JPRS ID: 10046 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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JPRS L/ 10046
13 October 1981
_ West E uro e Re ort
p p
CFOUO 52/81)
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JPRS L/10046
13 October 1981
WEST EUROPE REPORT
(FOUO 52/81)
CONTEN75
ENERGY ECONOMICS
BELGIi.TM
Government Criticized on Coal Subsidies, Mine Closings
(Jean Guily; POURQUOI PAS?, 3 Sep 81) ................v...... 1
ECONOMIC
FRANCE
Unions' Role, Dem~nds Under Socialist Government
(Jean Dubois; PROJET, Sep-Oct 81) 3
POLITICAL
FRANCE
Citizens Desire Right-Wing Activity; Chirac, Giscard Plan
(Irene Allier; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 12 Sep 81) ......e..... 12
CGT Leadership Change: Seguy's Health or PCF Stalinists
(Claude-Francois Jullien; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 12 Sep 81).. 17
P1ew Government; Transition, Er.rors, Successes, Future Problems
(Hugues Portelli; PROJET, Sep-Oct 81) 20
PS-PC Conflicts: Pduclear, Military, Immigrants
(Art~hur Conte; PARIS MATCH, 28 Aug 81) 23
TTALY '
PCI'S Colajanni Interviewed en Intraparty Wrangles
(Napoleone Colajanni Interview; EUROPEO, 21 Sep 81) ....o.... 28
- a - [III - WE - 150 FOUO]
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ENERGY ECONOMICS BELGIUM
GOVERNMENT CRITICIZED ON COAL SUBSIDIES, MINE CLOSINGS
Br_ussels POiJRQUOI PAS? in French 3 Sep 81 pp 13-15
[Article by Jean Gizily: "Coa1 ~ Coa1 ~ Coa1:'~~
[:'ext] Willy Claes is rea.dy to grant a 1 yeax reprieve to the
l~,st Walloon coal mine, the Roton in Faxciennes, near Charle:r~oi,
which would thus close its gates on 31 October 1982. The minis-
ter is real"ly too generous. But could we ask the minister about
~~:he fate he has planned for the coal mines of Eisden and
Winterslag, ?ahich cost the Belgian taxpayers just as much?
~ As a matter of fact, our Willy has already answered the question. 3n a recent me-
marandum submitted to his colleagues~ the minister of economic affairs justified
both coal and the coai mines of the Campine, which he sees as one and to which he
generous~y a~;tributes the sa.me future. This, very obviously, a little short. We
are quite willing to adinit, if necessary, the importance, even a relative one, of
a mini-independence in terl~~s of energy. We should no longer ignore possibilities
offered by new technologi.es, in which cansider the underground gasification
our coii:~try is getting behind. �'inally, it is also important to avoid social tra-
gedies 20,000 minezs to find a new job for, which is utopian whiCh would re-
sult from the widespread closings which nobody, furthermore, seems to want. Should
w~ for all that continue to pay the full price, and hlinc~ly so, for an artificial
survival of the Belgian coal mines? This is what Willy Claes, bothered by his
- voters, would like.
This would not seem wise. In addition, such a policy is not within our means. And
the "little red man~" who regulaxly promises us the apocalypse for tomorrow, is not
t'-e last one to know it...
156 Billion - 10 Years
In this case~ the opinion issued by the Walloon executive in Ju1y 1979 appears to
us to carry certain nus;.nces: "In the prevailing uncertainty concerning supply,"
the~r wrote, "the contribution made by the coal production in Lirtburg constitutes
a measure of security, even if the cost of producing coal in Limburg is much higher
_ than that of coal imported at the world price or even than the average production
= cost hithin the Common Maxket. However~ the executive requests that the exact cost
of this measure of security be calculated both in relation to the annual tonnage
_ to be mined and the duration of the exploitation." Two years later, we axe sti.ll
navigating by guesswork and the services of the Ministry of Economic Aff~.irs do not
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seem to be prepared to lift the fog. Well~ a moment of emba.rrassment is quickly
over...
According to Jean-Maurice Dehousse and his fellow workers~ an estimate of the expen-
- ses the state will have to support for loan guaxantees for the National Company fo~
the Financing of Cc.a1. Mines between 1982 anLL 1991 may be estima,ted at 156.3 billion
- francs. It is not certain. This will undoubtedly require a few explanations, if
not an ~,djustment of the aim.
The first thing would be to define the coal policy in Belgium within the fra,mework
of a real energy policy. Why not ther,~ in this context, call w~.th the utmost ur-
gency for a parliamentary debate on ener~r which is continuously being postponed
indefinitely? For administrators worthy of that name, however, it would be an op-
portunity to set in motion a new industrial policy with concrete and immediate fall-
out on employment: Mark Eyskens prefers to criticize the Belgians for living it up
too much. Of course, it is much easier to bawl us out:
On the other hand~ one caa.1 only agree with the Wa7.loon executive when it states
that, in order to prevent the "exponential" growth of the amounts to be paid by
the sta.te for the coal mines fram reaching unbearahle levels, it would be advisable
as of now to consider a ceiling on financial intervention. The possible heirs of
the gravediggers who are currently in power, ase prepasing themselves for a dread-
~ ful succession: in 1991, the cost of the Limburg coal will be, at best~ on the
or~ier of 30 billion franc:s. For budgetary reasons, it wiJ.l no longer be a questior~
_ under those conditions, c>f raising the school standards but of eliminating schools:
One cannot stop progress,,..
The Roton and Others
- The losses soaked up by t:he providential state wj11 continue to climb: from 1,864-
francs per ton for all trie coal mines in the Camrine for the year 1980, they will
reach 2, 500 francs 4~ yea.~~s from now, and 4~, 300 francs in 1990 . As these figures
came f`rom Mr Claes, sre wauld not want to suspect him of ha~ving placed the line too
high...
- To give an example, for t;he first 4~ months of 19�il, the losses per ton at Eisden
were already at 2,120 fr~~ncs, and at Winterslag at 3,211 francs. The Roton, with
_ its 2,398 francs, did noi;~ by the way, have anyGhing to blush about.
Hence, there is cause as it occurred and will occur in the steel industry to
rationalize. The fact tl.zat this rationalization applies solely to the Roton, the
reserves of which were e:stimated at 1,230~000 tons as of 31 October 1981 by the
Service of Mine Ma,nagemE~nt in Chaxleroi, and the closing of which could logically
take place in 1985~ is ciist~.irbing to say the least. One-way savings ase accepted
with increasing ill will in Wallonia where, if necessary, they might understand
and accept that the stat,e turn off the faucet for the Roton as long as a similar
_ effort, equally justifiE;d, is requested of Limburg. Which is not the case.
The coal file has been "put into commission." For the miners of Faxciennes, the
_ wait continues. To settle their fate without taking into account the Belgiaxi con-
text would be an injustice. One more. It would also ~e an economic mistake. One
more a1so...
COPYRIGHT: 1981 POURQUO=[ PAS?
_ ~~63
cso: 3100/963
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$CONOMIC FRANCE
i
UNIONS' ROLE, DEMANDS UNDER SOCIALTST GOVERNMENT
Paris PROJET in French Sep-Oct 81 pp 940-948
[Article by Jean Dubois: "The New Social Deal"]
[Text] In the latest statements from the employers and the
- labor unions, J. Dubois detects relatively parallel analyses
which can lead to compatible strategies. The labor unions
and the employers are facing common problems and it is in
their interPst to solve them together. Negotiations on
both side~ ].ook like the only way out of the current dead-
lock.
_ "A new social d~al," it was announced ~ust about everywhere. The thing seemed
certain if one listened to the apocalyptic remarks from some 2mployer circles:
"Just read the socialist draft, look at all the powers given to the labor unions;
business and industry will be paralyzed." The same impression came from wage
earners, that is, "to cut down" some militants who allowed themselves to dream:
"no more arbitrary actions by the employers; the time has come to move on to self-
management." ~ new deal--are you sure? Leaving each to his own imagination, let
us address ourselves to the central question: "Is there a chance that the change
_ in the political majority might introduce a radical transformation in relations
between the employers and the labor unions?" The answer is not obvious. This
might be a simple episode in the endless struggle which, for a century, has been
going on between the employers and the labor unions. But it is also possible that
an irreversible turning point might be reached, that the labor unions might assume
a new face for themselves and that the style of industrial relations in France
might be turned upside down. ~
~ The Hundred Years' War Continues
~ne word comes to mind in describing French-style industrial relatians, in compari-
- son to other countries, and that word is archaism; these relations essentially
- continue to be a part of the patterns inherited from the 19th century. A revo-
lutionary labor unionism, an agent in the class struggle, establishes for itself
the objectiv2 of abolishing the employers. Quite logical~y in keeping with the
adage of "to kill or be killed," the employers drEam of the death of their
_ adversary. Even though the most radical solutions a long time ago lost their
likelihood of materializing, the attitudes did survive: Open warfare is followed
by guerilla war. Throughout these past several years, the deliberate policy of
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F'Oi2 Oi~~Ff iAl.: [1.~iF ONi.Y
a number of employers was aimed at pushing the labor unions to the sidelines as
much as possible, in the absence of success in eliminating the lahor unions al-
_ togeth~r. The labo~ unions, on the other hand, adopted ways of behavior that
~ amounted to counteraggression aitd *_-e;ject~~d anythinb that smackecl of "class
= collaboration."
_ A third partner--tae government--always h~ld a capital position in this social
war. To win, each of the protagonists needed to have an ally. The more the powers
of the state grew, the more did the conquest of political power become an essential
stake. The two-way game had become a three-way game and developed according to an
unalterable scenario whose end does not seem to be coming. As if they were obeying
the movement of an invisible scale, the advers~ries alternately experienced success
and defeat. Let ~is recall the latest episodes which are not too far back. In
1936, the labor unions advanced along the bz~oad Popular Front; thi~ advance was
wiped out by the events of 194U aitd th~ Vichy regime. In 1945, the labor unions
resumed the offensive but the gains of the Liberati~n would be eroded as the Left-
wing parties lost all access to power. The year 1968 brought back a certain dash
[o the labor union movement but the economic crisis quickly put it on the defensive
while the employers congratulated each other on having a government to their
liking.
Within this perspective, what does May 1981 mean? A simple return swing of the
scale; it now remains for us to wait for the next phase and the medj.um-term
scenario for the ~utur.e wil'_ be written without any big chance of mistake.
The labor un~or~s will Lenefit from their pasition of strength to get as many ad-
vantz?ges as possible, both regarding tt~:eir conventional demands (wages, job
security) and in terms of institutional power (labor union rights, powers of the
- enterprise committee). On the strength of their closeness to the political
establishment, they wil~. be persuaded to ~refer the way of the broadest possible
legi~lative measures.
- The enterprise managers, in falling back_ on arguments of an economlc nature, would
try to cut. their losses and will bow to the inevitable; but they wi17. watt for a
real economic crisis to give them back their position of. strength which they held
during the preced:ir~g phase.
In short, only the balance of forces will have been ~eversed for a moment. Nothing
else will really have changed in the nature of industrial relations. The Hundred
Years' War will continue and 1981 will just have b~en one of its episodes.
~ This scenario is the sc:enario of failure. Not only political failure in more or
_ less long-range terms but above all a fundamLntal failure foi the isbor unions.
' It is not by accident that there has been taik of deunionizing far se~,~eral years
now; this is not a temporary or passing phenomenon. �ome re~ent publie opinion
~ surveys confirm the diagno~;is: Wage earners are profoundly tied to the fact ~f
the existence of labor unions but they want a different kind of unionism. The
passage of some social laws or an increase in labor union rights will not in any
way constitute a response to this demand. Tn the a6sence of f3:nding it, the pre-
_ dicticn of deunionization wi11 undoubtedly in the end become a reality. And that
will mean failure.
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Sociological Lesson from May 1981
~
This scenario appeared to be the most likely so lang as one looks at it throu~h
the spectacles of the past. On the other hand, a different reading of events is
pcssible if one adopts a broader sociological perspective. Our society is
changing and what happened in May 1981 evidences the emergence of strong ten-
dencies which have been at work for a long time already. Henceforth, the victory
of the Left is ao longer a part of the cycle of eternal return but signals a
possible advance toward the establisizment of new industrial relations in a
difterent society.
A Differentiated Society
- There is a first strong tendency which creates almost unanimity among sociologists:
We are moving toward a more differentiated society; one can no longer describe it
in terms oi the simplistic categories of yesterday. There is no longer any bloc
of rich people facing the masses of poor people, with the working class facing
the bourgeoisie. The demands remained homogeneous so long as the wage earners livec'.
in poverty and ir.security; with the rise in the living standard, differentiated
needs emerged. The qualita*_ive themes became intermingled with the quantitative
themes. Subgroups took shape and they no longer resemb].ed the excessively vague
- definitions of the working class. Each of them has its own aspirations which
- sometimes c~ash with those of the other subgroups< Some of them want to be able
to work more and others demand more free t{.me; the immigrants demand that we make
room fo~ them while our native-born citizens defend their ~ob monopoly; young and
old, men and women are becoming involved in competition. And let us not speak of
_ the objective diversity of status or economic situations; what is there in common
among those wage earners whose job is almost guaranteed and rhe seasonal workers
whose number keeps multiplying? What is there in common between those workers in
; the small enterprises of the declining branches and those technicians in the big
industrial groups that are at the very spearhead o~ technological progress, etc.?
For the past 2 years, confl.icts have each time been regrouping c~ifferent sub-
categories; sometimes wage earners in one and the same enterprise (including
_ supervisory personnel), sometimes a single job category, and other times even a
single workshop or a single establishment in one and the same company, sometimPs
an entire city or region, etc. There is no longer any constant in all this.
As a more profound and new dev~lopment, we can now see the workers today looking
fortaard to the possibility of pu-rsuing individu~~lized strategies of preference
over collective strategies. They reject the vocation of institutions ~o deter-
mine the best strategy in their place, in other words, control them. The document
on "Ttie Future of Labor"--drawn up in preparation for the eighth plan-su~narizes'
tllis tendency: "The new thing is that each thinks that it is up to him to judge
what has to be done in relation to his desires. Perhaps this is the emergence
of a new morality among the workers: Individual protest is considered possible
without excessive costs"1.
The multiplication of information and thP compl.exi,ty of modern systems offer real
possibiliti_es for looking forward to a broad diversity of strategies; there is no
- longer a single road toward obtai:li.ng one's salvation. According to Mr Crozier,
"Actors who have a r~ultipliri~y of alternatives available to them can no longer
be controlled, guided, and forced to act in the same fashion as they did in a
system in cney ha.: a considerably5lesser degree of libe.rty"2.
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EOR O~'FiC'tAi. a!~E ONI.Y
_ From that moment on we can just guess wl~t the menace is which hovers over these ,
institutions, both the enterprise and the union; th~~y cau no longer ~e content
with their traditional ways of re~ulation which have become too simplistic. It
is their autherity which is now be~_n~~, ~R~?llen~:,ed: "In all human gatherings a*
, this time, in which the multiplicit~ o~ i,,::~:ractions of.fers choices unkr~own until
now, the forms of authority which constituted the foundation of the instl.tu*ion
are breuking up. One can no longer in the same fashion contrel people ;aho hence-
forth enjoy degrees of liberty whicn transform the very nature o~ the social
fabric. The believer can seek refuge with his pastor, just as the dra.ftee can
run to his officers and tY~e high schooi student to his teachers"3 and by the same
token the worker can run to his outfit, the labor unionist can run to his dele-
gates.
_ Th7s context enables us to interpret May 1981. The victory of the Left is not dtle
to the sudden support of the French for the old revolutionary program.s, suddenly
perceived as a miracle remedy for aZl ills, certainly not as a"big thing," promising
an idyllic society. On the contrary, the election success did not stop the skepti-
cism of many people. Each doubts that the economic difficulties wiil d~sapp~ar all
- at once, that unemployment ancl the operating restrictions of the enterpr~ses will
vanish. As a matter of fact, the Socialist Party's success is the success of a
~ "catch-all" party; instead of giving this expression a pejorative meaning, ~e
should perceive its profound truth: The PS [Socialis~ Party] won because it appeared
to be the only one ro achieve the rally of widely differentiated groups which neither
in the Giscardian nur in the prospects of the collectivist type, found the way of
' being heard and r.:presented. In this sense, the success of the Left is due less
_ to the content cf its program and it is due more to the prospects of differentiated
� actions which it presents.
Will this orientation become a fact? The role of the labor unions wi11 be a central
one here. Or, succumbing to its old demons, coatinuing to fight yesterday's war,
it will line up its demand action toward the procurement of overall m~asures, thus
t~oping to meet the aspirations of a majority of its followers; that would mean pre-
paring the disillusionment of tomorrow; in shutting itself off within the area of
overall measures, it will fail to respond to the aspirations for autonomy and
difference which are behind the current social movements. Or it will understand
ttiat it is the only one capable of conducting differentiated actions, adapted to
the diversity of work situations, modulatPd according to the particular features
of each enterprise, each worker category. By losing speed while sticking to over-
all programs which are excessively politicized, it can start a rejuvenation cure
~ by demonstrating its local effectiveness in changing the daily lives of the wage
earners. Its future position therefore from this moment on~ will not be to work
roward a problemat-ical ideological adhesion to a program but toward the verifiable
utility of ttie labor union institution in m~difying the living and working condi-
tions of each and every one. That is the cl~ance which is offered to it today.
Labor lJnionism Recognized at Last
If labor unionism remained on the general and political level for so 1ong, allowing
tlie gap between the wage--earner rank and file and the apparatuses to grow, it at
least had a good excuse: The feeling of not being really recognized. Above all it
had to fight to e~cist.
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Everything so far happened as if France had escaped the second major strong ten-
- dency which emerged in the other industrial nations: T~ie tendency toward integra-
tion and institutionalization of lab~r unionism. Jus~. about everywhere, the
political system has permitt~d tt-~e opposition to be integrated in society, to
have access to the Establishment when its turn ca_*ne, without talking of revolution,
without being subjected of threatening the country`s general interest. Likewise,
labor unionism very early was recognized as an integral part of the social system.
It was all.owed to increase that which the sociologists call "access to control,"
~ that is to say, the ability to have its say in the decisions of other institutions
such as the governmen~, the enterprise. Very equitable "r~:les of the game" were
established so that the labor unions might agree to play the game instead of
spending their time trying to change the rules.
That is not the case in France. The laws are not being challenged but the attitude,
deep down, of the ruling class is being challenged. Jacques Moreau su~aarized the
strategy of the employers as follows: "As a matter of fact, the present approach
of enterprise managers tends to modernize the old dream of the French employers.
For most ot them, labor unionism is still an evil which one puts up with but which
should be rooted out as soon as possible. Is this an excessive judgment? The
expression is never as direct as a1Z that but this is where the tendency of recom-
mended policies is oriented in the end. In the absence of being able to challenge
its recognition once again, they will try to limit their control and to reject
their action outside the enterprise or in the institutions which are formalized
- and devoid of content"4.
This gap wi*h respect to the general tendency toward integration is so spectacular
that one of the first actions taken by Preside!~t Giscard was to try to fill the
gap by creating a condition for the "reform of powers in the enterprise." We know
what happened to the Sudreau report which recoBnnended the "strengthening of the
means of labor union action" and "the extension cf the field of negotiations"; only
a few scraps are left. The power of the enterprise boss remained a taboo area and
labor unionism once again was pushed to the sidelines.
From this viewpoint, May 1981 has a very o~bvious meaning: It is a big step on the
r.oad toward social integration. The political system shows, for the first time,
its capacity to i;nplement alternatioti i~ office according to normal channels. The
most revolutionary elements were disqualified. The electorate voted fc~ those who
wanted to make chanpes in society and not those who wanced to change society. Labor
unioni~m founc itself getting a place of honor on the national level; some of its
members took over important functions in the presidential and ministerial offices.
Tl~e appoicitment of. communist min{sters runs along those lines; until naw considered
pestil~~ntial, the minority L-inds itself a part of tfie collective setup.
`This process of integration will be continued if certain measures are taken ccn-
cerning labor union rights. The latter constLtute a big bugaboo for quite a few
employers. Still, this involves pr.actices, several of which were already contained
_ in the Sudreau report, wl~ile others are already in use in Germany or Sweden. Much
less than a rupture, thi.s involves ~he l~ne up of France along a tendency that is
more advanced elsewhere. We have fallen bet-~ind; but we are naw in the process of
catching up.
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- F(?R OF'~; n t, ~~SE Ot~i.Y
Is this scenario too optimistic? ilr.doubtedly, to t~Ye extent that its realizatio~~
depends on two prior prerequisites.
First of all, the employers musC acc=~~. ~_act u~ institutionaZization; they
must get used to the idea or faci.~g a st.�~~,~.g partner; they must learn t~ exercise
their own pawer by taking into account another power that is capable of limiting
� their Fower. Employer responsibility is overwhelming here. If the enployers p~ove
incapable of playing this new game, they will be forcing the labor unions to fail
back on the state, to demand of. it that i* impose restrictive laws which the
em~loyer partner always rejected.. This wlll then give us a system of form~al zules
and procedures involving paralyzir.g controls.
On the other hand, the labor unions must: kr.ow how to use their new pocser. The}~
- may be tempted to abuse Lheir victory; they might think that they have won the
battle on~:e and for all; they may in turn ignorP the employer as a par~ner; they
may wish to impose the strongest possible law upon the employer. Intoxicated writh
their access to political power, the labor unions might take the apparently easy
way by settling everytring through the law, multiplying statutory guarantees. In
this way the labor u:~ions would be expressin~ their disdain for the er~terprise and
by the same token they would, among the empl.oyers, trigger forms of behavior amount-
ing to the "resistance"to labor unionism which would lead back to the scenar3o of
The Hundred Year's War.
There is nothing :_~bviousiy to assure us that these two conditior~s ~ai3.l b~ met. On
the other hand, ~a~ ~ave never had a s~milar opportunity to break out of the vicious
cycle where the employers and labor unicns were trapped. It would be astonishing
if nobody were to try to benefit froni thst.
A Chance to be Grasped
- The blinders of the past ver~ often prevent us from detecting signs of renewal no
matter how obvious they may be. That is the i~npression which we get today from
the comparative reading of statements from the employer~ and from the labor unions.
Behind the reciprocal denunciations, we think we can detect the appearance of rela-
tively parallel analyses which are liable to lead to compatible strategies; the
concepts of. labor unionism are getting closer rather than moving further apart;
labor unions and employers face common problems which it is in tt-.eLr interest to
solve together; a relationship based on the development of negotiations appears on
either side as the only way out of the current deadlock.
Parallel Analyses
French employers often expressed their dYear� oE finding a labor union partner less
under the control of political slogans and m~~re concerned with enter?rise pr.oblems
rather than with overall ideological viewpoints. Very recently, F. Ceyrac declared:
"'~he labor unions today are moving along the linP of 1936. They seem to be
prisoners of a linear tradition which is now 44 years old, which absolutely ignores
both the aspirations of inen and women for work and the needs of the enterprise.
- The aspirations of inen are not the same at Dunkerque and Perpignan in a plant where
~ there are many women, in a plant out in the countryside, ~r.. a plant at Gennevilliers
or Lyons; I therefore think that progress is mo~ing toward diversification, th~t is
to say, the searcli--on the enterprise level-for solutiuns adapted ro the real
operating conditions of the enterprise and of labor"5,
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E. Maire finds words just as lti~rsh in danouncing those wha only believe in overall
' solutions: "Tfiey conf ine labor union action to a few unifying demands, incapable
of responding to the extraordinary complexity of real life. They put all their
hopes in a political victory which is considered to be able to res~lve, from top-
si.de, the problems which they leave untouched today. The ~nly supportable labor
unionist attitude consists in definitely rejecting this new promise of bureaucracy
- and setting up the facts, the requirements, an,d the real aspirations of each
social group as the f irst basis for action and reflection'~6.
Without pursuing these parailel quotations, let us be content here with one last
approach: Mr Ceyrac defined the social policy of the emploqers as having to
develop toward "pers~nalization." Here is what he says: "The rise In the living
standard creates a tiTide diversity of aspirations and thus, to respond to tha.t, an
individualization of solutions. The principle of indi~ri.3ualized social policies
- is the fruit of a convergence between the aspirations o'_= the personnel and the
' necessities of the enterprise." And E. Maire somehow cnme up with an echo to that:
"Building labor union action as close as possible to each worker, rehabilitating
an attitude of inquiry, a thirst for knowledge, unstanding the why's of individual
and collective reactions...there is no other way to make up our long-standing
delay and to build the labor unianism of our time."
But, some people might say, what about the CGT [General Confederation of Labor]?
~ One must undoubtedly bet that it will be forced to follow the movement started by
thP other labor unions. Such a bet is not impossible when one reads the declara-
- t~ons of J. L. Moynot; he also thinks that the essential part of the game will
be played in the enterprise: "The change cannot be limited to the traditional
field of social measures. tde think that the key to many problems is found in
the rights and possibilities of the workers to intervene within the enterprises
themselves. Permitting real access of workers to informatior, on the economic
- stuation of their enterprisc, group, and industry to which it belongs" constitutes
a central objective. "As a matter of fact, our contribution as a 13bor union to
the materia?ization of a real change above all takeG place in an autonomous
fashion amid our roots in the enterprises, at the ground level, and in the rela-
tionships which the workers are capable of establishing between the ~ediate
clemands and the prospects of the future"~.
[~~tiat more could business and industry want after thej called for a labor unionism
_ cent~ring around the enterprise? The only reserva*_ion-and it is a he~ty one--
has to cic~ w:ith the fact that tl:is labor unionism most of all wants r:ights and powers
in the enterprise. One does IlOt go without the other: The employers will. have to
- pay the price of a more realistic labor unionism.
And Common Problems
IL, ~~ut of. a:1ack of awareness, tliey Taere to continue their heavy-handed appruach,
~ tlien the labor unions and the employers :m_uld run an identical risic: They would
progressively lose control over the re~l. problems i.n the world of labor; they would
be incapable of regulating tt~e behavior of the social ac*_ors; they would a11ow the
creation oF a quasi-a~iaxchic situation in which the two institutions-the employers
and the labor unions--would no longer have any credibility.
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