JPRS ID: 9795 USSR REPORT PHYSICS AND MATHEMATICS INVESTIGATIONS OF THE GAS-PHASE CAVITY-TYPE NUCLEAR REACTOR

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/10057
19 October 1981
- Sub-Saharan Africa Re ort
p
FOUO No. 743
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JPRS L/10057
19 October 1981
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT
FOUO~No. 743
~ CONTENTS

' INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Cot Reaffirms France'3 'Privileged Relations' With Africa
(MARQiES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANBENS, 21 Aug 81) 1
ANGOLA
General Mobilization Against Washington, Pretoria Adwcated
(Editorial, Simon Malley; AP'RIQLIE-ASIE, 14 Sep 81) 4
Western Support Seen Increasing in Southern Africa Events
(Editorial;, Simon Malley; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 28 Sep t~l) 6
U.S. Accused of Wishing To Revive FNL~4
(AFRIQUE-ASIE, 28 Sep 81) 9
South. African-Captured Materiel Reportedly Goes to IINITA
(AFRIQUE-ASIE, 28 Sep 81) 10
CAPE VERDE
Agr~nian Reform Campaign MarYed by T.nciden~s
(AFRIQUE-ASIE, 14 Sep 81) 12
Briefs
Political In cidents in Netherlands 13
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
French Government Said To Be Facing Difficult Postcoup Situation
_ (MARCHES TR~PICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 4 Sep 81) 14
General Kolingba Said To Be Pro-American
(Francois Soudan; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 9 Sep 81) 17
- a- [III - NE & A- 120 FOUO)
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Briefa
Military Promotions 1~
French Military Materiel i9
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
Government Reported To Have Failed To Restore Economy, Democracy
(Claude Wauthier; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 9 Sep 81) 20
GABON
Drillings Near Mayoumba, Lopez Reveal 0{1
(MARQiES TROPICAUX ET MEDI~RRANEENS, 4 Sep 81) . . . . . . . . . . 23
Briefs
Bongo's Reported nenial 24
QiAN~:
Briefs
Cultural Agreement With USSR Urged 25
Delegation to DPRK 25
PRC Threatens Witlidrawal 25
GUINEA
Nigerian Fishing, CLltural Cooperation, Mining Cooperation
(MARQiES TR(JPICAUX ET MEDIIERRANEENS, .4 Sep 81) . . 26
BriefS
Australian Diaiuond Participation 2~
GUINEA-BISSAU
Briefs
French Agricultural Aid 28
MOZAMBIQUE
Needs, Expansion of Beira Port Detailed
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET I~DITERRANEENS, 28 Aug 81) 29
- Briefs
Ntachel May Visit Paris 31
NIGER
Briefs
Uranium Sales Policy ~ 32 '
Japanese Uranium Exploration Agreement 32
- b -
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NIGER'iA
Briefs
- Petroleum Prices 33
New Oil Discoveries 33
UGAP'DA
Briefs
- DP Accuses Government 34
ZAI RE
Briefs
Canadian Refugee Aid 35
Mine Investments 35
ZAPMBIA
Next Few Months Seen as Critical for Leadership
(AFRIQUE-ASIE, 31 Aug-13 Sep 81) 36
Ethanol Project Seen as Energy Saving, Economically He3.pfu1
(AFRIQUE-ASIE, 31 Aug-13 Sep 81) 39
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Ff1R I1T~T~'T AT. TTSF (1NT,Y
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
COT REAFFIRMS FRANCE'S 'PRIVILEGID RELATIONS' W~TH AFRICA
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1867, 21 Aug 81, p 2141
[Text] France's interest in Africa has not ceased with the asc.endancy of the new
president of the Republic. His personal advisors and the ministers in charge of
foreign affairs for development and cooperation have stepped up their visits to
- Africa--Mr Claude Cheysson has gone to Maghreb, while A'Ir Jean-Pierre Cot has ~;isited
South Saharan Africa. Having juet returned from a 15-a:.; trip to Cameroon, Senegal
and Ghana, he is leaving again for Nigeria. For itF part, Paris has received the
heads of state from the Ivory Coast, Gabon, Niger, the Congo, the ~vice president of
Kenya, the prime ministers of " Zegal and the Central African Republic, as well as
the secretary-general of the u.-.~: [Organization of African Unity]. The new leaders ~
have had ~ust as many opportunities to establish or braoden their contacts with the
African leader:;, for whom p~rsonal relationships have always had a particular
importance, to become familiar with their records and, rrom their contacts with
concrete situations, to study the difficult path of reconciling the preservation
of principles with the dictates of reality.
Mr Jean-Pierre Cot's statements, and his replies at a press conference of 18 August,
as well as those of Mr Claude Cheysson on the respect France has for all the commit-
ments made by her previous governments, and her extremely clear position regarding
the Republic of South Africa and the Namibian problem, shed light on the great
choices that will inspire France's policy on Af.rica, and help dispel the anxieti~s
which may have been aroused by certain documents of the Socialist Party.
Above all, the primacy of Africa among France's preoccupations has been reaffirmed.
It will have a privileged plac~ in France's relations with the developing countries.
This includes all of Africa--the French-speaking, of course, but also the English-
speaking and the Portuguese-speaking. Mr Jean-Pierre Cot stated that he was
impressed by the aspirations he observed among his interlocutors in Ghana, even
more so than among the FYanch-spe2,king Africans, toward a common des~iny, making
- them so sensitive to everything cox;cerning Namibia's independence and the fate of
their black brothers in South Africa, and which led them in Lagos to set the ground-
work for an economic community from a self-contained and i.nternal development whose
- f irst prinrity was agriculture. Ghana, the country of Nkrumah, was the first
non-French-speaking African state to receive the French minister for cooperation
and development--a symbolic and significant choice. It was to affirm this recog-
n~tion of Africa's aspirations toward unity t~iat Mr Jean-Pierre Cot recalled that
' for each of his visits to a French-speaking Afxican state, he intended to go to an
English-speaking or Yortuguese-speaking state, and that France will not only clearly
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respect the decisions of the African governments, but will actively support, by
every means possible, the solutions adopted by the organizations which unit them,
especially the OAii. In the more limited area of f inancial aid, France's tradi-
tional friends can rest assured. France will continue to concentrate her efforts
on them for, as Mr Jean-Pierre Cot stated on a realistic note, before he left
Dakar for Paris, "she does not have the means of assuring political and meaningful
aid to all of Africa."
Finally, France has traditionally maintained government-to-government relations,
no matter what type of political regime either may have. This principle will be
upheld, and display a preference for a socialist or c3pitalist system of social
organization will entail neither privilege nor rejection on the part of France.
The onl.y ones to find themselves isolated would be those governments that do not
assure the basic human rights to their citizems. Their conduct will be judged on
the basis of criteria that are presently being thought out.
Facing immediate pro~lems, especially in Chad and the Central African Republic,
the new government is defining its position in light of those principles. In Chad,
where Mr Campredon was sent to make contact with Chadian leaders, all factions,
with the exception of Mr Hissene Habre's, showed a willingnzss to maintain their
country's territorial integrity, to restore the national army, and to regain their
sovereignty. A mission of French experts recently travelled to Nadjamena to eval-
uate methods for re-establishing acceptable living conditions by restoring water,
electricity, and communications systems, etc. France's primary ob~ective is t9
restore Chad's capital, and she is ready to ake part in that by permitting its
residents who fled during the battles to come back there and settle again. In line
with this, France is pursuing diplomatic actious aimed at facilitating the applica-
tion of t~-ie OAU and Lagos resolutions and reconciling the conditions which would
allow t'r.~ Chadian authorities later on to demand the repatriation of the Libyan
troops. On the other hand, if the resumption of French aid may be studied, it
~till appears untimely today for the French government to consider s~nding an
ambassador to Nadjamena and be completely excluded from participating in one way
or another in the restoration and training of a new Chadian army.
In the Central African Republic, the situation remains uncertain. The appeasement.
tactics taken recently by President Dacko in lifting the ban on certain opposition
parties seem reasonable. rhe French government is continuing to carry out the
cooperation agreements, including that of military cooperation, uniting it witil the
Central African Republic, as it does with all the other African states which have
signed similar agreements with France. Theae, moreover, are not'ning other than the
legal framework within which French cooperation is expressed, in such a way that,
if something must be changed, it will not be the framework but the spirit in which
the coeperation was conceived. Despite certain statements mude at Bangui by the
Central African head of state, after the prime minister's recent off icial visit to
Paris, he did not ask that cooperation agreements with France be revised. Just
' lately, the minister for cooperation only re~eived a requesz to modify some of
the clauses governing military cooperation, but not concerning the matter of
French troop presence in Central Africa.
- In Senegal,France showed her traditional solidarity by grantizg emergency aid which
was justified by its difficul~ economic situation. A group of French experts,
::nder the director for development of the Ministry of Cooperation, is presently
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working with the Senegalese authorities, and in cooperation with a mission of the
IMF [International Monetary FundJ to def ine the country's needs and the possible
mear_s for aiding the success of the courageous plan of reparation begun by the Dakar
government. This would be a type of valuable assistance for F'rance's African
partners in preparing their records for submissian to international institutions
such as the 71~IF.
Thus, on his first trip to Africa, the new minister for cooperation and devel~pment
could ascertain the difficulty, as he himself put it, "of pas~ing from rhetoric
to politics," and of comprehending the true dimension of Africa's problems: the
legitimate desire for true independence and, at the same time, the need for foreign
aid in resolving the more immediate problems of everyday life for as long as the
- complex problems surrounding the establishment of a new economic order, sought by
the developing countries, have not been satisfactorily solved. Africa in particu-
lar expects France to explain its requests to the industrialized countries. The
minister for cooperation and development knows how to respond to the hope of
Africa and the Third World and to give France "the ambition, within the framework
af Euro-African cooperation, to be the dynamic and animating force for the European
side."
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris 198L
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ANGOLA
GENERAL M~BILIZATION AGAINST WASHINGrON, PRETORIA ADVOCATED
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 248, 14 Sep 81 pp 8-9
[Editorial by Simon Malley: "Angola: Aggression Should Be Stopped!"]
[Excerpts) South Africa's strategy in opposing the genuine independence o~
Namibia, in launching its fascist hordes and puppet mercenaries of the UN~TA
against Angolan national territory, in violating its sovereignty, i~ causing
death and destruction, could not be any clearer. First of all, public apinion
should be conditioned to come to believe that it is on the verge of f~cing
- a military confrontation with Cuba and the Soviet Union, that the latter has
already drawn up the plans aimed at conquering the entire region of Sc~uthern
Africa--including South Africa itself--and that the only way to save Wes~tern
civilization, which it claims to represent on the African continent, is to be
given a free hand and to be granted carte blanche to strike wherever it wishes,
attack whomever it wants, invade wherever it deems it necessary. And even if
the quasi-unanimity of the UN members were not taken in and condemned it, as was
recently proved by th e debates of the Security Council and the General ;Assembly,
is not the support granted South Africa by the Reagan administration sufficient
proof? Has not this administration saved it from the danger im~i{.cit in the
council's resolution vetoed by the United States?
But this is not all. Once these results have been ach3eved, isn't Pretoria
attempting to impose the second part of its strategy? In other words, isn't it
artempting to create a k3nd of Lebanese situation in the southern part of Angola,
with Jonas Savimbi playing the role of the Christian militias and South Africa
that of Israel? By creating a buffer zone in that area, the racist Pretoria
regime could install there the puppet Savimbi, who would then appeal fo'r th.e
recognition and support of the imperialist powers and t'heir allies. Washington
and Pretoria would thus repeat with Angola and Savimbi the Moise Tshombe 3n
Katanga, and the Ojukwu in Biafra, experience, two disastrous events, the
consequences of which are still--unfortunately--felt by Africar. people, and
especially the Zairians and Nigerians. Do the apprent3ce sorcerers of Pretoria
and Washington have such short memories? Have they forgotten so quickly the
extent of the repercussions of these tragedfes, the indignation and anger
_ pervading African opinion at the time these colonial adventures were launched in
- the sixties, advtntures that were neverthelea~s defeated, but not without the loss
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of thousands of innocer_t victims? Will the African peoples continue to tolerate
that their continent remain a field for imperialist and racist experimentation,
for experiments of domination and exploiCation?
This challenge by Washington and Pretoria must be picked up. It would be crirninal
to let it go unanswered. Otherwise, who could prevent Pretoria's racists from
being used tomorrow by U.S. policy makers in order to claim that other countries
such as Mozambique, Tanzania, Zamb ia, Nigeria, the Congo--and many others--must
. be the target of their aggression because their regimes are threatening the
security of Southern Africa, of which they consid~er themselves the principal
policeman? Thanks to its nuclear weapons--negotiated, moreover, during the talks
in Washington between Secretary of State Alexander Haig and Pik Botha--will not
Pretoria be assigned the mission of bringing "recalcitrant" African regimes
into 1 ine, in the name of the United States?
Already, thanks to the Angolan president's appeal, thanks to the Se~urity Coimcil's
meetings, to the debates of the General AssQmbly, to the honest reports of numerous
neutral Western diplomats and observers, the psychological war launched by Pretoria
did not succeed. Following many days of hesitat3on and circumspection in regard
to Luanda's affirmations, international public opinion sided with the victims of
South Afric.an aggression.
- If the Western press itseuf believes that a break between Washington and Africa
is inevitable, if Pretoria's schmnes would come to b e applied, why and how could
African peoples resign themselves to and remain passive ~?is-a-vis this monstrous
conspiracy which is taking shape in Southern Africa? To cross one's arms, to
limit oneself to the UN, OAU or other interventions in the international arena
while crimes are being perpetrated, while the freedom and independence of African
people~ acquired at such great cost are flouted, while new Katangas and Biafras
are in the process of developing, would be to insult the conscience of each
African, the dignity of each patriot, the honor of each militant. If the Security
Council was proved powerless, in the face of the U.S. veto, to take forceful action
against South Africa, the UN charter and a number of resolutions voted during the
fifties and sixties (notably the one called "iJnited for Peace") confer tfl the
Gen eral Assembly the right to step in when the council is blocked by a veto and
invoke ChaptPr VII (referrj.ng to sancti.ons) against any aggressor. ?,nd doesn't
Africa, the principal reservoir of the mineral resources vital to the West,
have the necessary means to halt the aggressor of the whole of Africa, the aggressor
and its principal instigator, Washington? And this Arab world, whose sacred cause
had mobilized African peoples when they decided to break off relations with Israel,
does it not feel a sense of duty vis-a-vis this~,violated, martyred Africa, the
victim--just like itself--of the hegemonic, imperialistic policy of the United
States and its privileged ally, Pretoria? Must one cite the names of those Arab
countries that are feeding the South African war machine through their oil and
their dollars?
For South African invas3on to stop forever, for the schemes aimed at balkanizing
th e countries of Southern Africa to be buried once and for ~11, collective action
by all those whc are targets of the danger represented by South African imperialism
is imperative, today more than ever before. At the United Nations, at the OAU,
at the non-aligned movement and in the socialist camg, a general mobilization must
be decree~ against Washington's, Pretoria's and their accomplices' economic and
strategic interests. The rest is nothing but idle talk....
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Afriqse-Asie 5
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AN~OIdA,
WESTERN SUPPORT SEEN INCREASING IN SOUTHERN AFRICA EVENTS
_ Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 249, 2iS Szp 81 pp 12-14
[Editorial by Simon Malley: "Pretoria-Washington Isolated"]
[Excerpts] It was in Lagos on 11 September. The Frontline Statea were meeting
for a summit conference under the chairmanship of the Nigerian ch3ef o+f. state,
Shehu Shagari, to review the situation created by the occupation of the p~ovince
of Cunene in the People's Republic of Angola and ado~t the mea~sures required to
respond to the challenge launched by the Pretoria-Washington axis against all of
Africa.
When President Sliagari asked, liow could th~ Frontline States' solidarity be trans-
lated into concrete decisions, President Samora Machel did not hesitate one
moment: Nothing could better convince the aggressors and the~ir U.S. accomplices
than the feeling that they are not only facing the Angolan people, but all of
Africa. Our fighters are ready to join their comrades in Angola if the Angolan
Government requests it. To be sure, there are other African countries, more
powerful and with more sophisticated means, which could play an important role
in supporting our Angolan comrades..."
- Actually, the participation--be it only symbolic--of the Afric~n forces on the
side of the FAPLA would no doubt have considerable impact on world public opinion,
even though it is obvious that what Angola needs the most is sophisticated ~
weaponry, of which Pretoria has an abundant supply thanks to the assistance of
the Western nations, notably the United States. These sophisticated weapons, as
well as the cadres able to use them, are available in a number of African countries,
be it Libya, Algeria, Nigeria, Ethiopia, etc. Why, then, shouldn't one resart to
them?
Have decisions been made on this subject? Will they be applied? Will they produce
positive results? If the decisions adopted have, naturally, remained a secret,
the hope felt by the Frontline States meeting ~.n Lagos is, nevertheless, great.
Isn't it, moreover, the reasoiz why the final resolution addressed a solemn appeal
to all the OAU members to provide assistance--eapecially military assistance--to
the People's Republic of Angola in order to grant this country concrete support
in resisting and defeating the South African invaders and occupiers? Isn't it
also the reason why the OAU secretary general, Noureddin D~oudi, was sent to
Luanda to find out what the OAU role could be? However, let us not get ahead of
the facts and tet us not put our trust in speculations and premature optimism.
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Nevertheless, we can note a factor which, in our view, is essential. By first
addressing themselves to the OAU members to fulfill their obligations and fully
assume their responsibilities, the Frontline States and Nigeria wished to face
the two-pronged goal pursued by U.S. imperialism and its allies: first, to inter-
nationalize the conflict in Southern Africa and attempt to transform it into an
East-West confrontation, and then to try to prove that Luanda's policy is deter-
mined by the Soviet Union and the socialist countries.
Lagos' answer was clear and unambiguous: it is important to africanize the war
of resistance against South Africa and it.s allies, to oppose a cammon diplomatic
front (already established, of course), but also a vaster military front to the
hegemonic objectives of Pretoria and to abort the pro~ects aimed at constituting,
in the very midst of the independent and sovereign countries of Southern Africa,
a number of puppet "buffer states," which would serve as permanent bases for
aggression against them. What has just taicen place in Laogs should be a lesson
_ for the imperialist, Zionist and racist forces. And if this lesson is not
rapidly understood, if, as we are convined, the United States is studying, in
conjunction wi~h Zaire, South Africa and Gabon, the formation of a"special
military force" targeted against the independence of the progressive and revo-
lutionary countries of Southern Africa--as the socialist Portuguese newspaper
PORTUGAL HOJE affirms--the Reagan administration would do well to desist. Threats
- of intervention, of colonial expeditions, destabilization campaigns...will never
d~feat this will to resist the schemes of aggressors which is increasingly
affirming itself among the peoples and governments of Africa.
Africa, and especialiy its revolutionary progressive regimes, is not and will
not remain alone, isolated, cut off from its friends and allies or subjected to
the diktat of Pretoria and Washington. First of all, it has its natural allies
in the socialist camp which, no matter what intern-cional constraints exist at
~his time, cannot afford to abandon it to the vultures and the grave-diggers of
its dearly acquired independence. Additionally, after the rise of the left in
France, the increasingly hard line adopted by U.S. policy, the resort by the
Reagan administration to the strong methods that became notorious at the time
of the cold war, the political climate in Europe is changing and many foreign
ministries are beginning to keep their distance.
Thus it is that Luanda's diplomacy is beginning to bear fruit in Wpstern Europe.
President Jose Eduardo dos Santos who started it is determined to break off the
isolation in which the Reagan administration has attempted to maintain Angola.
He first appealed to the UN secretary general, to thry Security Council, the extra-
ordinary general assembly and tens of chiefs of state in the East and in the West.
Special presidential emissaries went to many capitals. In Paris, Bonn, London,
Rome and New York, the A.ngolan foreign minister, Paulo Jorge and the Angolan
ambassador in Paris, Luis de Almeida, achieved remarkable successes. While
French Foreign Minister Claude Cheqsson was affi.rming that his talks with Paulo
Jorge took place in a particularly warm climate, that the French Government
firmly supported Resolution 435 Qf the ~ecurity Council and that he saw no connec-
- tion between the settlemenC of the Namibian question and the presence of C~iban ~
- troops in the country, West Germany warmly welcomed the Angolan minister. As
for Lord Carrington in Britain, did he not affirm to Luis de Almeida that his
government would not change its position on Resolution 435 and that despite the
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abstention of the British delegation at the Security Council on the South African
aggression, London had been the first Western nation to denounce and stigmatize
the invasion of Angola by South African troops and demand that they immediatel}+
withdraw?
If the climate surrounding the explosive crisis still reigning in Southern Africa
seems, for the moment, to be favorable to the Frontline States and pngola, if the
international press is continuing to severely criticize Washington's and Pretoria's
. policy, we are still far, very f ar from the desired ob3ectives, because nothing,
absolutely nothing has changed in the strategy adopted by Washington and in
Pretoria's aims. But when French President Francois Mitterrand will officially
receive President dos 3antos on 15 October, he will no doubt welcome him while
taking into account three particularl}r meaningful realities for France, Angola
and the African countries: President dos Santos will be the first chief of state
in Southern Africa to visit him, France will be the first Western nation visited
by an Angolan chief of state and finally, the reason why France was first chosen
by President dos Santos is because of the victory of the French democratic forces
at the 10 May elections and the assumption of power by the leader of the Socialist
Party, which filled with hope the peoples of the Third World and in particularly
those in Africa, who have suffered so much a result of the arbitrary, personal
and corrupt policy of tY~e Giscardian regime.
Should not common sense, mutual interests, the sense of international responsibility
inspiring both chiefs of state impose that the success of this meeting be equal to
the hopes that socialist France is awakening among the peoples of Southern Africa?
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Afrique-Asie
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ANGOLA
U.S. ACCUSED OF WISHING TO REVIVE FNLA
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 249, 28 Sep 81 p 29
_ [Text] The departure "in exile" of many former leaders of Roberto Holden's FNLA
for the United States, recently announced to the press by President Mobutu, is
a patently false attempt aimed at deceiving public opinion. In reality, Holden
deputy Hendrick Vaal Neto, who is among the puppets of the FNLA enjoying U.S.
"political asylum," revealed to his confidantes: "Our American friends informed
us that they wanted to reactivate the FNLA so that we can reorganize ourselves
and continue our struggle for national liberation."
- Thus, the Reagan's administration plot against the People's Republic of Angola
is taking shape and affirming itself. Following its decision to support Jonas
Savimbi's UNITA, it is now embarked in an operation aimed at training, arming
= and equipping the second Angolan puppet organization. Since this latter is
supposed to operate in the northern part of Angola, the question now is to know
to what an extent the assurances and promises repeatedly made by the bloody
c'.ictator in Kinshasa to Angolan officials in relation to his desire to cut off
any assistance to Angolan counter-revolutionaries can be believed. African
diplomats from pr.ogressive countries atationed in Kinshasa say that "here, no
one believes him. He is an inveterate liar, and his words of honor, his oaths
to Presidents Neto and dos Santos are worth nothing..."
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Afrique-Asie.
CSO: 4719/77
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ANGOLA
SOUTH AFRICAN-CAPTURED MATERIEL REPORTEDLY GOES TO UNITA
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 249, 28 Sep 81 p 17
[Text] As could have easily been imagined, the UNITA, which was able to escape
in extremis from the province of Cuando Cubango--where it was almost decisively
defeated by the FAPLA a little before the South African invasion of the province
of Cunene--can be found today in the occupied zone of the border province, in
~rder to "capitalize" on the results of the aggression, as the chief of st~ff of
the racist forces, Gen Geldenhuys, affirmed.
No military role has been attributed to the UNITA, and the South Africans could
not leave this province without running the risk of having the FAPLA defeat the
- puppets without further ado.
In Cahama, the Angolan army was intercepting radio messages from the racist army,
whose command post is less than 70 kms from the city of Xangongo. Even though
succinct, these messages provided confirmation of the fact that the only task
South Africa--fully conscious of UNITA's limitations--can attribute to it is to
undertake reprisals and repression against the civilian.population.
Consequently, the UI~ITA is performing "parallel activities" while the army of
occupation is, at this time, "recovering" all the civilian and military vehicles,
including the agricultural ones, in the occupied province. According to witnesses
who were able to escape the area, it is also destroying all the documentation of
thP Angolan administration, it is lor~ing stores, both state and private, as well
as the residences of local authoritie~ or of inere members of the MPLA-Labor Party.
As in 1975, herds are also driven beyond the border, into Namibia.
"The racists are not only genuine nazis and assassins," Commandant Farrusco, in
charge of Cahama, said with some irony, "but they are also true thieves, who loot
everything they can get their hands on. A large portion of this materiel, and
especially whatever can serve as transportation means, will then be handed over
to the UNITA." Thus the collection of "recovered materiel" that Jonas Savimbi
and his follower N'zau Puna will be able to show to the Western press in their
bases in Namibia is getting richer. It is even reported that the tractors and
bulldozers "recovered" by the invaders are actually sold to white Namibian
farmers by the UNITA.
At the beginning of the invasion, it was the South African army itself that took
care of the "enemy" and the MPLA militants who had stayed in the city. Jorge
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Mussua Michimichi, hospitalized in Ondjiva until the morning of the 28Lh, that is,
a feW hours before the total occupation of the city by the South African troops,
escaped the shooting by hiding in the hospital's water tank. From there, he heard
the South Africans threaten the women in the hospital to find out where the men
were hiding.
Suspecting that all the young people in the hospital were FAPLA members, the South
Africans would then shoot the men in their wards. Michimichi took advantage of
the confusion and the screams to leave his hiding place and escape through a
service corridor.
Officer Alfonso Maria, in charge of the Ond~iva units, told us that there were
indeed some Angolan soldiers among the most seriously wounded who were hospitalized
in Ondjiva, but that most of the patients were peasants wounded during the course
of tlie severe bombing attacks.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Afrique-Asie.
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CAPE VERDE
AGRARIAN REFORM CAMPAIGN MARRED BY INCIDENTS
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 248, 14 Sep 81 p 46
[T~axtJ The bill on agrarian reform abolishing the metayage system and making
tYie relations of production more democratic in the rural areas of the Cape Verde
- Islands--which still presented some feudal aspects--was recently subjected to
popular debate throughout the country's 10 islands.
In those islands and regions where the peasant masses have become conscious of
the social injustices suftered through the centuries of colonial and class
domination,discussions were passionate and constructive. But in Santo Antao
groups of indiv3duals, known to have belonged in the past to pro-colonialist
and revolutionary organizations attempted to undermine the ~nitiative of the
Cape Verdian Government. Taking advantage of the contradictions that feudal
- relations fixecl in the mentality of a number of peasants, and threatening those
who wanted to participate in the discussions on a theme that is close to their
hearts, these elements succeeded in upsetting the debates.
M~outhing reactionary slogans to Cape Verdian organizations abroad--closely tied
to international, and notably Portuguese, fascist groups--they fought local
authorities and attempted to disarm a policanan who had arrested some of the
agitators.
' During the course of these incidents, one of the demonstrators was killed and two
others wounded. Authorities arrested all thoae responsible for the clashes.
Howe~~er, these incidents did not prevent the enlightenment campaign on the
fundamental principles of the agrarian reform to be conducted throu~hout the
island.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Afrique Asie.
CSO: 4719/32
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CAPE VERDE
' BRIEFS
POLTTICAL INCIDENTS IN NETHERLANDS-The chauffeur of the Cape Verde consulate
in Rotterdam was wounded by gunfire on 9 September �allowing an altercation
with opponents of the Cape Verde Government. Simultaneously, in The Hague,
~ police prevented a group of about 20 Cape Verdian citizens from occupying
the country's embassy. The demonstrators wanted to protest against the "non-
democratic" Cape Verdian regime. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TRO1'ICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1871, 18 Sep 81 p 2380]
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.
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
FRENQi GOVERNMENT SAID T~0 BE FACING DIFFICULT POST(AUP SITUATION
' Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1869 4 Sep 81 p 2282
/Article: "Gen Andre KQ~ingba Becomes Head of State'1
/Tex~ On 1 September, the Central African arn~y forced the Central African
president, David Dacko, to hand over power to it.
The general chief of staff of the Central African arny, Army Gen Andre Kalingba,
has since then assumed the duties of head of state. The Constitution has been
suspended and any activity by political parties has been forbidden.
General xolingba indicated in a brnadcast speech that he had "asked for and
obtained" the resignation of President Qacko because of the president's health
and "taking into account the political tension that has reigned in our country
for the last 6 months."
The leadership of the country is now being taken care of by a Military Comnittee of
National Recovery, composed exclusively of the armed forces and placed under the
authority of General Kolingba.
The change in power was effected without any bloodshed and without violence. The
international airport at Bangui was not closed at any time and no curfew was set
up. Only telephone and telex communications were interrupted. The following day,
2 September, everything was absolutely normal in Bangui and the people seemed
rather satisfied. General Kolingba's radio speech seems to have been well
received by the people, who seem to be pleased at the arrival of a strong man as
the head of state.
The French troops remained confined to their barracks and did not intervene at any
point. The minister of defense, Charles Hernu, stated in Le Havre, where he was
presiding over the ceremony of the launching of the nuclear submarine "SAPHIR" at
the time of the events in Bangui, that the only mission of the French military
would have been to assure the protection of the life and property of any French
people if they had been threatened.
The forced resignation of President Dacko, although it seems to have caught the
French government unawares--the new French ambassador to Bangui had presented his
credentials the day before--is not a real surprise. The circumstances of his
return to power accompanied by French forces from the Barracuda operation prevented
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him from imposi~g his authority with regard to political adversaries, thus putting
his legitimacy in doubt. His first action was to reestablish the conditions for
operating a democracy by authorizing the establishment of political parties. The
result of the elections of last March, where he just barely obtained a majority,
revealed the fragile nature of his power and his lack of popu]arity among the
intell~ctuals, teachers, and students, who were irritated by the presence, very
conspicuous at that time, of soldiers from the Barracuda force and the number of
= French experts and advisers, which was deemed too high. The ruined state of public
finances and of the economy left by the dethroned emperor had made their presence
- necessary in the eyes of Paris, which had been asked to contribute financially
to the country's recovery. Since the~return to Bangui, it has been for all
practical purposes France which has assured the payment of government employees
and the daily life of the Central African Republic. This French intervention was
essential no doubt, but because the few members of the Central A~'rican elite
have not perhaps been sufficiently associated with it, it has given the impression
that France was trying to maintain the same control under President Dack~ that
it exercised under his predecessor, while the masses, confronted by difficulties
of all kinds, became progressively disinterested in the political contests and
withdrew their confidence from the head of st~te.
The worsening of the political situation resulted in bloody dis~urbances that
necessitated the intervention of French troops to safeguard French life and
property at the time of the elections, which took place under questionable circum-
- stances and the results were contested by the opposition parties which President
Dacko's efforts could not disband. He declared a state of siege on 21 July
following the attempt of 14 July zn a cinema in Bangui which resulted in four
victims, as well as forbiddinc~ the political parties of Abel Gouma, Henri Maidou,
and Francois Pehoua, and suspending Ange Patasse's party. President Dacko
decided upon the arrest of these heads of the opposition. In fact, only Ange
Petasse was arrested, the others having taken refuge abroad. Three weeks later,
in a desire for appeasement, which, it is said, was suggested by the new French
_ g~vernment, President Dacko lifted the measures forbidding and suspending the
political parties, and he put an end to martial law on 16 August. Nevertheless,
he asked the Central African forces to "remain in a state of alert and continue
the necessary missions of surveil]ance and security."
The development of events in Bangui seems to suggest that the military thought
their mission should not end there. President,Dacko, in a poor state of health
and apparently crippled by the easily discernable reserve shown by Paris with
regard to him, seems to have let himself be convinced without difficulty to cede
power to General Kalingba. Should we in fact credit him with the intention of
having made the first move and having preferred to transmit his responsibilities
to the army rather than to one of his political adversaries? Or should we view
the operation as a maneuver by the United States, which has intrigued us by its
presence in Bangui in the form of military attaches who have been arriving for
some time from neighboring African states?
The French government, which cannot be suspected of being mixed up in this change
of head of state and which views it as a purely domestic affair of the Central
Af rican Republic, nevertheless finds itself faced with a difficult situation.
It is obvious that its position in the days to come will be observed attentively
both within Africa and elsewhere.
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The penetration by the Libyan armed forces into Chad and the occupation which
has followed has led those African nati~ns.linked to France by cooperation and
defense agreements, a1ong with their neighbors, to question the efficacy of the
protection that Paris could assure them and to look for other possible "proteCtors".
President Reagan's doctrine, clearly stated, of opposing the Soviet influence
in Africa and elsewhere may encourage some nations to get closer to the United
~ States, es~ecially since Colonel qadha~iaf3.'s Libya, which has become the warehouse
for sophisticated Soviet weapons on the African continent and which has just
strengthened its ties with the Soviet Union, may be suspected of trying to
expand its influence in the Central African Republic. The French government cannot
remain insensitive to such a threat to ruin its positions in Africa and it will
have to find a way of reconciling the defense of these positions with still
ma�intaining respect for Central African sovereignty.
COPYRIGNT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.
11550
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CENTRAL AFRICAN REP~LIC
GENERAL KOLIN(~A SAID TO BE PR~AMERICAN
Paris JEIINE AFRIQUE in French No 1079, 9 Sep 81 pp 28, 29
[Article by Francois Soudan: "In Bad Health, Weakened, President Dacko Belinquishes
Power To the Army. As In 1965 :~e Coup d'Etat Zh~t Was Expected"]
[Text] Nobody, or almost nobody, knew it, but General Andre Kolingba, chief of staff of
_ - _ _ _
_ -
the Central African army and simply chief of state since 1 September, is a recid
ivist. That Tuesday morning when, before dawn, he entered the residence of David
Dacko on the banks of the Ubangui, there is no doubt that the president remembered
a conversation that he had had, 1 month before, with the one whom he had ~ust ap-
pointed general of the army: "The time has come, Mr President," Kolingba had said
to him, "to puti a stop to political disorder; resign, or else the army will no
doubt have to intea~fere."
In bad health--he suffers from high blood pressure which causes frequent fainting
_ spells--to such an extent that he had decided to come to Paris in mid-September
for treatment, looking older than his 52 years, David Dacko had nevertheless held
out. In Bangui you do not let go of power ~ust like that, especially when you
have experienced a coup d'etat once before (that of 31 December, 1965, which over-
threw Dacko and brought Bokassa to the presidency).
_ And anyhaw, it now seems clear, David Dacko had already chosen his heir apparent,
("in 8 or 10 months, after the legislative elections," he confided), and it was
not Kolingba, but Msgr Ndayen, the archbishop of Bangui, chief of the powerful
. Catholic church of Central Africa and brother of the ex-com~ander of the gen-
darmery, who had been removed from his position 3 weeks previously at the explicit
- request of Kolingba.
Following the failure of his first attempt, Andre Kolingba, formerly of the French
Military School of Fre~us, who was ambassador to Canada and West Germany under
Bokassa, therefore returned to the charge. With far less restraint (but without
bloodshed), since he brought out of its barracks the small Central African army
(2,000 men), of which he is almost undisputedly the chief, and proclaimed, in
keeping with a classic process, the dissolution of parties and the repeal of the
constitution.
Did France have an "in" in this, did it give its blessing to the putsch? At first
glance, this seems poss~ble, even probable, since France maintains 1,160 men in
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Central Africa, even right among Presideszt Dackn~s closest associates. In actual
fact, however, this is quite uncertain: the Barracudas had been very strictly
confined since last 14 July. It had been necessary to make a telephone call from
Paris at 9 o'clock Tuesday morning, i.e. several hours after the "coup," for the
am.~assador to find out that Dacko had been overthrown. It is obvious that, since
the election of the socialist, Francois Mitterrand, information "flows badly," as
the saying goes, between certain French information services--especially the mili-
tary--and the Elysee. Last of all, it is hard to see why Paris would want to
burden itself with the dilemma that is taking shape: keeping the Barracuda con-
tingent in a country with a"hard" military regime (which, to say the least, would
be contrary to its principles), and thereby risk losing its influence of the na-
tionals in the country.
Support
So then, is it likely that Andre Kolingba acted alone? No, because he will cer-
tainly, in the near future, have to pay the civil servants. This general, very
close to the former prime minister, Bernard Ayandho (a personal friend of Presi-
dent Bongo and outspokenly pro-American), undoubtedly did not "make a move" with-
out nets. The question is: who put them in place?
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Af rique GRUPJIA 1981.
9498
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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
BRIEFS
MILITARY PROMOTIONS--Gen Andre Kolingba, chief of general staff of the Central
African armed forces, who took power yesterday in Bangui, had been promoted to army
general, the highest rank in the Central African army, on 30 July. President
Dacko made this decision when the army was invested with complete authority in
the area of law and order following the attempt of 14 July, which resulted in
three dead and 32 wounded in a Bangui cinema. Appointed administrator of the
state of siege declared on 19 July, General Kolingba had issued a warning to
those "who are looting, raising barricades, or harming freedom to work. The army
will severely reprimand all agitators," proclaimed General Kolingba. At the same
time as General Kolingba, several other officers of the army were promoted to a
higher rank. These promotions, observers considered at the time, were justified
by the "loyalty" ~hown by the armed forces during the events that followed the
attempt of 14 July. %Text %Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
~ NO 1869 4 Sep 81 p 228~ L~~~~T~ Rene More~nc et Cie Paris 1981] 11550
FRENCH MILITARY MATERIEL-Major deliveries of French military materiel to the
Central African Republic before the putsch of 1 September: six lia~.son and recon-
naissance vehicles as well as 20 ~eeps have ~ust been sent to Bangui. For the
month of July alone France's military assistance to the CAR ampunts to 150 mil-
lion CFA francs. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 107Q~9 Sep 81 p 49]
[COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981] 9498
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EQUATORIAL GUINEA
ppVERN1~NT REPORTED Z~0 HAVE FAILED 1~Q RES1~01~ EODNOI~L, DErIDCRACY
Paris JEi]~TE AFRIQUE in French No 1079, 9 Sep 81 pp 50-51
_ [Article by Claude Wauthier: "Two Years After the Fall of the "Tiger" Col. Teodoro
Obiang Ngvema flas Failed To Reestablish Democracy, and flas Not Restored the Economy:
flope ~rn to Disappointment"]
-
[Text] Nothing is going any better in Equatorial Guinea, or so few things: the
' great hope that sprang up following the fall in August 1979 of Francisco Macias
Nguema, called the "Tiger," has dwindled in fac: of the inability of the new
regime to get the economy of a bloodlesa country back on its feet, to say nothing
~ of its refusal to re-establish even so much as the appearance of democratic fr~e-
dom. Admittedly the time o� hasty executions and atrocious torture~ is past, but
dreary apathy has come to replace the passing gladness which 2 years ago had
greeted the assumption of power by the aew strongman of the country, Colonel
- Teodoro Obiang Ngu~ma.
Stage-setting
The strange trial in July of the members of the unsuccessful plot of April 1981,
following which nearly 200 people had been arrested, did little but add Co the
! legitimate suspicion surroundiug the new regime. Actually the court condemned
only the "underlinga": one soldier to death, about 10 noncommissioned officers
and civil servants to long prison terms. Some 30 officers got off lightly with
6 months of imprisonment, while about 30 other accused people, including two of
Macias' former ministers, wexe released. As for the one who could have been the
guiding light of the plot, Moises M'Ba, accused of misappropriation of funds and
attempting to destabilize the state, sentenced in his absence to 20 years of
prison, he managed to leave the country with entire impunity shortly before the
month of April.
The route taken by this politician, and subsequently a wealthy businessman, now
taking refuge in Spain, was indeed a curious one. At the time of the Spaniah
colonization, Moises'M'Ba was one of the leaders of the pro-Franco party, Munge
(National Unity Movement of Spanish Guinea) and a representative in the Cortes.
Upon the approach of independence, proclaimed in 1968, he became the head of a
dissenting group of the Munge to support the candidacy of Macias in the presi-
dential election. As a result of his "flair" he was awarded the presidency of
the Council of State (senate), but in 1972 he deemed it more advisable to go to
; Geneva and get back into the ranks of the principal opposition party in exile,
the ANRD, (National Alliance for Democratic Re-estabtishment), and he became the
president of its central committee. Fosz� years later he was tur.cluded from the
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ANRD, and went to set himself up in Spain. Only a few months before the discovery
of the plot had he returried to Equatorial Guinea to create there an import-export
business firm in which Colonel Obiang is said to have held some of the shares.
In Malabo it is not considered entirely impossible that Moises M'Ba could have
been the pawn of a set-up designed to get potential rivals of the chief of state
out of the way, one which may have involved some dirty doings relating to big
money. As a matter of facts in Madrid the businessman has ~ust stated that the
chief of state likely demande~, for the benef~t of his 13-year-old son, Theodorin,
a capital increase of 30 percent of the firm, which likely brought on their fall-
ing-out and his departure.
In any case, for the time being power seems to remain in the hands of the clan of
Mongomo, the village of Macias, who was the uncle of Colonel Teodoro Obiang. The
number two man in the regime, Maye Ela, first vice-president and minister of for-
eign affairs is also Z nephew of the fallen dictator. Both of them are membere of
the supreme military council which was an outgrowth of the coup d'etat of 1979.
Mongomo is in the east in the conCinental part of the country, near the border of
Gabon, in the land of the Esanguis, a group constituting the ethnic majority of
the Fangs.
Bit-players '
The Esanguis represent only about 1.5 percent of the total population of the coun- ,
try, but most of the ministers, the military chiefs and the ambassadors belong to
the c.lan of Mongomo. The Bubis from the island of Bioko (formerly Fernando Po)
are represented in the government by the second vice-president, Eulogio Oyo
Riqueza, the minister of agriculture, Emiliano Baule, Borico, and the minister
o~ health, Cristino Seriche Bioko: it ia believed that they are hardly anything
more than bit-players.
However that may be, the political parties have not been able to resume any sort
of activity, in spite of the resolution to this effect adopted in March 1981 in
Geneva by the UN's Human Rights Com~ittee. But in November 1980 at the time of
his official visit to Paris did not Colonel Teodoro Obiang declare that it was
possible "both to rebuild the country and resCore democracy"?
Lethargy
On the other hand, the chief of state integrated into the army the membeXs of the
sadly famous "Youth in Pace with Macias" who had caused a reign of terror during
the former regime. Symbolic of the very few changes that have come about during
the past 2 years, the Equatorial Guinean "wall of shame," bristling with barbed
wire, erected by Macias around the sumptuous presidential palace in Malabo, is
still standing.
Coloncl Obiang has not restored the economy any more than he has re-established
democracy. According to the report of a technician of the FAO (Food and Agricul-
ture Organization of the United Nations), in January 1981 two-thirds of the popu-
lation had not eaten any meat for at least a month, malnutrition and underfeeding
were widespread. The production of cacao (40,000 tons before independence) today
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sits somewhere around 8,000 tons, as during the final yzars of the Macias regime.
The government has returned the confiscated plantations to their former Spanish
owners, but the latter hardly dare risk taking them in hand again and investing
the major sums required for putting them back into good condition. Furt?`.�rmose
negotiations with La~os to bring back the 40,000 Nigerian workers who had fled
from Equa.torial. Guinea under Macias have produced no results.
Y Money is flowing in, however, from Spain as well as from the European Economic
Community and from other Western countries. Madrid has sent off to its former ,
colony nearly 400 technical advisors. But neither this windfall nor the Spanish
technicians have been able to put back on its feet the economic mach~nery de-
stroyed by the bloody dictatorship of the "Tiger." A whole pack of businessmen
of shady character has pounced upon the country, whose administration is an inex-
perienced as it is corrupt, according to the testimony of a West German technician
recen~ly published in the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEIIVE ZEITUNG. Everything transpires,
- in fact, as if the country were stricken with a kind of lethargy while waiting
� for a miracle to happen: the discovery, of course, of a petroleum deposit, which,
among othPr things, would enable Equatorial Guinea, whose monetary unit, the
ekuele, is not convertible, to belong to the Customs and Economic Union of Central
Africa (UDEAC), so far noncommittal, and to end its isolation.
All of the neighboring co~mt~cies, Cameroon, Gabon and Congo, have struck black
gold, and two laws have just been passed regulating petroleum prospecting, an
undertaking in which Western companies are actively ergaged. The West has, in
fact, been the principal beneficiary of the fall of the former regime which was
aligned with the USSR. The two countries which have gained the most are Spain,
~ which currently supplies 80 percent of the imports, and Morocco, which, after
sending a detachment of Moroccan troops following the 1979 coup d'etat, succeeded
in obtaining the cancellation of recognition by ex-President Macias of the Sa-
haran Democratic Arab Republic.
_ Exiles
Of all of the movements in exile of opposition to Macias, only ANRD, whose general
n secretary is a university man, profeseor Eya Chaama, still remains to demand that
changes be made at last in a country which has regained only a san~blance of free-
dom. The 200,000 Equatorial Guineans who had fled from the former regime have,
for the imost part, felt up to now that it is preferable not to return.
- COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981.
9498
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GABON
DRILLINGS NEAR MAYOUMBA, LOPEZ REVEAL OIL
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 Sep 81 pp 2282-2283
[Text] During exploratory and evaluative pro~ects, Elf Gabon has just drilled two
promising wells, indicated a statement released by the nationalized company Elf
Aquitaine on 26 August.
The first, the Moubenga Marine exploratory well, located 70 kilometers south of
Mayoumba, passed through sandstone permeated with hydrocarbons at around 2960 meters
in the Dentale formation. A test conducted at the wellhead yeilded an oil flow
of 435 m3/day. Additional study will be required to clarify the value of this dis-
covery. The well is located in the Paka Marine license area which is 100 percent
held by Elf Gabon.
The second, the Konzi Marine No 3 test well, located 65 kilometers from the Lopez
cap, has conf irmed that the structure is of interest by passing through about thirty
meters of sandstone permeated with oil between 1080 and 1140 meters. Tests will
be conducted at the wellhead. This drilling location is in the Pongara Marine
license area for which there is an exploration and shared production contract between
' the Gabonese government on the one hand, and the nationalized company Elf Aq~iitaine
(70 percent) and Elf Gabon (30 percent) on the other.
~ The last discovery made by Elf Gabon was at the beginning of August (MARCHES TROPI-
_ CAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS 7 Aug 81 p 2058). Elf Gabon was operating for the Elf Gabon
(50 percent) / Mitsubishi Petroleum Development Company (50 percent) partnership.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cia 1981.
9693
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GABON
BRIEFS -
BONGO'S REPORTED DENIAL--President Bongo made it a point to deny to the French
Government that he is attempting to achieve a rapprochement with the United
States, according to the information published by AFRIQUE-ASIE. He affirmed to
the French Embassy in Libreville that "these are ramblings of a magazine that
' hates me..." But the Gabonese president forgot to mention to his French colleagues
that he had invited two high officials from the CIA to come to Libreville far
"consultation." "If I no longer have Col Robert here (the former French ambassador
in Libreville, previously a member of the SDECE [Internal Intelligence and Counter-
_ espionage Service~, a~cr.edited by Giscard and recalled by Mitterrand) and if the
- SAC [Civil Action Service] is abandoning me, I must, of course, look elsewhere,"
he reportedly confided to his friends. And what would be better, Mr President,
than Reagan's secret agents? [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 249, 28
Sep 81 p 28] [COPYRIGHT: 1981 Afrique-Asie]
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FOR OFFICIAL USE O1VGY
GHANA
i
BRIEFS
CULTURAL AGREII~NT WITH USSR URGID--The Ghana~USSR Friendship Associ~.tion appealed
to the government once again at the end of August to sign a cultural agreement with
the Soviet government. The appeal was made by the association's secretary general,
K. Opare Ababio, before the departure of 28 students for the Soviet Union. R. Opaxe
: Ababio noted that the agreement on the basis of which the students had obtained
study grants for the Soviet Union was not an official one. The last agreement at a
- governmental level dates from Nkrumah timea and has been abrogated, without ever
having been renewed, after the 1969 military coup d'etat. [Text] [Paris MARCH~S
TROPICAUX ET MIDITERRANEENS in French No 1871, 18 Sep 81 p 2386]
DELEGATION TO DPRK--A 4-member Ghanaian delegation headed by Joseph Wilfrid Boateng,
deputy minister of agriculture, left at the end of August for Pyongqang in North
Korea to participate from 26 to 31 September in a aymposium on food and agricultural
' production in developing countries. [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUR ET MEDITER-
RANEENS in French No 1871, 18 Sep 81 p 2386]
PRC THREATENS WITFIDRAWAI~--Chinese technicians engaged in the Afife irrigation project
threatened at the beginning of September to withdraw from the pro~ect if the local
traditional chiefs continued to encourage pilfering and depradation on the site of
the pro~ect. A number of persona ha~ve already been arrested and the pro3ect itself
has been put under police surveillance. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITER-
RANEENS in French No 1871, 18 Sep 81 p 2386]
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- GUINEA
NIGERIAN FISHING, CULTURAL COOPERATION, MINING COOPERATION ,
, Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 Sep 81 p 2274
' [Text] On 28 August, at the completion of the constitutive session of the Guinea-
Nigeria commission, Guinea and Nigeria signed two agreements to cooperate in the
~ areas of culture and of fishing. These agreements were signed by Mr. Ismael Toure,
Guinean minister of mines and geology, and by Mrs. Adenike Ebun Oyagbola, Nigerian
f.ederal minister of the Plan.
The two delegations also examined the possibilities for cooperation in the areas
of mining, animal husbandry and agriculture, as well as the possibility of Nigeria
supplying crude oil and petroleum products to Guinea.
Nigeria, which is building a huge steelmaking complex (to be operational in 1983
with a production goal of 3.5 million metric tons of steel) is already associated
with Guinea and with other partners in the Guinea Mifergui-Nimba project in which
it has a 13.5 percent interest, or the largest share except for the State of Guinea's
50 percent interest. Mr. Ismael Toure has announced that Nigeria's participation
in this project will be increased on 16 September.
The Mifergui-Nimba project, which should be launched this year, involves the mining
~ of a high content iron deposit at Mount Nimba (southeast Guinea) whose reserves
' are estimated at 2 billion metric tons. The first exports of iron ore through the
, Liberian mineral port at Buchanan are planned for 1984.
The Nigerian government is also involved in the Guinea Uranium pro~ect, which should
be underway on 1 November, and holds 25 percent of one of the two companies formed
~ 'for this purpose.
Finally, Nigeria has a 10 percent share of capital in the Ayekoye project. This
project involves Che mining of a 500 million metric ton bauxite deposit in northwest
Guinea and the onsite processing of the bauxite into aluminum~at first (1 million
~ metric tons per year to start), and then the production of 150,000 metric tons of
aluminum per year. The project also includes construction of two hydroelectric
dams on the Konkoure River.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.
9693
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GUINEA
BRIEFS
AUSTRALIAN DIAMOND PARTICIPATION=-The Australian company Bridge Oil Limited, which
is involved in petroleum and mine prospecting, has just secured a 45 percent share
of the $ 10.91 million in an alluvial diamond mining project in Guinea. The Austral-
ian treasurer indicated on 24 August that the partners in the Australian company,
based in Sydney, would be the government of Guinea which will have a 50 percent
interest, and two foreign companies, Simonius Vischer of Switzerland and the Industrial
Diamond Company Limited with headquarters in London, each with 2.5 percent. According
to the Bridge Oil Company, the alluvial deposit contains diamonds (gems) and gold.
Production should begin at the end of 1983 and should reach 500,000 carats per year
in 1985. Under the terms of the agreement, $ 55 million will be invested in machines
and equipment. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET I~DITERRANEENS in French 4 Sep
81 p 2274] ~[COPYRI(~iT: Rene Irbreux et Cie Paris 1981] 9693
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GLTIlJEA-BISSAU
BRIEFS
FRENCH AGRICULTURAL AID--France has granted Guinea-Biesau the amount of 5 million
French francs for agricultural pro~ects in the Bafata and Gabu areas in the
eastern part of the country. The agreement was signed in Biseau on 8 5eptember
between Mr Robbin, French charge d'affaires and Avito Jose da Silva, minister of
rural development of Guinea-Bissau. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUR ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1871, 18 Sep 81 p 2380J
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~
I~ MOZAI~IQUE
NEEDS, EXPANSION OF BEIRA PORT DETAILED
! Earis MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Aug 81 p 2235
[Text] The port of Beira, constructed in a difficult area at the center of Mazam-
' bique's coast, quickly proved itself the country's second port, and the first port
~ for th~, southern region's interior. It serves, in fact, four central Mozambique
provinces--Sofala, Manica, Tete and Zambezia--and five other African countries--
Malawi, Zimbabwe, Zaire, Botswana and Zambia--which is the reason for its importance
to the economy of the country and of the entire region.
The construction of the port of Beira was closely linked to the colonization process
in the English-speaking countries of the southern region. For the colonies of South-
ern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, and for Nyasaland (now Malawi), Beira constituted
the quickest access to the ocean and, consequently, the most profitable from the
point of view of transportation charges for products intended for export. The advant-
age remains the same today for these countries which are now independ'e~t~;':~tze~sses
AFP.
Given the port's privileged location, Mozambique authorities feel its development
is essential. The channel entrances must be dredged and excavated to attain suffi-
cient depth for large tonnage ships. The existing channels will not accommodate
25,000 MT ships loaded to full capacity. On the other hand, work is in progress
to improve current conditions and to develop the port's capacity. In fact, the
future of independent Zimbabwe allows reconsideration of the port of Beira's true
international role. ~
Thus, a dock which will accommodate large tonnage ships and petroleum tankers, which
should put into port at Beira for 18-day periods, is nearing completion. Next to
this dock, which will have multiple uses, there will be a container storage area
.and covered storage amounting to almost 3,000 square meters.
Construction of a fishing pier and a repair dock is also in progress and almost
completed. Eventually, a cannery, a fish meal plant, a refrigerated warehouse for
processing shrimp, as well as a f ish oil plant will be built and the infrastructure
requ~.red for production, equipment, handling and administration will be established.
Plants for processing coal and a pipeline for neighboring Zimbabwe complete the
panorama of installations with which the port of Beira is equipped. For 1982, an
increase in port traffic of 138 percent over 1972 is expected; the best year the
~ort will have had to date. In 1992, this percentage would increase to 260 pei~~ent.
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For_ this purpose, a Dutch consulting company, Nedeco, is currently studying the
possirility of dredging and excavating the channels. They feel that at first, over
the short term, 40,000 MT ships loaded to full capacity will be able to enter the
port~of Beira, and that, over the medium term, 75,000 MT ships wi11 be able to put
into port there.
According to the port director, Mr. Rui Fonseca, the investments which must be made
for port equipment, and particularly for widening the berthing areas, should corre-
spond, over the medium term, to the requirements of international traffic and to
modern standards.
From these statements it may be deduced that, like the port of Maputo (MARCHES TROPICAUR
ET MEDITERRANEENS No 1867 21 Aug 81 0 2179), the port of Beira must actively prepare
itself to retain its traditional users and to attract new ones, particularly in
the young neighboring republic of Zimbabwe.
Quarters close to the port sector are optimistic and go so far as tc consider Beira
as the best port in the country, taking into account the level of organization and
productivity attained over the past few years.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.
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MOZAI~IQUE
BRIEFS
- MACHEL MAY VISIT PARIS--An important economic agreement between Maputo and Paris
is being negotiated and could be signed within the next few days. Moreover, it
is possible that President Samora Machel will visit President Mitterrand before
the end of the year. It is known that, following Presiden.t Aristides Pereira,
President Jose Eduardo dos Santos will meet with President Mftterrand in Paris
on 15 October. The Elysee attributes particular importance to the visit by
President dos Santos because of the continued occupation of Angolan territory
by South African troops and also because of its concern to find a solution for
the impasse reached by the "contact group" on the Namibian issue. As is known,
the main reason for this impasse is the support granted by the White House to
the racist South African Government. [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No
249, 28 Sep 81 p 28] [C~PYRIGHT: 1981 Afrique-Asie]
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NIGER
BRIEFS
URANIUM SALES POLICY--By publishing in the JOURNAL OFFICIEL of 27 August a list of
all sales of uranium decided on during the first 6 months of 1981, the authorities
~ confirmed their resolution to make commonplace trade in a highly strategic product.
Deliveries to Libya increased six times (1,212 tons as compared with 200 in 1980)
and an initial purchase by Iraq (100 tons) was recorded. Whereas these two countries
have been blacklisted, in particular by the United States which, invoking nonprolif-
eration, would like to prohibit the third world states from access to nuclear energy,
even to the atom bomb. The position of President Seyni Kountche is clear; "We are
selling to any customer who, while accepting our prices, satisfies the purchase
conditions set by the international commission in Vienna." The loading of blue
barrels full of ore is carried out in broad daylight at the sirports of Niamey and
Agadez or in the port of Cotonou (Benin). Moreover, the quantities which w~ll be
sold to each of the customers is known in advance, by decree. Thus for exports
which will be delivered this year: France will purchase 2,293 tons (as compared
with 1,344 in 1980 or 47 percent of total sales); Libya, 1,212 tons (25 percent);
Japan, 816 tons (17 percent); Spai~~ 300 tons (6 percent); the FRG, 125 tons
(3 percent) and Iraq 100 tons (2 percent). In total: 4,846 tons for 1980. In
fact, to boycott some purchaser or other according to the whims of western diplomacy
would be tantamount for the Nigerien Government to losing control of the receipts
of foreign exchange vital for the pursuit of economic development [Text] [Paris
JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1080, 16 Sep 81 p 31] [COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA
19si~
JAPANESE URADIIUM EXPLORATION AGREEI~NT--A Japanese company, the Power Reactor and
Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation [PNC], signed on 9 September in Niamey a draft
~ agreement with the Nigerien Office of Mineral Resources [ONAREM] for the exploration
and exploitation of a new uranium deposit. The ONAREM-PNC association is to start
soon its exploration in Agadez Department (northern Sahara), on the In Adrar site.
The draft agreement was signed for the Nigerien side by the minister of mines,
Annou Mahamane, the director of ONAREM, Sani Koutoumbi, and by the director of the
PNC, Mikio Isetani. It stipulates that the Japanese company will finance the
exploration and installations at the rate of 400 million CFA francs for the next
2 years and an additional 600 million CFA francs for the fourth year. Japan is
already active in Niger in the exploration and exploitation of uranium in particular
through the Overseas Uranium Resources~Development [OURD], which holds 25 percent
of the capital of the Akouta Mining Companq [COMINAK], one of the two large Nigerien
uranium exploitation enterprises, with the Air Region Mining Company [SOMAIR].
Japan has purchased in Niger 816.6 tons of uranivmn since the beginning of the year.
[Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1871, 18 Sep 8]~
p 2383] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981]
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NIGERIA
BRIEFS
PETROLEUM PRICES--Despite the official denials of widespread infornQation in the
West concerning unofficial proposals of a reducti~n on the order of 3 dollars per
barrel made by Nigeria, it appears that this info~:~nation is correct. It has been
announced, indeed, at the maritime exchange of London that shipping orders issued
to tankers transporting Nigerian crude increased at the beginning of the week of
- 10 to 16 August. This increase coincided, the brokers emphasized, with the infor-
mation according to which Nigeria had reduced its sale price. During the past
weeks, the loading of crude from Nigeria had become rare. Ttie American Company
Amoco, of whom it was thought that it had stopped buying oil from Nigeria, was
among those issuing new shipping orders and proceeded on 11 August to transport
59,000 tons to the United States. On the other hand, during a press conference
dedicated to Nigeria's economic situstion, professor Emaneul Edozien, president
Shagari's economic advisor, declared that "the standardization of crude oil prices
will remedy the glut on the world crude oil market." This indirectly approved the
- proposal for the standardization of prices made by Saudi Arabia. Professor Edozien
also implied that Nigeria could be led to accept a decrease in its sale price,
_ adding that officials did not think it possible to return to the level of produc-
tion that existed before the glut, in other words, about 2 million barrels per
day, nor to the prices, and consequently, to the revenues following fron them.
[Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1867, 21 Aug $1
p 2167] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 9670
NEW OIL DISCOVERIES--1~ao oil companies, Mobil (U.S.A.) and AGIP (Italy) recently
discovered in the Delta region of the Niger, in the eastern part of Nigeria, two
important fields of hydrocarbon, announced Mr Lawrence Amu, new director of the
NNPC [Nigerian National PeCroleum Co.?]. Mr Amu, who was addressing the partici-
pants at the 5th international symposium of the Society of Petroleum Engineers at
Warri, oil town in the State of East Bendel, specified, according to the Nigerian
press agency NAN (official) that the Mobil field presumably contains 1 billion re-
coverable barrels. Mr d?mu did not give any details about Agip's field which he
qualified as sizable. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in
French No 1867, 21 Aug 81 p 2167] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981]
9670
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UGANDA
BRIEFS
DP ACCUSES GOVERNMENT--The Democratic Party in opposition (DP)~ accused the govern-
ment and military officials on 29 August of taking advantage of "isolated" attacks
- against goverrnnental installations to cause damage to the Ugandan people. "These
isola~ed acts of violence, sametimes carried out even by employees of the govern-
ment or the armed forces, serve as a pretext for the bad treatmen~ against the
Ugandan people," said the MUNNANZI, the opposition's English ianguage newspager.
The government's reprisals against same guerrillas are forcing many Ugandans to
"live like nomads" to escape these reprisals, the newspaper adds, and goes on to
say that these actions "caused the death of thousands of Ugandan civilians and the
destruction of their property. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS
in French No 1869, 4 Sep 81 p 2285] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie 1981] 9670
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ZAIRE
i
. ~ / BRIEFS
CANADIAN REFUGEE AID--The Canadi~n govertnnent has decided to grant $500,000 in aid
to the refugees settled on the Zairian territory. Thia aid, drawn from the funds
of the Canadian Program f or Humanitarian Aid, is part of a total grant of 22.4
million dollars that Canada haa p?edged to the African relief program. This aid
will be allocated mainly to the areas of housing, food distribution and health.
According to sources close to the UN High Commission far Refugees (HCR), Zaire
has given asylum to nearly 400,000 Ugandan, Angolan, Rwandan, Burundian, and Zambian
refugees. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRAN~ENS in French No 1869, 4
Sep 81 p 2283] [COPYRIGHT: Fene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 9670
MINE INVESTMENTS--According to Zaire'a General Comsniasion of Plat~n~ng, the total
cost of the public investment program in the mine sector for the 1981-1983 period
comes to 2,365.7 million zaires, of which 1,869.6 million zaires in foreign currency.
The self-financed portion of the program amnunts to 518.5 million zaires, of which
76.2 million is in foreign currency. External sources should provide 1,787 million
zaires in foreign currency. Some mining companies, like the General Quarry and Ore
Company (Gecamines), the Bakwanga Mining Co~pany (Miba), the Kiw Mining Company
- (Sominki), Kilo-MoCo (gold), and the Zairetain Company [pewter] will benefit from
new financial contributions provided for by the program. The cost of Gecamine's
3-year program, in this particular framework, comes to 1,956 million zaires, of
which 1,566 million zaires is for the "P.420" program and 390 million is for the
"P.470." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDIT~RRANEENS in French No 1869, 4
Sep 81 p 2283] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 9670
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ZAMI)IA
NEXT FEW MONTIiS SEEN AS CRITICAL FOR LEADERSHIP
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 247, 31 Aug-13 Sep 81 pp 18, 19
[Text] The government, say the union members, must not place
the responsibility for its economic and political problems on
~ the ZCTU [Zambia Congress of Trade Unions].
In Lusaka on this Monday morning in late July at 7 o'clock, the Zambians did not
get thei.r news bulletin as usual. In fact, Presfdent Kaunda used this pri~,~e time
to broadcast a 30-minute speech. Though most Zambians were still in bed listening
to the morning news that cold morning, they were forced to get up arcd listen very
attentively, for the president was announcing the arrest of some ~f the most emi-
nent and controversial officials in the country-high-ranking authorities of the
Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU). The arrested officials are the president,
Frederi~k Chiluba; his general secretary, Newstead Zimba; the assistant general
secretary, Chitalu Sampa, and the president-deputy of the Miners' Union of Zambia,
Timothy Walamba.
The reason for the arrests, he explained to his shocked and still sleepy-e}ed
compatriots, was having incited the workers to break social peacF an~ ultimately
overthrow the government. This decision is made to insure social peace and har-
mony in the country. President Kaunda accused the leadQxs of having urged the
workers to carry out wildcat strikes which have psact~cally paralyzed the mining
sector in Zambia during these past 6 months.
Torn Flag
Up to now 205,681 working days have been ].ost in wildcat strikes, and thesP ille-
gal work standstills have been disastrous for this sector of the already ail~ng
economy. In 1979 there were 44 illegal strikes involving 10,846 k~orkers, and this
year the number of strikes has doubled and these have involved 21,921 workers.
These past 6 months have seen the materializing of no less than 84 illegal strikes
involving 46,399 workers.
The seeming purpose of all of these strikes was the improvement of work conditions
and salary increases. President Kaunda accused the leadership of thQ workers'
movement of trading, f~r personal purpos~s, upon the economic problems which Zam-
bia is experiencing. He explained that instead of infnrming the workers of the
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real reasons for the situation and encouraging them to follow the correct proce-
dure for making their demands, the leaders choae to slander the leading party,
the UNIP and its leadership. "They consider that the solution to this problem is
to change the political leadership and the political and economic ideology. I~
is for that reason that they are prodding the innocent workers. It is for that
reason that they have not condemned the strikes, which have taken place without
any real motive," the broadcast message said.
To put a stop to the vandalism which has characterized most of the strikes, the
president has ordered the policz to intervene quickly and to see to it, whenever
necessary, that law and order are respected. He was particularly disappointed by
the daring and the lack of patriotism of the striking miners in the city of Kitwe,
who recently damaged the official Mercedes Benz of the Minister of Labor, Basil
Kabwe, who had rushed off to the Copperbelt to persuade the workers to return to
the mine. The miners jeered at the minister and insulted him, and tore up the
national flag--a symbol of the nation's unity--which was installed on his car.
President Kaunda questioned whether ar not the improvement of work conditions and
salary increases were the reasons why the union leaders had asked the workers to
strike, saying that in fact their objectivea were political and that they were
~ trying to use the workers to attain them.
The four arrested leaders are a part of the group of 17 leaders who were expelled
from the UNIP last January for having objected to the new system of local govern-
ment. None has returned to the party, even though the central co~mittee of the
UNIP invited them to do so last March.
The other leaders did not remain inactive following the government's decision.
The ZCTU held an emergency meeting of general council shortly after the announce-
ment of the arrests, and decided to require the unconditional release of their
:.olleagues. They launched an appeal for an international committee to investigate
the causes of the strikes and the faulty understanding which permanently exists
between the workers' movement and the government.
The ZCTU stated that the independent investigating committee should include repre-
sentatives from the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the Organization
for African Uaity (OAU) and other agenciea of the United Nations.
The worker leaders considered the arrest of their comrades "a betrayal" because
they had been thinking that the two sides were at that time coming close to a
meeting of the minds. The government, they say, must not take the ZCTU as a
scapegoat to explain its economic and political problems, and they warned it that
if the four leaders were not released, they could set off a general strike through-
out the national territory.
While the two parties were engaged in discussion, the mining companies, Nchanga
Consolidated Copper Mines and Roan Copper Mines, which until they had kept quiet,
were making an arbitrary decision which, at the last minute, gave zhe signal for
a final confrontation. The two firms, which had lost about $35 million during
the last strike, which lasted 7 days, announced the dismissal of 590 miners.
Before being laid off, 825 miners received one last warning. A spokesman for the
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two companies let it be known that the dismissed workers were laid off not only
because of their participation in tfie last strike, but also because they had long
since accumulated marks against themselves in terms of disciplinarp action.
"Struggle to the End"
This aggravation can only further exasperate the union leaders who were not con-
sulted before the dismissals, and arouse the anger of the workers.
It being clear that the government will not allow a committee to investigate the
strikes, the die is cast for a total showdown. The latest reports from Copperbelt
indicated that the miners were waiting for their end-of-the-month pay to go on
strike again as a sign of their solidarity with the arrested persons.
The dismissal of their comrades gives them an even stronger reason for not working.
The next strike action, if and when it gets under way, is likely to be long. It
is said that the rainers have sent their wives and children back to the villages,
and that they are staying to "struggle to the end."
The evolvement of the disturbing government-worker relationships having reached a
limit and Zambia's unity is seriously threatened. Other workere, teachers and
railroad employees also have already threatened to go on strike immediately to
stand behind their demands for housing and other advantages.
On a continent where changes in government are generally not constitutional, espe-
cially in the case of single-party systems, the coming months are going to be very
hard and crucial for the Zambian leaders. The last-minute cancellation of the
trip which President Kaunda was supposed to make to London for the marriage of
Prince Charles and Lady Diana shows that the situation is serious.
The four worker lead~s were arrested by security officers at dawn on this Monday,
27 July, practically the day planned for the president's departure for London.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Afrique-Asie.
9498
CSO: 4719/383
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ZAMBIA
ETHANOL PROJECT SEEN AS ENERGY SAVING, ECONOMICALLY HELPFUL
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 247, 31 Aug-13 Sep 81 p 19 ~ ,
[Text] Zambia, which is totally dependent on imported petroleum for meeting its
fuel needs, has a choice between different means of reducing its bill for importing
hydrocarbon, which at present amounts to nearly $200 million a year. It can take
very strict measures for saving fuel, as neighboring Mozambique has done, look for
other sources of cheaper energy, or, better yet, do both things at the same time.
In neighboring countries, in fact, it is forbidden to drive on Sunday, and gasoline
is sold there only on certain days at specific times. The amount of fuel sold to
consumers is likewise limited.
Where gasoline rationing is concerned, Zambia has known what to expect since the
days of the unilateral declaration of independence from neighboring Rhodesia
(today Zimbabwe) and the decision to take punitive action against that country
in terms of petroleum.
The Zambian government now envisages the possibility of~produ~ing ethanol on the
basis of raw materials from the biomass which would be added to gasoline to reduce
import costs.
The implementation of the first "alcohol" pro~ect ha.s been entrusted to Indeco
Ltd., one of the entirely state-owned affiliates of the gigantic Zambia lndustrial
and Mining Corporation ,(Zimco).
During these past few years Indeco has devoted itaelf to setting up a series of
new industries designed to contribute to the national policy of rapid industriali-
zation and import substitution. . ,
Z'he feasibility study on ethanol production which will result in the national
project was entrusted to Jager Associates of Zimbabwe. This choice among six in-
ternational companies which had submitted bids was approved by the Zambian govern-
ment and the World Bank which is to finance the study. Jager has a broad experi-
ence in central Africa, especially in Zimbabwe and Mali, where it has undertaken
to carry out ethanol production pro~ects. Zimbabwe is already mixing ethanol
with its gasoline.
~ The production of ethanol from raw materials of the biomass, like molasses, sugar
cane and cassava, for energy purposes is already a going thing in a number of
countries, especially Brazil.
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Now Zambia has enough agricultural potential to produce alcohol on a large scale,
especially from molasses Cabout 40,000 tons a year), wfiic~ up to now has been used
pr~ncipally for food reserves and, in part, exported to neighboring countries.
The purpose of the Jager study will be to determine which of these two uses of
molasses is the more profitable.
It is thought that it will be mnre advantageous for the country to devote molasses
to the production of ethanol than to use it as at present. The m3.~cture of ethanol
with gasoline will cause Zambia to achieve substantial savings on its bill for i~
porting petroleum.
In this country the amount of ethanol mixed with gasoline will probably be between
_ 12 and 20 percent, which will produce eavings in the same percentage on the bill
for imports.
It is believed that the study will be finished in 2 months, following which finan-
cial arrangements and an implementation plan will be worked out. The completion
of the project could come about 2 years after the signing of an agreement on equip-
~.ent and machinery.
The International Finance Corporation and the World Bank have already shown an
interest in making a financial contribution to this project.
Besides savings in foreign exchange, the new technology will undoubtedly create
new job opportunities, and perhaps will make possible, at a later date, the expan-
sion of the sugar cane fields.
COPYRIGIiT: 1981 Afrique-Asie.
9498 END
CSO: 4719/383
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