JPRS ID: 9944 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400040056-2
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JpRS L/9944
28 August 1981
West E u ro e R~ o rt
p ~
~FOUO 42/81)
FBI$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE ~
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JPRS L/9944
28 August 1981
WEST EUROPE REPORT
(FOUO 42/81)
CONTENTS
E CONOMIC
FRAN CE
INPF's Ceyrac Voices Views Opposing Mauroy's Program
(Francois Ceyrac Interview; PARIS MATQi, 24 Jul 81) 1
- FO's Bergeron Explains Union's Future Attitude
(Andre Bergeron Interview; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR,
18 Jul 81) 8
- Priorities of Planning Ministry's Racard Discussed
- (Franz-Olivier Giesbert; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR,
. 18 Jul 81) 12
POLITICAL
FRAN CE
Pro-Soti~et PCF Wing: Publish, Broadcast, Destabilize Marchais
(Frederic (~arpier; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATIEUR, 11-17 Jul 81) 15
- Election Causes, Government ~ture, PCF, Unions
~ (PROJET, Jul.-Aug 81) 18
- Briefs
Leroy Avoids Mos caw Meeting 30
SPAIN
Polls Show 12 to 26 Percent o� Basques Favor Independence _
(Jose Manuel Arija; CAMBIO 16, 13 Jul 81) 31
- a - [III - WE - 150 FOUO]
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MILITARY
FRAN CE
MATRA 'Scorpion' Reconnaissance System
(AIR & OOSMOS, 13 Jun 81) 38

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ECONOMIC FRANCE
CNPF'S CEYRAC VOICES VIEWS OPPOSING MAUROY'S PRO~CRAM ,
Paris PARIS MATCH in French 24 Jul 81 pp 52-55
[Excerpts from an interview with Frari~ois Ceyrac by Jean Cau: "An Interview with
, the 'Boss af Bosses;' In the Midst of the Economic Battle, the Best Generals Are
Dismissed"]
[TextJ [Question] In Mr Mauroy's speech to the National Assembly, he took sides
~ with you--without quoting you--when he said that the French pEOple voted the way
- they did in May and June because they wanted ne~o impetus and a new thrust, and
"not because they wanted to rest in the shade of the forest." In listening to
Mr Mauroy, did you notice an appeal for new efforts and hard work, or did his
speech strike a different note for you?
- [Answer~ I must say before anything else that I do not engage in polemics. I
observe things as the~ are, I told Mr Mauroy the following; "I will not mobilize
b~,siness against you. Political opposition is political oppasition. As for
business, it is not in the opposition, it is only supposed to tell the truth. My
role is to inform ;~ou: if I see certain needs or dangers, I will warn you in a
matter of fact way." Having made this clear, I was pleasantly surprised to hear
' today--from some quarters, Mr Mauroy or Mr Delors--vigorous appeals for hard work.
Mr Barre couidn't have done better. However, I am not at all sure that the French
people voted as they did because they wanted to liear these words. Mr Mauroy will
not make me change my mind or prevent me from thinking that it was for another
reason.
It is my view then that after a long period of struggle, the French people all
of a sudden heard voices telling them, "you should work less, the length of the
~aork week should be reduced, exports should be decreased, because it's too hard,
- life should be easier, and so forth." What does that mean, if nat to rest in the
shade of the forest and breathe the fresh air while biding your time? The French
people got the gist of Mr Mitterrand's speech. Now Mr Mauroy is changing the
tune. The French people will understand, if they can.
[Que~tion] In your opinion, Mr P:-esident, why in the world are they national-
izing? Some people have said that it is out of an almost mystical faithfulness
- to a myth. Do you think that ideology comes fir.stin this affair and economic
reasoning sec~nd? And if ideology is involved, what is the underlying goal?
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[Answer] I asked myself the question because this seemed to be such an obscure
subject that I felt it deserved a little thought. It's true that in the past we
nationalized because things were going badly. However, the groups being brou$ht
into the public sector today are among the most brilliant, the most dynamic, and
the most efficient in the French economy. So they are not nationalizing them
- because things are not going well.
Are they nationalizing ttl@11 because tl~ings are going well and they feel that they
can make things go even better? The men heading these groups have demonstrated
their ability and I am not so sure that a technocracy will do better. I think in
- fact that it will do worse. I therefore see no economic or technical reason. I
don't have a political explanat~on either, since when Renault was nationalized in
1946 for political reasons, the decision was made not. because the company was
doing poorly, but because Louis Renault was accused of collaboration and convicted.
To m-~ knowledge, no legal action of this sort has been brought against the heads
of the groups involved. ~
[Question] So there is no economic, technical or pol~tical explanation. What
is left?
[Answer] We have to go back to the myth. In my opinion, nationalization will
occur in 1981 because it was written into the r,pinay program. And if it was
written into that program, it is definitely because it was included in Che CGT
[General Con�ederation of Labor] program in 1934. The Socialist Party has an
_ affinity for history and myths. Perhaps we need a myth to strengthen the ties
between the communists and the socialisCs. And this myth is the myth of nationali-
~ation. No one dared bring up the one of the 200 families, but it's the same.
~QuestionJ What can.the practical consequences of nationalization of the banking
aector be for non-:.2tionalized companies and thus for small and medium-siz2d
businesses and i.ndustries? Could a surface tension arise?
[Answer] Why is the banking sector being nationalized? The government at present
has all the powers needed to regulate credit Proof of this is that it decided to
raise interest rates to heretofore unknown l~~vels without consulting parliament.
It controls credit ceilings, the Bank of France intervenes authoritatively and
effectively in the banking business... What more do they want? Here again we
see a myth involved--"the wall of money!" Since this wall of money was, to the
liking of some, only partially demolished in 1946, the demolition is being pur-
sued! The real question to answer today is whether the banks already nat~onalized
are better serving their customers than private banks. If there were an appreciable
difference between the two, if we could say that the Cr~dit Lyonnais, the Soci~t~
G~n~rale or the BNP [Ivational Bank of Paris] offered larger loans, were more atten-
tive to tY~:ir customers' needs, and more compassionate with small and medium-sized
tusinesses than other more arrogant and domineering banks, then I would understand.
But allow me to say that to my knowledge it is impassible to find any notable
differences in the quality of the service. Some conpanies have several banks.
They use each one for a certain number of services. Nationalized banks are better
in some areas, private banks in others. There is a whole range which allows for
individual service. Private banks' behavior vis-~a-vis their customers is no less
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good, efficient or open. Now tomorrow practically all competition among banks
wi1_1 be done away with.
[Ques:ion] There will no longer be a menu to choose from, but just a fixed-price
meal!
[AnswerJ I heard Mr Mauroy say in response to some criticism: "Cr~dit Lyonnais
and Soci~z~ G~n~rale are perfect, let's nationalize the others! The sarvices will
be just as good!" But they are already just as good! It's only that there will
be one thing missing: there ~rill he no more competition between the ~Srivate
sector and the public sector. Now this competition was good and effective. The
- only institutions left to emulate are th.e foreign banks. And here I wonder
whether we really want to serve the foreign banks. Do we want to make them appear
as the only competitors and the only possible factors of comparison for tltose who
want to shop around?
[Question] Do you think that ~the nationalized companies are less dynamic, and if
so why? In a work entitled "Changer," Mr Delors wrote, and I quote from memory,
that "heads of national ffrms too often tended tc take their hats and umbrellas,
go to the offices of the politic~il leaders, discuss with them how their firms
were going, and then leave quite merril.y with their umbrellas opened." He also
- said that we have to be careful not to create irresponsible companies. Is that
a danger?
_ [Answer] Are you referring to industrial firms?
[Question] Yes.
[AnswerJ What is true for banks is even more glaringly true for industrial firms.
Mr Mauroy again--and don't get the idea that he is my whipping-boy, but he is our
prime minister--had this to say with regard t~ these firm~s: "Look at how the
Renault company is doing!" Renault is doing well, but on~e of its most qualified
representatives said that it was essential for the compaiiy to have a private
competitor. T'he existence of a large firm of a comparable size is an important
factor of efficiency. Competition between the two companies plays an extraordi~
narily useful and effective role as a mobilizer at all levels. It is because of
this that the Fr~nch automobile has attained a high degree of competitiveness,
and has been able to maintain its position and even further improve it. What is
true for Renault is also true for the companies we are discuss~ng. As I said,
they were highly competitive, they had proven this internationally, and it's hard
to see how nationalizatinn, by some singular virtue, could make them any more
competitive.
In summary, there ia a risk that two things could occur. The first would resu~t
from the waiting period before the laws are voted on this fall. Couldn't these
large companies play out all their trump cards, given the highly uncertain situa-
tion in which they find themselves? Isn't there a danger that some steps may no
longer be so difficult? This is probably not a good situation as any action would
be taken in all alacrity.
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NOR OF~'1~'lAl. l'til~. nNl,'1
a In the second place, our competitors are not fools. Aren't they going to try to
profit from the situation? Some have in fact already begun.
Finally, how will cu.stomers in certain countries react? I am r.ot goisig to enu-
merate these countries; you icnow as well as I which ones they are. They pay close
attention to this kind of project and to the fact that our economic system could,
by politicizing, lose a great deal of its reliability. All of this creates a
less favorable situation for companies which have to ~ope with frightful foreign
- competition, where markets are taken away at the point of a sword, after difficult
negotiations and ridiculous efforts. We have no idea of the difficulties encountered
by the persons conducting these negotiations.
[Question] And then a decision is made in the shade of the forest that puts these
men in a shaky, uncertain position...
[Answer] When an army is involved in 2 dangerous and precarious war and its leaders
are wondering whether or aot Paris is going to replace them or send them back... If
I could draw a comparison, I would say that the companies to be nationalized are
our battle corps, our ar~o~:ed offensive breaking through the lines in the economic
war. Now suddenly, in the midst of battle, we upset the best fighters, we change
the structures... That would certainly not create a climate conducive to victory.
[Question] Mr Delors said on Juae 27 that the businesses to be nationalized will
account for only 16 percent of the gross national product.
[Answer] Wasn't that meant to reassure the population? Besides these large
gro~sps, there is their zone of influence... Doesn�t one of them have 4,000 suppliers
which are more or less working for it? When you take control of the one giving
out work, you become the employer of the subcontractors. And in that case I can
assure you that it is r.ot a matter of a mere Y6 percent.
[Question] Isn't there a danger that these companies will become rigid in their
employment practices, since workers and management will have the impression of a
greater sense of security?
[Answer] That's another story. Nothing that has been said would seem to indicate
thi.s at present. If by char.ce businesses were nationalized to create protected
employment zones where workers would enjoy the same security as in the civil ser-
vice, that would be detrimental to those businesses' efficiency.
[Question) And where is the money to compensate the shareholders going to be
found?
[Ansraer] ~n the pockets of the taxpayers! Or by borrowing or something else.
This is a political choice as much as an economic one.
The two main causes of concern when we think of compensation are the following:
first, what will that cost the government? Since we are all taxpa;:ers, we a11
have an interest in keeping the cost down. Then, the owners of the sto~k must
be properly compensated. It's a matter of absolute justice. There cannot be
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~uly ~ic~spoli~tlun, r~either now nor in fuCure. The compensation must therefore be
i�~>mputed fairlv as of now and proter.ted for the future. The problem of compensating
~t~e sharehol.der. is critical, because it invoives the national morality. The govern-
ment cannot despoil even in th~ name of the natian.
There i:; another issue. In working out the compensation, should, as some think,
the ide~ of discriminating between French and foreign shareholders be introduced?
Some would agree to special treatment for the foreign shar~holders because they
are foreign, and less good treatment for the French beca:ise they are French, but
this is unacceotable discrimination.
jQuesti.un] To go back to Renault, is it true that t~e company enjoyeci a kind of
privileged tr.eatment, paying less taxes and receiving capital from th~ government?
tn other words, was the competition with Peugeot altogether fair?
(AnHwet-] c,~n this very del.ic~te point, I will say ~uat one thing. Take the amount
oL profit taxes paid by Renault and Peugeot from 1970 to 1980! You will see which
c~~:.wa:1y provided the most funds to the government budget during that period!
[Quesrion] The government also talka about "spreading the power in companies."
Do you f.eel to Cre contrary that counter-powers have already reached a threshhold
that it would be dangerous to go beyond? BuL what in your opinion does "spread
the power in companies" really mean?
[Answerl Let's be serious: what power are we t~lking about? Administration's?
kianagement's? But everyone participates in decisions in companxes! And everyone
at his level--the foreman, the office head, the director, the president. The one
wh~ makes decisions least frequently is the president.
Do they mean to mix decision-making levels? I find that very strange and I don't
see how that fits i.n an organization chart. If that has any meaning, it is that
they are going to give the union representatives a counter-power, and that would
n~t be a d1�f.used power, but a centralized one.
Actuf~ll,y, behlnd these harmlese w~rde a con~iderable risk i~s involved--th~t is
th:~t n unt~,niet counter-power would be aet up and the decision-meking capr~~ity
' ,it ati l.rvelA wc>u1d bP diminiahed ox hamper.ed.
f[ere r;K~~.1n we ~~re dealing with an unknourri factc~r. They uae vague images, they
assure us by sa,ying ehat there will never be veto power... We say: "So much the
t~etter. We wil:l. sEe!" We are sti11 in this nebulous phase which was ~ust only
~~artl.y clarif.ied by the prime miniater.
[quesr.j.o~1) Don't you think that shortening the work we2k might worsen the already
bad problem of the black market in labor?
- (Answer] Mr Nonory said that this market accounted for 12 percent of French
goacis . . .
[Question] This is the sub~:erged economy, as the Italians say.
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[Answer] In France it is already one-third the size of the Italian ma.rket...
[Question] I have noticed that some of the illegal workers are civi~ servants.
[AnswerJ Not to blame them, but the most active cles in this area are those wi*h
the most job security and little pressure on the job.
I [Question] As a joke, we could say that the moonlighting work of teachers was
~ politics!
[AnswerJ They are in *_he process of proving that they are gifted. As for short-
ening the work week, we have said that w~ would agree to make an effc~rt by looering
the legal time to 39 hours a week. But in view of the cost of the operation, there
have to be offsetting measures. This social advance must be compensated by improved
productivity. That having been said, I am not convinced that the main concern of
French workers is to go from 40 to 35 hours. I have the feeling that here too
political circles have a rather outdaced view of the problem of the length of the
work week. I have the impression that they are not altogether in tune with the
realities and aspirations of 1981. We kr~ow perfectly well that what is important
today is to give more freedom and flexibility to workers so that they can adapt
their work to their family or personal concerns. It is only fair to make progress
in this direction, but always with th~ concern of achieving a greater return on
plant and equipment. As we have said, our foreign competitors know how to use
their equipment better than we do. How is it th2t they are able to make their
machines turn 50 percent more? Because work~hours are much more flexible and they
have separated men's work from machines` work. This is the basic requisite for
any social progress in this area. Otherwise it will just be another burden,
another impediment, and the corset enclosing French business will be tightened
a notch further. It will have a little more difficulty breathing, and everything
will move in the same direction as "~tatisation" [governmentization], nationaliza-
tion and government intervention.
[Question] A subtle difference has been made between nationalization and "~tatisa-
tion" a difference the French people have trouble understanding.
[AnswerJ Me too! I think that nationalization means control by the nation or
ownership by the nation and "~tatisation" means government intervention. But
since to my knowledge no one iu France has ever differentiated the state [~tat]
from the nation and since it is the state that embodies the nation, when we say
"nationalization" we are inevitably saying "~tatisation." I would like to know
how nationalization could be done without the state and without administrative
intervention in a country such as ours.
[Question] Won't nationalizations gradually create a state of mind that goes
beyond strict economics? The govertxment puts its hand on the banking sector,
' Saint-Gobain, Pechiney, ei~c. But might not the spot of oil which begins with
the economy spread to schc~ols, medicine, larcrl holding, etc.?
[Answer] I am afraid that under Socialist policy no sector can escape the general
movement. Some are more exposed but they all will have their little part, one
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' after the other. The three sectors you referred to--education, medicine and
_ f.arming--are already the objects of considerable attention, because the current
government has an overall concept of the collective society.
[Question] Have you had an opportunity to say all this to Mr Mauroy and our
political leaders?
[Answer] Given my position, I gave my views, and warned of evils and dangers,
as I told you in the beginning of this interview.
[Question] And preached in the desert?
Fran~ois Ceyrac makes the gesture of opening his arms and gives me a questioning
look.
_ July 1981... Direct from the CNP~'. Jean Cau (as they say on the radi.o). And
now (still as they say on the radio...) let's see how all those leaving on vaca-
_ tion are doing and if Bison Fute doesn't have enough worries with the four ~illion
drivers who have just left... I am calling the communist party in Rosny-sous-
Bois... Hello, Pierre Duschnock, can you hear meti Is everything a11 right?
COPYRIGHT: 1981 by Cogedipress e S.A.
9805
CSO: 3100/873
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ECONOMIC FRANCE
FO'S BERGEROi4 Exf'LAINS UNION'S FUTURE ATTITUDE
= Paris LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR in French 18 Jul 81 pp 32-33
(Interview with Andr~ Bergeron, Secretary-General of the Workers Force, by Lucien
~ Rioux.J
['~ext] [QueS~ion; Have you already felt the effects of this change we are hearing
so much about?
[Answer] In attitude, of course. Contacts with this government are much easier
- than with previous ~nes. For the rest, I can't say anything. There are still
~ probZems to be sols~ed, which is neither surprising nor something to be ashamed of.
; The ~residential elections were held on 10 May and now it's July. We have to
~ ~ive the new government time to study the files.
[Qu~stion] The labor unionist just gave his opinion. But what does the man,
- Andr~ Re~rgeron, think about tihis?

~ ~=~s~swerj ~L have always said that democracy cannot exist without a rotation of
;;:~~.ae;., that it is not good to leave the same people in the same ~obs for too long.
~ i~: rie:y bc;~~.ernments run into difficulties, it is partly because they have been
~ -a:Ja.y trUm responsibilities for 23 years. Thus the change which has occurred is
not: ~1L:'..v ;'~~~tu~:al but necessary. For the rest, we will judge by actions. When
- th~ ~r~~:~ ,.i_ons made are in line with the interests of those we represent, we wi.ll
suy so, and when thQy seem to be opposed, we will say that too. I don't think
t?~~:+~ it's good for democracy for labor unions to behave in any other way. I
neve~ s~xd ~hat the labor union movement should become a counter-power; when need
be, it should be a counterbalance to power.
[QuestionJ What's the difference between counter-power and counterbalance?
[Answer] Counter-power advocates want to assume all or part of the responsibil-
ities which, in our view, belong to the political power. Workers Force [FO] is
against this. When General de Gaulle, in his proposed 1969 reform, wanted to
give labor unionists pcwers in his regional councils in areas that did not concern
them, we opposed it. Not out of hostility to the General's policy line, but
because we felt that the role our militants were being given to play was dangerous.
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[QuestionJ And counterbalance?
[Answer] Government policy can jeopardize workers' interests--by blocking salaries
or b} setting limits on wage increases, for instance. By speaking out or taking
actic~n against this policy, the labor union acts as a natural counterbalance.
[QuestionJ The elections brought the Left back in~o balance. But wasn't this
result achieved by a policy contrary to the one you were advocating? You wanted
' to isolate the communists, but it was by bringing them into the Union of the
Left that Fran~ois Mitterrand weakened them.
[Answer] The Communist Party and the General Confederation of Labor [CGT] are
just the ~ame as they've always been. They suffered a loss of influence. Will
it last? I don't know. What I do know is that basically they have not changed.
By chance I met up with a Vietnamese couple who fled their country in 1978 on
one of those boats we've heard so much about. It was a doctor and his wife, and
they experienced the camps in Vietnam and told me about them... It's terrifying!
The appeasing words of the French Coffinunists do not make me forget that they
- approved of that.
For us, for me, it is a basic issue: it concerns the type of society and men's
place in society. `i'he communists came out of the elections in a weakened position,
and I am delighted about it. But they are still communists, hence objects of
concern.
[Question~ Hasn't the time come to complete the restored political balance of
the Left by restoring the balance of labor un9.ons? Workers Force now has a
number of points in common with the CFDT [French Democratic Confederation of
Labor] and the National Educat~.on Federation (FEN]. Why don't you associate more
closely with them?
[~nswer] We have excellent relations with the leaders of the FEN and the National
Teachers Union. We see each other frequent'1~~. lioth officially and in private,
and our views are similar.
With the CFDT, it's different. Our concepts of a labor union differ. I do not
- mean to question the honesty and sincerity of the CFDT militants. But look at
what has happened in the past few weeks. The CFDT has from all appearances done
= everything it could to infiltrate the government. You can find its men throughout
the wheels of the political apparatus. This is its business. Don't ask me to go
alon~ with itl I told Pierre Mauroy: "We don't want to have one foot in the
g,overnment and the other in the labor union movement." For us, the labor union
should be completely separate from the government and its parties, whatever they
~ are. Otherwise it could no longer play its role as a counterbalance. That
doesn't mean that we are going to complicate the work of the present government.
We have never practiced demagoguery, and we won't begin now.
[Question] Haven't the mi~itants of the CFDT--and the FEN, too (Andr~ Henry was
it.s Gecretary general)-�-grown away from their original organization by penetrating
the government apparatus?
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Fox oF~�ic~n~. ~~s~, orvi.~~
[Answer] Do you really think so? My impression is no. In my opinion, everybody
should stay in their place: it is up to the parties to direct the government, to
us to defend the special interests of workers.
_ [Question] So you refuse any reconciliation with the CFDT, even though it is
clearly drawing away from the CGT?
[Answer.J Look. We had very close contacts with the CFDT about 12 years ago, I
believe. Delegations from the two organizations used to meet every month. At
the end of one year, our representatives came back saying, "We don't know what
these people want." You see, we had neither the same roots nor the same back-
ground, sc~ how could we have the same views? That's how it is! I even made the
commitment not to accept any official contacts with the CFDT until our nation~.1
confederal commi.ttee had deliberated. This is an important committee which groups
together the secretaries of departmental unions and national federations. We do
_ not share CFDT's ideas on self-m.inagement, democratic planning, and such. Dis-
cussions will begin on the occasion of what is called the increase in workers'
rights in firms. We will observe the positions taken.
[Question] So it's a stand-off situation, then?
[Answer] No! A wait-and-see situation. The 10 May and subsequent elections
altered the political situation in the country. They did not upset the relation-
ship among labor unions.
[Question~ How do you intend to behave with the Communist ministers?
[Answer) The same as with the other ministers. We do not contest the right of
the president of the Republic and the prime minister to choose wnomever they wish
as their ministers. This is their responsibility, not mine. So we wlll have
talks with the Communist ministers--that include me, if necessary.
[Question] Aren't you afraid that they are in favor of seizure by the CGT of
- the sectors under their control?
~ [Answer] You know, we have Workers Force unions doing very well in municipalities
held by the Communist Party, which supports my idea that you cannot be t~e governed
and the governing at the same time.
[Question] To conclude, what do you expect from this new administration?
[Answer] Not everything! I do not question its desire to do well. That we can
assume. But I lcnow that the socialist ministers' margin of maneuver is narrow.
France is not a universe unto itself. The serious economic cri~is in the world
did not end the evening of 10 May. It continues and will continue. The older
industrialized countries of Europe have had a monopoly over the manufacturing
business for 150 years. Now they are losing this monopoly, because of profound
transformations which have taken place and continue to take place. Decolonization
for example--we were all for it, naturally. We are delighted that great countries
are entering the phase of modern development. But all this leads to a change in
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the relationship among industrial, economic and monetary forces in the world.
This is why we are more and more convinced of the need to strengthen the European
' Community.
[Question] A united Europe as a remedy to the crisis, then?
[Answer] No, as a way to survive. If we do not achieve concrete results on
economic, financial, industrial and social issues within the Community, we are
going to encounter even more serious problems which can jeopardize democracy and
Yeace. Because our economies are interdependent, we already have no hope of
achieving social progress unless it affects all the countries of ?destern Europe
at about the same time. Is this possible in the short run? The Luxembourg
summit was not very encouraging. Franr~ois Mitterrand's proposals--which I sup-
port--did not receive the response they deserved, even from the social-democratic
governments.
The Workers Force will act intelligently and realistically. We have acted
realistically in the past and been dragged through the mud. The times and poli~ics
have ..hanged, but we will not change our attitude. We will continue to defend
these ideas, because we believe they are fair.
' COPYRIGHT: 1981 "le Nouvel Observateur"
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E CON OMI C FRANC E
PRIORITIES OF PLANNING MINISTRY'S ROCARD DISCUSSED
Paris LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR in French 18 Jul 81 pp 30-31
[Excerpts from article by Franz-0livier Giesbert]
[Excerpts ] How is . it that they are saying at the Elysee ttiat he sulks an~l a't the
Matignon that he is moody? It's not important now, in any case. Michel Rocard
received a letter from the prime minister the other week setting forth his functions:
apparently, they are considerable. In charge of planning, tomorrow he may be nothing
more than a super-cc~~issioner of planning under the president's orders, but he
could also become one of the great zrchitects of the new socialist France.
He knows this. At Rue de Varenne, behind the brand new plaque decorating the door
of the first planning minister in the history of France, Michel Rocard d~~ss not have
the sullen. look attributed to him. On the conCrary, he receives labor unionists,
employers and suggestions with a kind of grandiloquence. From Savary to Chevenement,
his "dear colleagues" in the government have all told him the same thing: "Support
me. Everything is going to go through you." And he takes them at their word, this
man who is called "*_he minister of the futu.re." "We are the receptacle of all the
dreams and all the reforms that the ministries want to enact in a broader framework."
In view of what he has been voicing openly for years, we are not betraying any secret
when we say that the "minister of the future" cannot be enthusiastic about
Mitterrand's and Mauroy's economic and industrial program. He has not, however,
spoken out in the council of ministers against the huge wave of nationalizations.
Along with Delors and Fabius, the other two ministers involved, he even seems ready
to do everything to make "the overloaded boat"--as he would have called it jus*_ a
short time ago--sail. The two-year plan he is fast developing--too fast, because
of circumstances--has no other objective than that. Work begin.s Monday.
"A Burning Obligation"
- And the rep~rt will be wrapped up--botched up, says the opposition--in two months
before being voted on by parliament at the end of the year. In these circumstances,
there is no chance for "democratic planning" in the style of the CFDT [French
Democratic Confederation of Labor]: the government doesn't have the time. But Rocard
has given the following orders for the recruitment of his planning commission:
"I want the least possible number of civil servants!" Just like the Republic, the
planning ministry has left the era of bureaucracy....
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Neither Rocard nor his commission will have carte blanche: just like Matignon,
the Elys'ee intends to keep a close eye on things. For Mitterrand's men, the two-
- year plan is designed to "develop the link between economic transformation and
national solidarity." In its eyes, the government must constantly navigate between
- two perils: on one side, "Saint Simon's temptation" and disorder in campanies; and,
on the other, the "Salvation Arny" syndrome and an exaggerated welfare ::tate,
following the 3ritish modsl. It will be up to the ne~a planning ministry to set
the path between these pitfalls, and to give coY~erence to the structural reforms
which will turn the French economy topsy-turvy in 24 months.
~ The Japanese example has proven that a society can obtain results when it is able
to get all classes of ~ociety to participate in its objectives. The Rocard plan
is tnere for that reason precisely. Moreover, planning was even invented for that
purpose. People has simply forgotten it. A return to the source, then, and to
~ Liberation.
Today the government intends ta revive this plan that was put ~o rest. The entire
government, including Defferre. The enormous decentralization reform will not
destroy the plan before it is even resurrected, or so they say. Naturally, it is
the provinces and no longer Paris that will be deciding on public and community
facilities, i.e., housing and schools. But everything will not be delegated to
the provinces. The main industrial or agricultural policy lines will still be set
in the capital, for instance. Take a look at the Federal Republic of Germany,
a decentralized country par excellence. Legend has it that is has no government
plan. That's wrong: the highly detailed Finanzplanung programs public finance fo~
a three-year period. If the new planning off ice is in any danger, it is that it
would be reduced t~ zero during the implementation phase by Finance and Budget,
as happened under Giscard. The knives are already being sharpened on Rue de Rivoli.
It's a question of habit. And if the budget officials have the final word when
, the Rocard plan is ready to be enacted (Oh! So sorry. I don't have a penny left
for that."), then this plan can be stacked in the attic of planning myths, next to
' the Albert plan.
But there is another danger which is the exact opposite: that the planning ministry
wou13 become a cumbersome bureaucracy with its hand in everything. Philosophically
and pathologically, Rocard can only turn his back on what he calls "the cathedral
plan." Nevertheless, in the next few months the new leaders will have so many
controls at tl~Fir fingertips with the national:izations that they could lead the
country wherever they wished without even having to raise their voices.
"We will have more power," acknowledged one of the president's men. "Our capacity
for error will be larger, accordingly." And it has never been demonstrated that
the plan is always r.ight or the market always wrong. After all, these are
conscientious, wise and of course omniscient high officials behind the concorde
and steel fiascos. Rocard is aware of this. Now he just has to think of what
can act as a counterbal.ance in the decision-making process so that the next plan
(1984-88), the great one of the septennate, will not make the wrong industrial
choices.
Three Birds with One Stone
~ In the meantime, the minister is quickly trying to set priorities for the next two
years. As far as industry is concerned, there are no surprises: first machine
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i~'OR Oh'f~l('l~U. IItiH: (1N1.1'
tools, robatics, telematics ~ind biachemistry will be entitled a boost by the
government. By way of strategy, Rocard will take up the same crusade as Monnet did
35 ycars ago to reconquer the domestic market. Clearly French goods are less and
less frequently "made in France." It is s~ill all right to import soybeans, but
to have a shortage in the meat, poultry and fish sector is incomprehensitle.
We buy our wood abraod while we have immense forests. And the height of absurdity,
lavender is now coming from the Eastern European countries, as is foie gras, while
Italy is bombarding us with chestnuts. If you a11 all this up, it weighs heavily,
very heavily on our trade balance. What~can we do? Well, the government will
try to bring production back up in all these areas. If this is successful, it will
revitalize the economic fiber of dying rural districts, and create jobs or kill
three birds with one stone.
This is only one example of the "shock actions" being worked out today by the
new planners. The "minister of the future" is grinding away on them while discovering
more and more every day that he is one of the four or five men on whose shoulders
the responsibility for the success or failure of the leftist government will rest.
He greets this discovery with a mixture of contentment...and bewilderment.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 "le Nouvel Observateur"
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POLITT_CAL FRANCE
1
I PR~-SOVIET FCF WTNG: PUBLISH, BROADCAST, DESTABILIZE MARCHAIS
Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 11-17 Jul 81 p 32
[Article by Frederic Charpier]
[Text] Some "cri~.ical communists" held a meeting on Wednesday,
8 July, in Saint-Germain-des-Pres and denounced the PCF's mis-
takes that led it to a"subordinate position" within the left,
which has now attained power. Those communists--Henri Fiszbin,
Francois Hincker, Eddy Kenig, etc.--blame the party's leadership
for breaking ranks in 1977 with the PS and since following a dis-
astrous "sectarian" policy. But another diametrically opposed,
pro-Soviet criticism is developing within the PCF. Erederic
Charpier provides us with a very interesting report of a recent,
equally "dissident" meeting of supporters of this other opposi-
tion. Doesn't this dichotomy ultimately play into the hands of
Georges Ma.rchais by enabling him, to justify that he has a clear
conscience, to simultaneously denounce, using a tried and true
method, the "opportunism" on his right and on his left?
In a house in the middle-class, not the red, suburbs af Paris, a very odd meeting
was held on Saturday, 27 June. About 40 cammunists had gotten together on that day
to decide together on the measures to be taken to thwart the party leadership's
current policy. Were these communists nostalgic for the former Union of the Left,
"rightist oppnrtunists," as they are called in the party? I~ot at all. ~Jn the con-
trary, they were pro-Soviet, if not Stalinist, diss:[dents who had met together as
a result of their common belief in the "real socialism" of Eastern countries and
who were very detercnined to try anything to prevent the PCF from continuing to com-
promise itself 3.n an opportunistic government adventure.
There were about 40 militants there, former officials, cadres, elected municipal
officials, journalists, writers and even two federal secretaries, who considered
the political terms endorsed by the PCF leadership, so that four communist ministers
could get into the government, to be warning signals. Since the agreement made with
the PS on Afghanistan, SS 20 missiles and Poland constituted a veritable declaration
of war against the Soviet Union in their eyes, they considered it unacceptable. In
short, on 27 June the party's hard-liners held a sort of "French-style Katowice
forima"--the expression was coined by one of the participants--as the Polish party's
hard-liners did in opposition to the concessions made to the Solidarity trade union.
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'Tlieir objectives: "to destabilize" Georges Marchais, to get the four communist
ministers out of the government and even, if necessary, to establish another pure,
hard-line party. Soviet intervention in Poland, which they openly say is one of
their desires, wou?d aid th~eir plan: "It would be a blessing for the pro-Soviet
French," one of then acknowledged. "Regaining control of the PZPR [Polish United
Workers Party] would cause a split in the PCF, of which we would make the most."
Their plans: first, to establish a liaison report which, like that of Henri Fiszbin
~ and his friends on the other side, would make possible those noted horizontal links
of which the PCF has always been terrified; next, the use of an uncommitted radio
station--perhaps Radio Argenteuil, a city whose communist municipal government would
probably include some supporters of the new revolt. All of this would be done with
tne support of federations which are claimed to be politically "tied to the East,"
such as that of Nord-Pas-de-Calais and, to a lesser extent, tlhat of Bouches-du-Rhone,
- with the added bonus of the "benevolent neutrality" of a CPSU representative in Paris
who, having been informed, has apparently not raised any objection on principle,
but has also not made any further commitment.
Insult Count
How many are they, these dissidents who have placed their future struggles--the plans
have been postponed until after the su~er vacation--under the saintly patronage
of Jeannette Veermersch, the intransigent and also quite forgotten widow of Maurice
Thorez, who has never approved of her party's unified strategy? In truth, they are
not many, and they recognize this. Of course, they noted that at the last Central
Committee meeting, the treasurer of the party, Georges Gosnat, slipped a warning
into his speech concerning the dangers of a break with the Soviet Union. And they
firmly maintain that three members of that assembly of party officials would be ready
to take action with them when the time came.
But they also know that theirs is also an extremely minority movement. For several
reasons: f irst, because they are going against the grain. The communist electorate
forced the party's leadership to abruptly adopt a unified policy which, like it or
not, the majority supported. Secondly, because they ha.ve lost their credibility
by endorsing, with their silence of yesterday, the policy which they condemn today.
"We were wrong to hide under the table and to look like we supported the unified
policy," one of the intellectuals of the conspiracy admitted. "But we are going
to get busy. After all, the Katowice participants are also going against the grain
for the time being."
Finally, the pro-Soviets have been systematically eliminated from the organization's
key positions, at least during the period preceding the cold war between the PCF
and the PS, "in favor of the politicos of Marchais," a municipal cadre grumbled,
bitterly noting the insults swallowed--the least of which was not Roland Leroy's
ouster from the party secretariat at the 23rd congress, "because of Guy Hermier,
a dyed-in-the-wool pro-Soviet, however, who did not hesitate, for personal reasons,
to foster suspicion concerning the editor of L'HUMANITE!" And then there was the
more discreet departure of Henri Alleg from L'HUMANITE's general secretariat. The
author of "La Question" [The Question]--his personal account of torture during the
Algerian War--also a pro-Soviet, must have exhibited some weariness at being assigned
too often to take his party's messages to the Soviet Embassy in protest of some abuse
of human rights in the USSR. This is not to mention a ntmmber of other less important
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pro-Soviets who quietly left the party, discouraged by the incomprehansible fits
and starts of the Marchais policy.
The present dissidents have decided to mobilize themselves on the basis of these
inconsistencies. They will hold another meeting after the summer vacation. But
it is a good bet that Georges Marchais will not let them do it. And that after
striking a blow to his liberal wing, with Henri Fiszbin and his friends, he will
also deal a blow to his sectarian wing to "bring the party back Into line." That
spells trouble for the "great debate" scheduled to get underway in October among
_ the militants. Most definitely, it is very diff icult nowadays to govern from the
center
COPYRIGHT: 1981 "le Nouvel Observateur"
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POLITICAL FRANCE
ELECTION CAUSES, GOVERNMENT FUTURE, PCF, UNIONS
~ Paris PROJET in French Jul-Aug 81 pp 783-798
_ [PROJET roundtable with Jean Charlot, Marcel Gonin, Jacques Moreau, Jean-Luc Parodi,
Hugues Portelli, Rene Remond, and Colette Ysmal] After the balloting of 26 April and
- 10 May 1981, PROJECT organized a roundtable discussion with Jean Charlot (professur
of the Institute of Political Studies in Paris), Marcel Gouin (CFDT), Jacques
Moreau (deputy in European Assembly), Jean-Luc Parodi (CEVIPOF), Hugues Portelli
(University of Paris X), and Colette Ysmal (CEVIPOF). For practical reasons this
roundtable discussion took place before the legislative elections, and the reader
must bear this in mind.]
[Excerpts] Last 10 May France elect~d a socialist president of the republic. Without
tarr.ying over the numerical results, may we analyze the causes of the failure of
V. Giscard d'Estaing and those of F. Mitterrand's victory?
- Jean Charlot: If first of all the first round of 1981 is compared to that of 1974
in percentages of registered voters--for participation was different--a backing
off of both the right and the left in 1981 will be found, in favor of the ecologist
vote, abstention, blanks and voids. But this double backing off'is assymetrical:
the left backs off very slightly (less tha,z a point), and the right loses between
4 and 5 points. Moreover, on the right it is V. Giscard d'Estaing who backs off the
most, while on the left it is G. Marchais. The two major candidates do not enter
the second round with a personal defeat and a much lower working capital of votes;
on the other hand, F. Mitterrand, aside from a personal success and a less serious
handicap than in 1974, by comparison with V. Giscard d'Estaing, has at his disposal
a reserve of ecologist voters, and benefits from the failure of G. Marchais whfic.h
will favor the carry-over of the middle-of-the-road votes.
In the second round, following the recording of the carry-overs of the Communist
Party, F. Mitterrand quite liberally fills the tank with votes from the left, in
- spite of marginal abstention by the communist uoters in certain fiefs of the PCF,
and advances strongly thanks to the electorate of the ecologists. V. Giscard
d'Estaing does not have the advantage of all of the Chirac voters of the first
round; part of them go over to ttie abstention side, even to F. Mitterrand. But even
if the voters of J. Chirac had voted for V. Giscard d'Estaing in the second round,
1 As usual, PROJET will publish in No 158 (Septembe~, October) an in-depth analysis
of the results of this balloting and those of the legislative elections of 14 and
21 June, by Alain Lancelot.
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:~s did ttiose of J. Chaban-Delmas in 1974, the result would have been the same:
his defeat was a for.egone conclusion following the first round.
Th2 deep-seated reasons for this defeat, which are twofold, must be so~ight farther.
First of all, thp outgoing president had broken up his majority. The crisis betweett
RPR and Giscardians had been permanent since 1976, and V. Giscard d'Estaing had missed
- a chance to "stick the pieces back together" in his tnajority after the legislative
elections of 1978. At that time he could have given a more normal share to the
deputies of the RPR within the majority anrl in the government. On the contrary, he
continued to put off the RPR, which was, however, the ma.jority of the majority.
He therefore gave rise to the coalition of the Gaullists around J. Chirac, and,
in the end, the latter's campaign for the presidential election.
The second deep-seated political reason for this failure also goes back to 1978.
After the legislative elections, the president ought not to have kept R. Barre as
chief of the government. The prime minister's unpopularity was such that it was to
_ bring on that of the president. He then did not lrnow how to use the resourcea of
the constitution which make it possible to sacrifice a prime minister in order to
get back one's "political virginity."
These two basic reasons are, of course, in addition to a negative economic and social
setting for the outgoing president who was, besides, the stake of the electoral
campaign.
PROJET: Can V. Giscard d'Estaing's failure be explained by the man's style, strongly
criticized, and because 14 years is too much?
Colette Ysmal: I agree with J. Charlot about the strategies of V. Giscard d'Estaing
regarding the RPR, but I believe his basic error goes back to before 1978, In fact,
he ought never to have given J. Chirac the opportunity to become mayor of Paris,
which provided him with an exceptional forum.
But, in my opinion, there is also an important socioeconomic reason: the crisis
� heightened tensions within society inasmuch as it was a factor of discontent.
V. Giscard d'Estaing showed himself to be incapable of responding to these tensions,
of modernizing the French economy without causing the mdst disadvantaged wage-earners
to have to pay the price for it exclusively. Of course, these tensions already
existed in 19~?, but the legislative elections are a more fragmented type of balloting
(hence moxe difficult for the opposition) and it was a time of much dissension on
the left, which had enabled the r3ght to win once more.
The man's style is based on that: the way in which he held the French in contempt,
not only the masses, but also the political elite, simply speeded up the shifting
movement between power and society.
Rene Remond: In terms of political psychology, there is a surprise effect. It must
be remembered that just a few months ago everybody was betting that V. Giscard
d'FStaing would be reelected without any problem. The causes of his defeat, already
at work, were not readily apparent. So what happened to make them develop there
effect?
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The event of 10 May abruptly reveals things about French society that it d~d not
suspect about itself: it is a skylight opening upon the collective unconscious.
Firsr. of all, there exists a periodic urge towards the renewal of mankind, towards
a change, once a decade, even a limited one. V. Giscard d'Estaing benefited from
this desire for change in 1974: in comparison with the "UDR State" he represented
a novelty; let us remember the "from this day onward a new era has begun" theme
orchestrated by the press and accepted by public opinion. Previously there had been
1958, and since then 1968. France therefore was wanting a change. I also wonder
if keeping the same prime minister in officer for almost 5 years was not a mistake.
For these past few years we had been living with the idea that power constituted an
advantage for the one who held it, as if a situation income were attached to the
exercising of power and guaranteed it an indefinite renewal: this situation is
quite ambivalent; we have ~ust found that out through experience. Added to that
is the fact that while 7 years is long enough, 14 years is far too much: if
V. Giscard d'Estaing had announced that he would shorten his second 7-year term, he
undoubtedly would have obtained s~veral hundreds of thousands of additional votes.
The division of the right-wing parties, a second failure factor, goes much farther
than a quarrel among chiefs. From the day after the elections in 1974 the persons
closest to the president, particularly Mr Poniatowski, assumed the grave responsibility
of attacking ttie Gaullists, of worrying them--enough to alienate them from themselves,
- not enough to destroy them--and then the majority suffered greatly from it.
Anyhoca, this 7-year period marvellously illustrates the ambiguity of liberalism.
, There ~aas a shift from liberal reformism in 1974-75 to a conservative, if not
reactionary policy at the end of the 7-year period. Those who disapproved of the
liberal initiatives of the early days have not forgiven V. Giscard d'Estaing for
them; and the slip towards the right alienated another section of the electorate
fro~: him. More generally, a year ago everybody was thinking that society had a
yearning for security: all of the political formations, except the PS, emphasized
this major theme of authority and security. It was an illusion, an evaluation
error which disrega::ded the French population's desire for liberation.
Jacques Moreau: I will add three comments. Instead of bringing it together,
- V. Giscard d'Estaing, for 7 years, added fuel to the fire of the dissension in the
majarity of 1974. Then the electoral reserves from which he had been henefiting
indeed gradually disappeared because of the steps taken, the liberals first,
the conservatives afterwards. I think that the social categuries which failed him
and provided troops for J. Chirac are not so much the wage-earners as they are the
small merchants, farmers and middle-class people of the cities in the proviTices.
In the end, there were no longer any reserves in the cen*_er: today those ~aho used
to be reluctant to take sides politically have caused a burst in the center, which
is now either behind V. Giscard d'Estaing or behind F. Mitterrand.
Jean Charlot: The new center, in the long run, is ecology, which is now a reserve
for the lef* and no longer for. the right. Moreover, there is another significant
slippage, that of the young people between 18 and 20. The latter, when they voted
for. the right, more often voted for Chirac than for Giscard. Here we can see the
evolution emphasized by Rene Remond between the beginning and the end of the 7-year
period: in 1974 it was the right to vote for youngsters after the age of 18, the
liberalization of abortion and the divorce law; at the end of the 7-year period,
all that was forgotten. When they voted for the left, the young people voted
communist (as compared to 21 percent in 1978). This impressive drop is linked with
the combination of circumstances, and shows a certain political realignment.
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t!Ll~llc'~ ~'~~l'tE~lll: 1 1~~`l{c`\'t` C1l:iL ~~~~:~�;iC~~ .~~1~>:(:ijil~; Illct~lc` :ill~~(~lc'C ct'lJl' I1111 ~+I
~rave cuns~~quences at the heginning uf his 7-year term. He needed to create a
president's party starting in 1974, just as General de Gaulle had done. Now, despite
some attempts to develop the Republican Party, Giscard d'Estaing really did not
want to make it the dominant party, though he had the constitutional means i~r such
action. He did not even devel~p his own political class: at the time of the
elect~~ral campaign of 1981, moreover, he had trnuble forming a new team, and finally
fell back on influential persons of the UDF. For want of a serious political.
structure, V, Gi.scard d'Estaing did not carry out his camnai;n with new themes,
and kept coming back to the image of the autgoing president; he let himself get
hemmed in by the RPR, whereas he could have taken advantage of the fact that, with
each candidate representing one of the major tendencie~, his own was far from being
the worst.
Jean-Luc Parodi: On the interpretation of the event, I believe that the deeper
movements are being forgotten. At the beginning of 1977, the saying was: "At every
electoral voting the left slowly progresses through the socialist party; the communist
party gradi~ally crumbles." And then came the great splitting of each of the two
coalitions, and the disillusion of the voters of the left in 1978. At that time the
prevailing impression was that everything was coming to a standstill. Today the
resumi~~g of a great movement of unity is felt: the crisis of the 1977-80 period has
been erased. On the left, at least, the quarrel of the rival associates, Coluche
and the "band of four," etc. are being erased to go back to a period of hope for
unity.
- Second comment, the absence of alternation in French political life was causing the
desire for change to grow. In all European countries, a very slight propensity among
a ttte younger voters to vote for the left is seen. But in no country of Europe today
is such a distortion between the vote of the youngest and that of the oldest seen,
which proves the wish for change, which very likely will drop again in coming years.
Last of all, I do not believe that there has ever been in the Fiftl: Republic a
president's party, but only presidential majorities with, sometimes, mini-dissidences.
At the beginriing of his mandate V. Giscard d'Estaing came up against the competition
of the ather parties of the maj~rity: he succeeded neither in constructing a truE~
president's majority nor in making a real competition for his benefit. But, in any
case, there was no room for a party of a dominating president.
PROJET: If we t-urn to the other side, can we now explain F. Mitterrand's victory?~
Jean Charlot: BeFore 1978, polls were alrea~iy giving a score of 52/48 percent in
favor of ttte left. Potentially the left thus has been obtaining 52 percent of the
votes for year.s. In 1981, the right lost starting with the first round, but the
left did not really win until the second one. The fundamental factor in F. Mitterrand's
victory is the PCF`s score in the f irst round: the bolt came undone. An so today
we again find hope for tinity on the left, but in a very different way from the time
before the break! It does not proceed from an agreement at the top between the two
_ major parties of the left, but from the base, from a unitarian thrust of the
comm.unist voters, who, with 5ome of them going over to the socialist vote~, thus
"trapped" their party, made it hop un to the left's train which was already rolling
towards victory.
21
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J~~:in-I,iir I':ir~cl t: Uid wi~ n~~t ~~1 rc~~idy ~;e~t fo~~lc~d by the polls of the years 1979-80?
I3c~twc~~�n 1974 and 1978, in all of the palls V. Giscard d'Estaing always emerged as
~fle conqueror (with about 3 exceptions), and the gap between the conqueror and
_ the conquered never exceeded 6 points. After 1978? and above all following the end
of 1979, Giscard d'Estaing's advantage over F. Mitterrand in these hypothetical duels
takes on spectacular pruportions, up to 60 percent-40 percent. These results are
due partially to low mobilization of the electorate of the left by F. Mitterrand;
the c4mpetition between Rocard and Mitterrand within the PS bothers this electorate
and creates the illusion of a much greater domination by V. Giscard d'Estaing.
At the beginning of 1980, when the hypothesis is carried out within the PS and the
candidate becomes know, V. Giscard d'Estaing starts to break down in the polls.
I believe that we have been the victims of an illusion: throughout the whole of 1980,
contrary to poll results, the domination of the outgoir~g president undoubtedly was
- far less strong already.
Colette Ysmal: Something also needs to be said about the contrast between the
campaigns of the two candidate:~. F. Mitterrand succeeded in constit~iting quite a
remarkable image of a chief of government; the theme of "quiet strenth," for example,
greatly impressed the voters by opening up a prospect of change without risk and of
reasonabi2 p~wer. Settling in on top of that is the divine surprise of the
~ommirnist score in the f.irst round, which consecrates the failure of a strategy;
this score lifted the bond tnat weighed upon any possible victory of the left: the
PCF's place within the coalition. The PCF being unable to do anything except quite
simply withdraw, and there being uo programmatic agreement between the two parties,
1. tiitterrand's victory was able to make the unitari.an feelings of the electorate of
the left a thing of reality.
Rene Remond: F. Mitterrand's victory is, in fact, the meeting of a movement and a
man. About the man, I want to stress the reassuring, the security-inspiring aspect
of his personality; his seniority in the opposition even worked in his favor:
for 16 years he had been participating in the legitimacy of power as the moral head
of the opposition. He did not have to make it be forgotten that he had already been
a candidate twice. Finally, the rapidity with which the PS was able to reconstitute
a united front must be emphasized. Ever since the congress of Metz, public opinion
had been living with the idea that the PS was deeply split, and then it had believed
that Michel Rocard's stepping aside was going to weaken and demobilize the party.
It now found itself ~nanimous in its stand in the election battle, at the very time
when the majority could not succeed in overcoming its divisions. The unitarian
feeling theref.ore played a dual role in face of the majority and within the left.
Jacques Moreau: I believe also that political mechanisms now have much less control
over their electorate than they used to. This helped F. Mitterrand at the expense
~f the PCF, but it can help oth~rs in the future. The mechanisms can no longer
decide what they want for an election.
Anottier comment, I think that the internal debates on the left finally helped the
Socialist Party. In the PC/PS polemics, the latter presented the image of a party
inclined to Uecome autonomous, as compared to the ideological and organizational
tutelage practiced by the Communist Party. The internal debate in the PS showed the
French that it could be divided, but above all that it could hold discussions on
various themes, and that F. Mitterrand's great strength lay in bringing all of the
sensitivities together. This strength comes from the fact that the PS gathered ar.ound
him starting in 1971. The two debates somewhat enriched F. Mitterrand's candidacy,
and put a stop to prejudices against him.
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I~Inril ly, t.li~� I'CF'H frillur.~~ in Ll~e~ ~1ryt: r~~un~l ~~rC nl'f llie~ clynr~ml~�H in hfavrir ~~1'
l~. Mir.~crrand. A divergence of 11 points was quite unforeseeable, and this blunt
Fall shows that the PC's Framew~rk is no longer capable of responding to its
electorate's requests.
Hugue~~ Portelli: No doubt the mechanisms have less control over their electorate and
~ven .heir militant basis. For the PCF it must be emphasized that for the first
time in its history the period of united action with the Socialists has lasted nearly
10 years instead of the usual two (1934-36, 1944-46). Throughout this period voters
and militants acquired united front reflexes, believed in "unit5~." The Communist
leaders thou;ht that, as in the past, they could blot all that out by severely
attackin~ the PS. Their 1977 turn, in the end, did not go over at the base.
Francois Mitterrand's strategy weighed heavily in this failure. In the long run the
Socialist leader's campaign began back in 1979 with the PS's congress in Metz.
Presenting himself as a symbol of unity on the left against those who, in the PCF or
in the PS (Michel Rocard) wanted to drop it and make do with division, F. Mitterrand
was able to keep the unitarian voters of the PCF and his own basis which in the
majority had clung to the PS during the mutuGl program period. Once this image was
firmly set (especially with the Socialist project) it was that much easier for him
to spe~.k up for the unanimist approach, and, to reassure the left center, to rely
on tt~p "Rocardians" in the Mitterrand stream.
;
Finally, another success factor, the socialist political class has a will to rise to
power, and was ready to go there, no matter who the candidate was. Unlike the other
parties, the PS on the whole, in the long run, waged a campaign rallying around its
candidate.
PROJET: Perhaps we should go back for a moment to the r~atter of the Communist Party's
blunt fall.
Colet*_e Ysmal: Nobody had foreseen such a clear setback for the PC. A slow crumbling
~aas expected, like the one which h~.d already occurred between 1973 and 1978 and like
what had also appeared in the ].ocal ballotings. This blunt setback is not only the
failure of an anti-unitarian line; it is also that of a lir~e which appeals to purely
reactionary f~elings within French society: the struggle against drugs through
methods of systematic denouncement; attacks agains immigrants. Part of the communist
suPporters chose not to give in to this type of easy argumentation to which the
leaders of the ~aarty thought them susceptible.
Jean Charlot: Th~~ idea of a slow decline of the PCF had been around for some time.
Furthermore, since the beginning of the seventies the party was hesitating between
the strategy of unity and the strategy of "Party first." The year 1958 should have
been remembered: The PCF had already ruthlessly been taken down a peg in the elections,
and ir never fully recovared the electorate lost at that time. So the break was not
impossible, in spite of t;~z PCF's long digging-in process.
In 1981, even if we go back to the arguments of the "useful vote" in the first round,
this v~~te represent:= a deep disagreement between the communist voters and the party,
since t~ie leadersitip was making an appea7. to strengthen the PC first so as to have
a tougher left afterwards. To put the left before the party is, for an entire
segment of the communist electorate, a rebellion. But I believe that the "useful
vote" was very marginal. The young people from 18 to 20, for example, do not,
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it seems, vote for usefulness; now suddenly they abandoned the PCF, as we said,
contrary to their predecessors in 1978. Besides, if there had really been a useful
vote, there sh~�ild have been within the bastions of the PCF a correlative rise in
the vote in f avo~ of F. Mitterrand: now the losses of the PCF are far from being
recompensed by the socialist gains in these districts. The result of the legislative
elections of June will confirm whether or not G. Marchais' failure is truly the
result of a deep and lasting break, as I think it is.
Rene Remond: If we attempt to evalute the results of this election in a long-term
outlook, as J. Charlot urges us to do, we get the feeling that the erosion process
has been going on in the PCF for a quarter of a century. Sometimes this "retreat"
speeds up: in 1958 the PCF lost 30 percent of its electorate, and, as was stated
above, it never got it back entirely. Another big letdown today; but there is no
telling yet at what level the PCF is going to set its retreat line, no doubt half
way between its previous score and the latest result.
Jean-Luc Parodi: If the PCF did not win back a11 of its electorate after 1958, it
is because it no longer has a monopoly on the opposition as it had under the Fourth
Republic. Following 1962-65 it has been in competition with the socialists in the
opposition. I believe that in the long run this explains the crumbling of the
Communist Party.
Tn 1981 the PCF lost about 5 percent in votes. This loss can be subdivided into
several elements. First ~f all, the phenomenon of the useful vote must not be
eliminal-.ed completely. In fact, at the end of the electoral campaign, rumor had it
that the left would be absent in the second round, that there would be a Giscard-
Chirac duel: in face of this risk, the number of communist voters who preferred to
vote for Mitterrand as early as the first round through usefulness can be figured
at 1 percent. Futhermore, the presidential election is quite specific: in 1965,
at the time of the first election with universal suffrage, the absence of a
communist candidate was explained by the fact that this was not a"good" election
for the PCF and that it had been right to be afraid and to support F. Mitterrand.
The election of 1969 did away with that analysis: J. Duclos came out with a good
score, and what was due to the shape of the candidacies inside of the Left made us
forget the specif icity of the election. In 1974 there was no PCF candidate.
The possibility cannot be excluded that the voters ready to vote for the PCF in the
legislative elections do not want to run the risk, however small it may be, of
causing a communist candidate to reach the presidency: because one deputy among
others shares the power, but there is no sharing of the presidency. In my opinion
the PCF's score in the coming legislative elections should not be as low as the time
of the presidential election.
Finally, about F. MitteLrand's image, I should like to point out that a speech
" opposite to that of J. Moreau can be made. In the polls, up to a recent date, that
image was not very favorable, and, in any case, was not so good as that of V. Giscard
d'Estaing. I tend to believe that F. Mitterrand won the election in spite of his
image and not thanks to it. It was only during the last 3 months of the campaign
that F. Mitterrand's image improved in the polls: all told, it is because they are
getting ready t~ vote for him that they stop looking at him with reservations; the
vote that is going to be cast for him amends the image that has been made of him.
And the vote is goi~g to be cast for him because he is the only candidate in the area
of moderate discontent, of tolerable change. Obviously, for these reasons, it
was necessary for F. Mi.tterrand, in his campaign, to facilitate these transfers; I
believe that his support team, from this point of view, was very beneficial to him
in the posters.
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.Je3i1 C~1cir10L: Futh~~rnx~i'C F. T{~CCt'1'I':Ul~~~:: tlll:it;c` 1~':1:: 11~~I :~U t;l+~~~~ 'c15 Ctlt: ~ttl;lSc` ~~I (l.l~
party. For y~ars the Socialist Party has been benefiting from a very good image
in French opinion, which is important for the future. From the start the new
president has at his disposal an extremely popular party, and consequently the
prospect of a president's party, of a PS dominating the left, is possible.
Hugues Portel?i: As for knowing what carried the most weight, the victory of the one
or the failure of the other, I will say that Giscard's failure was more important
- than r. Mitterrand's success. In fact, the latter waged a negative campaign,
evolving around the rejection of the outgoing candidate. It can be said that Giscard
federated the Left thanks to this rejection phenomenon. For the future the problem
of the Socialist Party and the new president will be to transform a negative majority
into a positive majority; the question can be dispensed with in the short term
because the party benefits from the "presidential effect" in the legislative~elections,
but in the medium term it is much more difficult. Of F. Mitterrand's voters, 52
percent are an odd mi~ture which will have to be united.
PROJ~T: Is the new president going to read the constitu~ion in a different way?
Irlhat is presidential power going to be like in face of p,3rliamentary majority?
. Jean-LL~ Parodi: This election provides us with several institutional lessons.
The first two have to do with the past.
First of all, this election paradoxically revealed the hidden face of parliament.
On the eve of the elections of 1978, V. Giscard d'Estaing had said that he would
not be able to do anything, if he should find himself face to face with an assembly
of the Left. Similarly F. Mitterrand recently declared that he would not be able
to govern with an assembly of the Right. Thus, as soon as the assembly has a clear
majority, having a will and a chief, it is even stronger that the president. Second
victory for parliament, V. Giscard d'Estaing's failure to maintain a ti,omogenous
majority coalition. In European democracies the government is composed in proportion
to the tendencies of the parliamentary majority, and the leaders of the parliamentary
groups are generally represented in the government. Under the Fifth Republic, from
1962-66, the proportion of the Gaullist and Giscardian ministers is more or less
tiie image of their representation in the national assembly. From 1966 to 1969 the
proportior.alir.y remains respected, but the principal leader of the small party of
the majority, V. Giscard d'Estaing, is excluded from the government; his position-
taking for the referendum of 1969 is enough to bring about the electoral failure and
cl~