JPRS ID: 10062 WEST EUROPE REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 39
• Content Type: REPORTS

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9
FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY
JPRS L/ 10062
~ 1 October 1981
West E u ro e Re ort
p p
- (FOUO 54/81)
Fg~$ FOR~IGN BROADCA~T INFORFJIAl`IGN SERVICE
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007142/09: CIA-RDP82-40854R040400060039-9
NOTE
~ JPRS publications contain informati~n primarily from foreign
newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency
transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language
sources are translated; those from English-language sources
are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and
other characteristics retained.
Headlines, editorial repo;ts, and material enclosed in brackets
- are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text]
or [Excerpt) in the first line of each item, or following the
last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was
processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor-
mation was summarized or extracted. `
- Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
' enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
~ tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the
original but have been supplied as appropriate in context.
Other unattributed parenthetical r.otes within the body of an
item originate with the source. Times within items are as
given by source.
The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.
COPYRIGfiT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION
OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9
FOR OFFiCIAL USE ONLY
JPRS L/10062
21 October 1981
- ~ WEST EUROPE REPORT

a (FGUO 54/81)
CONTENTS
- E CON OMIC
- F RAN CE
New Ipok at Concorde Situation Seen Possible
(AIR & COSMOS, 5 Sep 81) 1
POLITICAL
BELGI UM
Poll on Pop ularity of Leading Poli ticians
- (POURQLOI PAS?, 17 Sep 81) 3
- FRAN CE
Post-Afghanistan: Security Zhreat, European Defense Policy
(Francois de Rose; TRAVAUX ET RE(~iERCHES DE L~IFRI, Fourth
Quarter 1980) 8
- Economic, Social Crisis: Greatest Security Zhreat
(Lionel Jospin; TRAVAUX ET RECHERCHES DE L'IFRI, Fourth
. Quarter 1980) 16
SALT II, II1 ; Arms Cont ro 1, Not Disarmament
( Xavie r De fl ine; TRAVAUX ET RECNERCEIES DE L~ IFRI, Fourth
= Qu3rter 1980) 21
SPAIN
Calvo-Sotelo, Suarez Bid for Contcol Underniining UCD's Chances
(Antxon Sarasqueta; CAMf3L0 1(i, 14 Sep 81) 31
_ _ ~ [IJI - WE - 150 FOUO]
FOR OFFICIAL USE O1VLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R004400060039-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLI'
MILITARY
F RAN CE
AS15TT Antishtp Missile Test-Fired First Time
(AIR & COSMOS, 5 Sep 81) 35
Briefs
Illegal Soldiers' Cr~mmittees 36
GENERAL
F RAN CE
National Research, Technology Colloquium Announced
(Pierre Langereux; AIR & COSMOS, 5 Sep 81) 37
~ - b -
FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R400404060039-9
FOR OFFICIAL IJSE ONLY
ECONOMIC FRANCE
,
NEW LOOK AT CONCORDE SITUATION SEEN POSSIBLE
Paris AIR & COSMOS in Fren~h S Sep 81 p 9
[Article: "Concorde on Agenda of President Mitterrand and Mrs Thatcher"]
[Text] Reporting on her visit to Latche where she was President Mitterrand's guest,
Nicole Kern wrote as follows about the Concorde [supersonic transport] in LE FIGARO
of 28 August: "Francois Mitterrand acknowledged with much regret that its cou~mercial
operation will have to be cancelled even though he considers it a remarkable
technical achievement."
In London on 10-11 September
This statement, which was not denied, prompted a great many comments on both sides of
the English Channel. The Office of the President of the Republic announced:
"No special study of Concorde commercial operations is being conducted at the present
time. Concorde service is governed by an international collaborative agreement
between Great Britain and France and is periodically reviewed by representatives of
both governments." The same source also indicated that the Concorde situation would
probably be discussed during the coming French-British top-level meetings to be held
in London on 10-11 September, meetings whose agenda has not yet been officially
confirmed.
If this does happen, the Concorde situa;.ion, which is periodically discussed between
the French minister of transportation and the British secretary of state for industry,
would thus, move back up to the very highest political echelon, a level at which it
has not been since the earliest days of the Concorde program's difficult beginnings.
Since then, Air France and British Airways have brilliantly demonstrated the transport's
technical qualities and shown that there is a body of customers for the ultrarapid
service provided by this type of aircraft, the only one of its kind in regular
international commercial operation. Continuously rising fuel costs are, however,
having a severe impact on Concorde operations.
We have the feeling that neither British Airways nor Air France want to end their
- supersonic service, and this despite certain restrictions imposed on the operating
capabilities of the seven Concorde transports owned by the two airlines. An official
British report even concludes rhat, on the other side of the channel, Concorde
operations are considered to be pr~ducing slightly positive financial results.
1
~ FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9
FOR OFF'ICIAL USH: ONLY
When Joel Le Theule was minister of transportati~n, we were allowed to look at the
position papers he was taking to a meeting on Concorde with his British colleague
not so long ago. We were able to note how extremely complicated that documentation
_ was. Consequently we believe we can firmly state that such papers are not discussible
in detail at a meeting of the highest political leaders.
Toward A New Ministerial Meeting
President Mitterrand a:~d Prime Minister Thatch~r are, therPfore, likely to instruct
- Charles Fiterman and his British counterpart to conduct a new review of Concorde
operations, a new review that was, in fact, already planned. At this stage, it would
be advisable for the French not to appear, for the first time, to be ca3.ling for the
cessation of Concorde service, because the British continue to maintain that we have
not discharged our full share of this project's costs and would, therefore, make us
pay dearly for such a request.
No Definite Prospects in the United States
Beyond any immediate financial and commercial reflections upon Concorde's future,
- consideration must be given to looking ahead and trying to determine under what
possible conditions the Concorde could be linked with a new generation of supersonic
airliners. Jack L. Kerrebrock, administrator of the U.S. Office of Aeronautical and
- Space Technology, recently told AVIATION DAILY that there would be a new super~onic
transport someday but that it does not seem desirable, at this stage, to emphasize
, such a program. NASA continues to work on the variable cycle engine so as to be in
a position to contribute to the development of this type of engine when the time comes.
Some funding is beirig provided for research on the most critical camponents of an
advanced supersonic transport, but this funding support is less than the amount which
had been included in the initial 1982 budget proposed by the Carter administration.
It follows from these remarks that the U.S. research and development effort is not
aimed at any foreseeable target date for actual production of a new supersonic
transport. Assurance of a direct link between the Concorde and the new-generatiQn
supersonic transports now appears to be increasingly unlikely.
COPYRIC:HT: A. & C. 1981
8041
CSO: 3100/2
i
2
FOR OFFICIAL t1SE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R400404060039-9
_ FOR OFFICIAL~, USE ONLY
POLITICAL BELGIUM
POLL ON POPULARITY OF LEADING POLITICIANS
Erussels POURQUOI PAS? in French 17 Sep 81 pp 7-9
LReport on exclusive survey, conducted by Marketing Unit: "The Political Barome-
t~r: Mark Eyskens Ta,kes Tumble; Wilfried Marte~s Recaptures I,ead; Guy Spitaels
Becomes Mister Wallonia; Irresistihle Rise of Eric Van Rompuy"~
- [Tex+,] The goa.l of the political baxometer "P.P.? - Maxketing
Unit" is t~ determine the populaxity of those who govern us.
The question asked of the respondents was: "For each of t~ze fol-
lowing political personalities, please tell me whether you would
like to see him play an importa.nt role in the coming months?"
The survey was conducted between 1 arid 4 September 1981 by
Marketing Unit, a company speciallzing in market study and public
opinion polls~ with a sample of 1~121 Belgians, 18 years of age
and older, structured b,y sex, age, type ~f housing, and socio-
economic class.
The results were weighed according to the size of the country's
regions.
Marketing Ur~it is a member of Febelmar~ the professional associa-
tion of Public Opinion Institutes.
At a tlme when Maxk Eyskens is trying desperately to hang on to power~ we see that
his rating has dropped considerably in the country as a whole.
Indeed, he has lost four points at the national level~ thus moving to third place,
behind Wilfried Mastens who, in spite of his e~:ile~ has not lost any of his credit.
Mr Martens undoubtedly remains an important element, which it would be absurd to
ignore for the future.
On the other hand, Mark Eyskens moved down everywhere, and particulaxly in Brussels
where he lost 1G~ points~ which obviously seems enormous.
Obviously, the prime minister is paying very deaxly for his tri~kv policy and also
for tl-~e softness and lack of courage which have presided over the development of
his scandalous budget. At the time of our April 1981 survey~ Mr Eyskens~ the
bearer of a11 hopes, was rising at a lightning speed. Obviously, it was not long
before he disappointed everyone.
3
F(1R (1FFTI~76T iiSF (1NT V
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R004400060039-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
However, let us also note the relative stability of Leo Tindemans~ and this in
spite of his recent setbacks, specifically concerning the presidency of the Counc~l
of Europe. Let us nevertheless point out that the ayatollah from Edegem is begin-
ning +o lose ground~ even in the Flanders.
Having sa~d this~ the biggest surprise remains th.e irresistihle rise of Guy
Spitaeis who~ over a 5 month period, has become a very important national figure.
As a matter of fact, while he advanced 5 points at the national level, he won 14
points in Wallania, becoming the most populax politician from the southern part of
the coun~ry. Is he thus drawing the dividends of his often advanced attitude in
community matters?
Another significant phenomenon, but this time in the Flanders, was the irresistible
rise of Eric Van Rompuy, th~ president of the CVP [Social Christian Pa,~ty - Flemish~
Youth, who, over a 1 yeas period~ went from 7 to 24~ points and who won the 10th
place at the level of the national audience, even ahead of people like Schiltz,
De Croo, C'iabert ~ Gol ~ Simonet~ or Leburton. Mr Van Rompuy ha.s obviously benefited
from admirable maxketing, even if some people confuse him with his t~other Herma,n,
the (non-conformist~ director of the CYP Study Bureau.
- Among the noticeable setbacks, we should mention Vanden Boeynants who, with 30 per-
cent, returned to the low score he had already received in June 1980. L'nquestion-
ably, his presidency of the PSC [Christian Social Party - French]~ which is perhaps
_ considered as lacfiing in determination, no longer receives the credit he could have
hoped for. The operation of opposition to the E`yskens budget, which he has just
started, will proba,bly a11ow him to regain his former position. But public opinion
obviously expects more radicalism from him.
Let us fina,lly note that Mr Glinne~ Guy Spitaels' former challenger for the prasi-
dency, ha.s returned to a relative obscurity~ having been literally crushed by the
surpri.sing score of the president of the PS [Socialist Paxty - French~.
On the other hand, the other Belglan leaders remained "stationary," with the excep-
tion of RW ;_Walloon Rally~ leader Henri Mordant who~ for the first time, does not
even appear among the top 20 in the national classification~ ha.ving lost 4~ points
in Wa.llonia, which is haxsh.
The independents of Messrs Duvieusart and Gendebien on the one hand and his desire
to merge with the FDF [Democratic Front of Brussels F`rench Speakers~ on the other,
a11 of this crowned by the prevailing confusion within the party, have been most
_ harmful to him. For the rest, neither PSC leaders Ma,ysta.dt an.d Desmarets~ nor UDRT
[Union for Democracy and Respect for Labor~ leader Hendrick mana,ged to cross the
borders of credibility.
Mark Eyskeris: Declining Support
To complete this survey, we wanted to test the credibility of Mr Eyskens by asking
the following question:
"Do you have confidence that the prime minister yrill be able to solve the problems
which are currently facing Belgium?"
4
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R440400060039-9
FOR OFF'ICIAL USE ONLY
The response was enlightening as only 7 percent of the Belgians have full confi-
dence in Gaston's son, and 30 percPnt axe rather confident, which brings us to a
total of 37 percent. On the other hand, 19 percent are rather not confident and
22 percent have no confidence at a11~ which ~ings the distrust vote to 4~5 percent,
with 18 percent with no opinion.
Now, it should be noted that in November 1980~ in response to the same question,
Mr Martens won 48 percent of the confidence votes as against 36 percent opposed,
which was really an excellent score.
Obviously~ the majority of the Belgi.ans no longer have much confidei~ce that Maxk
~ Eyskens will be able to solve our problems~ even if 38 percent wish to see him con-
tinue to play a political role, proba.bly a more subr~rdinate one. Watch out for the
slippery s"lope:
TaBI~E 1. Election Results.
i
Percentage
- 1, Wilf'ried Maxtens (2) ~2 ~S~Q� *
2. Leo Tindemans (3~ 38 2
~ 3, Ma,rk Eyskens (1) 38 -
= 4~, Willy Glaes 35 '
Karel van Miert (7) 33 S~Q~
6. Guy Spitaels (8) 33 t 5
7. Willy De Clercq (5~ 31 - 3
- 8. Vanden Boeynants (6 3~ - ,
9, Antoinette Spaak (9 28 ~'1
10. Erik van Rompuy (24~ - 21k (in September '80;
7
= 11. Guy Ma.thot (12) 22 ~S�~~
12. C.-F. Nothomb (14~ 22 t 1
13. Henri Simonet (11~ 22 S~Q~
14~. Andre Cools (10~ 22 S�Q�
- 15. Jos. Chabert (15 21 (S.Q.
16. Hugo Schiltz (16~ 21 + 2
17. Edm. Leburton (13~ 19 2
18. Jean Gol (17) i9 ~ 2
19� Ernest Glinne (20) 1~ - 1
20. Herman De Croo (19) 14~ - 1
Key: The first figure: rating of satisfaction in September 1981.
The second figur~: the progress or decline of each personality.
Next to each na.me, their rank in Ap~il 1981.
S.Q. = no change.
5
ann nr.nTnT~T TTCF l1TiTV
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400064439-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
TABLE 2. WALLONIA.
September 1981 April 1981 Difference
1. Guy Spitael s 48 3~ 14
2. Antoinette Spaak 4~ 4~ + 1
3. Andre Cools 38 ~ S'Q'
4. Wilfried Martens 38 ~ S'Q'
_ 5, Jean Gol 38 ~
6. Guy I~lathot 37 37 S. Q�
_ 7. Willy Claes ~ 0 S�Q~
8. Vanden Boeynants
9. Mark E~skens 35 3~ - 2
10. C.-F. Nothomb ~ s'Q'
11. Edmond Leburton 33 37
12. Ernest Glinne 3~ -
_ 13. Henri Simonet 29 ~ ~ 1
1~. Henri Mordant 29 33
15. Phiiippe Maystadt 27 28 - 1
Let us repeat: Guy Spitaels has become the indisputable socialist leader of
Wallonia, retiring the likes of Mathot~ Glinne and Leburton. He obviously has a
definite support. Within the PSC, even though he has experienced a setba.ck, Varzden
- Boeynants has kept his leading position, as against a stal2~nary Nothomb and a
Ma,ystadt who obviously did not take off. On the othsr hand~ timidly but re~ularly~
- pRI, [Party of I,iberty and Walloon Reform] leader Jean Gol has won h3_:~ slot, going
from 32 in November 1980 to 34~ in April 1981~ and to 38 today. This is rather sig-
nificant. On tlie other hand, RW leader Henri Mordant has begun a serious decline~
and this in contrast with Spaak~ who is still going up. This should strengthen
the FDF in its desire to present itself in Wallonia under its own label.
TABLP~ BRUSSELS.
September 1981 April 1981 Difference
1. Antoinette Spaak 4~9 51 - 2
2, Vanden Isoeynants ~7 51 '
3, Guy Spitaels j7 ~6 S.Q~
4~ , Mark Eyskens 33
, 5. Willy Claes 33 33 S�Q�
6. Wilfried Martens 33 39 - 6
7. Henri Simonet 33 3F - 3
8. Jean Gol 33 33 S�Q'
- 9, Willy De Clercq 33 38 - 5
lo, C.-I~'. Nothomb 33 30 3
11. Leo Tindemans 27 2? S'Q'
12. Karel van Miert 21 z5
13. Edmond Leburton 21 not c~assified
14. Jos. Chabert 21 not classified
15, Andre Cools 21 25
Unquestionably, Mrs Spaat: and Vanden Boeyna,nts rPmair. the two big leaders in
Brussels, even if sometimes they go d~wn rather noticeably. On the other hand, it
is a Walloon~ Mr Spitaels, who holds the lead on the socialist side. Henri
Simonet, for his part, continues to decli.ne in Brussels, even if he advances in
6
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R440400060039-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Wallonia, and in thc: Flanders, whereas thP liberal Jean Gol desperately (for him~
_ stagriates in Srussels. It is true that the F'lemi~h liberal De Clercc} is also ex-
periencing a f~ee fa11, but the most sensational and mos~t significant thrashing
remains that of Ma.rk Eyskens, who lost 1~ points.
TASLE 4. FLANDERS
September 1981 Apri3 1981 Difference
1. Leo Tindemans ~7 4'8 1
2. Mark E~skens 4~6 4-b S� Q�
3. Wilfrieci Martens 46 4~ t 2
4~ . Karel van Miert ~6 i
- j. Willy De Clerq 35 4~1 - 6
6. Eric van Rompuy 35 10 25
(Sep. 1980~
7. Wi.lly Claes 33 ~ 5
8. Hugo Schiltz 3~ 28 ~ 2
- 9, Vanden Boeynants 24 27 3
10. Jos . Cha,bert 24~ 25 - 1
11. Herman De Croo 20 ~2 2
12. Guy Spitaels 18 22
13. Henri Simonet 16 15 ~ 1
1~. Andre Cools 13 12 + 1
15, C.-F. Nothomb 11 10 1
Things are obviously turnir~ sour for the leaders of the PVV [Party of Liberty and
Progress]. Minus 6 for W~lly De Clercq, minus 2 for De Croo: tha,t is beginning
to hurt. Things are not more cheerful on the side of the socialists: since Novem-
ber 1980~ K~~'1 van Miert has been enga.~ed in a slow but steady decline, whereas
Willy De Clercq went from 41 in November. 1980, to 38 in April 1981, to 33 toda,y.
This represents a very serious loss of support. On the other hand, although
' Tindemans and Maxk Eyskens axe atill holding on~ Wilfried Maxtens has taken off
toward a new popularity. Having s~.ici this, the most surprising thing is unques-
tionably the fabulous upsurge of ~ic van Rompuy~ who has apparently become an es-
- tablished fac+, in the Flemish political scenery by cheerfully eclipsing the likes
of De Croo, Chabert, Schiltz, and Claes, and by even catching up with Ue Clercq.
Let us a,lso note that the further Mr Spitaels ad.vances in Wallcnia, the more he
fa,lls on the r'lemish side, going from 2~6 in November 1980 to 22 in April 1981~
dropping to 1B today. This should undoubtedly comfort him in his Walloon crusade.
� COPYRIGH'I' : 1981 POURQUOI PAS?
8~~63
CSO: 3100~19
7
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R400404060039-9
FOR OFFICIAL USF ONLY'
POLITI CAL FRANCE
POST-AFG'HANISTAN: SECURITY THREAT, EUROPEAN DEFENS~ POLICY
Paris TRAVAUX ET RECHERCHES DE L' IFRI in Fxench Fourth Quarter 1980 Vol 1 pp 335-343
[Article by Francois de Rose, French Ambassador and f.ormer permanent ~~epresentative
of F'rance to NATO. Section V, part 1, of new series, TRAVAUX ET REQiER(~iES DE
L"'IFRI". Vol 1 is "'Ihe Security of Europe in the 80's", various authors; pkrblished
tmder the direction of Pierre LellouchP by IFRI, (Institut Francais des Relations
. Internationales) 415 pp]
[Text] For anyone who is not convinced by the explanations and the assurances of
Chairman Brezhnev, the cveuts in Afghanistan should mark an important date in the
evolution of the relations bztween the Soviet Union and the rESt of the world.
As I am neither a Kremli^~~ogist nor a specialist in Asian problems, I will not try
to determine the basic causes of this action by the last imperialist power of this
end of the century. T~rill only note that this action follows logically on opera-
tions which, from North Korea to Cuba and Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, South
Yemen, Vietnam, and Cambodia, testify to the continuity of a design. Considera-�
tior~s of opportunism certainly played a role: a reply to the consolidation of the
- dipl.omatic position of China, following the Sino-Japanese treaty and the normaliza-
tion of relations between Beijing and Washington; a favorable situation created by
the events in Iran, underlining the wlnerability of the West to an energy crisis
and the inability of. the United Stat~s to free its diplomatic hostages; the aban-
3onment of any hop~ of early ratificat ian of the SALT II treaty; the political
- drift of the Amin government in Afghanistan. All these facts and many o~hers cer-
tainly wer~ weighed in the balance by the masters of the Kremlin.
Ifowever, if many elements ware at the origin of the invasion of a vital region of
~he Asian continent by the Red Army, among which we ca.nnut say which were the most
important, the result is that, from this platform, it can keep two irons in the
fire: keep things unstable and work against the territorial integrity of Pakistan,
a country fr.iendly to China and which the Soviet news agency TASS already accuses
of. being an obstacle to any political sett.lemer.t of the crisis; or threaten the oil
fields, without whose production the ~destern economy will break down. As has been
said on many occasior~.s, the strategy of tt~e Soviet leaders is a global and indirect
strategy.
It is global because, in tl~e purely military definition of strategy, that is, the
preparation and use of force for political ends, they have combined action in the
pol.itical and ideological domains with the t~king of control of positions which
give them in Africa and in the Indian Ocean more facilities than the Western powers
have.
_ 8
FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-04850R000400060039-9
HOR OFFIC'IAL USE ON~.Y
The only area where, up to the nresent, the USSZ nas not succeeded in making points
against the countries of the free world is the economy. With a foreign trade a-
mounting to 3 percent of total world trade, the Soviet means for exerting pressure
on the ~dest only bear or, certain specific supplies, useful no doubt (petroleuzn~
natural gas, titanium) but nevertheless too limited in scope or duration to ~ive
the Soviet Union a powerful means of leverage. Moreover, Soviet exports are more
than largely compensated for by its own import needs.
The seizure of Afghanistan will not increase the resources available to Moscow.
- However, it will provide the means to exercise a potential threat to the very basis
of the Western economy.
For the followers of the indirect strategy the progress achieved by the Soviets is
essential. The art of the strategist, like that of the chess player (a more stimu-
lating national game in intellectual terms than poker or bowling), consists in
~aining the maximum with the minimum of ineans and of risks. To do that one has to
tiave in all areas possible courses of act ion whir_h wl.11 force one's opponent to draw
back, after an evaluation of the balance of forces. This is what happened to
Khrushchev at the time of the Cuban missile crisis and rahat bhe Soviets have
sworn to themselves will not happen again.
By the oc.cupation of Afghanistan the USSR is henceforth in a position to exercise
in the economic sphere intolerable pressures on the countries with a liberal
economy. This is the complementary resource which the Soviets lacked in terms of
their global strategy.
Quite evidently, this does not mean that the Soviet Union will use this pressure to
strangle the West. This is all the less likely since Washington has made it
_ known that an attack on the free flow of petroleum exports from the Persian Gulf
area would lead to war. However, unless one believes that the two superpowers are
~ieading toward a kind of "super suicide," things won't happen that way in a period
o~ crisis. Events will evolve, in all likelihood, toward an evaluation of the
respective elements of power and of vulnerability. It is at this point that the
~ S~viet presence in Kabul, in Aden, and in Addis Ababa constitutes a potential threat
to the [desterners' very source of life. And if the analysis made by the men in the
Politburo brings them to believe that capitalism has entered the final crisis pre-
dicted by the sacred texts of Marxism, one cannot ignore the possibility that one
' day they might be tempted to hasten the end of capitalism by an interruption in oil
. deliveries, if their evaluation of the facts of the problem leads them to conclude
that the balance between risk and ga;n is favorable to them.
Even independently of a possible conflict, it is clear that the possibility the
USSR would have, directly or indirectly, to put its hands on part of the petroleum
proQluction of the Persian Gulf, would have considerable economic importance for the
Soviets. First of all, to meet their growing petroleum needs. Following that, to
obtain subs~antial foreign exchange earnings if the countries falling under its
control would continue to export to the YJest.
On the political plane the consequences would be no less iu~ortant. If it should
_ happen that the USSR can no longer, with its own resources, meet the energq needs
9
FOR OFFIC[AL LJSE ONL'r'
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R044400060039-9
FOR ONFICIAL l1SE ONL1~'
of its satellites, the latter would be forced to obtain their supplies on the world
market. Their resulting foreign pay~nents problem would aggravate their presen~t
debt to the external world. For Moscow there would be a loss of a powerful lever
of influence. Coztrol of part of the production of the Near East would avoid this
danger.
These considerations could therefore be added to the reasons arising from Soviet
rivalry with the West to provoke a movement in the direction of the oil wells,
more particularly in the northern area of the Persian Gulf.
In any case, on the strictly operational level, given the hypothesis of a conflict
in Europe, the occupation of Afghanistan does not change much in terms of the prob-
lem of European defense. Since the completion of decolonization and the appearance
of atomic weapons, the Western powers, in terms of their seapower, are no longer
in a position to apply the strategic concept wliich gave them victory in the past:
_ "giving up grounu to gain tizne." (This 3.s a concept which won out in the last world
wa-, thanks, moreover, to the decisive participation of the Soviet ih ion, because
its siza let it apply the same prlnciple.)
However, the effectiveness of this doctrine rests on the possession of resources~
the control of the seas, and the time factor making it possible to bring the re-
sources to bear, while a blockade forces the enemy to depend on its own resources.
The control of resources has been lost, mastery of the seas would be challenged,
and it is out of the question that a war in Europe could last beyond a few weeks.
This means that war would ~e waged with what one would have at the beginning and
that its outcome would no more depend on suppliER of petroleum from the Middle
- East than it did in the past on the capacity of industry and shipyards in the
United States to produce 50,000 aircraft and 10,000 Liberty ships after 3 years of
war.
This conf irms us in the view that the problem posed to us--and which the Afghanis-
tan affair shows us in all its "purity"--is that of a strategy for a state of no-
war. Now, it seems that there is a disturbing contrast between the approach to
the problem in Moscow and in the Western countries.
- We have said that the USSR is applying an indirect global strategy, to which the
invasion of Afghanistan provides in part the economic dimension which was mis-
sing. Everything is happening as if Che whole of internaCional and national life
were seen in Moscow in a context of confrontation (which does not mean conflict).
Not only is tlte confrontation seen as inevitable and implacable but even desired,
or perhaps better deacribed as the thread of history, the very substance of which
the present and the future are made.
Lt is not like that at all in the West. We have policies, and often grand poli-
cies, like the reconciliation between the former enemies of past wars, the con-
struction of Europe, aid to the Third World, transformation of a style of living.
These are so many examples of a vision of. the world which looks to the future. We
also have defense policies for which we agree to make substantial sacrifices.
10
FOR OFF[C(AL USE ONLY
~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-44850R000400060039-9
rvn v~ry~~~,~ .,~r. v:~~.?
However, as far as foreign policy and defense policy are concerned, it does not
appear that our countries think of these problems in +;he context of a confrontation
or, in any case, of a rivalry with an opposing group of countries which is follow-
ing a strategy in the sense of a struggle to impose its political, economic, and
social system.
_ Not only would tne strategy followed in recent u~~rs no longer be applicable, not
only is it the case that the Atlantic Alliance has no concept of victory in the
event of hostilities (it aims only at halting hostilities because of the danger
of an escalation to extreme Ievels of conflict), but nothing would be more foreign
to our vision of international relations than to consider them in the perspective
in effect on the other side of the Elbe River. Our only overall concept is oriented
on the hbpe that, over the long term, the differences in nature and ob~ectives be-
tween the East and the West will wind up by blurring away on the single condition
of increasing trade and contacts.
Our vision of the confrontation is exclusively military. Regarding our economic,
cultural, scientific, and technological relations with the countries of the Warsaw
Pact, we only see them in a perspective and in the service of detente. It is clear
that we are not speaking the same language.
However, the events in Afghanistan have provoked reactions which lead one to think
that it should be possible to benefit from them on condition that we ~ake this
view of two worlds in opposition to each ~ther and not that we are preoccupied
with returning as quickly as possible to the intellectual comfort of a resumption
of detente. The feelings in the Muslim world, even in Iran under Ayatollah Khomey- ~
ni, the unease felt by Indira Ghandi herself, the concern of Europe and of China,
and the reawakening of the United States constitute a spectacular turnaround in
the situation.
- In such circumstances the French government certainly is right in not wishing to
give to the countries which consider themselvea non-aligned the impression that, if
they condemn r~Ioscow, they would neceaearily agree with Western views of the situa-
tion. If, in the face of Fiael Castro's efforts, Marshal Tito succeeded once
- again in saving the Third World, at the Havana Conference, from an unconditional
- allegiance to Moscow, if Afghaniatan aroused reactions which we have 3ust recalled,
it does not follow that the non-aligned should have the intention, for all of tha.t,
of seeming to move closer to the Westernera.
- However, we can ask ourselves if it is appropriate to stimulate our reserve forces
by the fear of a"resurgence of the power blocs." There is not and there never
has been a power bloc in the West, and France, more than any other country, is best
qualified to know this. When France wished to leave the integrated military organ-
- ization [of NATO], when France aaked the staffs and forces of its allies to leave
its territory, it immediately obtained satisfaction. ~en Greece wae able to
do the same thing, and as far ae Turkey is con~:erned, it demanded and obtained the
. closure of the stations from which the United States observed the Soviet missile
testa at the Baikonur base in Central Asia. Despite this, a reference to the
policy of power blocs is part of our political phraseology. This ia not only un-
,just in terms of the comparison which it seems to make between the relations
of the free countries within the Atlantic alliance and the state of
11
FOR OFFIC[AL IJSE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400064039-9
tOR ONFICIAL USE ONL1~'
suboLdina~ion which characterizes the relations between the satellite countries
- and the USSR. It can constitute an obstacle which we impose on ourselves in the
_ evaluation of events concerning our security, if it is in the name of our inde-
pendence that we limit the exercise of our independence. It is not certain that
this is the best way of acting on the flow of events, in terms of the reactions of
an AmPrican administration which, after having believed for too long a time in
the virtue of a dialogue and in the good faith of the Sovie~s, risks going over to
the opposite extreme.
How have we not shown the independence of our judgments, in the face of the con-
verging points of view of the two superpowers, by refusing to approve of the SALT
II agreement which, moreover, marks a deterioration in the overall balance of
forces, in the detriment of the West!
Ileanwhile, the Russians call on the policy of detente to attempt to prohibit the
emplacement af missiles necessary for Europe's defense. They state, without
being contradicted, that with 100 Pershing rockets having a range of 1,800 lan the
Americans would have a first strike capability, as opposed to the 1398 inter-
continental missiles spread out through the immensity of Soviet territory! On
the day after the entry of the Red Army into Afghanistan, they had the effrontery
to say that the deployment of the Pershing missiles constituted "implicit aggres-
sion"! And the organization of Atlantic Alliance maneuvers in Norway was presented
by PRAVDA as a policy of hostility toward the USSR!
Certainly, the Afghanistan affair has not placed our security in danger, over the
short term, as the success of the Kremlin campaign against the Pershing missiles
, would have been. However, the two operations, placed in their present context,
show the desire of the masters of Russia to extend their empire where they con-
sider it necessary at the same time as they attempt to prohibit the mc~dernization
of Europe's defense systems.
There is another consequence of the Afghanistan affair which could have very pro-
found and perhaps healthy repercussions on European security. That is the emerging
awareness by the Westerners of the need to draw the appropriate consequences from
the fact of their vulnerability to events occurring in the four corners of the
world and the profound change that has taken place in the general circumstances
- afFecting their security.
Up to and including World War II Europe was the center of the world and dragged the
rest of the planet into its wars,
Since 1945 our continent has found itself in a very particular situations no longer
the center of the East-West conFrontation, it has known the state of no-war and a
feeling of security unknown until then, Certain countries, like ours, have been
shaken by the pangs of decolonization. However, the state of peace in Europe has
been really perturbed only by the ~aars between Israel and its neighbors, Vietnam,
Soviet penetration in Africa, etc., not ro mention the disturbance of our economies
consequent on the repeated increases in the price of petroleum.
Now, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has come to change this view of things.
Suddenly, we have realized that events taking place outside our geographic area
12
FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R004400060039-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLti'
would involve us in war. It is no longer we who threaten to drag the world into
our wars, it is the problems and tensions developir~g thousands of kilometers from
our borders which threaten to involve us in their warlike repercussions.
The first consequence that the European countries should draw from this is the
need for them to increase their capabilities for intervention beyond their own
continent. On this point France is far rrom being the country which is least
- aware of the problem. Its fleet on the high seas unquestionably has the capa-
bilities of an ocean-going navy, and its rapid deployment forces are probably the
best available in Europe.
Two facr.s must remain constant in our minds: the withdrawal of the British
- presence East of Suez when the London government, considering that it could not at
the same time maintain a presence in the Indian Ocean and in Europe, sacrificed the
overseas cotmnitment for the benefit of the British Army of the Rhine. The other
- fact is the position in which 4lashington foiind itself when, in order to put two
aircraft carriers in the vicinity of the Persian Gulf, it had to withdraw one from
the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and one from the Seventh Fleet in the Pacific.
There are therefore insufficient forces to hold several fronts at the same time.
An increased rearmament effort, as a consequence of the overseas threat, is there-
fore necessary, independent of the programs adopted concerning security in Europe,
and, as far as we are concerned, the modernization of our nuclear and conventional I
forces charged with the close-in clefense of our territory is also necessary. I
However, once the security of the European countries is threatened, not only on the ~
cc~ntinent but also overseas, it is necessary for them to be able to act in the
defense of their interests. This is a matter, overall, of nating that we will not
purchase our security by devoting between 2.5 and 4 percent of our gross national
product to defense. We also have to recognize that there is no miracle formula
which could compensate for the fact that the Soviets are now in a position to
tiireaten the oil fields and the Straits of Ormuz a~d that they have logistical
positions which would permit their ground and air f~rces to intervene there in a
few liours. Thus, the demands by certain countries of the region for a withdrawal
of the two superpowers or those tending to leave the Indian Ocean only to those
countries on its shores, are they pretenses whose evEntual acceptance would leave
the f.ield free to the sole influence of the USSR?
At the same time we understand the inadequacy of. our structures and of our means
of parrying the new dangers which threaten us. After we felt indignant at the
statement made by Henry Kissinger that Europe only had regional interests, we noted
thati.E our interests go beyond the framework of our region, our means of action
hardly go beyond it. Depending almost entirely on the countries of the Persian
Gulf for our supplies of petroleum, we also depend on the presence of the AmPrican
Fleet to ensure the free mo~ement of the oil tankers.
The Atlantic A1J_iance does not cover this region of the world which is vital for
all the nations of the alliance and for many other countries, in the first rank of
which is Japan. This geographic limitation which ensures that, beyond the Tropic
of Cancer the allied cor,imands have no further authority, may appear absurd. How-
ever, it is a fact, and there would be no political possibility of changing this
state of things and of extending to the whole of the Atlantic Oc.ean and the Indian
Ocean NATO's zone of responsibility.
13
FUR UFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R004400060039-9
HOIt OFFICIAL USE ONI.ti'
The problem had been posed in 1958 by General De Gaulle in the famous memorandum
whicr.iie sent to President ~isenhower and to Prime Minister Macmillan of Great
Britain. "The Atlantic Alliance," he wrote, "was conceived and its application
was prepared for an eventual zone of action which no longer relates to the politi-
cal and strategic realities. The world heing what it is, we can no longer con-
sider as adapted to its purposes an organization such as NATO, which is limited
to the security of the North Atlantic Oc~an, as if what is happening, for example.
in the ?-Ii:ddle East or in Africa, did not immediately and directly involve
Europe...." And he propesed a little further on, "that at the world political and
strategic echelon an organization be established including the United States,
- Great Britain, and France," which would have the task "of establishing and, if
necessary, of implementing strategic action plans, particularly involving use of
nuclear weapons."
We know that this memorandum was not followed up and tha.t, from this date on the
- process of estrangement of France from the integrated military organization began.
Let us note in passing that France did not yet have nuclear weapons and that pro-
posing a sharing of the decision to use American weapons was in confJ.ict with
what the general was himself to recognize later on, that is, that thxs is a
responsibility which cannot be shared.
However, doesn't the rest of the reasoning have an astonishingly contemporary sound
with the invasion of Afghanistan and the threat to the petroleum supply lines? Is
it necessary to wait, as in the case of the Shaba area of Africa, for a crisis to
- be fully developed so that, in the event, France and the United States would agree
on the logistical support which the latter would provide to the former or to exam-
ine in advance the possibilities of intervention and support? Do we still recall
that at the time of the Yom Kippur War in 1973 ~nly Portugal under Prime Minister
Caetano agreed to authorize the landing of American planes in the Azores, bringing
on an urgent basis the equipment Israel needed and that, without this help, only
' one-tenth as many American supplies would have been received.
~ If the Western governments recognize that the conquest of important geostrategic
positions by the Soviet Union constitutes economic and military threats, they
might usefully take up the idea presented in the 1958 memorandum.
Under ~*hat form and with what participation? Those are the points to be studied.
:do doubt, this should be done in the least official, least structured manner
possible. Starting irom the fact that the 4lesterners have to project elements of
f.orces to points far away from their zone or where the bulk of their forces are
located, it should be a matter of examining the possibilities which they would have
of according each other facilities for stocking, transport, and communications,
_ allooring the most rapid kind of intervention.
ilaturally, there should be no question of establishing any kind of political organ-
ism requiring new commitments or oE expanding to the whole planet the comnitments
of Article V of the Washington 'Treaty [the idorth Atlantic Treaty of 1949]. Instead,
it would be a matter of preparing, in the military echlons and between the countries
which have the capabilities anu responsibilities of implementing a policy which is
_ not er.clusively regional in scope, the means fo r their governments to act beyond the
geographic limits presently covered by the Atlantic Alliance if one day they
14
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R044400060039-9
FOR OFFICIAI, l!5E ONL},
consider it necessary. Let the Federal Republic r,f Germany and perhaps Italy
be added to the three countries of which General De Gaulle was thinking. This
would seem to be called for, the more so as in no case c~uld there be any question
of using nuclear weapons. Let us say, to be specific, that if American, Frenchy
British, and perhaps tomorrow German, ttalian, and even Japanese naval forces are
permanently stationed at the approaches to the Persian Gulf, it would be desirable
- that they are mutually aware of what their missions would be and what their re-
sources would be to provide protection to the movement of petroleum tankers when-
ever there is a threat to these movements. It would be desirable if certain of
the ?~estern countries, which should not always involve the Americans, as we saw in
the case of the Shaba affair already mentioned, were to undertake rapid redeploy-
ment of forces, were the transport available, facilities for stopovers en route,
and stocking of supplies laiown in advance.
What the governments of the Western countries must decide is whether the invasion
of. Afghanistan is only "unacceptable" from the moral and international law point
- of view or whether it also constitutes a threat to the security of the peoples
for ~ahom they are resportsible. If it is the second hypothesis which they decide
on, the least that we can say is that we are not drawing the necessary conclusions
f rom it .
Several months after the invasion of Afghanistan, it remains difficult to und.er-
stand tliat our governments tiave not considered it useful to call immediately for a
~ meeting at the ministerial level of the North Atlantic Council. Even a meeting of
the foreign minist~~rs of the United States, of the Federal Republic of Germany,
of Great Britain, and oF France, in the form of a working dinner, has not taken
place, for reas~ns which remain all the more mysterious for most of us, since we
have since then received Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Paris and met Chairman
Brezhnev in Warsaw. ,
LI we still need several cri~es like the invasion of Afghanistan in order to under-
stand the nature of the threat to which we are exposed and to change our reflexes,
there are still good times in prospect for the strategists of the Y.remlin.
COPYRIGHT: Ifri, 1980.
5170
c;SO: 3100/977
15
FOR OFFICIAL USE UNLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9
_ FOR OFFICIAL USr: ONLti'
POLITI CAL F~~
ECANOMIC, SOCIAL CRISIS: GREATEST SECURITY TfiREAT
Paris TRAVAUX ET BE(~iERCHES DE L' IFRI in French Fourth Quarter 1980 Vol 1 pp 345-349
[Article by Lionel Jospin, national secretary of the Socialist Party for international
relations. Section V, part 2 of new series, TRAVAUX ET REQiERCHES DE L~"IFRI".
Vol 1 is "1he Security of Europe in the 80's", various authors; published imder the
- direction of Pierre Lellouche by IFRI, (Institut Francais des Relations Internationales)
415 pp]
[Text] The Iraq-Iran war, the events in Poland, the invasion of Afghanistan, the
deployment of SS-20 medium range rockets, the decision to station Pershing rockets
and cruise missiles in Europe--these are among the facts which, since the beginning
of the year, indicate at times violently and in a disturbing way our entry intc, a
new phase of international relations. Destabilized in depth by the emergence of.
the Third World on the international scene, marked by an economic and political
- crisis which is sparing very few industrialiaed count~.ies,the old order based on
a balance of power blocs is splitting up, but without a new international order
emerging as yet. How will Europe pass through the present test--that Europe where
_ the division of spheres of influence after LJorld War II was marked with the
= greatest clarity and on which the economic and political crisis weighs with par-
ticular force? Will there be progress or regression? Today some people ask them-
selves about the security of Europe, as they spoke about its future, not so long
ago. Is this a sign of legitimate disquiet or of a peychological and intellectual
withdrawal?
It seems to me that the primary threat hanging over Europe, its balance, and its
future is posed by the economic and social crisis which so many of the countries
of Eastern and Western Europe are experiencing and the obstacles within L�he
European Community, which has not known how to affirm its identity in the face of
the great powers, up to now.
The aggravation of the unemployment problem, without inflation being brought under
control, characterizes the economic situation in Western Europe. The adoption of
policies to deal with the recession--toith the notable exception of the Federal
Republic of Germany but whose explicit policy of accepting a budgetary deficit is
experiencing real difficulties--which are increasing social inequalities, and an
3ttitude of fatalism among the people has its repercussions in the political and
insti.tutional field. The renaissance of reactionary and even racist ideologies,
the emergence of acts of terrorism are accompanied by a move to the right and by
questions regarding the role of political parties and of institutions which pro-
- vide guarantees for democratic life.
16
FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9
NUR OFFICIAL t!SE ONL~'
in t}ie countries of 3:astcrn Curope the feeling of stalemate in the bureaucratic
sacictles there, LJIIIC'Il are aleo encountering a weakening of their economic capa-
bili~tes already norably clogged by the low productivity of their productive
apparatus and disorder in the distribution system, can lead to social explosions as
a result of the refusal by their oovernments to accept a pluralistic system as an
expression of social diversity, The events in Poland show how unavoidable is the
process of evolution in these countries. However, they also show the risk o.f
instability which evolution brings with it. Ta deal with the claims and dissatis-
far.tion~ o~ t'_~~e worl:ing classes and the respective peoples, a recourse to external
adventures has often been a good recipe. All this is to say that the resolution
of the internal problems of Europe and of each European country will be a ma3or
element in en suring the security of Europe in the 1980'G. That is why one of the
main lines of orientation of the socialists is a refusal to accept the inevitability
of a continuation of the crisis. Of course, these problems canuot be resolved by in-
ternal measures alone. The external environment of Europe will be an influence in a
decisive way. It is therefore important to seek to control these external influences
and narticularly to define Europe's place in a world economy in the course of change.
~lmong others, the solutions chosen to make possible a reduction in tlie energy de-
pendence of Europe, to expand its action in favor of the growth of the developing
countries, and to negotiate the establishment of rules for an internationa.l economic
order accepted by all will provide the design for the future of Europe.
The petroleum crisis is not the whole crisis, as it does not explain all of it.
However, it makes i.t possible to see many facets of the crisis. Elmong them, we for-
get too often the attempts to restructure the world economy through the large,
multinational firns. The crisis is also bringing out a new division on the inter-
national scene b etween the countries which produce or have petroleum (and among
them are industrialized and Third World countries) and consuming countries (and
those have different development levels).
However, rather than developing an overall policy based on the establishment of a
new source of energy, France and Europe prefer to attempt to use in their favor the
~ contradictions existing within OPEC, or profit from the possibilities opened up by
the appearance of new producers "outside OPEC," such as Me:sico. And each country,
in trying to ma intain its place or improve it, pays the political price of petro-
leum.
_ However, the increased eff.orts to save on energy, the broadened program of re-
search on new source~ of energy, and the decrease in the decline of coal production
shot~ld, in France itself, reduce an excessive dependence on imported petroleum.
More broadly, the negotiation of middle range petroleum development agreements with
oil producing, developing countries and the adoption of joint planning programs,
- expanded to include all of Europe, should permit the stabilization of petroleum
prices, whose erratic evolution is the most dangerous threat of all.
Fartlier afield, it is necessary to work actively on the development of the Third
World ~countries. For socialists, there cannot be uncontrolled development by
putting these countries in competition with each other. The struggle for a self-
centered model program, giving priority to investments useful to all of the people,
17
FOR OFFICIAL LfSF. ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R004400060039-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE OPTLY
and in particular to agriculture, remains a necessity. This is the only way to en-
_ sure the real soctal progress ~f these countries and the development of social
rights and freedoms which today are too often scorned. The exploitation of an
urtder-paid and under-organized working force cannot provide a real base for devel-
opment, progress, and stability.
These objectives cannot be pursued unless the economic rules are established and
accepted by all countries engaged in international trade. The vagaries of the
international monetary system, the absence of a consensus on its functioning, the
difficulties which `he United States has in resolving the inCernal problems of
_ its econony without affecting the stability of the dollar--all of these circum-
stances maintain a state of permanent disquiet. And if the European :~fonetary Sys-
tem can have an effective role to play, its proper.:functioning remains too close-
ly linked to defiationary policies to provide the basis for a new equilibrium.
If economic stability is a guarantee of our security, the threats to the security
of Europe are also linked to the new armaments race, to the emhanced fragility of
detente, to the demonstrations of force by the great powers and more particularly
- by the USSR, and to the indecisiveness in the foreign policies of all of the
European countries.
The invasion of Afghanistan, coming after the deployment of the SS-20 missiles
aimed at jJestern Europe, certainly give rise to suspicions regarding the willing-
ness or" the USSR to maintain an atmosphere of detente. The delays by the Senate
and th~ Congress of the United States to ratify the SALT II accord~ and the
decision by PdATO to emplace Pershing rockets also made these developments appear
to reflect a certain hesitation by the United States about the course of detente.
[de are observing a crisis in detente signals, a reciprocal loss of confidence by
the two great powers, a source of misunderstandings which is filled with danger.
The growing misunderstanding--but things are not irreversible--between the USSR and
the L'nited States, and their desire to reaffirm their hegemony over the world to-
- day, constitute the greatest threat of all.
Any policy of force presunposes that the country which commits itself to it is
calculating for itself the risks which its actions involve. The L'SSR must know
that the Europeans are not disposed to accept, especially in the nar~e of a flouted
kind of detente, any demonstration of power which is dangerous for peace. It is
important tc show our capacity to preserve our independence. The legitimacy of
the pose of the USSR as a defender of peace has been largely placed in question..
It would be absurd not to turn back to it the burden of proof regarding its de-
clared objectives. The L'SSR has often emphasized the ideological struggle, and
we have not hesitated to take our place on this ground. The impasse~ which have
developed within the Soviet bureaucratic system and the inability of the systeri to
ouarantee individual and collective liberties still remain. A France which knows
how to commit itself and to bring Europe along to the establishment of a more just,
more egalitarian, freer, and more ia~ependent society may constitute a point of
- reference iohic'.i will go beyond the traditional East-West cleavages and which re-
fuses to consider the division of Eur.ope accepted at Yalta as definitive.
*These delays make the discussion of SALT III a relative matter. For our part we
think that if France can participat~ in them, it must be considered as speaking in
its own name, its nuclear striking force being considered as an autonomous entity.
18
FOR OFFICIAL USE Oi~I.Y
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9
NOR OFFIC'IAI. USF: ONLti'
l1s for now, we need to show our determination to develop our means of defense,
without letting ourselves b e dragged into a kind of competitive system which
stimulates the a.rmaments race. Thus, the socialists are proposing the building of
a sixth nuclear submarine and the carrying out of research on the neutron weapon
(but excluding series production of it}.
The auton4mous capacity of France to defend itself and to make the related deci-
sions must also be assured in relationship to the United States. The present pro-
cess of strengthening NATO (redeployment in Turkey, partial reintegration of
Greece, a decision on membership of the Spanish government) will have a ma~or
effect on the northern shores of the Mediterranean. This cannot be a factor favor-
ing real detente, the m~re so since the criteria which are leading to this develop-
ment remain unknowxi. Elsewhere, the principles on which the Atlantic Alliance
rests, the nature of the reciprocal commitments are factors which remain uncertain.
The L'nited States has not b een able or has not wished to associate its a~lies with
its decisions (the case of the boycott of the Olympic Games and reprisals against
- the USSR after the invasion of Afghanistan are known; the geographic sphere of
activity of the Atlantic Alliance is not fully known).
No doubt it is also time, as President Francois Mitterrand has said, to review the
nature of the reciprocal commitments of the Atlantic Alliance.
Certainly, the development of nuclear weapons and their miniaturization raises in~
a new way the problem of military alliances. LJithout going sa far as to state,
with ~Ierman Kahn and A. 4leiner that "coalition and nuclear threats are two contra-
dictory concepts," because of the fact of the enormous risks run by too strict a
commitment toward an ally, we can legitimately consider that the idea of making
- one's nationa]. territory into a sanctuary can only be decided by each country.
Hence the unavoidable logic of the eventual development by each country of nuclear
weapons, if we do not succeed in putting an end to the arms race. For us also,
r~ilitary sQcurity cannot really include true security. Only a resumption of dis-
armament negotiations can really ensure our security. The present situation de-
mands as a prior condition that the conditions for a return to the spirit of
detente must be present. The conference in Madrid--and that is why we hope for its
success--could be the occasion for this. In any case it will be a test of the in-
tentions of both sides. Possible ob,jectives in Madrid would be avoiding having the
conference in Madrid bog down in preparing a balance sheet--necessary and indeed
indispensable as that may be--regarding the application of the Helsinki accords
and proposing further advanceg in the three "baskets" (which are i.nseparable for us)
in arder to make it possible to resume t~e advance with the kind of confidence
necessary for detente. If the Madrid conference furthertnore makes it possible to
go further toward a conference on the reduction of forces and tensions in Europe,
- such as Francois Mitterrand proposed in December, 1977--which presupposes that all
kinds of armaments be discussed--we would re~oice. However, this involves a fur~
~ ther step which presupposes that the other steps have also been taken.
- The security of Europe will not be achieved by decree. It must be built ug. In a
world where the dialogue bet~.~een the superpowers is jammed up, where the emergence
- of the Third World countries will lead them to assert themselves, including by
means of war, it is important that Europe, and each of the countries which compose
19
FOR OFF1ClAL t)SE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9
fOR ONFICIAL USE ONLY
it, should appear as an independent point of reference, of stability, of innova-
tion. It is a new dynamism which must be achieved. To do that it will be neces-
sary to give back confidence in Europe to France, to give back to the youth of our
cauntry reasons to hope and to live for. If confidence in the leaders of our coun-
try, in its institutions, continues to deteriorate under the impact of scandals
and the loss of civic spirit,, the ability to mobilize the French for a pro~ect
looking to the future will be extinguished. Looking to the future provides the
basis for a strong demographic position and for economic and social progress. For
- the socialists, there cannot be a coherent foreign policy except in terms of its
rslationship with domestic policy. There cannot be external security without a
resolution of the internal problems of each country, ensuring the stability and
progress of each society. This is the direction of our program.
COPYRIGHT: Ifri, 1980
5170
CSO: 3100/977
20
- FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9
h'Oit OH'b'I('IAI. Util~: ONI.1'
POLITICAL FRANCE
SALT II, III; ARMS CONTROL, NOT DZSARMAMENT
Paris TRAVAUX ET REQiERCHES DE L` IFRI in French Fourth Quarter 1980 Vol 1 pp 381-391
[Article by Xavier Defline, an officer in the French armed serviceso Section VI,
part i of new series, TRAVAUX ET RE(~IERCHES DE L"'IFRI". Vol 1 is "7he Security of
- F.urope in the 80's", various authors; published under the direction of Pierre Lellouche
by IFRI, (Inatitut Francais des Relations Internationales) 415 pp]
[Text] The refusal of France to participate in the SALT III negotiations is not
a position of principle taken on an a priori basis. This refusal is based on an
analysis of the preceding SALT negotiations, their ob~ectives, their significance,
and their results. This position was also developed from an evaluation of the
advantages and risks which the extension of these negotiations to theater-level
weapons would involve for the security of Europe.
Which Negotiation?,
_ The negotiation to which we refer under the name of SALT III does not yet have a
very precise meaning, and its ob~ectives remain somewhat blurred. If NATO has
tried to learn the outlines more exactly, it is far from having obtained Soviet
agreement on the bases which the organization proposes. What would this negotia-
tion be? A prolongation of SALT II or a negotiation on European strategy? A
response is not yet available.
- A Prolongation of SALT II
Initially, SALT III was consider~ed to be a prolongation and a logical step after
the preceding agreements. Tt-.is new phase of the negotiation in effect was intended,
according to the terms of the de^_laration of principle attached to the SALT II
agreement, to continue bilateral discussions with a view to achieving the following
objectiqes:
--conclude with significant and substantial reductions in the number of offensive,
- strategic weapons;
--adopt qualitative limitations on ttie dep~.oyment of new types of ~aeapons ar:d on
the modernizat ion of e:~ist ing weapons;
--find a solution to the questicins set out in the interim protocol aCtached to the
treaty. ~
21
F~R OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R000440060039-9
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLti'
These negotiations were to be conducted by paying particular attention to the most
destabilizing, strategic weapons, with the purpose of reducing the risks of sur-
prise attack and by taking into consideration the factors which determine the
strategic situation. This last, very ambiguous formula reveals the reservations of
the Soviet Union, which most certainly intended to see finally taken into considera-
tion the demand which it had made from the beginning of the SALT conversations.
That is, taking into consideration all weapons capable of strikin.g the territory
of one or the ott~er of tl~e parties, From its point of view the following weapons
' should become a part of the negotiation:
--the American weapons deployed in Europe whose radius df action is sufficient to
make it possible for them to strike the territory of the USSR (Forward Based
Systems)*;
--the nuclear forces of third countries, and particularly those of France and the
J United Kingdom, allies of the United States.
Regarding these last two points, the minimum objective of the Soviet Union seemed
to be that, in the absence of an agreement establishing a ceiling for these systems,
Eastern Europe might benefit, in the calculation of its own ceilings, from a kind
of compensation equivalent to the threat which these systems represent. Of course,
and in terms of rigorous logic, the Soviet Union did not intend to see limitations
imposed on its own medium range systems, since the latter did not have the range
necessary to strike American territory.
Or Taking Into Account European Concerns
Things were shown in a completely new light, at least in the Western camp, following
- the speech of Chancellor Schmidt at the Institute of Strategic Studies in London
or.. 23 October 1977. The latter viewed the parity provided for by the SALT II agree-
ments as involving a form of reciprocal neutralization by the two great powers at
the strategic level, affecting everything which did not put their own survival in
question. He drew attention to the growing danger which, correspondingly, the
imbalance in theater-level weapons constituted, b.he more so as the Soviets were i.n
the course of deploying weapons of. a new type, the SS-20 missile and the Backfire
bomber.
It was with the objective of limiting the deployment of these new weapons L-hat NATO
studied an action program composed of two stages closely dependent on each other.
The first stage consisted in strengtl~ening and modernizing the middle range
arsenal of NATO, and the second stage was to use this modernization decision to
encour,:ge the Soviets to negotiate seriotisly the limitation of their own weapons
at the theater level. This negoti.ation had initially been conceived by the
Federal Republic of Germany as pertaining to theater-level weapons. Iiowever, this
- idea was rapidly abandoned in favor of an overall approach, fitting hetter into the
extension of the SALT conversations and avoiding making it appear that this was
like a search for a balance at the European strategic level,
-~Tf~e 160 or so fighter-bombers of the F-111 type based in Great Britain and the
aircraft embarked on ships of the Sixth Fleet.
22
~ FOR OFFICIAL LlSE ONL~'
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400064039-9
- NOR OFFICIAI. USE ONI.ti'
- Ln the mind oF the NATO lead~rs ~r~~..s r.eta phase ot- negotiations therefore was to re-
~ main strictly limited to the nuc?.e2r w+eapons of the United States and the Soviet
Union, and for this reason could only be conducted in a bilateral framework. How-
ever, the range of the negotiations was to be broadened, so that it would also
c.over theater-level weapons, or at least ~n thz initial phase the most destabilizing
_ weapons among them. The objective would b e to end with a strategic balance more
stable due to its being broader, covering all its extensions at the theater level.
_ ihus, it would be a matter of acting in s uch a way that neither of the tw~ super-
powers could subsequently benefit from any kind of advantage, either at the geo-
graphic level or at an intermediate level of escalation, which would allow it to
place in question the averall balance. This way of pre.senting thinvs made it
- possible to avoid the problem of the specific balance of the European theater. That
was an important point. In effect NATO denied seeking such a balance f~r itself,
because this would come down to ~-ecognizing the weakening of the American strategic
guarantee and the need to find a substitute for it in order to ensure the security
of 6destern Europe. However, as the negotiation was to give priority to theater-
level, medium-range weapons considered the most destabilizing, it appeared inevit-
able thlt the limitations of which they would be the object would take the form of
a~uropean sub-ceiling, with all the cons equences which the beginning of a European
strategic batance would thus see appear.
!1lthough this concerned a bilateral negotiation, the member countries of NATO con-
sidered that they should be indi.rectly associated with it, since finally it is
their own s~curity wtiich is involsed. As a consequence they created a consulta--
tive structure which should perr.iit them to define the principles on wh~ch tt~e
conduct of the negotiation will b.e oriented and to follow the course of the con-
versations. Thi:s they consider that they will be able to present a united front
and strengthen the American hand regarsing the Soviets.
The Soviet View of the Negotiation
Ttie ~measiness shown in Western Europe an d the proposal to open new negotiations
were all the better perceived in Pioscow as they were accompanied by a program for
the modernization of theater-level weapons which irritated the Soviets. The res-
- ponse given by Chairman Brezhnev in his speech in Berlin on 6 October 1979 indi-
,
cated taat, The Soviet Union is ready to reduce in terms of its present level the
number of inedium range nuclear weapon launchers stationed in the Western regions
oF the USSR, but only on condition that no further medium range nucl~ar weapon
launchers are stationed in Western Europe."
In t}ie mind of the ~oviets, it could not only be a matter of a freeze of NATO wea-
pons but also must include the French and British strategic forces. Moreover,
_ the communique of the Tdarsaw Pact coiuztr ies published on 6 December 1979 clearly
called on the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance to participate in a
European strategic confe~ence on the limitation of theater-level ~~aeapons. Further,
in his speech on 6 October, r~rezhnev refuted the accusations made by NATO, according
to which the USSR was seeking to achieve superiority in Europe. As proof that its
strategy, on the contrary, was deLensive, he stated that over the previous 10 years
rhe number of inedium range missiles, the n~ber of aircraft, and the total power
of the throw-weight had been somewhat reduced.
23
FOR OFFICIAL USF. OtiL~'
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400064439-9
- FOR ONFIC7A1. USE ONI.ti'
In fact the Soviet Union considers--and that comes out in the statements made
- later by Foreign Minister Gromyko and Marshal Ustinov--that a balance already ex-
ists in Europe, if one takes into account the French and British forces, and which
wae ir~plicitly recognized by the SALT II agreements. That is why the Soviet
Union condemns the program for modernization of DTATO weapons as constituting a
resumption of the armaments race and a reflection of the new aggressive attitude
- of the Americans. According to the Soviet Union the Americans were reportedly
~ seeking to overturn the strategic situation in Europe in favor of NATO nad at the
same time, "to bring near the frontiers of the USSR new medium range Fystems in-
tended to f ulfill strategic tasks," which in reality would constitute by-passing
the SALT II agreements. The NATO countries were also accused of "transforming
Europe into a launching ramp for American strategic weapons aimed at the territory
of the USSR," and they were threatened with the counter-blow of Soviet reactions
if they persisted with ~their intentions.
_ The warning is clear: if the negotiation can be undertaken, it can only be on the
_ basis of the present situation, but not on the basis of the position of strength
which 21AT0 is seeking to acquire as a preliminary.
After the I~odernization Decision of 12 December 1979
However, NATO found itself obliged to ignore the Soviet warning and to show its de-
termination by giving concrete form to its proposals, lacking which it would have
_ lost not only its credibility but also the means to exert pressure on the USSR
and the a dvantages which it needed in order to hope to r.egotiate with success. The
clecision reached on 12 December 1979 in Brussels to undertake a program for the
deployment in Europe of 108 Persliing II rockets and of 464 cruise missiles was
certainly essential to preserve the credibility of NATO. However, it no l:ess
allowed the lack of determination of several of its members to appear. In response
the Soviet reaction was rather brutal, since it consisted in pointing~out to NATO
that, by its attitude, it had destroyed the bases for a negotiation ~ut that the
n egotiat ion cou13 be considered again if the modernization decision was put off
or at lea st its application were deferred.
However, at first certain European countries continued to hope that the Soviet
Union would reconsider such a determined position and that it would end by over-
tures making it possible to begin discussions. However, a second obstacle emerged
with the intervention of the Red Army in Afghanistan, which profoundly upset
the conditions for an East-West dialogue, The hardening American position, which
- led to deferring ratification of the SALT II agreements, reflected a profound dis-
enchantment with the policy of detente and the process of arms control. The
European countries, once their first reaction of protest was over, now sought
rather to preserve what could be saved of detente in Europe, but their wish to
fill in�the gap which separated the Russians and the Americans was not enough to
lead the latter to take up again the theme of negotiations where they had been
- halted aud on t'ne same bases.
The situation seems to have begun to thaw, at least on the side of the Soviet Union
since th~ recent trip of Chancellor Schmidt to Moscow. Brezhnev in effect proposed,
witl~out waiting for the ratification of the SALT II agreements, immediately begin-
_ ning negotiations between the Americans and the Soviets on medium range weapons.
24
FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R044400060039-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLti'
The specific contents of this offer of negotiations are not yet very clea.r, ':.~ut we
can ask ourselvES wliat are the basic motives which led the Soviets to so noticeab?e
- a change in c._rection. Perhaps they intended to make trouble in the Western camp
by strengthening the position of those who would like to give priority to negotia-
tions on the modernization of theater-level weapons and thus to raise indirectily
once more the decision of 12 December 1979? Perhaps this was also a maneuver
aimed at separating the negotiation on theater-level weapons from the SALT process
and thus strengthening the perception of no linkage with the American central sys-
tems.
Why France Will Not Participate in the SALT III Negotiation
France has adopted an attitude of attentive reserve regarding the process of de-
velopment of the SALT III talks. France has no intention, and the president has
clearly stated this, of participating in any way in this new negotiation, It is
- not so much because France does not feel itself concerned by the arrangements
which would be reached in the negotiation but rather because~the objectives which
will be sought there are rather far removed from French ob~ectives and because
France risks losing in part its independence and freedom of action~,which are
indispensable to its security.
A Language Which Is Not Ours
i
The SALT negotiations were originally considered to be an instrument making it '
possible to transfer the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet
- Union to a plane where this confrontation would give place to the not~on of de-
- tente or of peac,eful coexistence, with the possibiliCy of establishing Soviet-
AmFrican relations on quasi-contra~tual bases.
The two superpowers were preoccupied by the rivalry which opposed them and.wtiich
~nvolved, if not the triumph of one or the other, at least the preservation of
- their respective prestige in terms of the rest of the world. They therefore sought
to reach agreement on rules of good conduct, based on the respect fQr their respon-
sibilities as superpowers, which would permit both of them to preserve their status
and their interests, while limiting the effort necessary to reach that goal.
Thi_s logic of the strong speaking to the strong, included in their respective
strategies, remained the key thread in their negotiations in SALT I~.and then SALT
II. They did not see, therefore, why this kind of logic would not be applied as
- well in the future negotiations in SALT III. Now France, whose strategy of the
weak country acting against the strong one and whose dispos~~i:,r. ~�1^3~^Q Qtrictl,y
defensive, could not participate in SALT III without speaking a totally different
language. It is doubtful that this language would have the slightest chance of
being heard, since our country would only amount to a negligible quantity in what
would be a game between the United States and the Soviet Union.
France has no interest in getting involved in a dialo~ue which has been established
� to satisfy the interests of the two great powers f irst. If it did take part, it
would have to accept rules of the game not in its interest. It could only tna.ke
the most of it by serving as a guarantor of an effort which would be beyond its
reach.
25
FOR OFF(C[AL USF. ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9
NOR OFFICIAL US~ ONLti'
Arms Control and Not Disarmament
_ The SALT negotiations have had the single result up to the present of slowing down
the qualitative and quantitative competition between the United States and the
5oviet Union and perhaps to make the future less uncertain for them. Howeve~, the
SALT negotiations have certainly not made it possible to begin true nuclear dis-
armament; quite the contrary. In effect the reduction of about 250 strategic
weapons delivery systems which, according to the terms of the SALT II agreement,
the Soviet Union would have to agree to before 1 January 1931 cannot mask the
fact that the Soviets, while strictly respecting the terms of the agreement, could,
between now and 1985, easily increase the numb er of its nuclear warheads by nea.rly
50 percent. An3 it is necessary to emphasize that the number of nuclear warheads
is probably the most representative criterion of their overall nuclear potential.
Although in a lesser proportion, the same is true for the United States, and we
can take it for granted, considering the alarmist reactions which have been ex-
pressed on the other side of the Atlantic regarding the contents of the SALT II
- accords, that these possibilities will be broadly exploited.
The process of arms control can certainly list to its credit the normalization of
relations between the superpowers for a time. It has given us the hope of making
the future easier to foresee, but it has demonstrated its limits in connec~ion with
recent events which have made it clear that the Soviet Union never abandoned any
of its initial ambitions. Nevertheless, the parties involved in arms control be-
lieved that they could rely on the results obtained to consolidate the policy of
- nuclear non-proliferation. For its part the Soviet Union believes it has every
reason to invite the other nuclear powers to agree to limit their own forces. How-
ever, there is a fundamental difference between the act of establishing a ceiling
for nuclear for~:es at a largely super-abundant level, as is the case presently for
the two superpowers, and establishing a ceiling which is just barely suff icient,
as would be the case with the other nuclear powers.
The United States and the Soviet Union in reality have huge nuclear arsenals, all
out of proportion to their strict needs for security and which are 3ustif ied prin-
cipally by the need to meet the challenge of their adversary and to concede nothing
to him in terms of military power. For France, on the other hand, which carries out
a strategy of dissuasion of the weak power opposed to the strong power, there can
be no question of accepting the least limitation on its strategic armaments, once
the latter are exactly of the right dimensio~~s to ensure its security. Unlike the
two great powers, France does not have a surplus nuclear capability which is
negotiable. tJeither is any constraint acceptable for the future, as long as the
- threat which France must face continues to evolve and to put France under the obli-
, gation of improving its strategic forces to maintain their credibility.
Finally, France has no moral obligation to enter this negotiation, since its
nuclear potential represents a very sma11 percentage of the existing arsenals. On
the basis of this fact one cannot seriously pretend that the French nuclear
arsenal constitutes a threat of a destabilizing kind for any party.
26
FOR OFF[C[AL USE O~ILY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/42/09: CIA-RDP82-40854R040400060039-9
FOR OF FICIAL USE ONL.Y
Occupying a Seat: to Do Wtiat?
It is certain that France will be under pressure, particularly from the Soviet
Union, to participate in these discussions, or that in its absence its nuclear
forces will be indirectly taken into account in the calculation of the ceilings
recognized for the two parties. In these conditions some people think that it
would be in France's interest to come to the conference table, b ecause there is
no better way for France to be able to defend its interests appropriately.
That is not a very realistie way of looking at the situa.tion because, if we act
in this way, our first demand should be to have a ceiling for nuclear weapons
recognized for us which would be sufficiently large, compared to our present
arsenal, to preserve the possibility of carrying out our future programs. Can one
reasonably llope that t'~e Soviets would agree to this demand, when at the same time
they would be under p�ressure to agree to reductions of their medium range weapons?
And even if these Soviet reductions were accompanied by an equivalent reduction
of Ar.ierican weapons, the Soviet Union could not agree that the other European
powers would keep full latitude to increase their own potential, the more so
since France and Great Britain, as members of the Atlantic Alliance, should
naturally, in the view of the Soviet Union, have their forces added to those of the
United States. The Soviet conception of security requtres it to have forces
capable of guaranteeing it against a potential coalition of all of the countries not
belonging to the socialist camp. The Soviet Union does not seem ready to accept
- constraints which do not satisfy this need.
The quantitative freeze of all medium range, theater-level weap~ns, of such nature
as to maintain *_his situation, seems to be the first objective which the Soviets
have set out for themselves before beginning the reduction phase. That point comes
out clearly in the Brezhnev statement of 6 October 1979. However, s3~nce such a
freeze is completeiy unacceptable for France, as well as any r~ther form of con-
cession, moreover, it would appear to be totally sterile to take part in a
negotiation where we could only present demands to the other parties wi:thout being
able to concede anything in exchange,
i
Search for an Impossible Balance
Although its advocates deny it, the SALT III negotiation could only dri~t prog.res-
- sively toward the search for a balance that would specifically;apply to the European
theater and which would be juxtaposed alongside a new parity for the central
Ameri.can and Soviet systems.
We can remain skeptical regarding the prospects of ending witn a satisfactory re-
sult for at least three reasons:
--tlie first arises from the very great variety of weapons now on hand. One could
not limit oneself to taking into account only medium range weapons, without running
the risk of seeinb the question arise of eventual destabilization by means of
weapons with a shorter range. How would it be possible to determine the relative
importance of the different kinds of nuclear weapons and to take into account the
diversity of their missions?
27
FOR OFF(CIAL USE UNLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9
N'Olt OFF7C'IAL USE ONL,Y
--the second comes from the need to take into account the fact that France and
Great Britain constitute autonomous decision-making centere and that it will no
- doubt be difficult to set out the terms of a balance having four components.
--the third finally results from the fact that the effectiveness of nuclear weapons
does not relate so much to their intrinsiQ~~. characteristics as to the way in which
they are used. In this respect the asyunnetry of existing strategies will remain a
fundamental element of the imbalance. This is because the Soviet Union, which holds
to a resolutely offensive and pre-emptive doctrine, will always have, even with
= equal weapons, the possibility of acquiring an immediate advantage over its
adversary by taking the initiative.
Playing the Game of the Soviet Union
In the present political situation o.f Europe it is no doubt appropriate to seek to
negotiate security conditions proper to this theater, because this would mean
accepting the risk of making even clearer the asymmetry of the raspective strategic
postures.
In facing up to Soviet power, which is dominant and physically present in Europe,
most of the Western countries are totally dependent for bheir security on the
guarantees expressed by the United States, which belongs to another continent and
for whom the stakes will not have the same value as they do for the USSR, or even
- for the allies of the United States.
The Soviet Union, which has a greater belief in the balance of forces between na-
tion s bhan in the virtue of negotiations, nevertheless has understood how much
prof it it could obtain from the conduct of the SALT negotiations, in the sense of
projecting the image of a nation which is strong, resolute, and implacable in a
negotiation. The position which the Soviet Union has acquired today, and which re-
lates first to a formidable accumulation of military power, makes it possible for
it to exert pressure on the member countries of idATO to undertake the SALT III
~L~gotjaCion~ (ur neg,.,tiatzons on iUTG~:coA strategyj iu the se?_se wliic'r. b~t.n, most
in conformity with Soviet interests.
The Soviets will seek to reduce progres~ively the dominant influence of the United
States in Western Europe and to seize upon every opportunity making it possible to
weaken the American strategic guarantee. In this regard the prospect of this new
negotiation for the Soviet Union is all the more attractive as the particular
sensitivity of the European members of NATO will let the Soviet Union play upon
_ their divisions and vulnerabilities in order to begin a direct dialogue with them,
on the periphery of the dialogue begun with the United States.
For its part France has no reason to lend itself to such a process if it amounts
to facilitating the game of the Soviet Union and permitting it, in time, to re-
solve the security problem in Europe to its satisfaction.
If France shows so clearly its refusal to participate in the SALT III talks, that
does not mean that France refuses to make its contribution to the nuclear disarma-
ment effort, which appears necessary for world security, today more than ever.
28
FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102109: CIA-RDP82-00850R400404060039-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLI~'
However, it cannot be denied that the results achieved by the United States and
' the Soviet Union, in their effort to limit armaments, are quite i~isufficient for
France to feel bound to engage itself in turn on the course of negotiations which
might lead it to mortgage its security for the future, but without having the two
superpowers accept the same risk for tliemselves.
It is necessary to note that, after more than 10 years of negotiations, the arma-
ments race, which one hoped was at the point of slowing down, on the contrary seems
to be be~inning again on a spiral that is all the more dangerous as it escapes
, rational analysis. The balances of forces, as they are perceived, analyzed, and
dissected tod.ay, too often reduce to an abstraction the destructive power of the
- nuclear weapon and the considerable capacities accumulated on both sides which
guarantee to each a largely superfluous capacity to destroy the enemy under a11 cir-
cumstances, even after having suffered a first, pre-emptive strike. The reason-
ing built around artificial scenarios makes it possible to justify the need to in-
crease certain aspects of strategic capability by the deployment of new systems of
weapons. However, these reduce to an abstraction, in mast cases, the marginal
character, even the unrealistic character, of the gains so achieved when one
reasons in strict teztns of military capab ility.
The reality is that the formidable nuclear potential which the United States and
the USSR. have makes any under~aking which could lead them to the edge of a direct
conf rontation extremely perilous and probably unacceptable. When one begins with ~i
the level of power achieved which is already huge, the question is no longer to '
know which of the two countries is superior to the other. The true question 3:s to
know which of the two will know how to exploit its military power more effectively
in the political. arena. It is there that the true imbalance is found. For the Soviet
Soviet Union, firmly led by an undivided government, can concentrate all its forces
in the service of a prudent but determined strategy and exploit without hesitation
every opportunity offered to it. t4eanwhile, it only has facing it a divided West,
whose leadership is no longer assured of a firm hand from the United States, which
is entanglPd in its doubts and contradictions.
The SALT negotiations perhaps are not responsible for this situation, although they
have contributed to maintaining the illusion that it was possible to bring the
Soviet Union to conform to the model of moderation proposed by the Americans. The
disillusionment resulting from the discovery of the reality of the Soviet Union
and the psychosis which pushes the West to seek its security in a new armament
effort no doubt are not a consequence of the policy of "arms control." Nonethe-
~ less, the fact remains that "arms control" has been found to be incapable of halt-
ing the pernicious process which leads to a reverse effect of what it sought, that
is, ttie resumption of an arms effort in place of disarmament.
The reality is that the confrontation which sets the United States and the Soviet
Union against each other, despite the appearances of peaceful coexistence, remains,
at least in the mind of the Soviets, a test of strength. In the Soviet view nego-
tiation for them is only a means of revealing the evolution of the balance of forces
to their advantage.
In such a scenario, where humanitarian preoccupations seem to be quite absent, one
can cloubt that the operiing of a new phase of negotiations, called SALT III, in the
29
FOR OFFiCIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9
FOR OFFICIAL l1SE ONLY
present circumstances, can provide a sigr.ificant contribution to the cause of dis-
armament. Moreove:, the parties to the negotiation are thinking first of all of
strengtltening their positions--the Russians, by the deployment af the SS-20 and the
BaCkfire bomber, and the Americans, by the deployment of long range, theater-
level weapons--before sitting dawn at the negotiating table.
For things to go differently, pressure from the international community would have
to be sufficiently strong and coherent to force the two great powers to go beyond
the rivalry which opposes each to the other and un derstand that their status as
great powers could suffer from general candemnation and the rejection of their
influence over part of the world. However, that is a totally different perspective
whose basic assumptions have not yet been established.
_ COPYRIG~:T: Ifri, 1980
5170
CSO: 3100/977
- 30
FOR O~FICIAL l1SE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R400404060039-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
- POLITICAL SPAIN
CALVO-SOTELO, SUAREZ BID FOR CONTROL UNDERMINING UCD'S CHA1dCES
Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 14 Sep 81 pp 28, 29, 31
[Article by Antxon Sarasqueta]
[Text] Most of the question marks surrounding the tensions that are jolting
the UCD [Democratic Center Union] and conditioning the course of the Calvo-
Sotelo administration have to do with the disagreement between the head of
ttie Executive Branch and his predecessor, ruling party atrongman Adolfo
Suarez.
' The increasingly hard-line stand by Suarez and his men in recent weeks comes
at a time when a government crisis is anticipated because of the incorporation
of independents, hastened by the resignation of Justice Minister Francisco
Fernandez Ordonez.
This magazine has heard prominent Suarez backers contend that forming a
splinter group or breaking up the party would be preferable to having the
government lead the party towards positions that are far removed from what
they regard as "their" UCD. These men accuse Calvo-Sotelo of directing a
move to the right in UCD policy.
Suarez and his men are not ready to give up the organization franchiae and
the green-flame "donuts" symbolizing the party, even though it might mPan
splitting or breaking up the UCD. This is their heavy wager.
Suarez continues to control most of the party through its leadership bcdies
and, therefore, holds the key ~o drawing up the electoral lists.
The fact that Suarez, at one of the UCD leaderahip's recent meetings,
suggested the formation of an election committee (as the party's bylaws
stipulate) consisting almost entirely of his confidants, gives us an idea of
the position of strength that the former president holds.
The committee will consist of five persons. In accordance with Suarez's offer,
they would be the president and secretary general of the ruling party plus
three others selected by the Executive Committee.
31
F(1R ~FFrrrAT, TTSF (1NT,Y
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-44850R000400060039-9
FOK ~FFICIAI. USE ONLY
This form~la would make it practically impossible for Calvo-Sotelo to appear
on the electoral lists or would bind him hand and foot as prime minister to
the int~rests of the Suarez faction, which comes down to the same thing.
In this contPxt, the possibility of leading independent figures joining the
new government (such as Antonio Ga:riguez Walker), the authorization of
private television and membership in NATO are government projects that clearly
bear the stamp of Calvo-Sotelo and have highlighted Suarez's opposition to the
prime minisLer's policies.
Here is where the Executive Committee, under the influence of the Suarez
people, is doing some tough ideological screening of the government projects
that Calvo-Sotelo has submitted. This ha~ conditioned the administration's
efforts, to th~ point that it has takcn a step backwards in authorizing
private television.
As Suarez continues to pressure Calvo-Sotelo, men such as former ministers
Rafael A:ias and Fernando Abril are the ones who are t:~king the hard-line
sta:ids beside the former prime minister, even more hard-line than thoae
Suarez himself has voiced, as one of the miniaters on the Calvo-Sotelo team j
admitted to CAMBIO 16.
Thece atta~ks and pressures on Calvo-Sotelo contrast with the support that
the prime minister is receiving from other party factions, which, however, ,
are poorly represented in the UCD's decision-making bodies and in the economic
and financial spheres.
Calvo-Sotelo is the only UCD figure today whom financial groups are willing to
back with the 4 billion pesetas that the party needs to run in the upcoming
general elections with a chance of winning.
In these economic and financial circles Calvo-Sotelo enjoys a high standing,
whicti has been enhanced in recent monthe by hia performance as prime minieter.
To judge by opiniai. polls, the public also has a poaitive opinion of him
so far. ~
~
In pursuing his strategy of "modernizing" the UCD by making it a party of
representative f~ctions and bringing in prestigious figures who are now
labeled independents (a sort of secret coalition), the prime minister has
the backing of Christian Democrata and Liberals within the party.
Nevertheless, the key man when the time comes to tip the scale in Suarez's
or Calvo-Sotelo's favor could be the current minister of territorial
administration, Rodolfo Martin Villa.
Martin Villa is Suarez's stabilizer in controlling the party's nationwide
structure and he exerts great influence over wideranging sectors of the
administration, both because of his track record and the team with which he
surrounds himself.
32
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102109: CIA-RDP82-00850R400404060039-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
This means that Martin Villa could be a decisive man in the government for
Cavlo-Sotelo, although the fact is that at present he is not one of his
closest confidants.
When Fernandez Ordonez's resignation triggered a crisis, the prime minister
consulted only with miniaters Pio Cabanillas and Jose Pedro Perez-Llorca in
- his office, and this gave rise to miatrust and bad feelings in the minister
of territorial administration, who reacted by moving towards Suarez again.
After a period o� confrontation with Suarez during the UCD provincial
el`ctions bef~re the summer vacation, Martin Villa once again hooked up with
his former prime minister last week.
Ttie two UCD leaders met for lunch in the minister's office and analyzed
the party's situation for 3 hours. In the context of the current UCD in-
fighting, this should be interpreted as a warning to Calvo-Sotelo from the
minister of the autonomies.
How~ver, Martin Villa, along with the Christian Democrats and without the
opposition of Social Democrat Fernandez OrdonEZ, supports one of the moves
in Calvo-Sotelo's strategy: bcinging independents into the next administration.
In spite of Calvo-Sotelo's denial that a ministerial crisis is in the offing,
a maneuver designed to dampen tensions in light of upcoming parliamentary
- debate on crucial issues for the administration such as the "colza case" and
- NATO, government sources close to the prime minister agree that there will
be one shortly, probably after the Galician regional elections on 20 October.
Independents in Government
As far as cabinPt changes are concerned (the replacement of Jesus Sancho Rof
as minister of labor, health and social security is considered a sure thing,
as well as some other minister implicated in the "colza case"), there is
still an emphasis on bringing in well-known independents, in spite of the
opposition of the Suarez people as announced by Fernando Abril.
Sources close to Calvo-Sotelo and that can exert major influence in the
negotiations under way at the top echelon of the ruling party, admitted to
~ CAMBIO 16 that the prime minister still intende to do this.
The makeup of che new cabinet will be the most visible indication of what
kind of maneuvering ability the prime minister has within the UCD and how he
is going to utilize the leverage of power to push forward with his goals and
bolster his own position.
One of the steps that the prime minister has to take to feel more secure is
to bring in prestigious independents who support his political programs and
his plans far the party.
The only way that he can do this by having more of a say in determining
_ the election lists than he has under the current circumstances in UCD leadership
bodies, which are mostly controlled by Adolfo Suarez.
33
FOR OFFTCIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
With general elections looming in 1982, the time factor is another handicap
for Calvo-Sotelo. Until the 23 February coup trials begin (they are
scheduled for March or April of next year), the very shakiness of our
democracy will serve to restrain not only the opposition but also any move
within the UCD itself that might jeopardize the continuity of the
government.
Tt~e most widely held view is that from that point on and after an extremely
delicate period, both the opposition and ruling party factions are going to
take more radical tacks, which would make an agreement on the future of the
UCD even more difficult.
The panorama facing the prime minister is obviously quite difficult: there
is internal party opposition to him (ia spite of all the conciliatory
documents that are made public), and opposition party preasure will mount
as Parliament opens.
A resolution of this tense situation of confrontation that has triggered a
- UCD crisis and that transcends the ruling party in its impact obviously
- hinges on a Calvo-Sotelo-Suarez pact. The prime minister's strategy at
present is to reverse the balance of power between him and Suarez so that
he does not have to continue bargaining from a position of weakness.
- If such agreements are not hammered out, other possibilities might come into
play across the country's political spectrum. In point of fact, the ruling
party would begin breaking up just a few months before the general elections,
which would certainly enhance the Socialist Party's chances of gaining power.
- COPYRIGHT: 1981, Informacion y Revistas, S.A.
8743
CSO: 3110/12
34
. ,
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R400404060039-9
FOR aF(F~CIAL USE ONL.ti'
MILI'1'ARY FRANCE
AS15TT ANTISHIP MISSILE TEST-FIRED FIRST TIME
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French S Sep 81 p 49
[Article: "First Test Flight of AS15TT Missile"]
[Text] Aerospatiale has just released a photograph of the new light AS15TT antiship
missile's first test flight made in late June at the Mediterranean Test Center (CEM)
. on the Ile du Levant. This first test firing of the complete missile verified the
weapon's performance in both range and speed, and tested its roll cuntrol and
_ low-altitude altimeter guidance systems. The sea-skimming missile was fired from
a fixed launcher installed on the coast of the Ile du Levant. Aerospatiale reported
that the missile successfully completed this trial flight.
At the same time, the Agrion 15 maritime search and target-tracking radar, developed
by Thomson-CSF for the AS15TT weapon system, was undergoing tests at the Gavres
test range near Lorient in Brittany where the high level of shipping activity
facilitates such testing. It will be recalled that the light AS15TT antiship
- missile is bei.ng developed, with Aerospatiale's Tactical Missiles Division functioning
as prime contractor, as part of the "Sawari" contract awarded France by Saudi Arabia
_ last year. This contract calls for the acquisition of frigates equipped with
Aerospatiale Dauphin helicopters armed with AS15TT missi7.es, in addition ta the
naval version of Thomson-CSF's Crotale surface-to-air missile and Matra's Otomat
antiship m~ssiles. Saudi Arabia is the first purchaser of the new AS15TT weapon
system to be delivered besinning in 1984.
~ COPYRIGHT: A. & C. 1981
8041
CSO: 3100/2
35
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102109: CIA-RDP82-00850R400404060039-9
N'i)R nFFI('IA1. U~H: ON1.1'
MILITARY FRANCE
BRIEFS
ILLEGAL SOLDIERS' COMMITTEES--A navy conscript, Patrick Le Trehor~dat, will hence-
- forth carry out the duties of secretary-general of the IDS [Information on Soldiers'
Rights]. Allied with the CFDT [French Democratic Confederati^n of T.,abar], the FEN
[National Education Federation] and Socialist Youth movements, the IDS is said to
have formed 25 clandestine "soldiers' committees" within the French military forces.
The secretary-general [Le Trehondat) has made himself known as such without incurring
_ any sanctions in spite of [Minister of Defense~ Charles Hernu's statements against
such illegal '~committees." [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 5 Oct 81
p 26 ] [COPYRIGEIT: 1981 "~~aleurs actuelles" ]
CSO: 3100/31
~
36
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY .
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLI~
GENERAL FRANCE
_ ~
= NATIONAL RESEARCH, TECHNOLOGY COLLOQUIUM ANNOUNCED
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French S Sep 81 p 17
[Arti;:? e by Pierre Langereux: "National Research Colloquium, 13-16 January 1982"]
[Text] The ma~or National Research and Technology Colloquium announced by
Jean-Pierre Chevenement, the new minist er of reszarch, will be held at the Palais
_ des Congres in Paris on 13-16 January 1982. This decision was made on 30 July at
ttie second meeting of the National Colloquium Organizing Committee chaired by
Prof Francois Gros, a member of the Institute of France. The colloquium's
executive secretariat will be headed by Mme Marie-Simone lletoeuf, the public relations
officer of the National Institute for Nuclear Physics and Particle Physics.
The minister had consulted beforehand with directors of those research centers an3
agencies for which he now has oversigh t authority and which include, inter alia:
the National Center for Scientific Rese arch (CNRS), National Center for
- Telecocmnunications Studies (CNET), Nat ional Center for Space Studies (CNES),
National Office for Aerospace Studies and Research (ONERA), Atomic Energy Commission
(CEA), and Solar Energy Commission (COMES).
The National Research and Technology Co lloquium will have the fallowing six items
on its agenda:
a. "Research, science, technology and society," in which research's cultural
contributions will be discussed;
b. "Research and technology: a choice and strategy for the future," which will
deal w ith the major balances betwee n research and key fields of activity;
c. "Expansion of research and technolo gy, a powerful factor in getting out of the
economic crisis," which will focus discussions onto the majot national and
international trends in industrial research and in extension of the public
sector;
ci. "Research and technology: men r~nd organizational structures," in which special
" emphas is will be placed on past results :~nd future prospects, as well as on the
regional dimension of. research;
37
_ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
e. "Science and decisiveness, partners in the making of choices," during which
~ nonscientists will speak and publicly debate the stakes involved in
scientific policy;
f. "Resources to be employed" within the purview of the next program law which the
Minister of Research will submit to the 1982 spring session of Parliament.
COPYRIGHT: A. & C. 1981
8041 END
CSO: 3100/2
= 38
_ FOR OFF'IC[AL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060039-9