JPRS ID: 9898 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Document Page Count: 28
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• Sequence Number: 10
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9898
7 August 1981
Near East North Af~ica Re ort
p
CFOUO 27/81)
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JPRS L/9898
7 August 1981
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA P,EPORT ~
- (FOUO 27/81~
- CONTENTS
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
Faruq Qaddumi Interview on PLO Strategy
(Faruq Qaddumi Interview; STERN, 30 Jul 81) 1
IRAN
Article Accuses IRP Following SAVAK Footsteps
(Hedi Dhoukar; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 20 Jul 81) 5
Mojahedin-E Kha1q Seen as Eventual Victor Over IRP
(Ghazi Sarhane; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 20 Jul 81) 9
Article Laments Recent Ma.ss Liquidations by IRP
(Bouzid Kouza; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 20 Jul 81) 11
ISRAEL
~ 'Creeping' Annexation Seen in West Bank
(Danny Rubenstein; NEW OUTLOOK, Jun 81) 13
Right-Wing Activism Grows at Universities
(Danny Shapiro; NEW OUTLOOK, Jun 81) 19
_ LIBYA
Misratah Industrial Complex Contracts Let
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 3 Jul 81) 21
MOROCCU
USFP Leader Blames Government for June Riot
(Abdera.him Bouabid Interview; JEUNE AFRIQUE,
8 Jul 81) 22
_ a_ [II~ - NE & A- 121 FOUO]
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SUUAN
Briefs
Irrigation Projects 24
Agricultural Projects With Egypt 24
Transport Study 24
French Printing Project 24
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INTEh-ARAB AFFAIRS
FARUQ QADDUMI INTERVIEW ON PLO STRATEGY
" DW 301351 Hamburg STERN in German 34 Jul 81 pp 112-113
[Interview with Faruq Qaddumi, director of the PLO Political Department, by Wibke
Bruhna--d~te and place not specified]
~ [Text] STERN: Menahem Begin.~.
Qaddumi: ...Terrorist Begin....
STERN: ...justifies his attack on Lebanon by their success. For more than a
year, until the autbreak of this missile war, there have been no Paleetinian
attacka on Israel.
Qaddumi: That's right.
= STERN: Begin argues that if there were not such frequent and heavy attacks on
Palestinian targets in Lebanon, then additional and more successful commandos
could possibly cross the border.
Qaddu~i: Does he say this?
STERN: At the momeat it does not appear as though any Arab or any other country
is ready to wage war with you against Israel. If these sporadic commando
- operations provoke sucl~ terrible preventive or retaliation st�rikes by Israel, why
then do you continue them?
Qaddumi: We must continue our military operations in the occupied territnries.
It is better to hold a small candle in one's hand than to conatantly curse the
darkness.
STERN: This does not change anything militarily, and in the political field it
does not make you any friends, for instance in Europe. What then is your
objective?
qaddumi: A counterquestion: How does a pearl develop? A foreign object enters
the oyster. It disturbs the animal, which rubs against it and is hurt. This is
exactly what we are doing. In the end we will find the pearl in the oyster.
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_ STERN: Aa long as they are not opened, oysters survive such irritation.
Qaddumi: We will never allow Israel to live in peace. We will never allow Iarael
~ to enjoy absolute security. Every Israeli will feel that a guerrilla could be
hiding behind every wall who might fire at him.
STERN: You cannot expect Israel to sit idly by.
Qaddumi: The most important thing is that Iarael has started it. Israel is
responsible for the dead on both sides. We do not have any alternative except to
_ give up. And the operations in the occupied Cerritories demonstrate that we are
not giving up.
STERN: Another possibility would be to talk with the Israel Government.
Qaddumi: With the Zionists? No, because Zionism means the colonialization of
PalEStine.
STERN: Then you are acting like the Israelis who say that recognition of the PLO
as the representative of the Palestinians is out of the question. How, actually,
- are ~hings suppoaed to proceed?
Qaddumi: Israel has occupied our country for 33 years now. The first requirement
is for it to withdraw from the occupied territories. Then we will be ready to
hold negotiationa on a solution to the Mideast crisis in the framework of an
international conference. ~
- STERN: What do you mean by "occupied territories?"
Qaddumi: First of all, the Weat Bank, the Golan Heights and the Gaza Strip.
STERH: This actually means: first withdrawal, then there can be talks.
Qaddumi: Unconditional withdrawal first. We have a vested right to part of
Paleatine. In 1947 ther~ was a UN division plan, which envisaged two stares.
STERN: A plan which the Arabs rejected.
Qaddumi: We acted like the mother, who had fought with another woman, for her
child before King Solomon. He proposed to cut the child in two. But the real
mother said: Let it live; it must not be cut in two.
STERN: This is why the real mother gave the child to the other woman. In
Palestine there was war inatead. If you were to get an independent Palestinian
state on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, what would then happen with regard
to the remainder, that is, Israel with the bordera of 1948?
Qaddumi: We will never recognize Ierael and will never accept the usurper, the
colonialist and imperialist.
STERN: But what else?
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Qaddumi: We will fight for our rights, for our return to our homeland.
_ S'TERN: In this way you are tying the handa of your friends.
Qaddumi: How?
STERN: You idea spells the dest;ruction of the State of Israel.
Qaddu~i: Yes. I want to destroy the ~.nemy who continues to occupy my hameland,
who murdered my parents, my brothers and my sisters. But we are not murderers.
We do not want to throw the Israelis in jail, as they did with us. We welcomed
and sheltered thousands of them during and after World War II.
STERII: That's not quite correct. 2here have been enormous tensions and terrible
armed clashes.
Qadduini: We are ready to live together with Jews in a demacratic state.
STERN: A state which would be governed by you because you would be in the
majority.
Qaddumi: Naturally.
STERN: There is a difference between realpolitik and dreaming.
- Qaddumi: Dreams sometimes come true.
STERN: You hawe denounced the United States as an aggressor and said that the
SoviE~ Union is your most reliable friend. One of the argumenta, with which
Menahem Begin seeks to ward off any potential support for you, is the assertion
that a future Palestinian state would necessarily become a Soviet satellite.
Qaddumi: We are a national m~vement. We welcome anybody who assiats us in this.
We are being helped by the Syrians, the Iraqis, the Libyans, the Chinese....
STF.RN: With weapons?
Qaddumi: The Chinese were the first. They gave us training and weapons. The
Soviets, like the other socialist states, assist us with political and military
aid.
STF.~tN: What are they asking for in return?
qaddumi: What do the Palestinians actually have to offer?
STERN: Maybe they will have something in the future.
Qaddumi: But we are talking about the present. Who can known about the state of
our relations with the Soviet Union in the future?
ST~RN: Your Arab friends are somewhat more reserved vis-a-�vis the Soviet Union.
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Qaddumi: This may hold true for Saudi Arabia. But King Husayn of Jordan, for
instanc~, was in Moscow recently and he got along quite well with his hosts.
- STERN: But when things start getting serious, he will not be very likely to side
_ with the Soviet Union.
Qaddumi: If a large-scale war really were to break out, then the Soviet Union
would be our ally because we prefer to be the friends of communists rather than
falling victim to thP Zionist and imperialist occupation power.
STERN: Communists, too, as we know, can be an occupation power.
Qaddumi: This is not the case with them in the Arab world.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Gruner + Jahr AG & Co.
CSO: 4320/5
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IRAN
ARTICLE ACCUSES IRP FOLLOWING SAVAK FOOTSTEPS
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in Fr.ench No 244, 20 Jul 81 pp 10-12
[Article by Hedi Dhoukar: "Bloody Intolerance"--passage within slantlines
originally published in itali.cs]
[TextJ The 28 June explosion which ravaged the headquarters of the Islamic
Republican Party (IRP) in Tehran no doubt constitutes an event of capital
importance for th e Iranian revolution after the fall of the shah, the hostage
incident at the U.S. ~mbassy, the L'.S. raid in Tabas and the war with Iraq.
Attributed by the regime--without any proof--to the Mojahedin-e Kha1q, this
spectacular attack literally decapitated the sole governing power in Iran,
whicii lost 73 of its leaders, including its chairman, Mohammad Hoseyn Beheshti.
To be sure, he was rapidly replaced by Bahonar, former minister of education,
as well as by Ayatollah Abdol Karim Ardabili at the Supreme Court (who gave up
_ hi.s post as chief prosecutor), but the party is in no condition to recover from
this "hecatomb," which took place after a scattering of the forces which had
previously gathered around i~.
- The elimir~ation of Bani-Sadr, Beheshti's last act, coupled with the systematic
repression of genuinely progressive popular Forces, has notably resulted in lead-
ing the IRP, vis-a-vis those forces, toward an isolation as absolute as the power
to which it aspires.
"'rhe most fragi.le residences are those of the sp:ider," This saying from the Koran,
which is also found in one of the pamphlets of the Mojahedin antedating the
explosion at the IRP headquar.ters, is all the more appropriate at this time.
Indeeci, had not Beheshti, the f.ounder and idealogue of the IRP, spun a veritable
spider web in the country by basing himself in the Parliament as well as in a
formidable propaganda apparatus?
rfore impor~antly, in arder to carry out this enterprise that certain political
forces--often acting in good faith--initially supported, Beheshti behaved as a
~enuine product oE the... shah's school. Just like the lat~er, he attended to
the ta~k of creating a F~olitical vacuum around himself, The mast absurd and
significant action he took was undoubtedly the closing of the university, an
1L15~.:LtUt].011 whi.cti has always been, in Iran, the vanguard of anti-imperialism.
Tens of thousands of students, instinctively perceived by the retrogressive--and
minorit-y--wing of the c1 ergy as potential enemies, have thus heen forced to leave
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for abroad at enormous cost. Those who have remained have been confin~d in
university cities deprived of water and electricity and have been exposed to
the attacks of the Hezbollahi. It was not enough, for the leaders of the IRP,
to consider a priori any "westernized" intellectual as a potential enemy of the
regime: They had to throw thousands of them into the arms of the West!
Another SAVAK
This is a striking example of the general behavior of the IRP since its access to
power. Its anti-imperialist slogans have solely served to objectively aid and
comfort U.S. positions in Iran. It is not fortuitous to note, on the other hand,
that the only action and expanding sector in the country has been and still is the
import-export field. This sector is, by definition, advantageous to the Western
business partners who supply Iran with basic staples, as well as to the big
"bazaris" who have earned 120 billion tomans from this trade under the reign of
Beheshti. One is also moved to ask what has become of the millions of SAVAK
agents who were raging during the era of the shah. It is perhaps easier to
understand now why only their leaders were sunm?arily executed, thus depriving the
people of their precious testimony. As for the archives of this criminal organi-
zation of sinister memory, one can well ask where they have ended up...! The
Iranian people, at any rate, have never found out. In return, after the SAVAK,
they were rapidly compensated with the IRP creation: the SAVAMA.
If one is to believe only the testimony--often written in the guise of letters
addressed to the "leader of the revolution"--of a number of respectible Shi'a
dignitaries such as 'Ali Karimi, a member of the Qom clergy close to Khomeyni,
or 'Ali Tehrani and others of a more modest rank, it will be seen that all agree
in saying that the IRP regime has gone much farther in the repression of the
leftist forces than the shah's government. Karimi even affirms that six leftist
militants "were executed while they were still imprisoned from the time of the
former regime!" Sheikh 'Ali Tehrani, one of the most important religious
dignitaries of Iran, has himself told newsmen that he "considers the IRP as another
SAVAK. Everything it does, both within and without Iran,l is done with the money
of the people. Its budget is larger than that of Che SAVAK, Soon, the crimes it
commits will be more numerous than those of the SAVAK. The same will be true of
corruption. The IRP has its own private prisons, where torture is practiced.
Many people have died in them." Wasn't an Iranian nurse executed some time ago
because she had reported to Western newsmen the way in which wounded Kurds were
treated in her hospital?
1. Among the IRP operations conducted outside of Iran, we cite the Saturday,
4 July, attack perpetrated at the Paris university city by a group of non-
_ resident "hezbollahis" against leftist Tranian students. Armed with knives,
sticks and razor blades, the "hezbollahi," dressed in shrouds, wounded
numerous students before being repulsed. The operation came a few days after
leftist Iranians organized a protest demonstration in front of their own
embassy, which refused to receive a delegation from the PSU, the PS and the
OEDETIM protesting the dismissal of the legitimate Iranian president as well
as repression,
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Wliil.e ttie repress:ion practiced by the shah was mostly aimed at the university, that
launctied by the IRP has not even spared schools. Never, even at the height of the
resistance against the Pahlavi regime, were minor children executed, as recently
happened in Tehran. Justice was never so expeditious as to sentence people to
death /without even being aware of their identity';~ as witnessed by a letter rrom
'Ali Karimi and another from the Mojahedin-e Khalq addressed to the Imam. In
the absence of defense attorneys; every pretext serves the purpose for thF execution
of dissidents. Thus 'Ali Karimi revealed to the Irnam that the notoriouF "red judge,"
Khalkhali, prepared "fictitious and falsified lists and called me one day to tell
m~: 'I will pretend I have found 300 kgs of heroin. You will say that you had
them burned.
Thus, Soltanpur of Feda'in was accused of "foreign currency violations," a pretext
that made it possible to execute him. Alas, examples of these practices abound!
`I7ic=y prove the degree to which the demented machine of repression has evolved
outside of ali the rules of the game, even if it were only juridical, not to say
democratic, The accusation of "corruption on earth" or of "crimes against the
Islamic Republic"--when it is not "against God"--is enough to be executed. Any
debate in this context has become impossible. This was illustrated by Bani-Sadr's
ouster. He merely wanted to obtain the right of a debate on television, "only
3 hours," with his adversarie~, as he wrote in a letter addressed to the Imam,
The explosion at the IRP headquarters was the culmination of the violence launched
by Beheshti's party and fed by hallucinating lies which finally turned againsr him.
Indeed, history teaches us that violence always reaches a point at which it becomes
uncontrollable. The first act in the regime's reaction: It is the "great Satan,"
U.S. imperialism, which was behind the attack, Second act: "It is the Mojahedin,
or, in other words, an Islamic opposition to an Islamic regime. Once again,
Behesliti's men have attempted to award themselves an anti-imperialist position that
no palpable act has ever represented, in order to justify in advance the repression
launched against those dissidents who are all the more feared by the powers-that-be
because they, for their part, intend to carry out the text of anti-American slogans!
What is one to make, on the other hand, of this enigmatic sentence of Khomeyni's
stating that "these so-called Mojahedin of the people have killed 72 persons who
were actually serving the people. They proclaimed thc~mselves hostile to Ayatollah
Beheshti and they killed him. But they also killed, in the process, 71 innocent
people." Was Beheshti, therefore, not innocent? At any rate, the Imam could not
be ignorant of the fact that, unlike Raja'i, for instance, Beheshti had never
apposed the former r.egime, from whose largesse he even profited, to the extent
tl~at he was appointed by the shah as counselor to the education minister and
grand ~_mam of the Hamburg mosque.
'lhe Iranian people's revolution having been everyone's revolutioii, how can one be
surprised that an increasingly larger majority of the people is revolting against
the one and only gro~.ip which has harvested--with at least debatable mettiods--the
fruits of this revolution? Despoiling Islam of all signi.ficance, the IRP only
maneuvered to grab power, while land ownership, riches and privileges survived
t, Italics ours.
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intacr and unshared in a context of absolute lack of freedom. Everything took
place as if the IRP's real objective were to prepare the grounds for a civil war
by reviving unsolved internal conflicts, by giving f~ee vent to undergruund
struggles and by developing a demented campaign of bloody liquidations.
This is why Beheshti's brutal disappearance and that of dozens of inembers of his
political apparatus have left Iran divided by an important schism separating
two violently opposed camps. Two camps that are not even divided by their
belonging to what is, after a11, the same class, even if the IRP purports to be
the mouthpiece of the "mostaz'afin," who are only good enough to come out and
demonstrate in its favor, while the mass of the unemployed is reaching alarming
proportions. As for the distinction between the clergy and the laity, it does
not withstand analysis, since it is so sutmnary and surresptitious. Indeed,
religious and civilian personalities, parties and associations can be found in
both camps. One has only to note the support--prudent, of course--given by the
Tudeh Communist Party to Khomeyni's policies. The latter appears today as the
only force still capable, by virtue of his great charisma, of averting a coup
d'etat by the armed forces.
This eventuality being, for. the moment, put aside--thanks notably to the "showra"
(the grassroots military conunittees which have contributed in denouncing several
plots within the army)--it is nevertheless undeniable that the IRP's political
bases are shrinking, while the popularity of the forces of the anti-imperialist
left continues to grow in spite of the violent repression directed against them.
The election to be held on 24 July to replace President Bani-Sadr will be
significant in this res~ect, Raja'i and some other candidates chosen exclusively
by the IRP will be the only contenders for the presidency. In this case, the
weakness of the popular mobilization will be such that Beheshti's party's
prestige will not be enhanced, especially if Raja'i's election is credited with
receiving more than 90 percent of the vote, an eventuality that is not unlikely.
This will seal the fate of a revolution whose greatness was derived from the
vast hope it had created in a third world mostly dominated at the time by
99.99 percent of dictatorships.
COPYRIGHT: Afrique-Asie 1981
CSO: 46?9/17
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- IRAN
- MOJAHEDIN-E KHALQ SEEN AS EVENTUAL VICTOR OVER IRP
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE ~.n French No 244, 20 Jul 81 p 12
[Article by Ghazi Sarhane: "Mojahedin: Gun in Hand"]
[Text] Are the Mojahedin-e Khalq responsible for the 28 June attack against the
headquarters of the Islamic Republican Party? Their adversaries say so. They
even declare that the man who set the bomb has been identified as a member of
this organization. However, in the absence of concrete proof--which the IRP
leaders generally lack to shore up their allegations--or without a statement by
the Mojahedin-e Khalq ciaiming responsibility for the attack, the only tangible
fact is the will of the powers-that-be to eliminate Mas'ud Rajavi's organization.
Even though the Mojahedin have never kept secret their will to fight the IRP,
whose leaders have been called "petty bourgeois in Islamic garb, men thirsting
for power, who use machiavellian policies and for whom the end 3ustifies the
means," numerous diplomatic observers in Tehran believe that the 28 June incident
was the pretext sought by the ultra-reactionary elements of the clergy to
unleash a witch hunt. Many diplomats go as far as to affirm that this was a
settling of accounts within the IRP itself.
Established in the sixties, the movement of the Mojahedin-e Khalq is.indeed, in
the view of all observers, the strongest and best implanted organization in the
country. It has gained in popularity and been strengthened since the revolution
thanks to the very IRP, wh ich has branded it as its number one enemy. Above all,
the weakening of the other forces of opposition such as the Mos'addeq followers,
who had no time to structure themselves, resulted in direct gains for the
Mojahedin-e Khalq organization; for it was able to broaden its field of alliances,
notably after the dismissal of Bani-Sadr, th e legitimate president elected with
over 10 million votes.
The Mojahec~in-e Khalq, an armed organization believed to number nearly 100,000
militants, has nevertheless always avoided engaging its adversaries in combat.
Its leader, Mas'ud Rajavi, even agreed not to run for the presidency when the
IRP leaders became fearful that he would be the beneficiary of the totality of
the minorities' votes, with whom he had clearly sided by pronouncing himself
in favor of decentralization.
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Wishing to avoid the str~ggle of the centers of power, the Piojahedin-e Khalq,
- nevertheless, vainly attempted to muster a political debate on the projects,
ideas and programs for the reconstruction of the country. Such a debatP, of
course, required at least minimal democratic guarantees.
The least that can be said is that the IRP was far from being in favor of a debate
of. this kind, rather g~;ving in to the temptation of totalitarian power. The
_ Mojahedin were therefore fearing a fate similar to that of the Tupamaros in
Urugua.y: Indeed, before the access to power of the fascists in that country,
the Tupamaros were like "fish swimming in water," but when the fascists gained
the upper hand, the Uruguayan guerrillas' organization was smashed by the bureau-
cratic machine, by torture, imprisonment and mass murders.
~ In this respect, it is interesting to note--even if a11 comparisons sin by
excess--that since the arrival of the IRP and besides a number of corrupted
cadre from the former reoime, it is the Mojahedin who have suffered the most
casualties within their ranks. To be sure, there are the executions, which
follocaed the attack against the headquarters of Beheshti's party, where the
victims have been mostly Mojahedin. However, the phenomenon started a long
time ago, when the "hezbollahi" stormed Tehran University, killing many members
of the Mojahedin-e Khalq. They then attacked the offices of ti~is organization
in all the cities of the country: Hamadan, Resht, Tabriz, Mashhad, Qom, Ahvaz,
etc., where numerous militants of Lhe movement lost their lives.
An A].terna.tive Force
At any rate, one week before the attack wh ich took Beheshti's life, the Mojahedin
demons trated the extent of their power by organizing a demonstration in Tehran
which mobilized more than 500,000 people. It was bloodily represented at
Ferdowsi Square by the Revoution Guards. Had it not been peaceful and had the
angry mas~~s not been unarmed, the demonstration would not have been stopped at
Ferdowsi Square and would not have been dispersed, It would have swept the
reactionary bands and groups right into the garbage dump of history," a pamphlet
of this organization mentioned.
However, the Mojahedin-e Khalq discards such an eventuality. It seems to concentrate
its stakes on the increase of the revolutionary potential of the Iranian people,
whose memories are fresh and whom it behooves to identify and sweep away dictators.
The Mojah~din-e Khalq is basing its entire policy on this prospect, hoping to
present itself as an eventual alternative.
In the view of the Mojahedin-e Khalq, by reversing the goals of the revolution
in order to serve its own interests, the dominant party is contributing to the
sharpening of the political conscience of th e Iranian people, whose vast potential
for struggle has remained intact. This fact alone, which explains the nature of
the ongo:ng repression, constitutes a victory in 3.tself.
COPYRIGHT: Afrique-Asie 1981
CSO: 4619/18
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IRAN
ARTICLE LAMENTS RECENT MASS LIQUIDATIONS BY IRP
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 244, 20 Jul 81 p 9
[Article by Bouzid Kouza: "Iran: The Tragic Paradox"]
- [Text] All popular revolutions must defend themselves. This is how it must be.
On the basis of this assum.ption, the leaders of the Islamic Republican Party (IRP)
are attempting to project--a tragic paradox--an image of revolutionary authenticity
and of anti-imperialism to the bloody purges and su~ary executions being carried
out for the past year in successive waves in the c3ties and villages of Iran.
However, nothing could be farther from the truth.
What is taking place in Iran is actually a well-considered project for the
liquidarion of a formidable mass movement rarely seen in history. And not as
"impartial and objective observexs," but as def enders of this revolution, which
is greeted with fervor by hundr~ds of millions of people around the world, we
have been led to this painful conclusion: Muslim sons of the people are being
muzzled, tracked down and murdered under the name of "law."
The official religious discourse emanating from Qom and Tehran reeks of such
caricatural manicheism that in the eyes of international and Muslim opinion,
it is the reflection of an intolerant, repress3.ve and fanatical Islamic faith.
To retain of Islam but the letter and ignore the spirit, to banish all "ejtehad"--
this conscious effort to understand society and remain faithful to the liberating
message of the Koran--is undoubtedly the biggest cr3me that certain Iranian
leaders can co~nit against Islam.
; Iranian patriots are aware of this, and this is why they are paying for it today
with their blood, the blood they freely shed to overthrow the shah. It is not by
coincidence that the reactionary wing of the Iranian religious establishment,
which succeed~d in co-opting the revolutionary movement and subsequently neutraliz-
ing it while still preserving an anti-imperialist parlance, is concentrating
its hardest blows agaisnt an organization such as the Mojahedin-e Khalq, which
represent precisely this liberating current expressing a different Islamic vision
of the world: a progressive one,
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~
The Mojahedin, therefore, const'itute a real danger for the reaction and for
- imperialism, because they are at the very heart of the Islamic equation and are
thus able--as they have already proved--to mobilize huge popular masses for. the
" purpose of engaging in genuine transformations thaC would ensure the preservation
and the triumph of the revolutionary process.
To defend th~m and to support them is equivalent to helping them preserve the
revoluti.onary fire in Iran as well as to repulse the 13.quidators.
COPYRIGHT: Afrique-Asie 1981
~ CSO: 4619/20
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ISRAEL
'CREEPING' ANNEXATION SEEN IN WEST BANK
Tel Aviv NEW OUTLOOK in English Jun 81 pp 16-20, 48
~Article by Danny Rubinstein~
~Text~
- (n June 1981, just before the elections, it is 14 on the West Bank with a data-sheet ap-
ears since the West Bank and the Gaza Stri pended. When one studies the data and sees
came under [sraeli rule. Hundreds of thou- their trend since the Six Day War one comes
to the conclusion that the party programs
sands of Israelis and hundreds of thousands we're familiar with aro meaningless. The par-
of Arabs who were of elementary school age ~~es in [srael are adopting positions on the
in 1967 barely remember that once there was West Bank that are delusions because they
a"green line" dividing Palestine. 19 years of are not based an a corcect reading of reality.
a divided Palestine (1948-1967) are gradually
becoming an episode in history receeding in The reality is that over d 14 year period a
time. [n the last three election campaigns process of anrtexation of the West Bank and
(1969, 1973, 1977) the political movements Gaza by Israel has taken place. Mostly this
and parties in Israel took clearly defined annexation is total and complete, but in
positions on the occupied territories and some instances it is partial. There was a time.
their Palestinian-Arab population. This ~n previous elections when one spoke of
problem was and continues to be a constant "creeping annexation". Now, in the spring of
topic of political debate wherein each side 1981, the creeping is coming to an end and
knows the strengths and weaknesses of the has a special character.
others. Little is known about the dramatic Eeonomic Annexatfon
changes that have taken place in the oc- The integration of the econumies of Israel
cupied territories during the 14 years since and the occupied tenitories was completed
1967. These changes shouid have brought several years ago. About a million and a
abuut a shift in the positions and political quarter Arabs are "captive consumers" of
programs of the various parties. And that is Israeli merchandise. They have no choice but
nut the case. The Israeli debate on the oc- to buy (sraeli products since the customs and
cupied territories will run along the same tax barriers of Israel also apply to the oc-
lines as it has since 1967, without taking into cupied territories. [n 1979 Israel sold 300 mil-
account that the situation has long sina lion dollars worth of goods to the occupied
changed. territories-this is more than the total that
For the coming elections, Meron Israel exports to France. T'he occupied ter-
Benvenisti, former deputy Mayor of ritories serve not only as a protected market
Jerusalem and currently running on the for [sraeli goods but also as a source of cheap
Citizens ~Rights List, has prepared a repoR labor for israel's economy: more than half of
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the wage earncrs work in Israei and they con- furtune wuuld have to be paid to the Arabs
stitute a third of the total Arab work force. thereby doubling the GNP of the occupied
Employment in Israel brings in 30% of the territuries. ~ _
total income of West Hank and Gaza Arabs. ecunomies in a very special way. The
Most of the Arabs who work in Israel come ec~nomic systems were unified in a manner
from the villages; according to the figures, designed primarily to benefit Israel. Of
Arab peasants have reduced the area of course the standard of living is risin~ steadily
cultivated land by 35% as of 1967. The in the occupied territories, bu[ nothing is be-
number of Arabs engaged in agriculture on ing done to extend the Israel social welfare
the West Bank is rapidly and steadily declin- ~dWS in order to prevent financial harm to
ing. Thousands of village families have in re- (sr~el. Two years ago the Begin government
cent years become urban working families. did udopt a resolution regarding the "equa-
Ntany of them were relocated to the fringes lization of services" between tsrael and
of the cities-primarily Jerusalem-in order to the occupied territories. This resolution was
be near the centers of employmeqt. This is a widely publicized but was evidently used for
clear case uf proletarianization which is of propaganda purposes only. In actual practia
tremendous importance. no services were equaliud.. The various
The full integration of the economies of socaal servias in the occupied territories are
[srael and the occupied territories manifests p~ovided by Church groups, UNRRA, and
itself in the almost complete unification of all Moslem charitable organizations. There are
the basic economic systems. The water supp- no payments on the West Bank such as the
ly system, the communications system, the allocations made by the National Insurana
roads, the tour industry, the monetary [nstitute. Hence the Israeli economic annexa-
system, the banking system, and most of the tion is one-sided. It is not applied when it is
electric power system operate as a single unit not worthwhile for Israel. However when it is
within the framework of [sraeli laws, regula- Worthwhile it becomes total and complete.
tions and taxes. In one area however, there is No Jordanian Lawon the West Bank ~
no full economic integration: the social The military government has issued
benefits of Israel do not apply to these areas. hundreds of directives on the West Bank
If the Israeli social welfare system were to be since 1967: These directives have radically
extended to the occupied territories it would altered the judicial and governing systems
_ put a heavy strain on the State Treasury. Of that prevailed in 1967 and which functioned
course t~e residents of the West Bank don't under Jordanian Law. In effect, Jordanian
puy (sraeli income tax, but even if they were Law has been eliminated from the West
to come under [sraeli income tax law it g1nk. In its place we see a very sophisticated
wuuldn't ease the financial burden of the judicial system that has adapted the govern-
State. This is because Arab families have ing system of the West Bank to that of Israel.
many children and the tax exemption credits This system bears traces ~f Jordanian Law
they would receive would cancel out any in- which the military government utilizes when
cume tax payments. On thc other hand, the it suits it (for limitirtg political activities and
National Insurance [nstitute of Israel would chiet7y for banning meetings, ete.). Almost
have tu pav these families child-support al- all of the [sraeli directives which changed the
lucations (the ex-soldier's allocation of law on the West Bank were issued to serve
cuurse would not appiy) and this would ~he interests of Israel rather the interests of
. :imuunt to a very large sum of money. the ,4rab population.
- Sumzone in the military administration True, the residents of the occupied ter-
calculated that if Israel were to Pxtend all its ritories can appeal to the Supreme Court of
socioeconomic legislation to the occupied (5rael. They rarely do this and only in recent
territories there would be almost no gain in years have they turned to the Court in mat-
income for Israel; but on the other hand, a -
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ters of land disputes, expulsions, (the electric The Gush Emunim settlers have joined the
- company case, ete.). With the exception of znforcers of "law and order". These units are
appeals to the Supreme Court, the cntire officially organized within the t~rritorial
leeislative pcocess (posting of directives) and defense system of the West Bank and con-
' the encire Israeli military-civilian ad- stitute an armed militia whose purposes are
ministrative apparatus in the occupied ter- not concealed. Recently, after some Arab
ritories are not subject to parliamentary, boys threw rocks at a settlers' bus near
public or judicial scrutiny. In other words, Ramallah, unidentified persons attacked the
from a legalistic point of view, the annexa- Ramallah bus station at night and wrecked
tiun has been. accomplished in a manncr ten buses. One can easily surmise that this
most convenient for Israai. When Israeli in- was ~ settlers' operation. The military
terests are to be served, directives are issued government helps the settlers in all matters.
that completely change the Jordanian Law Atter the bus station incident, a senior officer
and adapt it to the Israeli system. But the in the military government stated that all
Arab residents have no rights of supervision avenues were being investigated, including
and criticisrra as do tha residents of Israel. As the passibility that this incident was the
far as the Psrabs are concerned the military result ~ of internal dissension among the
occupation still exis~s except for~he fact that Arabs. Until now there have been very few
[sraeli directives have completely changed cases where settlers have been brought to
the legal situation. Examples are abundant: court for attacking Arabs. The few that werc
the military government determines by direc- brought to court rcceived light sentences or
tives which books are forbidden, which new- were acquitted. The perpetrators of the at-
spape~s can be published and where they can tacks on the Arab Mayors have not been ap-
be distributed (in Jerusalem or the West prehended.
Bank). Limitations are imposed on Arab A Third of W~st Bank ILand in Israsli
construction by means of directives on the Handa
protection of the environment. But when it More than a million and half dunams of
comes to settlements or army bases, there is West @ank land, out of'a total of 5.5 million
almost no interest in the environment or its dunams, come under Israeli control, i.e.,
protection. Because israel is trying to gain almost a third. Seven hundred and fifty thou-
controi of West Bank land, directives have sand dunams are State lands, i.e., under the
been posted that make it impossible to sue authority of the State of [srael and not that
the Israeli authorities in local Arab courts in of the Arab population. About a half million
cases of land disputes. The jurisdiction of the dunams of West Bank land is abandoned
fucal ~ Arab courts is, therefore, limited in (absentee) property which the Israeli govern-
matters of land and property in keeping with ment can acquire any time it wants simply
the interests of Israel. By the.way, the Israeli because the registered owners are in Jordan
corpo~ation Himenuta is allowed to buy land or elsewhere. Nfore than one hundred thou-
in the occupied territories. Israeli law on the sand dunams were bought by Jews and by
West Bank is very one-sided. tt has sue- (sraeli institutions (e.g., the Land Registry
ceec~ed in penetrating all walks of life with and the Jewish~National Fund). A~othertwo
one proviso: to prevent r~rab rights and to hundred thousand dunarrts were ex-
serve the needs of Israel. propriated for military and public needs, etc.
This legalistic form oFsophisticated annex- These lands inciude areas with restrictions
ation puts the Israeli doves in a bind. From (such as the ban on building within t50
their point of vicw it might be preferable to meters of certain roads, er certain distances
have real annexation, thereby extending from army camps or training grounds).
Israeli Law into the West Bank. If that were Land expropriation and Israeli settlements
done the Arabs would have the same rights have become extensive mainly in the follow-
as [sraelis and could demonstrate and ing three regions: the outskirts of Jerusalem,
urganiz,e politically. Obviously the lsraeli the lordan Valley and its slopes, and West
duves can't ask for annexation. Samaria. fn the Jerusalem and West Samaria
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regions the settlements are not necessarily Kalkiliah, and Tul-Karm would remain in
founded foc ideological reasons. In accor- [srael - wuld take in about 40% of the West
dance with present government policy, Bank Arabs (including Jerusalem) into the
families with housing problems turn to settle- lewish State. The Alignment's claim that it
ments beyond the grecn line. [n Maale doesn't want to rule over an Arab population
Adumim, Ariel and Karnei Shomron they is futile and incorrect. Considering the pre-
can get low-cost housing subsidized by the sent reality of annexation and settlements,
government. Families from the urban centers which the Alignment agrees to in part, one
of Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv apply for the con- ,;uul~i return to :~rab control only small ~reas
veniently I~cated cheap housing, even when ,iruunci Nublus, and perhaps a few other
thev have no political motivation. ~m:ill enclaves. Such a plsn is mea,ningless
Last year, in addition to large scale settling ,ii~~ Juesn't stand e chance.
invul~~ing huge capital investment, large E~iminating the Chances tor Autonomy
ira~t, ~f land in many locations were ex- The present situutiun in 1he West Bank and
~~r~priated by the army for military pur- ~;;~La duesn't give the autonumy pian any
- ~~ses. B~ses, den~~5, maintenance and train- chance uf success. Ever since the Cam~
ing gruunds that used to be located in [srael U,ivid accurds, the Begin government h;~s
ur the Sinai have been moved to the West ~une everything possible to make even thc
Bank. This involves many thousands of must minimal� ~utunomy plan un~~~urk:ihlr.
dunams, and if we ever have to withdraw Since 1978 the lsraeli military go~~ernmeni
frum the West Bank it is doubtful that we h~, restricted any furm of ,Arab puliti~ul a~-
w~uld find substitute locations for these tivity. ~1eetings and rallies are forhidden.
facilities inside the green line. The military hu~ks are banned, shows are stopped. ex-
s~~stem in the West Bank (installations, corir- hibits and galleries are shut down, peole arc
munications, roads) is such that it is difficult cunfined tu their humes, leaders ~:?n't ge:t
tu see how the Sta[e of (srael can get along rermits to travel abroad, etc. As sou+~ as the
withuut it. Eieein go~~ernment signed~ the ~+I;~n fur
These facts in effect preclude the pos- auwnumy for the inhabitants, it began tu
;ibilitv of g~ving back most of the West Bank svstematic~lly take away the authorily ~till
tcrritory to a Palestinian-Jordanian state, left in the hands of local Arab insitiwtions.
The reali~ies of annexation and settlements in Directives were issued limiting higher educa-
1981 not only negate the feasibility of a West tiun, restrictions were imposed on the local
B~~nk pdrtition plan (geographic or func- cuurts and on muney transfers, and the race
.ti~n~l), but muke the partition lines between tu take as much land as possible away from
Israel and Jordan a total contradiction to the the r~rabs began. Sometimes it looks as
principles uf the Alignment, [n the broad thuugh instead of negotiating for autonamy,
- metrupulitan area of Jerusalem, the stretches Israel could simply cancel the hundreds of
from Ram~llah to the approaches to military directives issued by the administra-
Hebron, there are 'today approximately a tion, and then the local Arab bodies would
- yuarter uf a million Arab residents, The have enough authority to lay the foundations
Alignment plan which includes greater fur ~utonomy.
Jerus~lem in the area of [srael w~uld incor- Of all the impossible options for the West
porate a large number of Arabs into the Bunk and Gaza, the o~e that stands out is
Jewish St~te f'rom this region alone. And if Dayan's "Unilateral Autonomy". In the
we add the West Samaria Bloc, which the ducument prepared by Benvenisti, it is made
Alignment agrees to incorporate into Israel, cleer that unilateral autonomy might curtail
then all the Alignment talk about ~voiding the (sraeli conquest but in its place would
annexation because of demographic dangers ;~rise a permanent regime of'subjugation. Ac-
is invalid. Even the .4lignment's minimal curding to the unilateral autonomy plan
p~~~ - whereby the areas of Jerusalem, there will be settlements and there will be
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Israeli army security zones interspersed can absorb over 40% Arabs in a Jewish State
amung which will be enclaves of autonomous while continuing to rule over them at the
Arabs, something like the Indian reserva- price of moral deterioration, international
tions ur the Soweto Quarter of Johan- isolatiun and obstacles to peacc. Ariel
nesburg. [n these enclaves the Arabs woulc: Sharon, the Minister of Agriculture, took ad-
be free to go to bed having returned from a vantage of a weak and embroiled ~overn-
' day's work for the Jews. They woul~ have no ment to channel funds to the West Bank set-
- intluence on their lives, their economy, their tlements. The magnitude of Israeli invest-
future. From time to time they would rebel ment beyond the green line in recent years
and then the army would restore order. has reached the p~int where it has distorted
The Aligrment's option is not realistic in the Israeli ecunomy. The entire social system
toddy's terms. but the autonomy option is uf Israel, as well as the national order of
bud and demoralizing. priurities, have been mortgaged to the huge
A Palestinian Stats~ payments for the settlements. Spiralling in-
The changes that have taken place since 1967 (lution, tluctuating between 100 and 200 per-
h~ve completely erased the green line, so that cent, stems in great part from the unlimited
in 1981 it is unrealistic to taik about restoring channeling of funds to the settlements. From
it and establishing a Palestinian State in the their inception all these settlements earn their
West Bank and -Gaza. The concensus in keep via government funds. For example,
Isruel totally rejects establishing such a State ~00 uut of the 600 families in Kiryat Arba
and the .[sraeli left that periodically talks maintain themselves from public funds or
abuut such a possibility doesn't realize that it guvernment jobs: salaried yeshiva students,
nu longerexists. Rabbis, local municipality workers, local
The economic integration, the Nlinistry of Religion workers, army yeshiva,
proletarianization of the P.rab villages, the spurts camps, field schools, Talmud Torah,
security and settlement arrangements, and etc. The lewish employers don't have to
above all the new reality of a united withold income tax (for this purpose Jorda-
Jerusalem make it impossible to reinstate the nian Law is valid) from their workers. Gush
green line as a boundary between two Emunim members of the local municipality
suvereign states-one Jewish and one Arab. scate upenly that they have never had any
Not the green line, not autonomy, and budgetary problems.
not the Jordanian~Palestinian option what Continuing the annexation and che rule
can the new reality in the occupied ter- uver the Arabs is destructive to Israel. Are
ritories lead to? there other options?
The Terrible Price A Five Year Israelf Trusteeship
In actuality the option of annexation has After studying the variuus options and all the
been exercised, The price that [srael has paid conditions, yteron Benvenisti tried to work
and is paying is terrible. The Begin govern- up a plan For ; gradual disengagement and
: ment can boast that�it has prevented the pos- Jewish Arab reconciliatian so that in the
~I sibility of dividing Eretz Yisrael. The partici- future a cunfederative solulion would be a
pants in Sharun's tours te the settlements viable optiun. Benvenisti recommends
come back excited about the new Zionism freedom of political action for the Arabs.
they saw in Kadum and Alon Moreh. But the reputriuting those expelled, rescinding curbs
truth is that annexation is entangling Israel ~+*'a~ademic freedom, holding municipa
in complications that will endanger its very elections, relieving the army of its ad
existence. We have swallowed the Arab pop- ministrative duties in the uccupied territorie
ulation and it is stuck in the throat of the and turning them uver to a special cabine
State and choking it. There is no way one minister, returning the authority taken awa
from Arab administrators, develop~ng a
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Arab economic infrastructure that wi
become self sufficient, equalizing the soci;
welfare benefits between Arabs and 1ew
disbanding the para-military units of Gus.
Emunim, establishing parliamentary anc
public oversight of the occupied territories.
and most important of all - proclaiming
thut the State of Israel sees itself as a tem-
porary trustee for a limited number of years.
Taking these steps would calm things
down and enable the formulation of perma-
nent solutions in the future which would. take
~nto account the national rights of Jews and
Arabs. These could be incorporated in the
Camp David peace process in cooperation
with Egypt. Aenvenisti believes that this is
the only way out as opposed to other options
which are destructive or unrealistic.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 by ~ew Outlook
CSO: 4300/61 �
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ISRAEL
RIGHT-WING ACTIVISIi GROWS AT UNIVERSITIES
Tzl Aviv NEW OUTLOOK in English Jun 81 pp 38-39
~Article by Danny Shapiro~
LText~ In universities ali over the world, the con- In the Hebrew University in Jerusalem,
f7uence of political sentiments apparant in similar battles are waged between the student
the surrounding society are often magnified union and the university, not for the usual
through a lens oF idealism, energy and zeal purpose of advancing the students' interests,
cnaracteristic of youth. Paris 1968, TGheran but rather to perpetuate a power struggle
1979, America in the late 1960'a and designed to gain publicity for the student
countless other instances testify to the uni- leaders and to enhance their political futures.
versality of this phenomenon. Such student Such is the nature of the recent con-
revolutions, ~iiceted against the ruling es- troversy surrounding Yisrael Katz, the
tablishment, have s:?cceeded, or nearly suc- chairman of the Hebrew University's student
- ceeded, in bringing about revolutionary union and head of Kastel, an extreme right-
change~ in governments and their policies. wing student faction. In March, Katz and
In Israel we see a strange mutation of this ~ ahout twenty Kastel membeSS tried to chain-
normal and healthy process. The past few shut the doorof Rector Raphael Mechoulam
years have witnessed the emergence of ex- in protest against his decision to extend clas-
tremist politics on Israeli campuses. These ses into part of the scheduled Passover vaca-
politics seem motivated less by_idealism or an tion to make up for time Iost as a result of a
intellectuai critique of the establishment, and lecturers' strike earlier that month. No at-
more by sheer power-hunger often nurtured tempt was made to redress the union's
by fascistic ideological tendencies. grievances through normal channels such as
negotiation. Rather, violence and intimida-
A~ti-Democ~atic Tendencies tion were the first reactions. Nor was any ef-
The ruling eroups in the various [sraeli stu- furt made to gain student support for the un-
dent organizations have exhibited less and ion's demands. This retlected not only dis-
less tolerance for the democratic processes dain for democratic mobilization but also the
stiil respected in uther areas of Israeli realizatiun by katz and his followers that
poli:ical life. In Tel Aviv University, for ex- there was, in fact, little st,pport for their de-
ample, a buard ufinquiry invalidated the mands. It seems that many Hebrew Univer-
results of the February student elections on sity students actually welcomed the extension
the basis of clear evidence uf gross ir- of studies, and such a revelation would have
regularities, such as ballot stuffing and other put a serious crimp in Katz's headline-
similar procedures. The university ordered erabbing antics.
new elections, and when the student union The coup de grace of the whole affair was
refused tu comply, the administration the demonstration organized by Kastel to
re.;cinded its recognition of,the union. ~rc,test disciplinary action being considered
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by the u~iversity against Katz. On Saturday label to these right wing student groups.
night, April about 50 protesters (in what Their contempt for democratic processes,
was billed a5 a"mass demonstration") ap- their cynical power-grabbing, their dispens-
peared ;ruesomely in Ku Klux Klan outfits ing with any effort to struggle for (or even in-
on the university's Givat Ram campus and yuire into) the interests of the students they
raved about the curtailment of student represent, and their national-chauvinist out-
rights. Once aeain, the result was little stu- look munifested in violence against .4rabs
dent support, and a lot of headlines. That, ~ind leFtist Jews, put them squarely in the
ufter ~II, was the whole Point. ~:~scist camp.
Anti-Arab Activities Where Do Th~y asin Their Le~itimacy?
Aside from showy power campaigns that The student right is at least tacitly aided an~
bear littte relation to the interests of Israeli lent le~itimacy from two sources: the student
students, the main preoccupation of these hudy at lar~ee, and the "establishment", i.e..
rieht-wing groups seems to be the harrass- the university administrations, local police
ment and intimi~iation of Arab and left-wine ;ind the larger political establishment.
Jewish students. On one occasion in It is true that Israeli academic rieor is verr
Februarv, a gang uf' "Yesh" (the Hebrew ~iemanding, and that most Isrieli students
acronvm for "Our Israel" and Kastel's are in their ?0's (havine had to complete their
eyuivalenl i~ Haifa's Technion University) arm~ ~ervice hefore enrolling) and must
members broke into a dormitory and at- ~~1't~n w~~rk to support themsel~es while
tacked three ~~rab students peacefully sleep- .~~ud~ing. NeverthPless, thcre is no ~xcuse I'or
ine in their beds. The Arabs sustained the ertent of apathy ~~n the part uf mo~t
~arious injuries, but despite cries of protest I,rarli students towards campus nolitics. The
from various groups, the aggressors have not Ira,t the~~ can do, as the Jc~rtt.ccr/c~ni Pus~
been punished. yteanwhile, one of the Arab ruinted uut in an edituriul on ;lrril I~, is e~-
victims who managed to inflict some minor crrise ~heir basic political riFht unce a year
~vounds on one of the attackers spent more ;in~1 ~ute the extremists out in student union
time in jail than any of the Jewish suspects. clcctiuns. In the Hebrew l,~niversitv, less than
Lnfortunatelv, this was not simply an ~~n~-third ~~t~ the titudents excrcised this rieht
isolated incident. ln the past two years, there la.t June. leaving the field upen for the small
have been periodic incidents of right-wine I~ut tightl~~ oreanized Kastel eroup to
Jewish attscks on Arab and Jewish targets, ~i~~minate the ~tudent uniun.
such as one last spring in Jerusalem when I'ur the uuthorities, it is only vrr~
Tzachi Haneebi (the Kastel leader, now recentlv that university administrntors have
chairman of the vational Students Union .~~~ukcn tu the threat of the eztreme rieht in
and ;on oiextremist ti1K Geula Cohen) led a their mid~t, as evidenced by the stands taken
chain-wielding gang against a peaceful :i~~;iinst the unions in Tel Aviv and Jerus~lem
~athering uf Arab and Jewish students. This in the nasc fe~~ months. Still, not enoueh is
made clear the fact that the right is not heine done tu ensure fair electoral practices,
satisfied in attacking only Arabs. As a t~~ ~rutect :~rab and Jewish r;tudents from at-
Hebrew University philosuphy student p~t tacks, and to ~unish the criminals responsi-
it, ..it is the extreme right which is duing hle t~or this violence. The police and govern-
~ill the attacking, and they are not attacking ment, t~o, bear their share of responsibility
'extremists' but Arab students per se, and for these outrages by their "see-no-evil" at-
Jews whu suppurt any uf the leftist parties." titude towards campus fascism.
l7ie au~h~~r. Dannt~ Shapiro, is a studrnr r~J poliriea!
An Ugly Mixture: Faseism ,c�irnce al the Hebrew L'ni~~ersi~v in Jerusalem, und lives
"F:1SCISI~~ IS ~tfl epithet at h(T1CS randomly Kihbu: Narel. Ne rs a jurrner rnember n% Hoshomer
Hut:air Suciolist-Zionisi y~outh movenren~ in :Vnrrh
hurled by IC(Ilsts :!t their op~lolleTltS. BUt amrrica. vnd edi~ed that movemenr's maga:ine. Youth
there is nc~thine Ilippant about applying such and Nation. in /97~5-77.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 by New Outlook
CSO: 4300/61
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,
LIBYA
MISRATAH INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX CONTRACTS LET
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1860, 3 Jul 81 p 1764
[Text] The West German firm of Brown Boveri und Co AG (BBC) in Mannheim announced
on 23 June that Libya had ordered a cold rolling mill for the Misratah industrial
complex. The order was addressed to a group of firms headed by Voest Alpine (Aus-
tria). Companies in the Brown Boveri group in Mannheim (Federal Republic of Germany)
as well as Baden (Switzerland) will be responsible for all electrical facilities.
The BBC's share amounts to 200 million Deutsche marks ($90 million), out of an
overall co:~tract for the rolling mill costing 1 billion ma=�ks ($450 million). In
addition to the firms mention.ed, another West German company, Dillinger Stahlbau
GmbH, and a South Korean firm, Daewo Development Company, will participate in the
project. We briefly announced the contract in MARCHES TROPICAUX on 6 February 1981
(p 305) .
= The cold rolling mill, the order for which was issued by the Libyan Office of Secre-
tary of Heavy Industries (Iron and Steel Projects Heavy Industries, Tripoli), will
have an annual capacity of 140,000 tons of cold rolled sheet metal and 100,000 tons
of undipped sheet metal.
Contracts for the future Misratah industrial complex, a gigantic undertaking, have
thus been let little by little. It should be recalled that in addition to the firms
mentioned for the cold rolling mill, contracts have already been made with: the
Japanese firm Kobe Steel (rolling mill for iron bars, wire and sections); an Austro-
German consortium including Krupp, Mannesmann, Brown Boveri, Thoste Bau and Voest.
Alpine (electric steelmills); the German firm Korf Engineering (iron ore reducing
plant); and with the Italian companies Technint and Fiat Engineering.
It should also be recalled that the entire Misratah project, of which we have spoken
several times, represents an investment on the order of 16 billion French francs.
The complex will include: two direct reducing plants producing 600,000 tons a year;
a steelmill that will produce 610,000 tons of billets and 650.000 tons of sheet metal
a year; a rolling mill producing 400,000 tons of iron bars and wire a year; a roll-
ing mill producing sections (120,000 tons a year); two lines producing 580,000 tons
of steel strip a year (hot rolling mill) and 140,000 tons by the cold rolling
method; plus 100,000 tons of sheet metal.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Yaris, 1981.
11,464
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MOR OHFICIA,1. USI~; UNLY
MOROCCO
USFP LEADER BLAMES GOVERNMENT FOR JUNE RIOT
PM140934 Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 8 Jul 81 p 17
[Interview with Abderahim Bouabid, first secretary of the Morocco's Socialist
Union of Popular Forces [USFPJ by Mohamed Selhami and Francois Soudan:
"Instigators Must Be Sought on the Government Side"--date and place of
interview not specified]
[Text] JEUNE AFRIQUE: You knew very well that by startinb a general strike
now the Democratic Labour ConfederaC�ion [CDT] made disturbances unavoidable.
Were you not playing with fire?
Abderrahim Bouabid: Any instigators must b e sought on the side of that panic-
stricken and irresponsible government, Law and order must be based primarily
on negotiations. However, the authorities have continually refused to discuss
the question of exorbitant price increases with the CDT,
JEUNE AFRIQUE: Would you have been able to control strike action on that day?
Abderrahim Bouabid: Certainly, but as soon as the police started shooting with-
out warning, everything became uncontrollablP.
JEUNE AFRIQUE: Since they took place on the eve of the OAU su~nit in Nairobi,
the riots weakened the Moroccan position. has this not embarrassed you?
Abderrahim Bouab id: If anyone should be embarrassed by this, it should be the
government. It was up to it to ensure th at the Nairobi stunmit was treated as a
matter of priprity.
JEUNE AFRIQUE: It has been reported that the king personally asked you to
accompany hi.m to the OAU summit....
Abderrahim Bouabid: Yes, but I refused because I had been informed neither about
the developments in the Sahara affair nor about the government's plans. The
national security co~r~mittee, which is supposed to deal with these matters and of
which the USFP is a member, has not been convened for months. As for the king's
celebrated peace plan, I know nothing about it. (JEUNE AFRIQUE note: Nonetheless
Abdelwahed Radi, chairman of the USFP group in the Chamber of Representatives,
accompanied Hassan II to Nairobi.)
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JEUNE AFRIQUE: Would you agree this time to discuss matters with Hassan II as
you did following the March 1965 riots?
Abderrahim Bouabid: I do not know. If the question were to arise, I would
discuss it w ith my comrades. .
JEUNE AFRIQUE: What do you demand--a change of government?
- Abderrahim Bouabid: As far as the immediate future is concerned, we demand the
release of the imprisoned activists, the repeal of price increase and the
restoration of freedoms, not to forget compensation for the families of victims
of repression. As for the rest, to change individuals is not sufficient. It
is necessary to change the orientation.
JEUNE AFRIQUE: This means that you want to participate in government.
Abderrahim Bouabid: Maybe, but on certain terms. We want to receive certain
guarantees.
JEUNB AFRIQUE: What sort of guarantees?
Abderrahim Bouabid: We will define thesn at an opportune moment. You see, we
are a well-b ehaved opposition.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA, 1981
CSO: 4519/29
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SUDAN
BRIEFS
IRRIGATION PROJECTS--In June, the French firm SOGREAH [Grenoble Hydraulics Studies
and Applications Campany] will submit its technical and economic report on the feasi-
bility of projects to be carried out on the 'Atbarah and Satit rivers. These pro-
jects involve the development of 25,000 hectares of land and the construction cf a
dam on the 'Atbarah River. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in
French No 1857, 12 Jun 81 p 1588] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 198 L]
11,464
AGRICULTURAL PROJECTS WITH EGYPT--Within the framework of the Egyptian-Sudanese
protocol signed in April, it has been decided to increase the capital of the Sudan-
ese-Egyptian Agricultitral Company from 10 million to 16 million Sudanese pounds.
There are also plans for building an agricultural equipment assembly plant. Fin-
ally, it was confirmed that this company will grow some 26,000 hectares of different
types of grain in Damazin next season. It should be recall~d that the Egyptian-
Sudanese protocol defining commercial trade involved some $124 million. It provides
for the following: Egyptian exports to Sudan including textiles, building mater-
ials, chemical products, rice and other goods; Sudanese exports to Egypt including
meat, camels, sesame, melon seeds, leather and hides, scrap iron and scrap copper.
[Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1858, 19 Jun 81
p 1647] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1981a 11,464
TRANSPORT STUDY--Renault is now conducting a feasibility study on new projects for
the Gezira Transport Company in Sudan. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITER-
RANEENS in French No 1858, 19 Jun 81 p 1647] (COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie.,
Paris, 1981] 11,464
FRENCH PRINTING PROJECT--An agreement between the Sudan Development Corporation and
a group of French and Sudanese firms was concluded in April to ensure the establish-
ment and organization of a printing plant costing a total of $10 million. Partici-
pants in the project are mainly the French firm Mame and the president of Sharaf
Company, Fath E1 Rahman E1 Bechir. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITER-
_ RANEENS in French No 1858, 19 Jun 81 p 1647] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie.,
Paris, 1981~ 11,464
CSO: 4519/26 END
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