JPRS ID: 9909 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400040021-0
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• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 21
• Content Type: REPORTS

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- JPRS L/9909
13 August 1981
Near East Narth Africa Re ort
p
~
(FOUO 28/81)
FBIS FOREIGN BRGADCAST INFORA/IATION SERVICE
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JPRS L/9909
13 August 1981
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
(FOUO 28/81)
, CONTENTS
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS �
Arab Investments Abroad Revlewed
( AI,-WATAN AI~- ~ ARABI, 29 May-1~ Jun 811 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
AFGHANISTAN
Freedom F`ighters~ Ordeal Detailed
(Denis Ropa; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 22 Jul 81) 4
IRAP1
New President Denounces Marxi.sts
(Muhammad Al~. Rajai Interview; THE 1~IIDDLE EAST, Jul 81)�.... 7
Bani-Sadr Interviewed After Arrival in Paris
(Abolhasan Bani-Sadr Interview; THE TIMES~ 30 Jul 81) 11
_ Bani-5adr Awaits Fall of KhomPyni Regime
(Amir Taheri; THE SUNDAY TIMES, 2 Aug 81) 13
IRA~
Positive Ramifications of Raid on Nucleax Reactor Examined
(Nabil Maghribi; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 19 Jun 81) 17
IAEA Official Conunents on Country's Nuclear Program
(Nabil Maghribi; AI~-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 19 Jun 81) 19
J ORDAN
King Husayn's Trip to Moscow I}iscussed
(AZ-WATAId AL-'ARABI, 5-11 Jun S1) 24
QAlAR
Amir's Speech to Fifth Class of Qatar University Graduates
(AZ-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 19 Jun 81) 27
- a- [III - NE & A- 121 FOUO]
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INTER-ARP,B AFFAIRS
ARAB INVESTMENTS ABROAD REJIEWED
Paris A~;=WATAN AL'-ARABI in Arabic No 224, 29 May-4 Jun 81 p 58
LArticle: "Arab Investments Abroad; 1980 Surpluses: $340 Billion"7
LText7 Before the October 1973 war, some of the Arab oil countries had established
development funds to aid tY~e Arab construction projects. These funds hit two targets
simultaneously: They aided Arab projects lacking financing and invested the financial
surpluses, even though the surpluses were not large at the time, in long-term loans.
This is what is called capital investment. These funds followed, and still follow,
- in eva]_uating projects generally the system adopted by the International 13ank for
Construction and Develonment and by the International Monetary Fund, with an important
difference, namely that of taking into consideration the social yield of every project
instead of restricting the evaluation to a project's material yield.
These funds could have stayed the favorite venue of investment for the Arab oil
countries had not fundamental changes occurred, starting with 1973 and especi311y
after 1979 which witnessed the second major rise in oil prices.
The first change lies in the fact that the oil ~ountries have become a world
financial power in a short time and have come to possess large surpluses. It has also
become evident that the size of these surpluses exceeds by far the investment capa-
bilities of the Arab funds, even though the capital of these funds has been raised.
The second change is a result uf the first change and it is that the central banks of
the oil countries have become compell~d t~ play directly, or through their ~rgani-
zations, a purely commercial role through the investment of these surpluses. The new
role (capital investment) is not conf ined to the central banks but has included some
of the private banks which have benef ited from the increased weal*h of their countries.
By virtue of this new role, the Arab banks have come to occupy a position in the
international arena through their effective participation in the world capital market.
Zhis position will continue to be strengthened.
Size of Surpluses
The inevitable question is: What is the vol~ume of these surpluses, what are the
- details of their investment and where do they exist?
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The FINANCIAL TIMES (14 October 1980) estimates the foreign assets of the major oil
countries (the Arab Gulf rountzies and Libya) at more than $340 billion by the end
of 1980, of which 120 billion were realized in 1980 alone. Three quarters of the 1980
surp.luses were realized by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq and the UAE.
These assets have been invested either directly through the purchase of stocks, bonds
and so forth or throug:i participation in the capital market, i.e. through advancing
long-term loans to international firms and establishements.
The direct commercial investment is what drew attention in the first pha~,: due to the
clamor which accompanied some transactions, such as Kuwait's attempt to purchase 15
percent of the Getty Oil Company for one billion dollars at the beginning of the summer
of 19A0. This attempt did not succeed because of the opposition of the Getty family
' and of the U.S. administration. This clamor urged the Arab investors to be more
careful and cautious. We must note that the Arab investors have chosen three main
markets for their investments: ~
The United K.ingdom for a historical reason emanating from the link between the
currencies of some of the Gulf countries with the Sterling zone during the protectorate
~ period and the immediately following period and for a current realistic reason, namely
the activity of the London money market and the strerigth of the pound sterling.
The FRG and Japan because of the technological superiority of these two countries.
The United States because of the international role of the dollar.
In addition to these detailed reasons for every market, there is an additional common
reason for all these markets (countries), namely the political stability they enjoy
as a result of the weakness of their communist or radical leftist parties.
~This is the general geographic framework of the direct investment. There is, however,
divergence from these geographic borders at times, such as Libya's purchase of 10
percent of the stock of the Italian Fiat Company and Kuwait's purchase of 15 percent
of the stock of Brazil's Volkswagen Car Company. But even in the latter example,
what is intended by the investment is the German technology, represented in the
Volkswagen Company, and not Brazil.
Investment Means
In these r~~ajor markets, the means of direct investment have been diverse and we wi11
review here the most important of them:
_ The purchase of shares and stocks in major international firms: The Saudi investments
in ~he U.S. market have been channelled toward the real estate, hotel and mining
sectors. It was announced nearly 2 months ago that 17 percent of the shares of the
Kaiser Steel Company were purchased by Lebanese financier Roger Tamraz, who operates
from the Bahamas, jointed with three 3aiidi partners .for the sum of $57.4 million.
Kuwait has also purchased shares in the biggest U.S. oil companies, such as Exxon (the
biggest in the world), Texaco, Getty Oil, Mobil and Standard Oil of California.
Kuwait has also purchased a considerable part of the stock of the Eastern Airlines
Company.
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Ho~vever, what mostly restricts the purchase of U.S. stocks are the two conditions
imposed on any transaction seeking the purchase of 5 percent or more of the stock of
any company. These two conditions are:
Prior approval by the U.S. administration through the Stocks and Banking Commission.
Ann~uncement of all the details of a transaction.
So as not to fall into this restriction, Kuwait has been content to purchase 4.9
percent of the stocks of the 20 biggest U.S. banks.
In addition to investing in the U.S. firms, Kuwait has also turned to investing in the
stocks of Japanese firms. Perhaps the most important of these firms is Hitachi (in
which Kuwait has become the fourth biggest stockholder), the Kobota ~ic] Company (in
which Kuwait has become the .lOth biggest shareholder) and the (Asahi Glas) Company.
These investments have been made through British, Swiss and Hong Kong banks.
No further details are available in this respect because such transactions d~ not
like, by their nature, to advertize themselves.
- Short Term Deposits: The Arab oil countries invest a part of their surpluses in
short-term deposits. The purpose of this type of investment is dual: To make such
funds available on short notice and to diversify, i.e. to distribute .the investments
in several spheres and several fields instead of putting them all in one place (don't
put all your eggs in one basket). Whaf: is sought here is not the yield of these
investments primarily but to reduce the risks. This is the so-called theory of
"security instead of yield."
Perhaps Si~INA ~audi Arabian Monetary Agency/ is the biggest investor in this sector,
considering that its investments in the top 20 banks in the world amount to at least
$500-600 million.
Treasury Bonds: Tiie first bonds to benefit from the Arab investments were the U.S.
treasury bonds even though the benefit has been partial, meaning that it has been
confined to certain bonds. In 1980, the Japanese treasury bonds discovered the Arab
investment5, or vice versa. This is not important. What is important is the outcome.
The information available to several Arab central banks contributed to the purchaae
of Japanese bonds in 1980.
The Arab public and private investment establishments will have a decisive funda-
mental role in financing the $6-billion loan which France and the FRG will seek in
' 1981 and 1982.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 AL-WATAN AL- ARABI
- 8494
CSO: 4304/45
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AFGHANISTAN
FREEDOM FIGHTERS' ORDEAL DETAILED
~aris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1072, 22 Jul 81 pp 50-51
[Article by Denis Rflpa: "An Impossible Victory"]
[Text] The guerrilZas in the province of Konar in northeastern Afghanistan have
just captured the Nari dutpost, 25 km from the Pakistan border, thus asserting
- control over the Pech valley and encircling the neighboring garrisons of Barikot
and Asmar, which can now be resupplied only by helicopter. Trucks loaded with
weapons (Ai: 47 assault rifles, ammunition, mountain howitzers, artillery pieces)
have been taken from the "enemy."
Pretext
This exploit was accomplished by the "rebel" groups ~f the Nuristan Front,
headed by a former prefect who joined the ranks of the resistance, Anwar Amin.
The villagers of the region, who had so far been hesitant about joining up, have
now done so and are negotiating with the authorities their passage to Pakistan.
For the past several months, there has been no mention of the occupation of
Afghanistan or of its people's resistance against the Red Army. There have been
no meetings nor protest demonstrations in the streets and university campuses,
no movie stars or singers to celebrate the Afghan resistance, as had been the
case for Vietnam. Prudent and divided, the West is still using the "divisions"
among Afghan fighters as a pretext to refuse them assistance or to provide minimal
help, while the "Viets" had been massively supported at the time by China and
Soviet Russia. What is really happening?
It is true that resistance is multiple and diverse, in the image of Afghanistan's
ethnic heterogeneity. It includes many "fronts" rooted in the country's
interior, as well as six political movements in exile in Peshawar, Pakistan,
where nearly 2 million Afghans have presenCly taken refuge. These political
movements remain divided.
Among them, three are the product of the explosion of the "fundamentalist"
opposition movement already in existence in 1975. The oldest one is Gulbuddin
Hekmatiar's Islamic Party, which claims similarities with Zmam Khomeyni and
has always refused to join the alliance of the other two, more moderate move-
ments, that of Professor Yunis Khalis and the Jamiyat-e Islami.
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The other three political movements, which have recently joined forces in
Islamabad, are of a more liberal and pro-Western bent and were formed after the
Soviet invasion: Ahmad Gailani's National Islamic Front, the National Libera-
tion Front headed by S. Mudjadeddi and M~ohammad Nabi's Islamic Movement. Their
common objective is to free the country, and the Afghan people would subsequently
choose their own political regime.
Assistance
The general staffs of these six fundamentalist and liberal movements established
in Peshawar were integrated by the Pakistan Government following ihe interdi~tion
of 42 political and religious parties in January.
At any rate, they only represent an infinitesimal part (1 percent) of the popula-
tion. However, they have been the principal beneficiaries of the financial,
military and health assistance from foreign countries, as well as of the humani-
tarian aids to the refugees. By virtue of '~eing the recipients of such aid f~r
redistribution, they can decide which of the various resistance movements
operating within Afghanistan they will support.
These movements include a large part of the country's active for~es and provide
most of the resistance against the armies of occupation. Some of them were
already well organized before the Soviet intervention. The centrist Hazarajat
Front numbers 2 to 3 million Shi'as and claims an army of 600,000 as well as
800,000 supporters. The Nuristan Front in the Northeast has acquired an inde-
pendent administration and finds its support among the traditional community
structures. In these two regions, which had escaped government control as early
as the end ~f 1978, the fronts have assumed a double function: to develop the
resistance and to help the civilian population (improvements in daily life and
economic restxucturing).
A preparatory sovereign assemb ly (Loy Jirgah) had met in Peshawar on 11 May 1980,
bringing together more than 900 delegates fr~m the 22 pr.ovinces of Afghanistan.
- Tentative unions had been outlined: the Nuristan rront signed an alliance with
the Konar tribes; the Durrani tribes, in the Southeast, formed a regional federa-
tion. In the South, the Baluchis control the province of Helmand and a large
part of the province of Herat. But the "great sovereign assembly" which was
supposed to meet in Afghanistan proper is being continuously postponed...
Passivity
A lack of cadre with genuine authority has not permitted the unification of the
resistance movements. The former Zaher Shah, exile~ in Rome, could have played
the role and actually advanced his candidacy a number of times. However, his
passivity is against him, and the anti-monarchical movements blocked the nego-
tiations. The same situation prevails among the fundamentalist and the liberal
factions of the political movements.
"God will come to our aid!" This is the war cry of these men who are, neverthe-
less, united in their will to throw out the invaders. In the field, after a year
_ ~
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and a half, combat losses (6,000 to 7,000 dead according to the resistance, but
surely double that) are largely compensated by the number of those who are join-
ing the combatants, now risen from 40,000 to 80,000 men.
Tactics have aZso been modified. Gone are the days when the mujahedin came down
into the valleys, turbans floating to the wind, to face Russian tanks with hunt-
ing rifles. Attacks are now being carried out against the enemy's rear guard by
- much smaller groups (50 to 150 men at most) who divide the tasks among them-
selves. As a result, with their approach having been signaled long before by
Afghan look-outs, Russian tanks a.re often reduced to burning with napalm villages
deserted by their inhabitants, only ta set an example. As for large cities--
with the exception of Ka.bul, the capital--guerrillas can afford to occupy them
for many days to reorganize th�ir networks, as was the case recently in Qandahar
and Herat, the second and third largest cities in the country.
With an army of almost 100,000 men, the Soviets seem to have abandoned their gual
of total victory over the Afghan resistance. Indeed, they�cannot increase their
forces without sacrificing more of their soldiers or provoking a genocide that
would be difficult to carry out for international reasons.
In turn, the Afghans cannot hope tc win as long as they are not united and will
tiot receive a considerably more substantial financial and military assistazce
from friendly countries. For the most part, thei~ weapons consist of what they
have been able to capture from the enemy: antitank cannons (RPG-25 and RP~75),
AGS-17 grenadE launchers and Kalashnikov rifles. However, quantities are insuf-
ficient. They especially lack ammunition, mines and ground-to-air missiles to
destroy their ~aorst ene~nies in the mountains: the giant Mi-24 helicopters.
. If the Afghan resistance does not receive the military support it has been unsuc-
cessfully requesting for over a year, Che USSR, which controls the cities and the
main communication thoroughfares, would be able to implement a more realistic
objective on an average term basis: by industrializing the country, it would
form a reservoir of technicians and workers trained in socialist countries who
would be devoted to it and would repudiate these mujahedin, certainly courageous
but belonging to another era. Thus would come the death of the Afghan resistance,
caused by the country's very people. .
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 19$1
CSO: 4619/21
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IRAN
NEW PRESIDENT DENOUNCES MARXISTS
London THE MIDDLE EAST in English No 81, Jul 81 pp 36-38
[Interview with Muhammad Ali Rajai, prime minister, by Nasira Sharsa, date and
place not given: "Reforms in Off ice Not Due to Ideology"]
[ T ex t] ~e u If' a sociaiist ooun ~ wants to hel us, it
Shalma: The Iranian P~P P tr'S P
against the old regime to bring about should prove its good faith by fighting
revolution so that class-difference against irnperialism evPn if it goes against
would be wzped out, wealth equitably ats personal interests. Whan the LJS cnt off
di.stributed among the people and the diplomatic relation.c with us and imposed an
quality� of life improved. When the eoonomic embargo~ the so-called socialist
Iraq.Iran war broke out it was countries sided with it, directly or indirectly.
expected that the socialist countries of The socialist countries do not support the
the world would support 1ran, but it truth.
was not so. Wh~? ? In those Muslun countries where the
Rajai: 1 personally do not believe that the m~jority of the populahon is nonShia, is
people went for revolution just for the sake there support for the lsiamic Revolntion
' of food, clothes and shelter. In this regard of Iran?
we are di$'erent from the Marxists. Our O Muslun populations ar~ one thing and
r~volutionary slogans were not for these. Muslim governments are another. The
We stand for freedom and Jamhouri-e- latter may be Musl'un merely in name and
Islami. We have faith in God, the Quran appearanoe. Muslim people definitely
~ and Khomeini, and the people are support and help us irres'pec.'tive o!'
convinced that if an islamic Government is nationality. Muslims all over the world
established, problems of food. clothing and have express~ed their readiness to come and
shelter will be solve~. achieve martyrdom in this war with Iraq
~ The people want Lslamic nile, which by and its supporters. But some Muslim
it~s very nature is the greatest enemy of governments, unfort.w~ate]y, are not willing
imperialism. Before the present lraqi even to condemn this aggression.
agRression they brought ahout the Kurdish O Why do you not solve the problem of
prc~blem and staged several unsucc~-ssful Kurdi.stan by giving autonomy to the
_ coups a~ain,~t us. Islam is fighting a total ~region w~thin a federal frxmework?
war against the im}.. ~d theu' Why is the war continuing, and what do
wron~ ideolo~v. the KLUYis want from you?
p Wh~� are the socitilist countri~ not p There is no war between the Kwdish
supporting you when you heve the people and the Central Government. It is
same ideolo~? the Marxisrts.who are fighting in Kurdistan.
O Unfortunatel~�, the socialist muntries are The Kunis had severe di$'erences with the
exhibiting the weakness of their own Shah and not with us. He was not only
ideology and character. We are Muslims inhuman to the Kuids but also to other
and we believe in th~ internationa] issue of Iranians. But we are not inhuman.
Islam. We rely on God and hence defend the MarJds~ts u-~ed to say that only they could
truth even if it is again~t our personal bring rnvolution to Iran, but their claim has
interests, whereas others always look ~ brou~t by Lslameandvthey~havhefailed.n
their personal interests.
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These defeated Marxists have e~~gineered for victory of the revolution does not go W
these divisive schemes in Kurdiskan in the them. In the fighting they substantially
name of Kurdish nationalism. Islam gained by soquiring weapons which they
believes in one nation. We are interna- did not r~tum. We, the followers o!' Is1am,
tionalists and believe in one Muslim nation. returned all the weapons and now do what
There are no Arab Muslims or Kurdish the government wants.
A'Iuslims. They are just one entity. Muslims ? But the Islamic Republican Party
of Ir3n or Lib,ya or Svria or of the African and the Communi.st PSrty both want to
countries are e~ssentially one as they follow work for the welfare of the people and
Islam and believe the Quran. We do not not for capitalism, which even now has
believe in national or international substanhal roots in Iran. ~?s things arE,
di~zsions or for that matter in geographical the masses are miserable and ex-
or racial di~zsions. hau.sted, es~ecially on account of
~ But Marxi.sts also have the same unemployment and inflation.
philosophy. They don't attach much O The present unemployment has little to
importance to national or geographical do with capitalism. Unemployment is a
partitioning of the world. typical by-product of any revolution. Was
O At present Kurds are fightii~g again,~, the Russian Revolution a capitalist
Iraq snd the Maixists are against us. At revolution? Did they not suffer from
pn:~ent, in Iiurd~~n, the war is just the unemployment after their revolution? Was
rc~-ult of anti-mvolutiunary and Mandst not the F~ench R.ewlution followed by
fun~es. unemployment and inflation? VVhen a
? But the Kurds w~ant autonumy. o~untry such as lran gpts rid of the
G Iran is facx~d with man>� problems all at capitalist system, and thousands of
once: anti-revolutionary foroes, Marxists oompanies with an average strength of
~~ho are alw~avs aut to fan trouble, the about 200 engincers each are closed, there is
Kurdish situation, the Iraqi w�ar. Why think bound to be unemploymen~
only of Kiu~ds? We should think about the I have no exact figiurs, but I may say
Arabs too. Within the constitution of our that we had thousands of aitifiaal jobs
Lslamic Republic there are specific which we.re spurious and not essentially
provisions to safeguard the interests of productive. There were,thousands of various
different pc~ple. We have hardly had time ty~pes of shops all over lran, including those
to implement these pro~~sions. Let the waz selling lottery tickets. We had more than
be over, and we shall find amicable 12,000 waiters. Do vou think they were
solutions to all such problems. . gainfiill3 employed? It was disguised
D You said that the Marxists are unemployment and it was a dead weight on
anti�revolutionary, but they played a the economy.
big role in the revolution. To achieve freedom for the people is one
O They had had no special role in f.he thing and to provide them with jobs is
revolution. Every one fought against the ~o~~, p~ ~volution was aimed at
Shah, including Marxists. We incessantly cleansing soeiety and wiping out those who
fought the Shah for 50 years and the exploite~ the people - traders and
communists did lend some support in this. m~~~ who were parasites. In the
Our objectives were diH'erent, although both P~ w,e may }~ave cre.ated unemploy-
of us wanted change. The Muslims wanted ment. The inflation, however, is mostly due
Islam but the Marxists did not. to the economic embargo impo.secl by the US
The ~deh Party as well as the Fedayeen ~d ~~s waz. Tel1 me which country has
guerrillas fought against the Shah, but ~n able to escape inflation.
their motives were difi'erent. They did not p~~ ~omeini delivered a speech
want Islamic Revolution. They wanted the 17 y~ ~a ~ W~ch he emphasised
Shah to remain and reform the Majlis. We tbe freedom of the press. Wh~~ then is
said that the Shah musi, go. We wanted ~e pen not free today? Some 55
total revolution whereas other `groups newspapers have been banned, and
wanted mcxiifications. people are expelled if the~� are
_ lmam Khomeini was convinced that for a ~ you think this may
total revolution the Shah must go, and this ~p~able damage to the nation,
oonviction was shared by all the Muslims. and that Iran may experience a civil
The Manosts and the nationalis~5 W~ on account of these ideological
participated in the struggle, but the credit difi'erences?
O Of all the ministries, there are three firom
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_ K�!ii~h we are obliged w ezclude the say a universitv professor of sociolo~ or a
Mandsts, t,ecau.~e of their idc.blogical fina]-year medica~ student. We cannot
viewpoint~ the I~linisl.ries of l.aw� and permit anti-revolutionary movements and
Jiistice, Defence and Education. Lriles.~ one there cannot be any freedom for ideological
firrrily believes in the tenet~~ of lslam and is pmpaganda by a minority section of the
quite conversant ~~th it, one cannot give society.
justice and decide caces acxording to the ? You were a teacher who taught,
dictates of Lslam. How� can we entrust such fought and suffered during the Shah's
a task to a peison who is A4arxist? regime. How do you jushfy the present
In the fight against iraq we cannot closure of universities and the attacks
employ a Marxist, for he wil] fight only for on tlie progressive elements?
his own ideolog~~. We need dedicated O These'~rogi'e.ss~ve elements" had fired at
soldiers and mercenaries. 7'hey must have students from inside the university campus
Islamic views and the com~c.~tion to fight for ]ast year, be!'ore this government was in
them. We cannot have Marxist~ in the power. Disturbances took place and the
defence forces. Further, those who do not R,evolutionary Council decided to close the
believe in Islam and Jamhowhi-e-LSlami universities. The process of reopening is
cannot be given the job of teachers. We bound to be tedious and long, for it would
caru~ot entn~st education to Marxists. They need a detailed consideration of the
cannot be allowed to teach our Young situation. We are at work and we believe
generation. that now it will not take much time. We are
A young, impressionab]e child should not a capitalist or an industrialised oountry.
learn to read and write according to the The previous regime spoiled everything.
basic framework of the society in which he We do not have money to spend carnlessly.
lives. The Government is very anxious to We do not have the required number of good
' resettle all employee.s who have been teachers. We had a few medical colleges, but
expelled. I want them to be productive. no medicine was taught seriously during
The other gmup being expelled are the four years of the ootuse. Most of the
Savaki, the fi-iends of the Shah who teachers were busy oollecting fat salaries by
wllaborated with him in his brutaltiy. taking up teaching assignments in other
Many of these now claim that they are cities like Lsfahan, Shiraz, Tabriz, Kirman-
Manrists. They hide the truth. Some who shah and Rasht. They spent one day at each
have been expelled allege fhat the~� have place every week. They cotild earn up to
been victimised because they support 10,000 tuman5 a month. Such teachers have
(Iranian Pr~ident Abol-Hassanl BaniSadr� now left the country.
The fact is that they have been expelled on p Thank you for ldndly sparing some of
acoount of their absenteeism or la7iness. your valuable time to see me.
These reforms in the offices are not due to O I feel that those who informed you on
~a~~ certain things are not faithfiil to
O Th~Fedayeen participated fully in Jamhouri-e-Lslami. I must tell you that we
the revolution and their aim is do not have ulterior motives either personal
essentially anti-irnperialist. How can or partisan. People are with us, and all of us
you promote the cause of the revolution are involved in nation-building. The
without their parbcipation? participation of the people is massively with
Q Lslam allows room for petsons with a us, and they woutd not tolerate anti-
difi'erent ideology to propagate their views> revolutionary activities at any ~wst, even in
but not to use force, to change the views of ~ p~~~es. They would not wuit for
othe~s. One cannot be allowed to impose his the Government to step in to curb the
own views on the public. Acoording to the anti-revolutionary elements and activities.
Quran, a person may have a religion of his The decision-making rests with the
own choioe. Muslims can live with others, masses. The masses have full faith and
and we have principle.5 and laws to guide us oonfidence in Imam Khomeini, and they
in that matter. cannot to; ~rate anything against him.
DiSerences of ideology are perniissble, There a.~'e some people disseminating wrong
but w~hat is not permissible is to misguide p~paganda on unemployment and infla-
others. We find th~t in factories labourers tion. 1 am afraid that your idea5 are
are ena~u_r~ed ta strike and stop work On influenced by such propaganda.
inquir~� we find that the laboure~s have ? My goal is to get views from all sides.
been misguided bv an unconcerned peison, But I feel that that unitv which had
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NOR nFF'I('IA1. Util'. ONI.Y
made the masses rise up against the
Shah is no longer there. Why?
O It is natural.
? Why is it natural?
O During the revolution, "Death to the
Shah" was a slogan welcomed by all, but
"Long live islam" is not a slogan which is
welmme to holders of all ideoloo es. When a
government is established on an ideology,
then the other ideologies are bound to be in
a state of discnmfiture.
Had our rnvolution been diHerent, and
like that of Algier's nationalist movement, ,
. then things would have been diH'erent.
" Their aim was to expel France but not to
establis}S Islam. So for them their task was
finished. We would be unhappy if we gave
up our ideology. I am happy even if I am
getting 7,000 tumans a month, but would
not be happy if I got 20,000 tumans and did
not have my ideolo~,y. . ?
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Magazines Ltd
~ Registered with Eritish Library;
ISSN 0305-0734
CSO: 4600/82
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IRAN
- BANI-SADR INTERVIEWED AFTER ARRIVAL IN PARIS
_ PM801235 London THE TIMES in English 30 Jul 81 p 9
[Telephone interview with Mr Abolhasan Bani-Sadr, former president of Iran, in
Paris by Hazhir Teimourian; date not given: "Khomeyni's Heavy Responsibility
for the Tr?gedy of Iran"]
[Text~ [Question] Mr Bani-Sadr, we were led to believe that you were determined
to stay inside the country. What made you change your mind?
[Answer] I very much hope that my stay abroad w.t.ll be temporary this time. One
of my aims was to stop the cycle of explosions and acts of destruction on the one
hand and government reprisals and executions on the other. I contacted Mr.Khomeyni
many times, directly and indirectly, but my requests were not accepted by him.
I subsequently thought it useful to visit abroad after the elections, because the
people of Iran demonstrated how unpopular those who have usurped power are.
According to our findings only about three million people voted in the presidential
elections. The regime fabricated the other 11 million.
I still believe myself to be duty-bound to the nation to struggle for the realiza-
tion of our original aims at the start of the revolution. Mr Khomeyni promised
me personally many times before the revolution in Paris to respect the right of
the people of Iran to democratic liberties.
I was myself actively involved then in formulating our aims. But unfortunately,
when we succeed in.attaining government, the lust after power stopped our progress
towards achieving our goals. In fact, quite the reverse has been achieved.
[Qu~:stion] How much is the Ayatollah at the mercy of those who surround him?
Do they mislead and misinform him, in your view, or do you hold him personally
responsible for the tragedy?
[Answer] It is irrelevant whether he knows what he is doing or not. I have
accepted full responsibility for all my actions, even though some of them can now
be seen to not have been the best course. I think that Mr Khomeyni hears heavy
responsibilit~ for the appalling disaster that has befallen the country. To a
- large extent, he has imposed this course upon our people.
~
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[Question] There has been press speculation here that your best option might be
to join the Kurds in the western region of the country where they exercise full
control. It is thought that given the present reign of chaos in the Ayatollah's
Iran, you could overthrow the Tehran government from the safety of that region
which you could proclaim a liberated zone. What ia your view on this subject?
(Answer] I have never seriously contemplated that path. In fact, I remained in
Tehran throughout the period of my hiding. No, we must think of a faster solution
to the problem f~~r the whole of the country. We must try to find a quicker way
of overthrowing the absol.utists who lust after power only, and we must stop the
Americans from installing a government in Iran. It is urgent.
[Question] How temporary do you expect this your second exile in Paris to be?
[Answer ] Very temporary .
[Question] While you were in hiding, did you contact other opposition~leaders
who are also in hiding? For exam~le, Mr Hedayat Matin-Daftari, leader of the
National Democratic Front and a former friend of yours?
[Answer~ No, there were no such contacts made.
[Question] Finally, could I ask you how you arranged for your flight abroad?
[AnswerJ We simply arranged it with the people in charge and wen~ to the military
airfield, where the plane was waiting for us. Of course it was dangerous, but
life is full of such dangers.
COPYRIGHT: Times Newspapers Limited, 1981
CSO: 4600/103
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IRAN
BANI-SADR AWAITS FALL OF KHOMEYNI REGIME
LD020920 London THE SUNDAY TIMES in English 2 Aug 81 p 7
[Article by Amir Taheri]
[Text] The escape from Tehran of Iran's deposed president, Abol-hasan Bani-Sadr,
aboard an air force plane last week has precipitated a new purge of the country's
~ armed services. At least three air force officers are said to have been executed
near Hamadan and about 200 others in a number of areas have been arrested and
charged with having colludeci in the escape.
Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani, the speaker of the Ma~lis, the Iranian Parliament,
told the assembly that the air force was "filthy through and through and should
be cleansed." Now there are fears that the purge will spread to the ground
_ forces. Military commanders recently fended off a"cleansing" operation by the
ruling Muslim fundamentalists, but will not be able to do ;~o again in the wake
of Bani-Sadr's escape.
- The aircraft that brought the ex-president to Paris, where he was granted political
asylum, was piloted by Colonel Behzad Moezi, one of the 57 air force pilots released
from jail by Bani-Sadr at the start of the Iran-Iraq war last September. Almost
all of these have now been arrested again.
Moezi was supposed to fly the Boeing 707 on a routine mission to south west Iran.
Bani-Sadr, dressed as a soldier and minus his moustache, was smuggled aboard with
his companions after being brought to the air base outside Tehran in a van, hiding
behind crates of eggs. Moezi--who also piloted the shah on his last journey from
Iran and was later jailed by Khomeyni for his royalist sympathies--told the crew
15 minutes after take-off that he was hijacking the aircraft and that they should
obey him.
Reliable reports indicate that the Iranian air force is virtually grounded by the
new wave of arrests, which has hit the technical staff as we11 as aircrew. A
committee of three mullahs has been appointed to approve all military flights.
Some Muslim hardliners have even called for the arrest and trial of the defence
minister and air force commander, Colonel Javad Fakuri.
The deposed president says he counts on the armed forces to "do theix duty" in
ending Ayatollah Khomeyni's rule, which he described as "the most tyrannical in
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; our history." But for the momenC he considers his main asset to be the urban
guerrilla organizations which have launched a wave of assassinations and bombing
attacks in Iran.
The ex-president has brought with him Massoud Rajavi, the 33-year old guerrilla
,leader whose organisation, the Mujaheddin, has been blamed for the assassination
' of some 200 leading supporters of Khomeyni in the past two months. Rajavi is the
Islamic authorities' most wanted terrorist. Some 50 of his comrades have been
executed in recent weeks.
B~~ni-Sadr first went to a four-bedroom flat in Cachan, a suburb of southern Paris.
It was here that he lived during his last period of exile, under the shah--and it
- is here that he received Khomeyni in the autumn of 1978 after the religious leader
hacl been expelled from Baghdad. Yesterday he moved to a villa outside Paris for
"security reasons."
A stream of Iranian and foreign friends visit Bani-Sadr. He tells them he does
- not believe his stay in exile will be long. But he seems frustrated by an under-
taking he gave to the French in return for being granted asylum. He promised not
- to engage in political activities while on French soil.
Bani-Sadr says the Khomeyni regime lost its legitimacy because of what he calls
the "national boycott" of last month's presidential election of his successor,
Muhammad 'Ali Raja'i. He claims that Khomeyni has lost effective control of the
country; the regime must now be dislodged by "popular forces."
The ex-president is clear about what he expects to follow. He believes he can
organise a wave of nationwide strikes and protest marches in Iran within the next
few weeks. He predicts "the fu11 collapse of the economy" by the end of the
summer. The "uaurpers," as he calls Khomeyni's government, would be forced to
step up repression of d~.ssidents on a larger scale than ever before, further
alienating the people.
Meanwhile, the Mojahedin, now allied to six other urban guerrilla groups, would
"eliminate Khomeyni's officials throughout the country." Top of the hit-list
would be key members of the riajlis. Iran would reach the point of full-blown
crisis--and the armed forces would intervene "to respond to the will of the people
and invite the legitimate president to return home."
Bani-Sadr has appointed Ra3avi to supervise the plan to overthrow Khomeyni. He
ha$ been declared head of an as-yet vague "Revolutionary Resistance Council."
The ex-president's right-hand man, Ahmad Sanamatian, who escaped with him, is in
charge of the political side of the operation.
- The exiled Iranian leader has asked his supporters to woo democratic governments
and organisations, persuading them that the present government in Tehran is falling
apart and that Iran's future lies with Bani-Sadr.
The plan is for the Revolutionary Resistance Council to develop into a provisional
government, ready to take over and supervise the transition after Irhomeyni's fall.
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Bani-Sadr hopes that other opposition groups inside and outside Iran will join
the council soon. His friends claim that they are in touch with the former Iranian
premier, Mehdi Bazargan, who is still in Tehran.
He also says he counts on support from the left-wing Iranian National.Front and
from a number of religious leaders who oppose Khomeyni. He claims to have the
_ backing of "at least 80 percent of the people."
Bani-Sadr refuses to make any personal attacks on Khomeyni, his former friend and
ally. He is bitter about remarks attributea to him about the Ayatollah. He says
he will give his assessment of Khomeyni "at the right moment."
Bani-Sadr has rejected suggestions that if Khomeyni is ousted, he should be put
on trial. He says he would send the Ayatollah back to the religious city of Qom
and ban him from further "interference" in politics.
The ex-president complains of Western ignorance of developments in Iran. He
claims that the present government in Tehran is paving the way for a second
- Afghanistan, an invasion or takeovet by the Russians. If he were given adequate
~ support, he says, he could avert this.
However, according to his friends, so far he has ha, *~o direct political contact
_ with any of the Western powers. He is said to be considering invitations from
the Austrian chancellor, Bruno Kreisky, and from a former premier of Sweden, Olof
Palme.
It seems clear that Bani-~adr will wait for a short while before trying to persuade
the French to lift their ban on his political activities. He believes that once
the present wave of anti-French feeling in Iran has died down, France may relent.
If not, he may go to Sweden or Austria to continue his struggle against the
Ayatollah.
The ex-president indirectly accepts responsibility for the current clashes in Iran.
He says he offered Khomeyni a deal to end the cycle of violence and counter-
violence. If Khomeyni stopped further executions, Bani-Sadr would order the
guerrillas to halt their attacks on government officials and revolutionary guards.
The Ayatollah has not replied.
Iiani-Sadr hopes that other exiled opposition forces will accept his leadership
quickly, making it possible to launch a united assault against the Ayatollah's
republic. But the other leaders have been cool towards the idea. The shah's
last premier, Shahpour Bakhtiar, also in Paris, has rejected Bani-Sadr's overtures,
and described him as "an accomplice to Khomeyni's crimes."
Only 'Ali Amini, a former Iranian premier, has welcomed Bani-Sadr. He said that
fighting Khomeyni could not be anyone's monopoly; former aides of the Ayatollah
should be given a chance to correct their past mistakes.
Reports from Tehran indicate that Bani-Sadr's escape has been welcomed privately
by the government. His presence inside the country was seen as an illustration
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of the government's inability to secure effective control of the country. The
regime has asked formally for Bani-Sadr's extradition from France on some 30
charges, many ~f which carry the death penalty.
Rajavi is also wanted on murder charges. A West German Interior Ministry report
claiming that Rajavi's organisation had links with the Baader-Meinhof group, t~e
IRA and the Italian Red Brigades has been produced by Tehran in support of its
demand for extradition.
It is, perhaps, too early to write off Bani-Sadr as a spent force. The ex-president
plans to launch a daily newspaper in Europe soon and smuggle "tens of thousands
of copies into Iran." He has also started recording cassettes in which he calls
for the revolution to continue and appeals to the armed forces "to rise and side
with the people."
The Mojahedin provided him with the organisation he needs. They have a network
of highly-trained cadres inside Iran and many sympathisers among Iranian students
abroad. They seem to have been promised that Rajavi would be appoinCed prime
minister if Bani-Sadr returns to power.
COPYRIGHT: Times Newspapers Limited, 1981
CSO: 4600/103
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IRAQ
POSITIVE RAMIFICATIONS OF RAID ON NUCLEAR REACTOR EXAMINED
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 227, 19 Jcin 81 p 106
[Article by Nabil Maghribi: "Positive Ramifications"~
[Text] Have not the reactions to the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear installa-
tions abounded with positive lessons that can be employed to serve the Arab causes?
The truth is that the positive ramifications, if we may use the phrase, of this
attack are numerous, the most important being the fact that it has ~enerated an
immediate Arab consensus for which we have been yearning amidst the conflicts and
disputes existing in the area. What the struggling and honorable masses hope for
is that this consensus will last and gain strength and will not be a mere transient
reaction in the face of the dangers threatening all of us.
The raid has confirmed with flagrant proof this time--and this is an important
positive lesson--that Israel is playing the Iranian card and tY~at the Iranian
regime is playing the Israeli card in the chain of attempts to weaken this nation
and to undermine its capabilities and morale. The two sides (Israeli and Iranian)
agree--whether those who disagree with us like it or not--on one goal. This is
what the Iraqi leadership exposed as of the first moment of the eruption of the
war with Iran. Perhaps the raid has come to prove to tttose "with good intentions"
that Iraq's warnings in this regard were justified and perhaps they will reconsider
previous positions about which the least that can be said is that they have been
positions far from the required sense of national responsibility.
One of the positive ramifications of this aggression is that it has produced,
perhaps for the first time in this manner, an international consensus to condemn
Israel. The world information media and the various organizations and peoples
have agreed on denouncing the Israeli piracy. The Iraqi diplomacy, and along with
it the Arab diplomacy, has moved effectively and decisively at the various fronts
to employ the international condemnation in explaining Israel's schemes and its
disre~ard for the international principles and laws. We have proven that it is
possible to explain our cause to the world public opinion successfully when the
efforts are consolidated and the viewpoints united and when goodwill prevails.
Another positive ramification is that the Israeli enemy has proven once more that
Israel views Iraq as the main danger threatening its "ambitions" in the area.
After the Egyptian regime's departure fr.om the battle, the Iraqi soldier has become
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the fundamental mainstay in any future military confrontation. Moreover, this
soldier's triumph in the war with Iran and the great field experience with which
he has emerged, as well as his rising morale, constitute altogether a danger
which Israel views with concern.
Yet another positive ramification of the raid is that it has confirmed that our
next battle will be a battle of advanced technology and that Israel views any
Arab technological progress as an unacceptable danger.
President Saddam Husayn revealed from the outset the importance of the Arab tech-
- nology and of its development in winning the future battle. He has called on
numerous occasions for exploiting the various capabilities available in the indus-
trialization and modernization battle and in developing the means of dealing with
the "machine." For this purpose, Iraq concluded in 1975 the agreement for setting
up a nuclear center for scientific research. Since then, Iraq has been working
in the scientific and nuclear field silently and in freedom from fabricated clamor
and from the "platform" speeches to which we have been accustomed. This is some-
thing that Israel could not imagine would happen.
Perhaps this very raid will motivate several Arab countries to carry on with their
scientific efforts and to invest the~.r monies and their capabilities in training
the Arab man to deal with the technology of the future without "complexes" and
without obstacles. ,
- On these bases, it can be said that Israel has lost heavily. Begin has not been
able to realize the goals for which he had planned through this kind of action.
Rather, he has intensified the determination of Iraq, both the leadership and the
people and all the masses behind them, to answer the challenge with a double
challenge by continuing the nuclear plan on the one hazd and by intensifying the
- efforts to develop the Arab technology and the capabilities of the Arab man on
the other hand in anticipation of the h~ur of the major confrontation.
No...
Who has said that the Arabs have lost in this raid?
We have lost some equipment but the will is stronger today than what it was yes-
terday.
The men who planned for the nuclear reactor can build other reactors today and
tomorrow.
Tomorrow is not far for him who looks for it.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
8494
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IRAQ
IAEA OFFICIAL CONIMMENTS ON COUNTRY'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 227, 19 Jun 81 pp 24-25
[Article by Nabil Maghribi: "AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI Interviews International Atomic
Energy Agency; Official Spokesman: Tammuz Was Scientific Center That Didn't
Require Strong Protection"]
[TextJ Last week colleague Nabil Maghribi went to Vienna, where the headquarters
of the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] is located to record on the spot
the reactions to the Israeli attack and to record an important interview with the
~ agency's official spokesman.
The weather is sunny in Vienna and the glass of the three skyscrapers occupied by
the IAEA offices shines under the light of the brilliant sun. Inside these sky-
scrapers, there is ceaseless activity. There are 1,600 employees working in three
main sectors forming the major sections of the agency: The Energy Section, the
Isotopes Section and the Guarantees Section.
The guarantees sector is the one entrusted with watching the nuclear reactors and
research centers of the 110 member countries of the agency. It is the sector
directly concerned with implementation of the nuclear weapons nonproliferation
treaty, symbolized by the three Latin characters T.N.P. (it was ratified in 1968
and came into force in 1970).
The IAEA is run by three organizations: The General Assembly, the Board of
Governors which comprises 34 countries, including four Arab countries (Egypt,
Iraq, Lebanon and Sudan), and the General Administration which is headed by
Swedish Physicist Seigfrid Eklund who has been holding this position for 20 years.
This week, he asked to be relieved of his responsibility. The General Assembly,
which will canvene in September, will appoint tiis successor.
The agency's annual budget amounts to $100 million paid by the member countries
in accordance with the financial contribution shares approved in the UN.
Pervasive Wrath
As soon as you enter the agency's headquarters, which are subject to strict secu-
rity guard, you feel as of the first instant that rhe Israeli atCack against the
Iraqi reactor Tammuz-1 or Osirak has preoccupied the interest of all the agency
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wor.kers. One of the main guards, an Austrian, hastened to tell me, while checking
my press card and exauiining the appointment book: You are definitely here to
record the reactions to the Israeli attack, isn't it so?
On the fourth floor, the reception was warm. The Information Department officials
welcomed the Arab press and expressed their full readiness to offer any help
capable of bolstering the agency's viewpoint which has been summed up by the
general director in three press statements: The first on 9 June and the other two
an 12 June. These statements refute the Israeli claims. The first statement says
in part that Iraq fully adheres to the nuclear weapons nonproliferation treaty and
that the outcome of the inspections carried out by the agency on the Tammuz
reactor has been positive. The second statement says in part that Iraq has ful-
filled its duties toward the agency and toward the nonproliferation treaty, that
the Israeli military action reveals total disregard for the agency's system of
guarantees and for the nuclear weapons nonproliferation treaty and that this action
causes great harm.to the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
The third statement was devoted i n its entirety to answer Begin's claims on the
presence of a secret cellar under the main reactor.
Reiterates Some Arabic Words
I asked Hans (Friedrich Mayer), a German who is the assistant director of the
Information Department, about General Director Eklund and he said: In principle,
his work in the organization has ended. He has asked to be relieved and is now
spending a vacation outside Austria after 2 weeks of exhausting work.
But he added in reassurance: However, the general director of information (the
agency's official spokesman) is waiting for }�ou to answer your various questions.
He is the one concerned with whatever pertains to information and to the press..
On the 19th floor, Dr ~eorge (Delcoin), the agency's official spokesman, a Belgian,
was extremely affable and warm. He knows Beirut well because he lived there and
he can speak some Arabic. He hastened to tell me: "I hope you will be accurate
in translating my statements. I am basically a legist and every word has a precise
meaning. Moreover, the agency is specialized in technological matters. Therefore,
it is better for the interview to be transmitted scientifically and accurately."
[Question] Begin has cast doubts on the serious nature of the control exercised
by the agency for nuclear reactions. Can we know simply how this control is
exercised?
[Answer] The control is extremely serious and effective, contrary to the Israeli
Government's statements. One-quarter of the agency's entire budget is allocated
for guarantees and control in order to prevent the use of nu~lear energy for mili-
tary purposes. If anything, this indicates the significance which the agency
attaches to this important aspect of its concerns.
Before conclusion of the nuclear weapons nonproliferation treaty, the control was
not effective. There was no neutral international organization to supervise the
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ban on the proliferation of *?uclear weapons and to try ro stop the use of nuclear
energy for military purposes. This treaty came to fill a significant gap in this
regard.
Thus, in the 1950's and 1960's, the control was bilateral, meaning that it was
exercised by the seller and the buyer only. The former required the latter to
abide by certain principles and bases. Naturally, bilateral control was not
_ adequate because it was influenced by "political objectives." Thus, the agency
was entrusted afterwards with the task of control and supervision over the "guar-
antees" which make it certain that nuclear energy is used in the peaceful sphere.
- [Question] How is the control exercised in practice?
[Answer] The agency presently has nearly 180 specialized inspectors from 50
countries and their task is confined to supervising the progress of work in the
nuclear reactors and research centers. The responsibilities of these inspectors
are distributed geographically, meaning that there are inspectors for Africa,
Asia, certain Arab countries and so forth.
These inspectors visit the countries concerned periodically to check the reactors
on the spot and to present detailed reports in this regard. They conduct a careful
check on the quantities of uranium and when they find that there is a shortage in
the declared amount, they ask the country concerned for a clarification in order
to know the fate of the disanpearing nuclear material. They then notify the IAEA
of the results.
[Question] Is this all? Is the matter confined to the inspectors' check?
[Answer] No. The signatory country is committed to notifying us constantly of
any modification in the course of the work. Moreover, the country which supplies
another party with a radioactive substance or with a reactor is committed in turn
to supplying us with all details and information. On the basis of all this,
concerted studies are conducted to enable us to exercise effective control.
[Question] The Israeli authorities say that the check or control by the inspectors
is ineffective because the agency is committed to notifying the country concerned
of the date of the -~nspectors' visit 2 or 3 months ahead of time, thus enabling
the country concerned to take certain measures to mislead the inspectors?
This Is Not True
[Answer] This is not true. The date of the visit is not set 2 or 3 months ahead
of time. Arranging the inspections doesn't require all this time. The time may
not exceed 2 weeks.
[Question] The Israeli Government also says that the control is not ."serious"
because the inspection is carried out over largely interspersed periods, thus
allowing the state concerned to use the energy for military purposes between one
inspection and the other?
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- [Answer] This also is not true. The inspection may be carried out monthly. It
is carried out periodically and constantly. All this is done according to the
information acquired and to the new developments that necessitate such a measure.
[QuestionJ When was the last time the agency inspectors visited Iraq?
[Answer] Our inspectors visited that country last January at the peak of the war.
The agency noticed that Iraq fully abides by its duties. Since then, there has
been no development or modification to necessitate another inspection of the Tammuz
reactor.
- [Question] When will you visit Iraq?
[Answer] At the earliest opportunity. We notified Baghdad this week that the
- agency wishes to visit the reactor to examine the consequences emanating from the
attack.
[Question] Begin has said that the agency inspectors failed to discover a secret
cellar.
[AnswerJ At the outset, Begin said that this cellar was present at a depth of
40 meters. He then backed down and said that it was at a depth of 4 meters. This
is unreasonable.
I repeat: It is unreasonable that specialists would not have discovered such a
cellar if it existed. As for the 4-meter gap about which Begin has spoken, it is
no secret. It is a complementary part of the center with a specific technological
purpose. This gap is known to us and Iraq has made it known.
[Question] In the light of your reports and the outcome of your checks, can any
criticism be addressed to Iraq regarding any particular point?
[Answer] Absolutely [notJ. The agency has no observations whatsoever. Baghdad
has completely fulfilled its commitments toward the I.'~EA and toward the nuclear
weapons nonproliferation treaty. The center is devoted to peaceful purposes. It
can be therefore said that Ta~uz did not, to start with, require strict military
protection from Iraq. It is a research center and there are dozens like it in
the U.S. universities and in other countries. Is it logical to ask for imposing
military guard on a research center? What will we achieve if we adopt this prin-
ciple?
[Question] Can I see your inspectors' reports?
[Answer] No. The reports are confidential and we have no right to make them
public without the approval of the country concerned.
As for our annual report, it will be issued in 3 months and it usually reveals
any violation of commitments. The 1980 report contains no violation by any
country.
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[~Zucst:i~~ii] 'fhe a~;c:ncy will hold its general congress (the General Assembly) from
21-25 September 1981 to study the consequences resulting from the attack. Should
we expect strict sanctions against Israel?
[Answer] Naturally, sanctions are expected. These sanctions are stipulated by
the agency's law or consti.tution. Israel may be exposed to the denial of all its
rights as a member of the agency.
What About Dimona
[Question] A final question. Israel is a member of the agency but is hasn`t
signed the nuclear weapons nonproliferation treaty. Does the agency inspect the
Israeli reactors?
[Answer] Israel allows us to inspect one of its research reactors. But it doesn't
permit anybody to inspect the progress of work in the Dimona reactor. It is well
known that France is the country which supplied Israel with the Dimona reactor and
France d~es not supply the agency with any information whatsoever on the Dimona
reactor.
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JORDAN
KING HUSAYN'S TRIP TO MOSCOW DISCUSSED
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 225, 5-11 Jun 81 p 37
~rticle: "Husayn in Moscow: Soviet Salt in American Dish"7
L'I'ext7 Amman--The attempt to portray King Husayn's visit to Moscow as if it were a
Jordanian turn toward the Soviet Union is exactly like the attempt to portray this
visit as if it were a new Soviet influence in the Middle East. Both lack accuracy
and a correct understanding of the Jordanian policy which is ultimately based on a
number of Jordanian convictions. Only Jordanizing the visit permits understanding
its dimensions. How do these dimensions seem?
If the Jordanian monarch's visit is measured by the contents of the joint communique
issued on this visit, its results would seem small, eve*~ very limited. But if
measured by Jordan's official viewpoint of the nature of the possible settlement in
the Middle East, then the talks which King Husayn has h~ld in Moscow are tantamount
to a declaration of the start of a new phase in the search for peace--a phase that
transcends the Camp David accords to more realistic, and perhaps more comprehensive,
steps.
It is impossible to understand the Jordanian position without referring to a number
of indicators which, if combined, form what may be called the "limits of the Jordanian
dealing" with the solution plans projected so far by the American side and by the
Soviet side. Ultimately, the Jordanian position reflects a national pan-Arab under-
standing of the reality of the conflict, an understanding characterized by a calm
historical dimension more than being characterized by emotionalism under the impact
of the political or strategic changes in the relations between the East and the West.
If King Husayn's trip to Moscow presents outwardly an additional proof that the
Jordanian position is not tied to the American or the Egyptian position, then it is
considered, on the other hand, a natural extension of the well-known Jordanian
positions thraughout the past 10 years. These positions can be checked since the
day Jordan took part in the Geneva Conference which was the fizst U.S.-Soviet f~rmula
for a solution under the auspices of the UN.
If the Jordanian position is itself the real obstacle in the face of the Camp
David negotiations, then this position in particular may result in the future in
reducing thz U.S.-Israeli influence on the settlement so as to make the solutions
more balanced and to make these ~olutions take into consideration the Arab aspirations
and Arab historical rights to the land, as well as to peace and progress.
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Before and After
Since the June LI9677 war, Jordan has abided by resolution 242 which calls for Israel's
withdrawal from the occupied territories. After the October [I97> war, Jordah
reaffirmed this abidance. On the basis of this abidance, a Jordanian delegation led
by 'Abd al-Mun'im al-Rifa'i proceeded to take part in the first disengagement ~f
forces] talks in Geneva. In the wake of the Camp David accords and in light of the
U.S. clarifications in reply to questions raised by Amman, Jordan declared its
opposition to the Egyptian-Israeli-U.S. settlement formula because it considered this
formula unfair and incomplete. The visit made by Husayn to Moscow is a new Jordanian
endeavor to make the Kremlin, after the White House, understand that the possible
solutions to the conflict are neither Soviet nor American but Ar.ab primarily,
meaning that the solutions should understand the Arab viewpoint and should not come
from beyond the pan-Arab will of the Arab peoples.
Further, it should be noted that the Jordanian regime has sought since 1967 to restore
the West Bank with all the diplomatic means available to it. Jordan started on 15
March 1972 by projecting the United Kingdom plan on the basis of Jordanian-Palestinian
concord within a federal state. But the PLO's rejection of the plan compelled Jordan
to fold this plan and to resume the dialogue with the frontline states, and particularly
_ with the PL~, in search of other solution formulas through a unified Arab position.
Jordan suffered from some Lhostile7 Arab campaigns in the years 1970-73 and then
came the October 1973 war and Jordan provided the proof of its commitment to Arab
solidarity. On 10 September 1973, King Husayn proceeded to Cairo to meet with
Presidents Anwar al-Sadat and Hafiz al-Asad and then declared full military mobilization
to prevent Israel from penetrating the eastern front through the Jordanian side.
Then came the Algiers summit (26-28 September 1973) and the second I~lamic summit in
Lahore (22-24 February 1974) to inaugurate a new era in the Jordanian-Palestinian
relations. In those two summits, Jordan declared its open approval of the
establishment of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian
people in a collective step o.f support for the PLO in the international lobbies.
Diplomatic Confrontation
Husayn then acted at botk: the domestic and external levels on the suggestion of the
resolutions of the Rabat su,unit (26-29 October 1974), even though he did not take
part in that summit. Then came Camp David.
When Jordan real.ized that al-Sadat's step was actually independent and that all that
was intended by Camp David was to neutralize Egypt and to throw the entire burden on
the shoulders of the eastern front, it declared its open refusal to join the Camp
David negotiations and moved toward diplomatic semi-confrontation. King Husayn
made a European tour (December 1978) which ended in the UN (October 1979) to explain
his view of the fair solutions. Last January, he again reaffirmed his previous
positions in al-Ta'if summit.
In the light of these considerations, what new thinq does King Husayn's visit to
Moscow bear?
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This visit cannot be separated from two constant points in the Jordanian position--
two points founded on both acceptance and reje~tion: Acceptance of resolution 242
which opens the door of dialogue toward a peaceful solution under the auspices of
the UN, as in the case of the first Geneva Conference, and rejection of the Camp
David accords which are confined to partial U.S.-Israeli solutions to the conflict;
acceptance of the PLO as a fundamental party in the dialogue and rejection of the
self-rule negotiations which isolate the PalPStinian base from its real leaders. From
this angle, the visit seems to be a Jordanian acknowledgement that the Soviet
. pzesence in the Middle East is an effective and undeniable presence and that Arab
consensus can employ this presence to balance the U.S. dr~mination of the solution
plans which, it is evident so far, have not led to a fair settlement. The U.S.-
Soviet dialogue may be what is needed here and King Husayn's visit is an indirect
call for this dialogue.
In any case, it is no secret that three controversies dominate the current Mideast
conflict: The first is an Israeli-Palestinian controversy, the second an Israeli-
Arab one and the third a U.S.-Soviet controversy. Any new link in any solution at
the regional level seems to be tied to agreement between Moscow and Washington as
part of a deal restricted to the Middle East or expanded to include the new troubled
areas in Africa and Latin America.
With Ronald Reagan's arrival in the White House, there is increased talk of what
Washington calls the "Jordanian solution." If this name, which Jordan doesn't at all
approve, has any political significance, then it is that no progress in the nego-

- tiations wi11 become likely unless Jordan takes part in them. As long as the West
Bank is swinging between actual occupation and the imaginary "independence" plans,
Jordan's agreement with the PLO on a unified position is coupled with semi-unanimous
. Arab consensus and with a clear plan of action that is capable of reducing the inter-
Arab conflicts and o~ compelling both Moscow and Washington, which have so far shared
the gains due to the abundance of Arab conflicts, to acknowledge the Arab fait
accompli. Yasir 'Arafat's expected visit to Moscow may enhance the Jordanian-
Palestinian coordination in the coming months.
Moreover, there is nothing in what King Husayn announced in Moscow to indicate that
- the king is wagering more heavily on the Soviet position than he has been wagering
on this position so far or that he is wagering on the U.S. position more heavily
than this position can withstand in this phase. This is the proof that no Jordanian-
Egyptian agreement is likely and that the Jordanian direction is ultimately the
direction that agrees with the collective Arab position.
Jordanization of the solutions under the current conditions means, to a large degree,
the Arabization of these solutions. Jordanization is the alternative to
Egyptianization, Judaization, Americanization and Sovietization. Moreover, such
Jordanization will actually help Lebanon overcome its bloody predicament.
- COPYRIGHT: 1981 AL-WATAN AL- ARABI
8494
CSO: 4304/45
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QATAR
AMIR'S SPEECH TO FIFTH CLASS OF QATAR UNIVERSITY GRADUATES
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 227, 19 Jun 81 pp 39-40
[Article: "Qatar University Graduates Fifth Class; Shaykh Khalifah: Developing
Qatari Man Is Our Number One Weapon in Progress"]
[Text] There is an organic r.elationship between university and development.
Shaykh Khalifah ibn Hamad Al Thani, the Amir of the State of Qatar, underlined
this relationship at the ceremony held on 6 June 1981 to graduate the fif.th class
of graduates of thz Qatari universities. The occasion, attended by the prominent
Qatari officials, underlined Qatar's determination to forge ahead with both the
applied and the humanitarian aspects of university education in order to create
the future from an advanced position.
Addressing the university professors and students on the occasion in his capacity
as the supreme president of the university, the Amir of Qatar said:
"It pleases me to welcome all of you most warmly on this blessed occasion in which
we gather this time every year to celebrate the graduation of a new batch of the
students of our young university. This year's occasion is the fifth of its kind.
Similar occasions evoke in the soul meanings whose memory is renewed with the
renewal of these occasions. Today's occasion, like the preceding occasions, is
filled with such meanings and abounds with such feelings. As for the meanings,
their essence is to venerate learning which has the most noble place in our religion
and the highest position in our world. As for the feelings, their essence is joy
and confidence: Joy in this select group of our youth for whom we have exerted
our utmost efforts in order to provide them with the sharpest weapon and the
noblest provisions that guarantee them the best means to secure the best life and

, best future, and confidence that these youths will dedicate the scientific knowledge
they have gained and the technical abilities they have acquired to perform their
sacred duties toward their homeland and to participate with all their capabilities
in realizing the comprehensive renaissance for which it aspires."
Developing Man
The amir added: "We believe that the state derives the soundness of its structure
from the sound upbringing of its citizens and that the best instrument for the
progress and prosperity of nations is the minds of their sons and daughters. This
is why developing the Qatari man has been in the past and will continue to be in the
future our main preoccupation and one of the basic mainstays of our national policy.
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"Motivated by this belief, we have devoted our attention to establishing Qatar
University and have directed the efforts with which this university is opening its
path toward the realization of its noble message: The message of molding the most
beneficial resources we possess, meaning by this our youth, the instrument of
our present and the treasure of our future.
"While following with utter care the successful efforts exerted by our university
to perform this message, it pl2ases us to see this university marching ahead toward
completing all the requirements of its university structure and to see that it has
- taken in the few years since its foundation ceaseless steps in this direction.
These steps have included the establishment of various specializations in sciences
and humanities, not to mention four research centers for education, sciences,
humanities and the noble biography of the Prophet. This year, the univeraity opened
the doors of its school of engineering to receive the first group of our children
to study this branch of science. Our country is in dire need of specialists in
this branch. The university has also begun implementing a complete plan for impor-
~ tant studies, namely studies on development in the Arab Gulf states.
"We devote special attention to cooperation in national development affairs between
the university and the authorities concerned with these affairs in our country. It
is a source of ~oy that the university has actually begun its cooperation with the
ministries and organizations concerned on their planned pro~ects and their scientific
activities which are channelled to serve national development in the various fields
and in a manner which strengthens the university's relations with the social organi-
zations concerned with this development and solidifies its ties with them in a way
that helps realize in the best manner our national goals in this extremely important
sphere. We also devote the same attention to the cooperation which the university
is pager to establish between itself and the Arab Gulf universities in particular
and between itself and the other universities and international organizations
generally. There is no doubt that this cooperation serves the 3oint scientific
interest of the universities and yields abundant benefits to all."
The Amir of Qatar added: "We have established our universities and have exerted
our efforts to help them and to help our graduates so that each of them may carry
the trust commissioned to him in the best manner. Briefly, this trust is to offer
the maximum possible under the canopy of our noble Islamic principles and our
deep-rooted Arab traditions so that we may realize for our people and our nation
all the advancement, strength, power and impregnability that we wish for them, may
contribute to spreading the spirit of cooperation, love and amity and may create
security, reassurance and peace among all people. I beseech God to lead our steps
on the path of right and to guide us to what is good for us and for the world.
He hears imploration and answers supplication."
Cultural Challenges
During the celebration, the Qatar University professors and students expressed
their joy, their appreciation and their pride in this lofty educational edifice
in their country which contributes effectively to developing and enhancing the
Qatari citizen's life toward the better. The generous personal care which Shaykh
Khalifah ibn Hamad, the ruler of the state, devotes to the university and his
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constant followup on all aspects of its activities get the main credit for the
development and progress which this young university has realized in record time.
T~he foundation of the university dates back to similar days in 1977 when the Doha
Palace issued law No 2 of 1977 founding the university. The male and female
teachers colleges constituted the nucleus which produced this lofty tree. It is
worth noting that teaching at the two colleges started in 1973-74. Now, we find
that Qatar University is a member of the Arab Universities Federation and of the
International Federation of Universities. The educational degrees granted by this
university are acknowledged in accordance with a resolution by the Federation of
Arab Universities. Moreover, the State of Qatar has participated in the state-
level international conference on recognition of the higher education degrees
and certificates given in the Arab countries and signed an agreement acknowledging
the Arab educational degrees and certificates at the UNESCO in 1978. It has become
customary for Qatar University to host prominent visiting professors from Arab and
international universities to take part in teaching the curricula, to lecture and
to hold public symposiums. Moreover, the university teaching faculty (including
professors, assistant professors and instructors) comes from among the elite
professors of the Arab and international universities. This is in addition to a
number of Qatari teaching faculty members and of experts of the UNESCO.
In addition to the theoretical and practical colleges in Qatar University, there
are a number of specialized research centers attached to it, such as the educational
research center, the scientific and applied research center, the center for the
Prophet's biography and Sunna, the human documen*_s and studies center and the plan
for development studies on the Arab Gulf countries. This is in addition to a number
of specialized magazines and periodicals published by the university's colleges
and by the various research centers.
Enrollment in Qatar University is not confined to Qatari students only but also
includes students from the Arab countries and from various other countries who
acauire their educatlon in colleges urith numerous specializations, namely: The
collegas of education, humanities, social sciences, sciences, Shari'a .::d Islamic
studies and engineering. Preparations are currently underway to establish the
colleges of information, administration and economy. A tour of the auditoriums
and lobbies of these collegea is enough to give an idea of the high technological
and scientific standard which rivals that of many of the world's universities.
Moreover, the visitor will see the faces of male and female students from the
Gulf states, Yemen, Sudan, Palestine, Jordan, Syria, Somalia, Ghana, India, the
Senegal, Uganda, the Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Japan, Australia, Korea, Indonesia,
the United States, Chad and Mauritania. They have all come to learn in the lobbies
of this young university, Qatar University.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
8494
CSO: 4304/39 END
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