JPRS ID: 9963 WEST EUROPE REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050013-8
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 13
• Content Type: REPORTS

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2447/02/09: CIA-RDP82-44850R444444454413-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
JPRS L/9963
- 4 September 1981
W est E u ro e R e o rt
p p
(FOUO 44/81)
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFOPtMATION SERVICE
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050013-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400054413-8
NOTE .
JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign
newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency
transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language
sources are translated; those from English-lan~uage sources
are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and
other characteristics retained.
Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets
are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text]
or [Excerpt] in the first line of eacYi item, or followi.ng the
last line of a brief, indicate how the original informa~tion was
processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor-
mation was summarized or extracted.
Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or tran~literated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the
original but have been supplied as appropriate in context.
Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an
- item originate with the source. Times within items are as
given by source.
The~contents of this publication in no way repres~nt the poli-
cies, views or at.titudes of the U.S. Government.
COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION
OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. '
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050013-8

APPROVED F~R RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400054413-8
FOR OFFICI,~I, USE UNLY
JPRS L/9963
4 September 1981
WEST EilROPE REPORT
(FOUO 44/81}
CONTENTS
ECONOMIC
SPAIN
Government To Lead Drive To Improve Industrial Efficiency
(CAM~IO 16, 3 Aug 81) 1
POLTTICAL
SPAIN
Centrifugal Forces Within UCD Described
(CAMBIO 16, 3 Aug 81) 5
MILITARY
BELGIUM
Journal Hits Milit3ry Procurement, Defense Policy
(POURQUOI PAS?, 23/29 Jul 8?) 12
- Negligent Dnfense Ministers
Problems idit E^uipment
FRANCE
Defense Mi~~i ~s:PY :i ;c� ,aF~; ~'t~�:al Ser.vir_e Ref~rm
(Cttarl~;. ..,,u :~`~::~~r:iew; PARIS MATCH, Z~t Aug 81) 15
i~r.NEP
4~,
FRANC~
Sucr_~~s~ of Third .A_r:~.an~ Launching Confi?-med
(P1;:~re L._ii.K~~Y'~::x~ AiP. & !;.ri~;;'15, ir ~;i . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1B
~ . v~7E - 150 FOUO]
FOR OFF[CT e T. 11SE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050013-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R400440050013-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
'MARECS A' Talecommunications Satellite Launch Delayed
(Pierre Langereux; AIR & COSMOS, 18 Jul 81) 21
-b -
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050013-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040400050013-8
- FOR OFFI.CIAL USE ONLY
ECONOMIC SPAIN
GOVERNMENT TO LEAD DRIVE TO II~LpROVE INDUSTRIAL EFF'ICIENCY
Madrid CA1~I0 16 in Spanish 3 Aug 81 pp 32-33
[Text] A financial housecleaning of crisis-plagued industries is the number
~ne requirement for the Spanish economy to move forward and become part of
Europe without falling apart. Almost 2 months after the government passed a
decree-law for industrial revamping, the housecleaning of crisis-ridden
sectors is under way, albeit with problems. The main problem is that in
order to save 7,500 companies and 550,000 jobs, 76,000 people have to be laid
off.
Europe began revamping its industrial sectors in 1975-76, when it began seeing
that the demand for a series of industrial goods (steel, ships, xron and ateel
products, capital goods, etc) was plummeting. While our neighbors were engaged
in painful surgery on their industries, Spain was atepping on the industrial-
ization acceletator siid did not want to hear about crises and financial house-
cleaning. "We are 3 or 4 years behind Europe, which we hope to make up
with our revamping plans by the middle of the decade. We have to keep in
mind, however, that what we were concerned about here in 1975-76 was the
political transition and that there were no legal labor unions with which to
conclude restructuring agreements," commented Enrique Aldama,the undersecretary
of industry and energy, to CAMBIO 16.
~ After the summer of 1980, the country had a whole string of prablem-ridden
companies, and it began to see clearly that entire sectors (iron and steel,
shipbuilding, ter.tiles, mator vehicles, footwEar, etc) were going under. For
the first ri.me, la.st Nove;~~er, a minis?pr of industry, k'elix Bayon, apoke of
the need for a s~andard ~~:-~ic~aCIL1?'P fnr ~~?vamning crisis-ridden sectora. The
integrated iron and steel industry could not hold out any langer, moreover,
and a sear~h began for a compromzse solution to its crisis. A reconversion
model was devc:lope~: tt~a :~~as tiad a f.~il? -'`iedged trial run and has been the
basis for che curyeii~ =e ~i..L~: i:his experience uuder the country's
belt ar.d fc~ced with a v?::: ng i1:d~rsLri.~t. disi~ite~iation, President Leopold~
Calvo Sotelo t,to?~iser3 t.:,.,~ 25-'' r"c~~~;t7.~r ~ind dizfici~7.~:" indu~trial revamping
nrogram.
1
- Fnp n~~T~T ~T TTCF nuT v
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050013-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050013-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
September Amendments
Three m~re months passed until the decree-law was passed by the Council af
Ministers on 5 June. In the interim there was a lengthy dispute among the
various ministri~s and a minimal pact with the Socialists under the overall
coordination policy. This pacr, whereby the Socialista abstained from voting,
enabled the decree-law to be validated in Congress as a bill. "In early
September we are going to prepare the amendments for the debate on the
industrial revamping bill. Basically, we want to change the system of tax
exemptio~.s and subsidies for companies. We are in favor of a short but in-depth
debate, inasmuch as the country has a lot at stake in this plan," noted Joaquin
Almunia, a deputy and secretary of union policy on the PSOE [Spanish Socialist
Workers Party] Exe.r.utive Committee.
Without a law but with a decree, the overhaul is under way. The CC00's
[Workers Commissions] approach in several of the sector negotiations (textiles
basically) is to delay them until after Congress debates the bill, presumably
in September. Its aim is to amend Article 1 of the decree by substituting the
wording "ahall agree to" for "shall negotiate" in reference to the parties to �
the negotiation, which would entail introducing the right to v~to the
decrees.
According to administration and UCD sources, this point is nonnegotiable,
their idea being that the government should issue the revamping decree on its
own, albeit with prior negotiations among the parties involved. "What the
government has to do here, as it is asked to do on man, occasions, ia make
decisions, face up to its reaponsibilities and govern. The ideal thing would
be a revamping plan that business and labor unions can agree on to the
greatest extent possible. But if this doesn't happen or if the agreement is
not to~al, we cannot allow the situation of a series of baeic sectors to
- deteriorate further. We would have to do it by decree. In general, I think
that all of the sectors are making quite a bit of progress," Industry Under-
Secretary Eiirique Aldama told this magazine. Three revamping decrees are
already in effe.ct: houaehold appliancea (20 September 1980), special ateels
(3 October 1980) and integrated iron and steel (8 May 1981). The three are
on the righr. track, in the administration's view, although the Integrated
Iron and Steel Coordinating Commission has a great deal of work ahead of it:
there is an initial program of urgent action, and within 10 months it will
submit an ambitious investment program up to 1985.
Where there are serious restructuring problems is in the major shipyards,
ASESA and ASTANO~ The negotiations between the INI [National Institute of
Industry] (they are public enterprises) and the labor union confederations
flounder on three sore pointa: the shutdown of work centers, a cutback of
5,000 jobs and wage control. "It's getting hard to reach a comprehensive
settlement, and perhapa the only way out is company by company negotiations,"
corranented Enrique Aldama. This could lead to major strife in the fall, given
the heavy concentration of centers and the strong preser~ce of the unions.
2
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050013-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R400440050013-8
FOR OFFI~IAL USE ONLY
The small and intermediate shipyards are discussing a reconversion plan with
Construnaves and the unions. There is broad common ground, and a joint first
draft might be submittcd to the administration by September.
Textiles is annther probl~m-ridi.~n ~ector.. 7'h~ :~d~ni.r..is:rat.ion has rehashed an
Intertextil reconversion plan by rncorporating unien proposals and is
preparing a decree that wi.ll be ready by the. end of tt.e month, unless last-
- miz~ute talks and disagreements move it back to September. The points of
disagreement are lay~ff~ ftt~ere are 10 ;�srcent too many people are on the
gayralls), zhe establishment of a.faurth shift and sea~onal work.
Footwear is not on the list of sectors affected by the revamping decree, inasmuch
- as it does not need financial or tax breaks or payroll cutbacka, but rather
, export promotion measures and an in-depth technological and commercial
overhaul, according to Industry Ministry sources. Nevertheleas, the employera'
union FICE and the sector union~ have h~mmered out a reconveraion plan thac
they have just submitted to the administratian.
Paper companies will also soon be submitting their plan, which entails little
- social cost since the measures to be taken are technological and specialization-
related. "Thi.s is a sector in which we have the basic element, the raw
material, and in which we could develop a very competitive industry at thp
' European level,'' Aldama pointed out.
The only private companies included in the revamping nlan are Femsa and
~ Robert Bosch Espana, because the administration wants to keep the German
multinational Robert Bosch in Spain and to promote a Spanish automotive
electric components industry. The two cencerns have agreed to merge under
the name of Femsa and have just hammered out an nverhaul agreeme~it with the
unions that calls for 1,700 layoffs, a 9 percent wage boost over the next 2
years and increases in capi.tal. The adminiatration has already conducted its
studies and, with the millions it has available, has cut off. the reconveraion
Iist at 11 sectors; thus, plans have yet to be drafted for capital $oods,
common steels and heavy foundry. "The approach to revamping has been to
restri~~, but not in tre .sense of erecting barr.i.zrs. T~le are leaving the door
_ open for same other sector t~ enter in the future. For the time being,
however, w~ .feel that ~:1.1 of the ones L-hat cught co be included are," Enrique
Al.daraa poi.rre~ .
Four basic criteria have been foZlowed for. selecting the sectors: sectore that
are majo~ =%~~?-^_F~ ~~f ~ a~ it; t;~~t ~ror~uce basic ?.tems or that have
Llld]OT fut~,r.P i~T(14n,~rtc, 'T'fli ;?~��~.c i,:~,l ,'_S ':7�;ti:�t~'~I' ~ 9�Cr'1L' OY' 1S IIOt pllt
on the rec,�m~:~rsion 1: ~~.ai =.t ~ltiklemen', fi~? ?ovPr~,m~n*. aid) is made by
,
an intermi,~i?terial con_n~i:.te~, ~~:d "r~~isk~-akion' i~ oren until 31 December
19i'.2, al*.t:~~~;r: r~ r~~~ .=.1. ~ exT~c, _i ,`.or t.1? `'.IT?~ h: i.ng. Co~sumer
el.ectr~~n.:i~5 .:1;.G C;'�"j '".ct'': :t!~ F ~+(t:.'~'C ~:5 ~ll~ l'G}~~2L 1CtC~Uf>t'C1~& r'fl t.:t f~ 1�~
3S Wl?~Z 1)?C~',S. . _ . ~"!.~.i.Z,l'.1"_, icl Eli~ Of Q"~`��~+{' i?i.~~7TSti Wlt~1
their iuQ:.~. ~.:�~~ai i:. ii: i: .a~t;�.,::.; :~:,^hly a:~ci enhance
, competitiv:~r.y This mFan:3 takin~ 9~CL3 to s�~,ale i~ack. j~r.odt~~rion costs (wages
3
Fnu l1FT`Tnr ~T nc~ nuT v
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050013-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040400050013-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
and social, energy and technological outlays) and to place companies on a sound
financial footing (capital formation and cutting financin~ coats), as well as
other measures to boost investment, enhance trade policy and update technology.
All of this is necessary because of our forthcoming memberstiip in the FEC.
To achieve this, the sacrifices have to be apportioned among companies
(shareholders), workers (layoffs and low wages) and the State (through the budget
and public funds, as well as tax breaks and financial aid). "We feel thaC
, 70 percent of the excess manpower, which we estimate at between 10 and 12
percent of the payrolls, can exit in a nontraumatic way, through early
retirement, voluntary resignations and disabilities," commented Enrique Aldama.
As far as the governmenr's efforts are concerned, the overha~.l will cost a
total of 570 billion pesetas.
"The cost of the overhaul in new money is 11.1 billion pesetas in 1981. The
re?aainder are allocations that were already earmarked for the crisis-ridden
sectors, but in an unorganized fashion, without any plan. The largest amount,the
cost o f replenishing the capital of public enter.prises that were losing
money, was already allocated; government loans are for the amounts that were
already provided for, and there has only been a 6.6 billion increase in
Industry and 4.5 billion in Labor," Aldama explained.
It remains to be seen what the cost of not overhauling t:~ese sectors will be.
"It is impossible to evaluate thP losses in terms of jobs, orders, reductior~s
in tax revenues and Social Security receipts, and increased imports and
dependence that a failure to act would entail. And we have to keep in ~nind
tha* by 1985 (some of them before) these sectors will have to stop posting
losses and become competitive internationally," Industry Undersecretary Enriqu~
Aldama said in conclusion.
COPYRIGHT: 1979, Informacion y Revistas, S.A.
8743
CSO: 3110/134
4
,
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050013-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R400440050013-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~
POLITICAL SPAIN
CENTRIFUGAL FORCES WITHIN UCD DESCRIBED
Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 3 Aug 81 pp 18-21
[Text] Amid a major upheaval in the UCD [Democratic Center Union], triggered
when the faction calling itself the Moderate Platform, backed by the signatures
of 39 "rebel" deputies, went public, President Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo began
pulling the strings for an ambitious plan designed to build what he himself
described as a"modernized" UCD. Deputy Alfonso Osorio and Antonio Garrigues
Walker, along with Matiss Rodriguez Inciarte, the assistant to the president,
and Luis Sanchez Merlo, Calvo ~otelo's two main political and economic
advisers, met for dinner on Friday 24 July with Calvo Sotelo at Rodriguez
Iniciarte's house on the outskirts of Madrid. Osorio, a Christian Democrat
_ politician with close ties to the Moderate Platform through Oscar Alzaga, izs
main booster, and to the entir~e "clan" of that ideology in the UCD, whose
leaders he brought into the first Suarez administration in 1976 when he assumed
the vice presidency, seems prepared to rejoin the revamped UCD that his friend
Calvo Sotelo is planning. It would be a party of well-definEd "sectors,"
"clans," factior.s" or "branches" with their own heads; in spite of the latest
atatement by the UCD Executive Committee, which Sua~ez and his men have
majority contr~l.of. The co~nittee rejected the formation,of organized factions,
though those attending the Tuesday 28 July meeting acknowledged that thia was
a purely political issue, rejecting any disciplinary measure against the
members of the Moderate Platform. Calvo Sotelo is planning a UCD staff with
representative "barons" and with inherent influence in the party. The men that
Calvo Sotelo will be bringing into this middle-of-the-road venture, which he
hopes to head up at the forthcoming general electi~n, according to reports
received by CAMBIO 16, includ~ in addition to Osorio, the liberal Antonio
Garrigues, who ia seen by ~~foncloa as r.he head of this political clan, Jose
Maria de Areilza, the chairmaa of the Council of Europe, and Jose Maria Lopez
de Letona, the Pr.esident of the Bank of Madrid, a former miniater and an
influential man in finanr.ial ~tnu hu;~ir~eUS circlee.
The program, which is expe::tc:d to take irom G to 8 montt?s, also includes other
- well-known f~ ;ures frc~~r. *_t.a ~~~~rl.-~ ~f ;~~~l.itics, econo~nics and letters in the
centrist ~ro~p,
- At the ve:_~ ;,:,:i�~i:+. _ . . ~ t ~ ~1;~..,, cis.� niain booster
of the move to esr.ablisli a faction tha; :id.enti.fies ~~ith tl~e ideology of
- Christian L'~emocra.cy, Os::a_ Ai.zaga, was ~�eeti.r? ir ~~-~~~at:e wirh r.hP nsesident of
the governmenr, Leapoldo Calvo Sotela, at Moncloa I'alace.
S
FnR nFFT~T~T ~r~F nnn.v
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050013-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000440050013-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Speaking firmly and with a nervous look on his face, Alzaga, one of the
youngest centrist leaders, explained to the president why a wideranging
ideological debate had to be initiated in the party to clarify the position
and standing of the various forces in it.
His support for Calvo Sotelo was, of course, a sure thing, but the party
leadership and machinery was something else again.
Alzaga reportedly analyzed the situation in which the UCD finds itself, reaching
conclusions that are disquieting for the party. What the promotor of the faction
that emerged with the name Moderate Platform, backed by the signatures of 39
legislators, stressed the most was the UCD loss of ground in areas as decisive
as Andalusia, Catalonia, Madrid, the Basque Country and conceivably Galicia.
The drifting away af the electorate and the "ruinous" (the word used by one
of the signers of Platfor~ document) management of the party machine headed by
Agustin Rodriguez Sahagun, are the basic motives for calling for an "overhaul"
of the centrist movement in terms of ideology and structure.
In.the background there is a dramatic confrontation, which is coming to light
more and more each day, between former President Adolfo Suarez and the current
head of government. The former controls most of the party "machinery";
Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo holds power and authority from his first 4 months at the
- head of the Executive Branch.
It was almost 2000 hours on Friday 24 July when Oscar Alzaga left Moncloa
Palace, just minutes before the first guests arrived at the "party" arranged
by Calvo Sotelo in the Moncloa gardens before taking off on vacation. ThPn
came the dinner with his colleagues and Osorio and Garrigues.
As Alzaga crossed in front of the car in which the party president, Rodriguez
Sahagun, was riding, the latter was talking on the phone with his cabinet
chief, Fernando Lanzaco, who was telling him about the newa that was coming in
and about the flood of calls from newsmen who wanted to know what the reaction
at the highest echelon was.
The fact was that the move by the 39 rebels had taken tk~e form of a letter-
document addressed to Rodriguez Sahagun himself.
Rodriguez Sahagun's first reaction was to downplay the matter, which in reality
repreaented a challenge to the current leadership of the UCD, and to point to
the statements in the letter of the 39 expressing support for Calvo Sotelo and
the UCD program and calting for a move towards the electorate. Pursuing this
strategy, the party's secretary general, Rafael Calvo Ortega, after conversing
_ with Rodriguez S~ihagun at the Moncloa get-togetlner, prudently underacored that
"the document of the 39 supports Calvo Sotelo and defends the UCD electoral
program."
But the ~aove had too much of an impact during the first 24 hours for them to
continue pursuing this atrategy, and after meeting the next day, Saturday, with
6
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050013-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000404050013-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
members of the Executive Committee iini:ed to Sua::ez, Ro3riguez Sahagun
threatened disciplinary action against the people who had set up a faction
within the party. Both Oscar Alzaga and Miguel Herrero de Minon, another of
the Plat.form's main prop~nents, denied publicly that th~ move was designed to
break up t'~~e IJCD.
Over the next few days, the ofEensive by the 39 kas followed up in articles
and statements to the press. The "rebels"' ~s~crit~ tarbet was Sacia~ Democrat
F'rancisco Fernandez Ordonez.
At his home in Santa Pola, Alicante, the justice minister told CAMBIO 16:
"A clarification will be needed. Parties are like a bottle of wine whose
label says Burgundy but that contains vinegar. The contents are the important
thing."
Most of the 39 rebels are Christian Democrats, as is the case with Fernando
Alvarez de Miranda, Manuel Diaz Pines, Jose Antonio Esperabe de Arteaga, Luis
Vega Escandon, former Minister Manuel Otero Novas or Oscar Alzaga himself.
Nonetheless, both theae and other prominent leaders of the UCD who belong to
this same political family and that suppo;-t the move by the 39 from the outside,
such as Ministers Inigo Cavero, Jose Luis Alvarez or Marcelino Ore~a himself
(see page 22), reject the term Christian Democracy in favor of Christian
humanism and say no to the idea of f.rming a party outside the UCD with that
ideology.
The fact is that in these outreach maneuvers within the UCD we axe witnessing
a struggle for power through ideological control.
"We are the essence of the UCD," said Otero Novas, while circles closest to
the 39 mentioned the presence within and outside the Platform of well-knuwn
figures with very closely linked politicF.l careers, as is the case with the
most prominent figures in the Chriatian Democratic faction and men like
Enrique de la Mata who have been together in the "Tacito" group since the
early 1970's.
The appearance of the Moderate Platfor!n, which in turn was attacked by
Fernandez Ordonez's men as an, attempt to form a major right-wing coalition
with AP [Popular alliancej leader Manuel Fraga, marks tne return of ideo-
logical factions to the UGD. They never actually disappeared, hut as of this
- week they are official again. Some people go further and think that the only
way out wili ne ~ retuin tio ~:ne originsl coaiitian system under which the UCD
emerged. ~'his is a g_~'scr~p~..icii c~.a~ mcsL� ot Che liCll �'tarons" reject.
~ Reports gar_h~red by CAMB10 1%i f~om cempiete~}~ reli~b?E sources indicate that
8 Y'eC112'll LO Z .l t:.^11 A'h:.. ~ ~..7.~i~~~c ~'i;"-t):1:. =T1~ :1S Fi ~i1~tiJ1@ 901LltlOil
fOY' ~}?C' Cl�Tl~ i'..~~. C . 1, . ~ i~ :t'~ . . .:izSYcC ~t:':lr }~'-h.r~i_','l :):?CA W t~~. . :~~i: A~7C~
o~Iier iba~~) t~; we!~t};~~ . i:.~~ ~.i .~i:it?~L;1': ~_'~~;C~~~.:C�~ �~'.r_Cc ti~ L:r.c'.elino ~.SV1118~
Mar,elino Ureja.,.is tr.at the iatter reject cl~e ;d~~ oi a coalition and a pact
with Fraga ie:~dir~g to l.'lt: HO~l.4)_l~d "ri~ ri~;i~t- wing.."
7
FOR OFFT~reT, iJSE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050013-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R400440050013-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
In any case, the people in the UCD are genuinely anxious to see Calvo Sotelo's
programs and to consider the possibil~ty of reaching the "big pact" among the
varioua factions and figures with their own iatrinsic influence.
The Liberals Lagging Behind
The move by the Christian Democrats has a concerted parallel in the liberal
faction, which for the moment, both inside and outside the UCD, is revolving
around various poles and considering a move to the progressive right.
In recent weeks there had been a series of ineetings between the proYnoters of
- the Moderate Platform, with Christiar. Democrats Oscar Alzaga and Miguel Herrero
in the lead, and liberals Eduardo Merigo, Antonia Fontan, Joaquin Munoz
Peirata, Soledad Becerril...to undertake unified action.
The liberals said "no."
Zn statements to CAA~IO 16, Merigo himaelf placed Alzaga and Herrero de Minon
in a conservative faction of the UCD. "We're not over there, nor in what cauld
be called the populist faction, where Adolfo Suarez and Fernandez Ordonez are:
with a liberal ideology and including other men close to this faction but
who do not define themselves a;: auch. We occupy our own epace in the UCD,"
Eduardo Merigo told this magazine.
In Valencia, where forcner Vice President Fernando Abril has followed tre
conservative right-wing ta~k at $11 costs, liberal Deputy Joaquin Munoz Peirats
is holding up the party's progressive torch. '
"It's inconceivable for positions as conservative as what is happening in
Valencia to exist in the UCD," Munoz Peirats told CAI~IO 16, "and we liberals
are going to fight this."
On the whole, the liberal "clan" firmly supports President Leopoldo Calvo
Sotelo, and the definitive emergence of a platform in the UCD like the one
offered by the young Christian Democrats would entail the organization of
~deological alternatives within the party, including the liberal faction.
The various political liberals whom this magazine has contacted have agreed,
moreover, that their boundary line on the left is the PSOE barrier, a boundary
that they are not prepared to cross, although they do not rule out the passibility
of participating in a coalition gov~ernment with the FSOE if such a praspect
would ever come to pass.
This analysis, which was outlined with quite a few points of agreement by
well-known figures of varying stripes within the libEral "clan," contains
the implicit charge that Fernandez Ordonez, the minister of justice and head
of the UCD's Social Democratic faction, is trying to place himse~lf in the
PSOE's political space.
8
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050013-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/42/09: CIA-RDP82-40850R000400450013-8
FOR OFFI~IAL USE ONLY
The dominai~` idea among UCD liberals ia to bring together the party's various
factions. "The point is to strengthen the UCD, not break it up," Eduardo
Merigo told this magazine, though the young liberal reiterated his suggestion
that the UCD run in the forthcoming elec:tion as the most important element in
a coalition in which other_ well-known political figures, Jose Maria de Areilza
and Antonio Garrigues Wallcer, among oihers, would participate.
To another UCD liberal, former Minister Jose Luis Leal, who explained that he
does not belong to any faction, the best solution ta the UCD's current crisis
is to bolster the party through a genuine ideological debate.
Leal, who according to his statements to CAMBIO 16 is not in favor of
reestablishing or formalizing factions within the UCD or having it return to its
coalition roots, feels that the government party should engage in debate and
close ranks without causing any ideological faction to lose its identity.
In Leal's analysis, the key is to reconcile the factions between the UCD's
most conservative faction (which has been taking unequivocally democratic
positions lately, however) and the most progressive faction (where he places
himself), which advocates social change through genuine ideological debate.
The new twist is unquestionably the definitive startup of what is known as
"Operation Liberal," headed up by Antonio Garrigues Walker, for whum a leap .
into the political arena is just a matter of time, before the upcoming general
election, however.
The move has the backing of Ambassador Antonio Garrigues and Diaz Canabate, who
on the anniver.sary of his son Joaquin's death told CAMBIO 16: "The liberal
clubs that my son promoted are based on the notion of liberalism that Joaquin
defended so strongly."
From his businessman's and lawyer's vantage point, Antonio Garrigues is
currently starting the first phase of "Operation Liberal," which consists of
building a liberal infrastructure throughout the country through the clubs that
have begun to open up. The Madrid club was followed by ones in Palma de
Mallorca, Toledo and Gijon. "We plan to have 20 compl.etely set up throughout
Spain by the end of the ycar, at the rate of 1 or 2 a week as of September,"
Antonio Gar.riguez tolc'�. CAI"BIQ 16.
The estimated cost for the project as a whole is 200 million pesetas over the
nQxt 2 ye-:,r~. A1~^.o^` r.1L of it i3 earc~arke~ for infrastructure (offices, pay
for managers, secretari=~~, sNx~~ic~s. . T~*i.*h an esti.mated 15 to 18 million
pesetas for each one af ~':e :l.nbs in t~:n three major cities (Madrid, Barcelona
and Bilbao) and between 5 and 7 million for the uthers.
Accord~ng tc> An':en:.o Garrio c~, .~c~ ai one :;F the _?~~~s ~vkl.~. t~e .-?1f--E~nazcing,
which m~=ks th~ be~i;'Dltle :1E1._3~~tl;~fi, CI':~.~~:;.~~.ri c;iat i;�~ ~~-~::?-,1 like ~~a
introduce i:.to sEani~h eeliti:~.
9
FnR nFFTf'TAT ii.r,R l1NT,Y
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050013-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R400440050013-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Antonio Garrigues denies that the liberal clubs are a"political operation,"
although he concedes that they do have "political consequen~es."
_ Garrigues stressed to thia magazine, however, that "the clubs wi11 be
permanent" and that their target is those intermediate groups in society that
want to get involved in public life but witnout joining a party.
In any case, the infrastructure of the clubs will be the springboard by which
Garrigues and many of the liberal figures who do not now belong to the UCD will
make as strong a leap as possible into the political ring, now that the ~
general election is approaching.
Another meeting of the liberal clubs (the first two were in July) has been
organized for late September in the Galician.town of La Toja, in an initial
bid to support locally his ideological positions in an election contest. In
this regard, it is no accident that the meeting coincides with a regional
parliament election campaign in full swing.
- The liberal clubs and the active presence of UCD members, including men like
former Minister Eduardo Punset, Deputy Joaquin Munoz Peirats or Eduardo Merigo
himself, are encountering strong resistance among centrist ranks.
Some well-known UCD figures, such as Minister Rodolfo Martin Villa, have come
out against what they regard as dual membership and accuse the clubs of being
a"parapolitical" organization, while the estrangement between Antonio Garrigues
and liberals Ignacio Camunas and Antonio Fontan is obvious, as the promotor of
the clubs acknowledged to this magazine.
It was Antonio de Senillosa, a Democratic Coalition deputy, who described
himself as a liberal "and very proud of it" and then came out in defense of
the "clubs," "associations" and "foundations."
"If someone tells me that the clubs, associations and foundations should not
engage in politics, I will respect that opinion, but I will question it."
"Keep in mind," Senillosa went on to say, "that these associations almost always
emerge as groups of intellectuals and politicians, which means that they
contain the seeds if not of a party, at least of its epicenter."
Countering the suspicions and accusations, Garrigues himself categorically
denied to this magazine that "Operation Liberal" by the clubs was aimed at
the UCD, noting that the government party's problems came from within, not
from the outside.
Garrigues asserted that in any case between 40 and SO percent of UCD liberals
back the clubs program, although he feels that the actual support would be
much greater.
10
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050013-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050013-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
After conversing with Antonio Garrigues and listening to his analyses of the
politic~l situation in Spain and his plans, one comea to the concluaion that
he clearly advocates an sutonomous liberal force on the political spectrum.
"Here in Spain we have to move towards an ideological clarification, like in
- the rest of Europe, where the liberal, Social Democratic ar_d Christian
Democratic forces are quite well-defined," Antonio Garrigues asserted.
Garrigues's ultimate objective is to secure the recognition of the Liberal
International and to establiah close cooperation with the Liberal parties of
the FRG and Great Britain.
But the immediate method of political involvemer~t on the part of Antonio
Garrigues and other liberal figures who are uot in the UCD is going to be
largely d~~ermined by political circumstancea over the next few months.
~ The fact is that the liberal "clan" as a whole is not the only faction awaiting
President Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo's decision concerning the UCD or the centrist
group that he might head up; all of the factions in this pol~tical zone are
, anxiously looking forward to it.
Their expectations are not exaggerated because in this case the future of
; Spain's right wing and the political stability of the country itself are at
stake.
Calvo Sotelo is looking at four options for resolving the party's crisis:
' continue tolerating the current tensiona with a parliamentary minority;
strengthen the party and create alliances to secure a majority along with
other forces; head up a coalition comprising all or almoat all UCD factions
but with new men and groups brought in, and finally, bring together the
_ various UCD factions based on a unity pledge and by bringing in new men and
groups. According to the reports we have heard, the latter option is the one
that Calvo Sotelo is working on.
His colleagues and a number of ministera are saying that an outcome to this
complex situation will take more definitive shape within the next 30 days,
during which time Calvo Sotelo will be holding top-echelon meetings in
Ribadeo, his vacation site in Galicia, with the main leaders of the party and
of other groups close to it.
COPYRIGHT: 1979, Informacion y Revistas, S.A.
8743
CSO: 3110/134
11 ~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050013-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R400440050013-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
MILITARY BELGIUM
JOURNAL HITS MILITARY PROCURF~IENT, DEFENSE POLICY
Negligent Defense Ministers
Brussels POURQUOI PAS? in French 23/29 Jul 81 pp 14-15
- [Text] When VDx [Vanden Boeynants] left his position as defense
minister, everyone could say that he had skillfully maneuvered his
ship and negotiated a difficult passage, with 5 years of rich ex-
perience. As for the army, it remained stuck in the middle of the
ford���. Since then, nonexistent ministers have taken turns trying
to get that heavy military vehicle out of the mire. With no re-
sults. In fact, Desmarets, Poswick, and Swaelen confined themselves .
to throwing life-buoys into the middle of the stream, shouting
encouragement, but without a precise idea as to an approachable bank.
In reality, these gentlemen knew, as do you and I, that what is
necessary is to turn back and return to general, effective, and
extended military service. But none of them wanted to say that
out loud. We still hope that a successor will be found to get
matters unstu~k....
Meanwhile, as we wait for that Godot, the successor-martyr, the man who will restore
mandatory 15-month military service, the crowd must be kept entertained.
This is what the present minister is doing, engaging us with his "10-year investment
plan for national defense." A long list of acquisitions, which are ritually submitted
for the government's approval. A dismal tale of lots of pennies.
All the same, let us glance at this famous plan. We learn in it that programs under
way are progressing normally for the acquisition of equipment such as GUEPARD, CVRT,
HELIP, RITA, MILAN, VBCI.... Wait a minute! Let's say it in proper words: anti-
aircraft tanks, armored reconnaissance vehicles, surface-to-air missiles, trans
mitting systems, anti-tank rockets, armored infantry vehicles, not to forget the
mine chasers and frigates of the navy, or the air force's F-16's and armored taupin-
ieres [person~iel carriers~. That is all very good.
Under the heading of_ extravagances to come, we learn that the arnry will have its
high-frequency radios, that the arttllery can hope for its new cannons, that the
F-16's will get some munitions (not much, but at last something...) within a reason-
able time. As for the rest, we will have to wait a few years: combat helicopters,
~ 12
FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050013-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R400440050013-8
FO{t OFFIC1.41. 11~F: ON:.1'
infantry mortars, replacement Mirages, ~HF radios, SHORAD (airport defense) missiles,
medium-range anti-tank missiles, replacement NIKE rockets, replacement tanks, anti~~-
tank munitions, artillery rocket-launchers, and...a complement of F-15 weaponry, all
that stretched out between 1984 and 1990...if the Russians wie willing to leave us
alone until then.
- All the same, the whole thing represents a nice sum in the billions, staggered o~?er
the next 10 years. A real effort! An effort that is far greater than some people
imagine. For example, Belgium will obligingly pay its share for the famous AWACS,
the NATO radar-aircraft. If only we had raised our voices to say that we would not
participate in such a foolish outlay, the utiZity of which was not evident* and for
which there was no compensation.... However, in the last analysis, we are paying
without a murmur. Was that fine indignation, then, only an act? Idle talk about
NATO?
Al1 that aside, this great financial effort should not blind us to the main point. .
Namely: we find pennies to buy equipment (costly and sophisticated), but we do not
find the men to use it. The army remains under-strength. Worse: it does not have
the means to correctly train and educate its soldiers. The noncommissioned officers
are now commanding skeleton units composed of under-trained, over-unionized "pro-
- fessionals." Personnel costs too much, there is not much left for operating expenses.
~ That being the case, what use are the prodigious programs, the ultra-modern armaments?
Such an army would be wiped out, quite obviously, by a good Afghan or Vietnamese in-
fantry armed with pikes and cudgels! These latter, you see, are motivated--and know
how to use their equipment!
The basis of the problem is the "middle of the stream." It is the failure of pro-
fessionalization, which has been obvious for 3 years now.
The rub of the question is that we must announce a return to 15-month military ser-
vice. A democratic measure (forget about the army as a career!), an economical
measure (compulsory military~service reduces costs), an effective measure (one
militiaman is worth three "volunteers"), and an opportune measure (we would finally
eliminate unemployment among our youth, which is tragic for all of us). But above
all: an unpopular measure! So who is going to announce it to the nation? Not me,
murmured Poswick. Not me, sighs Swaelen today. Therefore, time must be bought, by
the traditional method: studying the problem in committees.
Alas! That expedient is drawing to its end. The joint commission un national de-
f ense is making haste slowly, but at last it is going to report its conclusions.
Already, it has submitted its report on the question of fuel (asking for an addi-
tional 541 million) and the government had to free up 400 million....
Already, the joint commission chaired by Marshall Cudell and including political,
military and "diverse" technical types, has arrived at some inevitable conclusions.
General Contier himself, despite all his caution, was not able to hide the sad
truth. Namely: that the ~perational capability of the land army is slipping toward
* The utility of the AWACS appears now to be less than previously thought. For
example, why did the American radar-aircraft based in Saudi Arabia fail to detect
the Israeli jets headed toward Tamuz? Nelsonian myopia?
13
FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050013-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2447/02/09: CIA-RDP82-44850R444444454413-8
Fc~R nNF'1('1:11. I'til~ ON1.1
zero; that the navy can barely navigate; that the air force itself is beginning to
suffer.... And, finally, that every 15-month milit3.aman would save us one "volur.--
teer" (Francs 400,000 per year) or one unemployed worker (Francs 448,000). So?
50, in 3 or 4 months, the commission is going to present its report. Mr Swaele~
will then have to dismantle the heritage of VDB, the legacy of the Great Pontificate.
Oh, oh! Wtxat a painful prospect!
Bah! One must never despair. Four months is a long time.... Perhaps Mr Swaelen
will by then have had the time to find himself a successor?
Problems With Equipment
Brussels POURQUOI PAS? in French 23/29 .Tul 81 p 15
[Text] The COBRA armored vehicle, of the ACEC [Charleroi Electrical Engineering
Shops], has completed its various tests. They are said to have disclosed a disastrous-
ly fragile engine, inadequately developed. In August, the general acquisitions ser-
vice will submit its report to the minister. Will the decision in September be to
buy the 150 vehicles? Or perhaps a final scrapping of that purchase order, which
would miraculously cut the (anticipated} 3 billion it was to cost the defense budget?
Do not weep, carolos [Charleville inhabitants] deputies: in any case, the biggest
- piece of the action was to have profited factories located in Flanders.
Within the navy, like everywhere else, people's backs are up while they wait for
better times. So much the better if they get a few pennies to be able to sail~ one
of their four beautiful frigates: the "Westdiep" will perhags go to rejoin the
- STANAVFORLANT squadrfln. As for the dredgers, they will do a little sailing to pass
_ the time. Meanwhile, the Ostende shipyard is preparing actively for the building of
a minesweep...in 1985. A country is never small when it borders the ocean. Every-
thing is going well for the armorers. At Herstal, ships are constantly being dressed.
NATO has ordered 5.56-mm caliber SS-109 munitions from the FN [e~ansion unknown].
And, of course, FN's weapons are the best designed to fire the said muniti.ons. Then,
the Swedish army has ordered the marvelous FN-C, that toy rifle for which the world
is so envious of us. And the Americans are opting for the "Minimi," a darling of a
small, light machinegun, "the dream of the modern soldier," (dixit FN). Once again,
we are going to export our beautiful gadgets (or sell the licenses) all over the
planet. It was tiresome to see nothing but Kalachnikovs around lately....
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Pourquoi Pas?
9516
~ CSO: 3100/897
14
FOR OFF[C[AL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050013-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040400050013-8
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
FRANCE
" MILITARY
DEFENSE MINISTER DISCUSSES NATIONAL SERVICE REFORM
PM171506 Paris PARIS MATCH in French 14 Aug 81 p 90
~ [Interview with French Defense Minister Charles Hernu by Laurence Masurel:
"Military Service: There Will Be a Great Debate Before It Is Reformed date and
place not given]
[Text] [Question] Many French people were shdcked when you stated that the armed
forces should serve "France and socialism." Do you still think that?
[Answer] That is not exactly what I said. I said that they should serve France and
I added with reference to national service and specifying that I was talking as a
socialist and not as a minister, that as far as some young people were concerned
France could be served better under a leftwing government. It is clear--and to
discover this you 3ust have to reread all the books I have written over the past
23 years--that I think the armed forces' role is above all to defend the republic
and the nation, in other words France as a whole.
[Question] Imagine Mr Bourges or Mr Galley saying that the axmed forces should
serve "advanced liberalism." How would you have reacted?
[Answer] Mr Galley certainly did so since he stated in the National Assembly that
the armed. forces were "the last bastion of the liberal society." That brought a
reply from Socialist Deputy Alain Savary who protested this assimilation of the
armed forces with the defense of an ideology.
[Question] Do you think the armed forces should be the armed forces of the "people's
~ deterrent," as you said?
[Answer] I did not say that, although this idea of "nuclear and people's deterrent"
was used by my colleague Jean-Pierre Chevenement. I prefer the idea of "people's
mobilization."
[Question] Which means?
[Answer] My view is one of overall def ense. In the crisis-ridden society in
which we live, we must fight on all fronts: when our agricultural food industry
thz�eatens to collapse, when the computer industry is in a bsd,way, when we are in
danger of losing our aeronautics industry, in short when we are in danger of losing
15
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050013-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040400050013-8
FOR OFFICIAL US~: ONLY
our vital industries, it is as if we were losing military battles. 'Phey are real
' defeats. What kind of military defense would France have if all its industry were
controlled by multinationals, or if it had lost all its brains? My ministry, which
is a unique case, in tl~at it employs 750,000 people, is also taking part and will
take part in the f i~ht against unemployment by job creation. Similarly my minis-
terial colleag~ies are also defending France.
[Question] There is reportedly some malaise in the armed forces and their general
staffs owing to the many changes which have been made (four ministers and three
, chiefs of staff in 1 year). Is this true?
[AnswerJ The fact that there has been a rapid succession of ministers has nothing
to do with me. In any case no chief of staff has been changed since I have been
, in this job. Everybody has remained in his post. When I submit appointments or
changes to tne cabinet my crite�ria are quite simply those of ability and the
promotion table. The military in charge have followed the orders they received
from the government in office. Therefore there is no reason to hold them responsible.
Is there some malaise? I do not think so. This report is being spread by a bitter
right which would like that to be the case. Ah: How nice it would be if some
military chief were t~~ resign. Ah: How nice it would be if mutinoua movements
. were to start in the ~trmed forces. Well, that is nat happening.
[Question] Nonetheles:; it is said that general or senior offiaers fear the
politicization of the armed forces....
[Answer] If officers think that, let them write and tell me.
[Question] Are you going to reduce the length of military service as some people
thought?
[Answer] The content and efficacy of national service must be improved. For young
men, serving your time must not amount to wasting your time. We must create a
useful and responsible service and hence we envisage a number of reorganization
measures. That cannot be done in a week. In the fall I will go and open a session
cf the "Army-Youth" Commission whicYi will be attended by the trade union organi-
zations, conscientious ob~ectors, the human rights league, scouting organizations
_ and, of course, military organizations. There will, therefore, be a great debate
on this sub~ect durir?g which wide consultation will be established between the
military and young people.
I am convinced that that will bring progress.
Nine months later we will report on our idea and thinking to the chief of the armed
forces--zhe president of the republic.
[Question] What is the position on national service for women?
[Answer] ~ personally believe that voluntary service for women must be increased.
There is a big demand for it. Wh~n we recruited 100 women as gendarmes we received
more than 10,000 applications from young women.
16
FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050013-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050013-8
FOR OFFICIAL U~E ONLY
.
[Question] With regard to recruit training, you said: "The afficers and junior
afficers cann~t be expected to do everything. It is important to enter the armed
' forces, aftEr preparation by schools, secondary schools and universities. There
must be close cooperation with the national education system." What are your ideas
on this close cooperation?
[Answer] We need close cooperation not only with the National Education Ministry
but also with the Ministries of Labor, Youth and Sports, National Solidarity and
the Interior. How can young people be expected to feel the need to defend their
country if they do not have a historical awareness of that country? It is, therefore,
- important to teach history in school ~ust as it is important to try to be healthy
and to develop civic education. The armed forces cannot do everything. Efforts
must be made to train young people before and after the armed forces.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 per Cogedipresse S.A.
CSO: 3100/919
J. 7
~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050013-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R400440050013-8
FOR OFFIC'IAL ~1Sl~: ONLY
GENERAL FRANCE.
SUCCESS OF THIRD ARIANE LAUNCHING OONFIRMED
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 18 Jul 81 pp 55, 64
/Article by Pierre Langereux7
_ L'I'ext7 The CNES Lffational Center for Space Studies7 and the ESA LEuropean Space
Agency] just published the official tiut still provisional conclusions of the third
inflight test firing (L03) of the "Ariane launcher, successfully completed on 19
June 1981 in Kourou, French Guyana.
There are apparently no surprises and the CNES is now working on the rating documents
for the Ariane 1 launcher which will be discussed by a CNES-ESA rating committee before
being submitted to the Executive Board of the Ariane program for its approval in
September or October of 1981, or, in other words, before the fourth and final inflight
test launch (L04) scheduled for November 20.
The detailed examination of the. results of the L03 launch oonfirm the statements made
after the preliminary analysis i~~~nediately following the 19 June launching. The L03
launcher functioned perfectly and problems envountered during the first two launches
were completely overcane and corrected.
The thrpe stages of the launcher functioned perfectly, give or take a few seconds.
This oonfirms the effectiveness of the oorrections made to the Viking engines of the
first and second stages to get rid of the high-frequency (2,300 and 2,700 Hz) cam-
bustion instability that destroyed the L03 launcher in May 1980.
The Pog~ effect, noted at the end of the second stage of the flight during i~he first
LO1 launching in December 1979 and caused by the rigidity of tne N~04 pipes, was
eliminated by activating the Pogo device which made it possible to separate the
vibrations of the engines and structures fr~n those of the feeder circuits.
Finally, the slight pollution notecl inside tiie nose cap during firing of the LO1 was
reduced by moving the third phase retrorockets and by adding sealing valves to the
nose cap.
An analysis of the firing of the L03 also confirms a performance gain, which was
already apparent during the first firing, In these ccnditions, the "naninal guaranteed
performance in the reference orbit" (200-36,000 km., with an 8� incline) is now 1,780
kg. This means that Ariane 1 can, without any difficulty launch the large Intelsat
5 satellites, which i's the "test load" mission of the current European launcher.
18
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050013-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040400050013-8
MOR OFFIC'IAL USE ON1.Y
Reduced Pressure
We should add that this performance was obtained during firing of the L03 with Viking
engities operating under 53.5 bars of firing pressure,or less than the naninal
pressure of 54.5 bars used f or the first two firings.
�~he combustion pressure of the Viking engines was in f~Gt dE~liberately ~owered
during the firing of the L03 to increase the safety margin c~f thE en4ine.
It theref ore seems that the naninal guaranteed performance of Arian~ 1 could be
obtained with Viking engines operating under a reduced pressure of 53.5 bars, and
maybe only 53 bars (instead of the 54.5 bars set initially as the Viking's naninal
pressure for Ariane 1). A decision will be made on this subject after the next
inflight test firing of the L04 which will also be done with reduced pressure set
n ~ninally at 53.5 bars.
58 Bars for Ariane 3
However, the combustion pressure of the Viking engines will have to be increased
considerably for the new Ariane 2 and 3 models which should in principle be available
' by the end of 1982 and mid-1983, respectively.
To obtain the performance planned for the Ariane 2 and 3 rockets, the new Viking
engines will in fact have to operate under 58 bars of ncminal pressure, which requires
a rating of 64 bars of maximum pressure, and this of course without any combustion
- instability!
Now the previous modification (enlarging the injector holes) will not be sufficient
to safely avoid combustion instability.
The CNES and the SEP LEuropean Propellant Co_7 have thErefore undertaken ~dditi.onal
studies to imprave the stability margin of the Viking so that it can operate under 58
bars of firing pressure.
Several solutions have been discussed: chemical additives in the ergols, baffles in
the codnbustion chamber, reduction of the injection speec7, etc.
The most pranising solution naw chosen is to inject an additive (hydrazine hydrate)
in the fuel (UDNgi) in order to change the size of the drops of ergol injected,
which in turn reduces the sensitivity to combustion instability.
A Viking engine with a modified injector to operate on UDMH and hydrazine hydrate is
now being test~d at the ~Ierna~ test-bed and work is also going on tb check the corrosion
resistence of the ergol tanks and pipes under tension, in view of the additive.
These tests should give us inf ormation by September ~ the real operating range for
the new Viking engine under 58 bars of pressure.
Improved Ariane 3 Model
- The results of these tests are extremely important for the future of the European
launcher, as the CNES is working on an improved model of the Ariane 3 launcher for
1984-85, in order to accommodate the increased size of future geostatior,ary satellites
(ECS, Telecom 1, Australisat, etc.), which will be using the European rocket.
19
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050013-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R040400050013-8
FOR OFFICIAI, l)SF ONI..Y
This new Ariane 3 5(Sufxr 1) model will thus be able to carry two 1,195 kg. satellites
and the Sylda dual l~:unching device (200 kg.), or a total payload of 2,590 kg, in
synchronous transfer orbit. The Ariane 3 rocket is currently designed to launch two
1,140 kg. satellites (STS-PAM type), plus the Sylda, or a total of 2,480 kg.
To obtain this 110 kg. gai~ in the payload with the Ariane 3 S, the CNES is planning
to lighten the equipment canpartment and the third cryogenic H8 stage, and reduce
the launcher's dispersion margins.
This means then that they have to be certain as to the Viking engines' operating
potential at 58 bars. Otherwise, the improvements to be made with the Ariane 3 S
would only o~fset the performance loss of the Viking, without any gain in payload.
- Paradoxically, the future of the Eurot~ean launcher depends on the element that seems
the least c~itical, namely the Viking engine!
COPYRIGHT: A. & C. 1981
9805
CSO: 3100/880
20
FOR OFFIC[AL U$E ONLY
1
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050013-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050013-8
FOR OFFiC1AL USE ONLY
GENERAL FRANCE
'MARECS A'' TELECOMMUNICATIaNS SATELLITE LAUNCH bELAYED
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 18 Jul 81 p 55
/Article by Pierre Langereux7
~ext] The f ourth and last inflight test firing of the European launcher Ariane has
been delayed following difficulties that came up during the recent tests and the
incorporation of ESA's MARECS A satellite, the main payload for ~his launching.
>
The L04 launching is planned for November 20, 1981, while it had been set for October
1981. However, the final date won't be fixed for another week or two, before the end
~ of July in principle, when they know how long it will take to resolve the MARECS A
problems. We should point out that MARECS A is the first maritime telecommunications
satellite built in Europe.
Whatever the date may be, MARECS A will be launched at night, for reasons related to
putting the satellite into ccmmission. This will be the first night firing of the
Ariane launcher at Kourou. But this procedure will become routine later on, since
- a number of geostationary satellites require night launchinq because of the angle of
the solar aspect of satellites, among other reasons.
COPYRIGHT: A. & C. 1981
9805
CSO: 3100/880
- END _
i'
21
FI,1R OFF[CIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050013-8