JPRS ID: 9746 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050042-6
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• Document Page Count: 40
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• Sequence Number: 42
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9992
18 September 1981
West Europe Report
(FOUO 47/81)
t
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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.
JPRS L/9992
18 September 1981
WEST EUROPE REPORT
(FOUO 47/81)
CONTENTS
TERRORISM
ITALY
CGIL-CISL-UIL Labor Decision on Factory Terrorism
(ET, MONDO, 7 Aug 81) 1
ECONOMIC
BELGIUM
- Drop in Exports in Early 1981 Analyzed
(Jean Pourbaix; POURQUOI PAS?, 30 Jul 81) 3
ITALY
ENI's Macroeconomic Study on Future Trends
(Marino Varengo; IL MONDO, 7 Aug 81) 6
Status of Manufacturing Industry for First Half 1981
(Giancarlo Bussetti, et al.; IL MONDO, 17 Jul 81) 8
POLITICAL
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
SPD I.osing Support in Worker-Oriented Cities
(CAPITAL, Jul 81) 15
SPAIN
AP Leader Fraga Hopeful of Coalition With UCD
~ (Antxon Sarasqueta; CAMBIO 16, 17 Aug 81) 18
- a - (III - WE - 150 FOUO]
F(1R (1FF'If f A T, i I.CF, (1NT,Y
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MILITARY
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Expansion of Weapons Export Policy 22
(Joachim Krause; EUROPA ARCHIV, 26 Jun 81)
FRANCE
~ Geneste's Views on Neutron Bomb, Atomic Warfare 33
(Marc Geneste Interview; L'EXPRESS, 14 Aug 81) . .
- b -
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TERRORISM . ITALY
CGIL-CISL-iIIL LABOR DECISION ON FACTORY TERRORISM
Milan EL MONDO in Italian 7 Aug 81 p 27
[Text] It will be a kind of labor union antiterrorism. Six persons, whose names
are kept secret, are working on it on the national level: a federation secretary
and an official for each organization. 1'ask: to coordinate labor unionism's ini-
_ tiative to fight against factory terrorism. This is the most important decision
made on Wednesday 22 July by the unified secretariat of the CGIL-CISL-UIL [Italian
General Confederation of Labor-Italian Confederation of Labor Unions--Italian Union
of Labor] federation that met to discuss precisely the presence of Red Brigades
in factories, after the Friday 17 July meeting in Milan (IL MONDO, No 30) and after
the controversies that broke out as a result of Enzo Mattina's staitements on the
relationship between labor union struggle and terrorism. Al1 the initiatives of
labor unionism on the subject will come to this new working group that is also to
handle relations with the police (Luciano Lama, Pierre Carniti and Giorgio Benvenuto
met with the minister of Interior, Virginio Rognoni, a few days ago. Three ini-
tiatives have already been decided on.
1. A meeting of delegates from the three plants in which terrorists seem to be
most present: Alfa Romeo in Arese, Petrochemical in Marghera and FIAT. The ob-
jective is twofold: to intensify the analysis already made in the Milan meetzng
on the new phase of terrorism, centered in factories, and to give renewed trust
and support to the delegates who are in the fxont line and who "are going through
a serious moment of mistrust," as they recognize in mauy in the labor union movement.
2. Establishment of a central labor union file. This will primarily be Che task
of the offi.cials of the working group established at the federation level. On its
own account, the UIL has already started this work meanwraile. And Benvenuto himself
- is devoting a good part of his time to studying documents; periodicals and pamphlets
of the Red Brigades and associated organizations. The UIL has made advance announce-
ment of the publication, in September, of a real file consisting precisely of the
analysis of this material. Meanwhile, one thing has already emerged clearly from
a study of this material: the Red Brigade strategic guidelines correspond in de-
- tail, at times, with whole statements made textually in the pamphlets distributed
openly in factories by autonomy groups. This demonstrates that the two areas once
divided, that is to say the armed area and the one operating in the open, have
merged. And another hypothesis is gaining strength: that is to say that the ter-
rorists can count on connivences and complicity also among technicians and perhaps
even among executive personnel in the factories.
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3. A meeting of the unified executive committee focusing on terrorism called for
5eptember. The problem of the functioning of councils and the methods for elect-
ing delegates will be on the agenda. According to what IL MONDO is told, the as-
sumption is that a kind of electoral and regulatory statute will be launched for
the democratic functioning of assemblies and for the election of delegates. In or-
der to really ensure expression of the wi11 of the rank-and-file secure from pos-
sible intimidation by violent minorities. And in order to have greater certainty
of the democratic loyalty of those workers who take on labor union responsibilities.
COPYRIGHT: IL MONDO 1981
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ECONOMIC
DROP IN EXPORTS IN EARLY 1981 ANALYZED
Brussels POURQUOI PAS? in French 30 Jul 81 pp 33-34
[Article by Jean Pourbaix: "Collapse of Our Exports"]
BELGIUM
[Text] The results of our commercial trade-with other countries during the first
- quarter of 1981 are not good; they are even frankly disturbing.
In .January of this year, we exported 143.38 billion francs worth of goodc, compared
with 159,102,000,000 francs in January 1980. The figures for February 1981 are.
156,988,000,000 francs, compared with 173,251,000,000 for February 1980; and for
- March 1981, 174.08 billion compared with 176,026,000,000 in March 1980.'
Total exports for the quarter were 474,449,000,000 francs instead of 508,379,000,000
for the same period in 1980.
The drop, on the order of 6.7 percent, may appear insignificant at first sight, but
it is less so when one considers two factors, to wit:
First, during the first three months of 1980, our exports had risen 30.4 percent
compared with the first quarter of 1979, when they totaled nearly 390 billion
francs. The counterperf.ormance of the first quarter of 1981 attests to the profQUnd
collapse in our trade. .
Second, and without bothering with too many statistics, we see that during that
same quarter of 1981, our imports which normally include a large quantity of
materials ta be used by our industries remained practically steady at the rather
high leve]. of 563,407,000,000 francs.
Foreign Trade of UEBL [Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union] for First Quarter of
Years 1979 to 1981 (in millions of francs)
Exports
1979 389,993 -
' 1980 508,379 + 30.4 %
1981 474,499 - 6.7 %
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Imports
1979
1980
1981
416,097
571,996
563,407
+ 37.5 %
- 1.5 %
Annual Trade Defic_it of 300 Billion
While movements of exports and imports give rise to legitimate concern about the
present and future state af our economic activities, above all, they carry a heavy
threat to the trade balance and therefore, to the soundness of the franc.
Actually, each of the first three months of 1981 was marked by a substantial trade
deficit, which amounted to 31,484,000,000 francs in January, 30,777,000,000 francs
in February, and 26,697,000,000 francs in March.
This makes a quarterly total of some 89 billion, compared witli an overall figure
of 63.6 billion for the January-March period of last year.
Given this growing deficit in the trade balance, there is scarcely any wonder that
one member of the government recently estimated that the surplus in imports over
exports "will undoubtedly reach 300 billion by the end of 1981."
This estimate of 300 billion comes from Minister of Foreign Trade Urbain, who re-
cently spoke about the appointment of the director of the Belgian Foreign Trade
Office. The minister's figure even seems very modest to us. If each of the four
quarters of 1981 were to have a deficit comparable to that of the first three
munths, the estimate could not fail to be surpassed.
Already for the year 1980, our trade balance showed a deficit of 210 billion, com-
pared with 123 billion in 1979. .
Distribution of Losses and Rare Gains
2egarding exports, the regression of the first quarter of 1981 represents some
34 billion francs compared with the corresponding period of 1980.
Classified by major geographic zones, our sales abroad are as follows for each of
the two quarters examined: Exports in Millions of Francs
3 Months
1980
European Economic Community (EEC) 368,366
Economic Free Trade Association (AELE) 39,443
European CEMA countries 10,003
Other European countries 6,915
Africa 21,004
America 27,424
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3 Months Difference
1981 in Percent
337,518
- 8.4
34,973
- 11.3
10,019
+ 0.2
7,640
+ 10.5
24,306
+ 15.7
24,899
- 9.2
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(cont.)
Asia
Oceania
General Total
30,857
29,919 - 3.0
1,233
1,135 - 8.0
508,379
474,449 - 6.7
Three months of sales:
Belgium to Japan
Japan to Belgium
2,559,000,000
15,967,000,000
- A few details, hidden in the overall categories, should be brought out, parti~cu.3.arly
the following:
Under our exports to countries in the European Economic CommuniCy, the 30.2-Qercent
drop in our sales to the United Kingdom (36,347,000,000 during the first quarter
of 1981 compared with 52,101,000,000 during the first quarter of 1980).
Free trade zone: a drop of 20.4 percent in Belgian and Luxembourg sales to Switzer-
land (15,368,000,000 instead of 19.31 billion).
Among the European CEMA countries, Russian purchases, already up 20.9 percent in
1980, increase ugain by 30.6 percent during the first quarter of 1981, rEaching
5,774,000,000 francs, compared with 4,421,000,000 during the first three months of
1980. '
In Africa, new and strong expansion of our sales to the Republic of South Africa:
- up 53.1 percent in three months, or 2,294,000,000, compared with 1,499,000,000.
- In America, imports from the UEBL going to the United States drop 14.2 percent,
totaling (still after three months) 16,9E2,000,000, compared with 19,781,000,000,
which contrasts with the 40.3-percent advance achieved during the first quarter.of
1980. On the other hand, there was a net resumption of our sales .to Canada:
a 45-percent increase in 1981, or 2,052,000,000, compared with 1,415,000,000 in
1980.
In Asia, our business with Japan remains stagnant with respect to exports., which,
for the first three months of this year, dropped to 2,559,000,000 francs compared
. with 2.64 billion in 1980 (down 3.1 percent). These mediocxe figures pale along-
side the rise of Japanese imports into Belgium: up 62y'23 ,nercent in 1980 (three
months) compared with 1979 and up 70.8 percent in 1981 compared with 1980. Japanese
_ exports to our countr;* rose from 9,347,000,000 francs during the first quarter of
1980,to 15,967,000,000 for the same period in 1981.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 pourquoi Pas?
_ 11,464
CSO: 3100/907
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ECONOMIC
ENI'S MACRQECONOMIC STUDY ON FUTURE TRENDS
Milan IL MONDO in Italian 7 Aug 81 p 78
[Article by Marino Varengo: "How Much a Barrel of Oil Wi11 Increase"]
ITALY
[Text] Gloomy times for*I1ta]y's economy. i:NI [National Hydrocarbons Agency] also
joined in the chorus of pessimists recently with a study on the future evolution
ofthe priaicipa~.:If.alian marxoeconomic aggregations. According to the ENI experts
who used the econometric models of Data Resources an-TPrameiteia, productive activity
in Italy should be substantially stagnant for the second half of this year and for
all 1982, with timid signs of recovery just at the end of next year. At the end
of 1981, the gross domestic product will have increased 1 percent in comparison
with the previous year, but the increase is due almost primarily to the results
of the first half of the year. Growth is already slowing down now and the system
will remain in a stage of almost absolute stagnation in all 1982 (the gross domestic
product will rise 0.1 percent).
This stagnation will have two special aspects: among the components of the aggre--
gate ciemand, family consumer goods will remain almost stable (and this will prevent
the system from entering an out-and-out recession), while a definite drop will be
_ taken by investments, especially investments in industrial equipment and machinery,
which will decrease 10.7 percent in 1982, choked by high interestrates, by phenomena
- uf credit rationing and by gloomy market forecasts. Naturally, stagnation will
also have consequences on the cost of living. Again, the prevalent component for
all 1981 will, however, bE depreciation of the lira with regard to the dollar.
Therefore, the increase Jtr prices of consumer goods in 1981 will be 20.4 percent.
- But starting in the first months of the following year, the effects of stagnation
will begin to make themselves felt. Therefore, inflation will go down to 16.9 per-
cent in 1982. Stabilization of the lira on the foreign exchange markets will con-
tribute to this decline.
Bad news continues concerning accounts abroad. After an apparent recovery in the
first months of this year, caused primarily by the sharp depreciation of the lira,
exports will undergo a slowdown between the end of 1981 and the first months of
next year. Then, however, world demand should pick up again. Imports will decrease
during the whole last half of 1981 (-12.2 percent), but wi.ll go up again.
The result of these developments will be a balance of trade strongly in the red
(9,8 trillion lire defirit in 1981 and 10.4 trillion in 1982), onlq partly bal-
anced again by a more favorable trend in the services sector.
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The last macroeconomic f.act shown by the ENI study is unemployment. The unemp3oy-
ment rate will continue to go up: from 7.6 gercent in 1980 to 8 percent in 1981
and to 8.5 percent in 1982. Then, employed workers will not come out of the crisis
so badly. Pay per employee will show a 23.3-percent increase in 1981 and 19 per-
cent in 082, thus exceeding the inflation rate. The reason for this improvement
in real terms is primarily a sharp increase in actual wages because of company Ibar-
gaining in 1981 and the increases provided by renewal of the many labor can,tracts
expiring next year. On the other hand, profits will decrease, because forecasits
speak of a 20--percent increase in the cost of labor per product unit in these two
years.
But what interests ENI mostly is, naturally, the future trend of the price of a
barrel of crude oil imported into Italy. Forecasts, assuming that Italy wi"ll con-
tinue to import Middle Eastern oil (predominantl3irDf~-.the"lgglzt Arabian type) pri-
marily and that, therefore, there will be no effects of substituting heav3er ca-udes
(costing less), are that the average price per barrel will increase from $31.94
in 1980 to $36.94 in 1981 and $40.12 in 1982 (with a peak of $42 at the and of the
year), with increases amounting, respectively, to 15.7 percent and 8.6 pe-rcent.
These increases expressed in lire are sti11 more appreciable. Betr,aeet 1981 and
1980, the increase amounts to 45.9 percent, while in 1982, a turther xncrease of
5.6 percent is anticipated.
COPYRIGHT: IL MONDO 1981
10,042
CSQ: 3104/349
E_
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ECONOMIC
STATUS OF MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY FOR FIRST HALF 1981
Milan IL MONDO in Italian 17 Jul 81 pp 120-123
ITALY
[Article by Giancarlo Bussetti, Cristina Jucker, Gilberto Milano, Domenico Ravenna:
"Almost Normal Temperature"]
[Text] Olivetti has exceeded its budget forecasts. Pharmaceutical
companies are exporting more and, among the textiles, Zucchi and
Eliolona are thinking about the stock ma.rket. In the last 3 months,
many positive signs indicate that there is a small recovery.
It has always been a company showing good profits. But the 62-percent increase
in turnover achieved by Bassetti in the first S months of 1981, in a recession phase
for many sectors, surprises f irst of all the executives themselves of the. company
producing household white goods. And this kind of positive data concerning the
activity of the manufacturing industry :is showing up in constantly larger numbers
on the tables of institutes surveying the current state of affairs and of group
associations. In short, on passing the tiuoy of the first half of the year, the
situational survey pointer seems to be wavering around "variable," after having
indicated a sharp recession for over 6 months (fourth quarter of 1980 and first
quarter of 1981), with a decline of industrial production amounting up to 12 per-
_ cent (it must be pointed out, however, that the first quarter of 1980, with which
the first quarter of 1981 is compared, had an exceptionally positive trend). On
the other hand, according to forecasts by the research center of CONFINDUSTRIA [Gen-
eral Confederation of Italian Industry], the levels of industrial activity should
increase by 1.5 percent in the next 3 months (in comparison with the third quarter
of 1980). Is it basically possible to speak of a trend reversal? Are we actually
at the eve of a production recovery? IL MONDO asked this of about 50 companies
in nine production sectors. The checkup of the companies surveyed substantially
confirms the results of the situational surveys, although it brings to light a
large number of contradictions in the status of companies. The result is a very
uneven map of production activity, with appreciable differences between sectors
and within a given sector.
"As of the end of May, our turnover amounted to 526 billion lire, with a 23.7-percent
increase, which exceeded the budget forecasts," Carlo De Benedetti, vice presi=
dentand.managing director of Olivetti, stated. But, in contrast with the positive
trend of the Ivrea firm and, in general, of the data-processing sector (+10 percent
- in real terms), there is the disastrous situation of the electronic components in-
dustry for wlaich At1IE [National Association of Electrical and Electronic:i Industries],
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the group association of electrical and electronic companies, has asked for a state
of crisis. In the textile sector, which still has a negative situational trend
although with some symptoms of recovery (-6.9 percent in the second quarter of 1981
and -2.3 percent in the third quarter with regard to production), there is the house-
hold white goods sector that is experiencing good times. For example, Zucchi, ac-
cording to what the president and managing director of the company, Giordana Zucchi,
told IL MONDO, will soon be quoted on the stock exchange. This is an obvious sign
that the company's good trend should en7oy the confidence of savers. A similar
statement can be made for the chemical sector, suffering from a reduction in indus-
trial activity greater than the manufacturing average (11-percent decline in second
quarter production, with a trend reversal in the third quarter of up to +10 percent).
On the other hand, the pharmaceutical sector is moving more vigorously, owing to
exports. And, in the rubber sector, production of tires and technical items shows
an appreciable crisis that the mild trend of the electrical cable industry does
not succeed in putting back in balance. "Production capacities are underutilized
owing to the ialloff in demand and very soon we shall be forced to request the un-
employment fund.," Renato Martinotti, managing director of CEAT told IL MONDO.
The contradictions between the various sectoral and company situations is also re-
Elected in the numerous problems with which enterprises are faced at this t ime.
Positive signs are not lacking. Relations with workers' labor unions are sa`."s-
factory ("we are going through a good period in industrial relations," the cop
executives of Tonolli, the large semifinished metal products ihdustry in Milan con-
! firm, for example). Production capacities of companies have benefited from this
j climate, achieving a utilization ranging between 75 percent (Riva Calzoni, for ex-
j ample) and 90 percent (Zucchi). But the bite of tight credit and of the high cost
~ of money (with average rates around 25 percent for ordinary loans) have made them-
' selves felt on the financial structure of every enterprise. "Although many banks,
especially foreign banks, like Barclays, for example," Corrado Elmi, managing di-
rector of Caleppio., said, "are helping enterprises draw on foreign capital markets.."
This, in summary, is tYie situational trend of the leading enterprises in various
sectors, with special attention to these factors: turnover, utilization of pro-
duction capacity, labor union situation, exports (with possible consequences of
the changed lira-dollar exchange ratio), cost of labor, investments and f inancial
structure (effect of tight credit).
Foodstuffs. The average increase in tur.nover czF companies in this sector (whose
- production should increase +1.6 percent in the third quarter of the ypar) ranges
around 7-10 percent in real terms in the first 6 raont.iis of 1981 and the end of the
fiscal year torecasts do not deviate much from thesc values. There are rather many
companies that are doing well. For examptey Chia-ri & Forti believes, on the basis
of the results for the first half-year (4�10 percent turnover), that it can close
- the fiscal year with a good prof it by winnittg siices of the mar?cet from I-ompetitors.
Naturally, there is no lack of problems. For example, thP fi.nancial structure of
the enterprises has been weakened owing to a lengthening of customers' payre:it
terms. Pr3..r.:o Vismara., managing director of Francesco Vismara, Incorporatee, a de-
licatessen producer, says that "the volume of our credits i.ncreased 10 i,ercent,
on the av&rage, in comparison with the same period last year." With regard to labor
costs, an increase included between 20 and 25 percent is recorded, but, in some
- cases, it. }ias oLen possible to kePp the increase at apprecinb;.y lower levels (18
percent in Vismara). In general, the consequences oF the lira-dullar exchange are
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tilight. "In order to avoid the consequences of the changed foreign exchange ra-
tions," Giulio Malgara, managining director of Chiari & Forti says, "we tried to
take shelter in other European currencies. But there still are grave concerns for
tlie future."
ALIMENTARI ~ 1)
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1980 1981 previsioni
7 Fomr. Centro nudi confindurtrla
Key: 1. foodstuffs; 2. production;
3. hours worked; 4. labor force;
5. percent variations from the same
quarter of the preceding year;
6. forecasts; 7. source:
CONFINDUSTRIA Research Center.
,
t, o
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O ~CHIM>CHE
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1980 1981 prryioqnl
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Key: 1. chemicals; 2. excluding
pharamaceutical industries;
3. percent variations from the same
quarter of the preceding year;
4. forecasts.
Chemicals. This sector shows much unevenness in its various divisions. In the
Eirst 3 months of 1981, Montedison's turnover amounted to 2,013,000,000,000 (ag-
greaate turnover 2,928,000,000,000), marking a 4.4-percent increase. The small
size of the increase is due primarily to the negative trend of production of pastic
materials (counterbalanced by the positive trend of pharmaceutical products and
fertilizers). In MAXFIN, the largest Italian group in the production of paints,
headed by Montedison and the Varasi family, it is maintained that "the reduction
in the production of paints should decrease in percentage during this year."
On the other hand, the trend of the activity of Mira Lanza (Bonomi Group), which
recorded a 30-percent increase in comparison with the same period last year with
prospects of improving still more by the end of the year, is different. A factor
that has contributed much to this trend was the change in the exchange ratio between
lira and dollar, which constituted a definite increase in exports for Mira Lanza.
"We are at levels not far from double, although relative amounts are involved," one
Of the company's executives told IL MONDO. The situation of Boston of Bollare (Mi-
1an) is less happy than the above, but with stable results in terms of turnover
that have enabled ttie company to recover from inflation. "We operate in the sector
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of glues and adhesive tapes," Francesco Guzzetti, financial manager of the company,
told IL MONDO. "While prospects are for an increase in volume in glues, in adhe-
sive tapes there is some crisis owing to the proliferation of small companies that
have doubled the sectoz�'s production capacity, while the market absorption capacity
has remained unchanged." On the whole, the sector has a satisfactory labor situa-
tion for the companies and excessive consequences have not been observed with re-
gard to the credit squeeze. Investment programs are not large and are directed
toward a strengthening of existing structures.
- MATERIALI (1) 1 MEZZI DI TRASPORTO
~ ~ ILLL DA COSTRUZ.
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Xey: 1. means of transportation;
2. percent variations from the
preceding year; 3. forecasts.
Censtructi.on. Public buil.ding (10-year plan, Law 25, program for rebuilding Naples
and areas hit by earthquakes) is moving at a moderate pace. On the other hand,
private building is at a standstill. According to CRESME, a center for research
on the building market, the 235,000 housing starts in 1981 come mostly from public
building. On the whole, the production trend of construction enterprises should
go from a-0.5 percent in the second quarter to a+1 percent in the third.
Some comforting prospects come from the foreign market. "A rather strong recovery
has been observed precisely in these last few months by the presence abroad of Ital-
ian companies in this sector," Vincenzo Comito, financial manager of CMC, the power-
ful cooperative of masons and cement-workers in Ravenna, confirmed. Also there
is no concern for the :ompanies involved in international markets with regard to
terms of paymenr. "Our foreign customers," Comito stated, "pay puntually at the
times.agreed on." Concern in this connection comes, rather, from the domestic ma.r-
ket in which public agencies, traditional customers of the companies in the sec-
tor, still delay payments for extremely long times. The effect of the lira-dollar
eYChange ratio seems to be negligible. "Our company," Comito says, "has credits
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and debts in dollars and in the long run a kind oi compensation mechanism is
achieved." On the other hand, a negative trend is recorded in the tiles sector
in which erports underwent a sizable 23-percent decline, in the first 3 months of
1981, in comparison with the same period last year. The cause of this worrisome
trend," Giorgio Saltini, head of A'_3SOPIASTRELLE, maintains, "is the unstoppable
increase in our costs that are now double the costs of our leading competitors."
Electronics. This sector has quite a different trend within it. With the exception
of data processing, all the other divisions represented, in the first months of
1981, the negative trend of 1980 (-0.5 percent for the whole sector), with more
or less wide variations. The electronic components division is the one hardest
hit. But consumer electronics (audio, video-amd illumination) are also experien-
cing difficult times." "In terms of value," Oscar Cecchinato, personnal manager
of Philips, told IL MONDO, "we are two points below the turnover in the first half
of 1980."
Among the major problems affecting the electronics sector as a whole is the problem
of a structural excess of manpower, owing to the introduction of new technologies.
The labor union situation is affected by this phenomenon and, especially with regard
to consumer electronics, it is recording alarming tensions. There are many cases
- of unemployment fund and many companies are under supervised administration or in
bankruptcy status. We are very pessimistic on a recovery of the sector in the
short term," the say in ANIE. Another market that is going through a negative per-
- iod is the semiconductor market. "General forecasts are that the market will re-
main depressed for the whole year," Yasquale Pistorio, managing director of SGS-
ATES, maintains. "An anticipated improvement should take place in the last quarter
- of 1981. An appreciable recovery in 1982 and a boom situation in 1983 are forecast."
Pharmaceuticals. News of an increase in the price tag on medicines is only a few
days old. "This will give rise to an immediate considerable contraction in sales,"
the say at ISF, one of the largest Italian pharmaceutical houses, and this forecast
is also confirmed by other companies. This fact comes at the conclusion of a semi-
nar during which the physicians' strik.e, which lasted several days, severely af-
fected sales of pha�-maceutical products. "This fact," they say at Pierrel, "will
involve a 20- to 3, arcent reduction in turnover with regard to the 1981 budget."
At Farmitalia-Carlo ba they observe that "after a favorable start (+4 percent),
demand decreased appreciably, also affecting the use of nonprescription products.
The analysis division also felt the effect of a lack of laboratory analysis pre-
scriptions. Consequently, there was an increase of only 11 percent in comparison
with the previous year (while a 22-~ercent increase was forecast)." Prospects seem
rather good, however. "The market is stable," the say in ISF, "in spite of the
fact there there has been a little witch-hunting in this sector. Moreover, the
change in the lira-dollar ratio represented a substantially positive variant, be-
cause imports in dollars are very limited for all, while exports of raw materials,
especially antibiotics, are increasing. For example, this year, it is estimated
that Farmitalia-Carlo Erba will close the fiscal year with a positive balance with
regard to the balance of trade, that is to say the difference between imports and
exports, by over 100 billion lire.
Rubber. "The situation of the sector is extremely difficult, especially with re-
gard 'to automobile tires," Marinotti told IL MONDO. "Turnover in the first
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5 months of 1981 was 76 billion lire for the electrical cable sector (with a 13-
percent increase in quantity) and 66 billion for the tire sector, with a 17.9-
percent increase in comparison with the same months of the previous year, with an
increase due solely to the increase in prices. The situation of electrical cablea
is slightly better, in spite of delays in payments by ENEL [National Electric Power
Agency] and delays in.issuiug orders on the part of SIP [Italian Telephone Company]."
' Then with regard to investments, "in view of the present cost of money," Marinotti
went on to say, "it is not at all advisable to make any (except in the south, where
it is still possible to have f inancing facilities)." Elmi is_of:the same._opinion.
"Today the cost of money," he says, " discourages any initiative. It is impossible
to have easy f inancing anywhere in the north." The turnover for these first months
was not especially brilliant for Caleppio either (compared with last year's turn-
over) and the greatest difficulties pertaining to exports covering 54-56 percent
of production. "For the next few months, the situation appears to be stagnant,"
Elmi adds. "Consumption of plastic material has generally decreased by 16 percent,
not only in Italy, but also all over Europe. Moreover, Italy's high inflation rates
in comparison with the other European countries are making us lose the ability to
compete every year."
~ (1) MECCANICHE TESSILI
' (1)
0

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I I V I 11 111 1980 1981 preyifioni j ~
Key: 1. machine-building; 2. per-
cent variations from the preceding
year; 3. forecasts.
+4
+3
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-3
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1 IV I II III
1980 1981 prwisioni
:
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= inftr~
Key: 1. textiles; 2. percent var-
iation from the preceding year.
3. forecasts.
Machine-buildinK and metalworking. This sector underwent a different production
trend, in the first half of 1981, in its various subdivisions and an uneven trend
in some of them. Overall, production recorded a positive trend that can be estim-
ated at 6 percent in the first 3 months of 1981. The automobile crisis, which ex-
perienced a sharp drop in registrations (-6 percent) in May and June, after a posi-
tive first quarter, came about to check this sector's positive trend.
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_ "There are great fears for the future, they maintain at Alfa Romeo, in Arese. "if
the recession that has hit the sector all over Europe persists, it is believed that
the Italian sectar will also continue to remain affected." Conf irmation of a crisis
situation in the automobile sector was also received from the president of FIAT,
- Gianni Agnelli, who stated, during the shareholders assembly held on Friday 3 July,
that the 240-billion-lira deficit recorded by the company in 1980 must be attributed
to automobiles and industrial vehicles.
The crisis of the automobile sector has also involved other sectors like the
electrical-mechanical instrument sector in which there are, however, several dif-
ferent situations. "We anticipate having, for 1981, a turnover definitely larger
by at least 20 percent in comparison with 1980," they say at Riva Calzoni. The
trend in other companies, like Franco Tosi and Ansaldo, a public industry reporting
profits on its statement for a couple of years now, is positive, although to a
smaller extent. On the other hand, Marelli Magnetos and Italian Tecnomasio Brown
Boveri are experiencing serious problems. "We are forecasting that the turnover
at the end of the year may contain a figure 10 percent lower than the 1980 turnover,"
they say at Tonolli. "But we anticipate a slight recovery by the end of the year."
Textiles. According to very recent data, it is seen that, insofar as spring and
summer are concerned, the clothing business has had definitely better sales this
, year than last year. It is a small sign leading to a hope for the possibility of
new orders for the next season. For the rest, the situation of the textile sector
- is still critical. Nevertheless, "rather than lack of a market," they say at FISAC,
a textile industry in the INVEST Group, "what is causing restriction on supplies
is the fact that Italian manufacturing companies, FISAC's customers, are suffering
from the lack of money availability. The market in itself would still be rather
active." In addition, the cost of the dollar, whose consequences-are still diffi-
_ cult toevaluate fully, represents a severe blow to the nation's textile industry,
in spite of the fact that it partly protects from the importation of textiles bought
in the dollar area, Zucchi, whose company increased its turnover in the first half
of 1981 by 14 percent in comparison with the same months in 1980, told IL MONDO.
According to what they say at Bassetti, the domestic market is "in a wait-and-see
position, but not onE of collapse. There is no phenomenon that is dramatic in it-
self." The estimates and the forecasts by the research center of CONFINDUSTRIA
also speak of a slowdown in the negative trend in the coming months. The household
white goods sector, for which there were some perplexities in recent weeks, is more
favored. "Personally, I am rather optimistic concerning an increase in consump-
tion," Zucchi maintains. "In the last 2 years, in fact, annual spending per inha-
bitant increased from 14,000 lire in 1979 to 20,000 lire in 1980, levels still 40-
50 percent lower than in the United States and other European countries."
COPYRIGHT: IL r10ND0 1981
10,042
CSO: 3104/349
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IY)R nHFI('IA1, l)tiE ONI.Y
POZITICAZ FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
SPD ZOSIIdG SUPPORT IN WORKEx-ORIENTED CITIES
Hamburg CAPITAI, in German Jul 81 p 14-15
ZA-rticle: "SPD Election I,oaseg"]
ZTText7 All the government buildings in Bonn were flying their flags
at half staff, but nobndy really knew why. Usually well-informed
journalists attending the bock beer fest at the Lower Saxony repre-
sentation were asking each other the same queetion. At length, one
of them came up with a likely answer. "It must be because Hans-
IIlrich K1ose resigned today," he said. That was on 25 May; the real
reason for the official show of mourning was that the President of
Ecuador had been killed in an air crash. But there was no one there
who thought it inconceivable that the Schmidt guvernment might have
had the flags lowered on account of the sad events in Hamburg.
The SPD, in fact, has good reasons for mourning. On the heels of
Munich, Frankfurt and Berlin there now is the clearly visible split
in the Hamburg SPD which raises the threat that the last ma.jor
bastion of aocial democracy in Germany might fall. To be sure, the
Hamburg SPD retained its absolute majority in the city council elec-
tions 3 years ago --both in terms of seats and the popular vote--
but it did so only at the expense of the FDP which had gone through
a process of self-mutilation and did not elect any deputies to the
council. Another reason for the victory was that the bourgeois,
boyish image of "Uli" Kloae was atill untarnished in the minds of
many SPD voters even if did not carrespond to glose, the politician,
any longer. Meantime, as it happens, the clean-cut mayor, who still
gives the appearance of being a kind of national Mr. Clean, has
veered far to the left from which position, it may be assumed, he
will aoon be leading the intra-SPD opposition to nuclear power, to
NATO and above all to Helmut Schmidt. _
Klosels metamorphosis is tied to the Brokdorf issue. Iie himself
originally eupported and voted for the nuclear power project on the
Lower Elbe but is now fighting it tooth and nail. This has greatly
enhanced his standing among the aggressive and intolerant left wing
of the 5PD whose members chanted their "atom splitters into the
Elbe" slogan both inside SPD party headquarters in Ha.mburg and in
front of the building on the evening he resigned. No doubt about
it: the Hamburg SPD itself is split, with one of its wings fight-
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ing the other acrimoniously. Four of the SPD wards in the city are
for glose and three are against him. No one will really win; the
SPD will be ths loser in any event. In Mun.ich, in Frankfurt and
most recently in 3erlin, the local social democrats have provided
a.n object lesson over the years of how a party, victorious for a
long time,can be taken to the edge of the abyas and finally into
it.
Munich, for eaample, was solidly SPD in the fifties and sixties.
Folksy lord mayor Thomas Wimmer and his then youthful successor,
Hane-Jochen Vogel, saw to it that the CSII, a mighty force J.:: :Ba.va-
ria otherwise, etayed in the minority in the state capital. Vogel's
resolute decision to bring the Olympic Gamea to Munioh in 1972
helped the Bavaria.n metropolis obtain the moet beautiful sports
facilities in the FRG a.nd an infrastructure complete with under-
ground and above-ground mass transit that might otherwise not
have been built for another 10 years, if indeed at all. In 1966,
Vogel realized an impossible dream: the SPD got 58.4 percent of
the vote in Munich. But the party regular8, dominated by leftwing
intellectuals even then, did not appreciate the policiea the voters
had so strongly supported. The years of'vrrangling with the left-
wingers took their toll, finally causing the mayor to quit Munich
and move to Bonri. Georg gronawitter, his succesaor, kept up the
fight; but time had almost run out by then. The voters elected
CSU politician Erich giesl as mayor. In the most recent electiona
in 1978, the SPD managed to get only 37.5 percent of the vote.
Tn Frankfurt, for instance, the good old days under famed mayors
Walter Rolb and Werner Bockelmann were soon forgotten once Rudi
Arndt took over the job and began to transform the staid banking
and stock exchange center into a community that seemed to be run
by women and children. "Dynamite Rudi," as he was called for his
announced plan for blowing up the remains of the old opera house,
a representative of South Hesse, a leftwing SPD stronghold, was a
kind of victim of the Hesse syndrome which befell the Hessian
voters as a consequence of an endless aeries of socialist reforms,
particularly in the field of education. From one election to the
next, more and more voters turned thumbe down on the SPD. Finally,
� years ago, Frankfurt elected Walter Wallmann of the CDU as iord
mayor. He did such a good job that the SPD received only 34 per-
cent of the vote --16 percent less than 9 years ago-- in the most
recent municipal election which took place in the spring of 1981.
In Berlin, for example, Willy Brandt waselected lord mayor in 1963,
obtaining 61.9 percent of the vote. At that time, the way to city
hall seemed closed to the CDU .for the foreseeable future. Today,
Richard von Weizsaecker of the CDU ia at the helm, albeit govern-
ing with the aid of a minority coalition. Meantime, the social
democrats have lost a good third of the vote they obtained in 1963.
A tangled web of party and state interests that surfaced in nume-
rous scandals, most recently in the Garski credit affair, have
~
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contributed to the party's downfall. IInlike Munich, Frankfurt and
Ha.mburg, the Berlin SPD, under its new leader Hans-Jochen Vogel,
has not been taken over by the leftwingers. Thus, the SPD is most
likely to regenerate itaelf as an opposition Farty in Berlin.
In Hamburg's case, there is little hope of that. In fact, ea-mayor
Klose takes pride in having purged the Hamburg SPD, an erstwhile
solid labor party, of the taint of the "CSII within the SPD." Thie
particular exercise can be termed a.n unqualified success but only
in the eense of the SPD's having lost both the mayoralty and poli-
tical power as well in Hamburg.
(COPYRIGHT 1981 Gruner 4. Jahr AG & Co.)
9478
CSO: 3103/362
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POLITICAL
AP LEADER FRAGA HOPEFUL OF COALITION WITH UCD
Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 17 Aug 81 pp 28-29
[Article by Antxon Sarasqueta: "Fraga Says Coalition, Coalition!"]
SPAIN
[Text] On his way to Perbes beach, the AP [Popular Alliance] leader had a fall which
hurt one of his feet rather seriously--the left foot, it is reported--and fortunately,
his daughter, a young, attractive, medical doctor, looks after him "very well," in
the words of her father, Manuel Fraga. But not even adversity can prevent the
secretary general of the Popular Alliance from hurrying early to fish in the Betanzos
inlet: "Today I have caught 20 Mackerel" he noted.
But even while on vacation Fraga's true goal is to ally himself with Calvo Sotelo.
"A UCD-PSOE [Democratic Center Union-Spanish Socialist Workers Party] majority would
be artificial because involved are people with different programs and, additionally,
when the voters had cast their ballots for Adolfo Suarez the latter exclaimed:'For
God's sake, let Socialism not comel' However,'those who voted for the UCD are fairly
similar to those who voted for us, whatever Fernandez Ordonez or my former secretary
Seara may say on the matter."
Our interview took place in a modern and unpretentious living-room attached to the
old, rambling house built 22 years ago when Fraga fell in love w'ith the place and
gradually began to acquire the land which now embraces his property down to Perbes
beach itself, quiet even in mid-August.
It is not known whether this is so by virtue of strategy or conviction, but what is
certain is that Fraga says, regarding the agreement on autonomies which the AP did
not sign, that he has the impression that among the major forces "a consensus is taking
shape which we do not perceive clearly, a political pact." Does Fraga suspect, then,
that a coalition agreement is in the offing2 "We have not said so but obviously
there has been a desire by the two parties to move ahead and to leave the other issues
behind. This seems incorrect to us and, to tell the truth, appears as even a worse
alternative than those of Adolfo Suarez, which is already saying a lot."
In other statements by Fraga one nevertheless notices a conciliatory attitude on his
part vis-a-vis Prime Minister Calvo Sotelo and we told him so. This gave Fraga
grounds to assert that "I am a more conciliatory individual than any Spanish poli-
tician up to the point where the interests of Spain oblige me not to be conciliatory
with any of them."
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Having said this Fraga was to add later, on mentioning the level of opposition against
prime Minister Calvo Sotelo, that he hopes that he would do it "less badly."
"Up [o now," Fraga noted, "Calvo Sotelo's words have been appropriate, but his deeds
so far have been practically nil. We have maintained a certain degree of hope Uut
we believe that his obligation--he who has more means than anyone eZse--is to help
form that natural majority." And after gazing momentarily at the ceiling he immed-
iately shifted his eyes on his interlocutor and said: "And we shall not forgive his
not doing so...naturally of course."
Fraga denied that any type of agreement existed witlt the people of the Galician UCD
in light of the regional elections, among other things "because they are not in agree-
ment among themselves either, and yet first there has to be an internal consensus
among the currents of the UCD." So far what has been operative has been a pact at
the parliamentary level with the government,, which in the words of the AP leader
"represents the most significant progress in the last few months."
For Fraga, a center-left policy from the right is a danger for democratic stability.
He analyzed this as follows: "If there is a desire to consolidate a political system
there is a need for a system of a few and highly responsible parties with moderate
leanings, and this is something which the left has practically achieved here whereas
on the other side it has not been done, basically because so far the UCD has not
wished to do so."
Fraga continued with his analysis: "This attempt to cover the spectrum of the right
with the left and of playing with the votes of the right at being the center-left--
which is what Adolfo Suarez said and continues to do--will some day have to end or
else the system will not hold up."
Fraga believes that the ideal thing would be a urtited party of the right such as
Britain's Conservative Party or the Republican Party in the United States, but "one
should not impose conditions and make a thing more difficult when it in itself already
has many difficulties. What can you expect. And if the easier syste m for the time
being is that of factions and coalition, we would not oppose it." On this point
- the question came up immediately: If a level of instability continues on the right
during the next fall months, up to what point can the malaise increase among our
armed forces?
"Look, this subject does not involve me. The politicians have the obligation to
create circumstances where these issues do not arise. As far as I am concerned the
way in which we and the government can collaborate is the one I have mentioned in
this interview and I believe that, as long as this is not being done, unnecessary
risks are being taken."
The words are serious: "I believe that the government would be mistaken if it con-
tinued to go it alone or reached an agreement with the left. As soon as that large
moderate faction of the democratic right, or no matCer how we wish to designate it,
would be formed, those problems would become much smaller. Anyone would understand
this. "
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Fraga called for a coalition government. "I believe that nothing wrong would come
from a UCD-AP coalition government until the elections or later if such coalition is
planned as of now." One of the keys in the pact which Fraga proposes to Calvo Sotelo
and which the latter does not seem to understand at all judging by his lack of re-
sponse is the reform of the electoral law. "I propose that the German model be
taken as a basis because it is the least undesirable among those in effect in Europe
since it allows for a certain degree of proportional representation but*at the same
time, because of the electoral law's limitation provisions, the mtnor extremist
parties are barred."
Fraga wishes to establish an electoral system which would impose floors of 5 percent
at the national level and 20 percent at the regional level to qualify a candidate to
hold a parliamentary seat. He would increase the number of seats from 350 to 400,
the additional 50 to be placed on a list whose votes would be apportioned by provinces.
In Fraga's opinion, this would enable the provinces to have a larger representation.
All of this is summed up in one word for Fraga--stability.
We discussed the issue of the adulterated olive oil, a case likely to result in over
100 fatalities. The government is absolutely responsible for what is happening.
At least five ministers are implicated. A change of government? Let us say that the
government should have considered which of its departments have failed to function
properly and assigned responsibilities. This case will have political consequences
or will have repercussions in another, more profound way, in distrust in the system."
It is frequently said about Fraga that he is an impulsive individual and that his
internal fire works against him. Still, that is the image he projects, the one which
he likes to have. ThP truth is different. Fraga is a man with a cool head who thinks
sufficiently ahead before making any move and who takes advantage of his warm person-
ality.
Fraga spoke enthusiastically about Ronald Reagan, the American president, because
he feels that Reagan has acted consistently with his ideas. Consistently with one's
own ideas xa a quality most highly valued by Manuel Fraga.
"There is a tendency to scorn the political class in general," he said, "However,
first, one would have to take into account the circumstances of discontinuity in which
this situation exists and, second, part of this contempt comes from the szme political
class."
- Fraga added: "It seems very respectable to me that Mr Tamames should become a com-
munist and then stop being so, but what does not seem to be so good to me is that
he should now seize the opportunity to pick a quarrel with the parties. As far as
I know democracy cannot function with clubs, which are also lacking, by means of
foundations if three or four serious parties--even though, I have always field that
two would be sufficient--do not function."
Fraga said that neither is it possible to treat all politicians as equal and that the
people have to begin distinguishing among individuals and programs; at this point
he seized the opportunity to humorously relate the anecdote of the politician who,
asked if he would accept the post of minister, immediately answered yes but then
asked "minister of what?"
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In the meantime Fraga called for something to nibble on and we drank appetizer
wallcing through the garden of his sununer house ("achieved through the effort of many
_ years"). Fraga talked of the individual who helps the family look after the plants
and flowers--"Manolino is a delightful individual"--of the games of domino tlicit lie
plays there near the house with his usual friends, and of his brother Juan.
In the daytime, if the weather is good, he takes two swims. He reads the newspapers
less than when he is in Madrid despite the fact that on the top of the old desk of
the famous movie producer Samuel Bronson which Fraga's wife acquired at an auction,
the incoming papers are stacked up.
Fraga has his own vineyards and in his wine cellar he stores the spirits that he makes.
Additionally, he has to take care of the political visitors who come to see him from
the entire region, assigns 2 days every week to political-cultural-festive activities
to each of the provinces, and is planning a strong campaign for the regional elections
in October.
Fraga is indefatigable even during his vacations.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Informacion y Revistas, S.A.
2662
CSO: 3110/140 A
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MII,I TARY
EXPANSION OF WEAPONS EXPORT POI,ICY
FEDERAZ REPIIBI,IC OF GERMANY
Bonn EIIROPA ARCHIV in German 26 Jun 81 pp 363-372
Article by Joachim Krause, Research Institute for International
Policy and Security, Ebenhaueen near Munich: "Arms Export Policies
of the Federal Republic of Germany"7
Z_Text7 Since late 1980 FRG arms export policy has once again been
he subject of lively discu$sion resulting in the ma.in from objec-
tions raised within the SPD to plans for seliing two submarinee to
Chile and from the disclosure that Saudi Arabia had expressed an
interest in purchasing a quantity of Zeopard II tanks in addition
to other German war materiel. Politiciana of various pei�suasions,
industriaiists, labor union leaders, media personalities, scien-
tists not to mention the churches have made their views on this
subject known in a multitude of declaratione, resolutions a.nd
position papers. The government has made every effort to promote
this process and is in fact working for a diacussion of the prin-
ciples surrounding arms export policy which is divorced from the
Saudi Arabia.n and Chilean sales controver$y and which helps formu-
late a new set of political guidelinea.
Such a discussion is called for, since the last previous govern-
ment deeision on arms exports dating from 1971 has turned out to
be problematical. The lofty pretensione of the 1971 guidelines
dedicated to a policy of peace and providing for no German, arms
shipments to areas of tension outside NATO as well aa the diffi-
culties involved in carrying them out have given rise to repeated
criticism.1 Furthermore, the debate on security policy in the FRG
being tough enough as it is might be additionally burdened down
by the emergence of a"credibility gap" in the arms export field.
Ideals and Realities of Eaisting Policy
_ In debating the issue, the impression is conveyed at times that
~ there was no arms eaport policy prior to the govez�n.ment's 16 June
1971 decision on political guidelines governing the eaport of
weapons and other war materiale. In fact, however, the grounds
for sueh a policy were laid as early as 1949 when the FRG Basic
I,aw, under the influence of evente in World War II, provided (in
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.
' I-f1i2 t'sv' W\t ti

~
~ Article 26/I) .for a ban on any acts wYLatever that might disturb the
I PeacQful roexistence of peop+t:s ji-ld ArePare the conduct of a war of
a a~gression. In Articl.e 26/IT9 tne B,-jsf.c Zaw further decreed that
~ war weamons could only be produced, shl.pped and sold with the appro-
~ va1 of t-he gavernment. In 1961 , tYlese constitutional provisions were
complemer,ted and put in concrete tezms with the passage of the war
+ weapons control law and the Poreign trade law.
� ihe war weapons cc,ntrol law uf 20 Aprii 1961 contains a atrict pro-
z*iso on the production, purchase, saleand shipment oWethens.
~ It only applies to those weapox~s en~tr~e..rated in a supplement
sc-called "war weapons list" wiiich raostly includea heavy weapons
~ 9uch as tauks, armored vehiales, missilPs, warehips and warplanes
in addition to artillery~ anti-tan?~ and infantry weapons. All arms
not included in this list (such aa pietola and rifles) as well as
much military equipment and in3ua#ri-al products with military
applications are covered by ttvC sp'~~~~a~$ 1goT stringent
trade law of 28 April 1961 rrhict~
' on the 9aZe of suc;.h goods.
~
~ Both of these lawa set clow"a the condition$ under which the sale of
- arms and war materiala c;ould be d.inapproved or prohibited in some-
what vague terms (e,gr "disturbarace of the FRG's foreign relations;"
"threat of promoting activities detrimental to peace;" "preparing
a war of aggresaion," lledoweadnumbethe problemsginatheeal
of elbow room which, h ,
, years that followed.
Starting in 1961, the FRG, whtch ha.d not figured prominently as an
exporter of arma until then, begaia to usg arme eaports as an instru-
ment of faz�eign pol3cy. It provided aid in the form of equipment
= 3nd training as well aa surplus Bundeswehr materiel to aeveral
= A:frican countries and to India, 3ordan and Iran. These measures
~ wer.e taken against the politi.cal background of the attempt of the
then American government to en,.,uurage its allies to step up their
efforts to contain cammunism M the Third World. In addition, the
~ FRv governmens ~�~n d on hthebGermantc~u~ation amongithe youngonations
gating its po i
~ af Africa and Asia.3
The FRG was also being pr.essured by its Western allies ta lend
_ military support to the weaker HATO countries as part of sharing
~ the burdens of the alliance. T'ht: FRG started to comply in 1964 by
= eztending military aid to Turkey and to Greece. The secret arms
shipmznts to Israel, instituted in 19t~2 and reaching a volume of
~ some DM 150 million by 1965, constituted a special case. Greece,
Turkey and Israel primarily received weapons and armaments from
- Bundeswehr stocks in addition ta some new military supplies.
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The foreign policy debacle which followed the disclosure of the
arma shipment$ to Israel as well as the probleme arising from the
linkage to all-German political goale4 led to a hasty revision of
arms export policies in 1965. In February of that year, the Erhard
government decided not to undertake or to approve any further arms
shipment$ to areas of tension.5 Due to its vague language, this
particular decision was by no means undisputed. Generally speaking,
however, it did fulfill the purpose of not making the simultaneous
discontinuation of arms shipments to Igrael appear discriminatory
and it pointed to a more modest and more cautioua approach to
foreign policy.
But the decision of the government did have consequences. Between
1965 and 1966, equipment aid to non-NATO countries declined from
DM 135.9 million ta Dr7 30.2 million and ha$ remained at that level
since. There was a like decline in the volume of Bundeswehr surplus
sales to foreign countries and the discontinuation of military aid
to Greece also contributed to a decline in arms ezports. But the
sale of arms produced in Germany, which had been insignificant
until then, regietered a marked increase after 1966. By 1967, the
transfer volume of these egports had alreadp grown to twiee the
size of all military aid progra.ms combined. Mostly, these arms
sales went to NATO countries and European countries friendly to
the West; but aome did go to Third World natione.
These developments gave riee to criticism of the policies adopted
particularly within the SPD; after the change of government in
1969 fax-reaching measures were taken the most important of which
was the cabinet decision of 16 June 1971. In it, the government
complied with the general demand for aetiing political guidelines
to govern the ezport of offensive weapons an.d other war materials;
but the problematical concept of "areas of tension" was retained
and gi:en prominence. The decision stated that approval would be
given in principle to the eaportation of offensive weapons and
military materials to NATO countries provided that their ultimate
use was clearly defined. All other countries, however, should re-
ceive no offensive weapona whatever; but the sale of other war
materials was left open. Countries located in areas of tension
should receive no offensive weapons and, for that matter, no
other ma.teriel, if there is reason to fear that the peaceful co-
existence of nations and the foreign relations of the FRG might
be upset thereby.6
Despite thia decision which constituted a clear affirmation of
the greatest possible reetriction of West German arms exports to
the NATO area commercial arms sales to the Third World nonetheless
rose in subsequent years. Between 1964 and 1973, Wes-c Germa.n arms
deliveries to the Third World ma.de up about 26 percent of total
sales; between 1973 and 1977, they had risen to about 70 percent.7
According to an American government study, the FRG, which had ex-
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ported weapone and arma.ments valued at no more than DM 100 million
a year primarily to the Weatern world in the early seventies, ef:fec-
ted arms deliveriea to the Third World totaling DM 2.39 ffilion be-
tween 1974 and 1979. Thus, the FRG is fifth on the list of the
arms exporters to the Third World, close behind France and Great
Britain and ahead of Italy.
But a8 compared to Fra.ncs, Great Britain or even Italy, it must be
noted that the FRG has attained no share of the market --or merely
a very small part of it-- in major offensive weapons sold to the
Third World. What German arms have been sold to the countries of
Asia, Africa or I,atin America ha.ve been emall arms, subma.rines,
patrol boats as well as a relatively $mall number of light trans-
port and liaison planes. Warships made up the largest part of the
exports. In most instances, the government mechaniam for approval
of offensive weapons exports was in conformance with the legal
provisions and with political considerations, since the relatiFely
small German submarines and PT boats are hardly suited for "up-
setting the peaceful coexistence of nations" or for pr.epaxing wars
of aggression.
The large West German volume of axms sales to the Third World can
be readily understood once the "indirect" offenaive weapons and
arms exports are included which have risen considerably during the
seventiea. In the main, this is due to the industry's availing it-
self of legal "loopholea." A major way in which this is done is by
German firms entering into cooperative arms ventures with ma.nufac-
turers in other Western countries. Another way in which the strin-
gent export regulations ca.n be circumvented is by locating German
arms production facilities abroad or by selling production plans,
production facilities and weapons components to Western countries
or directly to the Third World. In a review prepared by the econo-
mics minietry, which was ma:de public as a result of inedia indis-
cretion, there were 67 countries listed in 1979 which had received
weapons components (including epare parts), production facilities
and construction plans originating in Germany.$ The FRG, it ma.y
therefore be assumed, has aince become a major licensor of small
and heavy arms production processes, ordnance items and weapons
- components for the Third World.
- Although the foreign trade law specifically states that the export
of parts, of production plans and arms production facilities is
contingent on official approval the government is less strict in
granting auch licenses for export tha.n in its treatment of similar
commercial venturea under the offensive weapons control law. In
this way, it was possible to effect "indirect" ezporta of German
offensive weapons to aeveral Third World countries which ahould
not have received them under the political provisions laid down
in 1971.
I7uring the past few years, the government's willingness to approve
the sale of offensive weapons to Indonesia, India, Iran, Ghana,
Nigeria, Abu Dhabi, Argentina and Chile has been the cause of some
public indignation. Above all, it was the way in which the question
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was decided as to whether a given country was situated in an area
of teneion gave rise to considerable opposition. For some time,
the government did not really come to grips with the problem and
it was the Saudi Arabian request which at length brought a.bout
the discussion of basic principlee.
Conflicts of Priority in Arms Exports
Summing up, it can be said that the government's arms export
policy did only partial justice to its restrictive pretensions in
the seventies. Compared to the United States, the Soviet Union,
France, Great Britain and other eaporters such as Italy, Israel
or Brazil, the FRG may be characterized as quite reticent to be
sure. But the effects of indirect eaporte make up for the differ-
ence in part ae well as the government's recognizable inclination
to relax the all-too-rigid restrictians imposed by the cabinet
decision of 1971.
Critics of the government feel that the reason for it is that the
armament induetry has succeeded in "swaying the government with
its arguments based on commercial considerations.119 At first blush,
this line of reasoning may sound convincing and may even be under-
standable in view of the actions of some German arma manufacturers.
Aut looking at the problem more closely, it becomes apparent that
it is in fact rooted in a number of unreeolved and hitherto scar-
cely perceived conflicts involving differing political priorities.
First of all, there is the problem of arms production itself. Ever
since the inception of German rearmament, all German governments
have stressed their commitment to the development and maintenance
of the patential for developing, producing and servicing weapons
a.nd armaments in the FRG. On the one hand, this was meant to
guarantee that the costs of developing, equipping and maintaining
the Bundeswehr would accrue to the German economy; on the other
hand, arguments on military-logistic and technological-economic
grourrb were always being propounded as for example the retention
of "judgmental capability with regard to complex questiona of
arms technology."
There was a deliberate decision not to eetablish etate-owned arms
production facilities patterned after the French, British or Ita-
lian model. In fact, all German governments were intent on getting
private industry to take on arms contracts and on achieving the
greatest possible spread a.mong the various branches of the industry
in the procesa. These efforts were crowned with succees: bq the
earlq sixties, total employm@nt in the arms industry had alregdy hit
250,000. The arms industry's ahare Af total industrial income has
since hovered around 2 percent and arms output has been climbing
steadily. Furthermore, the share of domestic contracts let by the
- Bundeswehr for research a.nd development and for supply and main-
tenance has risen to 80 percent.
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But thia policy has also raised ancillary problems rvhich have an ad-
verse effect on the restrictive arms export regulations. The fact
that the market economy is involved in the development and produc-
tion of weapons and armaments inevitably creates a commercial inter-
est on the part of industry tQ eapa.nd its circle of potential
cuatomera. Beyond that, Bundeswehr needs are not as sizable as to
guarantee German arms production at continuously high levels. But
aince it is neceasary to maintain much of the research and develop-
ment capability as well as the production of weapons and armaments
for reasons of security policy and the economics of arme production,
the question of operating at full capacity remains. A.side from ma.na-
gerial optians and interim government aid, eaporta point to a wag
out. IInder the circumstances, arms sa?es to NATO countries have con-
sistantly been welcomed and supported by the government, if for no
reason than that they enhance the efforte toward sta.ndardization.
On the other hand, we have seen that some branchea of industry,
such as shipbuilding, etill cannot operate at full capacity even
though they do export to other Western countries.
Thus, there are two problems confronting any arms export policy
oriented to highly restrictive practices.First, how to avoid a
3ituation in which arms production becomes uneconomical for in-
dustry ae a result of unacceptable arms export restrictions and
which causes it to turn to some other sector of production instead ?
Second, how to achieve a Kased acticab111 dietinction between a legiti-
mate interest in exports upon the need to operate at capa--
city) a.nd the purely commercial aims of the arms ma,nufacturers.?
There is another conflict of prioritiea which steme from the inter-
national interrelationships of German arms production. Once again,
since the inception of Germa,n rearmament, all governments have
stressed the need for close cooperation in the production of weapons
and armament8 between the FRG and its Western alliee. In the early
years, this was imperative in order to catch up with advancee in
military technology. Subsequently, all-European considerations and
alliance policy motivations took on greater prominence. Presently,
the government is hoping that arma cooperation will be a prima,ry
aid in advancing NATO standardization.
In terms of arms export policy, this presents a practical problem,
if the foreign partner wiahea to sell jointly produced weapons to
countries which, under German law, are not entitled to receive them.
In this ma.nner, a number of Franco-German anti-tank rockets have
waund up in Syria a,nd Iraq over the past few yeara. The Alpha Jet
fighter, jointly developed with French firms, is slated for export
to several African countries and there are buyers from outside
Europe wYio have already expressed an intereat in the Tornado figh-
ter as well. Aa a rule, the German government has come out on the
side of arms cooperation in such conflicts of interest in the past
by not eahausting available opportunities for intervention on the
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basis of either the cooperation agreementa or the regulations em-
bodied in the offensive weapons control law or those in the foreign
trade law applying to the export of weapons components to foreign
countries.
A third type of priority conflict arises if and when the deci$ion
not to supply arma to extra-European countries run9 counter to
vital political interests of the FRG. Ever since the 1973-74 oil
crisis, safeguarding an unhindered oil supply could be viewed as
one such vital interest which, for that matter, the FRG sharee with
mogt other Western countries as well as Japan. IInder theee circum-
stances, supplying weapone and armaments may become necessary in
view of the need to maintain special relations to moderate Near
Eastern governments and the need to counter the expansion of Soviet
influence in the area which is being promoted by mostly military
mea.ns. Although this particular job has in years past been taken
care of ma.inly by the United States, France and Great Britain, the
FRG, too, has repeatedly been asked to aupply arms. The mcrst note-
worthy examplee were the Shahts efforts to obtain Zeopard tanks and
warships and Saudi Arabia eapresaed deaire to purchase armored
vehicles. But offeneive weapone deliveries of this kind would be
incompatible with the 1971 provieions, since the Near East is a.n
"area of teneion."
Basic Elements of a New Policy
The self-imposed reetriction contained in the 1965 and 1971 policy
decisions not to export weapons to areas of tension is a problem
- today most of all because both the domestic and the foreign policy
aspects of arma ezport policy have changed. In the mid-sixties, the
German armament industry was mainly concerned with filling domestic
orders; coopci�ai,iva ventures witn krance and other Weeti E,~zopean
allies were still in the planning stage or just beginning, and out-
side Europe, no acute threat to vital interests as yet existed. If
an arms export policy adhered strictly to the spirit and the letter
- of the 1965 a.nd 1971 policy decisions would bring about a lowering
of arms production capability, an end to cooperative arms ventures
- with other members of the alliance and the relinquishment of oppor-
tunities to safeguard vital intereets. It would therefore be illu-
sory to assume that one need merely apply th� limitation of weapons
shipments to RgTO countries strictly enough in order to set things
right once again.
Any revieion of the principles governing the ezport of arms will
most likely have to back away from the areas of tension concept.
But this need not spell the end of a cautious arms ezport policy
by any means; restrictive approval procedures can still be main-
tained even if justifiable eaceptions are granted at the same
time.
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If anything, such a policy would be auited to export approval pro-
cedures involving complete offenaive weapons or spare parts or
offensive weapons componenta. The 1971 policy guidelines could be
retained in the sense of approving offensive wea ons exports to
f
NATO countries (or countries equally constituted5 providedpso~~
of final use is presented. By the same token, weapona export
countries appearing on the so-called COCOM liet ahould be dis-
approved. As far aa offensive weapons shipments to other countries
are concerned, a procedure analogous to the "equalization of goods"
principle known to jurisprudence might be followed. In other worde,
arme exports would be permiasible if (1) they would help solve
production capacity problems in industry at least for a time or
(2) help promote important foreign policy aims of the FRG and (3)
would not be in violation of the oifensive weapons control law.
That would mean that a decision would have to be made in each i.n-
dividual case as to which political conaideration should be given
priority status. Other pointa to be considered would be the mili-
tary consequences of any such shipments (with a view to the stabi-
lity of the recipient nation and the region), the huma.n rights
situation in the recipient nation, the danger of damage to the
FRG's foreign policy image, etc.
Deciding each case on ita own merits, makes it leaat likely that
arms exports would lead to the development of additional industrial
facilities to produce offensive weapone for export which in turn
would inevitably lead to problems of operating at full capacity.
Arws eaports mugt not be made to serve as a means of maintaining
high employment or a healthy economy. The yardstick to be uaed
must always be security-political requirements and the dema.nde of
the armament economy itself.
In case the German government decides to approve an arms export
deal on the basis of foreign policy interests, it ehould, if
possible, coordinate the move with its Western partners. This
would be advisable among other things with a view to politically
sensitive consequencea arising from arms eaports such as the need
to send additional supplies to the recipient country in case of
war or possibly to provide it with military advisers. Such coor-
dination is all the more important, if a country such as Saudi
Arabia, which has also requested arms deliveries from the IInited
Sta'tes, Great Britain and France, expresses a desire to purcha.se
weapons from the FRG. This would help guarantee that the arms
sale would become an integral part of a Western strategy aimed at
stabilizing the Gulf region and would open up a security dialogue
with the Arab countries.
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The joint ventures in arm$ production with the Weat European part-
ners must be considered separately. Insofar as these cooperative
ventures are based on treaties between governments, the FRG may
reserve the right to veto eaporta that might be effected by other
partner countries. In availing itself of these reservations, the
FRG would have to determine ita priorities on a case-by-case basis:
either disapproving the arms e xport deal or coming out in favor of
an undisturbed continuation of the cooperative venture.
In the case of export deals stemming from cooperative ventures th.at
involve individual firms not bound by explicit government-to-govern-
ment agreements, the German government's range of options is limi-
ted to disapproving the export of weapons components and construc-
tion plans. In the case of each cooperative project, this should
be preceded by an eaamination of the nature of the cooperative
undertaking (such as R& D and/or production and/or sales) and of
its bearing on standardization within the alliance. Those coopera-
tive projects which are clearly designed to circumvent German ex-
port regulations and which are ]imited to sales should be dealt
with in the most reatrictive manner. But projects which may be of
_ value to the alliance because of their high R& D content would
have to be handled more leniently.
In the case of arms export approvals under the foreign trade law,
similar procedurES would theoretically apply as in the case of
offensive weapons ezports. But this is hardly poesible in view of
the much greater number of export applications to be processed by
the economics ministry. Nonethelese, those tra.nsactions which in-
volve the export of lrnow-how in arms technology or the sale of
arms production facilities should be treated just like exports of
offensive weapons to non-1QAT0 countries, which are equal in signi-
ficance to these venturea. Other approvals for the export of arma-
ments under the foreign trade law should be denied only in excep-
tional case9 as for instance when the policies of a given country
clearly indicate that these arma.ments will be used for offeneive
purposea.
The German government's arms export policy should be charaeterized
by greater openness and self-confidence without, however, having
to relinquish its basically restrictive outlook. It ahould be
less "doctrinaire" and more oriented toward the individual case in
question. That is the only way of guaranteeing that the choice
made between different political priorities will be the most
appropriate one.
a
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If the general areas of tension formula were replaced by a new aet
of etandard concepts, this would do no more than shift the problem
around a bit.Many attempts along these lines have been made such
as the proposal for example to have the government approve in prin-
ciple the export of all defensive weapons or the suggestion that
arms exports to regions which are of particular security-political
import to Europe be permitted. The first proposal presents a pro-
blem because it is not always poesible to draw a diatinction be-
tween offensive and defenaive.weapons and because it would give
rise to a great number of new contradictions. If, on the other hand,
a particular region is characterized as being of special interest
to Europe, this has the drawback o.f raising a variety of expecta-
tions that can hardly be controlled. To one person, such aformula
might imply a revival of German or European big power schemes or
of "neo-colonialism;" countries in the region concerned, for their
part, might be led to believe that the FRG is willing and able to
provide them with weapons and armaments which, however, would not
conform with the intentions or the capabilities of German foreign
policy.
FOOTNOTES
1. Cf i.a. positions taken by "Study Group Military Policy" in
the following anthologies edited by them: "An Anti-White Book -
Materials for an Alternat3.ve Military Policy," Reinbek 1974,
pp 124-134; "Rearming for Disarmament Reinbek 1980, pp
259-278; also Eckehart Ehrenberg, "German Arms Exports," Munich,
1981.
2. Cf Helga Haftendorn, "Military Aid and Arms Exports of the
FRG,"Duesseldorf, 1971, pp 19-340 p 130 and appendix, Tab 3,
7-11.
3. Cf Helga Haftendorn, "Military Aid as Part of the Foreign
Policy Arsenal of the FRG and the United States," POLITISCHE
VIERTELJAHRESSCHRIFT, Vol 13, No 3(1972), pp 374-424; also
cf Waldemar Besson, 10The Foreign Policy of the FRG, Experiences
and Standards,"Munich, 1970, p 349.
4. Haftendorn, "Military Aid and Arms ExportsPop cit p 75; also
Wolfgang Wagner, "German Equipment Aid for Africa," EUROPA-
ARCHIV 6/19669 pp 221-232.
5. Cf statement by government spokesman von Hase on the Near
East, BUI,I,ETIN, FRG Press and Information Office, 17 Feb 1965,
p 225.
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6. F.ill text in WEHRDIENST, supplement to No 614177, 13 June 1977.
7. Ba.sed on ACDA computations, "World Military Expenditures and
Arms Trade 1963-1973,"Washingto2i, DC, 1975, pp 67-71; ACDA,
"World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1968-1977,"
Washington, DC, 1979, pp 155-158.
8. Cf DER SPIEGEL, No 14, 2 April 1979, p 67; DIE WTI,T, 19 April
1979.
9. Michael Brzoska and Herbert Wulf, "Offensive in Arms Exports"
in "Rearming for Disarmament op cit 259-278; alao IIlrich
Albrecht, Peter I,ock and Herbert Wulf, "Jobs through Rearma-
ment Reinbek, 1978.
(COPYRIGHT 1981 Verlag fuer Internationale Politik GmbH. Bonn.)
9478
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MILITARY
GENESTE'S VIEWS ON NEUTRON BOMB, ATOMIC WARFARE
Paris L'EXPRESS in French 14 Aug 81 pp 51-52
FRANCE
[Interview with Col Marc Geneste by Jerome Dumoulin and Albert Palle: "Colonel
Geneste: 'Advantage Lies With Defense date and place not specified]
[Text] What can France and Europe expect from the neutron
bomb which President Ronald Reagan has placed once more at
the focus of the strategic debate? One of the French ex-
perts on this weapon, Col Marc Geneste--the author of a
book on this subject * in cooperation with his friend, the
American physicist Samuel Cohen, father of the neutron bomb--
talks here of the radical change made by the neutron weapon
in the defensive strategy of the Western countries.
[Question] According to you, what should the new team in office in France do
- in the realm of defense?
[Answer] First, it should reflect. It should recall that since Napoleon's era
our defense doctrines elaborated during peacetime have all been catastrophic--
witness 1870, August 1914, and May 1940. It should dare challenge the sacro-
sanct dogma of the infallibility of deterrence on which our security is based.
Finally, the new team in office should ask itself the question: If the members
of the Warsaw Pact were to attack despite our threats of retaliation, what should
- t}ie next step be?
[Question] Should our enemies come, we could use our megaton thermonuclear
weapons against Moscow. Wouldn't that be a response?
[Answer] No. If we really were to fire, that would mean national suicide. Our
adversary has the capability to respond by annihilating us, unless he decided to
sustain our blows and conquer France undamaged, which is what I wou.ld do if I
were he. He could do it since we would refuse to do battle through deliberate
doctrinal choice. The massacre of Moscow's eivilians would not halt the armies
in the field because submarines do not stop tanks.
*"A Check to War: The Neutron Bomb," Copernic Press, 1980
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[Question] To say that we shall stop the tanks is represented as harmful to
deterrence.
[Answer] It is indeed the height of paradox but yet it is in fact the basis
of our doctrine: To endow ourselves with the capability to halt the invasion
would raise doubts about our resolve to unleash a fearsome attack against
cities. This concept is 20 years old and it has not changed. The only modi-
fication sincethe beginning has been the introduction of the firepower of a
few tactical atomic projectiles, namely, the Pluto missiles aimed at the forces
of the invader as a"final warning" before resorting to the holocaust. But
this does not change anything in the principle which provides that "the enemy
will not get through," that deterrence through terror is infallible.
[Question] What is it that disturbs you in this reasoning?
[Answer] Nuclear fire as a warning makes no sense if the adversary attacks
with liis modern weapons, that is, his atomic weapons. And if he were to attack
with his conventional weapons alone, such fire would be insufficient to halt
him. Undoubtedly, there is hope that it would serve as a trigger to the nuclear
weapons of NATO. But today there is no longer a valid dcctrine for the use of
these weapons. NATO's armies no longer know how they would use these weapons.
They used to know it when there were in Europe, during General Eisenhower's
time, "pentomic" divisions each of which was equipped with its 100 atomic
carriers.
But, following the launching of the Soviet Sputnik which made possible the stra-
tegic bombing of the United States, President John Kennedy and his team became
frightened of their own nuclear weapons. They invited the doctrine of "flexible
response" which calls for an initial conventional battle. They withdrew the
tactical atom from the first line of defense in Europe and confined it to the
role of bugbear, of deterrent. Tactical atomic fire on specific battlefield
targets have become impossible. It is claimed that an endeavor would be made
to reconquer the ground lost during a conventional stage by using fifty 20-kilo-
ton projectiles simultaneously, by f iring indiscriminately, by devastating Wes t
Germany! Such is the present and hardly credible strategy of NATO.
[Question] What would happen if deterrence should fail?
[Answer] If war should break out despite our blackmail involving general sui-
cide, a rout is inevitable. For the time being consequences are apparent on
the diplomatic plane. Europe and France being militarily at the mercy of their
adversaries, the result is that diplomatically the West would be emasculated in
case of serious crisis. The Soviets know that they can do what they wish, at
least at the periphery of their empire, without risking anything more than ver-
bal protests or economic sanctions--witness Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan, and
tomorrow perhaps Poland.
Our present doctrine reminds me of the Maginot Line, which was not really a line
but a wall section that could be circumvented. Our "strategy" can also be cir-
cumvented, not from the flank but from below, if one can put it that way.
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Below the level of strategic exchanges against cities an enormous breach can
be opened in the attack of the ground forces. It is this breach which urgently
needs to be filled.
[Question] Are you against strategic forces?
[Answer] Not at all. They are still just as necessary, but now insufficient.
The arms of terror are not the arms oiz war. "The individual insane enough to
press the button is not born yet," Marshal Grechko of the Soviet Union asserted.
The strategic anti-city forces represent only the most frightful and least plau-
sible threat--the thermonuclear destruction of the civilian populations. The
other threats are ground invasion, the blocking of vital communication lines,
and subversion. Laudable efforts have been made to counter the last two men-
tioned. There remains the threat of aggression by land, which weighs so heavily
on our foreign policy.
[Question] Can France fill this breach?
[Answer] I am convinced of it, and for a simple reason. The neutron bomb, with
its reduced blast effects, outdates the other battlefield atomic weapons and,
appropriately used, provides the defense with a radical superiority over the
attacking side. With this weapon, graduated response becomes absurd and the
strategy of deterrence alone through terror becomes archaic. Thanks to the neu-
tron weapon it is henceforth the ground forces--the invasion forces--which are
the most vulnerable. Two neutron shells can devastate 6 square km of terrain
- and neutralize all the troops at ground level, whether they are protected by
armor or not. Revolution is here.
Earlier, to destroy a tank, a projectile was necessary. By paying the price,
the tank would pass,the defense being always subject to saturation by numbers.
With the neutron bomb the more tanks at hand, the larger the number of fatali-
ties occur. Defense is no longer saturable--on condition, naturally, that it
agrees to protect itself from neutron weapons. It is sufficient for the defense
to go underground, which the aggressor cannot do. The neutrons can penetrate
armor but are checked by 1 and 1/2 meters of earth. New technology enables us
to base our deterrence no longer on the threat to exterminate civilians but by
crushing the aggressor troops. This is how we answer your question, if they
come what should we do? This is how yesterday's deterrence will be mated with
modern defense. You need both.
[Question] Does this acceptance of the battle not imply our return to NATO,
harmful to our independence?
[Answer] I don't see in what way the increase by a factor of 10 or 100 of the
arms potential of our ground forces--and thus of our tactical nuclear forces--
would be harmful to our national independence. Quite the contrary. This could
be the means of a future European defense. It could also be a decisive factor
in prompting our allies to align their frontline atomic capabilities along the
Iron Curtain as at the time of Dwight Eisenhower. In such a case, NATO would
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not need [he direct participation of the French forces in a narrow sector of
- ttie Front. NATU would he easily capable of deterring or crushing any aggres-
- sion. Our foc�c:es c.ould remain in general reserve to look out for saualls or
form the nucleus of a final counteroffensive group or provide a$econd line of
defense--nuclear defense--with those allied troops which su.rvive thE initial
clash in Germany reinforcing the French forces.
At any rate, our armed forces, equipped with neutron weapons, would converZ
France into a completely different military animal, a completely different
political animal. The French president would not be confined to the role of
firebrand of the halocaust who, for lack of anything better, has the role of
his predecessors. It is sufficient to adapt our doctrine to the progress of
technology. When a people do not tolerate what would save them in case of
- misfortune, they are at the mercy of their enemies.
_ COPYRIGHT: 1981 s.a. Groupe Express
2662
CSO: 3100/912 END
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