JPRS ID: 10038 CHINA REPORT POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 15
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/ 10038
8 October 1981
- Chin~ Re ort
p
POLITICAI, SOCIOLO~ICAL AND Mlll~'ARY AFFAIRS
- cFO~,~o , 7ia 1 ~
_
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JPRS I,/10038
8 October 1981
CH INA REPORT
POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY A~FAIR~
(FOUO 17/81)
CONTENTS
P~OPI,E'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY
Tar~k Units Overrun Cao Bang
(JIEFANGJUN BAO, 1 Apr 79) 1
Young Cadres Gain Combat Experience
(JIiFANGJiJN BAO, 1 Apr 79) 5
Military Scho ols Apply Comb~t Experience in Teaching
(Cao Yinglong; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 1 Apr 79) 8
Vietnam Border War Frovided Experiences in Modern Warfare
(JIEFANGJIJN BAO, 11 Apr 79) 10
Experiences in Vietnam Border War Summed Up
(JIEFANGJiTN BAO, 11 Apr 79) 16
Compil ation of Battle Examples, by Zheng Jia_n
Public Commendation Stressed, by Xing Shicao
Heroic Battle To Take Cam Duong Described
(Fan Kuangfu, Sun Zhibo; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 11 Apr 79) 18
Capt,ure of Mountain Peak During V~.etnam War Described
( Zha.ng Zher,gyang; J_T.EFANGJUN, 11 Apr 79) 22
~ Test Pilot Recovers From Injuries, Flies Again
(Li Ciying; JIEFANGJUN BAO~ 11 Ap?' 79) 23
Training Ref.'orm Stresses Simplicity, Practicality
- (Tan J i'an, Liu Shitong; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 1 Apr 79) 25
- a - [III - CC - 80 FOUO]
rnT n~"~".^- . rn~ n*n v
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Political Educat~.on Course on Agricultural Economic Policies
- (Ma Ronggui, ef, al.; JIEF.'~NGJUN BAO, 8 Jun 79) 29
Concept,~ ~ModPrn' Warfare, 'Modernized' Warfare I}istinguished
- (Jin Yan, Ye Xing; JIEFANGJUN EAO, 21 Jun 79) 31
Article Discusses Training To Meet Demands of Modern Waxfare
(JIEFANGJUN BAO, 29 Jun 79) 33
Flame Throwing Training, by Yu Qiguang
Infantry, Artillery Coordination, by Zi Songlin, et al.
. Corrmlanders, Troop Coordination, by Zhou Nan, Wei Youlong
Arm~r, Air Force Coordination, by Li Yongan, Jin Zhifu
Brief s
Artillcry Wartime Experiences 39
Value of Multiple Skills ~9
Lessans F`rom Border War 39
~
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TANK UNITS OVERRUN CAO BANG
' Bei~ing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 1 Apr 79 p Z
- [Article: "People's Armored Cavalry Carry All Before Them"]
[Text] Editor's note: People have been delighted to see that our young armored
; soldiers have leveled every dangerous difficulty in the recent defensive counter-
' attack, carrying all before them in a great display of martial prowess! The
China--Vietnam border is hilly and forested, with cliffs, canyons, and narrow passes
everywhere. Using tanks in this kind of terrain calls for dauntless heroism and a
' high degree of proficiency in fighting skills. Our heroic tank soldiers were able
; to overcome all manner of unimaginable difficulties, cut paths and seized passes,
~ moved ahead boldly, and created ma~rvels in the history of tank warfare, relying on
I a combination of the spirit of revolutionary heroism and superb fighting technique.
! Our army's powerful political work constantly nurtures and tempers the heroic
spirit of our officers and men to suppress all enemies; our army'~ military training
i is strict and arduous, constantly strengthening th: tactical skills of the soldiers.
~ It is true that education and training can produce fighting strength.
~
~ Our Guangxi border defense forces made a 100-1i long-range attack directly on Cao
Bang, delivering a killing blow to the Vietnamese forces in that area. What con-
~ tribution did our young tank units make to the battle? This is not only of interest
' to all of the officers and men of the army, it is something that concerns the
I
, people of the whole country.
The road to Cao Bang is rugged and rough. The terrain of the battle area is peri-
' lous, the enemy situation was complex, ~hey were heavily guarded and able to maintain
themselves. The key to implementing a combat plan for rapidly surrounding and
annihilating the enemy was the speed of dividing and penetrating them, and under
~ tl?ese circumstances, the difficult task of taking the lead position falls naturally
on thc~ shoulders of the tankers.
liefore dawn on 17 Febrt?ary, six rQd and green signal flares rose high in the air and
tt?e ground was shaken by tlie arti.llery fire of the counterattack against the
Vietnamese invaders. In the flash of the artillery fire, tanks full of power and
grandeur roared forward one after anot:her, bearing down on the enemy with the weighr.
of Tai St~an. Tank treads smashed the bamboo stakes that the Vietnamese had set in
the ground within our borders, tongues of fire pursuing and destroying those enemy
who had been awakened from dreams and fled in confusion. In an instant, the
Vietn~mese army's painstakingly built first~ line of defense had been breached.
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Ha~~ing broken throubi~ the pass, o~ir tanks braved a rain of shell;s and penetrated
deeply, swiftly, and violently toward the enemy over perilous karst terrain. Here, "
beRi.nning with land captured on precipitous cliffs, the road snaked through inter-
locking dogtooth peaks connecting with one small basir~ after another like."a long
vine growing melons." Every so often there was a narrow pass to cause difficulty
fcr our tankers' swift advance.
In this kind of terrain, tanks have no way to take up battle formations and can
only move along in single, serpentine file. If one tank breaks down, those behind
~ it find it very difficult to advance. As the troops penetrated into that pass, the
road became more impassable, the width of the space between the two mountains being
as narrow as the body of a tank, with rocky cliffs on both sides. There was no
time to wait for the engineers to open the way, and no way to detour around it.
What to do? First company commander Lin Mengzhu [2651 1125 3796], riding in tank
No. 101, inspected the width of the pass, relied on the practical experience of his
years of military training, and a:cording to the tank's capabilities decisively
ordered driver Zhang Dongfa [1728 ?639 ?127]: "Blast ahead, and use your horse-
power!" Tank No. 101 suddenly wenc. up against the walls of the pass. Once, twice,
it collided continuuusly four or rive times, the rock on both sides broke and fell,
and the tank finally broke a way thrcugh the rock walls and the Lanks of the unit
followed closely in bursting out of tlie pass. What courage and resourcefulness!
This kind of ramming was not rash, it represented a high degree of coordination
between the commanders' heroism and t?ieir scientific spirit. It is just this kind
of coordination that made this pathfinding tank unit into a sword that will
never dull.
When the brigade's tanks got to Na Cuong, they encountered a river. An old dildpi-
dated wooden bridge collapsed before more than a few tanks had crossed it. The
commander at once ordered the remaining tanks to ford the stream. Tank No. 406
began towards the middle of the river, some water got into the engine, and the tank
- suddenly stopped running. Facing this ~~nexpected circumstance, commander Li Wujun
[262.1 2976 0193] of the 5th Company, following them, decided promptly and oppor-
- tunely to send in another tank as they might as weZl make a bridge of the two tanks.
Under his direction tank No. 503 was driven into the river and drawn up to No. 406.
Witli tlie order to move forward, one [ank after another rumbled across the river. on
the auxiliary fuel tarks on the sides of Nos. 406 and 503.
Taking measures like this requires a steadfast determination. When this situation
was reported to the unit command post it was universally approved of. Even the
most cool-headed and experienced commanders did not withhold their praise: "How
daring! Our tank soldiers' cumprehension of the battle plan is truly deep, and
their implementation is resolute!"
. The tanks proceded, fighting as they went, penetrating 31 kilometers, and arrived
at Dong Khe [2639 3305J, an important Vietnamese strongpoint, in two hours and 45
minutes, which opened the door for the advance to Cao Bang. The enemy was dreaming
, and had not imagined that our army could be on their doorstep so amazingly fast, su
they began waving at our tanks, thinking we were their own. They did not wake up
until ,~~e 1-egan to fire, but by then it was too late.
Our tank units are not ashamed of being steel men or~ iron horses. From the time
they were dispatched outside our borders to Cao Bang, on the whole endless advance,
_ ~
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what people along the way saw was our tank soldiers crossing a natural barrier,
the bloody battlefield where a stubborn enemy was annihilated, heroic forms.
Near Thong Son, tank No. 507 was hit by an enemy anti-tank rocket and caught fire.
There is a deep ditch on the right side at this place and an overhanging cliff on
the left, so tank No. 507 was blocking the narrow way completely. At this tim.~,
enemy shells were exploding continuously all around our blocked tanks, sending
shrapnel and rock fra~ments whistling by and clattering against the tank turrets.
The whole battle situation did not allow them to stay there, and at that instant
the terrain and the enemy situation especially did not permit them to tarry long.
The tank soldiers knew that tank No. 507 conta.ined several dozen shells that would
- explod2 in a few moments. What to do? The wonders that occur in combat are fre-
quently beyond expectations and are more often than not within ~eason. Commander
of the crack 5th Compar_y Deng Ji [6772 4~80], who led in tank No. 508, roared
forward out of the raging flames engulfing tank No. 507, fallowed by com?nander Li
Wujun's tank No. 502, three tanks of the 2d Platoon, and two tanks of the 3d Platoon,
_ aIl of which broke through! When tank No. 507 e:~~loded, seven tanks had already
come through safely. This was truly a case of an army dedicated to a just cause
- having great wisdom and great courage! The speed of advance of this ~tream of
iron was not impeded, and under the accusate fire of our tankers the enemy firing
points were reduced to rubble one by ane.
The heroic tank units charged through Non kim Son, Na Xuan Son, Qua Cuong, and to
a point where Bac Son was right before them, Bac Son is only seven kilometers from
Cao Bang, and is a thoroughly important position. The steep slopes on both sides
of the highway were studded with pillboxes, bunkers and hidden trenches. Here they
han Soviet-made "Hail" anti-tank rockets, American-made anti-tank rifles, recoilless
rifles, 40 mm. rocket launchers, and anti-tank mines deployed in a staged arrangement
according to their different capabilities, the fire pattern becoming denser tocaard
th.e rear. From the foot of the hill to its peak there were more than 80 different
firing points arranged densely in,tiers, and there were even anti-tank personnel
hidden in the road culverts. This was the Vietnamese army's strongest ambush ring.
The enemy arrogantly threatened: We will demolish the Chinese tanks at this place.
Good will inevitably triumph over evil. You tend to your anti-tank, I'l1 tend to
my anti "anti-tank." The commanders, eager for a fight, determined to raise hell!
When our 6th Company reached the Bac Son bridgehead, they discovered that the
40-meter long bridge had been demolished. Because of the enemy's tight blockade,
follow-up units were not able to come up for a time, and the 6th Company had enemy
on three sides, a desperate situation. Commander Ren Zhu'en [0117 2691 1869] took
- over the responsibility fc,r directing the battle �rom the wounded company commander.
Th~ headphones of the tankers carried his resounding, powerful v~ice: "Comrades,
the time for the party's test~ng of us has arrived! The time has come to win honor
for the people! Every tank must pay attention to demarcate fire, and fight with a
cool heac~..." The voice was abruptly cut off as an enemy anti-tank rocket hit tank
No. 602, killing comrade Ren Zhu'en.
"Tle. After the 4th company of a certain unit had captured two hills in
succession, at 1500 on the same day it came to the foot of Hill 369. When it
was preparing ta outflank the hill frum the right, it was blocked by enemy fire.
The cunning enemy also lighted a fire on the hill that, fanned by the prevailing
_ winds, burned witli a crackle toward the company. At this grave juncture, Li Qi
[262.1 0796], a ne~a fighter who had been wounded in his ieft leg, rushed into the
sea of fire and drew off the ~nemy's fire. Seizing this opportunity, the assault
platoori swiftly outflanked the hill on the right and quietly closed in on the
inemy entrenc}iecl on the main peak. Zhang Dehai [1728 1795 3189], resourceful
leader oF the 6th squad, crawled sCraight over to the front of the enemy
batt~~lion's commancJ pust ~aithout being discovered by the enemy. A fellow wearing
the insiYnia af a senior captain was gesticulating there. Zhang Dehai fired off
a cartridge clip ~~nd fu7lowed this up by throwing several hand grenades, sending
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the battalion commander and three others to the Western Paradise. On the other
side, platoon leader Li Shicheng [2621 0099 2052] and Sth squad deputy leader
- Li Shuming [2621 261I 2494] groped their way to the enemy's machinegun defense
works on top of the hill and suddenly leaped up and fired fierce bursts. The
enemy threw down their guns and fled. Discovering that their battalion co~?ander
had been killed and that their defense works on the peak were occupied by us, the
enemy at once scattered in all four directions and fled for their lives. We took
this opportunity to destroy each and every one of the enemy soldiers, and a
reinforced company and a battalion co~and post were thus wiped out.
On other hills, the attacks mounted by our border defense units were also extremely
fierce. The enemy hurriedly reported the emergency to his superiors and asked
that he be reinforced posthaste by the 316tr-A Division. But the 316th-A Division
was still being blocked by the warriors of the 2d and 6th companies of a certain
unit and was like a mad dog shut up in an iron cage running about in an effort to
- break out and bumping against the bars. The division launched 18 assaults in
succession, and all were repulsed, so it could only haul away the dead bodies in
carts and flee in panic. The "elite" division ^ould not stave off the crushing
~efeat of the enemy defending Cam Duong.
During the battle to capture Cam Duong, where did the great intelligence and
courage of the officers and men of our border units come from? During the days
they were gathering material for their story, the reporters felt strongly that
the spiritual term "motherland" gave the border defense fighters inexhaustible
strength. The solemn slogan "Win glory for the motherland" encouraged the officers
and men to charge and take the enemy positions, energetically and bravely to kill
the enemies, and impelled the torrent of steel to surge forward with irresistible
force.
Xu Xianguo [1776 7341 0948], a new fighter of the 3d Squad, 3d Company, Red Army
Regiment of a certain tmit, is a lad who came from the hometown of Qiushaoyun.
After arriving in his unit, he took part in denouncing the Vietnamese authorities

_ for their frenzied crimes against China, heard the political instructor relate
the glorious traditions of the 3d Company, and understood that the fighters
shouldered the responsibi~lity of defending the motherland. Not long afterward, he
received a letter from home, which urged him, like the heroes of the volunteer
army [during the Korean W~~r], to defend the motherland and charge forward.
Reading the letter warmed Xu Xianguo's heart and added strength to every fiber of
his being. On 23 Februar~~, the company to which Xu Xianguo was assigned attacked
Hill 191, northeast of Cam Duong. After the assault began, owing to the deep
grass and thick woods, he lost contact with his comrades in the squad. Without
the slightest fear, he fought bravely alone, and seized the opportunity to
fiercely return the enemy's �ire. Singlehandedly he held fast to his position and
. did not let the enemy attack break through. Afterward, Xu Xianguo, again on his
own initiative, joined the battle ranks of tlie 2d platoon and, together with his
comrades, attacked the hill. F~r his meritorious service to the motherland he was
honored by Ueing admitted into the party.
"Win glory for the motherland by going forward to the last man and charging to the
last breath!" This was the pledge taken by Wu Yong [0702 0516], deputy leader of
the 5th Squad, 9th Company, of a certain unit. On a day before the assault on Cam
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Duong, Wii Yong wrote on his backpack the words "Win glory for the motherland,
cl~arge as lon~; as one has a breath in one's body." Filled with this kind of
determination, he fLung himself into the battle to attack Hill 280 on the north
side of Cam Duong. At noon on that day, Wu Yong saw that 18 enemy soldiers were
desperately trying to seize an unnamed hill west of Hill 280, so he boldly charged
toward them. Unfortunately, a bullet struck him in the abdomen. Wu Yong,
clutching his lower abdomen with his left hand and with his right hand holding
his weapon hangi::g from the gunsling on his right shoulder, continued to charge.
- When tie had advanced about 50 meters, another bullet hit him in thp left arm.
Wu Yohg, with the srrength of steel, still did not fall. Lifting his left hand,
which had been pressing down on his stomach, he calmly selected favorable terrain,
assumed a kneeling posture, and, holding his submachinegun steadily in his hands,
sprayed the enemy with fierce fire. Before long, an enemy bullet ripped through
. tiis chest.... The political instructor and fighters of the 9th company, at a
briefing given to reporters afterward, said: After the battle, we shouted Wu
Yong's name and ran forward, only to see Wu Yong leaning on a bank of earth still
- maintaining his posture of firing in a kneeling position, his open eyes looking
at the unnamed hill in front, and sprawled before him were four enemy corpses.
Our fighters, with this kind of incomparable love for the motherland and
inveterate hatred for the enemy, and with the heroic spirit of prevailing over
all enemies, relentlessly punished the Vietnam aggressors.
By 1800 on 24 February, we had captured all the enemy hills on the periphery of
Cam Duong, and our burder defense units, with irresistible force, pressed
straight on to take Cam Duong. The remnant enemy forces fled in disorder to the
Wai Bo [phonetic] River south of Cam Duong. Every one of our columns of deep-
thrust units, at rapid marching speed, thrust powerfully toward the Wai Bo
[phonetic] River to pursue and destroy the fleeing enemy. By 25 February, we had
captured all of Cam Duong. 9fter our border defense units entered and garrisoned
Cam Duong, they immediately began to comb the hills and mop up the enemy. As if
_ they were hunting rats, they dug out the defeated and dispersed enemy soldiers
from their hiding places. We anniliilated over 2,000 enemy soldiers. This signaled
the end of the battle of Cam Duong, which was a victory for our army and a crushing
defeat for the Vietnamese Army.
9727
CSO: 4005/2099
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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY
CAPTURE OF MOUNTAIN PEAK D'JRING VIETNAM WAR DESCRIBED
Beijing JIEFANGJJN BAO in Chinese 11 Apr 79 p 2
(Article by special staff correspondent Zhang Zhengyang [1728 2973 7122]: "Mass
Heroism and Daring--Pressing Forward With Indomitable Spirit"]
~ [Text] The 9th company of a certain unit, a company which during the battle of
Lang Son took by strategy the highest peak of the Me Bien Mountains and cut off
the enemy's line of retreat, was awarded by the superiors with a silk banner
inscribed "Heroic Company of the Me fiien Mountains."
At 1200 on 3 March, the 9th company, after a rapid march, came to the banks of the
Ky Cung River and by clever means crossed the river. Before dawn~ on the next day,
the 9th company beg~n an assault on the main peak of the Me Bien Mountains. The
- 2d platoon, which was charged with the mission of conducting the main attack,
advanced to an unnamed hill. When platoon leader Chai Chaohe [5591 0877 3109]
discovered that the enemy had set up artillery on the opposite hilltop, he
immediately ordered the 82-mm mortar squad attached to the platoon to open fire.
Striving to be the first to get at the enemy, the gunners blew up all the enemy~s
artillery pieces. Taking advantage of these circumstances, the fighters charged
forward and the company rapidly approached the main peak.
Then the 9th company, directed by company cotmnander Yu Lijin [0205 0632 6855],
adopting the tactic of a multipronged attack, fiercely assaulted the main peak.
Luo Chunsheng [5012 2504 3932], leader of the 6th squad, rushed to the extreme
front and killed four of the enemy in succession. The enemy, seeing the ferocity
of the 2d platoon's assault, thought we wanted to storm and occupy the main
peak from this direction and moved its main force to counter the 2d platoon.
Then the 7th and 8th squads of the 3d platoon, seizing this opportunity, stormed
up the peak. The outcome of our attack was that the enemy was wiped out,
leaving 56 dead bodies on the peak. The 9th company, at an extremely small cost,
had victoriously occupied the main peak of the Me Bien Mountains, thereby insur.ing
that our army could use its main force to assault the enemy defending the fortified
city of Lang Son.
9727
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TEST PILOT RECOVERS FROri INJURIES, FLIES AGAIN
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 11 Apr 79 p 1
[Article by Li Ciying [2621 2945 5235]: "'Lei Feng-Type Pilot' Wang Guanyang
Ascends Into the Blue Heavens Again"]
[Text] Air Force "Lei Feng-type pilot" Wang Guanyang [3769 0385 2254] has
recovered his health and is again flying into the blue heavens.
On 19 June 1977, when carrying out a scientific research test flight mission,
- Wang Guanyang was flying at the high altitude of 8,000 meters, w~en the engine
of his aircraft suddenly stopped. Unable to restart the engine, in order to
protect ttie scientific research equipment on the plane and the safety of
people's life and property, Wang firmly abandoned his chance to parachute to
safety, and, steering his aircraft so as to avoid on three occasions, factories,
schools, villages, and crowds, made a successful forced landing outside the
airfield though he was seriously injured. An examination revealed that his first
lumbar vertebra sustained a multiple fracture from being compressed, his lower
; vertebrae were cracked, and his lower limbs seemed to be paralyzed.
The party Central Committee headed by Chairman Hua showed extreme solicitude for
Wang Guanyang's injuries. On Wang's 2d day in the hospital, Vice Premier Wang
Zhen, who was inspecting work in that locality, rushed to the hospital and
expressed his sympathy and solicitude for Wang on behalf of Chairman Hua and Vice
Chairman Ye; he commended Wang Guangyang as a"heroic model pilot" and presented
a bouquet of flowers to him. The Air Force Party Committee bestowed on Wang the
- }ionorc~ry ti.tle of "Lei Feng-type Pilot," and selected him to be a delegate to the
Fifth NPC and a dele~ate to the natianal scientific conference.
In order to lielp Wan~ to make aii early recovery, the hospital set up an emergency
treat:ment ~eam composed of its leacling cadres, professors of inedicine, and
tturses. After repPated studies, t}ie team decided on the ideal treatment program,
which would not only c.ure Wang but also allow him to fly again. The team decided
not to operate btit to use a traction method which would effect a reduction of
the vertebrae. ~iur. ~his method would require the patient to endure a considerable
amotint of pain. WanK said with determination: "If only you can cure m2 so that
I can f.ly again, I will stand any amount of pain." During the treatment process,
Wang carried on a L-enacious struggle against his pain. In October 1977, he left
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the hospital. He persevered in such activities as running, swimming, playing
ping-pong, and scaling hanging ladders, and never discontinued them during the
frigid winter days or blazing hot summer days. Because of this regimen, his
body rapidly recovered its health. At the beginning of this year, after an
examination conducted by the Air Force General Hospital he was pronounced fit
and was permitted to fly.
One day in the first part of March, the sun shone brightly. Wang Guanyang and
instructor Hua Jun [3323 0193] took the controls of an aircraft and flew into the
sky, where they put the aircraft through a series of movements such as circles,
dive;;, climbs, and rolls. When the aircraft landed, his comrades came forward
to greet him, warmly shook his hand, congratulated him, and urged him to obtain
even greater successes in his scientific research flights.
9727
C50: 4005/2099
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TRAINING REFORM STRESSES SIMPLICITY, PRACTICALITY
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 1 Apr 79 p 2
[Articl.e by Tan Ji'an [6223 Q679 1344] and Liu Shitong [0491 0013 6639]: "Employing
Existing Equipment to Improve Training Has Bright Prospects"]
[Text] There is one view which holds: "Infantry elements don't have much bayonet
training and there is not much training involved in throwing hand grenades," and
"With our present equipment, it is usel~ss to reform training." Racently, the Jinan
garrison organized a demonstration by 21 elements advanced in training reform, and
it was a powerful answer to this do-nothing attitude.
The units taking part in this demonstration were units from the Jinan garrison that
had emerged in the past few years as showing the first successes in training reform.
This demonstration centered around the "three attacks" and "three defenses," namely,
having technical training as well as tactical training, having training of combat
elements and also having training of rear services and security elements, and having
nighttime as well as daytime training. Some units demonstrated the skill of fighting
speed with speed in dealing with enemy motorization. Some demonstrated "tricky
, moves for attacking enemy tanks. Each of these demonstrating units had its own
st~ong points, and ttie weapons in the soldiers' hands each had their own wonderful
effects, causing the spectators to open their eyes wide, and to open their minds
as well.
Strengthen Research on Adversaries in Future Wars, and Make the Research "Meticulous"
Many of the demonstrating units came to know that strengthening research on the enemy
situation j.s a prerequisite to reform of training. This has two effects: One is
tt~at it is conducive to breaking out of our mental rut. The more deeply we carry
out our research on the enemy situation, the stronger will be the compulsion to
reform training. 'Ihe second is that the more meticulously F~e do our research on the
enemy situation, the better directed our training reform wi1J. be. Therefore,
research on the enemy situation can not be done by and large, but must be "meti-
culous." We must put in the time and energy to study it all, from the enemy
- equipment to their strategic and tactical thinkirlg, from combat principles to combat
metiiods, from the attacks, amphibious landings, and airborne drops of the initial
stages of a war to enemy combat characteristics in all the stages of development,
from enemy movements in large unit operations to ~~he combat movements of individual
elements, even the movements of single soldiers. Practice has shown that those
units carrying out [heir research on the enemy situation well will be relatively
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accomplished in reforming training. The first comgany of a certain regiment, having
ordinarily taken research into the enemy situation very seriously, determined, in a
skirmish with enea~y force advance units during the demonstration, that their enemy
commonly opened up a way with tanks and moved in motorized vehicles. So in seizing
the advantageous terrain, they did not, as in the past, race to control the high
point, but seized the hilltop, the slope, and the foot alike ahead of the enemy,
_ launched their movement ahead of the enemy, and opened fire ahead of the enemy.
They deployed their forces in depth and in echelons. They said that in this way
they could prevent the enemy from skirting the commanding position and continuing
forward. If they had taken the high point as in the past, they would have been
doing exactly what the enemy wanted. Further, in surrounding and annihilating the
enemy, they took note of the enemy's armor characteristics and struck first at the
enemy tanks and armored vehicles, then at enemy troop concentrations, and finally
at the dispersed enemy, utilizing advantageous terrain, surrounding the enemy,
carrying forward the fine traditions of close combat and night combat, and, all-in-
all, fighting a beautiful "skirmish."
In Technical Activ~tes, Convert "Slow Work" to "Fast Work," and Learn the Knack of
_ Fig,hting Speed with Speed
Motorization and high speed will be ma~ar characteristics of future wars. Speaking
in a certain sense, speed xs victory. In the past, some comrades always felt that
any future war would come suddenly, enemy units would be motorized, and it would
be difficult for infantry elements to fight speed with speed. The experience of
some of the elements in this demonstration showed that to deal with the suddenness
of war and changes in the style of combat we must on the one hand depend on improve-
ments in our military equipm~nt, and on the other hand depend on our strict training
. to accomplish it. Under pre:~ent circumstances of our having poor equipment, if we
reform all those complicated operational regulations, reform those cumbersome acces-
sories that may or may not be needed, and reform all those routine methods of
oneration, we can greatly strengthen the mobility of combat infantry. The 82 mm,
mortar that tias accompanied infantry elements in the past is not itself a heavy
- weapon, but the accessories like the mortar base and mortar frame are heavy. In
previous training, not one step was Ieft out, from aiming to firing. The 82 mm.
mortar squad of a certain mobile artillery battery taking part in the demonstration
often thought about the suddenness and speed of future warfare while in training.
Since last year, they have reformed the conventional training methods of past years.
The equipment was changed from heavy to light, the firing procedure was simplified,
the number of inembers participating was reduced, actions were speeded up, they
practiced hard at range finding and~aiming, simplified firing, and after a year of
effort, the whole squad had acquired a body of special skills. No matter what the
- terrain, a mortar barrel can be carried on the back and fired when you stop. In a
year they carried out 13 firing exercises with live ammunition, fired 164 rounds,
and scored 160 hits. On the day of the demonstration they ~ere seen to operate a
single mortar barrel, changing the firing direction frequently and changing their
position frequently, usin~ it smoothly, and the shells, as if they had eyes, hit
the target every time. In past infantry element training in the 82 mm. recoilless
rifle, many units were overcautious in selecting, a base and setting up their
weapon. Since last year, the officers and men of many 82 mm, recoilless rifle
elements were concerned because these weapons were used principally against enemy
tanks and armored vehicles, and tanks are fast and a~tack with ferocity, so we are
not allowed to move at a leisurely pace and must reform. The 82 mm, recoilless
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rifle squad of the second battery of a certain unit participating in this demon-
stration changed the former overelaborate positional attack to a shoulder firing
method that stresses training. While moving the soldiers carry the weapon on
their shoulders, and when the situation arises they squat and fire, unrestricted by
positional considerations, greatly reducing both preparation time and preparation
procedures for firing. Comrades watching the demonstration said that the acces-
sories and operating procedures for various kinds of weapons all have a certain
scientific rationale and all have a certain use, but in accordance with the demands
of modei~n warfare and without violating scientific laws, it is extremely necessary
to learn several more "fast" skills, and it is something we should advocate
vigorously.
Consider the Most Complex and Most Difficult Areas and Popularize Soldiers with
Multiple Skills and More Training for Warfare
A certain "tiger attack company" participating in this demonstration, in past
~ f.iring training, thought a great deal about results and thought little about actual
combat, and often conducted their training in relatively good weather and terrain.
In the reform of training, they trained more in how to adapt to complex circum-
stances and made this an important part of their training reform. '~o temper their
combat capabilities under circumstances whert the enemy is using nuclear, chemical,
or bacteriological weapons, they spontaneously changed their firi.ng training to
conditions of having to wear gas masks. At first, being physically unaccustomed to
it, their results were not good, but they did not think about results and kept on
with t}iis kind of training. AlthouRh there was wind and snow at the demonstration
and the circumstances were complex, they obtained the second most outstanding results
for live ammunition firing even wearing gas masks. There were some companies parti-
cipating in this demonstration that also reformed the problem of too fine a division
of labar in some of the former specialty training and stressed allowing the soldiers
to learn several combat skills. After comrades in an artillery squad learn to be
gunners, they can also be aimers, ammunition handlers, and loaders. When comrades
on an infantry squad learn how to handle a rifle, they can also use an assault
rifl.e and machine gun, and some master enough scientific and technical knowledge to'
be able to study the use of any advanced weapons that may be captured f rom the enemy.
In Comhat Training, Pay Attention to Carrying on Traditional Combat Methods and
Studying New Combat Methods Boldly
Some of the elements taking part in this demonstration pay attention in their combat
training to leading t}ie officers and men to carry on our army's traditional combat
mett~ods and boldly study new combat methods, according to the composition, equip-
ment, and tactical thinking of the enemy. The seventh squad, f ifth company, of a
certain unit, in training on squad attack, kept in mind the enemy's defensive
c}~aracteristics anci studied three questions: one was with re~ard to an adversary
in a future war, pay close atten[ion to the characteris[ics of their fire dispersal
and study how to p~~netrate the enemy's front-line defense "fire control zone"
quickly and covertly; second, with an eye to enemies using a broad defense front,
great depth, and many obstacles, study ways oE opening up and passing over roads
through it; third, with an eye to enemy defense that emphasizes the development of
the use of tanks, study methods of using, small groups over multiple routes in a
- coordinated attack on the tanks. In this demonstration the comrades watching ~ere
- very inspired. The eleventh squad of the garrison company of a certain regiment,
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in their individual defense, with a view to the fact that enemy combat thinking
ordinarily involves infantry moving forward behind tanks in an attack, separately
rehearsed a set of inethods for striking at the enemy tanks and at the enemy
infantry. In the demonstration, soldiers were seen meeting the enemy tanks,
drawing near rapidly, placing an explosive device, leaving and taking cover imme-
- diately, opening fire on the enemy infantry, and moving with precision and
dexterity. Comrades watching the demonstration said, our training of soldiers
ought to be like the way they t~ave been trained, actively exploring ways of striking
with an eye to the enemy charcteristics, this is truly vivid training.
In addition, these demonstrating elements also carried on active reforms of teaching
methods. For exampl.e, full development of democracy, inspiring the cadres and men
to think about and discuss combat methods; in training, development of small group
training, organizing revolutionary competition, carrying out criticism of both
teachers and students, giving even greater development to our party's and our army's
mass line in the training of soldiers.
9284
CSO: 4005/2098
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POLITICAL EDUCATION COURSE ON AGRICULTURAL ECONOMIC POLICIES
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 8 Jun 79 p 1
[Article by Ma Rong~;t~i [7456 2837 2710], An Dewei [1344 1795 0251J and Dong Xiangqi
[5516 4382 6386J: "Help Fighters Get Rid of Their 'Hang-ups'--a Report on a Political
_ Education Session by the Political Instructor Liu"]
[Text] Recently, several fighters from the Seventh Company of Unit 81268 received
letters from home reflecting certain conditions concerning the implementation of
economic policies in rural areas. The subject attracted the attention and discussions
of the comrades. On that day, fighter Zhang Yirong [1728 5030 2837] from Hunan showed
his letter from home to the political instructor, Liu Wenzheng, saying, "Tell me--from
mutual aid teams to cooperatives to people's communes, the road has always been one
of collective prosperity, but now they come out with a"contracting to the team"
idea--is this conducive to carrying out agricultural modernization?" Several fightiers
present joined in and started a lively discussion with everyone eager to put in a
word. Some asked, "This was dealt with during the cultural revolution, so why bring
it up again?" The fighters had hoped that the political instructor could explain it
to them, but Political Instructor I,iu could not off-hand explain it too clearly--he
could only give them a few words of advice which obviously did not satisfy anyone.
Seeing that the fighters' mental hang-ups were not dispelled, Political Instructor
Liu felt disturbed. But he felt that he was in a difficult position. Since his
superiors had not arranged any education program concerning policies, could he say
anything on the subject? It would be easy indeed for him to use a few big empty words
to stifle the fighters' questions. But would that rid the fighters of their ideological
i~ang-ups? As a political cadre dur~ng the transition of the focus of party work,
tie s}iould be receptive to the discovery of new situations, to the study of new problems
and incessantly try to dispell ideological obstacles blocking the progress of the
cadres and Fighters--this was hiG duty. What especially disturbed him was the vague
andcrstanding demonstrated by the fighters there which showed that their thinking
~ti11 had not broken free from the ultralef.tist line of Lin Biao and the "Gang of
Four." If the fighters were not lent a positive guiding hand, how could they catch
i~p with the new situation where the party is switching work emphasis. At this point
i.n }iis thou&hts, Liu became imbued with courage and strength and was determined to
- '~elp ttie fighters shatter the mental shackles that were placed on their heads by
:,in Biao and the "Cang of Four". rurthermore, he would help them correctly under-
~tand the present policies so that they could march forward with confidence.
1
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An understandiug of the correctness of the present policies would be the best
argument for persuasion. Political Instructor Liu earnestly studied Central policy
_ regulations concerning agricultural villages and familiarized himself with each of
the fighters' hometown situations in seven provinces. He went, furthermore, to locally
stationed commune production brigades to make investigations. One of the fighters'
father was a secretary of a Party branch in an agricultural village. Through this
fighter, Liu came to understand the current situation concerning economic policies.
Then after comprehensive analysis, he began to educate the f.ighters. First, he lectured
on the good trend sl?own by implementation of Party economic policies in rural areas.
He explained from all aspects that "contracting to the team" was a method to strengthen
the production responsibility system, to mobilize the labor enthusiasm of the vast
number of farmers and to develop agricultural productivity. In direct response to
the suspicion that "contracting to the team" was a step back, he pointed out, "Whether
or not it is a step back depends on whether it is beneficial to the consolidation and
development of the socialist collective economy. During the Cultural Revolution,
under the ultraleftist influences of Lin Biao and the "Gang of Four", the "contract-
ing to the team" form of production organization was incorrectly criticized. Now we
are working from reality to apply methods that were effective before the Cultural
- Revolution--this is liberated thinking. "Contracting to the team" is a positive
policy for the development of production and not step back at all." At the same
time he explained that a few individual areas carried out "division of land to
families"--this was a deviation a few units committed during the implementation of
policies and was not a problem of the Central policies themselves. The fighters
must believe that local party organizations and the masses would eventually correct
this tendency.
This lecture completely won over the fighters. That night, many fighters wrote home
educating their families on a correct understanding and on a determined implementation
of the Party's current agricultural policies. The fighters expressed that they would
- devote themselves to the work of the army and guard the four modernizations with real
actions,
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CONCEPTS 'MODERN' WARFARE, 'MODERNIZED' WARFARE DISTINGUISHED
Beijing JIANFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 21 Jun 79 p 2
[Areicle by Jin Yan [2529 3508] and Ye Xing [0673 2502]: "A Dialogue On Modern
Wartare and Modernized Warfare"]
' [Text] Recently we overheard an interesting conversation between two staff officer
comrades concerning modern warfare and modernized warfare and have organized and
, recorded it as follows:
I Staff Officer Zhang: Old Li, there were many opinions concerning our latest defensive
i counterattack at the combat evaluation meeting yesterday. Some said it was modernized
~ warfare, others said it cannot be considered modernized but only modern warfare. What
' is your understanding of the two concepts, modern and modernized warfare?
~ Staff Officer Li: My understanding is that modern and modernized warfare are two
! different concepts. Modern warfare refers to the time during which the war occurred.
; Modernized warfare (also called warfare under modern conditions) refers to the appli-
' cation of the most advanced modern scientific technology in battle, comp?_ete with
modernized military equipment, modernized combat commanding and modernized combat
; methods.
' Staff Ufficer Zhang: I agree with this point of view. I feel, however, that the two
~ are different yet also related. The concept of modern warfare is broader, encompas-
sing a wider range. It can include moaernized warfare with its advanced military
equipment, b>>r. it can also include various specialized warfare where relatively back-
war~l mi.litar.y equipment is used. ror instance, the war to help Korea resist the U.S.
and the Middle Eastern War would be modernized warfare. African guerrilla wars and
the Cambodian war against Vietnamese invasion would, however, be modern war.s but not
modernized wars. OEten we say that "training must be tailored to the needs of modern
warfare"--that is tising the concepts "modern warfare" and "modernized warfare"
interchangeably. ~
Staff Officer Li: Ri_ght. After clarifying these two concepts, we can understand
clearer what we should call the latest defensive counterattack. This retaliation
is a war which occurred at the end of the seventies. From the point of time, it is
modern warfare. Due to the scope of the war, the limitation of battle site conditions
and other factors, both sides used only conventional weaponry. It could have been
a three-dimensional war, but it did not become a reality. Hence, it is not a typical
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modernized war. Naturally, this is not to~say at all that it is totally unrelated
to modernized warfare. Durin~; this war, the military equipment, the defense works
and the coordination of the various types of arms all revealed in differing degrees
certain characteristics of modernized warfare. From this definition, this self-
defense retaliation war is a special war within a special war~that possessed charac-
teristics of modernized warfare. It probed into the characteristics and laws
of modernized warfare, provided research material and contributed a definite basis
for study.
Staff Officer Zhang: I furthermore feel that clarifying the two concepts of modern
warfare and modernized warfare and making clear what this last counterattack was is
all about is a great plus in guiding us in making a su~mnary of our warfare experience
and in applying the experience in future training and warfare--it can prevent blind-
ness and can raise our political consciousness. In the first place, we will not
equate this war with modernized warfare and will not make all warfare experience
absolute. Having fought and bled in battle, and therefore highly valuing the summa-
tion of war experience is undoubtedly correct, but if we do not seek truth from
facts and merely regard the part as the whole, using the specific to arrive at the
universal prematurely and taking modernized warfare to be only this kind, then it
would simplify modernized warfare. As a result, we would consciously lower the
standards of our educatior~ training and battle preparation work unconsciously. We
would not earnestly pay attention to special points and developments and to study
warfare laws under modern conditions. If we do this, we will definitely sustain
great defeats in future wars.
Staff Officer Li: I~et me add to that. Clarifying these two concepts can also
prevent us from another one-sided error--that is, we should accept and recognize
the special characteristics of modernized warfare which this war possessed and trea-
sure the valuable experience which was bought with blood. In the summation and
application of the experience of this war, we should consciously apply scientific
mer_hods to use the parts see the wtiole, the specific to see the general, to see
paace time in war time, and to extract ways to deal with big hegemonist powers from
our e:cperience with fighting the little ones. On the other hand, if we belittle
the special characteristics of modernized warfare which this war possessed and over-
look the necessity of summarizing and studying war experience, what would that lead
to? The result can only be: after one experience, we will not have gained an ounce
of wisdom; after one war, we will not have progressed one step; education and training
would still stay the same and when war comes around again, we may even take a more
tortuous road.
Staff Officer Zhang: Our points of view are comparatively similar. Of course,
that doesn't mean that our points of view are necessarily correct. Let's bring our
viewpoints up and discuss them with the others.
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ARTICLE DISCUSSES TRAINING TO MEET DEMANDS OF MODERN WARFARE
Flame Throwing Training
Beijing JI~FANGJUN BAO in Chinese 29 Jun 79 p 2
[Article by Yu Qiguang [0827 1142 0342] from the headquarters of the Antichemical
tdarfare Corps: "From the Use of Flamethrower Soldiers to a Combined Training of
Specialized Soldiers"]
[Text] A flamethrower is a close contact weapon, used by the infantry in attacking
the enemy's sturdy firing points, blockhouses, tunnels, trenches, caves, shelters
and in destroying the enemy within buildings. This weapon gave play to a special
combat power during the self-defense retaliation war against Vietnam and compensated
for the insufficiencies of rifles, artillery and tanks during close contact fighting.
~ For instance, when a unit of border patrol in Yunnan was assaulting enemy fortifica-
tions in Man Chau and Lao Cai, rifle and artillery fires were helpless against the
enemy's zigzagging defense works and the tanks were unsuited to move in to destroy
them. The commander then mobilized a pla;.oon of flamethrowers to participate and
aid in the combat by carrying out close contact flamethrowing at the enemy's defense
works. Thirty-eight of the enemy's combat targets were wiped out and the fighting
was ended quickly. In any type of fighting, if the commander has a relatively deep
understanding of the principle of using flamethrower soldiers and can utilize them
in a relatively suitable manner, the flamethrower troops would be able to demonstrate
great effectiveness.
And yet, under the same fighting conditions, the flamethrower units under some of
the troops are unable to give play to their powers and may even sustain greater
casualities. The major reason is that co~nanders of some platoons, companies,
battalions and even regiments lack ~eneral knowledge about the flamethrower as a
weapon and do not know how to utilize this specialized troop. Unnecessary casaulities
would result especially if the commander does not know to organize firing to neutra-
lize, interdict and contain enemy fire and is not able to give cover to the flamethrower
unit while it is in the act of flamethrowing.
The use of flamethrowers is not supposed to be complicated, so why should there be
such occurrences contrary to our general knowledge. There are three major reasons.
First, it is because we "never burn incense during peacetime and only clasp Bud~ah's
feet duri.ng wartime." The flamethrower unit is usually assembled on the spot to work
with the infantry. Normally, the flamethrower soldiers are not even trained with
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with the foot soldiers, so the two groups do not understand one another and are
unable to coordinate. Secondly, in training and leadership, some commanders of
combined arms forces have only one type of arms in mind--they value the infantry
= and overlook special troops and specialized units and do not want to take specialized
soldiers like the flamethrowers. Only during combat do they recall that there are
such specialized soldiers to be used. Some combined arms forces commanders lack even
the most basic knowledge about such specialized troops. Third, the training of the
specialized troops is in itself not up to standards. Many cadres and soldiers of
specialized units reflect that "specialized soldiers are noncombatant public works
soldiers." They are indispensible for construction work, road repairs and production
work. It is not even sure that they can complete their own technical training, let
alone learn about ttie infantry. How can we change this situation? The lesson that
we learned from this self-defense retaliation war gave us the following enlightenments:
l. Specialized soldiers are not dispensible to modern warfare, but they can have a
very important role. In our present equipment organization system, specialized arms
- occupy a tiigh ratio, and from the developmental trend of modern warfare, special
troops and specializc~d troops will have an increasingly greater ratio. But specialized
soldiers have always been neglected. Take the instance of the flamethrower troops.
Since their establishment in the fifties, they first distinguished themselves in
action during the ,Iiangshan Island war and then again during the Indo-China border
defense retaliation war and were considered to be the second most effective weapon
for the destruction of enemy fire points. But in the years of peace afterwards,
people began to forget about these specialized soliders, and after many cuts in the
_ equipment organization system, these specialized troops became only a seedling,
occupying an extremely secondary and subordinate position. Scientific study of this
type of weaponry was almost terminated. Yet, it was these undervalued and pitifully
few flamethrowers which once again demonstrated their combat prowess in this last
defense retaliation. All commanders who took part in tfie war cried out for a
reinstatement and an increase in the organization and equipment of flamethrowers
and a strengthening of the building of the troops. The facts showed that specialized
soldiers are an important source of power in the coordinated combat of all types of
soldiers. In the cases of foreign military, specialized soldiers are not being
undermined but are being increasingly strengthened. At the same time that the United
States and the Soviet Union are racing to develop nuclear weaponry, they are continuing
the building and training of the various speci~lized troops. The Soviet Army in its
combined arms forces not only includes light flamethrowers but also heavy flamethrowers,
and is busily carrying on training with the flamethrowers fighting in cooperation.
The American Army in its combined arms forces not only has flamethrowing and smoke
- emitting specialized traops with battalions and companies equipped with oil bombs,
each infantry plato~n also carries flamethrowers. In the British, French, German,
Japanese and other h:ast-West European troops, there is similar flamethrower organiza-
tional equipment and ~reat emphasis is placed on the building and training of this
specialized unit. '1'he answer as to whether we should increase or slacken the building
of specialized troops such as flamethrowers is evident without further explanation.
2. The commander of combined arms forces must change his habit of depending on only
the infantry and quickly change his attitude to emphasize a good grasp of all differ-
ent kinds of special and specialized units. The lesson taught by this defense
retaliation tells us that giving play to the organic power. of all the various types
of arms is the key to gaining battlefield victory and that the inexperience of
commanders of combained arms forces with special troops and specialized troops atid
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their inability to utilize them suitably are the ba~ic reasons for the poor
coordination of th:: various types of soldiers. Therefore, from now on, we must
especially stress that commanders of combined arms forces grasp the importance of
training special troops and specialized units and that they familiarize themselves
with these types of soldiers and learn how to utilize them.
3 Normal practice must be like real combat--specialized units like the flamethrowers
must be coordinated with infantry companies for combined drilling. 'I'he self-defense
retaliatiou also tells us that last minute cooperation cannot form the soldiers into
a fist; only strengthened training during peacetime can bring about coord.ination
during wartime. Hence, after completion of its own technical training, the specialized
unit should be sent to infantry battalions or troops for coordinated combat training.
Flamethrowers and foot soldiers must be trained together on all battle formations with
actual weapons, artillery and flamethrowers. This way, it would, on the one hand,
familiarize the comrades of the infantry unit with the use of flamethrowers and enable
them to learn how to give flametlirower soldiers cover to enable the latter to complete
their task. And on the other hand, it would enable the flamethrowers to learn
infantry knowledge so that they would understand the combat aims of the infantry and
better coordinate with them to complete the mission.
Infantry, Artillery Coordination
Beijing JIEFAIVGJUN BAO in Chinese 29 Jun 79 p 2
[Article by Li Songlin [2621 2646 2651], Huang Wenzhou [7806 2429 5297] and Cang
Yongxiang [5547 3057 4382] from an artillery platoon of the Jinan Forces: "Contents
and Methods on Improving Artillery Training Encircling Infantr.y-Artillery Coordination"]
[Text] Ground artillery is used by the army as a surprise fire attack force during
combat. T'~~e army is responsible for using artillery to interdict enemy f ire, destroy
enemy fortifications and support the infantry in its fighting. Whether the infantry
can fight together in coordination with the artillery will have direct influence on
the outcome oF the battle. But for how many years now have artillery and infantry
a under the same division never met. The training of artillerymen is basically a
technical training of a single type of arms; ordinarily training consists of a single
vehicle, a single artillery piece, a single man. Firing practice at the end of the
year.is according to the training assi~nment which is to shoot a few firing exercises
' at a fixed shooting range. Coordinated training is mostly limited to one's own
coordination of sightin~, atld clearin~ and maneuvering the artillery piece. Once,
when we were drilling in coordination with the infantry during practice with live
ammunition, a great ntimber of problems arose. A commander of combined arms forces
was not familier with the artillery unit and firing was based on guessing. The
commander of the artillery unit did not understand the infantry's combat goals and
laws of mobility, so that even after the infantry had occupied the "enemy's" forward
position, the artillery firing arrangement was still not completed so the unit was,
therefore, unable to give the infantry support fire at the right time. Nor did the
infantry understand the military function ~f the artillery and it was unable to take
- advantage of artillery attack ancl fire Power to penetrate deep into enemy lines. At
the end of the practice drill, both commanders said with deep feelings: "Had there
been a real war, ttiis type of last minute coordination would indeed result in great
losses." How can we change the situation where infantry and arrillery never meet
f.or practice. After the self-defense r.etaliation war against Vietnam, we gave a great
deal of thought to this problem and feel that we should do the following:
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We feel that a key factor would be to have organizations above the division rank
create conditions for the artillery to practice together with the infantry. The
artillery unit under regimental command belong to the same organizational regiment.:l
system as the infantry, so the coordinated practice of these two is relatively easier
to carry out. But the artillery regiment under divisional command is fundamentally
unrelated to the infantry part ex~ept during large-scale practice when all are assembled
together. This sitiiation cannot be resolved by ttie artillery regiment itself. We
_ hope that divisional leaders and organizations can plan many medium- and small-scale
combined driYls during the year. By *~edium-scale we mean using the division as the
unit t~ organize artillery regiments to take turns to have combined practice with
the infantry under divisional conunand. By small-scale we mean that there must be
artillery participation in infantry battalion practice. In order to heighten the
effect of combined practice, we suggest that officers of the combined arms forces
carry out artillery practice with live ammunition. This would enable the officers
and cadres above infantry battalion rank to familiarize themselves with the organiza-
- tion, equipment and military function of the artillery and with live ammunition
practice enable them to understand the principle of the use of artillery and better
apply it and enable them to give the artillery reasonable assignments. The artillery
can, on the other hand, learn the various coordination techniques during combined
practice.
We must center on the coordination of artillery and infantry and strengthen the
artillery's tactical training. At present, the artillery units are basically doing
technical training. Tactical training is minimal, so that when they do have combined
practice with the infantry, the two cannot cooperate and are unable to bring about a
consistent coordinati.on. Therefore, artillery tactical training time should be
increased, centerin~; closely on infantry-artillery coordinatifln problems; cadres and
soldiers should be organized together to study the infantry regiment's organization,
equipment, weaponry functions and tactical characteristics. The artillerymen should,
f.urthermore on their own accord, xeview and study infantry practice, with emphasis
on understanding the duties of the infantry during all kinds of combat and the movements
of the infantry during the various stages of combat. They should study the many
battle formations (such as attack, defense, ambush, contact battle) and learn how to
- aid the infantry with artil.lery support during the various stages of combat. The
tactical arrangements of companies, battalions and other groups during live ammunition
practice must be completed before the conclusion of the practice. Rigorous demands
must be made on the troops based on artillery-infantry coordinated combat standards
and the main aim of artillery planning, deployment and movement must be placed on
supporting the infantry to achieve v~~tory.
tide must center on artillery-infantry coordinated training and impove the technical
_ training of the arti.llery units. The speed, accuracy and the ability to give surprise
attack form the basis of support for combat infantry. In the past, because there
was not much consideration given to coordination, the elements of speed and surprise
lttack were often neglected. In the future, technical training should be firmly set
up with service to the infantry as the guiding thought, centering on quick preparation,
quick and accurate shooting and si~rprise shooting. Reform and readjustment in technical
training content should be implemented, and at the same time, based on the experience
of this self-defense attack, new training topics should be added in order to meet the
need of artillery-inf.antry coordination, such as intermittent neutralization shooting
(sudden stopping and shooting to create illusion and impede enemy action) and the feint
removal of artillery and feint stoppage of fire in order to coordinate with the
infantry's feint att~~cks anci surprise flank attacks and other such war tactics. We
must especially strengthen the training of. the art::llery's forward observation posts
so f.irin~; can achieve sucldenness, accuracy and fierceness.
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Conunanders, Troop Coordination
Beijing JIEFEINGJUN BAO in Chinese 29 Jun 79 p 2
[Article by Zhou Nan [6650 0589] and Wei Youlong j7614 1429 7893] from a troop
of the Beijing Forces "Commanders Must Have a Broader Range of Knowledge"]
[Text] It is said that "Commanding lies not in bravery but in resourcefulness." The
coordination of the various arms in combat, to a commander, especially a high level
one, lies in his versatility in the art of war. If a commander is to master the art
of war, he must have a broad range of knowledge. The most basic requirements is
that he be familier with the various types of arms and with the principles of how
to use these arms correctly. On the complex and ever changing battlefield, in order
to be able to judge the hour and size up the situation so as to be able to correctly
- command his own various troops as well as to manoeuvre the enemy's commanding talents,
the commander is required to understand and master many fields of knowledge. Lessons
from foreign and domestic wars from antiquity to now and the lcnowledge of how to make
use of weather and geography are all very important to the commander. Clausewitz
in his book, "On War," said that "Military talent is the harmonious union of various
spiritual powers." This is very true. Especially under conditions of modern war-
fare, modern sciences such as high energy physics, space technology and computer
, science are continuously being applied to military affairs. The range of knowledge
- that a military commander is exposed to becomes increasingly broader. Therefore,
increasing the sptiere of knowledge of co~anders is an important step in the culti-
= vation and elevation of the cadres' organizational and commanding abilities.
_ At present, ttie majority of our military commanders have never gone through
institutional schooling and their cultural level is relatively low too. During
job training, the cadres were limited to organizational and commanding du~ies on
their own level; hence, their rance of knowledge is relatively narrow, We feel that
all levels of commanders, especially those in higher ranks, should increase ttieir
range oF studies, centPring on the topic of elevating modern warfare organizational
= and commanding abiliEies. They should learn, on their own, foreign and domestic
- theories of military science, step by step and in a planned way. For example, they
can center their studies on foreign military thoughts, strategies and tactics of
ldorld War II: They can read the memoirs of Eisenhower, Zhiakov, Roosevelt and Churchill,
the "War pocuments" of Rommel, and "The General Staff Headquarters of the War Periads"
of St~temenko. They can analyze what the changes in political and military situations
during the Great War broiight about in terms of strateg~c and tactical problems and
problems of con?bat methods, how these problems were handled, why they were so handled
, and extract useFul l.essons lrom them. Keading Sokolovkii's thoughts on the problems
of modern military strategy and Grechko's thoughts on future warfare would be very
helpf.u] in tne study of Soviet revisionism. The commanders must study astronomy,
ge~grap}iy, history and space technology. Only broad knowledge can lead to great
resourcefulness. After ttie commanders have been enriched by a broad range of knowledge,
tliey will then be able to correctly make use of the art of war during combat, based
on knowled~;e of Lhe enemy's situation, their own situati.on, on the weather and on
~;eogral~hy. But to truly accomplish this will indeed be difficult.
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Army, Air Force Coordination
- Beijing JIEFANGJUN 13A0 in Chinese 29 Jun 79 p 2
[Article by Li Yongan [2621 3057 1344] and Jin Zhifu [6855 1807 4395] from the Air
- Force of the Jinan Forces: "The Army and the Air Force Should Carry Out Confrontation
Dri.lls"]
[Text] For a long time, the army and the air force have carried out training
independent of one another. When the army trains against planes and defending against
air raids, the situation and the targets were always make believe; and because the
air force training is not in conjunction with the army, coordination, reconnaissance,
diving, bombing and attacking are done from the air into "empty air." Even during
large-scale exercises organized in military areas with the air force part of the
tighting, it is still only a display type of joint exercise. For instance, during
joint exercises when airborne units of the air force are to bomb certain key ground
t