JPRS ID: 9910 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400040022-9
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• Document Page Count: 47
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 22
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/~9910
13 Augu~t 19a 1
Sub-Saharan Africa Re ort
p
FOUO No. 735
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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JPRS L/9910
13 August 1981
SU8-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT
FOUO No. 735
CONT~NTS
IN TE R- AFT~I CAN AFFAI RS
BRGM Activities in African Countries
(MAR(HES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, lU Jul 81) . . . . . . 1
Nairobi Su~it May Lead to Afro-Arab Su~it
(Samir (~arbi; ,TEUNE AFRIQUE, 29 Jul 81) 6
OAU, ECA Compete for Economic Policy-Making Role
(Samir (~a~i; JEi]NE AFRIQUE, 22 Jul $1) 8
Interventions in 1980 of West African States Central Bank
(MARQiES TROPICAUX ET 1~DITERRANEENS, 24 Jul 81) 10
Shortfall in Drought Control Aid Bombshell for Sahel
(NEW AFRICAN, Jul 81) 12
Outlines of New FrEnch African Policy
(MAR(HES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 10 Jul 81) 14
Political Realities Will Slow French African Policy
(Mark August Nyirenda; NEW AFRICAN, Jul 81) 17
Briefs
Rice for Africa 2p
AN GOLA
Relations With Mitterrand Government Viewed Auspiciously
(San Fie; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 20 Jul-2 Aug 81) 21
Briefs
Relations With France 24
- a- [III - NE & A- 120 FOUO]
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B URUN DI
Briefs
Conflict With Zaire Denied 25
Rural Development Credit 25
CAPE VE RDE
Military Relations With Portu~al Reportedly Impossible
(AFRIQUE-ASIE, 20 Jul-2 Aug 81) 26
GAB O~I
Briefs ~
Concern About Sao Tome 28
MALAWI
B rie fs
Air Link Wi,th France 29
Studies on Ethanol Production 29
- MALI
Central Bank of Mati Reporics on Eoonomic Situatian
(MARQiES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 24 Jul 81) . . . 30
NI GE RIA
Briefs
No Preferential Oil Prices 32
Airline to Benin 33
Cooperation With Greece 3:~
Currency Reserves, Liquid Assets 33
Indus trial Output 33
UPPER VOLTA
Five-Year Plan Ob jectives Discussed
(MAR(~iES TROPICAUX ET ME~ITERRANEENS, 24 Jul 81) 34
ZAI RE
Mobutu Takes on De Beers Over riiamond Exploitation
(Jean Pourbaix; POUI~QUOI PAS?, 16 Jul 81) 37
Foreign, Domestic Activity in 0~.1 Operations
(MAR(~iES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 26 Jim 81) 40
Briefs
N guza To P ub lish Book 43
- b -
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INTIIt-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
BRGM ACTIVITIES IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES �
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1861, 10 Jul 81 pp 1814-1815
[Ar ticle--passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics or boldface]
[Text] In its annual report for the fiscal year 1980, the /Geological and Mineral
Prospecting Office (BRGM)/ first of all notes several striking facts about the
period in question, among which one will find, regarding Africa: the first concrete
development of a mining pro~ect in francophor.e Africa with Poura (Upper Volta);
- commendable technological advances in the Dikulushi and Dourekiki pro~ects, res-
pec tively in Zaire and Gabon; the clarification of BRGM's position in the /Tenke-
Fungurume Mining Company/ (Zaire) with the turnover of 26.5 percent of the shares
to the /General Campany f or Nuclear Materia ls (COGFMA)/; a resumption of activities
in southern Africa with the start-up of a prospecting operation in northern
Mozambique; and the completion, under the auspices of BRGM, of some 400 local
community water projects in six francophone African countries and in Guinea-Bissau.
One also notes that the ffitGM advisorp role on the /Red Sea Commission/ has been
renew~d for 3 years.
The report then elaborates on a sectoral basis on the activities carried out in
the period. We have extracted the following data on ovarseas France and Africa
from this report.
/--Mineral Resources./ With reagard to the /provision of mining services,/ in
- /Guyana,/'the work accomplished under the first 5-year program has be~n consoli-
dated, and a map (scale 1: 500,000) of mineral deposits has been published.
Evidence has been discovered of signif icant reserves of kaolin in the Charvein
reg ion. Gold operations have expanded, and one exploration proposal (Changement)
has been presented to the mining operators. Prospecting for diamonds in the Inini
basin has he~ped delineate a new zone where the alluvia have sometimes shown
promising ore content. Finally, the geological mapping of the Upper Oyapo+~k basin
has been completed.
In /New Caledonia,/ prospecting has covered three main areas: the southern part
of the territory (granitic-diorite in the chrysolites), the western �aa.st
(ba salts), and the central chain.
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The countries of /francophone Africa/ remain closely associated with the BRGM in
activities supported by the ministry of cooperation which completes ~fforts made
by the states to develop their natural resources. Some of these operations axe in
the nature of resource identification and classification, and some are directed
toward the study in greater depth of already-discovered mineral deposits, the
development of which could ameliorate the short-term economic position of the
country. Financing from Europeaa sources sometimes complements that of the minis-
try of cooperatian: for example, in the survey now under way in southwest
/Cameroon/. In /West Africa,/ phosphate prospecting has been resumed in a more '
comp lete and systematic way, wi~h the object, /in Senegal,/ on the one hand, of
discovering new deposits that would make it pos~ible to increase present exploita-
tion, and on the other hand, of developing confirmed indications along the river
with a view toward regiona~ development; in /Guinea-Bissau,/ of producing ev3dence
- of sufficiently large deposits to ~ustify new exploitation; in /Mali,/ (Tilemsi) of
local or regional utilization of good-qua.lity, easily assimilable phosphates.
In /Upper Volta/ systematic exploration of possible evidence of gold deposits in the
Gangaol region has been started, and so far results have proved encouraging. In
/Gabon,/ surveying operations in the Nyanga region have continued. In /Burundi/
and /Equatorial Guinea/ general exploratory operations have begun, and are among
- other things making use of geochenical methods.
In another f ield, BRGM has continued to assist in the administration of mines in
/Zaire,/ through the mining mission that has been second ed to the country's authori-
ties.
Since 1975, France's cooperation policy has been extended to new countries and
gets financing provided by the ministries of industry and foreign affairs. In
/Sudan,/ prospecting missions have found new indications of gold and base meta].s,
, while the f irst studies made of similar indications and of tungsten deposits
conf irmEd their commercial interest. In /Tunisia/, investigation of the lead-zinc
potential in the north central region has continued, in association with the
National Mining Office; the encouraging possibilities f ound in 1979 have been con-
firmed. The stratigraphic and mineralogical study of the antimony deposi*s in
central /Morocco/ has continued.
With regard to /mineral prospecting/ in /Guyana,/ several formations have been
discovered in the Adieu-Vat sector, in wake of the deta iled work intended to pin
down the depth of the mineral deposits. In /New Caledonia,/ the prospectj.ng for
chrome by means of surveys carrieci out in association with /SLN [expansion un-
- knownJ/ of four sites in the southern part of the territory ha.s not produced
evi.dence of economi~ally exploitable reserves.
In /francophone Africa,/ prospecting centers around phosphates, iron, gold, and
base and alloy metals, and the work is often carried out in joint efforts. In
/Mauritania,/ prospecting for phosphates is being carried on in the southern part
of the country; it complements the work undertaken by Senegal along the riverbank,
as part of a cooperative effort. In /Senegal,/ BRGM has continued to support the
/MIFERSO [Eastern Senegal Iron Mining Company]/ corporation of which it is a
~ share-holder, in the assessment of the Faleme iron deposits, as it does in
/Cameroon/ with respect to the development of Kribi's iron depositG as leader of
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- the consortium; these two very .different projects are important to the economies
of both these countries. In /Upper Volta/ (Black Volta consort~ium), in /Gabon/
(Eteke consortium), in /Mali/ ~Kenieba and Kangaba regions}, and in Senegal
(SABODALA), prospecting for gold has continued in hopes of rapidly obtaining
. concrete results. In /Ivory Coast/, exploration for base metals has been carried
out based on data provided by an aerial electromagnetic survey. Diamond prospect-
ing has continued under partnership arrangements in /Gabon/ and /Ma.li/ under dif-
ficult conditions, while tungsten was the object of a prospecting effort in
_ /Cameroon~ and /Rwanda/. Finally, prospecting for talc has continued to ma.ke good
progress in /Gabon./
- With respect to /mining projects/, among the operations being carried out by
COFRANIINES [expansion unknown] are:
--Gold from Poura, in /Upper Volta:/ COFRAMINES ha.s replaced BRGM as a share-
holder of SOREMT, which holds this gold vein. SOREMI has asked the help of
COFRAMINES in e~loiting tYie site. Construction work began in early 1981. The
- annual production from the seam will be on the order of 2 tons of gold.
--Tin from Kania~ in /Zaire/: this deposit of alluvial tine contains more tha.n
3,000 tons of cassiterite with an ore content of about 1 kg per cubic meter. A
start-up agreement was signed in August 1980; its ratification in early 1981 will
' make it possible to begin development of the site, which will be exploited through
- a company called SOMIKA.
--Chromite from Tiebaghi, in /New Caledonia/: reserves in this deposit are
estimated at 400,000 tons of extractible Cr203. In partnership with the /Dong-
Trieu Mining Company/ as part of a local New Caledonian affiliate, COFRAMINES in
1981 will contribute to the total of investments for exploiting the deposit,
alongside PARIBAS and INCO.
--Gold from Ity, in /Ivory Coast/: the feasibility report has been turned over to
the Ivorian authorities, who have accepted it. A start-up agreement is presently
being discussed by the authorities and COFRAMINES, which has taken out an option
on the project. The mine should produce 1.7 tans of gold in 7 years.
BRGM has for its part continued or undertaken the development of several deposits,
including the North-Caledonia project (/New Caledonia/). The study of this mining
and metallurgical project (about 30,000 tons of mickel per year) is being led by
COFRENIIrII, of which PROMINES, a subsidiary of BRGM (51 percent) and Amax (49 per-
cent), holds 90 percent of the shares. COFRENIl~II holds deposits in New Caledonia
~~ti.mated at 2 million tons of nickel metal, the richest ore being found in the
northern part of the territory (deposits at Tiebaghi, Poum, Art). The year 1980
was devoted, on the one hand, to a preliminary economic evaluation of the pro~ect,
and on the other hand to the development of a hydrometallurgical processing tech-
nique.
In /French Polynesia,/ BRGM has acquired SOGEREM's share (26.5 percent) in /GIE
Ra.ro Moana/ which is presently developing a phosphate deposit located on the
atoll of Mataiva (15 million tons at 33 percent PZOS). BRGM has thus became
responsible for a program to be carried out in 1981, which involves among other
thin~s an attempt at dredging (for ore) as well as various studies.
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In the field of /mineral exploitation,/ one finds the following points made
about Af r ica :
_ --/The Senegalese Phosphate Company of Taiba/ (15.6 percent owned by COFRAMINES):
the campany at the end of 1980 began exploitation of the new Keur Mor Fall deposit
and has improved its yield, increasing reserves by an additional 3 years. By
contrast, the considerable growth in the costs of exploitation, the slump in the
price of the phospnates despite their good quality, added to the completion of the
_ largely self-financed investment program, may produce some serious cash flow
problems.
--/Mining Company of Ogooue/ (owned 1~.6 percent of COFRAMINFS), in Gabon: though
1980 saw a slight decline in production, the volimme of sales remained as in 1979
at a good level (2.3 million tons), and the total of dividends distributed over
the 1979 and 1980 fiscal years was back up to the level of the years prior to 1978.
Two other important factors should be mentioned about the company. COMILOG [Mining
_ Company of Ogooue] is trying to improve its trading position in ferro-manganese by
acquiring a position in industrial networks. Moreover, the financial recovery of
the Gabonese state should make it possihle for it to increase its participation
in COMILOG's capital. ~
It should also be noted that the /Mining Company of Goma./ (owned 70 percent by
SEREM) in Zaire has begun the exploitation of the small deposit of alluvial tin
at Kalimbi.
Among BRGM`s /service company/ subsidiaries, /SOCOMINE (Mining and Industrial
Cooperation Campany,/ (50 percent owned by SEREM) has as its principal client the
/National Industrial and Mining Company of Mauritania,/ which it provides with
continuing technical assistance in the exploitation of the Zouerate iron deposits
and the development of the proposed exploitation of magnetite "hillocks."
SOCOMINE has also gotten involved in helping MIFERSO in Senegal.
--/Energy Resources./ With reagard to /"high-energy" geothermy,/ the initial phase
of geophysical reconnaissance in /Martinique/, financed by the ministry of indus-
try, has been completed, while the geophysical work and gradient drilling on
/Reunion/ continued. In the Republic of /Djibouti,{ an initial geophysical study
f inanced by the Aid and Cooperation Fund [FAC] has been completed on the Assal
f ield.
--/Water management, environment./ The exploitation of subterranean water con-
stitutes an important facet of BRGMRs activity abroad, particularly in arid
countries. Under this heading, its involvement it 1980 was concentrated on
/Africa and the Middle East/ as in previous years. BRGM has tried to respond
to the needs, whether in provision of technical assistance, assessing exploitable
resources, or in carrying to a conclusion, either alone or in partnership, con-
crete water supply or irrigation pro~ects.
With regard to /technical cooperation,/ specialists have been seconded to the
water management authorities in Morocco and Senegal for the preparation of water
drilling programs and their coordination. Similar activities are under way in
Guinea, Somalia, and with ACSAD.
4
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In the field af /hydro-agricultural development,/ BRGM participated in various
projects along with French companies $pecializing in agronomy or economy. This
type of operation, which is going on in Syria and Saudi Arabia, requires BRGM
to have sufficient understanding of drainage and irrigation techniques to be
abl~ to integrate the work of multidisciplinary teams.
The campletion of /village wells/ has become one of the specialties of the office,
and African countries call on i~~ extensively, because of its use of effective but
inexpensive techniques. BRGM is generally involved in pro3ects as overall pro~ect
director under authority delegated to it by the water authorities. Thus, in 1980,
the office supervised the creation and equipping of some 400 works in Cameroon,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Upper Volta, Niger, Senega7., and Togo.
Finally, BRGM is often called on to resolve many spot problems in urban and indus-
trial water supply. The Douala study (Cameroon) is worth singling out. Ca.rried
out jointly with /BCEOM [Central Study Office for Overseas Equipment]/ and
/SEURECA [expansion unknown]/, it has demonstrated the econamic competitiveness
of a subterranean water resource by providing the drinking water supply of a town.
One particular activity of BRGM should be mentioned in relation to /seismic and
volcanic hazards./ In the Antilles, studies of the seismo-volcanic hazard in the
area centered around Pelee mountain and the Soufriere have been continuing, using
cartography, Carbon-14 dating, analysis, and electrical soundings.
BRGM's Organization
/BRGM/ is a public enterprise of commercial and industrial nature which, beyond its
purely French missions /(National Geological Service)/, undertakes, directly or
through its fully-owned subsidiary /SEREM (Company for Research, Prospecting and
Exploitation of Minerals)/, min~ral praspecting all over the world with inter-
national prospecting teams: its prospecting work covers all metallic, non-metallic,
and energy substances, with the exception of oil.
With the help of the National Geological Service in processing the ore discovered,
and of. its mining research offices and its economists, BRGM can make a complete
evaluation of deposits. When thay seem to be profitable, BRGM makes available,
through the /French Mining Company (COFRAMINES)/, an enterprise af which it owns
68 percent of the capital, the necessary financial resources, and contributes to
the outfitting and then to the exploitation of mines located in various countries.
--The board of directors of BRGM is chaired by /Jean Audibert,/ assisted by
/Claude Fre~acques,/ his deputy. The general manager is /Paul-Henri Bourrelier./
African operations are headed by /Andre Papon,/ and /Georges Clair/ is responsible
for North Africa, Asia, and Oceania.
Jean Audibert is also president and general manager of SEREM and COFRAMINES.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.
9516
CSO: 4719/176
S
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
NAIROBI SUNIlrIIT MAY LEAD TO AFRO-ARAB SUNlNIIT
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1073,29 Jul 81 p 33
[Article by Samir Gharbi: "Towards an Afro-Arab Su~it"]
[TextJ Afro-Arab cooperation at last might be able to get out of the rut it has
been stuck in since the Camp David Israeli-Egyptian accords in December 1978. The
Arab countries in effect insisted that Egypt be excluded from ehe OAU. But Sadat~s
country, a full-fledged African state, preserved its right to take part in all
gatherings of the Organization. The XVIIIth summit (Nairobi, 24-28 June 1981)
even reaffirmed this right in a resolution. Given these circumstances, it has not
been possible since 1978 to organize any meeting of OAU heads of state and govern-
ment and those of the Arab League. 5uch a meeting would have given new impetus
to relations that are presently limited to Arab financial aid that is viewed as
the opposite side of the coin of African support in the Arab-Israeli confl~ict.
Such a meeting is needed to open the way to "total cooperation" that is greatly
desired by all. "Total" means c.oncurrently economic (investments, energy and
- trade) and cultural.
Meetings
One of history's ironies is that it was in Cairo, in March 1977, that the first
Afro-Arab summit was held. It was in Cairo that the ~oint political institutions
and the charter for cooperation were adopted. Heading the list was the summit
that was to convene every 3 years. Other provisions included a plenary conference
of foreign ministers (one session every 18 months) and a 24-minister standing com-
_ mittee, half of them named by the OAU (the committee of 12) and half by the Arab
League. The African committee set up at the time included two countries belanging
simultaneously to the two camps: Egypt and Algeria.
Both coimmittees did in fact meet twice a year: in Yaounde (Cameroon) and in
Cairo, in May and November 1977, then in Niamey (Niger) and Kuw ait in June and
December 1978, i.e., the time of the Sadat-Begin accords. Since that time the
meetings have been suspended and cooperation has occurred only on the bilateral
level. African heads of state and ministers have visited Gulf State sovereigns
and often readily obtained donations and credits. In March 1981, however, OAU
Secretary General Edem Kod3o and Arab League Secretary General Chedli Klibi con-
trived to convoke in Khartoum (Sudan) the coordinating committee, the fourth
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Afro-Arab institution after the st3nding co~ittee. It was done on the initiative
of Chedly Ayari, president of the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa
(BADEA).
Replacsments
Then ca~e the first manipulation of the mechanisms of the Cairo Charter. And it
was the start of a thaw, with the expectation that at the summit in Nairobi the
OAU would make the "right" changes in the makeup of the African committee of 12.
And so it was done. Algeria and Egypt were replaced by Morocco and Tunisia.
Egypt's deputy minister of fareign affairs, Boutros Ghali, took the unfortunate
occurrence in stride. Anyhow, the opponents of Camp David hadn't the audacity
this time to seek the exclusion of his country from the African organization. A
number of delegates simply walked out of the hall when he took the podium. This
raised the hackles of Gabon's representative who exclaimed: "When are we going
to make peace with Egypt?"
Banisliment
Nevertheless the fact remains that those in favor of politically reactivating
cooperation by excluding Sadat's government were a ma~ority at Nairobi. The;- are
also more "realistic," since the Arab financial manna is in danger of spoiling.
Moreover, if the standing committee that will meet in Dakar in the month of Nove~
ber fails to give definite shape to the hopes for "total" cooperation, then it
will perhaps be necessary to go even farther with Africa's banishment of Egypt
by calling a restricted su~it meeting.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981.
CSO: 4719/217
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INTER-AFRT.CAN AFFAIRS
OAU, ECA COMPETE FOR ECONOMIC POLICY-MAKING ROLE
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1072,22 Jul 81 pp 28-29
[Article by Samir Gharbi: "ltao Rival Step-Sisters"] .
[Text] It may be that the Nairobi African summit has found the beginnings of a
_ solution for the thinly-veiled rivalry between the OAU and the ECA (U.N. Economic
Commission for Africa). Certainly the request of the heads of state for both
- secretariats to set up at once a"joint annual program" in the economic sector is
a first step in that direction. But it remains an uncertain settlement since
there is an absolute abyss separating the points of view taken by OAU Secretary-
General Edem Kodjo and ECA Executive Secretary Adebayo Adedeji regarding the
respective roles and responsibilities of the two organizations as well as their
methods of cooperation.
Authority
The conflict started in 1976 when the OAU's general secretariat was assigned an ~
economic role. At the time, however, it was just a devout hope. It would spark
rivalry only once the special sum~nit at Lagos (April 1980) adopted an economic
action plan and entrusted its implementation to the Secretary General of the OAU �
"in collaboration with the Executive Secretary of the ECA." The latter would
have preferred it the other way arouizd: itseif being made responsible for carry-
_ ing out the program in collaboration with the Secretary General of the OAU."
Despite the personally warm relations between Tog4's Edem Kod~o and Ghana's
Adebayo Adede~i, the clash of responsibilities broke out a year later.
On 4 May 1981, Edem Kod~o forwarded to his ECA counterpart his work program for
the 1982-1983 term and asked him for his comments. In a lengthy letter including
an attachment (a 29-page table) setting out the respective programs of the OAU
and the ECA for the same term, Adebayo Adedeji made his reply on 20 May. Duplica-
_ tion, claimed Adede~t, even plagiarism of some of the ECA's programs. He con-
cluded that cooperation between the two secretariats would be quite restrtcted.
Consequently only 9 of 32 of the "food-agriculture" program's projects proposed
by the OAU's secretary general could be managed jointly since the ECA's work pro-
gram already encompassed the others. For industry this applied to only 6 projects
out of 30; for technology, 2 out of 21; for energy, 14 out of 21; aad, lastly,
_ for transportation and communications, 3 out of 32. Hence the "recommendation"
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of the ECA's executive secretary that the cost of the OAU's program, reckoned at
32 million dollars, be trimmed.
This showed a lack of coordination, no doubt, ar_d a clash of responsibilities.
But it was foremost a clash of authority. After all, it is possible to avoid
duplication among the respective projects. What remains to be determined is who
from the OAU, a continental organization, and fr~m the ECA, a regional commission
of the UN, is to be the chief architect for implementation of the African economic
program. In his letter of 20 May, Adebayo Adede~i maintained that he had never
_ constr.ued the Lagos summit resolution "as meaning that the ECA was to play a sub-
ordinate and secondary role" vis-a-vis the OAU as program initiator.
Reconciliation
He goes even further wh~n commenting harshly on the action proposed by Edem Kodjo
as a result of the La~os Plan. For instance, the action for industry strikes him
as "especially meager." At the same time the ECA "has gone beyond the stage of
grand intentions" and is concentrating "on definite projects." The ECA's execu-
tive secretary likewise is critical of the "industrial planning and policy" sec-
tion of Kodjo's program. In his words, it appears to be "more concerned with
studies and discussions that are past history instead of the with the future."
Finally, Adebayo Adedeji is upset over Edem Kodjo's plan to restructure the OAU's
_ general secretariat by endowing it with "highly qualified personnel" in the field
of economics. He believes that such a procedure would strengthen the OAU's eco-
nomic calling and would diminish the ECA's role. In shoxt, for Adedeji, the OAU
should throw its political and diplomatic support to the activities of the ECA
whose mission it is to come up with solutions for economic problems "with a strong
political bias" such as supervision and regulation of multinationals, law of the
sea, remote sensing, the intra-African i~nvestment system, etc. Accordingly, the
ECA's executive secretary champions the creation of a special ~oint team to elimi-
nate the "duplication" existing between the two 1982-1983 work programs and the
establishment of an independent four-member commission to study the details of
mutual coll3boration.
The formula suggested by the African governments in Nairobi bears a close resem-
blauce to the above proposals: joint preparation of a yearly work program,
mobilizat~on of the resources required for financing it, and a report on imple-
mentations drafted by each of the two secretariats. A special five-member com-
mittee should resolve the differences, analyze and adopt the yearly programs,
and lastly evaluate the progress realized by the two secretariats, in the inter-
ests of a reconciliation. Is this only a devout hope that is using technicalities
in search of its realization? The conflict itself is highly political: the OAU's
general secretariat comes under the purview of the African heads of state; the
ECA's executive secretariat comes under the UN. The real problem is determining
who it is that can spell out an economic policy for Af~ica. The solution is not
up to either Edem Kodjo or Adebayo Adedeji. It depends, rather, an a political
will that involves stating whether it is the OAU or the UN that has the primacy
when it comes to Africa.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981.
CSO: 4719/216
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~ INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
INTERVENTIONS IN 1980 OF WEST AFRICAN STATES CENTRAL BANK
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1863, 24 Jul 81 p 1936
[Text~ The West African States Central Bank (BCEAO) recently published a general
statement of its various interventions during 1980.
The monetary policy guidelines established by~the Council of Ministers of the
West Af rican Monetary Union (UMOA) for 1980 stressed the need to stem the reduction
in the central bank's foreign assets and to restrict the growth of its demand
monetary commitments in the interests of upholding the value of the common currency.
The year 19~0 was a tough f iscal year by v3rtue of its spare economic performances
and its renewed structural disequilibriums, and it put the agency of issuance in
the center of adjustment actions. As a result, the central bank was faced with a
delicate balancing act between monetary requests from businesses, banks and
_ national public treasuries that were victims of acute liquidity crises, on the
one hand, and the need to maintain the value of the currency, on the other hand.
By 31 December 1980, total central bank monetary interventions for the entire
union amounted to 542 bilYion CFA francs, including 95.7 billion in advances to
national treasuries.
The following table su~narizes, in billions of CFA francs, the growth and allocation
since 1977 of BCEAO monetary interventions:
1977 1978 1979 1980
Benin 9.3 11.3 18.2 25.7
Ivory Coast 169.6 179.2 234.2 346.8
Upper Volta 9.9 15.7 13.7 13.8
Niger 1.8 9.6 17.0 21.4
Senegal 53.1 75.0 88.9 112.2
Togo 13.5 14.2 20.5 22.1
Total 257.2 305.0 392.5 542.0
In Benin, 1980 was marked by the national treasury's partial disengagement from
the agency of issuance.
In the Ivory Coast, central bank assistance to the government underwent a sizable
increase. So did total refinancing of agricultural credits.
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In Upper Volta, increased credits for the economy were halted by virtue ef a slight
growth in the economy.
In Niger, assistance for the treasury more than doubled at the same time that the
commercial banks, benefiting from a noticeable improvement in their funds, resorted
less to the rediscount.
In Senegal, reduced assistance to the government was more than offset by the
sizable grow~h in assistance to banks and financial institutions.
In Togo, the treasury's indebtedness to the agency of issuance showed a momentary
decrease at the same time as commercial bank refinancings grew.
Among all six member states of the UMOA yearend overall situation of credits for
the economy grew from 1977 as follows (in billions of CFA francs):
31 December 1977 911.8
31 December 1978 1,099.4
31 December 1979 1,278.1
31 December 1980 1,446.7
For each of the years 1979 and 1980, refinancing assistance by the agency of
issuance totaled, in billions of CFA francs:
31 December 1979 31 December 1980
Refinancings to benefit the economy:
Agricultural credits 129.3 161.8
Ordinary credits 206,9 284.5
Total 336.2 446.3
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreaux et Cie, Paris 1981
CSO: 4719/237
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
SHORTFALL IN DROU(~iT CONTROL AID BOMBStIELL FOR SAHEL
London NEW AFRICAN in English No 166, Jul S1 pp 25-26
, [ Text ] A SCHEME aimed at controlling drought the diabursemeut of caeh was substanti-
in the Sahel ie $2-billion short of aid ated by CILIS E:ecutive 3ecretary 3eck
funde with only 16 months to go before Mame NDiack. He esid the committee
the end of the five-year plan. Thie was guilty of errors in cash programmin8
bombshell wae dropped in a review of the and strategy planninB. The committee
Inter-State Committee for the Control of hae admitted to beinB ill-equipped and
Drought ia the 3ahe1(CILL3) on ite Firet unable to plan. design, implemeat, man-
Generation Programme. age, or evaluate pmjects. �
. Aid figuree have dropped dramatically Donors ehould be heaitant to eeriously
for CILIS. In 1977-78 it received only 57 oommit money to aa organieation which
per cent promised aid. Thie fell to 43 per ia so helplees, eepecially ae it coneumea ~
cent in 1978-79. In 1979-80 it shrivelled aid with zeso returns for its commeree-
' to 19 per cent. Negotiationa and re- minded helpers. Teething mietakee caa
arrangement of prioritiee and better be underet~ad in any organisa~tion. But
- request doeeiere led, in 1980-81, to cash the budget CILy.S ie asking cannot
grante being raieed to 69 per cent. tolerate mistakes, eepecially when the
Deepite thie, the pragramme remaine capital abeorption capacity of all
drastically ehort of target. , Saheliancountriee ia eo dangerously,low.
Donore, who form the Club da Sa'~el ~ Total depeadence on international sid
founded in 1978, have not yet met their put the committee at the mercy of donors.
undertaking to complete the 300 national Wit,1n all Sahrlian eoonomiee in the red, it
and regional pmjecta in Cgpe Verde, the leavea the committee unable to contri-
~ Gambia, Mali, Niger, 3enegal, bute toward ite own development. It
Mauritania, Chad, and Upper Volta, . could flex no muecle when the Arab
which form the Sahel. donora, including 3audi Arabia, ineisted
Club membera endoreed tPie -food, on distributing their aid themselvee to
_ livestock, fisheries and development pro- couatries of their choice, rather than
jecte ia agreemente drawn up in meetiags leave the prerogative to OuagadouBou.
in Dakar, OEtawa, Ameterdam, aad Living conditione of the 3ahePa 36-
- Kuwait. The principal membera involved million people ase deplorable. They
are EEC couatriea~ Arab oil e~orters, desperately need 890,081 tona of graia.
World Food Cauacil, UN Development They frequently have to fight tlood
Programme and ~nd for International horrore. Political inatability ia an added
Develo~pment. dif~iculty for the secretariat. The civil
CILIS hesdquarters in Upper Volta's war in Chad and the movement of
capital, Ougadougou, claims the lack of refugees has compounded the probleme,
caeh backing for donore' ex~reeaed inten- making obeolete some long-term pla.ne
tione at thoee meetings has delayed and caeh projectione.
numeroue projecte. In fact, it hed neceesi- The Kuwait meeting warned that the
_ tated the Amsterdam meeting in 1978 to region will increasingly be competing
re-study the obstaclea to club funding and with other non-oal-producing areae for
to the optimum uee of the donations by funde in the 1980'e. Ita record of equip-
Ouagadougnu. The donore'soncera about ment abandoned in the fields or on the
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roeds, the diversion of funds by gweia- An ecology-foreatry team met in
menta from original programmee anei Niamey and Dakar ' in 1979 and now
recurrent cwita can hamper CILI3' awai+s funding for the revieed plan to
chances in the gro~wing competition for cater for the Sahelian population's needs
cash. in, forestry producta, the control of the
But the secretariat hae had oonaidsr Sahara which ia fast mwing south, and
able sucxeee ia alleviating haidehip ~ad eafeguards against the ravages of dry
eettiag parta of the 3ehe1 on a develap- weather. The Gambian Bar}jul, Declam-
mant courae. The Firet Generation Prog- tion, which ~ stresses the need for the
ramme hea fiaanced 23 of the 41 village preservation of flora and fauna, is
and paatoral water aupP1Y P='ol~ a~ regarded by CILLS as a major atep
hae plana to iatenaify the vital develop- towa.rds an improved ecology.
ment. It ~ hae conducted a country by It is ividely believed that CILLS muet
country e~eeeament of cattle bt~eeding court the participation of the Arab oil
and marketing and haa aubmitted exportera to cut down dependence on
reporta to the Food and Agriculture Weatern donors. But CILIS Chairman
Organieation on animal health ead Mouesa Traore, Preaident of Mali, is nat
liveatock. convinced that Araba who depend on
CILL3 ie to alert the Sahelian popula- Western industry for their own develop-
= tion to the importance of Seh diete. ment would be fully rnmmitted to inveat-
National fiah projecta are underway and ' ing in the Sahel, which cannot guarantee
a fiaheriea centre has been establiehed returns.
with available echolarehip in thia field. The outatretch�d hand syndrome ofthe
The aecreCariat hae intereeted the West aid-eeeking Sahel looka to be a perma-
German Government and the US Agency nent one. The beggar-giver relationehip
for International Development in par- between the Sahel and the Club du Sahel
ticular. A big concern of the committee is ia embarraesing. The region's creditwor-
the increasing amount of once arable thiness and its pol~ical instability make
- land that ia becoming deeert. donors ahy away. If the 3econd Genera-
~rrigetion and the ecology are high on tion Programme is to take-off, the
the priority list. Since the Sahel's serials secretariat will have to tighten not only
_ production is 95 per cent dependent on its manpower and diplomatic resourqes
rain, the booet in irrigation and damming but ot~'er donora proof of new-found
projecta have assured a cut on rieke. managerial ability~
COPYRIGHT: 1981 IC Magazines Limited
CSO: 4700/294
_ ~
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
- OUTLINES OF NEW FRENCH AFRICAN POLICY
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MIDITIItRANEENS in French No 1861, 10 Jul 81 p 1803
[Commentary: "Outline of a New French Policy for Africa and Development"]
[Text] Little by little, in interviews and through statements made by Claude
Cheysson and Jean�-Pierre Cot in tl~e exercise of their ministerial responsibilities,
the principles that will guide French policy toward the developing world and toward
Africa in particular are becoming clear.
- In remarks made recently before the economic and social council, the minister of
cooperation and development identified four leading ideas that will guide his
activities.
In the first place, France will refuse to reduce problems of development to the
problem of the rivalry between the two superpowers. It would quite simply be a
mistake to think that every Third World demand for a reduction of inequalities,
or agrarian reform, or any nationalization of foreign capital is necessarily in-
spired by Washington or Moscow. On the contrary, it is in the interest of the
developing countries to escape from bloc politics and in the interest of France
to help them to achieve this objective of freedom.
The countrie~ of the Third World must also be free to choose their model of
development. The disastrous situation facing the ma~ority of them is in part the
result of the orientation given their economies:by the outside colonial powers and
the rupture of the social fabric which resulted from it. This phenomenon was
aggravated by the development policies adopted by a number of states, particularly
in Africa, after their accession to independence, poli~ies aimed at reproducing
the industrial model of the West or the East.
So the developing countries should be able to develop, if they so desire, along
lines that are "autonomous, endogenous, and self-centered." This is the second
leading idea set f orth by Jean P ierre Cot, who elaborated on their substance in a
statement made 27 June before the forum of non-governmental organizations. Self-
centere3 development is development "centered on internal needs, which implies in
some cases a break with the international ~arket." It should enhance the capa-
bilities of the states to surmount their difficulties, especially in the food
sector. In order to get such a program under way, developing countries must first
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of all make use of their own strengths, bath by building up their base communities
_ and by improving cooperation between and among the states of the Third World--
cooperation that is sametimes labeled "South-South"--wi-.ich could take the form of
big regional economic groupings such as already exist in Africa and as have been
called for on the continental scale by the Final Act of the La.gos Conf erence,
adopted by the f irst economic "summit" of the Organization of African Unity [OAU]
(28-29 April 1980).
The concept of development implies, in the field of agriculture, an end to system-
- atic production for export and an emphasis first of all on production for domestic
needs, the encouraging of inethods to diversify food production--aquaculture for
example--and supporting integrated production models, or in other words striving for
for complementarity between agr3culture, stock-raising, aquaculture, industry, and
energy. In the field of industry, it is not a question of abandoning Western tech-
niques, but of inserting them into a development effort based on the domestic
dynamics. Priority should be given to industries ma.king production goods and to
"development" industries, that is industries oriented toward the sa.tisfaction of
domestic needs.
- The consequences of such a policy, 3oined to the increase in the cost of energy
and raw materials, are not lost on Jea.n-Pierre Cot. They could result in the
short term in unemployment problems in France, and in the longer term in "an
alteration in our own type of growth." It is necessary, therefore, and this is
the third leading idea, to take a broader view of our evolution in terms of plan-
ning, predicting, and organizing those alterations that everyone agrees are in-
evitable.
Finally, the wealthy countries must unequivocally accept the idea of a dialogue
with the developing countries hased on equality. This fourth leading idea was
expressed in concrete terms by Claude Cheysson, the minister of foreign relations,
in an interview in a political weekly: "As for France's policy in Africa," he said,
"it will be carried out, to be sure, and we will fully assume all our responsibili-
ties. However, one basic principle will guide us: never again will France take a
position or an actior. in the Third World--especially in Africa--without taking full
cognizance not only of what authorities in the country in question think--tha.t
much is obvious--but aiso of the views of neighboring countries also involved.
What happens in Ndjamena or Managua should not be decided in Paris. Or for that
matter in London, Bonn, Washington, or Moscow. Before doing anything, therefore,
we will always start off with uride consultatians with the iiiterested principals.
This is in no sense a disengagement- Mr Cheysson is at pains to empha.size this--
- but rather French renunciation of unilateral action. "I certainly hope," he adds,
"that we shall never intervene, especially with force, except where we have the
agreement and support of other powers, especially those in the region. In Ndjamena,
f or example, our intervention would have been completely different if it had been
part of an inter-African force, however minimal. And if a hundred African soldiers
had been alongside our own soldiers in Ndjamena, would the Libyan invasian of the
city have been inevitable?"
Far from trying to reap all the profits for herself of an independent policy,
France will try to join together with all its regional European partners and to
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work with them to promote "bold initiatives" concerning the Third World, from
which, Mr Cheysson reminds us, we import 75 percent of our raw materials, and to
which the European Community exports 40 percent of all it sells abroad, and which
also represents the only expanding market France has had since the f irst oil shock.
Beyond the commitment of the president of the republic to double political assis-
tance to the Third World, these statements put an end to the questions that had
been raised by the publication of PS documents which did nr~t represent cammitments
of the French Government. 'They ~xpress a long-term view of the new relationships
which France intends to maintain with Africa and the developing world--relationships
which remain at the heart of French policy cancerns.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.
9516
CSO: 4719/176
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
POLITICAL REALI'~IES WILL, SLOW FRENCH AFRICAN POLICY
London NEW AFRYCAN in English No 166, Jul 81 pp 13-14
[Article by ~rk August Nyirenda: ~~~y ~tterrand Must Go Slow in Africa"]
~Te~~ PORTRAITS of Valery Giecard d'Est~- terrand may be~ he faces a number of
ing, the fallen matador, etill abound on formideble obetacles, not least of. which
the streets of Parie. It is now just over two will be French economic intereste. It ao
months aince the conaervative President happena that the opposition Gaulliets
lost to a Socialist candidate, Francoia have considerable fma~hcial iateresta in
Mitterrand. There are aome obeervers Afric~?�
who believe that Giecard's purauit of a The fact ie that much will depend on
controveraial policy on Africa may have the outcome of the parliamentary elec-
had somet~ing to do with hie defeat. . tione in which, of courae the new
~ President will want his 3ocialist Party to
~ ' gain a m~jority. That me41ority haa been
T~L@~ CSII~O~s the preserve of the conaervativee who
It is not surpriaing, therefore. that have uaed it to back French activitiea in
several African countriea count them- Africa. 3hould Mitterrend get the metijor-
aelv es among the potential benefactora of ity in the Houae, he will be better
the new political climate in France. For ~~PP~ ~ implement hie policiea.
the victory of the socialiete in the ~e ~~~8tives are lesa compelting. If
presidential elections marke a watershed the 3ocialiet Party farss badly and fails to
in France's relatione with develaping ~~e ~1)ority, it might make a deal
countriea, partic�larly its formerAfrican with the communiets� Parti Communist~e
colonial miniona. Twenty-three unpre- F~nncais could demand to have eignific-
gnated yeare of FYench rule by the ant representation in the French Gov-
rnnservatives have taken their toll. ernment.The other alternative could
During this period France's misadven- come about if the conservatives retain
tures in Africa have been rnnsiderable - their majority. In that c~ase the Preaident
never hesitant to show the rest of the would rule by decree until freeh el'ections
world that it conaidered iteelf Africa'e were held in a y~ar.
policeman. In terms of the constitution of the fifth
But the soeialist win ia not necesearily French Republic, President Mitterrand
good news for all thoee with whom Parie could, to some extent anyway, rule by
has dealinge. Indeed Mitterrand'e victory decree. But observere believe that a
may leave some of the dependent pro- coneervative majority would constantly
Weetern African dictatorahipe consider� f~~te the implementation of socialist
ably vulnerable to internal oppoeition to policies.
their rule. Neverthelesa, many African �
gwemmenta will tr~ad cautiouely as A~1'@d~0=L
~hey re~appraiee their attitudes towards At the Uneeco conference on eanctions
France. � 8gainst South Africa in Paris laet May,
Well-meaning though President Mit-
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eecretary of the French 9ocialiet Party, are mostly with its former Fra~cophone
Lionel Joepin said the new government African coloniea, with the exception of
would do everything posaible to ensure South Africa and Nigeria. France's trade
that Namibia gained independence along with South Africa am~unta to less than
the linee of United Natione Reeolution one per cent of its total foreign trade.
435. . Black Africa's trade with France
Jospin, who was epeaking on behalf of amounts, to 10 per cent of total French
the party, denounced Pretoria's "aggree- foreign trade.
aive policies", the nature of whoee
apartheid-based power conetituted "a (i8II~0II
threat to peace aad a fundamental
obstacle to the development of th~ The view of some African political and
African continen~". Jospin added that th� diplomatic observera is that it will be
new goverament in Parie would suppo~rt eometime before France will be able to
the halting of ~a12 tiade with Namibia implement ita new policy changes. These
while the territory remained under quarters are therefore adviaing caution
South African administration. and not to expect tc?o ~nuch too soon from
President Mitterrand's government Paris. It haa been pointed out, for
haa hinted at plane to atop buying ita instance, that it would take the French
uranium from Rossing in Namibie. Thie sometime to untangle themaelvea from
comea at a time when the French are their economic tiea w~th South Africa.
reportedly scaling down their nuclear The apartheid state presently ranks as
programme and temporarily suspending the fifth largest French market in Africa
nuclear weapone teste. Even eo France after Algeria, Morroco, Nigeria and the
will etill be able to get ita uranium on the Ivory Coast. '
world market, where there ia a glut. Mitterrand himaelf has stated that he
Running in tandem with ite plans to would like to eee French ~aid to the Third
eignificantly reduce ite importe of South World. Elaewhere in Africa, the focus of
A&ican goade, ae well ae a total embargo French policy is likely to be on develop-
on the sale of arms to 3outh Africa. ment. The new government is known to
rrench weapona are currently made be in favour of increased aupport from
under licence in South Africa. Jospin, ~Western industrialise3 nationa over the
commenting on the imposition of sanc- NorthlSouth. debate. In this, President
tions againat the Pretoria regime, added Mitterrand will be strongly influenced by
that "they must be paired with increased Foreign Minister Claude Cheyson, a
support for the frontline countries". former Commiseioner for Developing
Jospin's atatement was followed by Fore- Countries in the European Economic
ign Minister Claude Cheyson saying that Community (EEC) - a man who hae been
France would provide diplomatic and decorated by eight African governments
political support to African liberation and ia a atrong supporter of.liberation
movementa. movementa.
France importa 4,000 tonnes of Such ia the calibre of Cheyson that as
- uranium oxide a year from South A&ica EEC commiseioner he refuaed to meet
and Namibia. The figure is expected to South African delegates viaiting Brus-
rise by an extra 1,000 tonnea a yenr when slea becauae of a personal feeling of
a new uranium mine comea on atream in repugnance for apartheid.
1984. According to estimates, French Mitterrand himself hae stated that he
importa from South Africa amount to would Iike to aee French aid to the Third
five-billion French francs. They include World daubled.
gold and other minerals and textiles - There is a growing feeling among
and agricultural praduce, mainly fruit. African leaders that the Americana,
Meanwhile, French exports to South personifiedintheimageofthereationary
Africa stand at an annual four-billion Reagan Adminiatration, may now deem
francs and include machine tools, electri- it timely to take over from the French as
cal equipment and spare parts. Africa's uninvited policeman. The US
The French will probably analyse the has been active in North Africa, where it
trends that emerge at thia year's Organ- has aet up a bridgehead for its Rapid
isation of African Unity (OAU) eummit Deployment Force ~(RDF). Now it is
before they crystaliae their own Africa reported that American interest in milit-
- policy. At present, France's economic ties ary facilities has percolated into Sudan.
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The Americana are already present in port to the Polisario, a movement that
East Africa, operating from Kenya, while hitherto has not received support from
their presence in the Indian Ocean seema the French Government. The French now
to be pernianent and increasing. expected to tilt towards Algeria while
France's relationa ~with the Fran- easing relations with King Hasean of
cophone African bloc is likely to remain Morceco.
unchanged for some time, though Paris Clearly the new African specialists at
may later re-negotiate defence treaties the i~uai d'Orsay (the Whitehall of Paris)
with some African countries. It is clear wi11 be lookir~g to Nigeria - a country
that France is against military opera- which over the year has not bothered to
tions of the type in which it sent its troopa conceal its contempt for French activities
to prop up the tottering regime of Za ire's in Africa. The French may try to show the
President Mobutu Sese Seko, whoae Nigerians that they mean to change their
troops were besieged during the Shaba image by applying pressure to get a
invasion by former Katangese gen- solution over the Namibian dispute.
darmes. It remains to be seen how Paris will
deal with Lagos and Libya as both those
Coatempt countries re-appraise their thinking
about France.
All in all, it is probable that Africa will
With the continued tension between benefit from the expected policy changes
Algeria and Morocco, Mittenand is in France~
expected to turn his government's sup-
COPYRIGHT: 1981 2C Magazines Limited
CSO: 4700/294
.
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
BRIEFS
RICE FOR AFRICA--Will azolla, a water fern, help West African countries attain
self-sufficiency in rice? Studies conducted in Dakar by the Overseas Technical
and Scientific Research Bureau (ORSTOM) indicate that the plant, which is a
familiar sight in the ricefields of China and Southeast Asia, appears to be an
eff.errive fertilizer. Laboratory tests have demonstrated that azolla has a
nitrogen-producing potential of 55 kg/hectare while what is needed is between
90 and 150 kg/hectare per harvest. Although less promising in the fields, the
tests remain encouraging: rice grown together with azolla and preceded by an
application of nitrates (15 kg/hectare) yields a harvest of 5 tons/hectare
versus a current yield of 1.3 tons. Large-scale use of azolla could bring about
a perceptible reduction in purchases of nitrate and paddy fertilizers. It is a
fact that rice consumption in the 15 countries -that are members of the West
Af rican Association for the Development of Rice Growing continues tu increase.
On a yearly per capita basis it averages 18 kg. In Liberia and in Sierra Leone
it can be as much as 100 kg. So, imports have tripled in less than a decade.
[Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1072, 22 Jul 81 p 32] [COPYRIGHT:
Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981.J
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ANGOLA
RELATIONS WITH MITTERRAND GOVERNMENT VIEWED AUSPICIOUSLY
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 244, 20 Jul-2 Aug 81 pp 57-58 .
[Article by San Fie: "Dos Santos Message to Mitterrand"]
[Excerpts] Carrying an important personal message from the president of the
People's Republic of Angola, Minister of Planning and Foreign Trade Lopo do
Nascimento, member of the MPLA Central Committee, had a long meeting on 3 July
with Pierre Beregovoy, secretary general at the Elysee Palace. The Angolan
president's special envoy, accompanied by Angolan Ambassador Luis de Almeida,
took advantage of his talks with Beregovoy to make a tour d'hoxizon on African
" questions, notably those pertaining to the security and stability of Southern
Africa, threatened by the systematic aggressions of Pretoria's racist regime.
- The Elysee secretary general, who was assisted by Guy Penne, in charge of
African affairs, and Regis Debray, in charge of missions at the Elysee secre-
tariat, made a point of reaffirming President Mitterrand's official positions on
South African policies, of stressing his intention to forbid French arms sales
to Pretoria and of protesting the policy of agartheid imposed by the Botha
gove rnment .
Following his meeting with Pierre Beregovoy, Lopo do Nascimento met with Jean-
Pierre Cot, minister of cooperation and development. Discussions centered on
Franco-Angolan relations, which Cot views in the light of the new conceptions he
had masterfully developed in his 9 June speech to the economic and social coun-
cil. This speech had made a profound impression on the Angolan minister.
Lopo do Nascimento's visit constitutes one of the first meetings between an
African official and the new French authorities. In the light of the importance
attributed by French authorities to a new concept nf relations with the Third
World--and more specifically with Africa--there can be no doubt that the results
of such a meeting were a test of Paris' intentions as to the definition of a
policy of cooperation genuinely free of the paternalist and colonialist tinge
adopted by the former regime.
The initial French political declarations on Namibia which firmly denounced South
Africa's racist and aggressive activities against Southern African countries,
portend an important change in behavior and approach to the prob lems pertaining
to the national independence of the region's nations.
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r
In this same vein, it would be useful to recall the great i~nport of Jean-Pierre
Cot's statements to the press or the economic and social council. They contained
- an unequivocal denunciation of certain relations between the former French regimes
and the Third World and a new and open concept of cooperation, development and
equality between nations of unequal development.
Indeed, it is in these two new fields--political and economic--that the changes
which have intervened in France will be gauged, not on the continua.tion and even
an increase of commercial relations. However great their importance, commercial
exchanges cannot be an end in themselves in the relations between the Third World
- and the industrialized countries. Known and recent examples of changes in com-
mercial relations which had seemed to be under the most auspicious marks are
numerous enough to demonstrate that the consolidation of frank and trusting
political relations alone can provide durability and the indispensable warmth ~
between nations.
To be sure, it will not be easy to perceive the Third World as more than just an
immense market and not to mix foreign and trade relations. But the stakes of a
new approach to international relations are too important to be overlooked.
Indeed, if it were only a matter of trade relations between nat~.ons, isn't it
evident that Angola has been amply successful in diversifying its exchanges,
offering several European count~ies the chance to develop such relations? In
the course of only 3 years, firms and trade organisms from various countries
have converged on the Angolan market, known to be vast and promising.
Had not the former French regime successfu~ly attem~ted to develop trade rela-
tions to become, in 1980, Angola's fourth largest partner, and to sign contracts
worth nearly 1 bill~on Fren~h francs through the intermediary of French firms?
Amplitude and Durability
In 1981, French exports to An gola could reach the billion mark, placing thia
counzry ninth or tehth in France's relations with Sub-Saharan Africa, up from
21st in previous years. French com~anies, fully supported by the banks and
credit organisms, have found a country that is sure of itself, rich and
promising.
However, it is not sufficient to hold important commercial positions in a country
to modify political relations. Beyond the Namibia problem and the arms sales to
South Africa, beyond the support granted to certain opposing factions in Angola,
this country rejected a whole conception of relations between France and Africa
which could but limit the development of agreements between the two countries.
That is why it is important to stress Angola's declared intention to hold rela-
tions with France, not within a mercantile context, but in the framework of a
kind of cooperation that both parties will have to jointly outline. To attribute
the needed amplitude and durability to future decisions, Angola immediately pro-
posed that this should take place in the context of a 5-year agreement of
cooperation. Undoubtedly, such an approach will be profoundly enriching for
both countries, which would jointly develop co~on actions.
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The Angolan desire to adumbrate a policy of friendship based on meaningful anti-
colonialism is apparently very deep, as is the wish for a complementarity of
interests and for an independence well ~derstood by both sides.
As long as commercial relations will be viewed within the framework of a generous
and healthy international cooperation, no one will regret the fact that they wi11
continue cm a positive basis.
COPYRIGHT: Afrique-Asie 1981
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ANGOLA
BRIEFS
RELATIONS WITH FRANCE--Guy Penne, in charge of African affairs at the Elqsee
Palace, will visit Luanda in mid-August. This is his first visit to the People's
Republic of Angola; he will be accompanied by Regis Debray, in charge of missions
at the Elysee secretariat. Guy Penne will hold talks with Angolan authorities on
the entire spectrum of Franco-Angolan relations, and particularly on the serious
threat to Angola following the numerous armed aggressions by the racist Pretoria
regime. [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 244, 20 Jul-2 Aug 81 p 21]
[COPYRIGHT: Afrique-Asie 1981]
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BURUNDI
BRIEFS
CONFLICT WITH ZAIRE DENIED--President Bagaza gave a press conference in Bujumbura
on 30 June, the eve of the 19th anniversary of Burundian independence. The chief
of state announced that Burundi would be given a new constitution. The text, al-
- ready adopted by the central co~ittee of the Uprona Party, is ready and will be
made public very soon. The text of the constitution will be submitted to a ref-
erendum. If it is accepted by the people, it wi11 be promulgated immediately.
On foreign policy, Col Bagaza denied that there had ever been a troop concentra-
tion along the Zaire-Burundi border: "There are really no border problems between
Zaire and Burundi, and for good reason: the present borders have long been recog-
nized. The border between Zaire and Burundi is exactly where it has always been
since the 1800's. There has not been any concentration of troops at one part or
_ another of the border, rather the Zairian army has been combing the Zairian border
regions. There was never a violation of the borders; Burundi has moved the cus-.
_ toms buildings that have been under construction for 2 years, but they are still
in Burundi territory", [sic] said the chief of state. At the recent OAU [Organ-
ization of African Unity] su~nit i.n Nairobi, Presidents Bagaza and Mobutu agreed
to create a 3oint security commission to reassure the people of the border re-
gions and tell them that there was no border conflict between Zaire and Burundi.
jExcerpts] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French I~o 1861
10 Jul 81 p 1839] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 9516
RURAL DEVELOPMENT CREDIT--The International Development Association (IDA), a sub-
sidiary of the World Bank, has just granted Burundi a credit of SDR 16.2 million
($19.3 million), which will be used to complete a rural development project in
the Kirimiro region, in the central part of the country. Some 28,000 agricul-
tural families.affected by this project should receive assistance in improving
coffee and foodstuff production. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1861 10 Jul 81 p 1839] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et
Cie Paris 1981] 9516
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CAPE VERDE
MLLITARY RELATIONS WITH PORTUGAL REPORTEDLY IMPOSSIBLE
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 244, 20 Jul-2 Aug 81 p 13
[Text] President Pereira and the head of the Portuguese state reviewed many
aspects of the cooperation between Cape Verde and Portugal during their meeting
in Lisbon at the beginning of June. This meeting resulted in a series of agree-
ments between the two coim.tries pertaining to specific sectors such as the
assistance to maintain the lighthouse network on the islands, formerly under the
command of the Portuguese navy, which still possesses naval maps indicating
their position.
However, no military cooperation agreement was signed, and Cape Verde is in no
way preparing to establish such ties with Portugal, without this being a hindrance
to Praia maintaining the best relations with this country.
Given the large Cape Verdian community residing in Portugal--some 40,000 people--
permanent coordination between the two countries is naturally indispensable.
President Pereira's private visit of friendship to Lisbon coincides with the
reservations expressed Uy Cape Verde about its adherence to a mu~tual defense
pact between the ECOWAS countries--of which it is a member. These reservations
led Cape Verde to refuse to sign this agreement, recently ratified in Lome, and
this coincidence led commentators to draw the wrong conclusion. Some of them
even affirmed that "Cape Verde was tur_ning its back on Africa and addressing
itself to Lisbon."
In fact, the reasons for Praia's refusal are to be found elsewhere. The fact of
not joining the ECOWAS at a high level of military co~rdination derives, for
Cape Verde as for Guinea-Bissau--which also re~used to sign the mutual pact--
from the very nature of these two countries' armed forces. Essentially born from
an army of liberation, the PAIGC's, these armed forces which were common to the
' two countries up to 14 November 1980, have preserved a marked "politico-military"
character. Moreover, they are in the process of being reorganized since Cape
Verde and Guinea-Bissau went their separate ways.
_ Additionally, the traditional ties dating from the anticolonialist struggle thar_
the~e armies maintain FTith socialist countries significantly differentiate them
from other a rmies in the region.
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At any rate, according to Cape Verdian authorities, it is neither opportune nor
indicated to envisage any kind of military integration in the present phase
- since geographic and demographic conditions limit the development of a conven- ,
tional arnry .
COPYRIGHT: Afrique-Asie 1981
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GABON
BRIEFS
CONCERN ABOUT SAO TOME--Omar Bongo has expressed to the U.S. Government his con-
cern over the reinforcement of the Soviet military presence in Sao Tome and
Principe. Zhe Gabonese president believes that the region's balance of forces is
seriously threatened. He took advantage of his visit to Washington in mid-June
to s.ound the alarm. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1072, 22 Jul 81
p 35] [COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981]
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MALAWI
BRIEFS
AI~ LI;dK ~JITH FRANCE--Durin~ the first term of this year, civil aviation
ofiicials prepared an accord between Fra.nce and Malawi which should enable
UTA /-Air Transportation Union 7to use Lilongwe for intermediate landings
in tfie spring of 1982, for botFi passengers and air freight. The new inter-
national airport of Lilongwe will be opened in the fourth quarter of 1981.
Construction costs exceed 450 million French frcncs. This is a Class A sir-
port according to ICAO standards, equipped with a runway 3.5 km long and
~:5 ~r'? wide capable of accommodating 500 passengers an hour at peak periods
and comprising modern facilities for receiving and handling freight. The
, future direct link between France and Malawi is certain to contribute to tr.e
development of relations in many domains between the two countries. /-Text 7
/-Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEr'~',S in French No 1857,12 Jun.81
p 1606 7/-COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981_7 121L:9 ~
STUDIr.S ON ETHAAiOL PRODUCTION--Malawi, which experienced a shortage of gaso-
line at the beginning of the year, has made up its mind, like some other
enclaved countries on the African continent, to use alcohol (ethanol)as a
substitute fuel. To this end, the Et~tanol Company Limited was recently
formed. Its capital, 2.25 million Malawian kwachas, is distributed as fol-
Iows: Oil Company of Malawi (Oilcom): 30 percent; Investment and DevelQp-
ment Banic of Malawi (Indebank): 23: pe~cent; KfW /-fteconstr~:c~tion Credit
Bank (FRG); 19 percent; Jager and Associates (Zimbabwe): 10 percent;
IFC: 9 parcent; Dwangwa Sugar Corporation: 9 per~ent. The plant, which
should begin production at the beginning of 1982, will produce about 5 million
liters of ehtanol a year and thua make it possible to save the equivalent of
1.5 million in currency a year. /-Text 7/-Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MED'
TERRANEE.~JS in F~ench No 1857, 12 Jun 81 p 1606.7 /-COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux
et Cie Paris 1981, 7 1211t9
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MALI
CENTRAL BANK OF MALI REPORTS ON ECONOMIC SIT[JATION
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERR~NEENS in French No 1863, 24 Jul 81 p 1938
[Text] In its latest quarterly bulletin the Central Bank of Mali furnishes some
latest indications of the way Mali's economic and monetary situation has developed.
Marketing of the chief agricultural products of the 1980-1981 harvest involved
108,100 tons of cotton seed (-42,400 tons compared with the last harvest),
27,500 tons of peanuts (-10,800 tons), 22,000 tons of corn, millet and sorghum
(-3,700 tons) and 57,300 tons of paddy rice (-1,600 tons). At the start of the
harvest buying prices from producers were r~ised, in Malian francs and per
kilogram, from 50 to 70 for corn, millet and sorghinn, and from 62.5 to 75 for
paddy rice. Income distributed among the rural population come to 11.9 billion
Malian francs for cotton seed (-4.6 bi113on), 2.2 billion for peanuts (-0.7 billion),
1.5 billion for corn, millet and sorghum (-0.2 billion) and 4.3 billion for paddy
rice (+0.6 billion).
Since 1978 foreign trade has developed as follows, in billions of Malian francs:
1978 1979 1980
Imports 128.6 152.9 183.9
Exports 50.4 62,7 85.9
Def icit 78.2 90.2 98
Among 1980 imports oil products accounted for 35 billion. Malian francs (compared
with 23.6 billion in 1979) and grains took care of 12.4 billion (+5.7 billion).
Among exports, the modern sector supplies 45.5 billion Malian francs in r.evenues.
Of th is total, 43.5 billion comes from cotton: fiber, yarn, fabrics and cakes.
Livestock exports account for 25.1 billion (traditional sector).
The general balance of payments for 1980 shows a deficit of 51.4 billion Malian
francs (versus an equally negative balance of 25 billion for 1979). The deficit
for goods and services is: 112.2 billion, attenuated by 60.8 billion in foreign
assistance endeavors.
At the close of December 1980, bills and coins in circulation amounted to
- 81.8 billion Malian francs (+~.9 billion compared with the close of 1979).
Total demand and term deposits in the banking system, includ3ng postal checks,
come to 62.5 billion (+2.7 billion over the year).
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Conversely, credits for the economy came to 164 billion Malian francs (+9.8 billion
compared with the end of 1979). Furthermore, credits to the government totaled
111 billion including 98.2 billion taken over by the Central Bank of Mali (versus
109.2 billion at the end of 1979). State corporations account for about 71 percent
of short-term credit use.
Also, at the end of December 1980, net foreign assets shawed an excess of commit-
ments worth 105.5 billion Malian francs in exch ange value, versus an insufficiency
of 100.3 billio n one year earlier.
The budget for fiscal year 1980, based on revenues of 76.8 billion Malian francs
(+11.1 b illion comp ared with the previous budget) and on expenditures of 79.4 billion
(+6.9 billion), shows an anticipated def icit of 2.6 billion (versus 6.8 billion in
1979). Apart from the budget, foreign debt taken over by the Autonomous Amortiza-
tion Fund totaled 7.3 billion Malian francs (+0.5 billion).
'I11e general index of constuner prices for food products rose in 1980: a 14.5-percent
increase for products sold by consumer coops and a 22-percent increase on the
open markets.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981
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NIGERIA
BRIEFS
NO PREFERENTIAL OIL PRICES--Late in June the Nigeria National Petrolewm Corpora-
tion had ~nce more confirmed that the country had absolutely no intention of
lowering the price of its oil. On 3 July, after having been sub~ected to ever-
increasing pressure from foreign oil companies, the company categorically denied
- the allegations published by the press, and notably by the NEW YORK TIMES, that
it had had begun making sales at preferential prices. These allegations followed
the decision--which, moreover, was not accepted by Libya (which decided on a
$1.10 per barrel reduction in the price of its crude, starting on 1 July)--made
on 22 June at Hassi-Messaoud, in southern Algeria by the African members of OPEC
(Nigeria, Libya, Algeria, Gabon) to maintain their prices at about $40 per bar-
rel. Nigerian production, which has been in a serious decline since the begin-
ning of the year (MTM of 26 June, p 1717), allegedly declined to its lowest level
in May, and the figure of 1.3 million barrels per day has already been put for-
ward for that month. It was believed in oil circles, however, that a slight
upturn would occur in June. But that augmentation may be only temporary, inas-
much as in June the companies were obliged to ta~.e out all of their quarterly
(April to June) quota. It should also be noted that, if Nigeria has up to now
remained almost unha.rmed by the first months of the oil crisis, it will be quite
different by the end of the summer. Exchange reserves have reportedly already
been impaired. For example, the idea is not discounted in business circles in
the capital that the authorities may be obliged to take major steps in the next
2 months: limitation of imports and even, possibly, devaluation of the currency.
In fact, people are recalling the 1977 crisis and the severe measures to which it
led at that time. It is estima.ted that from 1 January to 31 May Nigeria produced
an average of 1.75 million barrels per day, which brought it $10.3 billion, the
state receiving $38.9 on a$40 barrel. Now according to the budgetary predic-
tions based on production of 1.9 million barrels per day, revenue should have
been on the order of $10.32 billion. Nigeria has thus fallen $20 million short
of its predictions. Nevertheless, the difference is much more striking if one
compares the period with the predictions in the fourth 5-year development plan
(1981-1985), which were based on daily production of 2.19 million barrels per
day. According to that plan, oil revenue should have been $17.3 billion over
the last 5 months, which means a deficiency of $1.6 billion by the end of May.
According to capital business circles, the national development plan is already
being revised. Nevertheless, according to the interim director of the NNPC
[Nigerian National PeCroleum Corporation], Mr Odoliyi Lodomari, Nigeria--the
second biggest supplier to the United StaCes after Saudia Arabia--is having no
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trouble selling its oil and has reportedly already found new buyers. jTextJ
jParis rLARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITF.RRAN'EENS in French No 1861 10 Jul 81 p 1$29]
_ jCOPYRIGHT: Rene rioreux et Cie Paris 198L] 9516
AIRLINE TO BENIN--Proposed Link between Port Harcourt and Cotonou by Nigeria
Airways. Nigeria Airways plans to establish a weekly flight between Port .
Harcourt and Cotonou, the capital of Benin. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX
ET MEUITERRANEENS in French No 1861 10 Jul 81 p 1829] jCOPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux
et Cie Paris 1981a 9516
COOPERATION WITH GREECE-Theocharis Rentis, the Greek secretary of state for
foreign affairs, made a 4-day visit to Nigeria in late June and earZy July.
During his visit, a framework agreement on economic and technical :.ooperation
between the two countries was to have been signed. [Text] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET rI~DITERRANEENS in French No 1861 10 Jul 81 p 1830] [COPYRIGHT:
Rene rioreux et Cie Paris 1981a 9516
CURR~CY Rr`,SEr~VES, LI;~UID ASSETS--In its 25 May edition, the Lagos BUSTNESS

' TIMES reports that Nigeria's currency reserves were at 5.7715 billion naira
at the end of November 1980, and were thus 77.5 percent higher than on
31 December 1979, and l~.6 percent higher than on 30 Novernber 1980 /-as pub-
lished 7 In its annual business report, the Central Bank had given a figure
of 5.4~i56 billion naira for the end of 1980, compared to 2.291; billion naira
for the end of 1979, wnich is a gain within 1 year of 72.6 percent (MARCHES
TKOPICAUA ET MEDITFRRANEENS 17 April, page 1133). Again according to the
Lagos weekly, the banx~s reserves alone amounted to 5�5925 billion naira
at tr.e end of the year, and showed an increase 96.9 percent greater t~tan the
one for-the end of 1y79 and Lt percent compared to those for the end of
!r'ovemoer 1y~0. In addition, in its latest monthly bulletin, the Central
danic-also snows a rather distinct increase in the country~s money supply
from one ye~r to the next. These assets stood at q.2268 billion naira at
the End of December 1q80, and were up 3.0802 billion (*50.1 percent) from
the end of December 1979. From November to December last year, the increase
was 62n.7 million naira (+7.3 percent), wherea~ the difference between
Gctoner and November was only 1l~8.7 million (+1.8 percent). yote that ~.n
the previous year the difference between the last 2 months was reflected as
a drop of 37t~.2 million naira (-5.7 percent). ~Text 7/-Paris MARCHES TROPI-
CAUX ET`-h:EDITERRANEENS in French No 1859~26 Jun 81 p
1717 7/-COPYRIGHT: Rene
Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.7 12149
INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT--Only + 0.6 percent in 1980--According to the Central
Bank of Nigeria, the country~s industr3al output experienced an increase of
only 0.6 percent in 1980, whereas in 1979 it had been 18.6 percent (MAF~,C:iES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRA.NEENS, 31 October 1980, page 2678). The index, estab-
lished on the 100 basis in 1972, fluctuated downward during the year, fall-
ing in particular by 10.3 percent at the end of the first quarter compared
31 December 1979 by settling at 155.8, rallied slightly at the end of the
third quarter, settling at 161.8 (M.AHCH~S TROPICAUX ET HIEDITERRANEENS on
8 May, page 1306), and finally wound up at 168.1 on 31 December. The slight
increase recorded in 1980 is attributable in particular, according to the
Central Bank, to a decline in the mining sector, including oil. /-Text 7
- /-Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX r,T MEDITERRANEENS in F~ench No 1859~26 Jun 81 p 17177
rCOPYRIGHT: Hene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981_7 121l~9
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UPPER VOLTA
FIVE-YEAR PLAN OBJECTIVES DISCUSSED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 24 Jul 81 pp 1918-1920
[Summary] Upper Volta is one of the least favored countries on the continent and
one whose prospects hardly encourage optimism. The subsistence economy is not yet
evolving into a market economy. Between 1970 and 1980 the GNP has increased annu-
ally an average of only .6 percent, in fixed value francs: 87.6 billion CFA in
1970, 93.4 bil~ion in 1980. As for per capita GNP, this figure has declined dur-
ing the sam~e p.riod (16,850 CFA in 1970 compared to 15,000 in 1980). A breakdown
of GNP by sector shows the general stagnation of the economy, with the only sig-
nificant increase being in services.
Avg Annual
1970 1975 1980 Chan e
Agriculture 18.5 21.3 18.2 -
Stockraising, fishing 19.6 13.7 12.3 -4.7
Industry, crafts 13.4 15.7 15.9 +1.7
Services 36.1 39 47 +2.7
Total 87.6 89.7 93.4 +0.6
The financial situation shows a trend toward deficit: 7.7 billion francs CFA in
1979, but an improvement was underway in 1980 with estimated def icit at 2.3 bil-
lion. It is no surprise to find a deficit also in the trade balance with a de-
clining ratio of exports to imports. Compared to 41 percent in 1970-1974, the
figure was 37 percent in 1975-1980. The increased oil price was one of the main
causes of this trend. Prices of livestock, the country's main export (50 percent)
have increased, but not enough to reverse the very clear deterioration in terms of
trade.
Finally, with diminishing assets abroad and an increasing foreign debt, the state
budget is reduced to the function of ineeting operating expenses; investment expen-
ditures are met in large part by foreign aid. During the 1976-1979 period, for-
_ eign support provided 90 billion francs CFA out of the 112 billion invested.
A New Program in an Effort to Progress
The government is perfectly aware that the present situation cannot continue in-
defi.nitely, and that foreign aid, however large, cannot magically give impetus to
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a lagging economy. The main objectives for the decade 1981-1990, included in
the latest 5-year plan, are as follows: food independence and security; improved
income for rural people and stockraisers; improved standard of living; struggle
against desertification; escape from external and internal isolation; and develop-
ment of the industrial sector. To this end, prompt actions will be taken in the
various sectors:
1) Rural sector--Productiun of millet, sorghum and maize is now about 1 million
tons. The goal of 1.68 million is established for 1990. Rice should increase from
45,000 tons to 80,000 tons, and groundnuts from 120,000 tons in 1980 to 220,000
tons in 1990. This will require development of new land, better utilization of
water, and improved farming techniques. Under this plan, food independence would
be achieved before 1990 by a 10 to 15 percent total increase in grain production.
Among the major projects for 1990 is the Volta Valleys Development (AW--amenage-
ment des vallees des Voltas), involving about 55,000 families and expanding pro-
duction of grain and commercial crops (150,000 tons of grain, 70,000 tons of cotton,
40,000 tons of groundnuts, and 50,000 tons of sugarcane).
2) Industrial sector--This sector accounts for a little more than 11 percent of the
GNP, but since 1978 there has been a significant decline. In 1980 industry em-
ployed 7,000 persons, or .21 percent of the active population.
Mines. Upper Volta used to export copper ore (Gaoua mine) and gold from Poura
mine until 1966 (1,000 kg/yr). This deposit will be mined again for about 20
years. Aside from indications of nickel at Bonga and Dablo, and of gold at Kiere,
the manganese of Tambao is the main hope. The technical-economic study has been
completed; no date has been given for beginning ~f exploitation.
Industries. Current conditions do not favor establishment of viable industries.
~xisting industry is located at Ouagadougou, Bobo-Dioulasso, Banfora (sugarmill)
and Koudougou (spinning, weaving). Factories for fertilizer, livestock feed, and
veterinary and pharmaceutical products are being planned.
Energy. The basic objective in this sector is diversification of energy sources,
i.e. reducing the traditional dependence on oil (15 percent of purchases abroad);
and on wood burning for domestic purposes which has significantly degraded the
forest resource. Emphasis is on hydroelectricity, for which five sites have been
studied. However, the Koulbi Noumbel dam is the project which could significantly
ease the petroleum bill. Because of its importance, it is beinz. handled outside
the program, but it is nonetheless high priority.
3) Infrastructure. Roads. The network has 8,614 km of classified roads, of which
860 km are tarred. Objectives for this 10-year period are almost the same as those
for the 1977-1981 plan: improvement and development of the international network
and the secondary network (roads and tracks). Projects include the Abidjan-Niger
highway and complete renovation of the Dori/Djibo road in the secondary network.
But the main problem continues to be maintenance of the road network; adequate
structure will have to be developed on a national level to minimize reconstruction
and costly renovation.
Railways. The vital Abidjan-Niger syszem wil'1 be improved and modernized. Still
- under discussion is the Ouagadougou Tambao railway pro~ect, with the purpose of
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exploiting the manganese of the area, but it is unlikely that this Grill come about
in the next 10 years.
In summary, the following are the main figures of the new plan:
--Rural sector: 33 percent; 268.2 billion CFA
--Industrial sector: 15 percent; 166 billion CFA
--Services: 7 percent; 44.6 billion CFA
--Economic infrastructure: 25.5 percent; 200 billion CFA
--Social sector: 17 percent; 108.8 billion CFA
--Research: 3.5 percent; 22.4 billion CFA
--Total: 810 billion CFA
Not included in these figures are:
- --major hydro-agricultural projects: 60 billion
--major dams: 70 billion
--Tar~bao railway project: 37 billion
Development, but Supplementary Costs
This figure of 810 billion, which is only an estimate, will be provided through
foreign aid. However, it must be remembered that there are always operating and
recurrent costs which affect every project, and it is estimated that these could
amount to 28 to 31 percent of the initial investment over this period. Therefore,
consideration will have to be given to supplementary financing and careful plaii-
ning and management to achieve a lessening of Upper Volta's dependence.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Paris 1981
CSO: 4719/218
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--~a
~ ZAIRE
MOBUTU TAKES ON DE BEERS OVER DIAMOND ESPLOITATION
Brussels POURQUOI PAS? in French No 3268,,16 Jul 81 pp 37, 39
jArticle by Jean Pourbaix]
(Text] The "De Beers Central Selling Organization", the
primary wheel in the mechanism for the world marketing of
uncut diamonds, seems to have lost the contract for exclu-
sive sales which it has had for the last 14 years with
Zatre, the world's main producer of industrial diamonds.
In order to understand better the significance o~ this at
least potential rupture, it is useful to recall that the
De Beers group not only is the world's largest producer
of stones, but through its subsidiary the "Central Selling
Organization" or CSO of London, it controls four-fifths of
all diamond distribution worldwide.
CSO buys uncut diamonds from everywhere (even the Sov~et Union), sorts and classi-
fies them, and makes up rationally balanced assortments adapted to the conditions
of the diamond market. It sets the price at which uncut diamonds are bought from
the mining companies, then sold to the accepted diamond-cutters who transform them
into jewelry or into diamonds usable for the manufacture of industrial tools.
The assortments put together by the experts at CSO are offered in indivisible
lots to buyers at sales--which are called "sights" or "viewings"--organized 10
times a year in London. The price is fixed in advance and the buyer does not
have the right to reject two consecutive lots offered to him, without running
the risk of being taken off the list.
Because of this system, De Beers has never been forced to lower its prices, even
in time of recession, in nearly half a century. When necessary, it prefers to
stock unsold diamonds until economic circumstances improve. The result is a
secularity which is appreciated Uy the producers and which in large part explains
the solidity of the quasi-~monopoly which up to now has been held by De Beers.
Kinshasa Intends to Market Its Own Diamond Production
At the present point in time, it happens that after the meteoric climb (of 100 per-
cent and more) experienced by retail diamond prices 2 years ago, the market is in a
state of depression.
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At the general meeting of the "De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd" which was held at
_ Kimberley (South Africa), President Harry Oppenheimer announced the group's deci-
sion to reduce its production. This decision, he said, was motivated by the
weakness of world demand and by the accumulation of "sizable" stocks. Moreover,
CSO has for several months already been working to reduce the volume of the
stones offered its periodic sales.
Also, some producers fear that the organization is going to impose quotas and
they are considering marketing their production themselves. This is the game
' which Zaire has ~ust started to play, a country which is the world's largest
producer (by volume, not by value) of diamonds.
During the month of April, Kinshasa entrusted the sorting, assessment, and sale
of Zairian diamonds to the state entity "SOZACOM" (Zairian Mineral Marketing
Company). Since 29 May, SOZACOM has gone ahead in Kinshasa with the sale of
620,000 carats in diamonds to three independent businesses, the "Caddi" and
"Glasol" firms of Anvers and the "Industrial Diamond Company" of London. At
a rate of some $10 per carat, SOZACOM has brought in a total of around $6 mil-
lion.
At De Beers, hope has not been abandoned of restoring relationships with the
Zairian authorities. Nevertheless, the decision made by Kinshasa to hold a new
sale in June leads one to think Zaire is not going to change its position.
The ~ailight of a Worldwide Quasi-Monopoly
It is true that a compleCe cessation of deliveries of Zairian diamonds would not
cause CSO any great harm. CSO would be hurt worse if Zaire were capable of stop-
ping the smuggling of its diamonds.
Zairian diamond production is carried out by the MIBA company, or Bakwanga Mining
Company. Production for 1980 was 8,001,076 carats, down from that of 1979, which
was 8,062,869 carats. These figures are put out by the Belgian company SIBEKA
- (Industry and Investment Company) which holds a 20 percent share of MIBA. "The
illicit exploitation and theft of diamonds", SIBEKA reports, "were especially
serious during 1980 and constituted one of the ma~or concerns of the company,
which is determined to fight theft within its installations by strengthening
security and disciplinary measures, and more particularly by setting up a new
electronic surveillance and alarm device."
If one can believe the ECONOMIST, no less than 4 to 6 million carats leave the
_ country clandestinely, but the De Beers CSO supposedly succeeds in intercepting
a large part of it on the road that leads to Anvers.
The Zairian defection, however, does constitute despite all this a major source
of concern for the De Beers group, for a different reason. It fears, in effect,
that others will emulate Zaire, that it will incite other African producers to
follow its eacample.
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If the Zairian experiment, freed of the tutelage and technical assistance of CSO,
were to succeed, which is far from having been demonstrated, countries like
Tanzania and Lesotho could march in step with Kinshasa. It would certainly be
no different in Namibia, the principal producer of unusual gems, if a SWAPO
[Southwest African People's Organization] gover~ent were to take power.
The day when that scenario is enacted, one might say that the historic monopoly
of De Beers in diamonds belongs to the past.
The Risks Taken by Zaire
We must not fail to appreciate that Kinshasa is also taking some ticklish risks
in emancipating itself from the De Beers group. The ECONOMIST does not hesitate
to put it boldly in print: "The risks Zaire has taken by breaking with CSO are
enormous". Fc;r Zairian production has been in a phase of rapid decline for sev-
eral years now. "The exhaustion of the rich detrital deposits accelerated in
1980 and makes it indispensable," SIBEKA writes, "to accelerate the implementa-
tion of the investment program prepared by MIBA to increase the extraction of
Kimberlitic ore and begin exploitation by dredging the alluvium of the Mbujimayi
River as well as the ad~acent bottom lands."
As it is unable to underwrite the financing, in hard currency, of the necessary
investments, which require the immobilization of some $70 million (2,750 million
Belgian francs), the program has to date been only partially realized. There
have been contacts in recent months between the Zairian authorities, the Inter-
national Finance Corporation, a subsidiary of the World Bank, and MIBA. They
have resulted in the elaboration of a financing mechanism to cover the hard cur-
rency needs, but whether it goes into effect now depends on the conclusions of
- the IFS mission recently sent to Mbujimayi to study the project as a whole.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Pourquoi Pas?
9516
CSO: 4719/171
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ZAIRE
rC. ~IGIL, DGN~,STIC ACTIVITY IN OIL OPER.ATIOI~S
Faris hL4FcC~:r;;' TROFICAUX ET MEDITERRAIJE~F9 in F~encn 26 Jun 81 p 1722
~Text 7Research and Development
_ kt present, +.hree operating comoanies are enga~ed in prospecting for oil in
the Republic of Zaire.
1; Zaire Gulf: Offshore research and development in Zaire are provided by
tne Zaire Gul� Cil Company, an operating company woricing on oehalf of the
three nolders of the prospecting permit, which are, in order, Zaire Gulf Oil
Company: ~0 pzrcent; Japan Petroleum Zaire: 32.28 percent; SOLIZA ~Zair-
ian Petroleum Company 7: 17.72 percent.
In 1980, Zaire Gulf produced 6.508 million barrels, compared to 7.61l~ million
barrels in 197y 15 percent). Outp~t for the first 1~ months of 1y81 rose
to 2.402 million barrels, gainst ?_.226 million barrels for the corresponding
period in 198p. The iorecast is for 7.5 million tiarrels in 1y81.
The 1980 investment program was concerned with well reconditioning and com-
pletlon, drilling activities for sinking exploratory wells at Mwamba III,
and a producing oil well. ~etween 1970 and 1980, 27 wells have been sunk:
11 are producing oil, 3 gas and oil, 2 are being used for water in~ection,
' and 1C are non-productive. The 1981 program involves 96 million dollars.
In particular it plan.s for an earthquake levee about 120 km long, and the
sinxing of seven wells.
2:ZAIREP /-expansion unknown 7: The oil prospecting m~,neral rights"in.the
coastal area have been entrusted to SOREF%A /-expansion onknown 7, Shell
Zairex, and AMOCO Explo Zaire companies. The contracting companies, as a
joint company and responsible for the financing of research and development
are ZAIK~;P (Petrofina 100 percent), o~,erating company holding 30 percent oi'
the partnership; Shell Zairex (Shell 100 percent), operating company holding
25 percent of the partnersnip; and AMOCO Zaire Petroleum (AhI0C0 100 percent),
holding ~5 percent in the partnership.
ZAIR~,P began experimental production in April 1980. For the year 1980, the
Fartnership's production was 1l;2,325 barrels, and the first exports, in
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Decemner 198G, involved 36,22$ barrels~ During the first 4 months of 1980,
average production reached 600 oarrels a day.
The 19b1 progra,n plans continued production attempts. Three new wells will
be sunk during the second quarter of the year. In the event of positive
results, these wells could lead to large scale production oy th3s erganiza-
tion.
It should be noted that storage and pumping facilities at Kinka~i are con-
- nected 'oy a 4-inch pipeline 17 xm long to the Mibale East formation. The
Mibale field, equipped with storage, pumping, and crude processing ~water/
_ salt separation, gas separation) facilities, is connected by a 16-inch sea-
line ian long to the storage tanicer ~~Solen~~ via Zaire Gulf ~ s production
platform.
In the 2~ April edition (page 20) of MARCHrS TROPICAUX, we had already indi-
cated that ZAIREP had reportedly decided to put the finishing touches to an
important project related to the study of asphaltic sands at Mavuma, in the
Lower Zaire region.
3: ESSO-Zaire: The companies holding the oil prospecting mineral rights
in the ~entral basin are ESSO and TEXACO (50/50 percent). The operating
co:npany for the partnership, responsible for execution of research programs
is r.SSG-Zaire (a subsidiary of EXXON). .
The company~s 1981 research program includes two exploratory wells. The
first one was completed in May, and the second one will be drilled between
1 July and 1 October, at Bindja ~~Gilson.t~ On the basis of the results
obtained through these two wells, the company may decide on a seismic pro-
gram in 1982-1983.
Consumption and Imports of Fetroleum Products
In 1980, the consumption of petroleum products in Zaire amounted to 850,290
cubic meters (+I~.3 percent). The country~s supply was distinctly better,
and reserves, which were almost non-existent at'the end of 1979, have been
built up again. Consumption has however been restricted by the price in-
crease that occurred on 18 March 1980, and raised gasoline from 2.50 zaires
par liter to 1~ zaires, the price still current.
It should be noted that importers of petroleum products receive currency al-
locations from the Bank of Zaire, with the exception of those in Shaba and
the East, in ~?hich a portion of the needs are covered by SAD (without
currency attribution) licence.
Crude oil imports fell from 383,l~50 tons in 1959 to 36b,055 tons in 1980. ~
For 1977 and 1978, imports of crude had been 11~2,053 and 202,3?2 tons res- �
pectively. Imports of refined products rose to 1~,913 tons in 1980, against
400,549 in 1979.
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Refining and Distribution
= The national refinery at Muand~ processed 1~20,1~89 tons of crude in 1980,
against 406,598 tons in 1979 and only 168,336 tons in 1977. The refinery's
capacity is ?50,000 tons of crude. At present it covers a little over 30
percent of the local market needs; its de].iveries of finished products
rose in 1980 to 273,84l~ tons, compared to 231,994 tons in 1979.
Fuel oil, which is little used in developing countries, must be exported.
Exports were 9,376 tons in 1977, 138,~.t22 tons in 1979, and 137,224 tons in
1980.
It is interesting to note that since 1979 the refi.~ery has been using local-
ly produced crude, mixed with imported crude. A desalinization facility was
put into service in April 1981. In theory, it makes it possible to assure
operation of the refinery with local crude alone. This solution ~has not been
adopted, since Zairian crude contains properties that better meet the needs
of the industrial countries (60 percent fuel oil).
' Distribution of petroleum products is provided by Fina, N�obil Oil, PETROZAIRE
/-Gairian Petroleum E~terprises 7, Shell and TEXACO.
~ PETROZAIRE
The PET~OZAIRE company ( Zairian Petroleum Enterprises) is an establishment
belongfng to the state, founded in 1978 by ordinance no. 78-00l~. The com-
pany's articles of incorporation cover the who~e range of oil activities
possible within the country: prospecting~ production, refining, distribu-
tion, getrochemistry.
PET~OZAIRE, the state's advisor an ai:3 policy, is also responsible for effect�~
ing the studies relating to strategic investments. Since its creation, it
has completed three important studies:
Construction of a new 12-inch oil pipeline between Matad3. and Kinshasa
since the existing facilities haa already reached max~.mum capacity in 197~.
reasibility study of extension of the N;uanda refinery with a view to
doubling capacity, raising it to 1.5 million tons a year. The distilling
process chosen would be ~~hydro-cracking~' and not atmospheric distillation
which produces large fuel oil residues. The cost of the pro~ect, estimated
at approximately 250 million dollaxs, does not permit anticipation that it
will oe implemented in the near future.
The third study, which is very important to PETROZAIRE, given its
level of profitability, concerns installation in the refinery of a mineral
tar unit with a capacity of 35,000 tons a year. The financing of the pro-
~ect requires 8.5 million dollars and 5 million zaires. Achievement would
make it possible to use large quantities of fuel oil that are now exported.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.
121 I~9 42
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~zx~;
BRIEFS
NGUZA TO POBLISH BOOK--~iguza Karl I Bond has chosen Paris to launch a cam-
paign against President Mobutu's regime. It will begin with the publica-
tion of "The 30 June Appeal," a 70-page book that the former Zairian grime
minister dated symbolically w3,th his country~s independence day and in
which he calls upon "the Zairian people to aNake." /by Sennen Andriamirado,in
column Afrique Confidentiel~ /-Text 7/-Paris JEUNE AFRI~UE in French
~io 1069, 1 Jul 81 p 21 7_ COPY~IGHT: ~eMe AP'rique GRUPJIA 1981 7 1211~9
CSO: 4719/113 END
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