JPRS ID: 9890 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400040002-1
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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9890
3 August 1981
N~ar .East North Africa Re ort
p
CFUUO 26/81)
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORIVIATION SERVICE
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JPRS L/9890
3 August 1981
MEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
(FOUO 26/81)
CONTENTS
OPEC AFFAIRS
Motives for Saudi Arabia's Stance in OPEC Discussed
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 5-11 Jun 81) 1
OPEC's Negotiating Power Undercut by Collapse of Oil Prices
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 19-25 Jun 81) 5
IRAN
French Journalist Comments on June 28 Explosion
(Pierre de Villemarest; VALEURS ACTUELLES, 6 Jul 81) 7
IRAQ
Recent War Developments, Implications Discussed
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 29 May-4 Jun 81)~ 10
LIBYA
Briefs
� Gold Transferred From Europe 14
- a- (III - NE & A- 121 FOUO]
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OPEC AFFAIRS
MOTIVES FOR SAUI3I ARABIA`S STANCE IN OPEC DISCUSSID
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 225, 5-11 Jun 81 pp 56-57
[Text] The division in the ranks of OPEC over the levels of
production and prices was received with satisfaction by con-
sumers. However their optimism is exaggerated, for as soon
as the oil surplus disappears prices will automatically re-
sume their rise. When will that happen? The answer is sub-
ject to the Saudis' position and the unf olding of events in
the Middle East.
The decision to freeze the price of oil until the end of the current year was anti-
cipated before the ministerial meeting of OPEC that was held in Geneva (25-26 May),
but the announcement of an almost unanimous decision to cut back production was not
expected. This represents the first time that OPEC has taken up the issue of pro-
duction which used to be a private affair of the individual producing states'
prerogatives and policies.
Perhaps the decision to cut back production and freeze prices can be described as
a partial agreement or "an agreement to disagree" as Dr Soebroto, the chairman of
the c:onf erence and the Indonesian minister of Oil has said. Saudi Arabia forced
the hawks to freeze prices temporarily but it could not impose its strategy which
it had proposed for linking pricing to the rates of growth and~inflation in the
capitalist West and to a basket of strong currencies, so tha.t prices would gradual-
ly increase by a fixed reasonable amount. Thus once again the opportunity to con-
trol OPEC's decisions has eluded Saudi Arabi.a, even though its production repre-
sents 40 percent of all the member states' production.
It ~eems tha.t lobbying had almost succeeded on the principal that the hawks would
freeze prices until the end of 1982 in return for Saudi Arabia's raising the price
of its oil from $32 per barrel to $34 or $36 and cutting back its production from
10.3 million barrels a day to 9.5 or 8.5 million.
However the Saudi oil minister, Ahmad Zaki al-Yamani, stiffened his demands, tos-
sing all predictions head over heels. He insisted on a rollback for African oil
prices (Libya, Algeria, and Nigeria) from $4I to $38 or $39 per barrel, and to
accept the mentioned Saudi pricing strategy. At the end Che,two~parties were left
only with the impromptu solution proposed by VenezueZa to freeze prices and cut
back production by an average of 10 per~ent. This is a decision that is ~
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non-binding on Saudi Arabia (which it has rej ected) and is likewise non-binding
on Iraq and Iran to enable them to raise their production which is presently re-
duc ed . ,
Production Cutback Wi11 Not Absorb Surplus
The deci3ion to cut back production will become effective from the first day of
June 1Q81. It will amount to 1.5 million barrels a day. However this cutback
plus the previous reductions that member states have resorted to in recent months
(amounting to 12.6 percent of their production) will not guarantee that the oil sur-
plus that now exists on the spot market and which is glutted with a surplus that
is estimated at between 2 to 3 million barrels daily (largely the result of ~audi
Arabia's high production level), will not be absorbed.
The actual prices of oil ha.ve recently increa sed spontaneously by a small percen-
~ tage (4.8 percent) recently as a result of the increase in the cost of the dcllar
by which oil pri~es are posted. But Geneva's "half agreement" has left the issue
of unified prices dangling. And in opposition to the proposed Saudi pricing
strategy it seems that ti~.e time has not yet arrived so that an agreement can be
reached on a specific principle on which to rely as a means for setting prices.
Consequently the disparities in prices that hav e existed since 1979 hurt OPEC's
unity in the eyes of its antagonists and enemies.
Dominant Factors In Saudi Decision
But why did the Saudis refuse to cut back production and raise prices?
There are a number of economic and internal~ political factors that made Saudi Arabia
cling to its isolated position in OPEC.
Saudi Arabia has an interest in the stability of the capitalist economic system.
That is because its consuming economy is tied, to a great extent, to the economies
of the large industrial states, not to speak of the presence of huge f inancial
investments that it has in the industrial world (estimated to be $150 billion).
Further it is vulnerable in case of an erosion or a deterioration in the Western
economies which could, for instance, be a result of urcalculated jumps in the price
~ of oil.
There are those who say that Saudi Arabia is afraid that in a time of increasing
gloominess about oil prices the West will more rapidly turn to alternative energy
sources, and thus Saudi oil will lose its role in insuring the needed imports for
growth and likewise Saudi weight and political influence on both the international
and regional spheres will deteriorate.
Oil in one form or another is still a political weapon either overtly or covertly.
There is no doubt that the Saudi position recently stated in OPEC was viewed by the
great throng of Western leaders, who have i.n recent times visited Saudi Arabia,
with gratitude and acclaim. In return Saudi Arabia expects that this gratitude
wi11 translate into serious American and European efforts to put an end to Israeli
intervention in Lebanon, and to find a just solution to the Palestinian problem and
the Middle East crisis.
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However, this official Saudi reasoning which is given as a~ustification for its
~ refusal to cut back production and raise prices--�is open for discussion both with-
in Saudi Arabia and the Arab world.
Opponents of Yamani's point of view claim that Saudi Arabia is losing between $40
and $6G million daily as a resu?t of not raising prices and, further, that cutting
back production to half its current level would suff ice in providing for its finan-
cial and developmental needs. Some of them have even gone so far as to say that
the West, particularly the U.S., has not reciprocated Saudi good intentions with
appropriate actions and appreciation in restraining Israel's willfulness.
In any case the Saudi position does not seem to be final. Minister Yamani has al-
ready hinted at that when he said in a lecture he gave before the Geneva meeting
convened that it would be difficult for Saudi Arabia to unilaterally support a
certain position that is re~ected by the rest of the member states of OPEC.
Western Delight Over OPEC's Dissension
The bitterness and disillusion amongst circles in OPEC which is the result of the
continual division that occurs in the ranks of the organization is g~eeted with �
such satisfaction by the Western consumer nations, with the exception of Britain
which profits from any rise in the price of oil inasmuch as it has been transformed
into a producing state since the discovery of North Sea oil.
- The Western nations lmow that the production cutback and the price freeze will not
eliminate the ample oil surplus that exists on the spot market. And in the U.S.
prices of stocks and bonds have resumed their rise from the moment the OPEC resolu-
tions were announced.
There is no doubt that the economic sluggishness in the 4lestern world helped to
contribute to the oil surplus in the market, as a result of a decrease in consump-
tion. The relative conversion to alternative energy sources such as coal and
nuclear energy has also helped in that regard.
Libya, Algeria, and Iran comprise the OPEC "hawks." They demand large increases
in prices and a production cutback, without any consideration being given to the
effect that may have on the world's economy.
Iraq, Kuwait, and Venezuela on the other hand hold a moderate position. Mr Tayah
'Abd al-Karim, the Iraqi oil minister, says "We were hoping to achieve better re-
sults with respect to the over-supply of oil and for a unified pricing structure.
We got only half way down the road."
The Iraqi minister sharply criticized the position of Libya and Ir~n. He said:
"Our price policy is clear. It does not believe in wild price increases. Like-
wise we oppose the idea of a price freeze so long as the increases in costs due to
inflation continue to be passed along on imports to us." He affirmed Iraq's
calls for setting a gradual increase in prices that will take into consideration
the inflation rate and the exchange rate of the dollar.
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The Iraqi Minister indicated that the door has been left open to Saudi Arabia to
follow the example of the rest o~ the members in reducing the levels of production
and ad~usting the price of oil.
And now what about the expectations and predictions for the foreseeabl~ future?
Western oil experts are optimistic. They anticipat~ a stabilizati~n in the levels
of prices and productian in the present manner, and they even expect a new col-
lagse in the price of oil on the spot market ($34 a barrel at the present moment).
However that eptimism is premature. For in the absence of a firm foundation for
a pricing policy, prices are liable to rise just as~much as they are liable to
fall. Suffice it to say that as soon as the surplus disappears from the market the
prices will automatically resume their rise.
~ There are those who expect that Saudi Arabia intends to raise th~ price of its oil
by $2 to $34 a barrel, and to reduce its production as soon as the amounts of
Iraqi and Iranian ~il approach their farmer levels. And in addition to that
likelihood when the Western economy begins to prosper again this will lead to re-
newed consumption and consequently an increase in prices.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI '
9587
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OPEC AFFAIRS
OPEC'S NEGOTIATING POWER UNDERCUT BY COLLAPSE OF OIL PRICES
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arab ic No 227, 19-25 Jun 81 p 57
[Text] For the first time since 1973 the fall in oil prices caused by the oil sur-
plus in the world market has affected the negotiating ability of the oil countries
with their customers, and coasuming nations and the oil companies.
Most producing countries, including Libya, have been forced to lower their oil
prices in the last week by $4 on the aveYage due to market pressure in order to
keep their custamers who have now begun to rely on the spot market which is glutted
with an oil surplus that runs approximately at 2 to 3 million barrels of oil d day.
Meanwhile the pr~.ce per barrel has fallen from.$40 to only $33, which is, onl.y one
dollar above the official Saudi price for oil and is near the posted price for Gulf
oil.
It seems that OPEC as a result of political differences and economic rivalry has
lost its ability to set a unified price for oil or to set limited price increases
at a time when it currently should be adding a 20 percent increase this year just
to guard their returns from the effects of inflation.
At the same time it is not likely that the reauction which was announced (10 per-
cent) will help eliminate the oil surplus which is glutting the market.
It is expected that oil prices will continue to decline for the rest of this year,
so long as the producing states, and especially Saudi Arabia, do not cut back pro-
duction (Saudi Arabia's is currently 10.3 million barrels per day).
The Saudis say that they will not do this in the foreseeable future unless OPEC
adopts the pricing strategy it has proposed which is established on the basis of
tying prices to the rates of inflation and growth in the industrialized nations.
By this it hopes to establish reasonable price increases instead of the haphazard
jumps that have hurt the Western economy and which has produced inflationary re-
sults in the Arab economy.
It is believed that Saudi Arabia feels it is compelled out of a poli,cy of Arab
solidarity to continue its present very high production level in order to fulfill
its contracts with many nations including some developing states that used to rely
on Iraqi oil, the production of which has been curtailed by the circumstances of
the war with Iran.
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Currently the pricing issue is split into two schools of thought: One anticipates
that the price of oil will not increase by very much in the future fram its present
level. This prediction points out, as evidence, that tY~e demand for oil which
reached its peak in 1978 will not surpass this peak in the 80s.
One of the proponents of this view is Dr Mani' Sa'id al-'Utayba, minister of Oil
of the United Arab Emirates, who believes that oil is now near a reasonatb.le rrice.
He supports the Saudi point of view that there should be a price freeze until the
end of 1982.
The second school believes that the present rollback of oil prices and the oil sur-
plus both represent a temporary phase for respite. It e~ects that oil prices
will witness a rise in the coming period.
James Schlesinger, former U.S, secretary of Defense and Energy, supports this view.
He says that there seems to be what could be a"petroleum cycle" which exists on
the foundation of a rise in price that is then followed by disturbance and confu-
sion in the market, then economic stagnation, and then a drop in price. Then
finally there is a glut on the market and so on.
The case for cooperation with the Gulf Arab oil states further em}~hasized by oil
experts, businessmen, and European economists who are strongly calling for coordin-
ation and discussion with these countries in order to guard against any inter-
ruption in the supplies of oil that might result from any acts of violence in the
region--such as the recent one carried out by Israel against Iraq.
These people feel that both an oil production cutback and a limit on iCs exporta-
tion will not be a successful solution in the long run for stopping either the
erosion of the true value of oil or the drop in its price.
They say that the solution lies in a genui.ne rise of the price of oil in a
reasonable fashion along with the Western world's acceptance for a greater role
of the Arab hydrocarbon industry so that it can export its products to Western
markets.
On the Arab side it is believed that the current conditions on the oil market are
"the inevitable result of the absence of a unified price structure for oil"
according to the Iraqi Oil Minister, Mr Tayih 'Abd al-Karim.
He said that some of the oil exporting countries--in particular Iran and Libya--
have played a principal role in spreading disorder in the oi.'. ma.rket by their
reckless pricing policies in the past 2 years.
The Iraqi Minister called on the OPEC organization to put a resolute stop to the
deteriorating situation in the oil ma.rket by adopting a common production program
that can provide a suitable climate for a unification of prices and which would
enable the organization to resist any similar attempts to sunder its unity.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
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IRAN
FRENCH JOURNALIST CONII~NTS ON JUNE 28 EXPLOSION
Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 6 Jul 81 pp 28-29
~Article by Pierre de Villemareat~
~Text~ Ayatollah Hashemi-Rafsanjani, speaker of the Parliament, rose from his
seat and left; Mullah Ahmad Khomeyni, son of the imam, had just summoned him to
his home despite tiie late hour.
This was Sunday 28 June, at a closed-down achool building located near Teheran's
Bazaar, in the southern sector of the city, that is, in the middle of a popular
quarter. The ayatollah had been taking part in a meeting of the IRP ~Islamic
~ Repub].ican Party] parliamentary group: the organization of which he is a member
and which has 130 deputies in the Chamber.
Customarily, this meeting is held on Monday nights at the party headquarters on
Avenue Villa, more to the north, in what under the monarchy had been the banks and
- embassies section. But serious incidents had resulted in a change of time and
place oE the meeting: The day before, the imam-djomeh of Teheran, that is, the
_ head of the capital's clergy, Ali Khamenei, had been wounded in an assassination
attempt.
All the IRP deputies were not present: The meeting, the party's principal proceed-
ing, included the hard core of President of the Supreme Court Ayatollah Beheshti's
followers--some 30 persons.
A few minutes after Ayatollah Rafsanjani's departure, a second leading figure
also rose and left the school, without any explanation: Prime Minister Mohamed Ali
Rajai. Then suddenly, the explosion. The premises where the meeting was being
held wer.e totally destroyed. The 72 dead included 20 deputies, 10 ministers, and
Mohamed Beheshti.
Immediately, at a press conEerence, the government spokesman, Mr Behzad Nabavi,
mentioned several persons wha:could have been responsible �or the massacre:
followers of ex-President Bani Sadr, dismissed from his position 1 week before;
members o� the liberal lay party National Front; or even leftist religious mili-
tants. He did not, however, believe it to be "an army conspiracy."
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The IRP for its part, in a communique, claimed that the crime had been organized
by the CIA and the Israeli secret services together with Iraqi President Saddam
Hussein.
But in Iranian public opinion, the facts appeared pertectly clear. The crime
benefited the two who had "providantially" escaped it: Ayatollah Rafsanjani and Mr
Rajai. And it was undoubtedly hatched by Imam Khameyni himself. It was noted
that the latter used extremely cold terms in the message of oondolences he had
addressed to the family of Ayatollah Beheshti, which merely acknowxledged that "The
Ayatollah was a good Muslim."
Aged 52, a former religious affairs official in the Ministry of Education, and
former imam-djomeh of the Iranians residing in Germany, Ayatollah Beheahti had
played a leading role during the 1978-1979 revolution. It was he who organized,
first from Iraq, then from France, where Ruhollah Khomeyni had successively taken
refuge, the distribution of inessages recorded on cassettes. This "acoustic
samizdat ~Russian term for any means used in USSR to evade censorship of distri-
buted matter~" mobilized the masses againat the shah.
With the installation of the Republic in February 1979, Beheshti had devoted his
efforts to orqanizing the majority party and reconstructing the Iranian state
around this party. It was a difficult task, but one which he, to a certain
extent, succeeded in accomplishing.
His clan, sometimes referred to as the "clan of the theologians," first eliminated
the religious liberals, the followers of the Republic's first prime minister, Mr
Mehdi Bazargan; then, the religious leftists, disciples o� Ayatollah Tabatai and
Ayatollah Taleghani; and lastly, the pan-Islamic inner circle, linked to the PLO
and to Libya, and led by Ayatollah Khalkhali, former public proaecutor, and Aya-
tollah Montazeri.
Outside the IRP, Beheshti drew support trom the Tudeh, the Iranian Communist
Party, and from several small le~tist or Trotskyite groups.
Last week, at the time of his assassination, he was seeking to have the Majlis,
the Teheran Parliament, vote to legalize these orqanizations.
Mr Bani Sadr, ex-president of the Republic, himaelf the son of an ayatollah and
a friend of the Khomeyni family, had grouped around him the former followers of
Ayatollah Taleghani as well as two extremely leftist but violently anti-Soviet
paramilitary organizations: Mojahedin (people's fighters) and the Fedayin
(people's volunteers).
He also had the support of two regions that had remained in a atate of semi-
dissidence: Kurdistan in the west and Khorasan in the northeast. (The latter prov-
' ince will probably be, in the long run, the seat of :he most powerful resistance
against Khomeyni-ism, in that the power there is in the hands of a particularly
orthodox ayatollah, Qomi, rector of the Koranic University of Meched.)
The imam had abandoned Mr Bani Sadr in the beginning of June, removing him from
command of the armed forces, and ~hen, authorizing his deposition by the Parlia-
ment. This appeared to awing the balance of power in favor of Beheshti and the
IRP. But the Bazaar massacre restored the balance.
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The imam had already indicated at least ~nce in the pas~ that hP did not trust
Mohamed Beheshti. In 1979, he had decreed that the president of the Republic
must be a layman--a measure designed to prevent, under any circumstances, a
situation wherein a head of state, elected by the people and at the same time a
member of the high clergy, might compete with "God's representative." But also
a measure directed, almost by name, against Beheshti, who was planning to have
himself designated a candidate by the majority party.
The "ayatollah of the cassettes" occupied a very special place among the leaders
of the revolution. Unlike Ruhollah Khomeyni, he took an interest in Western
culture. During his stay in Europe, he learned German and English and, somewhat
superficially, French. In Hamburg, he eyen frequented a Masonic lodge, under the
protection of a minister of the shah, Mr Sharif-Emami.
In power, while ostensibly leaning for support on the Iranian Communist Party,
and while maintaining close ties with the Soviet Embassy, Beheshti also main-
tained contacts with the Americans. A few days before Ayatollah Beheshti was
assassinated, the NEW YORK TIMES published a study on Iran stating that the West
needed a"strongman" like him, backed by a structured party and religious legi-
timacy.
Initially at least, the disappearance of Beheshti has restored to powet the clans
of Ayatollah Khalkhali and Ayatollah Montazeri. The word in Teheran is that the
latter are bein~ pressed to make peace with Iraq--perhaps owing to a mediation by
pro-Soviet Libya.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 "Valeurs actuelles"
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IRAQ
J
RECENT WAR DEVELOPMENTS, Il~LICATIONS DISCUSSID
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI it. Arabic No 224 29 May - 4 Jun 81 pp 36,37
[Article: "Will Tehran Have the Courage to Seek Peace? The Iraqi Summer in the
Iranian Spring"]
[Text] In recent weeks, international concern over the Lebanese crisis has diverted
Arab and foreign media from fo~lowing the so-called spring offensive in the Iraq-
Iran war. There had been considerable discussion about the offensive last winter
and about the concern over increasing Syrian-Iranian collusion in the open con-
frontation. But what has really happened in the spring of the war?
Baghdad--' AL-~dATAPd AL-' ARABI'
The Iranian offensive has not been a sudden question for anyone in Iraq or in the
circles of observers outside the war region. The military triumphs won by the
Iraqi army from the first moments of the outbreak of hostilities, which the politi-
cal leaders wished to be limited in order to leave the door open for negotiations,
have not led to a true dia.logue thus far because the nature of the internal develop-
ments that Iran has experienced since the fall of the shah have continuously pre-
vented negotiations.
The Imam Khomeyni is struggling internally against several fror~ts. Likewise,
Iranian President Bani Sadr and the U.S.-Soviet vying in the Iranian arena over
what has become dis~ointed is polarizing domestic parties. In short, since the war
began the ranks of Iranian leaders have not included anyone who will risk making
peace, and it is not in the interest of foreign forces pressuring Iran to have
Tehran emerge from its plight. The Americans want to return there, and the Soviets
want the popular leadership to "renounce" the ayatollah's rule so that the Left will
advance by making new political gains at the decision-making level.
The Military Temptations
While Iraq was asserting its readiness time after time to end the war by direct
negotiation so that it could turn its attention to other important matters--the
Arab-Israeli struggle on the one hand, and on the other, domestic progress in all
its forms--the Tehran rulers were deciding to adopt a completely negative attitude
because the internal fragmentation they are underoing does not permit them to make
a bold decision to enter into negotiation.
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Iraq has persisted quietly in resi~,ting the use of military "temptations"'in~fihe
form of an expansion of the extent of control and occupation over new positions
along the lines of combat in order to push the crisis to its conclusion. Within
the Iraqi leadership there were those who advocated greater restraint while
Islamic efforts and the efforts of the nonaligned bloc achieve an end to the con-
flict, because fresh blood spilled over the land will result in new claims and
will complicate the opportunities for negotiations.
The spring saw all of the military and political realities on the battleground,
the most ma.rked being perhaps that the Iranians had lost their wager that they
would divide the domestic front in Iraq, which faced the historic challenge with
splendid cohesiveness, whereas the new experiment that Iran is going through is
creating dangerous political balances. The Irania.ns who had come forth after the
- shah's downfa:~l to build a democratic society of greater justice without dis-
crimination oi� class distinction internally and without racial disputes with other
nations found themselves faced with two defeats simultaneously: a humiliating
spiritual defeat in terms of the new instituti~ns (which have not yet come into
being) and a military defeat which placed the regional and international forces,
which supported the Iranian change, in a position of wariness and watchfulness.
There is a French saying: "Failure has no friends."
The Plan...and the Surprise

, The Iranian leadership had to make a choice, and they chose to pursue the military
adventure, in the hope it would bring some gains of land Ghat would save the
domestic situation from the divisiveness aff ecting it. Thus it paved the way for
what was called the "spring offensive." The Iranian plan was based on three
stages:
1. The Special Forces (Commandos) Brigade would set out to occupy Qasr-e Shirin in
heavy landing operations using helicopters;
2. An infantry of 5,000 men would thrust across the Ku~ar Pass;
3. An infantry support force of 7,000 soldiers armed with anti-armor shells, would
effect the success of the third stage of the plan, after the infantry force had
spread out across the pass.
It seemed evident that the Iranian "couunando" force was charged with occupying
Qasr-e Shirin, penetrating Iraqi territory--even if only a few kilometers--and
then heading south to link up with the infantry force that would have carried out
the occupation of the Kujar Pass. The two forces would then push toward the Iraqi
borders in order to occupy the city of Mandali and meet north of that city after
cutting the supply lines of the Iraqi forces.
The Iranians implemented their plan. At night, helicopters landed the "commando"
brigade in the rugged hills around Qasr-e Shirin, and the infantry forces set out
for the Kujar Pass. But the Iraqi movement was a complete surprise.
When the Iranian landing was being carried out, the Iraqi forces made a special
landing behind the Iranian "commando" lines and engaged the Iranian brigade in
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fierce combat. When the Iranians were convinced that their soldiers were suf-
fering heavy losses and that the force that had been landed was no longer capable
of carrying out the mission according to the plan it was given, they intended to
withdra~ what was left of it. In that context, an Iranian off icial indicated Chat
Iran had "lost the best of its fighters in that encounter."
On the Iraqi side, after midnight, an armored force moved to an area northeast of
the Iranian force in the Kujar Pass and surrounded it. Iraqi helicopters began a
rapid landing operation behind the lines of the 7000-man infantry force armed with
"RPG" shells, preventing it from either advancing or withdrawing.
He Was There
0� course the Iranians had not foreseen the outcome, na.mely, that 12,000 Iranian
soldiers would either be killed, wounded or captured; in other words, that Iran
would lose over 10,000 men in the "spring offensive"!
The Iraqi media presented details of the new victory and were content to state that
Iraqi President Saddam Husayn was there among the fighting men, hundreds of ineters
away from the front line of the battle. At one moment he held up his rifle and
called out: "I am here with you, soldiers. Let's go, men."
In Tehran, the Iranian president was warning of the "danger of collapse" within
Iran. He neglected to state clearly that the army that was winning the victories
was the army that believes in its cause and its leadership and is supported
- politically and militarily by a firm domestic front. It believes in peace and
fights for peace rather than in order to change the domestic equat3on in the
struggle for power.
The Language of Reason
In a television interview with a captured Iranian pilot, a new aspect of the
Syrian role in the present war was revea.led, confirming what the Iraqi authorities
had announced after the raid on al-Walid airport last 12 April.
The pilot, First Lieutenant Kawah Kurbayah, said that he took part in the raid,
flying in Syrian air space both going and returning, and with Syrian support.
He clarified in the interview tha.t the Iranian planes took off from the Sharukhi
base, flying toward Lake ar-Ridatiyah. There the planes refueled, entered Turkish
airspace and then Syrian airspace, where two planes again supplied them with fuel
in the Syrian skies, to permit them to carry out the raid on the Iraqi al-Walid
airport and return to Syrian airspace, where they were once more refueled.
The pilot added that one of the Iranian planes had been hit in the raid and had to
land, as agreed to, at an airfield near the Syrian town of Dayr al-Zur. Its
pilot was then transported by helicopter to Damascus airport and from there by
another plane to Tehran.
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- Has the Iranian spring offensive sufficed to convince the Iranian authorities to
use reason in the present conflict, or will the Iranian internal situation con-
tinue to be dominated by the Iranian military attitude? Until now the spring
offensive has been an Iraqi su~ner. What surprises do the coming months conceal?
Perhaps the coming weeks will bring the first answer.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
5346
CSO: 4304/36
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LIB~iA
BRZFFS
GOLD TRANSFFRRED FROM EUROPE--Libya has transferred most of its recently purchased
reserves from European banks to Tripoli as a precaution against the risk of having
it frozen, as was the case with Ir~n in 1979. Th3s step was taken following the
deterioration in relations between Libya and the U.S. and western nations after
Libyan adventures in Africa. Libya had bought large amounts of gold since the
end of last year. Its reserves of the yellow metal now amount to around 113 tons,
compared to 83 tons last September. At that time the price of gold was sub~ect
to decline, having registered a drop of $100 per ounce. [Text] [Paris AL-WATAN
AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 229, 3-9 Jul 81 p 53] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris
. 1981]
CSO: 4504/36 END
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