irik~a (1,000 inhabitants) has always
been considered a bastion of support for Habre, the FAN soldiers there were
driven away last month but they are still trying desperately to regain control.
The Chadian national forces, assisted by Libyan troops, have deployed many
soldiers and much military equipment to crush, once and ~or all, FAN
operations. According to reliabie sources, their soldiers are reportedly
now being trained by Egyptian and Sudanese officers who avoid entering Chad
for fear of being captured by government forces. Some 20 military advisers
from the US were allegedly attached to them in early September 1981. [Text]
[Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 249, 28 Sep 11 Oct 81 p 29] [COPYRIGHT:
1981 Afrique-Asie] 9479
CSO: 4719/69
12
FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060062-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060062-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
COMORO ISLANDS
.
�OPPOSITION SEIIV STRENGTI~NED BY PARIS'S NF)GLECT OF ABDALI,AH
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1080 16 Sep 81 p 5'1
_ ~rticle by Sadio Lamine Sow: "Vigil of Arms"
~ext7 After a long wait, the Comorian head of state will finally be re-
ceived at the Elysee in October. Ahmed AbdalZak~ had multiplied his ges-
' tures of goodwill towards the French socialists since the election of
Francois Mitterand. He has taken as his own the offici~il p~isition of tlie
PS on the western Sahara, thus diarinishing his support of Morocco. At the
last OAU summit in Nairobi, he refrained from any allusion to Mayotte.
And for the past few months he has been striving to convince Paris of the
"painful necessity!' represented by the Denard affair.
But the French Government maintains an attitude of watchful waiting regard-
ing the regime which emerged from the 19?8 coup d'etat. It thereby leaves
a clear field to an opposition trying to take shape as an alternative. ~
Mouzawoir Abdallah, former Minister of Foreign Affairs in the government of
President Soilih (killed in the Bob Denard coup d'etat), secretly left
Moroni in June to come to Paris and make contact, according to certain sour-
ces, with some exiles. Mouzawoir Abdallah is preparing to return to his
country, after a pilgrimage to Mecca. He took care to alert the Moroni au-
thorities by a grofession of faith which he particularly addressed to the
presiding judge of the supreme court and to the army chief of staff. "A
demagogic and useless precaution," according to Ali Mlahaili, Comorian am-
bassador to Paris, "since Mouza.woir has never been troubled, and could move
f.reely on the island. Besides, he represents no one but himself."
~ And yet certain French circles, who have kept interests in the Comoros, see
in him a possible succ~ssor to Ahmed Abdallah. The more so since the URDC
[Jnion for a Democratic Republic in the Comoro~, whose president is Soihili
Bacari, has just made.him its "principal animator." If the ultimate aim o:f
ttiat associ~tion is the conquest of power, it also wishes to bar the way t~
y the FNUK-UNIKOM, a movement born of the fusion, on 18 July in Paris, of the
United Comorian National I'ront and the Union of Comorians. Presided by
- Aboubakar Ahmed Nourdini, that movement does not rule out recourse to
13
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060062-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060062-3
- FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY
violence to force in Moroni. The Comorian Government, for its part, main-
tains that Nourdini is of Kenyian nationality and c~me to the Comoros but
' once, in 1g60.
Tnere is another opposition movement in the running: the National Committee
of Public Safety, founded by Said Ali Kemal~ former ambassador to Paris,
~ who resigned his post. He appears to have the support of the Association
- of Comorian Workers in France. As yet, little is known of his program,
which professes to be liberal and contemplates attaining power only by demo-
cratic means.
Everything suggests the Comoros are on the eve of change, even though Pres-
ident Abdallah has denied rumors of ~iis intention to leave office before
his term expires in 1984. The economic condition of the country could have
. justified that intention. The state treasury has a chronic deficit of over
1.5 billion CFA Fr. Prices for the four export products (ylang-ylang, va-
- nilla, cloves,and copra), from which are derived 95 percent of the country's
foreign excl:ange, are falling from year to year. France contributes 45 per-
cent of budget subsidies. Development projecta exist only thanks to Persian
Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia.
Occupying a strategic position in the Indian Ocean, alongside forward-looking
_ Madagascar, the Comoros aspire to change. If Ahmed Abdallah does not impose
it, a storm could well follow for his regime.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981
cso: 47~9/33
14
~ FOR OFF[C[AL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060062-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000404060062-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
CONGO
BRIEFS
FAO FINANCING AGREEMENT--The FAO and the Congo signed on 8 September, in Brazza-
ville, a financing agreement dealing with the study of self-sufficiency in food
supplies. The FAO's share in this pro,ject is $45.000. [Text] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1871 18 Sep 81 p 2393] [COPYRIGflT:
_ Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 8796
CSa: 4719/18
15
FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060062-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/42/09: CIA-RDP82-40850R000400460062-3
FOR OFFI~IAL USE aNLY
NIGERIA
JIL PRODUCTION DOWN IN AUGUST; FAVORABLE PROSPECTS FOR EARLY 1982 ~
Paris MARCHES TROPICAU~ ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1871, 18 Sep 81 p 2384
[Text] According to financial circles in Lagos,~Nigeria's oil production reportedly
amounted to some 708,000 barrels a day in August and was consequently higher than
- previous estimates that put it at 640,Op0 barrels a day (MARCHES TROPICAUX, 11 Sep-
tember, p 2334). Nevertheless, this productiun of,708,00Q barrels a day represents
- a 66-percent drop compared with the beginning of the year. As for exports, they
were put at 500,000 barrels a day for the same month, about one-fourth the monthly
exports of a year ago.
" The same financial circles indicate that the government's losses in receipts, which
were on the order of $1 billion a mohth during the last quarter, reached.some
$6 billion for the first nine months, according to unofficial sources, or nearly
30 percent of the 1981 budget, put at $21.4 billion.
Nevertheless, the drop in the price of crude oil; thanks to the granting of a$4
or 10-percent rebate by the government since 26 August, should favor a reswnp~ion
of production in the months ahead. Oil circles believe tfiat production could
go as high as 1.5 million barrels a day during the.first quarter of 1982.
The situation with regard to new prices in effect~ since 26 August remains confused
and it would appear that buyers are awaiting their first bills in order to know
the true situation. .
Initially, an official bulletin from the Office of the President authorized the
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) ~to grant a$4 per barrel refund to
its customers. However, the bulletin stated that the official price per barrel
remained $40 until the OPEC summit.conference, to be held in.Abu Dhabi i.n December.
For its part, the NNPC notified comp~anies that the rebate would be 10 percent and
that it would imply a price variatior,t ranging from $34.83 to $36 a barrel, depend-
ing on the quality of the crude, an.d that it would involve only that portion of
production from the NNPC.
This share is partially bought back by the foreigi? companies. The rest is sold
- by the NNPC itself. ~
16
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060062-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000404060062-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ~NLY
At a recent meeting, officials of the national company assured their col~eagues
in the fc:eign firms that the refund would finally be granted for all production, �
to wit, the 70 percent from the NNPC and the 30 percent for the other companies.
Concerniag the latter, the rebate sh~uld result in a reduction in xoyalties and
taxes paici to the Nigerian Government and should be around 10 percent.
In addition, the statement by Saudi Minister of Petroleum Ahmad Zaki Yamani con-
- cerning another future drop in Nigerian crude to $31 or $32 a barrel has not been
co~nented upon officially. The statement by the Saudi minister~has been reported
in several daily newspapers in the r~iger~an capital, which, as usual, are very
discreet about the country's oil situation and.gublish only.authorized statements...'
In the circles concerned, Yamani's stat.einent was sanewhat surprising insofar a~
for the time being, nothing would seEm to poiht tc a drop in the price of Nigerian
crude.
Oil: Company Production During First tZuarter and in June and July
Oil production of the different operating companies in Nigeria was a$ follows dur-
ing the first qua-rter of this year and in lune and Ju1y (in thousands of barrels):
- June~ July Average
lst Quarter
Ashland 9.6 . 5 g,6
ELF (Gasoline and Lubricants Company of France] 57.5 56 � 73.3
Gulf 329 204 318.1 .
Mobil Ken/Sun g 8 8~3
- Mobil ~ .112.1 93 192.1
AGIP/Phillips [Italian Petroleum Enterprise] 81.1 23 154.6
Pan Ocean 7.6 7 7~9
Phillips 1.02 1 1.2
Shell 698 343 899.3
Texaco . 46 31 " 42.9
Total 1,349.2 771 1,707.3 ~
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981. '
11,464
CSO: 4719/439
17
FOR OFFICIAL USE ON1LY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060062-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/42/09: CIA-RDP82-40850R000400460062-3
FOR OF'FICIAL USE ONLY
NIGERIA
_ BRITISH LOAN FOR ABUJA FEDERAL CAPI�TAL PROJECT
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1871, 18 Sep 81 p 2385
_ [Text] Following his visit to Nigeria (MARCHES TROPICAUX., 11 September, p 2335),
- British Minister of Housing and Construction John Staniey announced on 11 September
that the Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD) of his country the equivalent
of COFACE [French Insurance Company for Foreign TradeJ in France was planning
to guarantee 300 million pounds in bank credits for construction of the future fed-
eral capital in Abuja. The minister.added that the guarantee could subsequently
be granted for additional credits.
It is emphasized that this is the first time that the ECGD, which has already
guaranteed 100 million pounds in credits for about eight other specific projects
in Nigeria, has guaranteed such large sums in an African country.
It will also be recalled that the Abuja project was granted the equivalent of
some 1.9 billion pounds by the Federal Goveriunent itself. Contracts concluded by
foreign firms already amount to over 1 billion pounds,~ but the British share was
previously under 10 million pounds. The British firms inyolved in the project are
Scott Wilson Kirkpatrick and Partners, Taylor Woodrow and the Milton Keynes Devel-
opment Corporation. Representatives of these firms,accompanied the minister on his
_ trip, along with representatives of Balfour Beatty, Costain International and the
Morgan Grenfell Bank.
The Abuja project is included in the 1981-1985 National. Development Plan. The
new city will welcome the first.official organizations in ~1982-1983 and its popu-
lation should reach 1.6 million inhabitants betiaeen now and the year 2~00.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.
11,464 ,
CSO: 4719/439
18
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060062-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/42/09: CIA-RDP82-40850R000400460062-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
SENEGAL
BRIEFS
_ IDA AGRICULTURAL LOAN--Senegal i~ borrowin~ $19.5 million (17 million SDR
[Special Drawing Rights]) �rom the International Development Association
(IDA, a subsidiary of the World Bank) to upgrade the practical impact of its
agricultural research operations. The long-term goal is to diversify the
agriculture and improve the productivity of crop farms. Five regional re-
search stations will be modernized and research teams will be formed. Empha-
sis will be placed on establishing better links between research and diffusion
of knowledge. A commun~ique issued by the bank indicates that the IDA credit
will. be opened as soon as funds become available. [Text] (Paris MARCHES
TRUYICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1871, 18 Sep 81 p 230] [COPYRIGHT:
Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 8796
CSO: 4719/26
19
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060062-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060062-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
TANZANIt~
ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL SITUATION REPORTEDLY REMAINS SERIOUS
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MIDITERRANEENS in French No 1871 18 Sep R1 p 2396 ~
[TPxt] On the eve of President Nyerere's visit to Paris, the AFP [French Press
Agency] has taken stock of the economic and financial situation in Tanzania
- which is generally viewed as remaining very serious.
The news agency mentions that since May this year, the Dar es Salaam Covern-
ment has outlined a"national economic program for survival" on which to base
its policy. Gasoline is rationed and there are constant shortagea of bread,
sugar, electric bulbs and batteri~s. Maintenance work on roads and buildings
is slight or nonexistent.
With a population of 17 milli4n people and a per capita GNP of les8 than $250,
the country has not recovered fram three successive shocks: the oil price in-
crease (55 percent of its foreign currency e~rnings goes to pay that bill), the
war against Idi Amin Dada (which according to the government has cost $500
million) and ~he downwards trend in selling prices for agricultural goods
~ (coffee, cotton, sisal).
For the second year running, the industrial activity dropped in 1980. Due to
the lack of spare parts and raw materials, which can no longer be purchased
because there is no foreign currency available, most factories are operating at
40 percent of their capacity, according to the minister for the plan and eco-
nomic affairs, Kighoma Ali Malima.
But what is even more serious is the long-term downtrend in the production of
agricultural goods for export which represent 80 percent of the foreign cur-
rency resources. Observers think that this is probably due to the ~istakes
made in the implementation of Tanzanian socialism in the rural sphere and most
particularly the nationalization of cooperatives.
Over 30 percent of the development budget for 198Q-1981 was not used as a re-
sult of economic freezes. On the whole, Tanzania imports two and a half times
more than it exports aYid must live on credit.
The external debt amounts to no less than $1 billion an.d the outstanding trade
debts total $300 million (one-fourth of the imports), a fact which creates
hesitation among those who would like to trade with that country.
20
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060062-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R400440060062-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Tanzania receives very large amounts of foreign aid--$32 per inhabitant and
- per year--mostly from the Scandinavian countries.
But only the International Monetary Fund (Il~iF) can restore Tanzania's.finan-
cial credibil.ity through direct and massive aid to its balance of payments.
However, the IMF's conditions for granting new credits are seen as unaccept-
able by the Dar es Salaam Government. Among other things, the fund calls for
a devaluation (the figure of 50 percent is reported to have been put forward)
of the Tanzanian shilling which is sold in the black markez for one-fifth of
its current value (1 Tanzanian shilling = 0.7 French francs). Tanzanian econ-
omists believe that a devaluation would increase the government expenses be-
cause the cost of imported goods would go L~. To offset this increase, there.
would have to be dismal cutbacks in the social program since the 1980-81 budget
- for ordinary expenditures already shows a$150 deficit.
Tanzania does not want to give up its social system which provides, among other
things, free primary education. "What is the advantage of development if most
of the population is deprived of basic things such as education and medical
care?" the mir_ister for the plan told AFP.
So far, the government had managed to keep the price index within reasonable
limits (+30 percent) through a price control ~olicy. But inflation is appre-
ciably higher in the gr~wing black market.
- Faced with the pressing suggestions made by the IMF, the Dar es Salaam Govern-
ment is implementing its "national economic program for survival" which allo-
cates foreign currency on a priority basis to the purchase of equipment, raw
materials and spare parts to enable the economy to keep going.
Priority has been taken away from big development pro~ects (except for the
building of a pager plant and the expansion of Dar es Salaam Airport) and placed
on improving the existing structures. But this change of direction will take
some time. Tta~ tsxtile factories, in Arusha and in Dar es Salaam, are sched-
_ uled to be expanded in the near future although they are currently woxking at
a mere 40 percent of their full capacity. All the financial backers are aware
of this need for a change of direction. Making use of unexpended funds from
' Lome I, the EEC will overhaul 600 vehicles which were put out of service by
public companies and will make improvements on the Dar es Salaam-Kigoma cen-
tral railroad service.
The Tanzanian Government refuses to establish a connection between the country's
economic and financial situation and its socialist option. During ~he United
Nations conference recently held at the UNESCO in Paris, the Tanzanian minis-
ter. for the plan again pointed out that countries following "capitalist" poli-
cies find themselves "in the same boat" as Tanzani.a.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981
8796
CSO: 4719/18
21
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060062-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060062-3
FOR OFF'ICIAL USE ONLY
TANZANIA
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AT TIME OF NYERERE'S VISIT TO NRANCE
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 249, 28 Sep-11 Oct 81 pp 18-20
[Article by Daniel Joussan: "Socialism, Tanzanian Style"~ .
[Excerpts] The new direction of French policy toward Africa received the
approval of Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, on an official visit to Paris.
After a 2-hour meeting with the French head of state, the Tanzanian leader
said he was "very happy" with the exchange of views, mainly on Namibian
matters. They also discussed the new international economic order, a topic
on which the two heads of state had already expressed very similar ideas.
They will meet again next month at the North-South Conference at Cancun.
On 15 September 1981, Tanzanian President Nyerere met the new French president,
socialist Francois Mitterrand. This was a significant event. For the past
15 years, Tanzania had tried to wed socialism with African tradition. This
effort, on the fringe of the official canon of scientific socialism, has
attracted French theorists whose principles the current government espouses.
Moreover, the Tanzanian president is, on the international scene, a spokes-
man for Third World demands--nonalignment, new international economic
order, African unity and the struggle against apartheid are the keynotes of
Tanzanian foreign policy. It was hoped that this meeting would be the time
that the new French government would outline more clearly its policy toward
tk~e Third World and Africa in particular.
Another question arises at the time of this visit: "What is the current
status of Tanzanian socialism?"
The results of nearly 15 years of this policy are necessarily mixed.*
*The Franco-Tanzanian Friendship Association has just published a pamphlet
"Tanzania, Toward Another Kind of Development?" which tries to evaluate these
15 years of Ujamaa socialism; it provides specific types of support in France.
(It can be ordered from the Franco-Tanzanian Friendship Association,
20 rue Rochechouart, 75009 Paris, 12 francs plus 3 francs handling chsrge.)
22
~'OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060062-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040400060062-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
- The Arusha Statement
First there is~~villagization." If the somewhat authoritarian last phase
shocked some well-meaning self-management types in the west, the upheavals
ultimately were few in number and it is undeniably a success.
Here is 1 example among 9,000--the village of Kigwe located about 50 km from
Dodoma, the future capital. It has 4,000 inhabitants. Since villagization,
services have increased. There is a school and, as throughout the country
since 1977, all primary school-age children are being educated. A total of
eight water faucets throughout the village supply inhabita~ts with running
water. In Tanzania, approximately one out of three villages has such taps.
Kigwe also has a post office, cooperative store, a veterinary station,
dispensary, workshop for making cattle carts, mill, police commissariat and
county court. Moreover, village life has provided training in collective
life and in decentralized decision mak.ing through village committees and
various related subordinate committees.
The Ujamaa objectivel of cooperative production has perhaps been downplayed
somewhat because of the obligatory resettlement. Today, col,iective production
is a modest portion of the total agricultural production. However, its
social significance should not be underestimated. Thus, in Kigwe, with the
proceeds from the Ujamaa field--here, a vineyard--the villagers purchased a
truck which serves all villages in the area. However, the possible dis-
- advantages of villagization should not be denied either, disadvantages
which Tanzanian authorities sometimes have trouble seeing. Rene Dumont
points out that, "in the very large villages, decreased labor productivity
has been noted since people lose more timn going to the fields, taking
fertilizer and harvesting the crops. There is also decreased soil
productivity because of the constant cultiv3tion without organic or even
(more often) chemical fertilizers." He a.dded that, "these drops in
productivity ar~ the primary~ causes of agriculture and foodstuff deficits
whictt grew larger in 1980." Agricultural production is inadequate and
although in 1978 and 1979, the food self-sufficiency goal seemed to be
attained, this is no longer so; in 1980, Tanzania had to import more than
200,000 tons of cereals.
To encourage food crops, the government kept the price of export crops
relatively Low. Their production, for the most part, decreased, thus
aggravating the balance of trade deficit (they represent a total value of
1Production and service cuoperative
2Rene Dumont, Marie-France Mottin "Africa Strangled", Le Seuil, Paris
1980.
- 23
- FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060062-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000404060062-3
FOR OFF(CIAL USE QNLY
60 percent of exports.) To reverse this tendency, the government was obliged,
- on 9 July 1981, to increase the price of these crops.
Crisis in Industrial Sector
The situation in industry is more serious. Each crisis shows the catastrophic
mismanagement of the nationalized sector. Amir Jamal, the fiuance minister,
recently said that Tanzania had doubled its praduction capacity since 1974,
but that at the same time its praduction had decreased 20 percent. In other
- words, factories are currently operating at 40 percent of their capacity.
There are several explanations for this. First, the perverse effects of
foreign aid. Despite its principles, Tanzania is one of the Third World
countries which receives the most foreign aid. It represents more than
15 percent of its GNP. It is used to invest in elaborate technologies which
very often exceed the country's capacity to operate or maintain either
because of the level of technical knowledge or financial ability. Decreased
- foreign currency resources and the increased price of oil exacerbated this
tendency. Tanzania no longer has the means to buy raw materials or the
~ necessary spare parts for its industry. Aere is one example among thousands:
most trawlers of the Dar es Salaam port, all provided by foreign nations,
no longer have functioning radar or sonar equipment for navigational safety
or for detection of fishing beds.
There are other reasons for the current problems. The establishment of a
, sizable nationalized sector has facilitated the emergence of a large class
of bureaucrats. Since the Arusha statement, one objective of tl:e leaders
has been to set up a code for civil servants. Most are devoted and effective.
Yet administrative delays are often long. Also, traditional family ties
overcome national solidarity with all the attendant problems: theft of
public equipment, creation of useless jobs, etc. In the past 2 years
especially, corruption has been on the increase because of economic difficulties.
Black Market
It must be said that life is very expensive in Tanzania now. For understandable
reasons, the government refused, as the LMF wished, to devalue its currency:
this would increase its difficulties in obtaining oil unless its exports
really increased, since production structures cannot meet this new external
- demand. Inflation has increased considerably and in 3une 1981, the government
had to double prices. Scarce foreign currency and the relative overvaluing
of the Tanzanian shilling created a large black market where the rate of
exchange went as high as seven times the official rate.
To deal with these difficulties, the Tanzanian government 2 years ago requested
� Il~' credits. These were conditional on the application of ineasures of a
liberal economic policy, incompatible with the Tanzanian option.* A
*For more details, see "Economic Alternatives" No 5(July 1981): "Tanzania
Grappling with the Il~".
_ ~4
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060062-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060062-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
compromise was reached 1 year agn, respecting in part the Tanzanian objectives.
However, since May 1981, the situation has been d~adlocked with Nyerere
refusing to devalue, as the Fund still wants.
Today, this economic crisis deepens into an ideological one, perhaps more
difficult to reso lve. The well-off segments of the population are beginning
to question openly the socialist option. The well-to-do class is, for the
most part, Indian, some of these people are obviously very rich and they
regret they must invest their capital elsewhere. Indians, however, are on
the fringe of political life. The well-off Africans, especially small
businessmen and bureaucrats, are being tempted by the siren call of liberalism
and could easily imagine Tanzania following the Kenyan way which they
idealize all the more easily because they do not know it well. This tendency
is expressed decidedly within the party which brings together most people
and civil ser.vants.
During IMF negotiations 2 years ago, the current Finance Minister Edwin
Mtei, reputedly pro-American, wanted to accept the Fund's conditions. He
- was then replaced by Nyerere's old collaborator, Amir Jamal. At present,
this liberal fact ion appears to be very disorganized and does not speak
out publicly. Ye t discontent is growing among some civil servants and
could coalesce. Nyerere's faction which is first nationalist and understands
the word socialism as having a strong humanist, government-manage~ent
content remains in the majority. Toda;~, this uncontestably popular leadership
group seems shake n by the crisis of its theoretical basis.
Flight Forward?
Nyerere has chose n to make a visible show of strength to the IMF. In recent
months, many demonstrations supporting government policy have been held, at
which time IMF interference in Tanzanian domestic matters has been criticized.
Yet behind this mobilization agairst a common enemy, was there not a fTight
forward in some respects? Is there an alternative strategy if the situation
gets worseY In addition, since January 1981, President Nyerere has waged a
major campaign against corruption: arrest of Indian businessmen, removal of
- a minister and two regional commissioners, transfer of many civil servants to
Zanzibar and dismissal of the entire management of a firm responsible for the
cultivation of pyrethrum,
"It is too late, the phenomenon has spread too much. For years, the ministerial
department for the struggle against corruption has been preparing files on
corrupt individuals. They were never worried." A representative of the
radical faction told us this recently. This faction only exists in intellectual
and university c ircles. Moreover, marked by the Marxist-Leninist tradition,
it is quite dogmatic. After the Arusha statement, its representatives
marched to Ujamaa's tune, attempting to give it a more theoretical content
but they never managed to ~ell their ideas, especially transforming the
party with its nationalism of the masses into an enlightened avant-guard.
Today, they seem a bit on the offensive, violently criticizing corruption
25
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060062-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040400060062-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
_ and the government for not taking measures sooner. Y~t this wait-and-see
position is not an alternative.
There is still the army. Its prestige has increased since the war against
Amin. It is reinforced by a militia in all villages and places of production,
and it is made up of party militants. It tends to be much more visible and
_ several members of the current government are from the military. It is no
doubt nationalist, but it is difficult to know more about its poYitical
orientation. Would it react if corruption increases or there is a more
liberal orientation? ~
That is not the case for the moment. Despite the difficulties, Nyerere's
- prestige is considerable. If the situation in the large cities might lead
to pessimism, one need only visit the countryside to verify that the
- mobilization of the peasants continues: a school is built here, a dispensary
- there and in another plac~, a village building. Of course, the Tanzanian
peasants, perhaps inadequately politicized despite 15 years of socialism,
remain somewhat removed from major national problems. Yet those in the
central plateau who, because of the drought, have harvested nothing in 1981,
know well ::hat the government is distributing free food aid to them. This
_ president focuses on these people.
What will happen afterward? When reelected in September 1981, Nyerere said
he was running for the last time. The changing of the guard seems poorly
prepared and his departure may cause certain contradictions to arise. The
question was raised and discussed, with no answer given, in ~he July issue of
"Nova" (a Tanzanian monthly): "After Nyerere, Who?"
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Afrique-Asie
9479
CSO: 4719/69
26
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060062-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R000440060062-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
TANZANIA
BRIEFS
NYERERE'S PARIS VISIT--President Nyerere left Dar es Sa7.aam on 10 September and
went to Lagos (see under heading "Namibia"), to Algiers where he paid an offi-
cial visit on 12 and 13 September (see under "Algeria") and then to Paris where
he met with President Mitterrand at the Elysee on 15 September. Since 1969,
this is the first stay of the Tanzanian head of state in the French capttal.
It seems that President Nyerere's wish to make that trip this autumn was con-
nected with the preparations for the Cancun Conference. In fact he wanted to
talk with a statesman whose views he considers to be close to his own in many
respects and to discuss the need to establish a new international economic or-
der. Tanzania is a country which increasingly r~lies on cash crops to ensure
its survival. But in view of the constantly deteriorating terms of exchange,
that country is faced with a very difficult economic situation as we can see
in the article below. The luncheon given by President Mitterrand at the Ely-
see on 15 September gathered, in addition to President Nyerere, the ministers
of foreign affairs and cooperation of both countries and the ministers of cul-
~ ture, a fact which is exglained by the prestige of the Tanzanian "model" in the
- eyes of the French socialist leaders. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MIDITERRANEENS in French No 1871 18 Sep 81 p 2396] [COPYRYGHT: Rene Moreux
et Cie Paris 1981] 8796
EDUCATIONAL REFORM--A presidential commission, in charge of reforming the Tan-
zanian system of education, left Dar as Salaam'on 12 September to make a 2-week
- working tour of nine countries of Africa, Europe and Asia. The delegation is
going to Ghana, the Ivory Coast, Zimbabwe, Sweden, East Germany, West Germany,
Malaysia and Japan. Prior to making this trip, the members of the delegation
were scheduled to tour the main regions of Tanzania to collect suggestions from
teachers and principals of private schools, including those of parochial schools.
[Text~ [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEBITERRANEENS in French No 1871 18 Sep 81
p 2397] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 8796
BELGIAN TRANSPORT AID--Belgium has pledged to give Tanzania important financial
aid to help improve its transport on Lake Victoria and to help build a training
institute in Mwanza, the largest port fln the ahores of that lake. [Text~
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MED'ITERRANEENS in French No 1871 18 Sep 81 p 2396]
[COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 8796
CSO: 4719/18
27
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060062-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R000440060062-3
- FOR OFFiCIAL USE ONLY
UPPER VOLTA
NEW R~GIME'S CHANCES OF SUCCESS EXAMINED; IMPRISONMENT OF OFFICIALS QUESTIONED
� Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1081, 23 Sep 81 p,p 24-25
[Article by Siradiou Diallo: "Nuisance Prisoners"]
[Text] After th~ euphoria and the promises that followeii victory, the state of
grace which the current regime enjoyed is definitely over: Ten months after he
came to power, Col Saye Zerbo is facing a situation that'risks becaming more diffi-
cult with every passing day. ~
' Hoisting the standard af justice, order and eco~~~mic recovery, the former commanding
officer of the interservice regiment of the Ouagadougou area had no.trouble in
ousting Gen Sangoule Lamizana on 25. November 1980. Paralyzed.by the maneuvers and _
clan rivalries confronting one anotl:~r withi~ti his regime and violently disputed by
an active opposition. supported by the most restless uni~ns in the Southern Sahara
of Africa, Maurice Yameogo's successor was at the en~ of his rope: His. young ~
subordinates had only to bend ov~r and pick up power.. .
- Wishing to illustrate their desire for change,.the new�leaders~ immediately took. �
measures that broke with current practices under the regime~of the "old" general.
Thus, they required punctuality of workers in government offices as~well as.at ~
work sites and in the factories, and absenteeism was heavily punished. .Cafes,
bars and restaurants w~re closed during working.hours an3 government cars could
not be vsed outside their hours of service. Wages were frozen and the right to
strike severely regulated.
Authority
~ In order to show that the slogan of austerity is not an empty word, Col Saye~Zerbo
sets the example himse~.f. At the wheel of a Renault 12, he does not hesitate to
drive around Ouagadougou to see for himself ,the application of the polic; of re-
habilitating the administrative machinery.
This determination to restore government authority both pleases and reassures .
public opinion, once exasperated by the laxity of civil.servants. "In order to
obtain a simple document," one cadre told us, "you would have to return to the ~
Ouagadougou City Hall several times," because the head of the departmerit was always
absent. He spent more time playing cards and checkers and at the Independence bar
than he did in his office. "Now things have 'changed and.it is better," says
28
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060062-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R000440060062-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
another, mainly thinking about the peasants who, in order to complete administra-
tive formalities, now waste less time in the city.
Ambition
Nor do the foreigners conceal their satisfaction. Initially worried, diplomats,
international officials, experts and financial backers did not take long to depart
from their expectant atti'tude. They are happy to fina~.ly be able to deal with
real interlocutors. Now, one of the expatriates told us; "we can work, for not �
only is there no fear that one's dossier is going to get lost in a~drawer, but'one
is sure that within a reasonable length of timE,�they w311 rep],y with a'yes' or a
'no'." In other words, not only ~as the paralysis of yore come to an end, but the �
= absence of authority and the anonymity of government have given way to a new team
that in no way conceals its desire for power, for in its o.pinion, everything muat
be subordinate to the higher interests of the government. . ~ �
But for the Pretorians in poweY in Ouagadpugou, the leitmotiv is above all economic
recovery. It was not any accident that the highest organ of government~that they ~
created following the 25 November-1980 coup d'etat is called the Military Committee .
of Recovery for National Progress. They intend to march double time in order.to
' bring the country out of its chronic underdevelopment. This is an ambitious pro- ~
gram insofar as Lipper Volta is not only one of the five poorest ~ountries in the
world, but also a landlacked country which, until proven otherwise, does not have
vast natural resources. � '
This does not prevent Col Saye Zerbo from moving heaven and earth. For him, as
for his comrades in arms, it is a question of doing his utmost to succeed where
his civilian and military predecessors failed. To that end, he.did not hesitate
to bring back out all the dossiers being studipd or that were buried under the~old~
regime. In February of this year, surzounded by publicity, the cornerstone for the
Poura gold mine, southwest of Ouagadougou, was laid. This pro~ect was on the brink
of entering its active phase because in Luxembour.g, ttie retiring minister of
planning, Georges Sanogo, was putting the final touches on negotiations with the
foreign partners when he was.surprised by the coup d'etat.~
The new authorities not only revived the dossier and succeeded.in r~suming work, ~
but they also hope that the mine will go into operation as early as 1984. They are
now trying to find backers for other gold 3eposits considered to be richer th~n.
that in Poura, particularly in~the south and north central regions..
Resources
Furthermore, it would appear that the subsoil of Upper Volta contains a number of ~
mining resources: diamonds in Che Barsagho region, ptiosphates in the east, uranium
in the west and the Sahel, copper in the southwestv Missions that have gone
abroad have received precise instructione in order to interest investors in the
operation of these deposits, whose extent remains to be determined.
- For the time being, it is above all the Tambao pro~ect that is en~oying the govern-
ment's attention. Located 300 kilometers northwest of the capital,~Tambao contains
29 ~
FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060062-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/42/09: CIA-RDP82-40850R000400460062-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ,
a rich manganese deposit which all the governments that have succeeded one another .
in Ouagadougou put at the head of their program of action, but wnich none was able
to bring off. Will Col Saye Zerbo succeed? What is certain is that he seems to
wish to direct his efforts, not so much toward immediate working of the deposit,
but rather, to construction of the railroad, because,~some in his entourage say,
of the rich agricultural possibilities of tha regions that the raiXroad~will have
to cross.
- Questions
The Military Committee has in fact~set as its top priority its food 'self-sufficiency, ~
compromised by the cambination of the three chronic phenomena: the drouglit, en-
- croachment of the desert.and ruraL underequ�ipment. Consequently, it~has planned .
the setting up of 7,000 watering~points and the construction of many hydroelectric
dams, particularly the Konpienga, on a branch of the~White Volta, and the Bagre, �
downstream on the same river. Electricity-must be produced, while ~.rrigating
thousands of hectares of land to be used to produce grain and garden crops.
- Will such a portfolio of fine projects be enough to.dissipate the doubts and un-
certainties that hinder the political action of the regime? At any rate; while a
large proportion of public opinion was.overjoyed.about the arrest of tHe dignitar=
ies of the Third Republic, many are now wondering:� Why are. those men still being
held without trial? If some are guilty of embezzlement and abuses of power, as
it has been stated privately, what are they waiting for.to prove it?
What is sure is that they have been assigned officers houses~inside the military ~
- camps of Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso. The ministers iive two to a home, while
- the former president of the National Assembly, .Gerard~Kango Ouedraogo, and~former~ ~
Prime Minister 3oseph~Conombo both occupy a house of their own.~ The s~me is true
of the former chief of state,.Gen Sangou~le Lamizana,~who occupies the house which
he himself once assigned his predecessor at the head of state, Maurice Yameogo; .
since freed. ~
We are told that ~11 of these former dignitaries ~re being'treated with the regard
due their rank. With respect to ~food, th~y have the same menu as the officers mess.
In the beginning, those at the new military camp in~0uagadougau en~oyed the~daily
menu made up at the Hotel de 1'Independence re~~aurant.. Military doctbrs watch
- over their health.. All receive a salary corresponding to their grade in the civil
service and regularly correspond with their families~ Some manage their affairs '
from the camp.
Threats
And yet, the many friends which thes~ officials have abroad are beginning to worry,
if not about the,coriditions, then at least about the length of their detention. ~
Old protagonists of the Afxican po~itical scene, such.~as Joseph Conombo and
- Gerard Kango Ouedraogo,cannot disa~Spear overnight without people being moved.
As for Gen Sangoule Lamizana, whose moral fntegrity and political unself ishness, ~
is known to everyone, while it is understandable~~that he was ousted from power,
because that goes with the territory, it is difficult to see why he is kept so
30
FOR OF~TC~AL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060062-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060062-3
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
long in a camp. Given his age (65), it would be more reasonable if Lamizana were
sentenced to house arrest, if need be, in his nativ.e village of Dianra (Tougan re- �
gion in the we~t) rather than kept prisoner in Ouagadougou. �
Not only are such prisoners a nuisance; but their shadows,,which continue to haunt �
minds, may well tarnish the country's image: Far from facilitating the task of
the new leaders, this situation complicates it, particularly�with financial backers.
Above all, the truce observed by the unions has de.fini~ely come to an end.~ Follow-
ing the coup d'etat, the seeretary general of the pQwerful CSV (Voltan Trade Union
Confederation), Soumane Toure, issued a cautious appeal to his members for vigi-
lance. However, at the.beginning'of September, h~ condemned the threa~t which
restrictions on trade union freedoms, pose to the independence and autonomy of the
unions. ~
- Are these the first s.igns of the social hurricane which, sahether directly or not,
has always swept away the different regimes in power i,n Ouagadougou? Col Saye. '
Zerbo should think about it before it is too late.' ~ �
_ COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981.
11,464
CSO: 4719/431
31
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060062-3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000404060062-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE UNLY
ZAMBIA
BRIEFS
WHJAT PROGRAM'S PROBLEMS--The budget for the wheat growing program in Nampamba,
near Ndola, had to be reduced by 1.5 million Zambian kwachas, said L. Turnbull,
one of the officials in charge of that progratn. This cutbaclc was required due
to the lack of available funds. The program, started in 1978, is ,jeintly
financed by the EEC and the Zambian Goveanment. During the last farming season
it produced 11,000 bags of wheat and 13,000 bags of soybean. There were plans
to develop 15 f arms with an area of SO hectares each during the current season
but only 11 of these projects could be carried out due to financial difficul-
ties. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1871,
18 Sep 81 p 2398] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 8796
IMF NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE--Zambian Finance Minister K. Musokotwane is scheduled
to go to Washington at the end of September to continue negotiations with the
IMF (International Monetary Fund). The fund has recently allowed Zambia to
dra~a 800 millicrr Zambian kwachas worth of SDR (~pecial drawing rights) of which
about 30(~ million have already been drawn. The minister has refused to coumment
on a report carried by the TTMES OF ZAMBIA alluding to possible difficulties in
the withdrawal of the rest of the amount granted by the IMF. [Text] [Paris
- MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1871, 18 Sep 81 p 2398]
[COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 8796
CSO: 4719/26 END
32
- FnR nFFTf'1Ai, iISF, ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060062-3