JPRS ID: 10005 CHINA REPORT POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050055-2
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 55
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/ 100~J5
23 September 1981
, China Re ort
. p
POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS
- CFOUO 16/81)
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JPRS L/10005
23 September 1981
CH Ii~A REPORT
- POLITICAL,~ $OCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS
(FOUO 16/81)
CONTENTS
PEOPI,E'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
MILITARY AND PiIBI,IC SECURITY
Importanca of Military Schools, Academies Stressed
(JIEFANGJUN BAO, 14 Apr 79) 1
Teacher Urges Attention to Both Political, Military Affairs �
(Hu Duntang; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 11~ Apr 79) 3
Student Points To Need for Stucly of Topography
(Chen Jianguo; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 1!~ Apr 79) 4
Teacher Indicates Need for Knowledge of All Service Arms
(Ye Zhenhong; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 11~ Apr 79) 5
Combat Experience Helps Im~~rove Infantry School Operation
(Xu Fangchun; JIEF.l~NGJUN BAO, 1!~ Apr 79) 6
Infantry School Student,s Learn by Joining in Fighting
- (Chen Yongyuan, et al.; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 14 Apr 79) 8
- Second Battalion Captures Tra Linh
(Tan Yixiang, et sl.; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 17 Apr 79) 12
F~leet Zeaders Exigage in Political-Ideolagical Work
(Ji Ying, et al.; JIEFANGJUN BAO, Z7 Apr 79) 1!t
Instructional Films Serve as Training Material
(JIEFANGJUN BAO, 17 Apr 79) 17
Military Academy Discusses Issue of Concentrating Forces
(JIEFANGJUN BAO, 19 Apx' ?9) 20
_ - a - [III - CC - 80 FOUO]
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Regiment Proficient in Two ~rpes of Antitank Weapons
(JIEFANGJUN BAO, 28 Apr 79) 26 ~
Schools, Academies Improve Course Work
(JIEGANGJLTN BAO, 28 Apr 79) 27
Specialized Disciplines, by Wang Zhenya, Wang Zhongye
Avoid Duplication, by Ouyang Shiyuan
Rational Allocation
Political Acaderny Improves I,eadership Workstyle, Teaching Quality
(JIEFANGJUN BAO, 28 Apr 79) e 30
Guangzhou Air Regiment Reforms Flibht Training
(Zhu Zongzhi; JIEFANGJUN RIBAO~ 14 May 79) 32
Training Courses Viewed ~om Battlefield Perspective
(JIEFANGJUN BAO, 23 May 79) 3L~
More Tactical Training Needed, by Wei Shoujun
Firing Training Reform Urged, by Zhu Xiax~ghui
Unit 81202 Changes Cadre Training System
(Hao Hongjuan; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 29 May 79) 36
5econd Artillery Trains Top Cadres in Military Science
(Luo Chunrong; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 29 May 79) 3g
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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY
IMPORTANCE OF MILITARY SCHOOLS, ACADEMIES STRESSED
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 14 Apr 79 p 3
[Short commentary: "Carry Forward the Spirit 'To Run Schools on the Battle-
front
[Text] From an infantry school of the Guang~i frontier guards, the leading
comrades led the teacners, students and cadres rushing to the first Iine of
the counteroffensive in self-defense, to learn and train themselves while di-
recting fighting. They not only rendered services to the war but also
enriched teaching and learning, and turned out qualified personnel. This is
a fine example of doing one thing for many purposes. The actual combat has
proved that there is a great difference between ca~res who have undergone
training in military schools and academies and those who have not. We.should
make up our mind to run the military schools and academies well in order to
turn out more and better personnel for the army.
Learning while fighting is the glorious tradition~of our military schools and
academies. During the period of the War of Resistance Against Japan, the world-
- famous Chinese P~:ople's Anti-Japanese Milit?ry and Political College was operated
most of the time under circumstances of frequent and fierce fighting behind the
enemy. At that time, when the enemy troops came, we fought them bravely; and
after the c~nclusion of fighting, we sat down and continued our study. We stud-
ied whatever was necessary for the war and used whatever we learned. Our new
experience gained from fighting was again used to promptly strengthen education.
In this way our Anti-Japanese Military and Political College trained a large
number of outstanding cadres and made important contributions to victory in the
war. Today, the old tradition shines with new radiance. This infantry school
tested the results of education on the battlefield, learned the experience of
actual combat, and this helped to make the contents of education all the more
in line with the requirements of actual combat. This means that the glorious
- tradition of our Ar.ti-Japanese i~filitary and Political College is being carried
forward under the new historical conditions. This spirit "of running schools
on the battlefront," this spirit of integrating theory with practice and taking
the initiative to undergo the test of practice, is worth learning from and
should be popularized.
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The battlefield is a mirror. By going through the test of actual combat, we
can further determine the policy of operating schools, unify the thinking on
education and do a good job in the form of education. In order to apply the
experience from the test of actual combat to education, all of us, from lower
ranks to higher ranks, should conscientiously conduct research and summing-up,
eleva~e perceptual knowledge to rational knowledge, and compile new teaching
materials. When this work has been well done, all military schools and aca-
demies will gain benefit from it.
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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY
TEACHER URGES ATTENTION TO BOTH POLITICAL, MILITARY AFFAIRS
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 14 Apr 79 p 3
[Article by Hu Duntang [5170 686~ 1016], teacher of the political teaching and
research office: "One Y~iust Be Well Versed in Both Civil and Military Affairs"]
[Text] On this occasion I took part in the counterattack in self-defense, and
was personally on the scene. What I saw and heard has benefited me a great
deal. One thing taught me a very profound lesson. The first company of a
certain unit was fighting in defense of Height 390, and unfortunately both the
commander and deputy commander were wounded. Then pol.itical instructor Li Gan
[2621 1626] came aut boldly, commanded the entire company in repulsing the suc-
cessive attacks of a reinforced company of the enemy, and they firmly held
- their position for 2 days and nights. The company won the honorable fiitle of
- a"heroic company in defense." The cadres and fighters unanimously praised
their political instruc:tor for his dauntless courage and comu?and ability, and
asked the higher authorities to award him a citation of inerit first class, and
to name him a"model political instructor." When the second company of a cer-
tain unit met with strong resistance while attacking a height, the political
. instructor led a platoon dnd, while shouting the slogan "party members follow
me, bravaly charged forward. However, he did not pay attention to tactics and,
as a result, suffered serious in~uries himselF and caused casualties to the pla-
toon. The cadres and fighters said: "The political instructor has a fine
spirit but very poor tactics."
These two instances tell us that a political cadre should not only be able to
perForm political work but also under5tand milit3ry affairs and be able to
organize and direct fighting. Otherwise, like, the political instructor of
the second company, he cannot accomplish his combat task despite his great
courage. As seen from our past experience in education, some students of the
polit~cal team had tt~e tendency to pay greater attention to politics than to
military affairs. lhey thought that it would be good enough to be a politieal
cadre as long as one was eloquent and cuuld carry out ideological work. This
kind ~f thinking is harmful. For our education in the future, we must use
these lively and practical experiences and lessons gained from the counter-
attack in self-defense to elevate the consciousness of the students, to over-
come the incorrect tendency to pay greater attention to civil affairs than to
military affairs, and to help the army train a number of young red-and-expert
co~anders who are well versed in both civil and military affairs.
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MILITARY AND 'PUBLIC SECURITY
STUDENT POINTS TO NEED FOR STUDY OF TOPOGRAPHY
Bei~ing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 14 Apr 79 p 3
[Article by Chen Jianguo [7115 1696.0948], student of the fifth team: "We
Must Learn Military Topography"]
[Text] Fram participation in the counterattack for self-defense, my most pro-
found experience is that the students of the infantry school must learn military
topography. Without knowing this sub~ect, they cannot be good basic-level
commanders in.the army.
Qn this occasion, I was assigned to the fifth company of a certain unit to
_ participate i.n the fi.ght~ng. Once our company was thrusting deep into the
enemy territory. The ~ight was dark with 'neavy fog, observation was very dif-
ficult. The company commander was not familiar with map reading, could not
determine his position correctly, and also did not ~hoose the correct route of
advance. As ~ result, we walked into an enemy ambush ring and were attacked
by enemy fir~ from three sides. Later, with the assistance of our other units
in the neighborhood, we finally pulled out of the enemy's encir~clement.
On another occasion, our company was ordered to move to anotl;er posi*.ion. As
our cadres could not read maps and had not grasped the essentials of following
maps in advance, they led the men into a deep blind gully. We spent 2 hours
wandering around and then returned to the highway along the original path.
As a result, for a journey of 12 kilometers we spent 8 hours in walking, the
men were very tired, and we were late in getting to our new position.
However, the situation was entirely different with those c~mmanders who had
learned military topogr.aphy. In spite of high mountains, dense forests and
complex togography, they could always follow the route mapped out by their
= senior officers and reach their destination on time. In an unexgected encoun-
ter with the enemy when they had no time to make a careful topographic survey,
they could also analyze and judge the Features of the terrain .from the maps,
_ make a correct disposition of troops under command, and hold the initiative
in �ighting.
The foregoing experience explains that it is not only necessary to learn mili-
tary topography but also to learn it energetica113, skillfully and thoroughly.
Not only should cempany commanders learn it, but squad leaders and platoon
leaders should also learn it. Therefore, the training units at all levels
- and the schools and institutes of military operation should give full time to
this study to meet the needs of actual combat.
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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY
TEACHER INDICATES NEED FOR KNOW.T~EDGE OF ALL SERVICE ARMS
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 14 Apr 79 p 3
[Article by Ye Zhenhong [5509 2182 1347], teacher of the first tactics teaching ,
and research office: "Speaking From Forgetting the Use of Flamethrower~�t]
[Text] In operations under present conditions, various arms of the services
will take par~t in the fighting; the commanders of companies an3 the leaders
of battalions, platoons and squads also must have knowledge of all armed serv-
ices so that in ar~ operation they can work in coordination and give full pl~ay
to their respective forces. In this operation of counterattack in self-defens~e,
- we saw this point very c:learly. Some basic-level commanders had no knowledge
- about the various arms of the services, and could not use the special services
squad attached to the company, so the attack was delayed. The 7th company of
a certain unit, with a squad of flamethrowers attached, was attacking an in-
tense firing point but forgot to use the flamethrowers, relying only on the
demolition team to blow up the enemy, and could not succeed in several attempts.
Duan Fuzhao [3008 4395 2600], leader of the flamethrowers squad, volunteered
take the task and eliminated the firing ~oint in just one attack with flame- .
throwers. This made the company commander suddenly realize what he shouid. hav~
done.
Actual combat is a mirror to ~udge teaching. In my opinion, the infantry
school has taught too little about the various arms of the services. This is
not a small looghole and should be corrected. We should have the studen~ts
acquire this know~edge right in school so that on leaving school the'y Frill be
first-rate commanders who can direct modern warf~re.
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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY
COMBAT EXPERIENCE HELPS IMPROVE INFANTRY SCHOOL OPERATION
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 14 Apr 79 p 3
_ [Article by Xu Fangchun [1776 5364 2504], head of a certain infantry school of
the Guangxi Frontier Guards: "Actual Combat Lets Us Know How To Operate the
Infantry School Effectively"]
[Text] With the close concern of the higher level party committees, our
school's senior officers led all students and the ma~ority of cadres and
*_eachers to take part in the counterattack for self-defense against Vietnam.
They learned warfare in the course of the war, and effectively advanced the
work of our school in all fields.
The hardship of combat life helped all comrades to build up their revolutionar}=
willpower. The borders between Chiiia and Vietnam are situated in the subtropi-
cal zone, with high mountains, dense forests and narrow paths. Every day they
marched, engaged in fighting, very often with no food to eat and no water to
drink, and they could not even sleep well. They were required to answer cor-
rectly i.n action the questions of life or death and ssffering or happiness at
all times. The comrades took heroic persons a~ their example, and asked to
take the most arduous combat tasks as soon as they came to the battlefield.
. Many comrades charged ahead before others in attack and left behind others in
retreat, never complained of serious in~uries or left the frontline on account
of minor wounds. Not a few comrades risked their lives t~ rescue their com-
rades-in-arms. Their �ighting will grew stronger with the �ighting. Conse-
quently, all the comrades of our school received a most practical and most
profound coursa of further education in the fighting tradition of our army.

-~i The comrades said: "We are peoplE who grew up in times of comfort, and now
we have truly experienced some of the hardships of our revolutionary forebears,
who climUed over snowclad mountains, marched across prairies, shed their blood
and sacrificed their lives." All our comrades have thus enhanced greatly ~
their political consciousness.
By taking part in this war, all the comrades have steeled themselves, improved
their ability to exercise command and enriched their knowledge of warfare. On
the front, we assigned the students, teachers and cadres according to their
specialties to the grassroots and command posts at various levels to learn and
steel themselves, either as cadets or as acting officers, and together with
the anny comrades to organize and direct fighting. The students of the poli-
ti.cal team were to assist the company comnanders to perform the work of
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4 agitation on the battlefront. In fighting, they used fully their knowledge
learned in school and guaranteed thp accomplishment of their combat tasks.
While learning and steeling themselves, they also gained many good combat
experiences from the army units. For instance, to counter the Vietnamese
tcoops' unusual tactics of "scattering into small groups, running away under
an attack, and dispersing in face of a charge," some of our units sent out
"feel2r" teams to search aut the enemy from one point to another. Some units
summed up experiences in seizing a mountain stronghold, attacking a firepoint,
destroying a bunker, scouting around a grove, and laying a minefield. Thus,
they enriched our knowledge of fighting and enhanced our ability to organize
and direct the fighting.
Actual combat judged the effect of school training and substar.tiated the con-
tents of education; it provided our school w~th firsthand material for impro*v-
ing the work of education and training. Practice is the only criterion for
judging the truth. From the judgment of actual combat on this occasion, i~c
can be seen clearly that the contents of education laid down in the curric~luan
do basically conform to actual combat. Students who have ~one through the,
strict training of the school have high military and political quality, a~nd
can command the troops to win victory. At the same time, frotn the experier~ce ~
and lessons of this war, we have seen what the army units are in urgent n~ed.
of, what problems the school training should solve, what improvements sno~ld
be made in education and training, and how school training can serve a~m~
units in a better way to win victory in war. This war is a special war of
special wars; however, it alsc reflects the ?.aws of ordinary wars. The s~ma-
tion of these experiences is of general guiding significance to fueure wars.
Therefore, we call upon each comrade of our school to keep a record in addi-~
_ tion to his combat training. He should carefully make a record of eyeny bit
of experience he gained on the battlefield, frum organizing troops on the
march, taking a rest, scouting and posting guards to assigning varibus cc~mbat
- duties, from organizing an attack and building defense to setting u~ an ambush
ring, fighting a contact battle, withdrawing f rom the battleground, and so
forth. These valuable materials will provide the basis for enriching the
contents of education, compiling teaching material and making training plans.
Our participation in this war has also laid a foundation for us to check on
and use the cadres. During the war, the leading officers of army units and
our school at all levels worked together.on the front to check on the stu-
dents and gather firsthand material, made assessment of every comrade, and
thus could better carry out their role of a"collective department of cadres."
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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY
INFANTRY SCHOOL STUDENTS LEARN BY JOINING IN FIGHTING
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 14 Apr 79 p 3
[Article by correspondents Chen Yongyuan [7115 3057 3293], Zhang Yongxiang
[1728 3057 4382] and Cai Duowen [5591 1122 2429], and staff r~porters Wang
Shu [3769 3412] and Li Ya [781~ 0068]: "It Is Indeed the Result of Infantry
School Training!"]
[Text] The battle to attack and seize Liangshan started. On the battlefield,
the noise from the guns resounded through the skies, and the gunpowder smoke
filled the air. Our heroic frontier guards surged f~rward like a wave of iron,
and pressed on step-by-step toward Liangshan. The Vietnamese aggressors re-
lied on the strategically located, difficult terrain and the open and hidden
pillboxes to put up a last-ditch struggle in.their vain attempt t.~ hold the
"fortress" about which they had boasted for a long time.
In the heat of fighting, a contingent of young men, full of vim and vigor, , .
came to our position. As soon as they arrived, they immediately scattered to
_ various units and thre~w themselves into the battle. Some volunteered to lead
shock teams and thrust into the enemy position. Some worked at the command
post to help draft fighting documents and issue orders. Others with maps and
a compass in hand guided the deep-thrust troops in a quick march over high
- mountains snd through dense forests. Still cthers took over a transistor
me;aphone from the political instructor and, while fighting, carried out the
work of agitatiori on the front. All the commanders and fighters were elated
- by the arrival of these reinfarcements, and they could not stop rais~ng their .
proficient and high-level military skills. ~hey said cheerfully: "The 'young
advisers' have come to our front, they help us to fight more skillfully!"
~ Who were these 'young advisers'? They were the students of a certain infantry
school of Guangxi frontier guards and, under the command of the school leading
comrades, they came to learn how to fight by moving their classroom to the
battlefield.
When the counterattack battle in self-defense had ~ust begun, the comrades of
the infantry school were filled with indignation and u~nanimously wished to
- personally deal the Vietnamese aggressors a crushing blow. The students said:
"We are all key cadres from the army units. Without joining in this battle
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+ how can we gain any practical experience in commandi.ng troops in fighting?"
The teachers said: "All students who have come to the school have later gone
out to fight in battle. Without fighting in battle, how can we teach them
and convince them?" The leading comrades of the school considered the desire
of the students and teachers correct and reasonable. Learning and fighting
at the same time is an old tradition of our Chinese People's Anti-Japanese
_ Military and Political College. Therefore, the school leading comrades promptly
submitted a petition to go to the war, In a short time the higher authorities
' approved their application.
When these students arrived at the front, they truly lived up the education
and training of the party, and they did not disappoint the broad ranks of com-
manders and fighters. In the battle attacking the Liangshan Court of Justice
Building, student Chen Jinmu [7115 6930 2606J, a cadre of the second team,
came to L-he second platoon of the sixth company of a certain unit. This was
called the Dagger Platoon. When they advanced to the northern area of Liang-
_ shan, the enemies, who had hidden in buildings on both sides of the street,
directed fierce fire at them, and the platoon was prevented from going further.
Chen Jinmu calmly put to use the offensive tactics he had learned in infantry
school, and while covering fire was directed at the enemy, he led his men to
quickly pass through hollow ground on the left flank. When they had jus t
- passed the first enemy crossfire, they again faced the frontal attack of enemy
tanks. Chen Jinmu followed the essentials of attacking tanks and gave his
order: "Cover with machinegun fire and rocket launchers, look f or favorable
terrain and destroy the tanks!" The first tank was stopped with a hit, and
- the second enemy tank turned around and tried to escape. Chen Jinmu again
ordered the rocket launchers to aim at its vulnerable point. "Fire!" As soon
as he gave the order, this tank also became a heap of scrap iron. The enemy
arn.ored cars behind immiediately turned around and fled. The comrades of the
- second platoon gave chase. At this moment, suddenly two men jumped out of an
enemy armored car and were going to throw handgrenades at us. Chen Jinmu was
quick of eye and deft of hand: he fired a whole clip of ammunition at these
two men, and they fell down at the sound of his firing. Then he directed the
rocket launchers to destroy the armored car. Under Chen's command, the Dagger
Platoon successfully accomplished its mission.
The cadre students can direct fighting; how about the fighter students af ter
their training in infantry school? They also can direct fighting. Han Chang-
yuan [7281 2490 0337], a student of the sixth team, was a company clerk before
he entered the infantry school. During this battle, he was the leader of a
platoon which formed the main force to attack Height~480. Under the heavy
gunfire of the enemy, Han Changyuan flexibly used the tactical principles he
had learned in infantry school. He employed a small force to pin down the
enemy in a frontal attack, and led the major force of his platoon to outflank
the enemy from behind. When they were 30 meters from the enemy, he ordered .
all his men to throw handgrenades. The enemy firing point was wiped out. Then,
he again adopted the tactics of fighting in small groups under mutual cover,
outflanking the enemy from both sides and making a breakthrough in the middle.
They quickly seized Height 480 and opened a passage for other units to move
ahead and penetrate into the enemy position.
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There were many more outstanding students like Chen Jinmu and Han Changyuan.
The third area group of the second team had 38 students who took part in the
fighting. All of them fought bravely, exercised flexible command in the bat-
tle, and assistedthe troops to seize one height after another. None of the .
38 w~s a casualty, and all of them rendered meritorious services; 12 of them
won second-class merit citations.
The students from the infantry school are c2.pable not only of exercising com-
mand in fighting but also of doing political work in wartime.
In the course of fighting, the students of the political team acted in accord-
ance with the various stages and different conditions of the battle, put to use
the knowledge they had learned in infantry school, actively assisted the company
~ cadres to perform politir_al work on the battlefield, and effectively guaranteed
the fulfillment of all combat tasks. Student Han Shifu [7281 1102 4395] was
assigned to the ninth company of a certain regiment to be its deputy political
- instructor. On 2 March the ninth company was given the task of attacking
Height 279. Due to enemy crossfire, they were unable to advance. The fighters
were bogged down in muddy water for a day and night.
Facing this situation, Han Shifu suggested that the party branch take the oppor-
tunity to start a political mobilization. He then went to the main attack pla-
toon to call a party group meeting, explained the great significance of taking
this height to the entire battle, and aroused tremendously the courage of all
party members and other fighters of this Dagger ~latoon. When the company
pushed on to the side of an iron bridge on the northern side of Height 279,
they were intercepted by enemy gunfire. At this critical moment, Han Shifu
recalled what his teacher had said about the signi�icance of setting an example
at the crucial moment of fighting to political cadres, so he took up a transis-
tor megaphone and called out loudly: "Communists and Communist Youth League
members, now is the moment the party is putting us to the test, bring credit
to our motherland, avenge our sacrificed comrades-in-arms, charge forward!"
This brief and forceful agitation filled the fighters with righteous indigna-
tion. Al1 comrades of the company cried out to kill and captured Height 279
in one vigorous effort.
- In peacetime the students study specialized courses at the infantry school; in
actual combat the basic training provides them with a reliable guarantee for
the fulfillment of combat tasks. In the last battle, the third company of a
certain unit came to a minefield while attacking Height 627. Students Zhang
Qingwu [1728 1987 2976] and Liu Dongsheng [0491 2639 0524] of the fourth team,
who were attached to this company in fighting, had studied the mine course in
the infantry school, and both received a 5[full marks] on every test. On that
occasion, they went ahead of the group of fighters under their command~to remove
the mines. Zhang Qingwu deftly cut the electric wires to sever the power source.
i.iu Dongsheng did not have any clippers with him and so he had to break the
wires with his teeth. They quickly removed 23 mines and very soon captured
Height 627. In actual combat these two men again won perfect full marks. In
the assault on Luping, when nine students of the war-training team had just
arrived at the command post of a certain regiment, they learned that the regi-
ment was in urgent need of a map of a certain region. The regiment was short
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of staff officers, so student squad leader Deng Zhiqi*~g [6772 1807 1987] told
- the chief staff officer: "We have studied the course of map making, please
gi.ve us this task!" They used flashlights for light, leatherbelts for measure-
- meni and sl.abstones as dracoing boards, and prepared 13 sets of maps that very
- night for the need of directing the attack. As they knew a lot about reading
an~' using maps, on rainy days when it was dark and the terrain was intricate,
they always held the maps in hand and walked ahead of tt?e deep-thrust units,
and correctly brought the troops to their destination on time. The army leader-
ships at various levels were pleased and said: "The young men trained by our
infantry school are really useful. The school training makes a great difference!"
The battlefield is a classroom not to be found at ordinary times. Here the stu-
dents can learn things they have no way of learning in normal times. The brave
and indomitable fighting style of the commanders and fighters, their resourceful
and flexible skill of command, their lively and effective agitation on the
battlefield, and their quick and prompt rear services provide them with rich
and varied teaching materials. Student Wu Zhiqing [0702 1807 3237] of the poli-
tical team was assigned to the fifth company of a certain unit as a deputy poli-
tical instructor. He promptly carried out the work of agitation and tried by
all means to learn how the company political instructor had performed his war-
time political work during previous battle situations. When the company was
guarding Height 409, the enemy charged seven times in quick succession, and the
fighting became exceedingly fierce. At that time the company political instruc-
tor went to the first and seventh squads at the most forward position and
directed the fighting. At the critical moment, when f resh supplies of munitions
could not catch up, tae political instructor called upon all fighters to follow
the example of the heroes in the Battle of Shanggangling Ridge during the Korean
jdar, and gave the comrades very great encouragement. In the attack on Height
417, the political instructor told the advancing fighters: "The communists
should take the lead in the assault, the Youth League members and revolutionary
youths should fight bravely and make contributions to the motheriand." During
the fighting, leader Liu Zhongjiang [0491 0112 3068J of the fifth squad took the
lead and captured Height 407. He applied for party membership. The political
instructor consulted with the party branch committee members and then announced
~ immediately to the entire company that Liu Zhongjiang was admitted to the party
on the firing line. Student deputy political instructor Wu Zhiqing carefully
took notes of all these deeds, which he planned to compile into a manual for
study. Like Wu Zhiqing, all other students were carrying out their studies
while taking part in the fighting. Each set his mind on doing something use-
ful and at all times and everywhere took notes of all valuable experiences on
the battlefield.
The task of fighting back in self -defense against Vietnam was accomplished.
These students and teachers were sentimentally attached to their comrades-in-
arms, the frontier guards, they could hardly bear to part. When the students
returned to the infantry scho~l, they immediately began to do the work of
summing up their experiences and compiling war records. They pledged to apply
the experience they had gained from the fighting to the teaching in the school.
From actual combat they also corrected things not quite realistic that they
learned in the classroom, so that a greater number of more qualified basic-level
commanders would be trained for the army to meet the needs of actual combat.
9039
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MILITARY Ar1D PUBLIC SECURITY
SECOND BATTALION CAPTURES TRA LINH
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 17 Apr 79 p 1
[Article by Correspondents Tan Yixiang [6223 1837 4382], Chen Miaohua [7115 3267 5478],
r~porter Fang Hang [2455 5300]: "Night Tiger Attacks Enemy Front"]
[Text] In the war of defensive counterattack, many units of our border defense
troops developed the combat tradition of the "night tiger," utilizing the darkness
of night daringly to penetrate the front and the rear of the Vietnamese forces,
carrying out surprise attacks against the enemy and achieving glorious results. A
very vivid example is the demonstration of the "night tiger" power by the 2d battalion
of a certain regiment. The battalion penetrated Bang Loi at night and in the battle
moved 8 kilometers into the enemy's rear to capture Tra Linh.
On 28 February, a certain unit of the border defense troops, after capturing Cao Bangi
received orders to move north to capture Tra Linh. On 1 March, when the unit advanced
to Yaoteou south of Tra Linh, it was attacked by the enemy. The enemy occupied the
mountain ridges on both sides of the highway and had built heavy fortifications
forming a very strong defensive position. The troop commander sized up the situation
and decided to order a unit of troops to penetrate Bang Loi between Yaoteou and Tra
- Linh and occupy the nameless high ground on the northeast side of Bang Loi and attack
the enemy's rear toward the south. This difficult task was assigned to the 2d ba-
ttalion of a certain regiment that was famous for being trained as "night tigers."
- It was 0200 hours on the morning of 2 March when the 2d battalion received the orders.
Deputy regimental commander Xiang Xuehua [0686 1331 5478] and battalion commander
Yang Deming [2799 1795 2494] led the whole battalion and in the rain advanced along
the lzighway. The 2d battalion was skillfully trained for night action. During its
march, the whole battalion extended in formation for 1 kilometer without.ths use of
any light and made no sound. Whenever a flashlight was seen far away, the whole
battalion i~ediately hit the ground along the highway. The movements were quick and
silent. With the cflntinuous sound of rain, the enemy sentries did not discover that
there were troops advancing along the highway. Suddenly, a hercl of water buffalo ran
onto the highway from a small road and ran wild among the troops, the situation was
very tense. The commanders held their rifles but nobody yelled and nobody fired.
Everyone quickly moved out of the way to let the water buffalo pass and the troops
contineud quietly in the rain. At 0430 hours in the morning, the 2d battalion pene-
trated the nameless high ground northeast of Bang Loi. Each company quickly occupied
_ the.positions and separately built fortifications toward Tra Linh and Yaoteou, forming
a circular defense.
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There were enemy troops in the fillages and mountain recesses along the highway and
there were many sentries. But, because battles had been fought mostly during the
daytime for many consecutive days, the enenry did not reaiize that our border defense
troops had penetrated its lines on a rainy night. Even at dawn, the enemy sti11 did
not know that the 2d battalion had already penetrateci its lines.
On the morning of 2 March, just after the 2d battal~on had finished digging its
fortifications, they heard axtillery firing from the foot of the mountains. The
soldiers looked toward the wes* and saw that an 85nmi cannon artillery company of
V~etnamese forces had set up and was firing at our brother troops north of 7.Ya Linh.
- Deputy regimental commander Xiang and battalion commander Yang iunnediately ordered
the artillery company to make preparations and at the same time ordered deputy
_ battalion commander Luo Shangqin [5012 0686 2953J to organize two platoons of the 4th
company to attack the enemy's artillery position. As the two platoons moved downhill
they were discovered by the enemy's artillery soldiers. T'he enemy took immediate
action and a vehicle emerged from a mountain trench in an attempt to move the cannon.
The enemy could not be allowed to escape! Four mortars of our artiller~ company
fired simultaneously, four shells exploded in the midst of the enemy pos~tion. The
driver of the enemy vehicle tried to ~ump from the vehicle and escape but he was
killed by shell fragments. The enemy's artillery position erupted into chaos. At
this time, the 60mm cannons of each infantry company opened fire. The howitzers of
our artillery regiment also opened fire. Soldiers in the enemy artillery position
were killed or wounded. A combat team of the 2d s~uad of the 4th company including
Chen Jie [7115 2638], Xiao Lijun [5135 4539 6511] and Lai Rihong [6351 2480 4767]
led by Comrade He Yulun [0149 5148 0243] charged downhill straight toward the enemy's
artillery position. When the mortar shells of the artillery company fell, these
heroic warriors also charged the enemy position. They searched along the communica-
tion trench and shot the enemy one and two at a time. The remaining ener�y soldiers
escaped into stone mountain caves surrounding the artillery position. He Yulun and
- the other three pursued and killed or wounded over 10 enemy soldiers while suffering
no casualties.
- There were two other enemy artillery positions to the northwest and 1 and 1/2 kilo-
meters due south of the high ground. While the 2d battalion fiercely attacked the
enemy's cannon artillery position, the enemy in these two positions began shooting
at the 2d battalion using various artillery. The 2d battalion returned fire to sup-
press enemy fire and reported the coordinates of the enemy artillery pasitions to the
higher authorities and requested our artillery regiment to commence firing. Under
the attack by our artiliery fire, over half of the enemy soldiers were killed or
wounded and they quickly lost their defensive capability. The remaining enenry
soldiers scattered and escaped. Our followup units advanced along the highway from
the south and occupied the eneur~'s artillery position. They also captured vara.ous
artillery pieces. The 2d battalion attacked toward the west along a rough highway
and charged into an enemy battalion's encampment and captured over 20 vehicles. Thus,
- a whole battalion of the 118th artillery regiment of the Vietnamese Army was destroyed.
The successful nighttime penetration of the 2d battalion destroyed and occupied one
- artillery position of the enemy, suppressed two artillery positions of the enem,y,
broke the enemy's defense system, created chaos among enemy troops south of Tra Linh,
and created favorable conditions for the followup units to advance north along the
_ highway to attack Tra Linh.
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. MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY
FLEET LEADERS ENGAGE IN POLITICAL-IDEOLOGICAL WORK
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 17 Apr 79 p 1
[Article by Ji Ying [4949 5391], Guo Ibng [0948 2767], Yue Shi [6460 4258], Wen Dong
[2429 2639], Zuo Min [0155~3046]: "Deepening the Understanding of the Spirit of the
Third Plenum; Exert Efforts To Adapt to the Work of Shifting Emphasis--Leading Cadres
of the North Sea Fleet Lead in Doing Political-Ideological Work Well"]
[Text] Recently, the leading comrades of the North Sea Fleet have led the working~
group which went among the troops to understand the ideological situation of shifting
the emphasis of work and have led the political-ideological worlc necessary to unify
the ideological understanding of the cadres and soldiers under the spirit of the
Third Plenum.
, Beginning on 6 March, five leading comrades of the party committee of the North Sea
- Fleet led a wbrking group, went deeply into the battleship detachment, the marine
police, the fortifications region, the training corps and the hospitals to understand
the ideological situation of the troops. They conducted investigations and studies
for over 1 month and say that shifting the emphasis of work by the whole party has
_ brought about a profound change in the ideology of the cadres and soldiers--everyone's
thoughts have been liberated, everyone is actively thinking about the problems, every-
one dares to express his opinions, and everyone is concerned about the building of
the four modernizations. But, they also saw that some comrades still have some mis-
understandings. For example, some comrades have seen many cases of reinstatement
of unjust cases, mistaken cases, false cases and they worry that this is r~ot bene-
ficial to raising high the banner of Mao Zedong Thought. Some comrades read the
newspaper which introduces the advanced technology and management experience of cap-
italist nations and mistakenly believe that capitalist things are good, Some realize
- that the time for political education has been reduced and they believe political
work is not important anymore and political cadres hav.e nothin~~to do anymore. Some
believe that paying attention to elevating the standard of living does not require
paying attention to hard work and struggles, etc.
' Analyzing the above situation, the leading comrades of the fleet believe ihat.under
the new situation, political and ideological work must be greatly strengthened to
- educate the broad numbers of combat commanders to believe firmly in the correct
- leadership of the party Central Cotmnittee headed by Comrade Hua Guofeng and to unite
together to carry out the four modernizations. For this, they asked the l~adership
on each level conscientiously to grasp tightly and well political and ideologica}.
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work, instructed the leading agencies of the fleet to propose specific suggestions
_ to strengthen political and ideological work among the troops. The leaders went
among the troops to lead political and ideological work and they talked about it
wherever they went. Political commissar Kang Zhiqiang [1660 1807 1730] led the work
team actively to provide guidance on specific problems that exist on a widespread
scale by lecturing on holding firmly onto the road of socialism, holding firmly onto
Marxism-Leninism and the basic principles of Mao Zedong Thought. They paid attention
to helping everyone understand clearly the following five relationships:
(1) Solve the relationship between the remnant questions of history and raising high
the banner of Mao Zedong Thought. Solving the re~ant problems of history and bringing
order out of chaos will develop a situation of stability and unity and mobilize
enthusiastic factors to carry out the four modernizations. These efforts coincide
entirely with the traditional teachings of Comrade Mao Zedong concerning "the cor-
recting of all mistakes" and the principles of Mao Zedong Thought. Reversing the
- history which had been overturned by Lin Biao and the "gang of four" is truly raising
high the banner of Mao Zedong Thought.
(2) The relationship between learning the advanced technology, management experience
of capitalist nations and the realization of modernization of socialism. Introducing
the advanced technology and management experience of foreign nations helps to learn
those things that are useful for modernization of socialism and for hastening the
modernization of socialism. It is not learning the reactionary ar~d decadent things
of capitalism. We must separate the superiority of the socialist system from the
backward situation in production created by the interference and sabotage by Lin Biao
and the "gang of four," we must firmly believe that socialism will win over capitalism,
as long as the past experience and lessons are correctly summarized, as long as we
_ persist on the road of socialism, as long as we fully develop the superiority of the
socialist system, we will be able to catch up and build a prosperous, rich and strong
nation.
(3) The relationship between insisting on taking education and training as central
to strengthening political work. The function of assurance of political work is to
assure first that each task must have a firm and correct political direction. Taking
education and training as the center is necessary to the objective reality, it is
required by the development of the situation, but education and training must not
oppose political work and weaken political work. Conversely, under the new situation,
the tasks of political work are heavy, the demands are higher, the time for political
education has lessened, political and ideological work is necessary, political and
ideological work must penetrate into every task.
(4) The relationship between improving the material life of the masses and developing
the superior tradition of hard work and struggle. Hard work and struggle are the
superior tradition of our party and our armed forces, they are the true nature of
our laboring people, they are the important guarantees that we will achieve all
victories. The development of the nation's productivity is prerequisite to improving
the standards of material life. Only when the nation is rich and strong can the
life of the people be improved, only through hard work and struggle can production
advance, At present, due to the long period of destruction by Lin Biao and the "gang
of four," there are many difficulties in the economy, the standard of the ma.terial
life of the masses cannot be improved on a large scale immediately. Thriftiness,
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conservation, hard work, and struggle must be further advocated. We must consider
the whole situation, understand the whole, we must not concentrate on calculating
personal gains.
- (5) The relationship between enlivening cultural life and guarding against erosion
by capitalist class ideology. We must see from foreign movies and classical dramas
how foreign nations expose the decadence and darkness of the old world and learn from
art. At the same time, we must utilize the method of class analysis to separate
clearly what is the good style of the proletariat class, what is the evil style of
the capitalist class, exert efforts to support the right and stop the wrong.
The leading comrades of the fleet led political and ideological work and served to
demonstrate to the troops the work of strengthening political and ideological work.
The troops, cadres and soldiers responded saying: The leading comrades of the fleet
came personally to do politi,cal and ideological work and they widened our thoughts
more and the shift of direction in the emphasis of work was made clearer.
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- MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY
INSTRUCTIONAL FILMS SERVE AS TRAINING MATERIAL
Beining JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 17 Apr 79 p 3
[Article: "Introducing Several Military Education Films"]
[Text] Military education films are graphic teaching materials
- ~ for us to learn the knowledge and the ~xperience of modern warfare.
Correctly using these teaching materials will~promote rapidly and
effectively the modernization of our armed forces. Therefore, each
unit should emphasize the release and showing of military education
films for learning and study. Here, we will introduce several mili-
' tary education films ma.de recently by the 81 Motion Picture Studio ,
in the hope of soliciting the attention of the troops so that mili-
tary training will emphasize the use of these graphic teaching
materials. --Editors
"Defense Against Atomic Weapons"
The film introduces the properties of nuclear weapons and basic knowledge of defense.
The film begins with an intorucction to what are nuclear w~eapons, the four types of
killing factors of nuclear weapons: light radiation, shock waves, early nuclear
radiation and radioactive contamination. The film includes film clips of our nation's
nuclear weapons' tests actually taken on site to introduce separately and show the
" destructive capabilities of the four types of killing factors and methods of defense. ~
The film also introduces the defensive capabilities of various types of fortifications,
underground tunnels, trenches and other such underground defense facilities against
the destructive factors of nuclear weapons, and introduces the key points of how air
raid shelter fortifications "block, drain, filter, eliminate" nuclear weapons. The
film also gives a concrete introduction and explanation via an antiatomic warfare
exercise.
"Fundamentals of Reading and Using Maps"
The film introduces the fundamentals about reading and using military maps by showing
cadres learning in class. The content is divided into two parts: The first part
introduces how to read a map, including the scale of the map, the utilization of~
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plane and right angle coordinates and symbols for ground surface objects, reading
of landforms. The second part introduces how to use the map, including how to demar-
cate maps and determine standing positions and how to utilize maps to advance and to
study the terrain.
"Military Rope Bridges"
The film introduces a simple and easy to use military rope bridge developed by a cer-
tain unit to overcome obstacles in mountain terrain and in crossing rivers. .The
ropeway is simple in structure, easy to install and it is difficult to detect from
the air. Tanks, trucks and various artillery can all cross over it. Prac~tice shows
the trial production of the rope bridge is successful and it is a contribution to
our military buildup.
"Parachuting Qr,�er the Ocean and Rescue Operatians"
The film shows an exercise of parachuting over the sea conducted by a certain un_it
unit of the naval air forces and introduces knowledge about parachuting over the
- ocean and rescue operations.
Locating a person in the ocean is very difficult. Then, how are pilots who have to
parachute over the ocean found quickly and rescued? The film answers these questions.
The film shows inspection before the exercise and introduces and shows the perfor-
mance and the method of using various rescuing equipment in the ocean. The film
shows the actual use of this equipment and the use of helicopters, hydroplanes and
battleships by the commanding agencies to rescue three pilots No 03, No OS and No 07
after they have parachuted over the ocean and the search and rescue mission in the
- ocean with the help of militiamen. It further introduces the actual use of rescue
equipment and the method of organizing rescue missions at sea.
"PLilitary Meteorology"
The film introduces the effects of ice and snow in winter, the clouds and fog and
strong winds in rainy seasons and various weather conditions on military activities
in modern warfare. ~ �
; The film first introduces the different effects of ice and snow upon co~nunications,
radar, starting of vehicles, takeoff of airplan~s, the speed of marching troops,
movement of tanks. At the same time, the film includes film clips on the German
- Army attacking Moscow in November, 1941, showing how the troops were attacked by
strong winds and snow and low temperatures which immobilized vehicles, guns and
froze to death some 110,000 men. The film shows the severe effects of low tempera -
tures and severe cold on military action. ~
The rainy season also causes a lot of difficulties for activities of naval troops
and airborne troops, and an especially great inconvenience to movements of inechanized
troops. This is because in the rainy season, the air in tunnels and undergrou~d
fortifications is damp, and weapons and equipment rust. The film uses film clips
showing how dampness and rain and muddy road conditions affected military action
and reduced the speed of marching troops in the US-Japanese war during World War II
and graphically explains this problem.
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Clouds and fog and strong winds all affect military action to varying degrees: The
various types of cumulus clouds will affect takeoff and landing and flight of airborne
troops. Fog reduces visibility and causes collisions at sea. Strong winds will cause
the loss of military facilities and people's lives and property. They will also
aFfect the precision of artillery fire, stong winds also affect parachute troops
and nuclear explosions. The film uses some clips to explain t..hese problems.
Various weather conditions can be the enemy of military action but they c~n also be
its friends. A lot of weather conditions can be utilized by militarq activities.
The film uses some combat cases of our armed forces and foreign armed forces to ex-
plain this problem.
- The films can help the commanders of our armed forces understand the basic knowledge
about how meteorological conditions affect military activities.
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*1ILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY
MILITARY ACADEMY DISCUSSES ISSUE OF CONCENTRATING FORCES
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 19 Apr 79 p 3
(Article by the writing group of the Mil:itary Academy: "Pla~e Emphasis On New Char-
acteristics; Explore New Ways--Military Academy Holds Academic Discussion on the
Problems of Massing Military Forces Under Modern Conditions"]
[Text] Massing a superior military force and annihilating the enemy one by one are
the traditional winning tactics of our armed forces in overcoming the enemy. Under
conditions of modern warfare, as military science and technology develop daily and
as weapons and equipment are modernized, is the massing of military forces still
required, can it be realized, and how can military forces be massed? This is an
academic and theoretical question which is being debated. To enliven academic
r.hought and adapt to the needs of future combat, the academic committee of the
Military Academy held a discussion meeting in March of this year to explore this
subject. �
At the beginning of the discussion, the principal ancl first political commissar Com-
rade Xiao Ke [5135 0344] spoke. He encouraged everyone to express and liberate their
thoughts and to hold a lively academic discussion. At the meeting, leaders, teachers,
researchers and agency cadres of the academy talked and expounded on their opinions
about the following three questions and brought up many good points.
How To Treat the New Factors Affecting the Massing of Troops
Many comrades pointed out that under modern conditions, with the use of atomic wea-
pons, guided missiles, laser and chemical weapons, large numbers of tanks and ad-
vanced reconnaissance equipment, it will be necessary to change the form of combat
which will greatly affect the movement of troops, strategy and tactics. Some new
factors affecting the massing of troops have already emerged. They are mainly the
following: In future warfare, the Soviet Armed Forces will use their s~ronger de-
fensive capabilities and concentration of tanks with better mobility as their main
attacking force and their initial strike force. In the future our military forces
will have to change from striking at enemy infantry with massed military forces to
attacking tanks and armored vehicles. Because the enemy will be using highly de-
- veloped reconnaissance equipment and means to monitor every corner of the battlefield,
there will be many new difficulties in any attempt to disguise the massing of military
_ forces. Because the enemy will use nuclear weapons and various types of accurate
controlled and guided weapons, great changes will occur in the suppression of fire
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~ i.~�
power, in the caliber of the aritllery, the concentration of fire power, consumption
of a~nunition, range of killing and wounding and the time for preparation of continued
firing. These are new topics in calculating the scale, concentration and fire power
of massed forces. As the weapons and equipment of our armed forces develop and the
services increase in variety, the target of motorized military forces will be big,
the dependence upon roads will be strong, and because of the different types of troop
equipment, the motorized conditions needed and the speed of movement are different,
and many new problems will emerge for motorized movement, concentration and deploy-
ment of military f~rces. The logistics of our military forces has changed from the
past practice of obtaining supplies locally and from the enemy and utilizing war to
supply the combat capability to mainly relying upon our own logistics supplies and
the consumption of materiel has drastically increased. This also greatly affects the
massing of troops. Therefore, the study of the problem of massing military forces
under modern conditions must emphasize these new changes and new factors.
Thus, the situation has changed, and in future warfare, should the principle of
massing military forces be insisted upon? Ztao opinions emerged in the discussion.
Most comrades believe the principle of massing military forces is still suitable,
but under modern conditions there must be new methods and new demands. Fro.r.: the
point of view of historical materialism, modern warfare is the development of past
warfare. Warfare has advanced from the age of using cold weapons to the age of using
hot weapons and now further into tha age of the emergence of thermonuclear weapons.
Military strategists in the past and today, both at home and abroad, have not aban-
doned this principle because of the changes in warfare brought about by weaponry
development but they have emphasized it even more. For example, the United States
and the Soviet Union both know well that there is the possibility of using atomic
weapons in future warfare but they still include the massing of forces in their own
combat regulations and commands and combat guidelines. They emphasize the massing
of forces at key locations and at apprapriate times in order to create a superior
force at the decisive moment. Of course, massing forces under modern conditions is
not the simple repetition of the past practice of massing forces, it has a new
characteristic and a new content. �
_ Massing forces is the material foundation of a war of annihilation. Fighting a war
of annihilation requires surrounding the enemy whether it is at the beginning of the
war, during the middle or the latter period of war and regardless of the scale of the
war. Reading the enemy's combat couanands and regulations shows that the gap between
company and company, battalion and battalion, regiment and regiment, division and
division in their deployment in combat has increased. The peripheral area of one
battalion covers 10 kilometers. To annihilate the enemy in such a large area, there
must be sufficient forces to launch a major attack and carry out continuous strikes,
there must be sufficient forces to penetrate and divide the Qnemy, plus sufficient
. forces for antiairborne defense and reserves. A common saying says that even a
skilled housewife is helpless without rice for cooking, without superior forces as
- the material foundation it is difficult to fight a battle of annihilation.
At the same time, massing military forces is also a necessary condition to changing
- a bad posture to a superior posture and to grasping the initiative. A superior pos-
ture or a bad posture, initiative and defensive moves are very important in whether
the battle is won or lost on the battlefield. Yet, superior posture and initiative
are not empty thoughts, they are actual and concrete. Especially in future warfare,
we will be fighting in a strategically defensive form and with inferior equipment
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against an enemy who is temporarily on the initiative and with superior equipment.
Therefore we must concentrate superior armed force~ in each battle to defeat the
enemy little by little with local superiority before we can gradually develop an
overall superiority and initiative and change the combat situation to seize victory.
In modern warfare, because of the strong reconnaisance capabilities of the enemy, the
high degree of inechanization, the quick speed of motoiized maneuvers, the great de-
structive power, the situation in the battlefield will be more complex and variable.
Only by concentrating superior armed forces can we have a strong motorized strength
to face the various complex situations thay may occur at any time.
_ There is another opposing opinion which believes that under a situation where atomic
weapons are used in the battlefield, massing armed forces should not be emphasized.
Under certain conditions, nuclear weapons can independently complete the task of
annihilating a certain massed target. The principle in combat conditions in a
nuclear war is that all maneuvers obey the maximum development of nuclear power. There
is a new change in the art of command under the conditions of nuclear war. It is the
change from the past strategy of forcing the enemy to disperse to forcing the opponent
to amass within a definite space, forming a favorable target for atomic attack. Based
- on the above reasoning, some people advocate that the form and content of massing
military forces under conditions of nuclear war must be changed. Some people have
even daringly imagined and proposed "atmospheric strata type" combat. This means
to organize several combat squads with superior equipment who can fight independently
and, to a considerable depth in the main direction of the attacking enemy, to cooper-
ate closely with the masses and the local troops and to utilize motorized and versa-
tile coff .t tactics to strike and exhaust the enemy by layers, like the stratosphere
which continues to weaken the energy of the sun's ultraviolet rays, to destroy the
enemy piecemeal.
PrP t`~e Difficulties Encountered in Massing Forces Under Modern Conditions Insolvable?
In the past, this opinion has often been heard: Under modern condi.tions, rPCOnnais-
sance tech,iology is highly developed; it is difficult to hide any intention of
massing forces. Atomic weapons have a strong destructive power and it is difficult
- to assure the safety of the troops of massed armed forces.
At the meeting, comrades of the Stragety, Foreign Armed Forces and Services Teaching
_ and Research laboratory analyzed the reconnaissance capabilities of modern techniques
and the killing and wounding power of atomic weapons by dividing one into two. They
believe modern reconnaissance techniques are indeed developed. At present, the
United States and the Soviet Union possess optical, infrared, radar, and electronic
reconnaissance and other tools which can continuously gather battlefield information
from the air and on the ground. Their com~on characteristic is that their range of
reconnaissance is broad, their resolution is high, their reliability is good, and
their transmission rate is fast. This has brought about great difficulty in the
concentration, advancement and camouflage of troops. The killing and wounding power
of atomic weapons is also great. But, although there are difficulties, they are not
insurmountable. After discussion and argument, everyone expressed the same views
on the following two problems.
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One is that the modern developed reconnaissance means and reconnaissance equipment
can be countered. Comrades used the most advanced reconnaissance satellite "Big Bird"
of the United States as an example and analyzed the limitations of modern reconnais-
sance techniques. "Big Bird" takes pictures at an altitude of 150 kilometers (the
perigee of the satellite orbit) and the resolution is 0.3 (when two ob~ects are
closer than 0,3 meters, they cannot be differentiated). But the scope of one recon-
naissance has a definite limit. Because the orbit of the satellite is high, and
especially because of long focal distance, detailed photography, the scope is more
.Limited. It is also affected greatly by weather and meteorological conditions. When
the cloud layers are thick, when there is heavy fog and at night, the resolution
of visible ligh[ photography is greatly reduced and sometimes it is even impossible.
Also, the transmission and reading technology are complicated and require a definite
time. This means, modern reconnaissance tech~lology is advanced but it is not omni-
potent. When we mass armed forces, we can completely avoid its advantages and utilize
its shortcomings, hide our intention and utilize various false moves to hide real
moves and carry out skillful combat camouf lage to create conditions for massing
armed forces.
The second is that the power of atomic weapons is also limited. Everyone pointed out
that the limitatious of atomic weapons are mainly manife~ted by the limitations of
- the killing and wounding area of 7 square kilometers. Its killing and wounding
effects will be greatly weakened by complex topography and bad weather conditions.
- Its scope of application is limited. The enemy frequently uses it in the main di-
rection and in decisive regions, it cannot be used everywhere, The number of atomic
weapons deployed is also limited. When a division of the Soviet Army goes to war,
it can only receive the support of from 10 to 20 nuclear weapons. These limitations
provide us with the possibility for defense and for massing armed forces. As long
as our oroanization and commands are appropriate, the armed forces are deployed
properly, various defensive measures are done well, we can mass the armed forces in
time even ir? conditions of atomic war.
This is so in theory and in practice. Everyone took the fourth Middle East war as
an example to further explain that as long as the measures are appropriate, all kinds
of advanced technology can be countered.
What Are the New Demands for Massing Forces Under Modern Conditions
When talking about whether armed forces can be amassed under modern conditions, some
comrades believe it is impossible and possible, the key is whether the conservative
academic ideas can be overcome to see the new demands brought out by massing armed
forces under modern conditions. Everyone's opinions were summarized into the fol-
lowing four points.
1. Modern conditions require a concentration of superior forces and also a concen-
tration of firepower, in particular, a superior antitank firepower must be formed.
In future warfare, our striking targets will be a concentration of tanks and armored
vehicles that have strong firepower, fast mobility and good defenses. Therefore,
concentration to form a superior force includes contrast of forces and contrast of
firepower, We cannot use human-sea tactics against the enemy's firepower tactics,
we cannot use guns to fight artillery. We must avoid the situation where we a~e
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superior in infantry forces but inferior in firepower. In the organization of
firepower, we must use antitank weapons (including antitank guided missiles) as the
backbone, combine artillery firepower with infantry firepower, combine stationary
firepower with mobile firepower, combine surface firepower with airborne firepower,
combine antitank firepower of the main forces with the antitank firepower of the
people and masses. In the deployment of firepower, we should scatter firearms,
_ concentrate firepower, fully develop the whole strength of varied firepower to strike
_ at the tanks.
2. We require concentration of a superior force to annihilate the target but also
we need strong and mobile reserve units. In the past, our armed forces did not have
- strong combat-ready reserves in each major combat zone. Battlefield reserve units
were also very small; sometimes there were none. ~is situation is not suitable
for modern warfare. Combat experience in World War II pro~~ed that the degree of use
- of reserve units is very important in winning or losing the war. In future warfare,
when understanding the use of reserves, we must take into consideration the preser-
vation of retaliatory strength at the beginning of the war and pay attention to
maintaining superior forces in the direction of the main battles and in key regions.
- We must take into consideration the use of superior forces to strike at targets and
also pay attention so that we have sufficient forces to assure the attack. We must
take into consideration the frontal attack on the enemy, and also pay attention to
having sufficient force to strike at the enemy's reinforcements. As long as we
fully estimate the change in various situations on the battlefield and assure a
strong reserve with a high mobility, we can handle the various cpmplex situations.
3. We must require that the troops amass speedily after fighting has started, and
also require the full utilization of massed troops at predetermined battlegrounds
before the battle begins. Speedy concentration and dispersal are necessary measures
against strong firepower, quick motorized mobility, and massive destruction of the
enemy is atomic weapons, This requires that problems in two aspects be solved well.
One is to require the high ranking commanders to understand well the opportunity for
massing troops; it should not be too early and it should not be too late. The other
is to require the troops to quickly become motorized in order to advance with speed,
- to amass quickly and form a surrounding position. To wait for a weak point to
attack under our armed forces' present condition of relatively poor motorized mobility,
we must fully utilize the favorable conditions of the predetermined battleground and
place troops according to plans made beforehand in fortifications that can be used
for attack and for defense and that have already been constructed, order troops about
less and station them more. We must lure the enemy to the region previously set up
by us and launch sudden attacks from all sides to annihilate the enemy with one strike.
4. We must ask couananders to have a highly superior art of commanding and require
the commanders to be careful i~ handling the degree of massing forces. Massing
forces under modern conditions relies upon the skill of the commander to develop
his subjective dynamic function. He must not mechanically utilize the principle of
massing forces and formalize it. This requires that the commanders understand the
enemy and our own troops precisely. In the art of commanding, the commanders should
use their resourcefullness and change with the opportunities, be skilled in creating
illusions and chaos among the enemy, luring them to make mistakes, then concentrate
forces to annihilate the enemy at the appropriate time. The degree of concentrating
forces depends upon various conditions of the enemy and our own troops' appropriate
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deployment of forces and careful grasping of the situation. Generally speaking, at
the beginning of war, the scale of concentration of forces r~~ust be smaller, the pro-
porticn must be greater to fight medium and small-scale battles of annihilation, to
accumulate small victories into large victories. During the middle and the laCter
period of the war, the scale of concentration of forces must gradually increase as
the war progresses, creating a strong offensive against the enemy and annihilating
any active force of the enemy en masse by continuous battles on di~ferent scales.
At the end of the discussion, deputy director and chairman of the military science
committee Comrade Tao Hanzhang [7118 3352 4545] proposed suggestions regarding the
aspects for future discussion of the question concerning the concentration of forces.
He said, viewing the talks, there are still many questions concerning whether one
should, whether one can and how to concentrate forces under modern conditions, which
_ require profound discussion in the future. These problems are: To study how to
counter the enemy's advanced reconnaissance technology, develop interference and
counterinterference, implement electronic warfare, to study how to do the work well
in massing troops in combat and camouflage troop movements, to study how to improve
the art of command under conditions of atomic warfare, such as how to strategically
and tactically amass forces, how to concentrate firepower, how to rationally deploy
the forces and such problems, to study how to camouflage engineering projects and
how to assure engineering projects which can stop the enemy's motorized movements
and assure that our forces are concentrated, to study how to prevent the enemy from
launching a surprise nuclear attack while we are massing our troops, how to better
destroy the enemy and preserve our own forces, all of these problems wiil be pro-
foundly discussed in the future.
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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY
- REGIMENT PROFICIENT IN TWO TYPES OF ANTITANK WEAPONS
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 28 Apr 79 p 1 �
[Article: "Everyone in the 'Jinan First Regiment' Has Become Prof icient in .
Two Types of Antitank Weapons"]
[Text] Everyone in the "Jinan First Regiment" froni the regimental commander,
the political commissar and the off ice workers to the cooks and health workers
is now becoming prof icient in the use of two types of antitank weapons. This is
a good achievement that has never happened before.
After training tor the new year began, they repeatedly gave attention to explaining
to the officers and men the importance of doing a good job an antitank training and
required everyone in the regiment to become proficient in the use of such anti-
tank weapons as 40 mm rocket launcher on the basis of the fact that there are
occasions in modern warfare in which tanks are used in Targe numbers. In order to
do a good job of guiding antitank training, the regiment organized a teaching
and guidance group with the responsibility of training a core group and of
- guiding and assisting companies and off ices. Since there was not enough
- equipment, they collected together a11 of the 40 mm rocket launchers in the entire
regiment and carried out training by group with the battalion as the unit in
order to guarantee that everyone could perform practical operations. The leading
cadre and staff officers regularly went to the f ield to take char e of
im plementation. The regimental commander Ma Lida [7456 4539 6671~ and the
political commissar Chen Chungeng [7115 2504 5087] took the lead in studying.
The odd-jobmen and the office cadres who coul~ not participate in collective
training all individually made up for the lessons they had missed with the heip
of the full-time personnel. The antitank spirit went through the entire regiment.
tn the latter part of March, everyone in the regiment took a test on what they
had learned about antitank weapons. As the rPSUlt, everyone mastered the use of the
40 mm rocket launcher and antitank land mines, with all of the combat companies
in the entire regiment obtaining very good average results in antitank f iring
practice with the 40 mm rocket launcher.
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MILI~ARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY
SCHOOLS, ACADEMIES IMPROVE COURSE WORK
Specialized Disciplines
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 28 Apr 79 p 3
[Article by Wang Zhenya [3769 2182 0068] and Wang Zhongye [3769 0022 2814]:
"Giving Prominence to the Characteristics of Specialized Disci~lines and Adjusting
Balance in the Curriculum"]
[Text] Giving consideration to accelerating training of a core group for building
modernized armed forces, the Antichemical Warfare Academy took resolute measures
to adjust the proportions of teaching time and to revise the arrangements and
content of the curriculum, with ths first gratifying ~tep being taken in bringing
about a shift in the points of emphasis in work.
Because of the disruption of Lin Biao and the "gang of four," teaching and
instruction at the academy was far from meeting the needs of establishing
modernization of the armed forces. The students felt that the proporti.on of time
spent on military science, politics and cultural education was not suitable, with
too much time being devoted to politics education and with basically no arrange-
ments being made for basic cultural courses. They also felt that the contents of
what was taught was out-af-date, that the specialized courses in anticremical war-
fare were not adequate and that there was a high proportion of common courses.
They said: "The time that we spend in school is valuable. How can studying like
this meet the needs of building modernized armed forces?"
Most recently, at the meeting on bringing about a shift of the points of emphasis
in work, the leaders of the academy and the concerned departments listened exten-
sively Co the opinions of the masses, revealed contradictions, analyzed the
current situation and resolved to take immediate measures to readjust the propor-
tions of time spent on education in military science, politics and culture. In
the Command Department, the teaching ratio for military science, politics and
culture was readjusted f rom the former 7 to 3 to 0 to 6 to 2 to 2. In the Poli-
_ tics Department, the teaching ratio for military science, politics and education
was readjusted f rom the former 4 to 6 to 0 to 3 to 5 to 2. In the Engineering
Department, the original ratio of 8 to 2 between specialized education and polit-
- ical education was adjusted to 9 to 1. At the same time, considerable changes
were made in the content of the curriculum, with a policy of "elimination,
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reduction, addition and emphasis" being carried out differentially on the basis
of differing conditions. That is, the instructional content on obsolete equip-
ment and of the common courses was eliminated, for example, the use of poison
detectors, bayonet charges and throwing hand grenades. Reductions were made in
instructional content on matters that had already been studied in the armed
forces and on topics it was desired to eliminate, for example, the use of type 68
observation instrument. Increases were made in basic courses on culture and in
instructional content on knowledge about modern warfare, as, for example, elec-
tronic -:esistance, network command and new antichemical warfare equipment as we11
as new development in foreign armies relating to atomic and chemical weapons. In
the specialized classes in the Engineering Department, the 82 days that were
released after the readjustment were applied to strengthening basic courses and
specialized courses. In the intermediate technical corps, the 52 hours that were
released were devoted to teaching English. In the teaching of command cadre,
increases were made in lectures on lasers, infrared and microwaves.
After the proportions of training time had been readjusted and after the curricu-
lum had been revised, the original teaching plans were upset. Some of the courses
that had been prepared had to be abandoned and some had to be reduced, while
there were some aspects of the new curriculum that had to be instituted at once.
. Thus, there was a considerable amount of difficulty. Leaders and relevant depart-
ments at all levels of the academy unifie3 their teaching ideology, made rational
adjustments of their plans and got a firm grasp on implementing their work. The
, broad ranks of instructors actively supported this readjustment in practical
actions. They said that as long as it was beneficial to modernization, they
w~ould be willing to overcome any difficulty. The broad ranks of students felt
that the readjustment had been done correctly, that good modifications had been
made and that making adjustments in this way was done with an eye to future
developments and in consideration of realistic possibilities and feasibility so
- that substantial effects can be seen. At present, the Antichemical Warfare
Academy is teaching in accordance with the educational plans developed after the
readjustment.
Avoid Duplication
_ Bei~ing JIEFAWGJUN BAO in Chinese 28 Apr 79 p 3
[Letter to th~ editor from Ouyang Shiyuan [2962-7122 0013-3220], instructor at
the Changsha Engineering School: "Duplication Should Be Avoided in Setting Up
Courses in Military Thought"]
[T~xt] Comrade Editor: At pr~sent, in addition to courses on politics and
instruction on the ideology of building the people's army, there are still
courses being taught in our military schools on the military ideology of Chairman
Mao and on the principles of combat for combined arms units. The content~ of the
- three aforementioned courses duplicate and overlap each other. Since combat
principles are embodied in Chairman Mao's line and principles concerning people's
wars, to restudy combat principles after having studied Chairman Mao's military
ideology constitutes duplication. The questions in Chairman Mao's thoughts about
people's war of the attitude of the proletariat toward war, the decisive factors
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in defeat or victory in war and the armed power of the triple alliance overlap
the relevant content of the courses on politics. In giving an account of the
formation and development of Chairman Mao's thoughts on people's war and of his
principles of tactics and strategy, it is difficult to avoid overlapping of con-
tent with the courses on politics in regard to the glorious traditions of our
army and party history. For these reasons, in setting up courses on military
thought, I propose that we must indeed be practical and realistic and avoid
overlapping and duplication in order to facilitate devotion of more time to the
study of specialized subjects.
Rational Allocation
Beijing SIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 28 Apr 79 p 3
[Article: "Pr.~ceeding From Actual Conditions and Top-Quality Vocational Courses"]
[Text] At political academies, one primarily studies politics, while, at techni-
cal academies, one primarily studies specialized subjects. This has always been
an unalterable principle. H~owever, at present school curricula are not suitable
and it is a fairly common situation for the proportion of time among courses to
be out of balance. For example, regardless of the school, the specialized subject
or the object of study, at least 20 percent of the courses must be on politics
for fear that everyone will say that the principle of "politics taking command"
is not being applied. Regardless of the concrete circumstances and conditions,
everyone must set up a course on the military thought of Chairman Mao for fear
that others will say that one has thrown away the "banner." All of this shows
that the pernicious influence of the ideas of "giving prominence to politics"
and of "politics being able to assault everything" propounded by Lin Biao and
the "gang of four" are even now still poisoning our work. If we do not
thoroughly root out these id~as, then it will be very difficult to proceed from
actual conditions in developing suitable curricula and making proper allocations
of teaching time.
Proceeding from actual conditions and top-quality vocational courses constitutes
the strong call of the broad ranks of students of all types of schools. Exactly
how much time should be devoted to courses on politics and political activity in
various types of schooZs is a matter that can be decided on the basis of
experiences in teaching practice. At the same time, modifications should be
made in the methods of teaching courses on politics. There are some people who
believe that the more time that is devoted to courses on politics the better and
that many courses on politics should be given regardless of the school or the
period of study. We cannot let these one-sided concepts and practices continue.
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POLITICAL ACADEMY INiPRUVE5 LEADEkSHIP WORKSTYLE, TEACHING QUALITY
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 28 Apr 79 p 3
[Article; "Listening to Opinions Face-to-Face to Solve Problems Without Delay -
- Political Academy Part Standing Committee Improves Leadership Workstyle"]
[Textj Most recently, the Party Standing Committee of the Political Academy
collectively listened to the opinions of the upper-class students and resolved
problems without delay. This was praised by the students.
Following the Third Plenary Session of the llth Party Central Committee, the
Political Academy convened an enlarged session of the Party Standing Committee
at which they made a conscientious study concerned primarily with teacY~ing,
striving to improve teaching quality, improve leadership workstyle and adapt to
the problems of establishment of modernization. At the meeting, many comrades
pointed out that there was bureaucratism, subjectivism, red tape in fhe work of
the Party Committee. If the leadership work style was not improved, then it
would not be possible to give primary attention to teaching in a genu ine way
and improve the quality of teaching. The members of the Party Standing Committee
listened to everyone's opinions open-mindedly and resolved to improve leadership
workstyle, to put face-to-face leadership into practice and to solve problems
without delay. When they said something would be changed, it would be changed.
During the course of the meeting Party Standing Committee members Lin Hao
[2f,5t 3185], Xie Ming [6200 2494j, Yang Xiushan [2799 4423 1472], Li Fuke [2621
1133 0344], Li Gai [2621 2395] and Zhang Shaohong [1728 1421 5725] guided the
leading comrades in the various off ices and teaching and research departments in
going to the upper-class groups and calling together representatives from each
class of students for informal discussions at which they collectively listened to
the opinions of the students and made studies on-the-spot for the purpose of
resoiving problems.
At these informal discussions, twevle student representatives frankly presented
criticisms and proposals in regard to problems in various areas, including
the leadership workstyle, teaching work, political work and rear-,echelon service
guarantees of the academy. Student Comrade Yan Conglin [7051 0654 2651] said that,
in military science classes, we should be studying modern warfare and Soviet
military conditions but that we are now studying is old content, old plans and
old methods. He proposed that planning for teaching of military science should be
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taken into the classroom where joint discussions could be held on what basically
should be taught and how it should be taught and that we could not hold on to
everything from the past. The Standing Committee members listened to these opinions,
and, f eeling that they were correct, at once decided that teaching of military
science should follow the mass line. A day's time was devoted to allowing the
students to discuss teaching plans and the problems in conducting modern warfare
that must be studied in a ciown-to-earth way. Student Comrade Wang Benhan [3769
2609 3352] pointed out that, in the previous stage, thinking on teaching of
political theory had not been liberated and that there were many important
theoretical problem s that had not been studied conscientiously but that had been
evaded. He indicated that many theoretical problems had been raised at the
meeting for discussing ideological gu idelines on theory that had been held most
recently and that the students hoped that these problems would be restudied and
discussed again. The Standing Committee members exchanged opinions among
themselves. They then immediately decided that time should be set aside to study
the problems that were raised at the meeting on discussion of ideological
guidelines on theory and that everyone should express their ideas freely,
engage in independent thinking and carry on study and discussion in a
- consciencious way.
The Standing Committee members also gave serious consideration to the problems
the students had raised about daily living and other problems.
Tne upper-ciass students were very satisfied with the results of this informal
discussion meeting. Some comrades said with f eeling; "In the past we presented
our views many times. However, we drew layer on layer of circles and official
documents were issued, with very little eff ectiveness. This time, the Party
Standing Committee and the off ices and teaching and research departments of the
Academy took the lead in collectively listening to our opinions and solved many
problems on the spot, 'Phis vigorous and speedy way of solving problems is a
good way of running a school.
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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY
GUANG~iOU AIR REGIMENT REFORMS FLIf~'IiT TRAIIJING
Beijing JIEFANGJUN RIBAO in Chinese 14 May 79 p 1
[Article by Zhu Zongzhi [2612 1350 2535]: "A New Breakthrough in Flight Training"J
[Text] A certain air regiment of the Guangzhou air force, by refnrming the training
content and methods of the 1950's, has made a fairly large breakthrough in flight
training.
For a long period of time, this regiment's training content was fixed in 3 outlines
divided into 3 kinds of weather conditions--daytime simple, daytime complex, and
nighttime simple--totaling 120 training exercises. Many drawbacks were gradually
revealed in this kind of training: the arrangement of the sequences of the exercises
was strict and overcautious; on a training flight a plane could not successively fly
at one altitude; the dividing line between nighttime and daytime was clear; and the
tactical training topics lacked a tactical background. This was a feasible distri-
b ution of careful training for new pilots, but the pilots who had completed the
flying required by the three outlines still flew in that way, and they could be
- likened to soldiers who every day stand at attention and then at ease, and then
quick march, a procedure that restricted the development of their technical and
- tactical levels. This year the regiment, afte�r repeated experiments, carefully
selected and synthesized from the 3 outlines and 120 training exercises 3 large
training topics--piloting, firing weapons, and air combat tactics--and 10 training
exercises, including instrumentation, aerial acrobatics, firing at air and ground
targets, coordinated flying in formation, air combat interception by 1, 2, and 4 air-
craft, and the flexible use of different airfi~lds. The dividing lines between high,
middle and low altitude were broken through; the dividing line between daytime and
nighttime was broken through and flying was organized so as to straddle day and night;
the dividing lines between the four kinds of weather conditions were broken through,
and a daily flight plan could call for flying in several kinds of weather. Every
training exercise was given a tactical background, was focused on the features of
the enemy's present equipment, contained specific demands, and provided training
in the tactical movements of search and discovery, attack, interception, and aiming
and firing. Af ter this reform of the training content, the pilots' mastery of
techniques was brought into full play and the training process was accelerated.
While the flight training content was being reformed, the regiment made fairly large
improvements in training organizational methods and in aircraft maintenance regulations,
thereby greatly increasiag flying time, flying strength, and aircraft utilization
~ ~
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rate. It is estimated that this years'G flying time will rise from the past maximum
flying time of about 60 hours to 160 hours, a one-fold increase compared Co that be-
fore the reform. After improvements in the training organizational methods and in
the aircraft maintenance regulations, the division of work was made more rational.
The former method of having three maintenance squadrons in the regiment handle one
flight was changed so that the number of maintenance personnel was greatly reduced,
the original three maintenance squadrons becoming one flight service squadron and
two aircraft safeguard squadrons, each with its own responsibility. This way of
working cut down labor strength and improved the relationship between work and rest,
and also improved the specialization system and maintenance.quality. The proportion
of aircraf t in good condition rose from 90 percent in February to 95 percent in
~ March. This way of working insured that aircraft were flown to the maximum limit,
the proportion of aircraft flying incraasing by 60 to 70 percent as compared to that
of the past.
Over a training period of more than 1 month after the reform, during which flight
plans were drawn up under the less than ideal conditions of unstable and dangerous
J weather, the flying strength and the aircraft utilization rate still showed a big
improvement. In March, the average flying time in the regiment increased by 60 per-
cent as compared to that of the same month last year, on every flying day the pilots'
average flying strength increased by 70 percent compared to that before the reform,
and the aircraft utilization rate increased by one-fold.
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TRAINING COURSES VIEWED FROM BATTLEFIELD PERSPECTIVE
More Tactical Training Needed
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 23 May 79 p 3
[Article by Wei Shoujun [7614 1343 6511], instructor at a certain infantry school
of the Guangxi border defense units: "Put Tactical Training in First Place"]
[Text] Infantry schools should strengthen the tactical training of students and
improve their organizational command capacity--~his is extremely important for im-
- proving a unit's combat effectiveness. The war of self-defense counterattack once
again confirmed the truth of this proposition.
For several years, there has been a strange breakdown in the training of basic level
commanders by the school and the units, as they have only valued the technical training
of individual company and platoon cadres and have neglected to raise their tactical
level. The peacetime training does not take into account the cadres' role in wartime,
b ut only looks at the number of target rings, number of ineters, and number of seconds
in the cadres' bayonet charges. The military competit~ons conducted by the unit and
the school seem to uniformly consist of technical items. If the lower level is com-
pelled to put this large amount of time and energy into technical training, how can
the organizational couQaand level of the cadres be raised?
This war of self-defensive counterattack proved that whether or not a basic-level
commander's tactical level is high and his command capacity is strong makes a big
difference in the results on the battlefield. When the 2d company of a certain unit
was assaulting Hill 10 it was pinned down by enemy fire. The company's cadres were
not nervous or excited and did not act rashly; they immediately organized the guns
attached to the company to cover the unit's advance. At the beginning they organized
a two-pronged assault, but afterward, based on the terrain and the enemy's situation,
they switched to a three-pronged assault. During the battle the cou~ander promptly
and correctly reported coordinates and directed the artillery fire. Because the
company's cadres were resourceful and fle~cible, the company could scatter, draw in,
unite, and attack in a clear-cut arid orderly fashion. The battle resulted in few
deaths in proportion to the wounded. The upper level awarded the company a silk
banner inscribed "Heroic Assault Company." The commander of another company, when
it was attacking a certain hill, disregarded everything else, and led several fighters
in a charge. Even though the charge was beaten back down the hill, the enemy fled.
Looking at the factual accounts of these two companies` exploits, we can see the
importance of the tactical training in peacetime of basic-level commanders!
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. Looking at the classroom from the perspective of the battlefield, the infantry
school should overcome its fault of emphasizing techniques and deemphasizing tactics.
The training of the units' cadres should also do this.
Firing Training Reform Urged
Beijing JIEFANGJUN RAO in Chinese 23 May 79 p 3
[Article by Zhu Xianghui [2612 3276 2547), a student at a certain infantry school
of the Guangxi border defense units: "Firing Z`raining at Infantry Schools Must Be
Reformed"]
[Text] By taking part in the war of self-defensive counterattack against Vietnam
we learned some useful things, but we also discovered some problems which necessitate
a reform in peacetime instruction.
I will speak only of firing training, nothing else! In the "Outline of Instruction"
for military academies and schools, 480 hours are devoted to firing training, or
73 percent of the time for training in technical subjects. This is not a small amount
~ of time. A great amount of this time is devoted to basic training, as the time for
applied firing and for firing at moving targets amounts to only a few days. Z'here
is a similar situation with regard to the training results demanded: it is not
sufficient to make the overly high demand for firing accuracy the hitting of the
_ eight-point ring; it must be the hitting o� the nine-point ring or better. The
trainees commit all sorts of mistakes--clog up the breach, cover the front sight,
block the lins of sight, wear glasses and choose the firearms they use. With regard
to applied firing and firing at invisible targets, the time for training is small
and the requirements are low--it is all the same whether one does well or poorly.
This does not suit the demands of actual warfare. .
Obviously, in anything one must begin with the basics, but the goal of an infantry
school's training is not to turn out sportsmen but basic-level commanders who can
organize training iii peacetime and direct operattons in wartime. In the war of
self-defensive counterattack, a great amount of the firing was firing in mountainous
terrain, firing at pointblank range, firing at moving targets, and firing at angles
of depression or elevation. At no time will the enemy stand stiil in one place and
- wait while you clog up the breach and cover the front sight; h~s will usually take
up his gun and make a clean sweep with one burst of fire. Many~ comrades, because.
they are in a rut, excessively, demand precise aiming, but if your gun is not fired
then the enemy will be allowed to open fire and blood will spatter the battlefield.
There is a bitter lesson here!
- We think the firing training in military academies and schools should be reformed.
Most of the students come from units, and they all have been in the artay for 2 or
more years and have a certain foundation in firing. Therefore, in the teaching
outline, we can properly arrange for somewhat less basic training in firing and for
somewhat more training in firing at invisible targets and moving targets, for some-
what more training in firing in mountainous terrain, at point-blanlc range, and at
angles of depression and elevation, in order to meet the requirements of a future
war against aggression.
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UNIT 81202 CHANGES CADRE TRAINING SYSTEM .
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 29 May 79 p 2
[Article by Hao Hongjuan [6787 3163 1401] et al.:~ "'Small Concentration! Is a Good
Method of Strengthening Cadre Training"]
[TextJ Since beginning training tnis year, Unit 81202 has changed from its former
state of affairs, in which it had slackened its hold on cadre training, and has ob-
tained marked results by adopting on 3 occasions the "small concentration" method for
training company and platoon cadres.
The term "small concentration" means to concentrate on a regular bas~s all company
and platoon cadres and train them as a unified regimental organization. The ad-
vantages of training the cadres in this way are:
First, it makes it easy to strengthen the leadership over cadre training. In the
past each battalion trained its cadres in a decentralized fashion. The time and con-
tent of the training were not identical and it was very difficult to concentrate
the energy of the leadership, causing the training to always remain at the level
of vague generalizations. After the "small concentration" method was adopted, at each
session 3 to 5 of the regiment's leading cadres and over 10 staff offic.ers could con-
centrate on cadre training.
Second, the time for cadre training can be insured; and the energy of the cadres
_ being trained can be by comparison concentrated. Previously, every year the cadre
training days were not completed, frequently because of home visits, being away on
official business, and meetings ox because of small-unit [fendui 0433 7130] training;
the time for cadre training was squeezed out or became a mere formality. This year,
all of the company and platoon cadres, with the exception of those in exceptional
circumstances, have completed 20 training day~ and have learned ma.ny more things than
they did in the same period in previous years.
- Third, through this method the topics studied are linked together, which is beneficial
to review and imprevement. In the past the regiment, from individual soldiers to
- battalion, took several months to complete the training topic on assault tactics, and
many people said, "Learning in the front and forgetting at the back--the training has
become a matter of just going through the moCions." Af ter the "small concentration"
training method was put into effect, once the platoon assault topic had bean completed,
the cadres immediately switched to the topic of company attack and defense, and this
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was closely followed by the topic of battalion attack and defense. In this way,
connections were made between the "front" and the "back," and there was a great
difference in training effectiveness, The company and platoon cadres throughout
the regiment, in examinations on all the topics they had studied and trained in,
attained a level of good or higher.
Fourth, the method makes it easy to pool the wisdom of the tnasses, to study problems,
and to improve together. Formerly, a battalion's views and ways of working on some
problems were not identical, each unit of a battalion had one method, and everything
was one-sided, Through a full discussion by the masses in a display of military
democracy, several opinions were rapidly concentrated on the problem and the original
methods of each small unit [fendui 0433 7130] were enriched and perfected. Everybody
held that it would have been very difficult to sum up these small experiences if
decentralized training had been carried out.
During its "small concentration" training, this regiment also paid attention to cor-
rectly handling the relationship between cadre training and small-unit training.
After the cadres had been concentrated, they took the following three measure in
order not to adversely affect unit training: First, they fixed the cadre training
at the stage of small-unit technical training and of tactical training at the squad
level and below, every day leaving behind one cadre to control the unit training.
Second, before cadre training began, the regiment trained a group of key personnel
for the small units, two to three for ev~ry squad, which solved the problem of in-
structors for small-unit technical training and tactical training at the squad level
- and below. Third, during training on the topic of attack and defense hy platoons
and companies, the cadres and fighters trained side by side, thus killing two birds
wi th one s tone .
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- SECOND ARTILLERY TRAINS TOP CADRES IN MILITARY SCIENCE
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 29 May 79 p 2
[Article by Luo Chunrong [5012 2504 2837] et al.: "Taking Seriously the Study by
Division and Regimental Cadres of Modern Military Science"]
[Text] Training classes conducted by the 2d artillery for the study of modern mili-
tary science by division and regimental cadres while on the job formally began at the
beginning of rfay. In previous years, owing to the disruption and destruction cau~ed
by Lin Biao and the "gang of four," many leading cadres did not dare to study military
science and for a long time remained "laymen," which did not suit the n~w situation
_ in which the focus of armed forces work has been shifted. In order to let the leading
cadres ma~ter as quickly as possible the specialized knowledge pertaining to their
respective service arms and in order to get a good grip on education and training
in the unit, the party committee of the 2d artillery has decided to train in rotation
within a period of 3 years or more all leading cadres who hold posts at the division
and regimental level.
The party committee of the 2d Artillery highly values this concentrated training.
Before the training began, the committee compiled and printed over 260 charts and
diagrams of all sorts that had been drawn or copied, and organized over 10 experienced
instructors conscientiously to prepare lessons and give trial lectures as part of
their teaching task. Comrades undergoing the concentrated training have already
begun an estimated 2 and 1/2 months of extensive study.
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