JPRS ID: 9897 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400040009-4
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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/989"l
6 August 1981
Wes~ Euro e Re Qrt
p p
(FOUO 37/81)
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JPRS L/9897
6 August 1981
WEST EUROPE REPORT
(FOUO 37/81)
CONTENTS
TERRORISM
ITAZY
Resurgence of Terrorist Offensive in Factories
(Guido Compagna; EZ SOI~E-24 ORE, 1 Jul 81) 1
ECONOMIC
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
United Counterattack Urged Against U.S. Interest Rates
(Jean Denizet; I,'EXPANSION, 3 Jul 81) 5
Socialists Propose ~European Development Board~ for EEC
(Giorgio Ruffolo; IZ SOLE-2!~ ORE, 23 Jun 81) 10
I TALY
Bank of Italy Proposal To Reform Banking System
(Nicola Forti; IL MONDO, 3 Jul 81) 1L~
MILITARY
FRANCE
Organization, Mission, Ftiiture of Navy's Air Force
(ZE MONITEUR DE Z'AERONAUTIQUE, Jul 81) 16
- a - (III - WE - 150 FOUO]
cnn /1CCT!"T A i r rc~ n~rt v
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TERRORISM ITALY
RESURGENCE OF TERRORIST OFFENSIVE IN FACTORI~;S
Milan IL SOLE-24 ORE in Italian 1 Jul 81 pp 1,2
~Article by C~i do Compagna]
[Text~ Terrorists strike plants at Marghera and Arese. What
this latest offensive means.
Milan The union people have finally admitted that it is there. It
is no longer possible, since the Taliercio and Sandrucci kidnapings, to
argue that the terrorist~ have not infiltrated the factories. It is
also hard to argue that they have not penetrated the union as well,
that they are not among the delegates or sitting on the Plant Council.
In Arese, a member of the Plant Council has been a wanted fugitive for
several months.
The Red Brigades have returned to the offensive. The rsnewal of hosti-
lities only looks less sensational than things used to be: they ara,
right now, holding no fewer than four citizens at once: the former pre-
sident of the Campania Region, Ciro Cirillo, Patrizio Peci's brother;
two industry executives, Taliercio of Petrochimico's. Rorto Marghera
operation, and Sandrucci, of Alfa Romeo's Arese plant.
There is deEp conczrn among exec utives at Porto Marghera. We got that
word from Montedi5on~s president Schimberni: you get an even better
grasp of the situation when you read the documents the management asso-
ciation has on file. They call for solidarity in support o~ a class of
people who are being made t~~ pay for situations for which they are not
to blame. They call upon the police to provide better protection. And
they urge Montedison to do everything possible to rescue Taliercio, whom
, the terrorists have already publicly sentenced to die. In short, they
reopen the agonizing question to negotiate or not to negotiate all
over again.
This is the report on the last few days, with still another incident to
swe11 the roll: the ~uicide on Monday of Carlo Mandelli, an Alf a Roraeo
employee who used to work with the kidnaped engineer, Sandrucci. What
drove him to it? Was it fear? Was it nervous exhaustion? Perhaps it ~
was a combination of both. In any case, it is one more bit of testi-
mony to the pervasive climate of tension now affecting many plants.
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In union ranks the reaction to these most recent events is one of dis-
may. The Lombai~dy director of the CGIL-CISL-UIL has scheduled a semi-
~lai� ori terrorism for~ mid-July. Meanwhile, some union people will ad-
rnit, ~n confidence, that this time the terrorists are beginniii~ to gain
a limited area af consensus. At Alfa Romeo, for example.
What new development has enabled them to do this'� "First of all," says
one union man, "now they know what things are really like in the plant.
And then at Alfa Romeo there is a special agreement, the one on ~'worker-
manag�ed groups," that puts heavy responsibility on the union to restore
productivity. And of course not everybody liked that. And some of the
people who didn't are members of the Plant Council. And that's how the
ter~rorists found new room to operate.'~
When you read through the Red Brigades' latest documents you discover
that this L-ime, alon~ with the more conventional rabbie-rousing slogans
(the kind that were standard during the days of Curcio and Gallinari),
there is a whole new vocabulary that is typical of Seventies-style
"ixiiion-speak, " coupled with a complete command of the standard termino-
I.ogy of 11uor debate.
Per1l~i~s it, is no accident that the terrorists adopted a no-pr~ofile atti-
tude during the FIAT labor battle, when the union had taken positions
:of. extreme belligerency. Similarly, it is no accident that the Red
F3rigades are so boldly surfacing at Alfa Romeo. Here is a reconstruc-
tion of the reemergence of terrorism at Arese.
Marcti, 1980. The agreement on ;~orker-managed groups had just been
si.~ned. At Alfasud it just squeaked through; at Arese it was approved
immediately. And, right on the dot, came a document from the Red Bri-
g~ades. This was no plant-gate flyer: it was an 84-page mimeographed
booklet.
pn the frontispiece, the five-pointed star. Two bold headlines read
"Red Brigades," and below them stood "Alfa Romeo. Then came two slo-
~ans: "Let's attack and Utop the bosses~ plan backed by Massacesi and
the bourgeois statel~~ ~~Let's push on with our program of struggle as
we build the vi~tal parts of the Mass Revolution:~~
Then follow 84 pages of political arld labor movement analysis. After
t11e iiiitial fanf'are of' sloganeering, it gets down to a sober and de-
tailed discussion of problems in the plan;,, in all its disparate sec-
rors. Nobody who had not ~aken part in the union's internal debates
could have written it! There are a lot of graphics, diagrams, and
tables illustrating the way the work is organized. At the end comes
tl?e 5i~,nature: Red Brigades Walter Alasia Column "Luca" Walter
Yeszoli Bri~ade "Giorgio.'~
T}~aL si~nat,ure had appeared before, but, beginning in March, it was to
he seen witli increasing frequency at Arese. For example, in one shop,
,just tlie ot}ler day, they found a great long Red. :3rigade banner. Who
mana~;ed to get it into the plant, past the security guard that had been
tightened in the wake of. these latest events?
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And t,he:n, once t,hc: a~;recment on production crews had been reached, the
union began having management trouble. There was a clash at Alfa over
L-he number of workers with zero hours getting Income Supplement pay-
metits. There were very few of them, but the Plant Council opposed it.
The Red Brigades were heard from again. Right after the agreement, in
early March, they "kneecapped" Alberto Vallanzasca, a shop foreman.
On 3 June they kidnaped Renzo Sandrucci, an executive who had taken
_ part in the negotiations leading up to the work crews agreement.
In the first Red Brigade bulletin clai.ming responsibility for the kid-
naping i,here is a reference to the argument over the Income 5upplement
Fund and some mention of the FIAT dispute.
Communique N~ 1 says: "Just recently Massacesi and his executive staff
have asked for Income Supplement Fund payments for zero work hours for
more than 500 workers, obviously chosen from among the sick, the old,
and the shop activists, a lesson also taught by FIAT. The management
plan is clear: in order to get their anti-worker plans into effect,
they must get rid of anybody who in any way tries to stave off the
bosses' restructuring plans, as happened at the Foundry where the work-
ers have the lowest productivity, and as tiappened in other snops where
the workers voted down forced transfers. Agnelli has started using the
same approach at FIAT: first asking for ICF payments to thoueands of
laid-off workers, then dismissals, then resignatior:s, then retirement
incentives, until now wheii they plan to refuse ISP eligibility t~o the
rest of the 23,000 zero-hours employees and to force another $0,000
workers into the same situation."
Meanwhile, some arrests were made among Alf a Romeo worl~ers. Two of the
men arrested, Vincenzo Toraldo and Pietro Di Gennaro, have written to
the Plant Council: they maintain that they are innocent, but the prime
concern reflected in their letter seems to be to complain about the
situation at A1fa Romeo. "On the one hand," the letter reads, "there
is management's arrogance in promul~gating a blacklist of 585 workers,
by means of which they hope to strike a mortal blow at us here at Alf a
as well as at FIAT; on the other, there is the Red Brigades~ kidnap-
ing of corporate board member Sandrucci.." Given these conditions,
the two jailed workers admit that it will be hard for the Plant Coun-
cils to choose.
Perhaps, though, the most signif icant document in the Sandrucci kidnap-
ing case, at least �rom the unions' point of view, is the one marked
N� 4�
First of all, it is not signed "Walter Alasia Column," but merely "Red
Brigades." In the second place, it is dated Turin, and after three
perfunctory lines about Sandrucci it deals solely and exclusively with
the FIAT dispute.
- There is a precise and minutely detailed descripti on of the current
discussions between FIAT and the metalworkers' union [FLM]; then they
go back to the 3$-day strike, during which the Red Brigades went into
deep cover.
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Say~ tlie communique : "`~l~ere was a time when we deluded ourselves that
we could go on providing a voice for very strong anticapitalist senti-
ment, and upon that sentiment build a viable counterforce, and that we
could hold out on that basis without having to reckon with a far more
complex reality. The October struggle at FIAT raised issues that went
beyond job security, issues that wrought havoc with and challenged the
very concept of capitalist organization of labor."
There is no point now in trying to reach any general conclusions. What
we are left wi.th is impressions, albeit impressions bolstered by a num-
ber of t;nion peo,ple. ~rerrorism has moved back into the plants at a time
when the labor movement and organized labor are in deep trouble. This
is a brand of terrorism culturally disparate from that of its historic
roots. More a child of 19~~ than of 1968; more the offspring of Auto-
nomia Operaia [Worker Autanomy], that is, than of the student re~ellion.
In short, what,we have now is a brand of terrorism that owes a good
deal less to its classical revolutionary roots t;han it does to Profes-
sor Toni Negri's "Power and Sabotage."
COI'YRIGHT: 1y81 Editrice Il Sole-24 Ore s.r.l.
6182
CSO: 3104/323
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ECONOMIC INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
UNITED COUNT~RATTACK URGED AGAINST U.S. INTEREST RATES
Paris L'EXPANSION in French 3 Jul 81 pp 46-49
[Article by Jean Denizet]
[Excerpts] France's economic policy today depends on foreign exchange problems to
a great extent: there are two such problems, which are very different in nature.
The first concerns relations with the European Monetary System [SME]. The second
has to do with the franc's accelQrated drop in relation to the dollar, a fate sharec
by all European currencies.
Some good minds, among both socialists and the opposition, think that France should
have left the SME at the start of the Mauroy government's operation instead of
vigorously defending the current rate of exchange. This opinion cannot be allowed
to prevail. Prior to 26 April, the franc was the subject of speculative attacks
originating much more from outside than from within the country. As always, such
attacks were not based on the objective certainty--rarely established--that the de-
clared rate of exchange had become unsuitable ar that it soon would be; they were
simply based on the conviction that the franc's fixed rate of exchange within the
SME would not be defended by the new government. Above all, this was a test of de-
termination. It is clear that we must never give in to this kind of attack. Sur-
rendering at the outset would have been psychologically disastrous. It would have
been acting like the horseman who failed to impose his will on the horse that balked
before an obstacle: the mount will balk before other obstacles.
Even if, for reasons that are more political than economic, the government wants
to withdraw from the SME o:~e day--which would be a mistake, in our opinion--it should
not do so at the outset and under pressure from speculative attacks. It is not the
political gesture that would be remembered, but the gesture of weakness, o� surrender
to outside attacks.
The Mauroy government's decisions were the best that could have been made: tighten-
ing exchange controls for residents, making them almost hermetic, establishing prop-
erty currency, and finally and above all, affirming an absolute determination not
to yield to speculative pressure. We should remember that most large-scale specula-
tion is no longer domestic as it was in 1926, since foreign exchange controls (which
did not exist at that time) are too effective; such speculation is found outside
the country, among professionals attempting to obtain profits by selling a currency
on the open market. Their sales attract a mass of followers; as the process snowballs,
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the defending government panics and gives in after exhausting part of its reserves;
the speculators buy back the francs which they owe at very low rates in comparison ,
to those of their promise to sell, pocketing a possibly huge profit and waiting for
the opportunity to begin again. We have seen many operations of this type since 1967.
Brief, Dramatic Operations
In the case of such speculative attacks, there is no other possible recourse except
to fight and counterattack.
There are hardly any international economic situations for which a government is
totally defenseless. Perhaps the most disastrous effect of the oil-price increases
by the OPEC oligarchy is that we have become accustomed to such situations of help-
lessness, which are now accepted too easily. Instead of trying to move Washington
to show compassion for our fate through pleas which are barely heard, so strong is
the Reagan administration's determinstion to carry out its own economic experiment,
we should first consider what we can do ourselves, and possibly what weapons we can
use to make the United States listen to us. At least two can be imagined.
First, the Bank of France could be authorized to transfer dollars to oil magnates
at a rate intermediate between the exaggeratedly low rate of a year ago and today's
exaggeratedly high rate. There are precedents for this, and ones which were less
justified than in the present case.
Avoiding Hyperorthodox Measures
"Forcing petroleum to pay for itself" is a perfectly justified rule when it is a
question of a dollar price imposed by the seller and a franc-dollar exchange rate
complying with a certain economic rationalization. But when the franc price is the
result of a purely speculative rate of exchange, destined one day or another to
undergo a drop as great as its recent rise, an equalization of the various buying
rates recorded during the period of rapid increase would be a sensible operation.
We should be careful that the fear of being considered too lax does not lead to
hyperorthodox measures that are ultimately destructive for the current policy, since
� their main drawback is driving up French prices at the worst time. We should admit
~ that the decision of 10 June was a decision to make up for the previous government's
alleged delay in dealing with the dollar's rise. The fact remains that as prices
of petroleum products are established on the basis of a more and more expensive dollar,
and one which is consequently less and less stable, it becomes more and more question-
able to take serious inflationary risks. In a system of fixed exchange rates, it
is essential for domestic prices to immediately reflect a devaluation which has been
decided in complete independence and whose purpose is clearly to raise the franc
price of imported products. We should not carry this rule over to the system of
floating exchange rates, in which rates are subject to chaotic forces.
The second possibility of action: we are not condemned to passively witness the
franc's accelerated depreciation in relation to the dollar. Any government can and
must defend its currency against an unjustified decline. In this instance, the SME
is not an obstacle, on the contrary. One of the most important clauses of the SME's
charter is that member countries must regularly cooperate on the exchange rates for
their currencies in relation to third currencies and adopt a joint policy i.n this
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regard. This provision has remained a dead letter at a time when it has been most
necessary. No one in the SME remembered it when the dollar began its irrational
rise, i.e., when its exchange rate exceeded Fr 5 and DM 2.12, and even more so when
it reached Fr 5.50 and DM 2.35 (unless the ultimate purpose of the French-German
loan planned in April was the joint defense of the franc and mark against the dollar,
This point will be discussed below).
No One Wanted to Intervene
Why has there been this acceptance of the free fall o~ SME currencies, the same SME
whose praises we have continund to sing? Is it because every~ching seemed to be for
the best in the best of worlds, with European currencies wisely grouped together
in their decline? Carter himself was startled by the dollar's accelerated drop
in October 1978. European governments did not have this same type of reaction. Was
thex~e really nothing to be done? Opinions had become polarized about the rise of
American interest rates, which it was believed would cause the dollar to rise irre-
sistibly.
False reasoning: the capital attracted by the high interest rates paid in New York
could have made it there just as well at the exchange rate in effect when the rise
first began. This is what would have happened in a system o~ f ixed exchange rates
and everyone would have considered that normal. It is because no one took action
on foreign exchange markets to provide the fixed-rate counterpart of purchases of
dollars seeking high rates that the dollar's rise was coupled with that of exchange
rates. Floating capital has since speculated with one as much as the other. We
now have a crisis of speculation over the rise of the dollar; this rise resulted from
the increase in exchange rates but has since continued on its own.
SME member countries were not at all helpless to combat the dollar's rise, i.e.,
the decline of their currencies. On the contrary, it would have been very easy to
~ act. They would have had to provide the counterpart, at the exchange rate chosen
by them, of dollar purchases made to take advantage of New York's high rates, i.e.,
to sell the dollars requested. It is no doubt understandable that they were reluctant
to part with their reserves of dollars or strong currencies, especially those member
countries which were afraid of one day being forced to defend the (fixed) exchange
rate of their currencies within the SME. But moves to stabi'lize a currency are
seldom made with the reserves of the country or countries attempting the stabiliza-
tion. Believing in the effectiveness of its action--this is certainly the minimum
requirement--the stabilizing country places itself in a position to exchange its
own currency. We should recall Carter's first stabilization attempt in November 1978:
the plan specifically consisted of obtaining, by borrowing, the European and Japanese
currencies which he needed to slow the rise of those currencies in relation to the
dollar. When those currencies began to decline in late 1979, the marks, Swiss francs
and yen borrow~d in 1978-79 and which were still owed, were repurchased by the United
States on foreign exchange markets for much less than they were sold a few months
earlier, then repaid. This is the typical operation of a successful stabilization
move. Poincare's loan in 1924 from Morgan Bank to defend the franc left the treasury
with a substantial profit after repayment.
Borrowing a large amount of dollars to operate with is the ~asiest thing in the world
today: the Eurodollar market is theYe with its inexhaustible resources, at least
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when the borrowers are SME member countries. Expensive? No. The dollars borrowed
would be immediately sold against marks, French francs, f lorins, etc.: this is the
_ purpose of the operation; tl-,2 rise of the dollar must be prevented and the decline
of those currencies at the same time. The counterparts obtained wou~.d be immediately
replaced on the Euromarkets f.or those currencies; the cost would only be the differ-
ence between the American rates and the European rates. The final profit from the
operation would probably pay off such interest charges. And in any case, the stabili-
zation of European currencies will cost less than their current decline.
An Agreement for the Seven Exchange Rates

' We will never know if this was the type of operation which Mr Barre had in mind in
the weeks preceding 26 April. It that was the case, Germany's agreement meant a
great deal: it implied a joint defense of both currencies against the dollar and
consequently an agreement on a forked dollar-vs.-franc-and-mark rate. Because of
the 5ME, it is the seven exr_hange rates which the two central banks would have agreed
to defend. The idea should not be rejected aprjori because it was launched by the
Barre government. On the contrary, it should be carried to completion and given
its full European logic. All SME member countries should make the decision to take
out a loan in dollars, jointly and severally. They should all endorse the idea of
a joint defense of European currencies against the dollar and agree on the procedures
for this joint action.
Thus we would still suffer from American interest rates, but we would no longer suffer
from the dollar's appreciation and its inflationary effects on our economies. The
choice of the exchange rate which the SME would establish for the dollar would no
doubt be difficult. The dollar could not be reduced to.too low a rate, thus giving
it back a competitive advantage which its rise has caused it to forfeit for several
months. Similarly, it will be necessary to decide between a low dollar rate, which
lowers the price in national currency of imports priced in dollars, and a higher
rate, which retain~ normal competitiveness for European exports. ,listakes will un-
doubtedly be made, but ones which can still be corrected. In any case, they will
not be as serious as total surrender to the absence of reason, which is the current
position. The accelerated and totally unjustified decline of European currencies
is a threat to ~urope's financial role, its development possibilities and its
political role.
Less Helpless Than Would Appear
American interest rates still remain. Convincing the United States to abandon them
is a hopeless task: the Reagan administration identifies totally with monetarist
ideology and intends to prove its validity through sheer determination, indeed even
unyielding obstinacy. As disturbing as this behavior may be, we should first con-
sider it coldly, from the sole standpoint of our short-term interests. WE are not
as helpless as it would appear. First of a11, it is highly uncertain that we are
obliged to "stick" to the American rates as we are doing. The technical measures
taken on 23 May are effective and, like the English and the Germans, we could no
doubt unhook our short- and long-term rates without hesitation. Then, if we are
not afraid to take this risk, it would be possible to gamble with the movement of
exchange rates. Having regained control of European exchange rates, a movement to
lower the dollar very quickly would be initiated so that possible capital losses
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on that currency would exceed expected gains in interest. Paralleling this, the
chances of capital gains on Eu-ropean currencies would exceed the difference between
American rates and European rates. Thus we would regain control, via the medium
of foreign exchange, over our domestic rates.
~ The "aberrant" interest rates which are "destructive for the world economy," prac-
ticed by the United States for a year and a half with brief interruptions, are per-
haps even more harmful than the most worried critics believe. In reality, it is
possible that nothing threatens the Western world toda;� more than the desperate
attempts being made, with their backs to the wall, by the doctrinaire theorists of
the most rigid and most intransigent monetarism. In view of this risk, Europeans
must first close ranks. They will be able to effectively fulfill their duty to help
an ally in danger only through unity, understanding, parience and determination.
It is often in the most serious crises that the impossible seems possible. For a
year and a half, the SME has helped Europeans to overlook the accelerated decline
of their currencies (and consequently of their financial power). Each nation seems
to have surrendered to the helpless SME the responsibilities of any government for
its own exchange rates. But it is conceivable that, following the dictates of
necessity, Europeans will realize that they have to defend their currencies, and
that they will then discover the reason why the SME was established: to be an in-
strument of force, because it unifies and increases the efforts of all. If a de-
cision-making center were thus to appear on this side of the Atlantic at a time when
the American decision-making center seems to be momentarily obsessed with a certain
idea, the Western crisis would then have a chance of reaching an outcome less tragic
than the one which may be feared today.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 S.A. Groupe Expansion
11915
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ECONOMIC INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
SOCIALISTS PROPOSE 'EUROPEAN Di:VELOPMEN'T BOARD' FOR EEC
riilan IL SOLE-24 ORE in Italian 23 Jun 81 p 3
~ [Article by Giorgio Ruffolo: "The European Challenge Is Taking Hold in the
South" ]
[Text] An agency for the development of the EEC [Eurogean Economic Community]
weak areas.
We publish [below] large extracts from a document on the regional policies of the
EEC that were elaborated by a group of socialist deputies in the European
Parliament and coordinated by Giorgio Ruffolo. The proposal for an agency in
charge of development was presented by Ruffolo himself at the Thursday session,
on 18 June.
The prospect of inclusion by the Community first of Greece and after that of Spain
and Portugal points out in radically new terms the matter of territorial imbalances,
requiring a thorough revision of economic policies and of the present pattern of
_ Community growth.
In 1957, in the South of Italy the EEC had the real and sole problem of regional
underdevelopment of significant dimensions (equal to about 8 percent of the
_ Community population).
In the future Community of 12" the areas to be developed represent a little less
than 20 percent of the European population and as the diversities and the hetero-
- geneity of problems are accentuated, the structure of the Community will tend to
become dualistic or even "trialistic."
In the face of this new historical prospect, one must note a preoccupying state of
unpreparedness and of confusion at the Cammunity 1eve1. The matter is still being
~dealt with in a bureaucratic and passive manner, as if it were a question o~
forcing new Community realities into a mould of pre-existing policies and instru-
ments and not, as is instead necessary, of making profound innovations in both
instruments and policies in order to adapt them to the completely different condi-
tions of a new Europe, one in which the Mediterranean component is about to acquire
very considerable importance.
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Under these circumstances, the expansion can turn out to be an element of separ-
ation rather than of reinforcement of the Community, as moreover occurred with
the failure of the integration of Great Britain, a further impetus to the danger^us
- tendency, now in progress, to abandon solidary behavior and to try to maxi.miz~,
according to the relationship of strength, national benefits, minimi2ing costs (also
through the accentuation of protectionist practices). It is in this climate that
the principles of the "just return" or of the "two-speed" Europe are asserted,
" which in practice represent the negation of a Community.
Therefore, to avoid this serious risk, it is necessary to take advantage of the
opportunity of expansion to delineate a new Coumiunity plan for a more balanced
growth, in which the matter of North-South dualism will no longer be compressed
within the constraints of a subordinate and marg~nal regional policy, but will
become the central element of a complex planning strategy for European development.
The particular importance that the Mediterranean component will come to assume
under the new circumstances of the "Community of the 12" suggests the opportuneness
of promoting, as an important element of this strategy, a big "planning framework"
for the development of the regions of southern Europe, to make of them an effective
instrument for the integration of the "new countries" into the Community and, at
the same time, a developmental frontier for the existing member countries.
In the present general lines of the regional policies, conceived by both the
individual states and by the Community for the support of depressed regions, the
basic characteristic appears to be that of the pursuance of a"single and homo-
geneous model of development," which is translated into the objective of the
realignment of backward regions with the conditions of production and of the
standard of living of the strong areas, based also on an instrim?entation that is
centered on intensive and thorough development.
Today it seems clear that the implicit or explicit choice of a"quick implementa-
tion strategy" in depressed areas of the model furnished by the more highly indus-
trialized areas is illusory, impractical, and contradictory.
In the first place, it has in fact been shown how the balancing of the conditions
of income and productivity of the retarded regions w3.th those of the advanced
regions, through a forced and accelerated developmental policy in the case of the
former, would moreover require a long time. In fact, in the backward areas the
organizational-industrial structures are increasing and changing onlq gradually;
and consequently an increase in high productivity jobs cannot be accelerated at
will.
It is a question of a real possibility of quickly aligning (that is, during
- politically acceptable periods) the economy of these areas with the conditions
of the more advanced zones.
There thus emerges the need--emphasized in the Giolitti Report, itself--to exploit
the developmental potentialities existing in the various disadvantaged areas, and
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' in which new and different models of industrial take-offs are often delineated,
chara~terized by a kind of "diffused" and not heavy growth, by the great expansio~i
of small and medium enterprises, by a more balanced relationship between industry,
agriculture, and services.
The strengthening of the developmental processes that have been autonomously set in
motion in the various areas in turn requires a profound revision of the policies
and of the instruments of intervention. In fact, the actual experience of these
processes emphasizes how the priority need is that of an organic action for promo-
tion and assistance, limited only to financial aid, to enterprises that are
operationally deficient in organizational and managerial capability, productivity,
and equipment for services and information.
The need to exploit developmental strategies that are suited to the existing
potentialities of the various areas and the growing mobilization difficulties
regarding the transfer of resources to disadvantaged zones, because of the interna-
tional economic crisis, emphasize the need for future regional policies to be
based on institutions that are different from those that are traditionally charged
with the much less complex assignment of financial incentives.
It is a question of promoting the creation of "agency-type" organizations that are
capable oF more effectively carrying out multiform planning activities which under
the new circumstances are needed for the development of backward areas (transfer
of technology, know-how, organizational and managerial capability, commercial
assistance, etc.).
From this point of view it is important to consider some elements that have resulted
from the actual experiences of some areas that have tried new models of economic
take-offs:
- The decisive role of occupational and industrial training;
- The need for an active participation on the part of the regions concerned, avoid-
ing the error of programs that come down from above;
- The importance of a balanced developmental process between agriculture, handi-
crafts, small industry, and services;
- The decisive contribution of small enterprises, and in general of the closely
woven fabric of small initiatives for jobs.
While there are ad hoc organizations and agencies that have been operating for some
time in various countries, up to now there has been a lack of coordination and
impetus with respect to these initiatives atthe Community level. It is thus essen-
tial to proceed in the direction of the establishment of a Community "pool" of real
resources capable of exercising this impetus. Hence the proposal of the creation
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oE a l:uropean llevelopment Board [OES]. The new organization, directly under the
authority of the committee, should carry out three basic functions:
a. Assist governments and local authorities in the s:tngling out and in the ela-
boration of specific developmental plans;
b. Organize inform