JPRS ID: 9763 USSR REPORT POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

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• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/ 10025
2 October 1981
Latin America Re o~t
p
CFOI~~ 24/81)
Fg~~ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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N~TE
JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign
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mation was summaxized or extracted.
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2 October 1981
,
LATIN AMERi~A ftEPORT
(FOUO 24/81)
_ CONTENTS
' COUNTRY SECTION
- CUBA
Soviet Union's Influence in Country Described ~
- (Pietro Sormani; CORRIERE DELLA SERA, 1 Jun 81) 1
- Attacks on Cuba in Yugoslav Press Scored
~ (Carlos Mora; BOHEMIA., 17 Jul 81) 5
Port Work, Transport Problems in Cienfuegos
= (Gregorio Hernande~; BOHFI~IIA, 17 Jul 81) 10
EL SALVADOR
El Salvador Rebel on U.S. Role, Politica~. Optiois
(Ma,jor Xavier Interview; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 3i Aug-13 Sep 81) 18
- - a - [III - LA - 144 FOUO]
Fl1R (1RFi!''T A i T f.CF r1NT .V
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COUNTRY SECTION CUBA
SOVIET UNION'S INFLUENCE IN COUNTRY DESCRIBED
= Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 1 Jun 81 p 3
[Article by Pietro Sormani: "C!~h:~: Needful and Fearful of Russia"]
[TextJ "Soviet Influence Emerges with Arrogance in Fidel Castro's Republic."
"What little industry the island has today has been achieved with Soviet capital
and assis~ance." "What ts not produ~ed there is imported." "Sugar--the cnly local
resource--is no~ enough to pay for the price of low-interest credits and energy
supplies." "Ct:ban soldiers are in Africa and in Latin America to support Moscow`s
_ policy amonf the nonaligned countries."
From our special correspondent.
Havana--"Cuba," said a young intellectual to me, "has become the sixteenth republic
of the USSR." He said this in a low voice, glancing around him because one of the
~ characteristics of "real socialism" is a very efficient secret police. Who can
guarantee that there are no powerful electronic ears here in this typical dark bar
in the Rampa section.
This sta*_ement, at first glance, seems absurd. What can be more different fro~
Soviet dreariness than this sunny and extroverted country? What can two people
like Fidel Castro and Leonid Brezhnev have in conlmon? The cultural difference is .
more important than any ideological brotherhood. Even "The lnternational" in the
first few years after rhe Revolution took on the beat o;F the conga.
But looking more deeply into ehings, the Russian influence is emerging with arro-
gance. The massive Sovietization of the Seventies has left its trace on the
govern~ent apparatus and the party, on the economic planning system, on the police
and on the army. What can be called the "organization of life" from education to
work, from sports to tourism and f.rom hotels to business, is copied word for word
from the Soviet Union. For the foreigner, that identification is absolute. At
times, even the National hotel seems to be right out of Moscow's Ukraine: the
same inef.ficient service, the same bathrooms that do not work, right down to the
same "tarakani" (even though here they call them "cucarachas").
Officially, it is spc',cen about as little as possible. In every public speech,
the reference to the "beloved" Soviet Union is obligatory--a testimonial in recog-
nition of its friendship and its aid. But the propaganda is discreet. There are
no photographs or sayings of Soviet leaders~ Russian, although taught in the
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schools, is never used. People pretend to believe that Cuba is a sovereign state
and that its relationship with the USSR is of the same type as, for example,
France.
Realtty is quite different. If the Soviet influence is underground, its pr~sence
cannot be concealed. In some cases it is flaunted, as when, in the past few weeks,
four units of the Black Sea squadron, amongst which was a missile-carrying ~hip,
dropped anchor in the port of Havana. But generally, the three or four r.housand
military stationed on the island are not seen in uniform and have practically no
cor~tact with the local population.
Even the 15,000 technicians who work in the nickel mines or in other indu~trial
plants try to keep a low profile. They travel in groups and frequent businesses
and local establishments set aside for them. But it is impossib].e to avoid them,
especially on Sunday when they join their hefty comrades, exhibiting their milky
white skin on the edge of the pools.
Above all, the Soviet influence is evident in the economy. What little industry
Cuba has today is built with Soviet capital and with assistance from Soviet or
East European technicians. I visited the only steel mill on the island, which
produces 350 thousand tons of ingat per year. The machines are Russian, the
ter_hnicians have studied in Russia and the entire work organization is Russian.
What Cuba does not produce is imported directly from the Soviet Union--refrigerators,
radios, televisions and photographic equipment. Even the automobiles are by now
almost all Soviet (or rather more appropriately stated, Italian-Soviet), the "Lada"
(the old FIAT 125) having supplanted the lovingly cared-for Fords, Buicks and
Cadillacs that for so many years had provided the only means of private transpor-
tation for the Cubans.
"The USSR has saved us from economic disaster," Jose Ramirez, assistant professor
of the University of Havana, told me. "When the U.S. imposed the smbargo and
pulled out all of its investments, we were confronted with a scary crisis. Who
else could we have turncd to if not Moscow?" This is the drama of all of the
emerging or ex-colonial countries wha need foreign aid, and who, abandoned by
. the West, rely on the interested generosity of the communist East. What happened
in Cuba has occurred in other countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America and is
happening in Nicaragua.
. The America of Eisenhower dece~ved itself in thinking that it would be able to
sway Fidel Castro by suspending guaranteed-price sugar purchases. BuL Castro
srruck up an agreement with the Soviet Union. In exchange for sugar, the USSR
supplied Cuba with petroleum, raw materials and industrial plants. Shortly after
the revolution, the Cuban leaders tried to diversify the economy and Castro went
as far as actually asking the peasants to destroy the sugar cane plantations.
Production. which under the Batista government had reached 6 and even 7 million
tons per year, collapsed, causing the country great damage.
Castro changed his tactic~, had them replant the cane and again concentrated on
sugar to insure the development of the island. Production again rose, bu* never
achieved Castro's goal of 10 mi]lion tons. Today, the "zafra" is about 7-8 million
tons and even though its importance has diminished in the Cuban economic complex,
sugar still represents 80% of exports.
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Sugar is the wealth ar.,i curse of Cuba--wealth be~ause it means work (even though
hard work) and profit, a curse beca~ise it means soil depletion, dependency and
colonialism. All of Cubati historv can be viewed in terms of sugar. Sugar needr~
a large market: fir.st Spain, which, in order to cultivate it, imported slaves
from Africa, theri the U.S. (c~~reful not to upset the interests of the great
_ monopoly) anci finally the Sovier. Union whicli has replaced private with state
interests. Cu~a is caught in a vicious circle from which it is not ab~e to
escape. It needs sugar, but at the same time it must free itself from it if it
wants to become i.udependent.
Carlos Franqui, Castro's former compatriot in the revolution and now exiled in
Italy, states in his latest book (recentl~T released): "There is, in the history
' oE Cuha, an unchanging characteristic--cursed, (but) objective and real--that
- keep~ returning, recurring and rising again: the sma11 island at the door of the
U.S. cannot be free and independent." But as a result of conservative thinking,
he refuses to recognize that this constant factor has an absolute value. He
observes: "It was impossible to gain freedom from Spain during the colonial
period, and we freed ourselves from i.t. It was impossible to gain f:reedom from
the U.S. during the Repubiic, yet we freed ourselves from it. It is impossible
to gain freedom from Russo-Castroism, but we wilJ. fiee ourselves from it."
Will it be so? Or is I'ranqui forgetting thc~ pr.ofound differences between the
present situation and the past and deluding hiniself? Cuba freed itself from Spain
with the help of the U.S., and freed itself from the U.S. with the help of the
_ Soviet Union, but who can help it to free itself from the Sov~et Union? What
other country i~ today in r.i position to defy Che two superpowers? Perhaps, one
day, China, but this is an uncertain and far.-off prospect. At any rate, before
it can happen, Cuba runs the risk of being completely Sovietized. The mechanisms
of mass control that are at the disposal of totalitarian regimes professing "true
socialism" ar~ much more efficient than those of a Spain in full decline or an
America Fraught with consumerism.
Not even Cuba is ablE~ to give up easily the economic advantages derived from Soviet
frie:ndship: the sectirity of energy supplies, the aid and the low-interest credits.
Sugar. is not enough to pay the costs of it. Castro is constr.ai.ned to accept a
Soviet mi~_itar~~ presence on the island, to supgort Moscow's pol.icy among the non-
a].igned a~id Thi.rd Wor.ld countr.ies, to help the insurrectionist movements in Latin
America and to send its "mulatto legions" to Africa. There are 60,000 Cuban
soldiers in Angola, Mozambique and rthiopia. Underpaid and disliked by the locals,
they meet in battle thous~nds oE miles from their homeland for the sake of Castro's
_ cynical self-in[erest. For a handful of rubles he has lent hi.mself to the Kremlin's
imperial dream.
There are those whc~ attribute to Fidel Castru a r.ore stibtl.e and more nobl.e design:
' After having used the S~viet Union to free himself from American contr.ol, he plans
to be able someday to use his ri.sing personal prestige, which he still enjoys in
the underdeveloped countries, to f.ree himself from Soviet control. The African
legions, if they serve MoSC.ow's inter.ests also serve Cuban interests, imposing
them on the international scene. Sugar, an instrument of Soviet dependence, is
also the condition for development and, Cherefore~ for economic independence..
The working class mobili.�r.~~tion campaign launched in the past fer~ months is not
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~ only a maneuver to cover up secret dialogue initiatives with America, but an
attempt to re~ew the more gsnuine revolutionary traditions and ~o regain a legiti-
macy that has been lost over the years.
It may be that all this is true. Castro is an ambiguous and contradictory person.
but one who has his own dignity. His love for his homeland is indisputable. The
same cannot be said for the other leaders such as his brother Raul or Carlos
Rafael Rodriguez, that long-time communist who had no scruples about participating
in ttie previous Batista gavernm~~nt. And there is the weight of a situation the
terms of which not even Castro can change.
The Soviet Union will never give up Cuba--the outpost of its empire a few tens of
kilometers from the U.S. and center for control and subversion of all of Latin
America--and, if it should ever do so, it would be within the framework of a
worldwide agreement that would leave little or nothing in terms of inde~endence
Eor the island. The fatalism against which ~'ranqui h~irled himself, is still well- ,
rooted in Cuba, and everything in the present or in ttie 3mmediate future tends to
confirm this. �
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Editoriale del "Corriere della Sera" s.a.s.
- CSO: 8028/ti237
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COUNTRY SECTION CUBA
ATTACKS ON CUBA IN YUGOSLAV QRESS SCORED
Havana BOHEMIA in Spanish 17 ~ul 81 pp 62-63
[Article by Carlos Mora]
(Text] Any observer of international politics is in a position to know that re-
centl.y f��riendly relations and cooperation between Cuba and Yuyoslavia have grown.
This is a healthy sign in the panorama of tensions troubling today's world,
threatened by the imperialists' most bellicose, reactionary sectors with another
war, whose consequences would be catastrophic for htiunan~ty.
S The visits to Cuba by, first, Petar Flekovic, president of the Executive Council
of the Socialist Republic of Croatia, and, later, by Dragoslav Markovic, president
of the AssembZy of the Socialist Federal Republic ef Yugoslavia, are eve:~ts of
great significance in the history of relations between the two countries.
As a result, it is genuinely surprising that there is in Yugoslavia a certain
current harmful to those relations that seems to run outside the policy laid down
in that country by the League of Communists.
Periodically, articles hostile to Cuba appear in di~ferent Yugoslav publications,
employing all the known falsehoods, defamatory statements and distortions concern-
ing our histoxy and our social reality for purposes fhat we really cannot
understand.
One day, the article appeared in the r~agazine NIN. Another time, the pages of the
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW jtranslation of the 5panish title] were used; and suddenly,
as if to confuse the inexperienced observer, there was an article signed by a
gentleman called ~anez Stanic in a very "modern" magazine published in Yugoslavia
that is called START. Some people call it the "Yugoslav PLAYBOY." In the journal,
the most subtle political argumeiits are used, and the point of view of some
"socialists" in that country is defended, in alternation with naked women and the
~ "cleanest" pornography,.
It is there, in that magazi.ne, wher~ this Stanic, in a curious demonstration that
in his country there is the so-::al.led "freedom of the press" that the bourgeois
defend so ardently, attacks the Cubar~ Revolution, using vile, hypocritical language
typical of the most rabid enemies of socialism. It is a sick language of cheap,
clumsy anti-Sovietism that shamelessly employs all the "slogans" that the Yankee
imperialists and their puppets once used against Cuba and that is currently used
by the traitors making up the Peking gang which has placed itself at the service
of humanity's worGt enemies.
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Apparently, Stanic is writing outs.ide the policX that his eountxy, his govern-
ment, and his:~arty (if he is a member of the leagne~,axe carrying out.
For it is not a matter of dealing in nuances- in the interpretation of any of the
problems faced by today's world. It is not a matter of speaking out in favor of
this or that road to socialism within observance of the basic principles~of
Marxism-Leninism.
No; what Stanic is doing is repeating, with alleged semantic skill, all the de-
famatory statements and lies that the American imperialists hav~ used against Cuba
throughout the last 22 years.
The Yugoslav hack speaks of Cuba's "dependence" on the USSR and says that the
Cubans do not view that dependence as an obstacle to their sovereignty.
Immediately thereafter, Stanic says--with admirable cynicism--that for Cuba the
principal enemy continues to be the United States�, not the Soviet Union.
The foregoing is not worth a response. What would be interesting is to find out ~
how Stan~c developed that blind hatred,~imilar to that of the most stubborn reac-
tionaries and bourgeois, toward Lenin';,~ homeland, the cradle of world socialism.
By utilizing lies and distortions as an argument, the ~rriter echoes the rea~tionary
myth that Cuba became socialist because of the American imperial~sts' pressura and
stupid aggress~ive policy.
The maligner ccunpletely ignores the Cuban people's anti-imperialist roots. He.
has not read Marti, and, of course, he is not familiar with Fidel Castro's
"History Will ,Absolve Me."
The struggle against Fulgencio Batista's bloody dictatorship, which cost the l~.ves
of so many revolutionary fighters, is, for Stanic, a series of terrorist acts, and
the assault on the Moncada Barracks by a group of brave patriots, a mere "adven-
turist action."
The entire struggl.e of the Cuban people for true independence, for what it formally
abt~ined after the 1895 struggle was despoiled by Yankee appetites, constitutes r~o
more than an expression of "romanticism" to this START writer.
We said at the beginning of this article that we cannot understar.d how such, things
as this monstrosity by Mr Janez Stanic or the ar.ticles that have appeared gr~-
viously in NIN and other publications aan be published in Yugoslavia, a friendly
country.
This expression of liberalism is disconcerti.ng to us, although there is ~rr effort
to present it to us as a manifestation of "freedom of the press"; for .it is not
easy for anyone with common sense to swallow that alleged "freedom of the press,"
managed with the same viewpoint as that of the bourgeoisie and the z~ewspaper
owners joined together in the IAPA. ~
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In Yugoslavia, r.o one may publicly attack the League o~ Coamnunists or oppose its
domestic and foreign palicy. No ane in Yugoslavia may publicly attack, in an
article such as the one Mr Stanic devoted to Cuba, tfie self-government that constt-
= tutes the basis~of the social system in that country.
As a re.sult, it is disconcerting, inexplicable and surprising that in a Yugoslav
publication it is possible to run an article full of defamatory statements, venom,
distortions and ill will toward Cuba, its~ravolution and its people.
7'hat obviously runs counter to the present level of relations between the two
countries.
- Stanic does not confine himself to the general remarks we have cited concerning
the origin of the Cuban Revolution, in the struggle against Batista and the as-
sault on Moncada.
He centers his criticism on what he calls the consonance of Cuban and Soviet in-
terests in Africa, attacking the example of proletarian internationalism that the
� Cuban people have consistently, s~elf~lessly and bravely provided in the African
continent.
It is here where the author of the START article reveals himself to be a master
~ of maliciousness and defamation.
Stanic compares Cuba's aid to the Angolan people t~ South African intervention
in that country.
He says that the Cubans saved Ag~stinho Neto, whom he terms a representative of
a competing force in a battling Angola, along with two forces represented by
Jonas Savimbi and Holden Roberto.
There can be nothing lower, more rotten, more vile than that thesis advanced by
the Yugoslav hack.
This unhealthy anticommunist does nat say that Jonas Savimbi and Holden Roberto
are two vulgar agents of the CIA, serving the worst African cause, which is that
of the enemies of the people, in collusion with the Chinese hegemonists and other
forces of reaction allied with the American imperialists.
When Ethiopia is mentioned, he also uses the same lies employed by the imperial-
ists, waving the flag of Eritrean separatism and hiding the fact that the charla-
tan Siad Barre joined the game of the ene:nies of the Ethiopian Revolution in
order to try to carry out his clumsy atnbitions to expand and dominate the Horn
of Africa.
At the height of his feverish anti-C~;~ban and anti-Soviet rage, Stanic goes so far
as to use the same map circulated b~ the Yankee Pentagon to indicate alleged Cuban
military bases in Africa, a ploy t),iat could not fool anyone and which was even
~ criticized in the U.S. press itself.
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According to the authqr of the STA.p;r attackF Cuban intervention in Africa is
causing unifi.cation of the redctionaries and irritating the United States.
As one can see, it concerns Stanic a great deal that the United States is .
irritated.
The article does not mention Washington's pc~licy in Africa, in Asia, and in Latin
America. Ncr does he attack 5outh Africa, nor is he concerned about apartheid and
South African racism.
The objective underlying this vile START attack is to undermine Cuba's prestige
in the Movement of Nonaligned Countries.
An old lie, that Cuba has brought the entire nonaliqned movement to a position
_ of confrontation, is used by Stanic.
In his lengthy article, even the untru~hs that Peking continually wields against
Cuba are echoed.
He says that "Peking is sensitive to the strengthening of the Soviet presence in
Africa" because that continent belongs to the third world and cannot be left at
the mercy of Soviet hegemonism.
- There is no roam in the narrow, chauvinistic, hate-filled mind of the hack in
question for the idea th~at Cuba, the Cubans, practice proletarian internationalism
as a matter of principle, fairly, honorably, without asking anything in return or
demanding anything in return.
To Stanic, there are two types of internationalism:
a) That carried out by Cuba and the USSR by means of intervention i; the internal
affairs of other countries;
b) That carried out by Yugoslavia, which gives precedence to sovexeignty, autonomy,
independence and responsibility for the people themselves and for the working
class.
To the Cubans, there axe actually two conceptions of internationalism, in response
to the thesis stated above on the basis of Stanic's ~oint of view:
One conception, the one put int�o practice by Cuba, is that of solidarity with the
people fighting for independence, that of socialist unity, that of the unrelenting
struggle against American in~perialism, the Zeading enemy of the people, and the
struggle ~~r national liberation in Asia, Africa and Latin America.
= The other conception, the one embraced b.y Stanic and those v~ho stand behind him,
is that of infidelity to princ'iples, of opp~rtunism, of intrigue and maliciousness,
of divisiveness and aonstant plotting against the Movement of Nonaligned Countries.
All the rest is providing ammunition for the imperialist campaign against Cuba,
against the Soviet Union, against socialism.
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Each country has the right to hu]:ld ~ocialism in accoxdance ~ti.th itS. A~tn charac-
teristics. and its specific condi:tions.
This has alwa,ys been recognized by the Cuban revolutionaries. There are no magic
formulas that are valid for the entire world.
Cuba respects Lhe road to socialism that the Yugoslavs have chosen, and by the
� same token it does not accept any Stanic's telling us that we are copying tfie .
Soviet model, for in the hypothetical case that we were, we have the same rignt
that the Yugoslavs have to travel the road of self-government.
- To.assert that what we are doing is incorrect and that what Mr Stanic defends is
- correct is to practice the most clumsy dogmatism and, what is worse, to come dan-
~ gerously close to the ideas advanced by the enemies of socialism, t~ the ideas
of the American imperialists, of tfieir interventionist arm (the CIA) and to the
Chinese gang~s policy of betrayal of socialism in coll~asion with the world's most
- reactionary groups.
Stanic's defamatury statements in the magazine S~ART, his foolish sti~ing of lies
- and his cowardly attack on the Cuban Revolurion and its heroic people cannot be
disguised by being hidden amid all that pornographic filth used by corrupt capi-
talist societies in magazines such as START, with which those advocating certain
viewpoints in Yugoslavia want ta emulate western consumer society.
Or could it he that this is the socialism that Stanic and his political adv~.sers
want?
~ COPYRIGHT: BOHEMIA 1981
9085
CSO: 3010/1763 ~
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COUNTRY SECTION CiTBA
PORT WORK, TRANSPORT PROBLEMS IN CIENI'UEGOS
~ Havana BOHEMIA in Spanish 17 Jul 81 pp 28-31
[Found-table discussion among port and transport officials, organized by BOHEMIA;
_ report by Gregorio Hernandez]
[Text] One of the meeting rooms of the Executive Committee of the Cienfuegos
People's G.~vernment was the setting for this round tableo
This province, which until recently was one of the national leaders in the effort
t~ avoid delays in the loading and unloading of goods in the port-transport-
domestic economy chain, and thus in the payment of demurrage, suddenly fell to
sixth place, with the resultant harm to the economy, among other things, that such
a situation entails.
To find out the reasons and the measures adopted to recover the lost position, we
went to the Pearl of the South. Cooperation by the party and the People's Govern-
ment was not late in coming~ Thus, representatives of the c3ifferent agencies that
by their actions decide the results, positive or not, along with representation
from the labor movement, met there and candidly analyzed the problems while also
disclosing commitments already undertaken to remedy the critical situation.
Panelists were Roberto Tiel de Leon, vice president of the chain and member of the
_ Executive Committee of the People's Government in Cienfuegos Province; Enrique
Mena Exposito, director of the Mambisa Terminals Enterprise, Centxal Region;
Carlos Manzanares Carrabeo, administrator of the Mambisa shipment agency; Ignacio
Nualla Alvarez, administrator of the Cuban Freight Enterprise--CUFLET--agency;
Isidoro Monzon Diaz, provincial director of the Ministry of Transport's Expediting
Enterprise --EXPEDITRANS; Manuel Matienzo Abuela, chief of railroad distance and
operations office in the province, Central Division; Nelson Gomez Rosell, adminis-
trator of the Cienfuegos Truck Depot; Ricard~ D`Escoubet Nerey, director of the
Cienfuego~ Cereals Combine, belonging to the Ministry of the Food Industry; Bruno
Rodriguez, vice director of production at the Karl Marx Cement Enterprise, belong-
ing to the Ministry of Construction; Enrique Garcia Ramos, deputy insurance office
from the Ministry of Agriculture in the southern province. A representative of the
Ministry of the Sugar Industry was invited but unfortunately could not attend.
Also present at the round table was Fernando Eras, chief of the Transport and Com-
munications Department of the party's Provincial Committee, as well as Angelica
Robillo and Luis Sarria, respectively officials of the Cereals Combine and the
Mambisa Terminals Enterprise, Central Region.
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The meeting included vigorous mucual criticism as well as self-criticism. No one
held back. At any rate, our conclusions~appear at the end. The reader can judge
for himself.
Here, then, is the round table.
[BOHEMIA]: Cienfuegos Province, which held a leading position after the state of ~ ,
emergency for the port-transport-damestic economy chain was decreed, has fallen
to sixth place nationally. What's the reason for this sudden shift?
Roberto Tiel: Basically, the reason is the delay in the loading and unloading of
goods by a group of enterprises involved in the economy. The most notable in this
regard were those related to sugar and nonsugar agriculture, in the loading of
fertilizer. This led to unfavorable wo~k resulzs.
Another enterprise was the Karl Marx CemenL- Factory, in loading for export, be-
cause of problems the enterprise caused. These, as basic enterprises. There are
others, such as the Cereals Combine, which also affected the situation in the
province.
Another factor is problems with notices, in the case of the equipment that should
be received. All this has led to delays and, therefore, has affected work
results.
[BOHEMIA]: What's the cause of the hiqh level of goods stored at the port durin~
the first quarter of the year, and what measures have been taken to remove more
of what is unloaded? -
Enrique Mena: During the first quarter of the year 1980, the port of C:ienfuegos
handled 65,600 tons, and during the first quarter of 1981, this was 100,800. That
-x is, during the first quarter of '81, 35,000 tons more was handled than in the same
period the year before. However, during the first quarter of 1980, although less
cargo was handled, the average was 12,200 tons stored at the port; and in the
first quarter of '81, when 35,000 tons more was handled, the average stored was
~ 10,735--that is, 2,000 tons less. March, to ~e specific, ended with 7,200. These
figures are not alarming in the case of the port of Cienfuegos because ot the
limited storage capacity, especially roofed capacity.
The basic causes that gave rise to this situation are the following: During the
first quarter of the year, several ships arrived at the port whose cargos were
deposited at our warehouses and docks because of lack of distribution, though
that's not the present situation, for 90 percent of the cargos are distributed.
One of the ships was loaded with pulp. This cargo stayed for over a month and a
half in the port warehouse, and it turned out that the pulp was for Havana. The
same thing happened with the vessel "Sandino," which had to leave 3,500 tons on
our docks because of lack of distri~ution.
Something similar happened to us with a ship loaded with rice. We had to put a
goodly amount of that tonnage in our warehouses because part of it could be dis-
tributed, and the rest couldn't. The same thing happened with ships loaded with
containers.
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Also, our own deficiencies have hampered us. We've had equipment breakdowns; we
' haven't been skillful at times in utilizing all the transport faci.lities given us.
[B~HEMIA): What factors contribute to the delay in the pro~essing of the documents
necessary for the port to carry out, promptly and properly, the unloading of the
ships?
Carlos Manzanares: We want to clarify two points. The first is that the dociunents
*r,at the steamship agency delivers to the port should involve the manifest, the
stowage plan, and the carga list by hold, but not other documents that also
a:Ffect the port. Second, we're a national, not a provincial, enterprise.
The basic factor that leads to some delay that might take place in the delivery of
the documentation to the port is its failure to arrive at our enterprise in time
for us to do the translations and get them to the port. It's impossible for the
steamship agency to do the translations in time when the documents arrive right
on board the ship, as happens on occasions.
Another issue is that, although the enterprise already has the original documenta-
tion and does the translation in time, it has to wait until the ship is told the
port of destination before sending it the translated documents.
Occasionally, when a ship arrives with a maximum of 40 or 50 lots, the units cd.n
d~ the translation, but not when there are manifests for 400, 500, or 600 lots.
[BOHEMIA]: Isn't there another solution?
Carlos Manzanares: [ae can�t offer another solution, or any answer.
[BOHEMIA]: Undistributed goods, especially in containers, have come to account for
- 33 percent of cargos stored aL- the port. What's the justification for this?
Ignacio Nual.la: During the first 10 days of Apri1, at the port of Cienfueqos, of
an inventory of 9,031 tons, 2,938 were awaiting distribution. Of these, 2,728
involved containerized cargos--176--containers and 200 general cargos, which
constituted 33 percent of undistributed cargos at that time.
This abnormal situation was due to the late delivery of forwarding notices, OPE-2,
by the enterprises for which those shipments were intended; and they are: Maprinter
[Cuban Enterprise for Import of Raw Materials and Intermediate Products], Quimim-
port [Cuban Enterprise for Import of Chemical ProductsJ, Medicuba [Cuban Enterprise
for the Import and Export of Medical Products], Cubametales jCuban Metal Importing
EnterpriseJ, Fecoimport [As published: ?Fecuimport: Cuban Railroad Importing Enter-
prise], Cuuatex [Cuban Enterprise for Import of Fiber, Fabrics, Hides and Their
Products], an3 Consumimpcrt [Cuban ~;nterprise for the Import of General Consumer
Goods].
Although they knew about the arrival. of these goods, the enterprises I named had
not prepared the corresponding forwarding notices. There are still five con-
tainers without notices from the enterprise Maquimpor~ [Cuban Enterprise for Import
_ of Machinery and Equipment] that came from the ship "Abel Santamaria," which
arrived at the port on 8 March of this year.
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At present, the distribution situation at the ~ort o~ C~en�uegos, zepresents
90 percent of the cargo, but there's still 10 percent not distri.buted that belongs
- to the enterprises Maprinter, Exiquin jExpansion unknown], Eximal jExpansion un--
known], Medicuba, Maquimport and Quimimport. That is, the same enterprises that
were found to have problems during the first quarter are in that situation.
[BOHEMIA]: Expeditrans, the central factor and coordinator of work in the chain,
plays an essential role. What have the problems been that have affected the pro-
vince most, and what measures have been proposed to remedy them?
Isidoro Monzon: The port-transport-domestic economy chain in our province has been
affected by the following factors:
Deficiencies in daily operational planning, which has caused great delays in the
loading and unloading of the means of transport. .
The failure to establish staggered schedules for the placement of the vehicles to
be loaded at tbe port's different loading sites and those for the domestic economy.
The lack of systematic management and disposition of the vehicles arriving in this
province empty on the basis of demand for transport.
At the same ti.me, there's the violation by the supplying and producing enterprises
of some clauses that establish the times and sizes of deliveries to their customer,~~,
and, in fact, the failure of the enterprises receivinq the goods to demand adher-' ~
- ence, which has allowed violation of such clauses in contracts.
Forwarding of goods, especially in the enterprises Universal, of the CEATM .
[State Committee for Material and Technical Supply]; and in Supply and Transport, of
the riinistry of Construction; the sugar and agricultural enterprises belonging,
respectively, to the Ministries of Sugar and Agriculture, has also affected the
- chain in the province because of the delays :it has caused and irrational use of
means of transport. Combined with all this we should note the lack of information
concerning expected shipments and defects in giving of prior notice to achieve
greater certainty in the unloading of the means of transport.
Deviation from truck-loading schedules also has hampered work in our province,.for
the units arrive outside of the scheduled times.
= To solve these problems, a work plan was drawn up and discussed by the executive
committee of the chain's provincial committee. It sets forth the specific measures
to be carried out by each of the links in the aforesaid provincial chain.
jBOHEMIA]: For 6 months, Cienfuegos has maintained the watchword of zero demurrage.
_ v~lhat factors have made it possible to achieve these results in the railroad?
Manuel Matienzo: There are three basic factors in the achievement of these positive
results--zero demurrage--in the railroad: First is the level of discipline and
awareness reached by the railroad workers in th~j segment of the chain, which has
enabled us, woxking closely with our Central Division's freight department, to
begin coordinating the loading or unloading with the users as soon ~s they notify
us that the cars are on the way, maintaining constar.t monitoring of the cars from
division level to the station of destination.
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Another fa.:to~ is the daily meeting held by the managers of the chain with its
different members in which discussions take place and opera:.ing agxeements are
made about the work plan to be followed the next day, They insure the loading
or unloading of the units.
And finally there is the effort made by the stevedores' brigades from the dif-
ferent enterprises using the railroad and the freight center, which have achieved
these successes.
[BOH~tdIA]: How has the use of truck transport been? Has there been a positive
or negative outcome in the loading and unlaading?
Nelson Gomez: Regarding the use of truck transport, we can report the following:
_ In number of tons per vetiicle/days worked, we've gone from the 21.4 we were get-
ti.ng hefore th~ emer}.;ency was declared to 33.5.
- Trips per vehicle/day worked, from 1.4, which we were getting, to 2.4.
Wage cost per trip, frocn 19 pesos to 15.36.
- Hours' delay in loading and unloading, we have: before.July 1980 there was a
- mont171y average of 31,436; and now that average is 17,362 hours.
; Before July, as a~r~onthly~average, 25,000 tons was moved, and now 55,800 has
been reached.
I think we should go to systematization of all factors in the chain, avoiding ~
last-minute marathons by all means. Moreover, our port should consistently main-
tain a minimum of its facilities, regardless of how critical the arrival of ships
may prove to be.
At the same time, we should punctuaYly transport everything contracted for by
virtue of better use o~ our units' capacities and rotation cycles.
Regarding the domestic economy, we should lay the foundation for improved organi-
zation and planning of its storage capacity, bearing in mind the variability of
our exports and imports.
[BOHEMIA]: What control measures does the provincial delegation of the Ministry
- of Agriculture carry out to improve the efficiency of loading and unloading the
means of transport through the Farm Supplies Enterprise?
Enrique Garcia: Uur ministry has been encountering some problems, pri.marily in the
unloading .:~f trucks. Various measures have been taken to remedy this situation.
First of all, w~ held a serninar with all our enterprises, with participation by
Expeditrans. A sta.nding representative was named to the committee that manages
the chain every day. Another measure, of great importance, is participation in
- the chain meetings that are held at both provincial and national level by those
directors of our enterprises who have encountered problems with loading and
unloading.
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Another measure is the one requixing that the of~icial responsible for the de-
murrage will pay the fine with his own wages and not with the enterprise's funds,
as was happening.
We also encountered some difficulties with the cars loaded with fertilizer from
- the Frank Pais factary in Matanzas. We visited the factory and altered the pro-
gram, and a 10-day delivery schedule for fertilizer was established. Since that
visit, the problems we had with the arrival of trucks from that factory have been
solved.
[BOHEMIA]: The Karl Marx Cement Enterprise has caused delays in the loading and
unloading of trucks and late loading of ships. Will it be possible to efficiently
insure the delivery of the cement for export without the payment of demurrage?
Bruno Rpdriguez: You have to consider that the Karl Marx factory began to pro-
duce on 8 March, and in April we started delivering cement for the domestic
economy, and in May for export.
The delays our factory has caused in the loading and unloading of trucks hav~ been,
in our opinion, first of all because of the adjustments it's been necessary to
make in the baggingtnachines, and, besides that, there's our personnel's inexperi-
ence in the handling of the cement for export and for the domestic economy.
_ F~r a year, we have been taking measures in the factory to solve this problem,
and they act~sally haven't worked out as we wished.
At present, measures have been taken to insure that work goes on 24 hours a day
- in the shipping building. The comrades who work there are being coordinated,
and an effort is made to meet the goals for the shipping building. They also work
to maintain the equipment, and at present three cement-bagging machines are being
used.
We think that from now on the factory will be able to solv2 all the problems and
avoid payment of demurrage for the cement we have to export in 1981.
[BOHEMIA]: What factors have caused this co~mbine, which had operated successfully
for 5 months, to fall back and cause delays in transport beginning in April?
Riaardo D'Escoubet: As a concrete answer, we can point to three factors:
The staggering of transport we were receiving in April, which affected ~ss.
Second, the changing of norms in accordance with Resolution 236, to overfulfill
above 120 percent.
And, third, the temporary departure of 35 comrades to do ~ther jobs, which affect-
ed two stevedores' brigades, each one consisting of 5 comrades. The absence of
a stevedor in each briga6e means 27 fewer tons handled.
Now the brigades are full. We've held ongoing discussions with the comrades,
and they have already fulfilled norms above 100 percent.
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[BOHEMIA]; What motivates the labor movesnent in terms of emulatl.on so that
Cier,fuegos ~~ill regain the vanguard position it occupied nationally in tihe chain?
Diosdado Villaurrutia: We have to say that the labor movement ~.n the province was
receptive to the directives issued by the CTC ICentral Organizotion of Cuban
Trade Unions), in the light ot the party's call, with respect to intensifying and
giving impetus to emulation-oriented activities intended to enthusiastically and
_ productively increase the motivation existing in the port-transport-domestic
economy ctiain in Cienfuegos Province.
Basically, we've practiced emulation in the transport, merchant marine and port
sectors. We think it is time to encourage this emulation in the farming seccor,
and they are already at work in the sugar sector. We also include another activi-
' ty, as in tYte case of the comrades who work in the Cereals Combine.
We've foreseen that it's necessary to vigorously insist that the workers in the
enterprises and units learn the problems of their area, what problems the chain
is having. To actively make use of the favorable setting of the pr~duction and
service meetings; the workers should be told what they can work on, where their
_ effort is wanted.
- The workers of Cienfuegos won't be responsible for the province's failure to
attain its rightful position.
[BOHEMTA]: We would like the representative of the president of the provincial
chain to provide a commitment for the near future concerning effort and positive
results.
Roberto Tiel: Concerning commitment, the province's basic objective is to again
succeed in occupyir.~ the outstanding position it deserves. That is, recover
what has been lost and retain it with systematic labor, systematic monitoring by
all the links in the chain and enterprises belonging ta the domestic economy.
If you will, also challenge the other provinces to maintain zero demurrage. .
Our Opinion: For this round table with the Cienfuegos chain, we intentionally in-
vited two agencies that normally have not been present at these journalistic
sessions. We are speaking of CUFLET and the steamship agency. Our readers must
have realized their importance to the chain's efficiency t:i~rough distribution of
the cargos from the ships that arrive at our ports and the prompt delivery of
documentation for their dispatching.
At the same time, we have observed the success shown by the means of transport in
the use of both rail and truck movement, as well as the relative stability of
port manu,~ment despite the excess goods in their warehouses. ~iowever, there is
the phenomenon that the principal agencies of the domestic econ~my are presenting
problems themselves that clearly lead to the province's reduceil efficiency in
relation to others in the country, especially when there were times when
it was thought that Cienfuegos was going to squeeze Pinar del Rio out of first
place.
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Problems caused hy the unscientific linking of output with wages in the Cereals
Combine; the lack of adequate training for a certain key employee in the inner
workings of the cement factory.
Agriculture had to take drastic steps with those who, by their negligence, caused
the payment of demurrage. . . .
In the sugar industry, there were also problems that affected the chain's effi-
ciency, although we did not have the opportunity to hear the views of that sec-
tor's representative.
That is, from what we can see, these sectors were essentially those that had a
negative influence on the position of the chain in the pro~ince, not to mention
what can happen to the economy, especially at the port, in terms of loss of
foreign Exchange, if there had not been a favorable balance between the payment
' of demurrage and e~rnings from prompt dispatching.
At the round table there was a commitment to efficiency. When the next check is
held, we will attempt to learn about its results, and we promise to co~nent cri-~
tically if that commitment has been fulfilled.
Will Cienfuegos rise? We will wait and see.
COPYRIGHT: BOHEMIA 1981
9085
CSO: 3010/1763
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EL SALVADOR
EL SALVADOR REBEL ON U.~. ROLE, POLITICAL OPTIONS
PA141527 Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 31 Aug-13 Sep 81 pp 44-45
[Interview with "Major Xavier," chief of international relations of the E1 Salvador
People's Liberation Forces by Guillermo Papussy: "The United States and the Junta
Want to Maintain the Status Quo to Perpetuate the Old Systen of Exploitation and
Repression"--date and place not given]
[Text] [Question] What is the revolutionary movement's present strategy following
the general offensive in January 1981? What are its future objectives?
[Major XavierJ The general offensive in January represented a stage, a step forward
_ for the revolutionary movement. Not only did we maintain our positions but we
also won new ground. The situation inside the country has changed and the class
struggle has undergone a qualitative improvement. That is largely why we decided
on a series of tactical and strategic changes following three fundamental axes:
resisting, consolidating and advancing.
Resisting: Our forces have already repulsed more than 100 offensives whose objec- ~
tive was~to wipe out the revolutionary movement, the enemy has met with glaring
defeat.
Consolidating the "local people's power" in the zones under the revolutionary ~
forces' control means or.gani~ing the population's social and political life
according to revolutionary rules and laws. As regarc3s the third point--advancing--
we have opened up two new fronts in the north of the country and a third 25 km
from the capital since January.
[Question]. There is talk of inediation at present. What does that mean in practical
terms? Would not a possible "agreement" with the enemy be likely to turn against
the revolutionary movement?
[Major Xavier] First, we are convinced that our revolutionary plan is, at present~
the only possible solution for our people and their problems. There c.an be no
question of going back on this plan. Our people are forced to wage an armed
struggle for their liberation because of our obligarchy and the United States,
which have prevented any other solution from being found. The war and the class
struggle which are shaking our country have claimed several thousand victims,
but we think that we must take an open attitude and consider any possibility of
settling the conflict with as little bloodshed as possible. Even outside the ~
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country those people who are interested in E1 Salvador are aware of the massacre;
we have contacted i.nternaLional forces which are consider.ing the possibility of
less violent and painful solution to the conflict. Our mediation initiative ie
in keeping with this aspiration of ours. Unfortunately we are convinced that the
United States and the junta do not at prQSent want to find any solution which is
likely to fulfiLl oiir people's aspirations. Indeed, their interests depend on
the "status quo" thanks to which they are maintaining the old system of exploita-
tion and repression. These are not supposztions. I am merely referring to the
official statements made by junta representatives to members of the socialist
international.
In short, we now know that neither Washington nor the Christian Democratic di~.tator-
ship is prepared to seek a solution to the conflict, thus clearly showing the real
objectives of their political plan. The enemy's refusal to open serious discus-
- sions can only make us follow through our course and pursue the war to its logical
conclusion.
[Quesr.ion} The democratic and revolutionary front is a coalition of democratic
Eorr_es and mass organizations. What composition and role do the latter have?
[Major Xavier] The spec~i.al. char.acteri.stic of the mass organizations is, on the
one hand, t.hat they are figtiting for the immediate demands of the people they
represent and, on the other, that they form part of the politico-military strategy.
The mass organizations not only su~port but coinplement the military organization.
The mass organizations' struggle is at present centered mainly on the impact of
the economic crisis, trying to stop this burden being placed on the proletariat's
back; they are showing that the junta's economic plan is not viable and cannot
solve the probl.ems facing the various social stra.ta.
These organizaL'ions chi~f].y make it possible to show the masses that there is no
workable solution outside rhe people's revolution. The fundamental role of these
organizations, therefore, is to gradually incorporate the various urban and rural
soci~il strata in~o the r~volutiotiary struggle.
[Question] What pla~e do strikes have in this type of mass struggle?
[Major Xavier] We consicier thar the legal place of strikes has been virtually
eliminated, and we observed this clearly in January when even the smallest demands'
- were violently stifled. Since then the junta has reshaped the labor code in such
a way as to l.ebalize its own excesses. Indeed, this reform means that the trade
union must request permi.ssion from a higher body for`any strike initiative. This
body will in turn decide whether the economic sector affec:ted by the strike is of
- crucial i.m~ortance r~ the country. If it is, and if the strike movement were to
continue .i~s StCU~~;IE?. it would immedi.atety be acting illegally. The economic
sectors declared to be of crucial i.mpurtance are not clearly defined, and this
gives the government complete freedom tu interpret the law...
[Questi~nJ Does lhe intervention by North American advisers change the existing
balance of forces?
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[Major Xavier] First, the IVorth American intervention in the country has been
going on for some time. From the economic viewpoint, large amounts of American
aid are enabling the country to face the most serious crisis it has ever experienced
and are preventing the national economy from collapsing completely. In addition,
the U.S. support is enabling tk~e Christian Democratic dictatorship, which has no
social backing, to remain in power.
From the military viewpoint Washington's intervention is more obvious and extensive
each day. We calciilate that there are several hundred North American 'advisers"
with responsibility at various levels: from the armed forces general staff to the
command of the regional forces. During the major antiguerrilla operations we
noticed that on each occasion there were more North American officers physically
present leading the operations. The North American presence has alsv been Qbserved
in military,training both in E1 Salvador and in other countries: the Lnited States
and Panama. Must of the yaukee "advisers" are Vietnam veterans.
The United States is supplying very large amounts of arms and equipment: we have
sufEerc:d napalm and poison gas attacks.
It is important to stress that the North American presence is spreading to other
Central American countries: Honduras and Guatemala.
There is a very large North American presence in Honduras. The :nilitary equipment
which the United States is supplying to that c~untry far exceeds its national
needs and can only be explained by an attempt to make that country a base for
interventio