JPRS ID: 10056 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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JPRS L/ 1 Q056
16 October 1981
West Euro e Re ort
p p
cFouo 53~8, ~
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JPRS L/10056
16 October 1981
~ WEST EUROPE REPORT
(FOUO 53/81)
CONTENTS
ECONOMIC
FRANCE
Patronat: Role, Policies Under Socialist Governm2nt
(Henri Vacquin; PROJECT, Sep-Oct 81) 1
POLITICAL
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Strauss on Coalition's Problems, CDU/CSU Policy
(Franz Josef Straues Interview; STERN, 10 Sep 81) 7
FRANCE
Revel: Mitterrand Policies, Contradictiona
(Jean Francois Revel Interview; CAMBIO 16, 15 Jun 81) 15
Debray's Cuban Ties, Government Role Exsmined
(CAMBIO 16, 15 Jun 81) 20
ITALY
New Law on State Subeidies to Parties Proposed
(Luciano Santiili; EURQPEO, 14 Sep 81) 22
SPAIN
PSOE's G�uerra Optimistic About Party's Proapects
(Juan de Dios Mellado; CAMBIO 16, 7 Sep 81) 30
_ - a- IIII - Tn1E - 150 FOUO]
C/~D ACTT/~T i ic~n n~r~ v
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ECONOrtIC FRANCE
PATRONAT: ROLE, POLICIES UNDER SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT
Paris PROJECT in French Sep-Oc.c 81 pp 949-954
jArticle by Henri Vacauin: "The Need for Employ~er ldentity"] _
[Text] In four rounds, the employers have lost political power. Along with jt
they also ]_ost a certain type of relationship with the admini:;tration. The labor
inspector is becoming more of a source of worry~, the "provisianal order" is becoming
l~ss.clear, "the RG [General Information Directorate of the MinistCy o� the Interior]
is becoming less useful," "the conciliation board members are less slow, and layoffs
are even more rigid while it iG almost impossible to fire any labor union delegates,
all of this is taking place against the background of an expanded labor union role
in the enterprises. The employers suddenly find themselves exposed, without any-
body to latch on to in dealing with a poliCical power who~e scale of values is as
~ alien to them as it is unpredictable and disquieting.
_ Employers in Limelight of Politics
a
Since May and June 1981, an entire population stratum, which plays a decisive role
in keeping the economy going and thus managing its performance, ha.s been adrift.
It is ev~n further shaken up by the close look which the political power or the
labor unions are taking at it in their naiveness or ignorance. "It is enough to
make you vomi;.," says one; "this is like travelin~ steerage,'~ said another in Ju1y,
, at a moment when the employers, circling the wa.gons, are more concerned with
_ standing shoulder to shoulder than developing a detesminatfon to harm anybody.
' In this verq bjna�ry country, the images of Ep3na1 worked too well in the past to
permit the recognition of the real identity of the other side to be easq. Today,
- the employers are paying the price. Of course, the former ma~ority and they them-
~elves ff~ade much use of the procedure to deny the Left an.d the labor unions but
they did not gain anything. Before Chat, the Iabor unions developed under the same
Manichean gaze and we hav2 been able to see the results for ourselves. The poli-
tical majority and the labor unions ehould meditate on that score at the risk of
failing to bring about the change which they are henceforth committed to. Since
1974, it was that same desire for change whicY! brought Mr Giscard d'Estaing and
tnen Mr Mitterrand to power: This is a latenC demand �or a more reli~.'~lp social
regulation system, aimed at less unemployment and more efficiency.
Because Giscardism did not succeed in ~nod3fying the effectiveress of the social ~
triptych, that is, the public powers, th~ employers, and the labor unions, it is
now Mitterrandi~m which is today responsible for doing the job. The social
consensus, which the goverument is seeking, because this is a profound demand,
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means that it is necessary to rethink the links between the employers, the labor
unions, and the government. It would work onlq within the context of the social
game, with the labor unions replacing the employers in t.he privileged link which
the latter had with the government. The social crisis triptych--in coming to
_ grips with the 2 million unemployed in the future--needs a strong policy and that
means a labor unionism which wi11 awaken to reality plus a powerful employer
identity so that mutual exchanges may be bounced and so that the realities of
the enterprise may be presented in the debate even and above all if the interpre-
tation which the employers give to events is different from that of others.
- Now, this fundamental need for a strong identity for each actor does not depend on
- ~ach of them. The most wlnerable right now are the employers; it is perhaps not
entirely useless to remind the new government of that either. Pulitical power
always structures its conversation partners and this is particularly true in
France where the employer institutions craditionally have been strongly under its
~ control. The abrupt break of the umbilical cord between the political establish-
ment and the employers will only accentuate the solitude of the employers. It
will be necessary to avoid any hasty interpretations of their beha?ior at the risk
of understanding nothing.
The State of the Employers
In the face of this new attitude, where are the employers and, in order better to
understand their state of mind, where do they come from? Beyond their well-known
heterogeneity, they have in cc~mmon a taste for power, for action, a developed sense
of individualism, an aggressiveness stimulated by competition, and great pragmatism.
All of these are aspects which characterize them even ahead of the profit motiue.
To succeed or to last, they also need some contradictory aptitudes, including
strict management and a capacity for transgression without which their can be no
creativity. While they have no monopoly on these aptitudes~ they live them daily
with a sanction of their decisions which is a11 the more immediate, the smaller
they are--and that helps to develop the art of decision-making.
Nevertheless, the employers, like the rest of French society, can be subdivided in
various,ways, depending upon the approach. The Marxist apgroach gives us a rather
homogeneous repres~ntation, except when the vicissitudes of elections introduce the
need for separating the big ones from the little ones. The e~ection approach lines
them up in the form of Giscardo-Chiraquians. Looking at their current or future
ways of behavior, general definitions are even more effective. Their pragmatism,
their loyalty to the enterprise, and their fighting spirit in the end make them
accept social and political changes. But right now, the employers, small or big,
are in shock and they are worried and their first reflex is to kfck. The preceding
administration was familiar to them; they knew how to anticipate what it was going
to do; the new administration is still rather hazy regarding its blueprint and the
more it is so,~the more it play~ on cords which are not theirs. The visit to the
Pantheon of President or the sincerity of the premier may seduce the crowds but
they irritate, they confuse, and they even shock a little bit and lyricism is
often something unusual in employer circles. Mr Barre had gotten them accustomed
to the upgrading of business, while the newcomers, with a few exceptians, appeared
less competent and less credible to them. Anti-intellectualism is as widespread
among the employers as workerism is among the labor unions.
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After the Fear oi the Labor Unions-a Revolution of Habits
Finally, for most of the employers, the elections were not won only by the political
Left but also by the labor ur:ions. This is another characteristic of the majority
of French employers; the labor unions were never really recognized as a fact of 1ife,
they were baxely tolerated. Labor unionism inspires fear ar.d that fear grows the
more one has to deal with it. Now, more than two-thirds of the employers, the
small employers, are not familiar with it; they experience it through agents,
_ avoiding the cut cff figure of 50 persons and they establish branches for groups
of 49 people. For those who have practical experience with the labor unions, the
"annoyances" rather than fear characterize their behavior and their familiarity~
with labor unions, as a fact of life, is approximative~; by waq of example we might
' mention the hard approach which was greatly developed after 1978 where the decline
in the fighting spirit in support of wage demands involved the enterprise manage-
ment in a struggle usually directed against the labor unions as such.
From Mr Furnon at Novatome, going through the "salt mine" ot SNIAS [National Aero-
- space Industry Company], at Marignane, where an employer group worked to eliminate
the labor unions as a fact of life in gEneral or mounted a selected drive in which
the CGT [General Confecteration of Labor] and the CFDT [French Democratic Confedera-
t ion ~f Labor] suff ered heavily. In other employer circles, fear produced soft
technologies for the elimination of manufactured products in the peripheral re-
search companies of the employer institutions. Finally, a certain liberal, modern,
young or Christian employer group, although in the minority, pursued a strategy of
cooperation with the labor unions. According to all evidence, this group is today
least troubled. Thi~ fear of the labor unions on the part of the employers is
accentuated today by the specter of ~he extension of ~ ~tive bargaining agree-
ments, particularly in the PME [small and medium-size businesses] where the assump-
tion as to the development of labor unionism in the streets, in the counties, or
' in the residential sections causes a real scare. (A labor uniunist once a week
comes to the street, as is don.: by the CFDT in Paris in the Sentier section.)
Here again, when the extension of labor union influence takes place, the employers
simply adjust, finding out that reality is less anxiety-generating than the myth.
Right now, fear is sustained by,the absence of contact which permits all kinds of
assumptions, including naturally the moat apocalyptic ones. For the most part,
the employers associate labor unionism with an attack on their freedom to make
decisions; it matters little to argue about the refusal of the labor unions to
become.involved in this field; this fear has irrational strength behind it.
The employers also are going to have to submit to a long-range regionalization and,
as of nnw, a new w.:y of gradual negotiation, from the national level to the branch
level and down to their enterprise. We cannot rule out the possibilitp that the
time when it was enough to implement the decisions of the particular labor union
~category is gone. The reduction in working hours will really be negotiated in the
�ield as a function of the special features of each enterprise. Tt wi11 be necessary
to negotiate the replacement of certain gains with others, based on th~ specific
1 nature of the enterprise and the momecit; it will be necessary to know how to work
out temporr~ry and renegotiable accords, to replace the sliding scale with the
- scale of economic realities, and to negotiate partial compensations and productivity
increases. In addition to surprisea on the market and regarding credit, the
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employers will have to learn to negotiate differen~ly, taking on the burden of
having to train their labor union conversation partners in absorbing mana,gement
data which for the most gart are beyond Chem. Never before perhaps has so mucn
been demanded of them. This is because they are not on~y asked to participate
in a modification of social relationships but also to prevent the ravages of in-
flation in connection with 7ahich power in wage negotiations will quickly tell
them that they are the best guarantors.
Ne~i Legitimacy
Accustomed to adversity, the emnloyers should, after recovery, benefit from this
situation and derive some advantages. There are many elements in their favor.
, Since 1974, the crisis has considerably upgraded the image of business; the
French have become aware of this: Jobs and the quality of life constitute a de-
cisive key in Che enterprise. This realization of what business means is accompanied
by a simultaneous understanding of the management function. In 1968, many employers
had confused the demand for a different type of authority with a re~ection of
authority and government. A3 a matter of fact, wiiat we have now is a tremendous
number of demands that must be handled--b~it 9.n a different waq, this way. This is
perhaps what brought Mr Giscard d'Estaing down and what Mr Mitterrand understood
- so we11 since he is a fan of Florentine authors. The new administratian has much
charisma and much in the way of symbols; it is also developing an image of power
whose fallout will benefit the legitimacy of the exercise of decision-makixtg
authority by the manager of the enterprise.
Invested with this symbolic reinforcement of legitimacy, the employers will also
benefit from an entirely different demand addressed to them by the government. Of
course, less will be possible in the way of excesses because surrounding labor
union and government pressure will be much more present; but, regardless of how
' little the rules may be respected, the administration, which needs the employers
- for the economic upswing, will become more sensitive to their state of mind. And
that includes compensation for the increase in the interoccupational minimum growth
T�rage, the recasting of the entire social security setup, as well as the desire of
the new administration in Paris to meet with the enterprise bosses. Never before
has an administration expressed such curiosity�in meeting with business and the
employers who are less and less considered exclusively as profiteers but also as
sources of jobs.
The Possible Awakening to Militantism
The average employer conceives a link with his professional organization as being
somettiing very close to anarchism where ind�vidualism exerts pressure on the desire
for collective investment. From his labor union, he expects assistance in terms
- of disputes and the law, he expects aid concerning the rights for supervised working
time and an often narrowly corporativc defense of his indivj.dual interests. The
average employer was a virulent autonomist; in his eyes, the CNPF [National Council
of French Employers] and the CGPME [General Confederation of Sma11 and Medium
Size Businesses] were very Parisian organizations from whom he demanded much with-
out giving any of his freedom out in the field.
In their entire past, the employers have displayed tremendous allergy against
collective organization. The only moments of unity came during the time of the
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great fear, in 1968, before Grenelle, and the launching of the ECSC in 1936. The
corporatist-individualist had ~t limited need fer collective identity to suppoxt
him. Today, a radical change is taking place. The French Left wants_"to diffuse
power in the enterprise";th:Ls suggestion touches the very center of the scale of
values of the small or big employer. TI~.e stak.es are no longer measured in terms
" of 2% more or less in financial terms but involve the very foundation of employer
identity. From this change will spring an entirely different demand for collective
belonging and emgloyer identity, in other words, a stronger demand for a national
- link around which this identity could take shape. The emploqers are going to
~.scover the strength of the unity myth.
The 18 July 1981 protocol on the reduction of working hours was forwarded for nego-
tiations by branches and the latter in turn will pass this on to the enterprises
before spelling out their commitment. This decentralization will make the employer
negotiate on the basis of his own specific nature and he will no longer be im-
plementing a nationwide agreement. This is an evolution in the association liak
between the employer and his organization; the employer will ask his local,
departmental or regional association to help him in negotiating. And the employer
organi2ation will get more involved in the real situation faced by.its members.
- This double phenomenon can lead to a kind of association link which would be some-~
thing new.
The political establishment has tui`s?ed regionalization into.the keystone of its
reform drive. This upgrading of the department, of the region, as far as the
employer is concerned, will move the decision-making piaces closer to the place
of his preoccupations. A personality in his region, very much in evidence on the
social scene, the employer is already in a good position to tackle his task much
~ietter than the local unian leaders. Decentralization will upgrade or create
regional negotiating bodies for which the employer structures, somezimes unused
for a long time, are much better prepared than the labor union structures. The
employers will discover that reality offers much more opportunities than the
apocalyptic visions might hint today.
Toward a Powerful National Employer Confederation?
The fear of the wolf, the defense of identity, the learning of negotiating pxoce-
dures, the adversity represented by the international crisis, the obligation to
_ go it alone--now that they have lost their mentor with the disappearance of a
friendly political establishment--the need for henceforth having a common frame
of reference, a doctrine, a policy-all of these are new factors whose combined
effects will push toward a rally. It remains to create the doctrinale and organi-
zational conditicns for this profound demand. The employers are not entirely
~ helpless. Over these past 20 years, they have often struggled with these problems,
regardless of whether it involves doctrinale or even awkward research (the liberal
- charter of Mr de Calan) or proposals for structural reforms in the GEROP. Regard-
less of the tools which the employers may use, they face one problem: At last to
create the great employer confederation which will be totally representative and
which will be adapted to the profound latent demand.
Did not Mr r~itterrand, from the CERES [Center for Socialist Studies, Research
and Education] to the Rocardians, manage to solve the problem of squaring the
circle~which was more complex in ita heterogeneity than that of the employers?
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If Mr Ceyrar_ goes, it now remains for the employers to figure out their polic3~ and
to find the leader capable of tackling the difficult management of the operation.
But that is not the least paradox: At a moment when they believe they have last
~ much due to the elections, the employers find themselves fcrced to win thQir
identity.
COPYRIGHT: CERAS, 15, rue R.-Marcheron,92170 Vanves.198,1
5058
CSO: 3100/982
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POLITICAL FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
STRAUSS ON COALITION'S PROBLEMS, CDU/CSU POLICY
Hamburg STERN in German 10 Sep 81 pp 264-271
~[Interview with CSU chief Franz Josef Strauss: "'If Schmidt Has the Courage To
Reduce Social Payments, We Are Prepared To Support Him
[Text] In an interview with STERN, CSU chief Franz Josef Strauss
explains why the CDU/CSU should not hope for a breakup of the
SPD-FDP coalition and under what conditions the chancellor can
count on CDU/CSU support.
STERN: More and more Germans want.to emigrate because they do not see any real
f uture prospects. How do you feel personally?
Strauss: Uneasy too when I think about the present situation in Europe and in this
- country. For simplicity's sake I draw on the words of Economic Minister Graf
Lambsdorff for the conclusion that things are not whati they should be in this coun-
try. He has said recently that the country must be straightened out again. Surel_y
one does not make such a statement unless something is not right.
STERN: This probably is also the view of those who are emigrating, and thei.�r
number is increasing. It is expected to amount to 100,000 next year.
Strauss: Too many things are converging at present--the fear being st:irred up by
ideologists to serve their purposes, the fear of war being stirred u~ by people
espuusing pacifism, behind which is Moscow's psychological warfare. Added to this
is the vague feeling that the foundations of prosperity are swaying and that the
pillars of stability have already partly burst. Perhaps one o~:ght to include a
third motive. People see countries with great expanses, where life is more informal,
with less government providence anct social eare, less government omnipotence, with
greater personal freedom of movement and, at t'~e same time, substantially greater
risks and less social security--the United States, Canada, Australia. I at least
have not heard of anyone wanting to go to the countries of really existing socialism.
~ STERN: Do you seriously believe that the fear of war now manifesting itself in the
protest of the peace movement is exclusively the result of 3oviet propaga:~.da? Don't
you think that many people are honestly and sincerely manifesting their displeasure
about constantly increasing armament?
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- Strauss: I want to make this clear once and for all: I have never yet fmputed a
dishonest motive to convinced pacifists who are against any use of force, but I
have done so in the case of communists espousing pacificism to serve their ~urpvses,
in whose view Soviet atomic weapons are instruments of blessing, whereas at~om~c
w~apons in the hands of the Americans represent diabolical means of mass annihila~
tion. In this connection, even though unfortunately hardly any history is being
taught in school any more...
STERN: ...Not in Bavaria either?
Strauss: In Bavaria still and again, but not to an extent I f ind sat~stactor}r. In
_ this connection, I say, one should not forget the disastrous role play~d b~ the
pacifism debate in France and ~3ritain in the thirties. Hitler was aelighted about
its expansion, made sure he was kept informed about its progress and dre~w the con-
~ clusion from itthat, because of their internal exhaustion and becausP o~ their
internal weakness, the western pouers.in the event of an atta,ck ~ga3n,st, P~land
would no longer be in any position to implement their Polish security guarantee.
~ STERN: What do you mean by that?
Strauss: All collectivist systems, all totalitarian ~tates have an.~.nner law--
expansion of power. They are not satisfied until whoever is their closest neighbor
is subjected by force to their will for power, or at least made politically -
dependent.
STERN: You once said that Brezhnev has more brain~ in his behind than his German
- admirers have in their heads. So chances are that he will moL start a war.
Strauss: I said so after an anti--Reagan campaign in part of the press and the
media public corporations. As if Reagan were the cowboy in international affairs,
constantly in a"High Noon" mood, his hand on his gun, walking into the Western
saloon, shooting down the lights--in other words, representing an incalculable
risk. Reagan had said: The communists lie and cheat when they are concerned about
world revolution. The German admirers of Brezhnev and opponents of Reagan then
immediately empathized with Mr Brezhnev, noting while shedding crocodile tears that
the door between Moscow and Washington had now been slammed shut for an indefinite
period. They had not even been able to dry their tears when Brezhnev declared that
he attached th~ greatest importance to meeting Reagan as soon as possible in a
summit meeting to discuss all great international questions, and thus also those of
armament and disarmament policy~ I therefore need not retract any of my assessment
of the tactical attitude of t~ralitarian states. I consider Brezhnev a true states-
man who, unlike Hitler, is not blind to risks or obsessed by risks but conscious
of ri~ks and shying away from them.
STERN: Fear happens to be the basic feeling in our time. Since the founding of
the Federal Republic is has never been articulated as strongly as now.
Strauss: That is true. But we should also name the fearmongers. How about the
federal chancellor, who has claimed several times in all seriousness that the
CDU/CSU is conjuring up the danger of war and that the SPb alone offers a guarantee
of peace? Is that not fearmongering? There is a macabre humor in the fact that
now suddenly the chancellor in Copenhagen is urgently reproaching Europe for being
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too :~fr:~icl. 'Phi~ i.s a case of someone feeling guilty, becau~e, if only owing .
- to his high position and his former high reputation, he has decisively contributed
to generating that fear. It is a case of someone switching from the arsonist's
~ role into the f ireman's uniform. The whole spectacle being staged by the SPD in
connection with the counterarming decision and the decision by the U.S. Presiaent
- to produce the neutron bomb--a spectacle in which Soviet producers too have made
known their interest and their participation--has led to an increase in this
climate of fear.
STERN: There is also fear for our economic future. But since the federal government
began its efforts for a budget reform the CDU and CSU have been silent. leaving the
citizen in a quandary as to w:~ure the CDU/CSU would do its red-penciling...
Strauss: ...This question was bound to be asked...
STERN: ...At the moment it is the most urgent question...
Strauss: ...I will not avoid it either. But firat I would like to make it clear
that we refuse to share the responsibi~ity for all that the SPD-FDP coalition has
botched since 1969, and also that we are not prepared to take the blame for the
governmezt program, whieh is inadequate and unbalanced and constitutes a poor
compromise.
STERN: But the citizen is entitled to expect a clear statement by the opposition
concerning the policy of expenditures for the next few years...
Strauss: ...Nor do we want to get o ut of that. On the contrary, we will make some
economy proposals of our own. As long as the government is not prepared to expose
*_he true causes of the poor financial situation with unsparing self-criticism, and
to steer a radically new course from social-care thinking to performance thinking,
there is no togetherness anyway. So please no further search for alleged scape-
- goats to serve as an alibi for one's own FailureS
STERN: What do you mean by that?
" Strauss: When things were going downhill economically, the SPD-FDP government
never looked for mistakes of its own. Those at fault always were the businessmen,
the doctors, the dentists or the real estate agents, and finally the oil princes
and the multis--in other worda, me too. For I too am a multi: I own 100 Exxon
shares...
STERN: ...Exxon has 697,000 shareholders...
Strauss: ...One really ought not to overestimate my influence on Exxon's business
policy. But back to the economy program. As far as I am concerned, one thing is
clear: Before one can talk about individual points of budget reform, one mList
reveal the true causes of the precarious financial situation in order tu make
possible a radical change of course.
I am sure the government has not got the strength to do so.
STERN: What do you think are the true causes of the financial straits?
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Strauss: Ev~r since the SPD and FDP started governing, it has become fashionable
- to spend more money than is being earned and, ~n top of that, ihrough ever new
taxes to see to it that ~usiness loses the desire to invest. Without investments
there are no jobs and no funds for covering social expenditures. Our economy has
not slowed down only because of the policy of high interest by any means, as the
_ Social Democrats would like to make one believe. It is suffering far more acutely
- under the disparagement of business and the performance concept. One therefore
has to put an end to this philosophy of envy and to this credo of ignorance. Or
did the SPD and the FDP perhaps not arouse the covetousness which encourages the
lazy to be lazy? When the government realizes this and, on top of it, at long lasi_
summons the courageto make reductions in social payments we cannot afford any
longer, we are prepared to support it.
STERN: In an all-party government? Or are you flirting with a grand coalition to
remove the financial straits?
Strauss: The opposition can ne3ther resign, nor can the opposition claim a ma3ority
in the current Bundestag. The government must approach us. It was not all that
long ago that Mr Schmidt shouted to the CDU/CSU in the Bundestag, "I don't need you
to solve my problems."
STERN: As minister-president you have the opportunity in the Bundesrat [upper house]
to change the economy concept your way. Do you want to take advantage of that .
opportunity, are you going to let the government run aground?
Strauss: In case of a genuine change in course, our offer of cooperatian stands.
But I think the coalition is unable to make a fundamentally different economic and
financial policy, such as is also being mentioned by Genscher and Lambsdorff after
they hzve put the country in disarray as helpers of the SPD. We cannot spare the
FDP that blame.
STERN: At least the liberals have prevented the supplementary tax demanded by the
SPD and the employment program.
Strauss: And that was needed too. For witP~ those crazy notions the socialists
have demonstrated once more that they cannot� learn. As soon as they venture forth
into the economic policy and financial policy sector, they leave their brains in the
cloakroom, then put on a small or large Marx w�ig, including a beard, and then again
hold forth about the theory of the state being in charge everywhere and of the
stupidity of business. They probably will never understand that social security
- presupposes performance which brings in the money. But I cannot expect performance
from someone whom I constantly burdern with new taxes. Therefore all plans for
releasing the money to rev up the economy with the help of tax increases are just
as imbecilic as wanting to make a diabetic feel more vigorous by letting him have
some glucose.
STERN: Is it really possible to do without more taxes?
_ Strauss: The possibilities of taxing the citizens have been exhausted. If one
wants to get the economy going again, one must lower taxes (such as the wealth and
license taxes). Even businesszs that are no longer profitable, that are in the red,
have to pay a trade return tax if they duly pay the interest on long-term borrowed
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capital. As long as the burden of interest was 6 or 7 percent, this was not such
a pressing problem. But now that the interest is between 14 and 16 percent, at
least in this area immediate steps should be taken, and the CDU and the CSU would go
- alohg with these. And the planned new fixing of unit values of real estate must
not under any circumstances lead to a cold tax increase, and thus to cold exploita~
tion of real estate owners.
STERN: You have no use for governmental employment programs?
Strauss: UnemFloyment can be fought only by lasting strengthening of pr3.vate and
public investm~:nts, not by pr~grams intended to offset economic trends. The SPD
calculations to finance government proFrams creating ~obs with the help of ever
higher taxes, in order to rev up the economy, have never yet worked out. The only
correct prescription is to enable businesses to increase their yields, and thus also
their profits, ~ut also to give the workers performance bonuses.
STERN: But first you expect the workers to take on new burdens as a result of
drastic intervention in the social net...
Strauss: ...The social net ought to help the truly weak. Today the social net is
increasingly being abused by the lazy as a comf ortable hammock. That cannot be
tolerated any longer.
STERN: Where would you put the knife first? At continuing to pay wages in case of
illness?
Strauss: Such intervention presupposes a readiness on the citizen's part to make
sacrif ices. . .
STERN: ...It seems to us that this readiness is greater than the politicians
bplieve it is... ~
Strauss: ...I think so too. I am therefore prepared to advocate tough measures.
STERN: You are evading our question. What do you think about continuing to pay
wages in case of illness, for instance?
Strauss: Never fear; you will get a clear answer. We will have to introduce
waiting periods for all w~~rkers in order to limit, above all for small and medium
enterprises, the no long~-r bearable avalanche of costs resulting from continuing
to pay wages. In this country the average absence owing to illness is simply too
high. Surely we are not a nation of sick people.
STERN: Would you also advocate reductions j.n wnemployment benefits?
S~rauss: Social payments have to be examined in toto--in other words, also including
unemployment benefits, which are not excessive in the case of the trul.y unemployed.
Surely it is absurd rhatin this country someone drawing unemployment.com~ensation,
by taking advantage of the continuation of wage payments and of the wage tax adjust-
ment for the year, can earn more than someone who has worked every day throughout
the year. Some action has to be taken there. Just as important are stricter rules
governing the question of whether someone can be expected to take a certain kind of
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job. Or is it proper for the federal government, in 1981 for example, to pay more
thar_ 8 billion marks in subsidies for miners' insurance (as mu~h as three-quarters
of the total expenditures) if the rightly superj.or care of miners is also extended
*_o those who have never worked underground. A~so unavoidable are reductions in
certain areas of overblown social assistance and the canceling of payments in the
event someone refuses a~ob and the like.
STERN: The economy commissars of the opposition are also considering changes in
promoting training.
Strauss: We will be unable to avoid cutting the BAfoeG [Federal Law for the
Advancement of Education] payments to high school students, and of course there
will have to be a rethinking of aid for college students as well. There are too
many college students being supported in the Federal Republic. It used to be that
5 percent of an age group would attend college--and would do so at a high level.
Today an average of 20 percent attend college--lowering the level of performance �
substantially.
STERN: How do you want to make reductions?
Strauss: I am for a two-track system. Whoever does normal-level work can get
loans; whoever comes up with a top performance should get a subsidy or fellowship.
STERN: Why are the CDU and CSU actually being so difficult as far as a reform of
the children's allowance is concerned--for example, as regards introducing income
limits?
Strauss: I don't need any children's allowance of course. Nor do I oppose income
limits. A children's allowance is certainly already problematical as far as the
first child is concerned, for the family's burden does not really start until there
is a second child and particularly a third child. And there, of all things, the
government wants to reduce payments. We don't agree with that.
STERN: Last week it looked as if the government would fall apart over the economy
dispute. Were you hoping for a switch in coalition by the liberals?
Strauss: So far the prevailiag opinion has been that Genscher was confronting the
SPD with the alternative: Either the SPD knuckles under, or the FDP will leave the
coalition. Put politely but drastically, this means that the tail is wagging the
dog. This relationship is now starting to reverse itself. Increasingly the dog
is wagging its tail again, because in the future the threats of the FDP will no
longer be taken seriously by the SPD. Mr Genscher and Mr Lambsdorff have made so
many vigorous threatening statements only to slip into the coalition bed again
afterward, having sacrified their sacred principles in order to make the coalition
last a little longer. They have fallen on their faces again. They did not even
manage to putacross their minimum demands...
STERN; ...But at least they have prevented salient tax increases. But back to the
question: Did you think the FDP would leave the coalition?
Strauss: I have never been one of those who predicted that an FDP change in
- coalition was pending or was to be expected soon for sure. Besides, what Genscher
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wants or does not want is almost irrelevant. As a result of its many strong
statements which then were not made good, the FDP has forfeited its credibility.
We will not permit it to steal away from its complete share in responsibility.
- None of the poor conditions it now deplores would have come about withouC the FDP.
- STERN: Wait a minute, Mr Strauss. Didn't you signal to the FDP some time ago that
if it finally left the coalition and formed a governm~nt with the CDU/CSU it could
even c~unt on Genscher becoming chancellor?
Strauss: I beg your pardon? That did not come from me. But a CDU/CSU palitician
_ is supposed to have said so. I think Mr Genscher himself in conversation with.
several people answered this hypothetical question with a clear n.o.
STERN: Why are you so~fi~-mly convinced that the FDP will stick with the SPD?
Strauss: Because Genscher is afraid that the party will fly apart, that there will
be a rightwing and a leftwing FDP, with neither managing th~ 5-percent hurdle. At
the FDP party congress in Cologne, Genscher had to fight a stron~ wind concerning
his policy of dependability vis-a-vis the NATO two-track decision and his clear
stand about the need for nuclear energy. He had to put his whole prestige on the
line in order that the party congress might not end in an open defeat for him.
Since then he has known where he stands with his party.
STERN: Why is it that the opposition kept silent so ptrsistently in the budget
debate, thus giving the FDP a chance to advocate demands reaching far into the CDU
electoral clientele? Did none of you notice that?
Strauss: Your question is not entirely un~ustified. Genscher b'ew up a balloon,
which then hovered brilliantly over the vacation landscape. But in the meantime
the air has gone out of the balloon again, and it is lying all wrinkled on the
, ground. As opposition we must not pretend to be the government. Besides to a
- large extent the FDP copied our demands. But at the coalition table it lost its
courage again. How does our saying go? Sure they would have liked to, but they
didn't dare be allowed to.
STERN: Anyway, there is no supplementary tax and there is no increase in the
value-added tax.
Strauss: But of the salient intervention in the law governing performance.
[Leistungsrecht] which he and Lambsdorff talked about, only fragments have remained.
This liberal socialist coalition has again shown that it is capable of only one
thing--gradually to make the country ungovernable.
STERN: Ungovernable: that is one of your exaggerations. And, plese, why do you
say "liberal socialist" and not "social-liberal"?
Strauss: Because the latter, as far as r am concerned, means the wrong use of two
ter~?s sacred to me to describe poor results.
STERN: Let us assume that the FDP will, after all, change its coalition preference
before 1984, or that there will be a CDU/CSU-FDP coalition. Is it conceivable ~
that under those circumstances, of the successful tandem of Economics Minister
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Schiller and Finance Minister Strauss of the Grand Coalition of 1966, the latter
will go to Bonn again in order to, as you say, straighten out the country again?
Strauss: That question I have been asked several times in the Bavarian Landtag,
though in a much less friendly tone than yours. Personally I do not have the
intention or desire to return to Bonn as a working politican. The idea that as a
minister-president one has quit national politics is erroneous anyway. I have
learned, though, that one should never say "never," because that way one imposes .
a restriction on one~2lf which might not make any sense one day.
STERN: You would be keen on national polittcs then?
Strauss: I en~oy being Bavarian minister-president, which right now is better than
being mayor of Hamburg.
STERN: Does that mean that you do not want under any circumstances to become
candidate for chancellor once more?
Strauss: I will not allow my person to stand in the way of any formation of a
coalition, if only because of course I reserve for myself the freedom of opinion
and of speech depending on how things are going.
STERN: And how are things going inthe CDU/CSU?
Strauss: The CllU/CSU is facing an acid-~test. It must achieve the masterpiece of
_ subordinating to a greater degree all~int~rests of groups, however legitimate, to
the overal.l concept. That means a radical change in course, a genuine alternative
to the government program, without which the CDU/CSU cannot claim credibility
either.
' COPYRIGHT: 1981 Gruner + Jahr AG & Co.
8;~0
CSO: 3103/448
~

~;k~
~
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POLITI~AL FRANCE
REVEL: MITTERRAND POLICIES, CONTRADICTIONS "
Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 15 Jun 81 pp 64-67
[Interview with Jean Francois Revel, former editor of L'EXPRESS, in Madrid; date
not given]
[Excerpts] Jean Francois Revel, former editor of L'EXPRESS, spent 4 days in Madrid
at the invitation of CAMBIO 16 and DIARIO 16.
"I have signed a contract to write a short treatise on the Mitterrand program, the
socialist plan and, in particular, the anticipated nationalizations which, whatever
the left may claim, entail a total change in the nature of the French economy. If
all the private t,:-~ks are nationalized, the control of credit wil~ be transferred
- completely into the hands of the state, and this is absolute state control of the
economy."
A Facade of Moderation ~
But, with Revel, CAMBIO 16 wanted primarily to analyze the French political siCua-
tion since the Mitterrand victory and before the legislative elections that will
take place in June.
_ CAMBIO 16: What is your opinion of the first socialist government of the Fifth
Republic?
Jean Francois Revel: It is a rather improvised government, aimed at offering France
an image of moderation with a view toward the legislation elections. Personages '
from the old SFIO [French Section of the Workers International (French Socialist
Party)] have appeared, such as Prime Ministe'r Pierre Mauroy himself, who is very
anticommunist; there is Michel Rocard; and the members of CERES [Center for (Social-
ist) Studies, Research and Education] appear to be ~reatly controlled. ~
I mention improvisation because Mitterrand did not want to assume power so, quickly.
He wanted Giscard to remain at tlie Elysee until the 28th, and that is what he told
Roger Frey, head of the Constitutional Council. But Giscard did not agree. He
wished to leave as soon as possible. That forced Mitterrand to move hastily, and
not without creating tension among the government group. For example, the prime
minister who had been planned was not Mauroy, but rather Claude Cheysson, who had
to be content, if we can use such terms, with tYee Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
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Cheysson accepted that relegation very unwillingly, and then demanded, in return,
that the Ministry of Cooperation, which in France means Africa, be combined with
the Foreign Affairs Ministry. In fact,~that ministry has been entrusted to Jean
Pierre Cot, who will come directly under Cheysson. Under Giscard, it was one of
the ministries directly subordinate to the president. And now, Debray's appointment
_ as Mitterrand's adviser, something disturbing, will not help to improve the atmos-
phere.
C16: So, a perfect socialist harmony does not prevail....
JFR: There are individuals on this team who hate each other's g~its. The French
Socialist Party is a great mosaic of movements, in the image of the Socialist .
International itself. There are convinced Atlantists and irate anti-Atlantists.
There are advocates of a mixed economy and advocates of the state's total control
= of the economy. There are Social Democrats and there are Marxist-Leninists; and
Mitterrand has had to give each one of the movements its small portion of power.
C16: How can cohesion and continuity be achieved?
JFR: Everything depend~ on the results of the legislative elections. It would be
a big surprise if the left did not win them, although a fluctuating movement cannot
be precluded either. But let us consider the most predictable hypothesis, which is
the victory of the left. Then, everything would depend on the dimensions of that
victory. The French electoral system is very peculiar, and can facilitate enormous
changes in, and transfers of votes. If the left wins a small majority, of 10 or 12
deputies, Mitterrand will have to give up many things in the socialist plan. If
the landslide occurs, and it gains 50 or 60, it will be backed by a highly radical
assembly, which will demand of it the implementation of all the promised measures,
regardless of how insane they may be. In fact, it may be predicted that a sizable
increment in the number of socialist deputies, elected with the support of communist
votes, would redound, rather, to the benefit of the PS' [Socialist Party] most
leftist wing.
C16: By way of a welcome, Mitterrand has had to confront a decline in monetary value.
JFR: That is so, Overnight, and this is a fact, we French have found .ourselves 25
percent poorer, and it has been necessary to put all the meat on the spit; that is,
ttie Bank of France's reserves, to prevent a more serious decline. We are told to
remain calm, that there are sufficient reserves for 6 months. But this, in essence,
also means that Raymond Barre did not handle it so badly, did he? Now, the govern-
- ment proposes to bring about a tremendous increase in consumption. The interoccupa-
tional Quaxante~d minimum wage [SMIG] will rise to 3,500 francs, in other words,
about 60,000 pesetas. The family subsidies to the aged and retirement funds will
be doubled. The demand will increase, but the supply will not; because there is
no confidence and, in addition, it will be necessary to cope with the demands for
raises in the higher wages, wherein there is always a desire to maintain their
difference from the SMIG. This does not help the battle against unemployment; and,
- on the other hand, it does foster the invasion of the French market by foreign
products which are far cheaper and increasingly cheaper. In short, the prospects
are by no means pleasing, not even for the short term.
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Nationalizations
C16: And what about the nationalizations?
JFR: This is a key issue, concerning which, insofar as I can observe, Mitterrand
has succeeded in deception, even in Spain. His package of nationalixations is
impressive and, in fact, it socializes the French economy entirely. When he is
attacked on th~s point, Mitterrand always hides behind De Gaulle. But he has
nothing to do with it. Mitterxand is nationalizing a vast number o� business firms
whose stockholders are small holders, people with savings and pastal savings bank
accounts; and, in addition, all the private and financial banks, which in turn .
control a huge number of industries. One can readily see that this number of nation-
alizations far exceeds that carried out be De Gaulle. De Gaulle nationalized unpro-
fitable entities such as Coalyards of France, or carried out punitive nationaliza-
tions such as that of Renault, which was accused of having worked for the Germans.
What Mitterrand wants to do would impose on the French economy limitations that
would preclude its being considered a market economy or one of free enterprise any
loreger .
C16: However, during the election campaign he seemed to be abandoning many things.
JFR: During the election campaign Mitterrand was very ambiguous, and constantly used
that double-talk which typifies him. On some occasions he said that his presidential
program had nothing to do with the Socialist Party program; while on others, such
as in the debate with Giscard, he accepted the socialist plan and all its nationali-
zaticns completely. In any event, his so-called "presidential" program was only
slightly more moderate than that of the party. When talking with Giscard, he reaf-
firmed the fact that he intended to nationalize all of the private banks. Now let
him explain how that can be done and,.at the same time, avoid a totally state-
controlled and bureaucratic economy. On the other hand, in an interview that I
held with him for L'EXPRESS, he appeared completely moderate and circumspect,
claiming that the model of society would not be changed, to the point where I had
to call him later on the telephone to point out that, during the entire interview,
tie had never uttered the word socialism. He asked me to send it to him, so that
he could add something containing that word in the margin. And he did so.
There is somethir..g that is clear. If the socialists and communists gain the 300
deputies in the forthcoming elections, I don't see how they will be able to resist
the rank and file of their parties, to prevent all that their leaders have promised
them, in writing. It must not be forgotten that the PS rank and file militant is
as collectivist as the communists. These are ideologists in the style of Chevene-
ment (leader of the PS left wing and minister of technology and research).
_ The Double-Talk
C16: Let's speak a little more about Mitterrand's "double-talk".
JFR: Precisely because Mitterrand has always used double-talk, one day appearing
more of a Social Democrat than Schmidt, and the next, more radical than Brandt, it
is obvious that all his real policy depends on the results of the legislative
elections. It will also depend on the number of socialist deputies who need
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communist votes to win in the runoff election. To give the readers of CAMBIO 16
an idea: In the assembly which has just been dissolved, there were 117 socialist
and radical socialists deputies of the left; now then, of those 117, only 12 had
been zlected without a need for communist votes. A socialist landslide could occur,
and there may be many socialist deputies who do not resart to the communist vote.
But that simply means that the socialist vote has become radicalized, and that the
votes in favor of the PS extremists have increased. On the other hand, if Mitterrand
has only five or 10 deputies as a majority, the moderates, such as Charles Hernu,
who is a classic Mendesist, will be in comm.3nd in the government.
C16: But if he has to get along with such disparate people in order to govern, will
Mitterrand be able to maintain France's international position?
JFR: Actual~y, there are in the French socialist world positions as different on
international policy as on domestic policy. In the present team, there are indivi-
duals totally opposed to NATO and EEC, who practice a sort of Red ultranationalism
and who would completely accept the closing of the borders, because Europe means
the multinationals; and, on the other hand, there are veterans of Europeanism, not
only in the government, but also among the immediate advisers, such as Pierre Uri,
wha was with Jean Monet, and others. Then there is another major sector which is
essentially Third World oriented and anti-American, and which does not consider the
- USSR a threat, because the real threat is the United States, imperialist capitalism
and all that....So there is friction, and there will be friction in the future; it
will increase, and obviously that will result in a weakening of France's interna-
tional position. Now then, Francois Mitterrand has, in succession and at the same
time, used the language of each one of the movements, waiting to see which is the
one in command in the party. For the present, the matter is distributed rather
in favor of the Third World proponents and the leftist ultranationalists, with a
few bouquets for the Atlantists and Europeanists. One need only note who his pre-
ferred guests were on the day of his "coronation": the Gabriel Garcia Marquez's, ~
etc; whereas no dissident, not even those who are closest to the PS and who live
in France, was invited. And who advises him on external affairs? Regis Debray, who
is an agent of Castro propaganda, as everyone knows, I mean that it is an honorable
_ profession....It would suffice to say so publicly and clearly. But that is very
- disturbing, because Mitterrand neither knows nor understands anything about the
Third World. Economically speaking, he is a nonentity. In domestic economic policy,
he is beginning to understand somPthing; but on international issues he cnntinues
to believe in the most childish things: for example, that if the underdeveloped
countries are poor it is because the imperialists have stolen their raw materials,
and so forth. Hence, we again encounter total error.
The Holy Alliance
C16: To conclude, after the fall of Giscard, wheYe does the left stand?
JFR: As we know, the Gaullist RPR [Rally for the RepublicJ and Lecanuet's UDF [French
Democratic Union] have become united in an electoral coalition. This is important
psychologically, because the war, the hatred and the low blows between *.he two
groups were perhaps the main cause of Giscard's defeat. Even in Chirac's own ter-
ritory, in Correze, the RPR promoted voting for Mitterrand. Now the solution to
this problem (and perhaps a possible balancing or compensation effect that is rather
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commonplace in France) may conceivably benefit the right. In spite of everything,
I believe that the presidential majority will achieve the parliamentary majority.
The opposite would be a great surprise. For the right, the most important thing
is having found a leader in Jacques Chirac. Moreover, one observes among the
French electorate a confluence toward a vast center. The French electoral map has
undergone a genuine revolution. It can no longer be said that this or that region
is a territory of the left, or vice versa. For example, the PCF [French Communist
- Party] has lost one labor and industrial zone after another, and has made some
headway in underdeveloped agrarian regions. This is perhaps the only positive
piece of information from the French elections. On the other hand, the moderate
_ right vote tends to occupy the entire map of the nation, becoming deregionalized and
mixed with the also moderate Social Democratic vote. In other words, France seems
to be headed toward an electoral situation similar to that of the United States;
that is, toward a disappearance of the traditional French electoral tribalism and
toward the advent of an electurate that is permeable and changeable, depending on
the individuals, the ideas and the programs offered it, or depending on the interna-
tional situation, and this regardless of the strength of the leading local politi-
- cians. If Chirac knows how to read the French electoral map, and acts accordin~;ly,
he may bring about a great national trend in his favor. He should be ne means
turn the opposition into a right wing conservative group.
Mitterrand and Spain
~ .
C16: Will the relations between France and Spain improve with Mitterrand?
JFR: I have come ro Spain for a few days to rest, to see~bulls and al~o to become .
informed somewhat concerning ~he situation. Despite that coup psychosis that one
detects among cextain colleagues in the press and in some newspapers, I am optimis-
tic about Spanish democracy. It has just won a notable victory in Barcelona. The
updating of the policy, under difFicult circumstances, has amazed Europe, and I
believe that coupism, if there is coupism, has received a sharp.blow, if I may use
the play on words.
As for Mitterrand and Spain, I feel that I am being repetitious, but we are faced
with the same problem of double-talk. In principle, as although he has never
said anything concrete or precise, Mitterrand and the socialists should be more
favorable than Giscard; and regarding the ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group],
after Regis Debray's appointment, I hope that I am wrong, but I don't want to
delude myself, I don't believe that the Spaniards can do it.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Cambio 16, Informacion y Publicaciones, S.A.
2909
CSO: 3110/8
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~ POLITICAL FRANCE
DEBRAY'S CUBAN TIES, GOGERNMENT ROLE EXAMINED
Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 15 Jun 81 pp 66-67
[Article by X.D.: "The Cuban Connection"]
[TextJ When President Francois Mitterrand named Regis Debray a personal adviser for
foreign affairs, the shock and uneasiness increasad in the Western foreign ministries,
and particularly in those of Latin America.
Now, and for the good of civilization, Fidel Castro has just given the presidential
adviser exceptional support, by entrusting Cuba's representation in the UNESCO
executive body to Alfredo Guevara who, in addition to holding positions associated
with the "revolution's" cultural.activities, is the person in the leader's closest
confidence and that of his brother, Raul, in the dark maze of securit~ and the Cuban
secret services, according to reltable sources.
Alfredo Guevara is a long-standing member of the Cuban CoIInnunist Party who, at one
time, when upset, embarked on a crisis with the orthodox communist movement and went
~ into exile in Mexico, coming in contact with Fidel. When the latter overthrew
Batista, Guevara was one of the organizers of the first Cuban security entity, along
with Cienfuegos and others.
_ This man of culture and good taste studied in Paris, and later in Prague. In Cuba,
t~e has served as director of the Film Institute, and is now vice minister of culture.
In fact, Western intelligence specialists and services consider him an essence of
a"Father Joseph" in the Cuban secret services; and he has always been at the side
of Fidel Castro on "histu:ic" occasions, such as those in Bogota or Chile.
Some of the Cuban politic:tans and intellectuals now exiled or jailed in Cuba were
personally interrogated by Alfredo Guevara.
The Mission in Paris
In these circles, which are generally very well-informed, it~ is claimed that Alfredo
Guevara's function in UNESCO is a mere cover. His true mission is that of serving
as a direct contact between Fidel Castro and Regis Debray. Debray's presence in
an office at the Elysee is like manna falling from heaven to Castro.
In fact, the Cuban Embassy in Paris is filled with personnel who are completely
devoted to the USSR, whereas Guevara, although he is a communist, is primarily a
_ m~mber of Fidel's system and apparatus.
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Another important endeavor of Alfredo Guevara, to be carried out together w~ith Regis
Debray on the splendid platform that has returned to his Paris for such things,
consists of the organization of a World Congress of Solidarity With the Cuban
Revolution, to be held in Havana, which would be an imitation of former demonstra-
tions at the time when Castroism enjoyed great prestige among the leftist intellec-
tuals all over the world.
This involves the reconstruction of that fabulous propaganda system, based either on
self-interest or gratuitousness, and fostered with invitations to hundreds and
hundreds of intellectuals and artists to visit Cuba.
In fact, nothing of all that remains in Europe any longer, despite the assiduous
defense of Castroism on the part of writers such as Garcia Marquez or Julio Cortazar.
Alfredo Guevara has just concluded a first stay in Paris, to which he will return
in September. His position in UNESCO has left him a large amount of free time.
Whereas, in the cultural area, Alfredo Guevara's preferred occupation is films, in
the realm of security and secret services, one of his specialities, there are the
subversive and national liberation movemeitts,and there have been indications of
very concrete relations on the part of this individual with the POLISARIO (Front)
[Popular Front for the Lit;eration of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro].
This is not the first time ~hat UNESCO has served as a platform or cover for that
kind of business.
Without going further, in connection with Spain CAMBIO 16 has learned.that, until
- recently, a high-ranking South American (although not Cuban) official of the inter-
_ national organization was responsible for shipping to Spain money from Cuba that
was destined for various extreme leftist organizations.
This money was received in Barcelona by the person who until her death 3 years ago
was the Cuban consul, Marina Diaz Arguello, who also held the position of consul
_ in the Canaries, a major Cuban and Soviet espionage base.
In this regard, it may be recalled that the head of the Fishing Institute in Cuba
is Isidoro rtalmierca, the number one security man.
Havana's interest in subversion in Europe, especially in the Mediterranean countries,
is long-standing. It may be recalled, not without interest, that Regis Debray was
Fidel Castro's contact with the Italian editor, Feltrinelli,when the latter, before
being assassinated, was financing the organization of the first terrorist groups
in Italy.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 CAMBIO 16, Informacion y Publicaciones, S.A.
2909
CSO: 3110/8
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POLITICS ITALY
NEW LAW ON SZ'ATE SUBSIDIES TO PARTIES PROPOSED
Milan EUROPEO in Italian 14 Sep 81 pp 10-13
[Article by Luciano Santilli: Double or Nothing]
[Text] Financing for our political parties. Deeply in debt
incurred by increasingly costly st aff and apparatus,
Italy~s political parties are keeping their fingers
crossed pending enactment of a bill that would dou-
ble the already controversial subsidies they get from
the government. Just how do `~hey spend the money ~
entrusted to them? Are all expenditures justified?
And do the official financial reports tell citizens
the whole truth?
The democracy factory resumes operations this fall amid a sea aF t;roubles-
Things are not going at all well, not only because its customers, the
voters, have grokn hard-hearted, and are looking with increasing lack
of interest at the generally mediocre quality of th~ product. The
parties are in danger of permanent shutdown, or of subsisting on star-
vation rations because they are plagued by debts and by budget reports
leaky as so many sieves. Warns Renato Altissimo, Minister for Health
_ and admin~.strator to the Liberal Party (PLI):"The smaller parties sim-
ply don't have the clout or, if you will, the business income the PCI'
is said to have from bus.iness activities, nor yet do they enjoy the ad-
vantages that come from peopling the civil service and the State, as
does the DC. If the government does not intervene, Ita~y will very
shortly have a two-party system, and the smaller ones will just fade
- away.'r
Like everybody with debte big enough to make them candidates for bank-
ruptcy, party administrators dream of a stroke of luck that will instant-
ly put them back in the black and satisfy their voracious creditors.
The parties have been preparing for thish~aagical turnaround, semi-secr~et-
ly, for months now: a new public finance bill, which will p_�actically
double the amount set in 1974 (45 billion lire per year plus the extras
provided for election campaigns), and, most importantl.y, will peg it ta
inflation, is all ready. When they plucked up courage to place a draft
bill already approved by the Senate on the Chamber agenda, the political
leaders knew very well that they were challenging public opinion.
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The operation is not one of the block-busters that leave great gaping
holes in the national budget: the total cost of financing for the
parties, which will reach 120 to 130 billion lire, will not exceed 3
ten-thousandths of the GNP. And yet the Radicals have vowed an all-out
battle to stop it, armed with more than 8,000 amendments. Roberto
Cicciomessere, who wrote most of them, will make some fairly far-out
proposals. For example, one amendment would confine financing to par-
ties winn ing more than 5 percent of the vote. In this wa.y he will ~ive.
_ his comrades ammunition to take exception to his amendment in intermin-
able speeches which will effectively tie up the Chamber. The need for
hard cash for.the parties is so urgently pressin~, though, that hush-
hush negotiations are already under way to forfend such a threat. Par-
liamen~'s pledge to appropriate billions for fighting world hunger, the
Republicans' perennial demand, is rumored to be the price for calling
off the filibuster.
Actually, not even the R adicals are still making an issue over the legi-
timacy of public financing. "The voters, albeit by a very shaky majo-
rity, have said they want it, and we must take due note of that," admits
Cicciomessere. Furthermore, there is some cogency to the tally-sheet
now circulating among party administrators: the 45 billion lire from
1974 are worth, in real terms today, about a third of that. On the ba-
sis of those figures, there is a lot more muscle to the arguments of
those who demand that the moralization process, the linchpin of the
platform of the government Giovanni Spadolini heads, be ~onducted with-
out hy pocrisy. In other~ words, that State financing be adequate to en-
able the administrators t~ resist the temptation to mingle it with other, ~
less immaculate sources.
The touchstone for mc:asuring the legitimacy of the parties' call for
help thus turns out to be quite a different one. How did they use the
money they have already got from the taxpayers? What has changed in
the composition of their revenues since 1974~ While the answer to the
first question must perforce be that they spent it the same way they
spent funds before, with the extra safety net of a guaranteed income,
it is also easy to note that there are parties, such as the Republican
Party, which already depend for very large percentage.s of their funds
on a check from the Office of the President of the Chamber.~
The rnajor p~rties, with the PCI and the DC in the lead, count heavily
on contributions from members and sympathizers. Their annual reports
contain entries bulging with billions, such as "acts of generosity,'~ or
"miscellaneous revenues." DC administrator Filippo Michele would never
admit, any more than would his colleagues, Franco Antelli of the PCI or
Giuseppe Gangi of the PSI, that that money wasn't laboriously scraped
together, a thousand lire at a time. And yet they cannot dispel the
irresistible suspicion that there are just as many unmentionable con-
t~ibutions now as there were in the recent past a past spattered
with scandal and corruption.
They say in the Radical Party: "The parties informed the voters: you
must finance us out of the public monies, or else we'll steal, we~ll
be corrupted. Yet how many sordid stories have come to light since
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" 1974?" In short, it is by no means certain th.at the public contribu-
tior? has in fact raised the level of moral~_~y in politics, or that it
has k~pt parties and factions immune to the temptation to seek the
- disrf.pz.tf::~t~3.e c}iarity of rogues and scalaw~~gs ~aoking for protection.
No such ~r~ant as the one enjoyed by the 2talian parties exists i.n any
other European coun~ry, al*hough there are many facilities made avail-
~Fl~ i~i t`~~~ t:orm af servi.ces for political activity.
- Cash r~acic ir~~, i~owever, is still vita.l to the Italian parties, a far
- cry fi~om the 19t}?-ceiitury model, stil.'~ working in the United States,
- ~:rf_ campai~~~? orga~lizat~ions which are p,ared down to practically nothing
in off ~,~~,~:rs. "The money from the S~~ate has shored up the party appara-
tuscs, hc,r~:; of a teridei~cy toward bureaucratizati~n that stems from their
_ ezt;reu~c.iti� Ydealogical character, in pursuit of a solid consensus on the
prir~c i~;? ~~s rather than the practice; of gaverning, " reflects Giuseppe
Ruspant;.ni, the PRI's administrator. '
'I'1~.~ f i yures are cloquent ( see table) . The DC spends more than 6. 3 bil-
1 ion 1 i rc a year on salaries, abcrut half what it spends on the press
a~~d pr~opa.g~anda (thc~se t~~~o items are the costliest for all parties).
"We have cut 5taft.', we have work;ed out systems for using people better,
but t.he barnacles, the petty privileges, and sundry people sent round
with r~ecommendations are there, all right, in party offices as else-
where," Micheli compl~ins.
i Altissimo has conductrd bloody RIFs: the PLI has cut its payroll from
130 to S0, yet even that ~ke].eton staff costs almost ~00 million lire,
~ nearly half the regular year'Ly contribution from the State. C1early
the perfectly oiled orgar~izi.rng machine of the PCI, costing 4.1 billion
~
lire a year, shou.td qualify Antelli to run ~he personnel office of a
= multinatiorial solely on ttie grounds of his efficiency. There are those
who still wonder, thou~l~, I~ow the figures in thi, arrnual report jibe
witt~ sums under tl~e charitable contributions heading, upon which, one
= way or another, the Commuriist Party depends.
- Not, all the praise or all the blame of course, falls on one side:
the Social Democrats percent of the vote in the last elections)
_ spend close to a billion lire on their leadcrs, executives, and er:iploy-
ec~s, ac,d another billior~ and a half (those two items alone swallow up
_ the entire State contri'pution) goes for operating expenses (telephones,
rent, or~;anizing expenses, and travel). Either they are spendthrifts,
or else the DC's ~tiche:li is a wizard because he has never exceeded 1.2
- bil:lion li.re to maintain a machine that rakes in better than a third of
r,tie vote.
Evcci t,he part.ies who:>~~ or�~aniz~tion is Xargely a matte.r of f~,ntasy and
the ~c~oci wi.l:l of l,he i r� membec�s, like the Radical Party and th ~ Proleta-
r� i an Unity Party ( PP,~UP run up heavy expenses, albeit commensurate with
tt?cir ~tiowing i.ri tl~c elections. Salaries are not, as they are in the
DC, peg~ed to the contract pay for office workers and the Roman electric
uti.l i ty workcrs, ~?or yet do they match those in the PCI, which are pegged
to the metalworlcers' wages. . Francesco Rutelli, secretary of the Radical
24
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I 6~~~ I~R~
- o~M~ ,~I~I~ ~ ~ ~ ~
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KEY TO TABLE
BOOKS IN THE PARTIES' POCKETS
= REVENUES
1. ANNUAL MEMBERSHIP DUES
2. CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THE STATE
(including reimbursement for regional
- and European campa~ign expenses~)
3. MISCELLANEOtJS FINANCIAL REVENUES
4. MISCELLANEOUS INCOME
ACTS OF GENEROSITY
TOTAL REVENUES ~
EXPENDITURES
1. PERSONNEL
2. GENERAL EXPENDITURES
3. C6NTRIBUTIONS TO PERIPHERAL HEADQUARTERS AND ORGANIZATIONS.
4. EXPENDITURES FOR PUBLISHING, INFORMATION~ AND P1tOPAGANDA
EXTRAORDINARY EXPENDITURES FOR ELECTION CAMPAIGFIING
TOTAL EXPENDITURES
DIFFERENCE
The total expenditures reported by some parties include some not clas-
sified under any of the five headings in the table. The difference
between revenues and expenditures in some cases is not equivalent to
a real deficit. Parties which had accumulated a surplus in the preced-
ing fiscal year may choose on some occasions to carry it over into the
revenues for the next fiscal year.
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l.'arty, makes 400, 000 lire net . And yet ~~xt takes only supporting organi-
zations parallel to the party, such as the Calamandrei Center or Friends
of the Earth to start a hemorrhage that will wipe out the cushion of any
economies. .During 1979 and 1980 the PRI has accumulated a deficit o�
some 860 million lire.
The burden of the peripheral structure, the sales subsidiaries ot the
party-owned businesses, is even more horrendous. The Socialists hit
5�8 billion lire, and the PCI lays out better than 38 billion to back
up its 12,000, not to mention sections and their federations.
To be silent is a fate tantamount to death. All Italian parties are
clearly agreed on the truth of that axiom, judging by what they spend
on the press and propaganda.
Except, that is, for UNITA, which does run in the red, but which boasts
a circulation which, on certain holidays, tops a million. All the
other party papers have almost invisible circulation: a few thousand
copies of IL POPOLO (all DC members of parliament and leaders are re-
quired to subscribe), AVANTI:, I1 SECOLO D~ITALIA~ and UMANITA. Th~e
tab: billions for the DC and PSI,. hundreds of millions for the MSI.
The herculean efforts the Republican Party has made over the past ~`L4
months at economies have gone to revive LA VCCE REPUBBLICANA, which
was mired in debt and losing.money.
To stanch this growing hemorrhage in expenditures, which depends partly
on actual cost increases and partly on the parties' stubborn conviction
that the strength of the apparatus and the volume of propaganda are
directly proportionate to success at the polls (a look at the figures
will show they are wron~), the subsidy simply didn~t have a chance.
That is why the parties keep asking their members for more and more
help. Party cards cost more; the targets for contribution at party
festivals are more and more outrageous; there are more and more cele-
brations and demonstrations, risky operations which often do not even
pay their costs.
In Parliamentary circles it is no longer the communists alone who com-
plain day in and day out about having to turn over a fat slice of their
subsidy to the party. Gi.ovanni Cuojati, the Social Democrats~ admini-
- strator, has had alternately to beg and throw tantrums to get what he
wanted from his own party~s deputies in the Chamber (the party is over
_ 5,5 billion lire in debt). In the other minor parties, too, alms from
MPs is already accepted practice. ~
And even so, this is not enough. The cost of Italian politics, offi-
cially quoted at around 1$� billion lire, is in fact far higher. So
the beleaguered bookkeepers do the best they can with unfathomable
jugglings. Bartolo Ciccardini recounts this peculiar occurrence: the
DC in Rome entered 600 million lire in its accounts as collections for
party cards, which in fact had not been isaued for 'L years. Underground
rivers of money so~.:etimes ooze up, no matter how careful the administra-
tors may be.
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"Their annual reports, morover, while they show cash on hand, do not
include either a statement of financial health (indebtedness to banks,
social security, or suppliers) or a list of assets (real estate, com-
panies engaged in business, real estate, or tourist-trade activities)~'~
explains Benito Covolan, president of the Financial Analysts' Associa-
tion. ~~At this rate various arrangements by the national leadershig
can incur debt, receive financing and gifts that do not show on the
books without anyone's knowing about it. The way they are compiled and
written these days, the parties' annual reports are a mockery."
The Communist Party owns, in addition to its headquarters on~Via delle
Botteghe Oscure and other premises in Rome, 30 percent of its section
headquarters scattered all over Italy. But they do not appear on any
official statement. Equally mysteriously missing from the report are .
the names of the construction and real estate corporation which owns
real estate un behalf of the DC, and the names qf Sofinim and other
corporations run out of the Socialist Party's administrative office.
Only in this last-named party is there anything like open and unashamed
admission of. the possibility that the party might be engaged in busi-
ness activities which help to pay expenses. Actually, a good many
administrators commonly engage in financial transactions which are some-
times put through with the guaranteed yields on treasury bills (DOTs)
- or government bonds (Republican R~spantini, for one, admits doing this
sort of thing), and sometimes floated on the riskier ups and downs of .
the stock market a practice which recently had a lot of administra-
tors wringing their hands be~;ause they had acted on bad tips from un-
reliable sources, according to a persistent rumor at Montecitorio.
These parallel activities are a kind of second job, providing additional
income which could never replace the essenti~l revenue from the public
subsidy. This is why, avoiding unnecessary publicity, the parties ace
going to see to it that the Chamber very quickly increases the set h~n~-
out for all of them. Beginning next January, the contribution will be
updated on the base of an index maintained by the Central Statistics
Institute (ISTAT)minus a third, calculated on the total national tax
revenues. Reimbursement for campaign expenses, however, will be made
immediately and in toto, ratizer than being spread aut in payments over
the legislative term.
"We do not produce goods; we are not like companies that can raise the
price of their products," Micheli argues. The complex machinery that
protects against inf.lation but also helps to fuel it is not,~however,
the only major problem facing Italian companies. The other big push is to
boost productivity. And it is on this score that even those who admit
the legitimacy of public funding and who are sympathetic to the request
for an updating tend to worry a little. What evidence of increased ef-
ficiency have the parties produced since 1974?
Their productivity, measured in ideas and laws for better governance of
- the nation, does not seem to have grown. Perhaps the money given the
parties was not simply thrown away, but so far it certainly is not what
anybody would call a lucrative investment.
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But Are They Public or Private?
That is anything but an academic question to Italy~s political parties.
_ According to the law, political parties are free associations of pri-
vate citizens, without status as a corporation or fictitious person.
Public financing for them was arrived at on the principle that they are
public agencies which contribute to the life of the democratic State.
"It is clearly an anomaly, which ought to be done away with,~~ admits
Ugo Spagnoli, vice-chairman of the Communist MPs. It is an anomaly
which illustrious jurists have suggested redressing by changing the
parties into legal organs (corporations). It is also quite probably a
major obstacle to any system of effective control on their budgets.
The audit of party books by a committee of auditors, even in the more
rigorous version which Parliament will write into the new regulations
on public f inancing, is in f act a mere formality. The secret books of
the political parties will remain in the jealous custody of the party
administrators. Legally recognizing the fact that the parties are in-
deed public organs would make it possible to bring them into the pur-
view of the Audit Off ice.
Against this eventuality, however, thers are no less belligerent argu-
ments. "The principle of control must be made to guarantee the propri-
ety of all revenues; it must not be permitted to shackle the freedom
o� the parties to use their resources as they see fit," is the convic-
tion of Francesco Paolo Bonif acio, former minister of justice, who re-
ported out to the Senate the bill now before the Chamber.
These views carried the day in the Senate partly because the new regu-
lations unquestionably make the annual reports more credible, extend
the requirement to publish financial records to splinter groups.and
lone politicians, and threaten to cut off public contributions for in-
_ complete or imnr~per rPports. Ot~-~r regul~~~;,r.s, however, l~avc room
tor doubt. For iiistance: contributions of less than 5 million lire
per year may remain anonymous.
_ Gustavo Minervini and other independent leftist Deputies, while they
favor State financing, consider the text of the bill as approved by the
Senate inadequate, and have therefore drafted a number of amendments:
a requirement that party administrators retain all documents and papers
bearing on their accounts and make them available to the Audit Board,
and another requiring the Office of the President of the Chamber to
. conduct informal audits.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Rizzoli Editore
6182
CSO: 3104/380
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POLITICAL SPAIN
PSOE'S GUERRA OPTIMISTIC ABOUT PARTY'S PROSPECTS .
Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spani.sh 7 Sep 81 pp 31-33 ~
[Article by Juan de Dios Mellado]
(Text] "If I didn't know his voice, I would say that it was a UCD
[Democratic Center Union) 'progreasive' speaking." This was how a Socialiat
mayor on the Costa del Sol suunnarized Alfonso Guerra's speech to buainesamen
in the tourist and construction industries.
Another mayor was even more terse: "He talks like a government offi~ial," and
a third, from the Labor Party, added: "There is no reason for the PSOE
[Spanish Socialist Workers Party) to exist after what Guerra said. That's
what the UCD is there for."
The pale, completely untanned Alfonso Guerra seems to ha~e spent his .
entire vacation trying to figure out how to put his party and Felipe in
Moncloa. .
"I have the impression that this is how it will be. At least the polls
- show us to be sure winners, although we all know that they change a lot, and
you cannot mechanically.claim that they are borne out precisely. Now then, we
have a chance to win and to have an aizable majority." Guerra feels that
neither the administration nor the UCD will be able to hold out until March
1983. "They've run out of replacements and are incapable of offering hopes
to the country because they can't even offer hopea to their own voters. I
am convinced that the UCD won't make it to the next elections."
Elections in 1982
According to the Socialiet leader, the electiona will be moved up to the
fall of 1982, and "if you prod me further, to the spring of next year."
The government itself is also considering this likelihood and hae already
shown its nervousness by inventing ridiculous thing$ like se~cret pacts with
forezgn powers.
Alfonso Guerra designed his party's electoral strategy at his summer retreat
in Tarifa (Cadiz). At least that ia what we can gather from his remarks.
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"My duty so far as the person in charge of the election campaigns has been
to convince the country that we are going to win.and to dispel any mental
blocks that people might have againet the Socialisza by conveying a sense of
calm. We have a political and even a moral obligation to prepare for the
contingency of having to govern." Guerra, who does not exactly have a
reputation as a moderate, is neither frightened nor worried about the role
that he might have to play in this entire operation. "I don't know whether
explaining all this to the country meana becoming a moderate," and he
challenges anyone to prove that "what I am saying now are not the same thinge
that I have always said."
Of one thing he is certain: If his party doea not win a large enough majority
to govern, it will not turn to the co~nunists. "I have the impression that
we will not go along with the communists, and I think that the communists are
as aware as we are that a Socialist-Co~unist government is not feasible, at
least for the time being. Agreements and compromisea can be re2ched, but
outside the government."
He has an alternative answer, and his eyea turn to certain factions of the UCD,
but this does not mean that the Socialiats are trying to sink the centriats,
"because the poor fellows are alr2ady in bad ahape, but some of them could
fit into a Socialist government."
The French experience, "which we are monitoring with great interest," is not
a model for Spanish Socialists either, becauae each social aituation demands
a different approach and different changes.
But a socialist political map of Europe is already taking shape in Alfonso
Guerra's mind. "Our certainty comes from our ability to offer the country
hope, because Spain wants a change." He draws the following conclusion as
he sinks down into one of the plueh sofas at the Marbella inn: "There is no
one else besides us, except for the people who have been in power since the
dictatorship, and they aren't offering any guarantees to the citizens."
PSOE Congress, Everything in Place
_ There is not a single cloud in Alfonso Guerra's mind portending stormy
weather at the upcoming gSOE congrese. "We l~ave become convinced of our
responsibility, and common aense has settled in in the party."
The PSOE's "number two man" feels that "positions will be very uniform at the
upcoming congress, although there might be some differences." He expressed
_ his complete conviction that "the internal crises plaguing the parties will
show up the least in the PSOE congreas." His almost total assurance was
faithfully reflected in his almoet 2-hour talk with busineasmen and PSOE
activists. He would then tell CAMBIO 16 that hia party's leadership is
working full bore to prepare for the "political entry, which will not be a
mili~ary parade or an easy stroll," and in which Felipe ~onzalez will again
play a major role after a certain period of ~eat and calm.
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Felipe Gonzalez will emerge from hie "barracka" and, from what we can gather
from Alfonao Guerra's remarks, will return of his own accord. "Felipe ia
important, but he is not every.thing," Alfonso Guerra noted. "$ecause
regardless of all his good qualities, his ability to get acrosa to the peopl~,
his personal charm and political imagination, in a~party like ours, Felipe
Gonzalez is not everything." To Guerra, there are other things too: strong
roots, a great organization, unbeatable cadres "and a party leaderahip headed
up by Felipe, and it's not by chance that the two go together."
The PSOE, which almost seems to be tasting power already (if we go by Guerra's
arguments and hopes), could not have had this kind of leader without its
organization behind him, nor could the p~arty organization exist witho~ut
Felipe Gonzalez and the teamwork accomplished in recent years.
"This is not the Guerra I know; they've awitched him on me," said a "
Socialist at the conclusion of the talk. No playing to the gallery, no
headline remarks, not even a"barb." Self-controlled, measuring his words,
~ although this time it was Sancho Rof who infuriated him. Any self-reapecting
administration would have quickly gotten rid of an inept minister like Sancho
Rof. But there he is, and no one can kick him out. And Guerra exclaimed
"Since he's the UCD boss in Pontevedra, anyone can get rid of him."
Guerra is so convinced that the PSOE will win the next election that not
even Calvo-Sotelo causes him to lose aleep, much less makes the victory a
bitter one. With Andalusian, if not Galician sarcasm, he says: "The bitter
victory will be because of the grief on his face, the infinite sadness
reflected on his face. I think he's a good election adversary; I, at least,
prefer him to someone else."
In an a~ir-conditioned, four-star hotel with plusi: cushions, Guerra could be
taken for a tourist who has lost his way, with his enormous glasses and eyes
that look but do not see. His feet are firmly planted and his head is as
; cool as a computer, however. "No one ahould fool himaelf, because this
country's problems can't be solved in 4 days or even 4 months."
iJnemployment, inflation, industrial reconveraion, the rediatribution of
income, interregional solidarity and increased public investment are some of
the issues that the PSOE will exploit in the election campaign. "Halting
the drop in employment and creating new jobs will be one of our main
objectives."
In Guerra's opinion, the first thing to do to accomplish this is to create
a climate of confidence, to rescue ourselves from the economic chaos that
government authorities have gotten us into. In this regard,.the Socialists
feel that they have one unavoidable task: to shatter the n~twork that has a
monopoly on credit policy and to end the widespread paralysis of inves~ment
and low productivity. "Only the PSOE can do this, even if it has to
confront the nine banks that dominate the economy and control credit." And
the Socialists are preparing for this ruthless struggle, which in the
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Socialist leader's opinion has already begun on the Right, which "has tried to
create a climate of fear by insolently claiming that people could lose their
cars and television sets or by employing more sophisticated techniques and
saying that we have sold out to a foreign power."
Another Kind of Capitalism
The 1 percent who control 25 percent o.f the country's wealth will have an
implacable enemy in the PSOE, to judge by Guerra's remarka. He said that if .
the Socialists come to power, they would apply drastic fiacal pressure,
clarifying that they are not againat business, just a certain powerful and
parasitic sector *_hat produces almost nothing. "We would replace plundering
capitalism with productive capitalism, inasmuch as you cannot use the word
businessmen to describe the people who have engaged in criminal profitcering
with cooking oil, killing more persons than terrorists have this year. We
cannot tolerate what is happening with Fidecaya and what ia going to happen
with Banco Occidental. These 'businessmen' are going to have an implacable
enemy in the PSOE."
_ "A change in the system, not a change of edminiatration, is the enly thing
that can work in Spain right now, as has happened in France, and all of this
on the basis of consolidating democracy. The current administration has
pursued a policy of gestures, of taking problems more seriously and of acting
with greater foresight, but that's as far as it has gone and it has not
inspired confidence within society or within the administration itself, because
it hasn't taken any serious steps, suc".. as firing Sancho Rof."
He then fires out a question that resounds through the hotel hall almost like
a shotg~~z blast: "What kind of confidence can a government with a minister
like that generate?"
He does not want to unveil the election campaign strategies that the PSOE's
minds are devising, because one of the party's targets is now the NATO issue.
NATO Membership tidithout Consultation
"They'll force it through on us, without consulting the people. I would like
someone in the administration or the UCD to explain to me why Spain is
joining NATO, becauae none of the arguments essayed so far ia valid, or to be
more exact, no one has explained the advantages to me."
The issue of NATO membership will be the first major skirmish, paving the
way for the frontal assault on power, and according to Alfonso Guerra, the
administration and its party are not waging a clean struggle.
"There was no reason for the government to publicize the military's resolution
on the NATO isaue. In any case, the military is just an advisory body, and
it's not honest to use it like the UCD has done. The fact of the matter is
- that the Right is prepared to reaort to all sorts of arguments and ruses to
sidestep a referendum."
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Alfonso Guerra's keen political noae tells him that the NATO issue is already
virtually decided, although the Socialists have to uphold their views, out
of "n:;rricular concern over the ahameful way in which the UCD apparently
negotiated membership in NATO." Surrounded by eocialiat disciplea, Guerra
adds pragmatically that the government should have first secured full-fledged
membership for Spain in the European Economic Community and then in NATO,
not the other way around.
"The UCD should not use the military as a screen for itss etrategy, because
with or without NATO what our Armed Forcea need is a major technological
overhaul.
"For political reasons, among other things, the Armed Forces have to be
updated technologically, and some of their members have to forget about their
notions of a coup, so that, furthermore, they can be of uae for
something, so that they can be strong and so that they can fulfill the
missions that the constitution entrusts to them."
He feels that the operational divisions, duly modernized and overhauled, ought
to be stationed at our borders, not in urban centere or at worker rallies,
"to give them the feeling that they are defending the nation, and not against
(put it in quotes) 'internal subversion."' ~
"In any case," Guerra says, summarizing his previous thoughte, "we Socialists
are not going to have it easy. It will take more than a day to brea~ the
resistance of much of big capital and to rid the atmosphere of apecters.
The lack of confidence that the Calvo-Sotelo administration is prompting in
itself might lead people to begin placing their truat in us."
The economic program that the PSOE will present at its upcoming congress and
that was drafted in its entirety by Basque economist and deputy Carlos
Solchaga, is reported to be almost completely social democratic. Guerra
himself was hesitant throughout his addreas and remarks about the thorny and
ticklish issue of nationalizations.
"For the time being," he said, "we will nationalize the high-tension grid,
and what happened to Suarez won't happen to us, in the aense that when he
announced this move, he suddenly got 1.3 billion pesetas to finance the UCD's
campaign."
Generating confidence among businessm~n and the social and economic sectors and
throughout the country will be the socialiat platform for getting to Moncloa,
with a clear-cut social democratic program that will go after votes on the
center-left.
This is why Guerra was very careful with hia words. "We must not confuse
nationalization with socialization."
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Guerra could not help getting in this barb: "There's Calvo-Sotelo on a pleasure
- trip in the Aegean, and back here he's trying to sneak through a goal on us
with the Gibraltar issue."
- In Tarifa, with the Rock in the background, Alfonso Guerra sifts through the
socialist economic program that Solchaga prepared and that Guerra will have to
"turn into a vehicle" at the upcoming Socialist congresa, the congress of
homogeneity.
COPYRIGHT: 1981, Informacion y Revistas, S.A.
8743
CSO: 3110/1 g~
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