JPRS ID: 9871 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400030052-7
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 52
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9871
28 July 1981
Sub-Saharan Africa Re ort
p
FOUO No. 732
FB~$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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- JPRS L/9871
28 July 1981
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT
FOUO No. 732
CONTENTS
ANGOLA
French TV Reportage on UNITA Forces Derided
(AFRIQiJE-ASIE, 6-19 Jul 81) 1
Reportage Decried, by Augusta Conchiglia
Ango3.-an Ambassador's Protest
Briefs
More on French Ambassa3or 4
More Oil Contracts 4
CAPE VERDE
Briefs
Relations With Portugal, Guinea-Bissau , 5
Defense Protocol 5
Naguicave Survival in Doubt 5
FRG Cash Donation 6
CHAD
Acyl Ahmat Discusses French-Chadian Relations
(Acyl Ahmat Interview; MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS,
19 Jun 81) 7
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
President Has 'Difficult Task' in Improving Regime's Image
~AFRICA, May 81) 10
GABON
Figures Provided on Exploitation of Mineral Resources
- (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 12 Jun 81) 12
Commeuts on Census Figures Discrepancy
(Francois Soudan; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 8 Jul 81) 14
- a - [III - NE & A - 120 FOUO]
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Briefs
Immigration Restrictions Requested 15
Iron Ore Mining Viewed 15
_ GHANA
Briefs
Black Star Recovery 16
- Possible French Investment 16
'Favorable' Oil Investment Climate 16
Higher Cacao Price 16
IVORY COAST
Problems, Differences Affect Cocoa Price Agreement
(AFRICA, LE CONTINENT, various dates) 17
Ivorian Refusal
: Ivorian Intransigence, by Lionel Zinsou
MOZAMBIQUE
South African Raid Seen Contributing to Leftist Slide
(AFRICA, Apr 81) 19
Details on Cahora Bassa Operations, Future Expansion
(MARCHFS TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 19 Jun 81) 21
- Briefs
French Topographic Contract 23
- b -
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ANGOLA
FRENCH TV REPORTAGE ON UNITA Fvn~E$ DERIDED
_ Reportage Decried
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 243~ 6-19 Jul 81 pp 29-30
[Article by Augusta Conchiglia: "In the Bush of French Television..."J
- [Excerpts] Nothing could be more favorable to the U.S. strategy of destabilization
, in Angola than the documentary shown on French television on 18 June. The public
of this cotmtry had vainly hoped that the information professionals, irrevocably
faithful to yesterday's Giscardian power, would introduce into the powerful media
they still control more objective criteria and that they would investi~;ate more
seriously before pronouncing ~udgement. Incorrigibly, they ignore the most
elementary notions of professic~al deontology. Unconcerned about induci~g the
public in error, the director of the televised magazine of the first network,
Jean-Marie Cavada, presented a documentary on the "Guerrillas in Angola," affirming
- that Jonas 5avimbi's UNITA controlled a territory as large~as France. According
to him, the traitor in Pretoria's pay is supposedlp conducting one of these "new
anti-colonial wars" whose importance is still largely neglected.
He riaturally specified that these "free world" fighters were struggling against
the Soviet-Cuban occupation and kept in check the Luanda forces they support.
For c--er a month and many a kilometer, two reporters, Michel Badaire and Jean
Lugo, reportedly lived in the "liberated zones" of UNITA. From this long and
_ e~chilarating experience, they claim, they brought back slightly repetitive images
of an UNITA "base" in Angola where life goes on in an idyllic way. To the sound
of traditional welcoming songs in Umbundu, some tens of "regular soldiers" parade
with a martial air. About the same number of civilians,well organized--and even
better fed and clothed--warmly support them.
"Brigadier General" N'Zau Puna goes through the military arsEnal, notably numerous
trucks and other military vehicles right out in the open, adding in French that
thPSe arA weapons capturea from the enemy, "our sole source of supply."
Savimbi's right arm insists that UNITA controls, if you please, the provinces of
Cuando-Cubango, Cunene, Bie, Huambo, Beneguela and MoXico. And if everything is
like in this base--as it is stressed--it would indeed be paradise: we are shown
schools for children and adults, physicians and nurses and even a field hospital
where the slightest case of appendicitis is treated; without forgetting, of course,
musica.l interludes and a soccer game played according to the rules. In sum, an
envia::le situatic-in...
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Moreover, since UNITA says it controls three-fuurths of the territory, precautions
are minimal, almost symbolic. Of course, the newsmen do not specify the name of
the regian or the border they had to cross to get there... Their film is remarkable
for the absence of all ~eographic reference that could prove that this is indeed
Angola. Nevertheless, any traveler going ;.hrough hundreds of miles of Angolan
territory must cross rivers, get a glimpse of a mountain or come across a railroad
line. No trace of any "enemy," and still less of the population, but only a look
- at two unfortunate Soviet prisoneLs, ~ivilian pilots for Aeroflot, whose plane had
been downed near the Namibian border...
Finally, for all those like me, who had been able to ~ze the miserable condition of
the people who had had the misfortune to follow UNITA in the forests of the central
and s~uthern parts of the country while most of Savimbi's forces recruited on a
tribal basis were departing in the baggage of the South African invaders down to
Namibia, Badaire's reportage is hard to swallow.
In successive waves, these isolated peasants, victims of hunger and poverty, returned
to their villages and asked for the protection of the Angolan authorities. The
year 1978 saw a mass return of many thousands of starving peasants, sick, practi-
cally naked and above ai~ ~lse, frustrated because they had been cheated by UNITA,
which had promised them a"happy life."
Thus, wherever they can still operate, in the border zones, UNITA bands are inten-
sifying their reprisals against the villages that "betrayed" them. Here is a
terrorist escalation: if the people detach themselves from us, they say, so much
the worse for them.
With the dismantling of clandestine networks by the Angola authorities and the
guerrillas reduced to impotance for lack of popular support, UNITA can only
continue its war from the South African bases in Namibia.
The few pockets of resistance still existing within Angola have been re-supplied
with weapons and field radios. South African places sometimes attempt tn make
drops of arms, foodstuffs and medicines.
This will continue as lono as the war in Namibia and the South African occupation
will last, until the FAPLA, with the support of the people's militia--ever more
prepared and ready to finish with this war--take them by surprise. This is almost
what happened to Savimbi himself--remarkabley absent from the rzportage--when in
November 1978, enci.*_-cled by the FAPLA, he was saved in extremis by South African
_ helicopters who came to his assistance during the night. It is this same N'Zau
Puna who had prepared and signed the radio message found by the Angolan forces
who captured some of the rebels. In the S.O.S., he had said he could hold out
no longer and that a helicopter should be dispatched to bring back Savimbi and a
"French friend" to a more secure area. The Angolans had suspected the latter of
being a French secret agent. However, one must acknowledge that he, at least,
had wanted to see reality for himself. His compatriots and colleagues of today
seem, for their part, to have been a lot more prudent...
COPYRIGHT: Afrique-Asie 1981
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Angolan Ambassador's Protest
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 243~6-19 Jul 81 p 30
[Excerpt] On 18 Juue last, the TF 1 network of the French televis~on presented
a film titled "In the Angolan Bush." If the producer of this film, Jean-Marie
Cavada is to be believed, this film constitutes a challenge to Soviet power in
Africa. 'fhe ambassador of the Peopl~'s Republic of An~ola, Luis de Almeida,
regrets that a taste for sensationalism and the appalling naivete of Messrs Badaire
and Lugo have induced to French people in error by presenting to them a film por-
traying the so-called "UNITA guerrillas." The ambassador also deplores the large
publicity that preceded this repQrtage, notably in the LE MONDE newspaper, a pub-
lication known for its seriousness, but whose "specialist" in African affairs,
Jean-Claude Pomonti, loses no opportunity to tarnish Angola's reputation and its
people's efforts to build a more humane and ~ust society.
COPYR.IGHT: Afrique-Asie 1981
CSO: 4719/140
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~ ANGOLA ~
BRIEFS
MORE ON FRENCH AMBASSADOR--This was the reaction of French Ambassador Jacques
Posier in Luanda to the election of Francois Mitterrand in front of many Western
diplomats: "What I can say is that Francois Mitterrand will c?nly remain in the
Elysee for a few months. He will plunge the country in a catastrophic ~ituation ?
and the French people will revolt against him..." What is the Quai d'Orsay waiting
for, then, is the ques*_ion often asked around Luanda, to recall tliis perso~age
whose disdain for Angola and for his own government is vying with the hostility
he shows towards both? [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 243, 6-19 Jul
81 p 33] [COPYRIGHT: Airique-Asie 1981] ' .
~ MORE OIL CONTRACTS--As we go to gress, Angola is near to signing contracts cover-
ing ten offshore drilling blocks which span the Angolan coast from its present
oilfields in the north down the border with Nami:ta. Local soundings have indica-
ted that the area of coast of Kwanza Sul in the centre of the country is particu-
larly rich in oil deposits. Marathon Oil is one big US concern favoured to carry
= some of the plum jobs. Drilling is expected to start in Y~83 says SONANGOL, the
= Angolan state oil set-up. [Text] [London AFRICA in English No 116 Apr 81 p 99]
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Africa Journal Ltd ~
- CSO: 4700/166
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CAP~; VERDE
BRIEFS
RELATIONS WITH PORTUGAL, GUINEA-BISSAU--On 5 June, Aristides Pereira, president of
the Republic of Cape Verde, labeled the 5-day visit he made to Portugal as "very
positive." Pereira said that his visit was mainly of a"political nature." "The
results were very positive and exceeded the objectives we had initial~y set," he
said. Pereira added that no military cooperation agreement was signed during his
visit, but he did not exclude the possibility that in the future, Portuguese sol-
diers might help with the reorganization of his co~intry's armed forces. "All prob-
- lems concerning possible bilateral cooperation agreements in different fields will
be studied at a coming meeting ~f the Portuguese-Cape Verdian joint commission,"
he stated. On 4 June, Col Silvino da Luz, Cape Verdian minister of foreign affairs,
joined with his Portuguese counterpart, Andre Goncalves Pereira, in signing an
agreement providing that half of the repair and expansion work on the port of
Fraia will be financed by the former mother country. When questioned about the
future of relations between Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau, broken off following the
November 1980 coup d'etat that ousted President Luis Cabral in Bissau, Pereira
said: "It is up to history to say who is responsible for the break. Nevertheless,
we believe that it will be possible in the future to establish cooperation between
the two nations." Pereira called the statements made by Maj Nino Vieira, president
of the Council of the Revolution of Guinea-Bissau, at the recent summit r_onference
~f ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) in Freetown as "very positive."
[Text] [Faris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1857, 12 Jun $1
p 1592] ~COFYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981_7 11,461~
DEFENSE PROTOCOL--In a statement made before his 12 June departure for the OAU
ministerial meeting in Nairobi, Silvino Da Luz, minister of foreign affairs of
Cape Verde, said that his country wauld support a proposed defense protocol within
the Organization of African TJnity. Da Luz added that Cape Verde would give its
backing to such a proposal because it is in keeping with the aspirations of African
peoples to freedom and because it could constitute support for countries bordering
on South Africa. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
No 1858, 19 Jun 81 p 1650] LCOPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paxis 1981_7 11,464
NAGUICAVE SURVIVAL IN DOUBT--NAGUICAVE, a joint shippin~ company owned by Guinea- '
, Bissau and Cape Verde, may not survive.the deterioration in political relations be-
tween the two countries following the 14 November coup d'etat in Bissau. Meeting
in a general assembly on 16 June in Mindelo (Cape Verde) to examine the company's
future, the Guinean and Cape Verdian delegations decided to call a special general
assembly meeting in 45 days for the sole purpose of discussing the dissolution and
manner of liquidating NAGUICAVE. NAGUICAVE had a capital of 25 million escudos
5
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(Cape Verdian currency worth 11 French centimes). The Guinean and Cape Verdian
governments both hold 48 percent and the rest is held bq private parties in Gape
Verde. The co~pany operated two vessels costing 165 million Cape Verdian escudos.
[Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPZCAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1858, 19 Jun 81
p 1650] ~IPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981J 11,1~64
FRG CASH DONATION--On 10 June, the Federal Republic of Germa.izy made a gift of
39 million German mazks to Cape Verde to finance a 2-year cooperation program
ainly involving rural development projects, road construction and ship repair.
Ten million marks will be used to buy a ship to go back and forth betweEn the
islands. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS French No 1858,
19 Jun 81 p 1650] ~OPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.~ J1,1~6L~
CSO: 4719/73
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ct~an
ACYL Ak~fAT DISCUSSES FRENCH-CHADIAN RELATIC~NS
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Jun 81 pp 1635-1636
[Report on interview with Acyl Ahmat, minister of foreign affairs of Chad, by
correspondent Jacques Tremoliere: "Acyl Ahmat in Paris"; date of interview not
given]
[Text] He is about 35 years old. He has an open face. Despite
hi~ innate elegance, he has a silhouette Uetter adapted to the
cavalcades on the steppes of the Sahel area than to quiet
- discussions in a salon of a Paris hotel. This is how Acyl
Ahmat appears, or more properly said, Acyl Ouled Ahmat, of the
Djatne tribe of Bedouins and minister of foreign affairs of the
GUNT (Transitional Government of National Union) in Chad. The
warmth of his greeting reflects his attachment to the values of
his country, which some know but others do not. In his eyes
it is naturally preferable to be on the right side.
A French administrator once noted his intelligence--a period in
- the past, as they say in Arabic stories--and pushed him forward
in his studies. He likes to recall it. He has not forgotten.
Whenever he can, he telephones this spiritual teacher. Through
him it is also to a certain France dominated by the shadow of
General De Gaulle that he says he remains faithfu~. This is a
France, we must agree, which is a little elitist and resolutely
anti-Philistine, which would surprise many French. Socialism
does not appear to have any particular attraction for hi.m,
although he is pleased to introduce frequent references to "the
Chad revolution" in socialist terms. If he has come to Paris, ,
he tells us that it is simply because Giscard disappointed the
Chadians. He therefore hopes that Mitterrand will understand
them better, which would make it possible to establish normal
relations between France and Chad.
[Question) Rightly or wrongly, Minister, umong the cabinet rainisters in Chad you
are considered the most convinced stipporter of Libya.
[Answer] I am not unaware of that reputation, but I would certainly not lower
myself to deny it before President Mitterrand or Jean-Pierre Cot. France is badly
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informed about Chad. It no longer has any representative in N'~jamena and is livi:lg
on the issuance of old information, military in origin, reflecting the "pro-Habre"
' inclin~tions of those who spre~d it about. It has been more than 25 years since a
nazara has followed the daine . Since that time there has been no one down th~re
- who has understood anything about our affairs.
What I know best about Libya is its pris~ns, where I have spent time on several
occasions. Li~e all the Arabs of the Batha I only joined the revolution rather
- late. We are supportPrs of law and order. We cannot live without order. I was a
government official loyal to Tombalbaye, who sent m~ to the UN, where I prepared
_ the first resolution of protest against the occupation of the Aou2ou strip by
T.ibya. W3~n't this on the recommendation o~ Qadhdhafi? I was lat~r contracted
by the MRA , which war.Led to have done with Tombalbaye, because he ha,3 shown himself
incapable of resolving the Claustre affair. Mallo~ did not succeed ~n resolving
it, either. That is how I joined the side of Goukouni and of Hisse~n Habre, who
were together ~t first, then separated from each other, then joined together again.
In the Batha area i recruited a small army of 500 soldiers, because I thought that
it was not healthy to ]eave a monopoly of t~e fighting t~~ the people of the north.
Today these soldiers only number 80. The liberation of Faya and of Ati is due to
them.
My real objective was to unifq the various political tendencj.es. At one time ther.e
were no more than 10 in N'Djamena. I sought to unify the various tendencies and
keep Chad united. When Hissein Habre and Goukouni marched on the south in the
spring of 1978, I went to Kamougue to push them back. In the Pala affair, at
Mayo-Kebbi, my troops played the principal role--one could say the only one. At
the time your press said that i.t was Libyans and Cubans on tihe side of Kamougue.
We were the Cubans.
[Question] You say that you are for union in all its forms. Why did you think it
was impossible later on to have any understanding with Hissein Habre? Acyl looked
at me with irony.
[Answer] Hissein knows how to fight and is a good organizer, but such an under-
_ standing is impossible. Against everyone's will, for more Chan 2 years he badly
treated one of your women. You are free to consider that that is of no importance.
That is your affair. However, as he committed comparable or worse actions, tn the
detriment of our Chadian brothers, we consider him as an outlaw, as outside our law.
In our country, you do not come back under the law after you have become an outlaw.
/I thought that you knew that./ [in italics]
At the end of 1979 Hissein Habre really had our backs to the wall. Why hide that
fact? If no one would help us, we were lost. We first of a11 addressed ourselves
to France, which had largely equipped our enemies, in order to obtain arms and
ammunition. France didn't even want to hear our request. Sudan, Egypt, and Algeria
also dodged ~s. I was in Iraq to ask for help from Saddam Hussein, when war with
Iran broke out. Saddam Hussein ;:nen evi~lently had other concerns than Chad. The
only recourse was Qadhdhafi. He promised to act, and he did so. Perhaps for you
he is the devil, but that devil brought us peace which we had been waiting for since
~ 1964. That is why, although we don't want Libyan troops to stay a long time in
our country, we will not order them to leave. You should know Chat also.
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[Questiort] The presence of the Libyans in Chad has been a matter of concern to many
African states which are our allies. If we re-establish normal relations with the
GUNT, whose period of authority, moreover, has expired, wP would lose their considera-
tion.
[Answer] That argument is only valid outside of Africa. Those countries are all
capable of resolving their differences with Qadhdhafi themselves. Some of them have
- a common frontier with him. Why would it be necessary to have ttiis difference
resolved in Chad? They have only adopted this attitude because France inspired
them to do so. They would never have thought of it without France.
However, that is not the real question. Qadhdhafi, the devil? I could ask you just
what he has done, apart from having had your embassy in Tripoli burned--just a
matter of a few bricks--to justify that opinion of him. Moreover, you had this
opinion oi him already before the affair of your embassy. Tunisia, Egypt, yes,
- I understand their attitude, but you? Remember that he is a devil with whom you
know how to come to terms on occasion, as the matter of the aircraft and the racing
cars and Libyan air space demonstrate.
- However, I accept your conclusion. When you have a friend engaged in a fight with
the devil, you can let him deal with it himself, but he is then in a rightful posi-
tion to doubt your friendship. You can also show him this friendship in a positive
way. If Mitterrand chooses the first solution, as Giscard did, everything will be
clear, and we will know what we are dealing with. If, as we hope, it is the second
_ course which is to be followed, it will be for you to eacplain the reasons yourselves
to your ~lfrican allies, and even to encourage them to send ambassadors to us. Note,
moreover, that several of them, like Nigeria and the Central African Republic,
never withdrew their ambassadors.
[Question] Ambassadors to be sent to a government which has no legal existence?
Is this the time?
[Answer] Let us be serious. Everyone wants a real government in Chad, resulting
from the clearly expressed will of the Chadians. President Goukouni wants it like
evervone else. However, if you simply mail a letter to Abeche in N'Djamena, the
]eCte~-c will never arrive, because there are no more mailboxes, stamps, personnel
to transport it, or a mailman to deliver it. You do not organize an election in a
countrv which has reached this degree of disorganization. The people no longer even
kaow in what district they live. The Amcricans, after the liberation of France,
expressed ttie same idea as you have, and you know what General De Gaulle said to
them. The provisional must remain until the permanent solution can really be
established. However, you often find that what is good for others is bad for you.
For us, the essential matter is peace regained, peace maintained, and peace con-
structed. Peace only, aafia beus [Hassaniya Arabic translation of "peace only"].
Couldn't France hel~ us?
FOOTNOTES
l. Christian, in a Moslem country. By extension a European.
2. Pastoral people on the march.
3. French Administration Reorganization Mission in Chad. We naturally leave to
Acy1 Ahmat the responsibility for making this statement.
COPYRIGAT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.
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~
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
PRESIDENT HAS tDIFFICULT TASK' IN IMPROVING REGIME'S IMAGE
- London AFRICA in English No 117, May 81 pp 26, 27
[Text]
N EARLY two years after the mili- rest of the Cabinet played various roles
tary take-over in the West under Nguema's tyrann;cal regime.
African state of Equatorial Guinea, Itis,Perhaps,~artoftheSMC'sstra-
the scars of the 11 years of the dic- tegy to tmprove ~ts public relations that
tatorial regime of the late President President Mbasogo took the first step
Macias Nguema on the economy and to fulfilling his promise to reduce the
life of the people are still visible as role of the milatary in his Government
ever. Even in Malabo, the capital, b~ the appointment of the first
many houses and snops belonging to civilian member of the Cabinet in late
fore~Rn nationals - Spaniards, March. Emiliano Buale, an agricul-
1Vigerians and Cameroonians - who tural engineer, was made Minister of
were forced to flee the country, re- Agriculture. A month before the
main empty. Very few shops have appointment President Mbasogo toid
been reopened. ~ Guineans that his Government was
drafting a constitution and intended to
Influential politicians and business- diminish the role of the armed forces.
men who successfully escaped the long gradually.
arm of Nguema's securiry forces and One of the measures to that end was
went into exile have still not returned, a decree, ~ublished in early March,
while many who came back have which obl~ges military men holding
quietly slipped out of the country. Government posts to declare ~~hether
However, the rulingSupremeMilitary they preferto return tostrictlymilitary
Council~SMC) headed by Lt. Col. duties or retain their jobs in the admi-
~Teodor guema Mbasogo has placed nistration. In the lattercase, according
no restriction on anyone. There have to one journalist, they must accept an
been no political arrests, nor has extended leave of absence from the
anyone been detained without trial, armed forces.
and no one has gone `missing'. To many Guineans, however, the
But despite the many efforts of the S;~IC's reforms are simply cosmetic.
SMC ro return the country to normality For instance, although the
many Guineans still see the present Government has announced its
regime as new wine in an old bottle, intention to broaden the leadership
and the so-called military coup of 3 base away from the milita~~, President
August 1979 as merely a Cabinet re- Mbasogo has extraordinary powers.
- shuffle in which the pnncipal corrupt He is the cle (ac~o Minister of
actor was removed. Apart from Capt. Defence, as well as the Minister of
Riquesson Ela Eulogio, second Vice- Information and Culture although the
President of the SMC who was impri- portfolios are held by his aides. He also
soned under Nguema, virtually the has the final say on foreign affairs and
finance.
10
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- Meanwhile the Spaniards. Equa- quantities, a priority issue for the
turial Guinea's former colonial mas- Government would be to mend fences
ters are back in business although with its neighbours and work out per-
they were expeUed in large numbers by manent borders on land and sea.
Macias Nguema. One of the President Already there have been indications
Mbasogo's first acts when he came to from Malabo that it is genu~nely
power was to issue urgent appeals for anxious to repair its tarnished image.
aid from Spain. There ar~ currentl}~ Guinean delegations are now frequen-
about 120 Spanish advisers in the tly seen at African and other interna-
country. ostensibly hetping the tional focums; and Mabasogo also
Government to 'organ~ze' the made official visits to the Federal
administration. Republic of Germany, France and
It is an indication of the trust and Spain. Ambassadors of western and
confidence the President has in his eastern countries are being accredited
- fellow Guineans that there are over to the country.
~00 Moroccan troops in the country The President Mbasogo has a diffi-
who form the inner core of hispersonal cult task ahead in his `house cleaning'
guard. While his predecessor made exercise; for this to succeed his regime
use of Russians and Cubans and to a must convince Equatorial Guineans in
certain extent the Chinese, President exile in more positive ways that his
MbasoQO is using Moroccans and it is administration is a`ne~v wine in a new
general~ly held in Malabo that their bottle', that the ghost of th~ late Presi-
presence ~s crucial if the new regime is dent Nguema has been exorcised, and
to continue in power under him. SMC that there is a place for them in the
has abrogated the fishing treaty with the Government's efforts to rebuild the
Russians and reduced the diplomatic country. Also the momentum of aid
personnel in their mission in Malabo. flow must continue under the 'open
7 In the past, Equatorial Guinea has door policy' as this would be a catalyst
been isolated and has neither been a in mot~vating the foreign investors
member of ECOWAS or UDEAC to into further investment and participa-
which its French-speaking neigh- tion in the riation's development �
bours belong. Recently, however,
there have been suggestions in Yaoun-
de by the first Vice-President, Floren-
- cio Ela, of his country trying to seek
entry into the UDEAC which may
perhaps improve the rate of the Ekuele
which was devalued by ~0 per cent not
long ago. ~
Ec~uatorial Guinea's relationship
with ~ts neighbours, all of them oil pro-
ducers, will be of importance. Both Elf
and Hispaniol are likel}' to continue
their prospecting on the borders of
Gabon. If o~l is found in commercial
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Africa Journal Ltd .
CSO: 4700/174
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1 GABON
~ FIGURES PROVIDED ON EXPLOITATION OF MINERAL RESOURCES
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1857, 12 Jun 81.p 1601
[Excerpts] Gabon's mining production includes oil, manganese, uranium and secon-
darily, gold and diamonds.
In 1980, the search for oil was very active. A total of 26 companies participated
in exploration in Gabon. There were 20 exploratory drillings representing 37,453
meters and three yielded commercial discoveries. In addition, there were 24 devel-
, opment drillings compared with 16 in 1979. Hawever, oil production is down 9 per-
cent campared with the previous year, with 8,895,000 tons.
The two refineries in Port-Gentil, SOGAxA [Gabonese Refining Company] and COGER
[presumably General Refining Company], processed 1,292,193 tons of crude oil com-
bined. Crude oil exports amounted to 7,687,118 tons, 9.2 percent less than in
1979. The main customers were France, the United States, Brazil, Chile, the
Federal Republic of Germany and Spain.
In 1980, manganese ore exports reached a relatively high level compared with the
average for recent years: 2,136,452 tons, but they were down compared with 1979,
which had a record with 2,308,077 tons. The year's production was 2,163,380 tons
compared with 2,300,094 in 1979. The average price per ton FOB was, in current
francs, about 10 percent higher than the~:previous year.
At the end of 1980, the still delicate situation of the world iron and steel in-
dustry pointed to serious difficulties in selling m?tal ore during the first half
of 1981 and COMILOG (Ogooue Mining Company) announced a rather sharp reduction in
production for 1981.
Production of uranium concentrate amounted to 1,381 tons, containing 1,033 tons of
uranium metal, for 1980. It was slightly lower than in 1979, when the figure was
1,i0~J tons of uranium metal. The Franceville Uranium Mining Company (COMUF), the
only uranium producer in Gabon, will be able to produce 1,500 tons of uranium
metal a year starting in 1982. However, the slump in the market that began at the
end of 1979 grew worse in 1980 and one can already predict a rather substantial
dr.op in sales in 1981.
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Gold production was negligible.in 1980 with 17.2 kilograms of fine gold. Diamond
production was 556.95 carats with exports of 696.25 carats worth 14.7 million CFA
francs. In 1980, mining research involved uranium, lead, zinc, copper, molybdenum,
barytes, talc, gold and diamonds.
' COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie. Paris 1981
11,464
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GABON
COPS~~NTS ON CENSUS FIGURES DISCREPANCY
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1070y 8 Jul 81 p 39
[Article by Francois Soudan: "Gabonese Surplus"]
[Text] Just how many are they, from Bitam to Mayumba? It is impossible to know,
and it is, doubtlessly, one of the subjects that are taboo in Gabon--which has a
few others as well: between the official numbers published in Libreville and
those estimated by the international financial institutions and organizations,
there is a veritable gap of at least 500,000 "makaya," (middle-class Gabonese).
They really and truly exist, according to Gabonese authorities, who claim a total
population of 1,300,000. No doubt they have been confused with the trees, the
World Bank and the UN seem to retort: they only acknowledge, respectively,
645,000 and 800,000 Gabonese (preliminary results of the 1980 census).
Moreover, it was a funny kind of census. Conducted by a group of UN experts
assisted by 60 Gabonese, it was held in August 1980 and the results w~re submitted
to the Ministry of Planning in December. The census takers had counted 800,000
inhabitants, or 150,000 more than the last estimates of the World Bank, but half
a million less than the figures presented by the government. That caused a polite
but firm expression of regret from Minister of Planning Pascal Nze: "You made a
mistake," he told the experts. "We are more numerous; you must count again."
And he insisted on the "inefficiency" of censuses in Gabon, which neglect certain
populations scattered in the bush. The UN team then left Gabon in a fury...
How can this discrepancy be explained? It is quite simple, if one is to believe
~dorld Bank analysts: if Gabonese indeed number 600 to 800,000, this gives Gabon
an annual per r_apita income of $3,280, which puts Gabon in second place in Africa
after Libya. It is indeed a flattering sum. However, Libreville would find it
difficult, in this case, to ask for priority aid and preferential loans granted
to less well-endowed countr_�ies. To b~ sure, the government is contesting this
explanation. In its estimation, the "makaya" are 1,300,000, and nothing less...
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981
CSO: 4719/141
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GABON
BRIEFS
IMMIGRATION RESTRICTIONS REQUESTED--Meeting on 10 June in Libreville with Pre:ident
Bongo, secretary general and founder of the PDG (Gabonese Democratic Party), the
- Political Bureau of the party examined a situation characterized by "vexatious
- attitudes with regard to nationals or reprehensible forms of conduct such
as armed robberies, murders, and so on." According to the communique issued fol-
lowing the meeting, "in the face of this situation, the Political Bureau, while
welcoming the decision recently made by the president of the republic to set up a
Mir~istry of Public Security, has asked the government to: "do everything possible
so that that ministry will very rapidly become operational; exert more control
over immigration which, as everyone knows, may, when it exceeds a certain limit,
create conflicts between nationals and non-nationals. Furthermore, the Political
Bureau calls on members of the party and all the people to demonstrate more vigi-
lance, civic spirit and patriotism by systematically reporting to security forces
any suspicious presence on national soil and any subversive acLivities. In this
action that is demanded of each one of us, we must not lose sight of our wi11 and
that of our leader to live in harmony and perfect understanding with all countries
enamored of peace in general and in particular, with the countries of Central
Africa." [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1858,
19 Jun 81 p 1660] ~GFYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paxis 1981J 11,461~
IRON ORE MINING VIEWED--Presided over by Gabonese Mini:~~ter of Mining ri'Bouy Boutzit,
the board of directors of the Mekambo Iron Mining Company (SOMIFER), which halted
all activities 3 years ago, has just decided to restructure its capital in order to
permit the launching of a study program aimed at developing the major Belinga iron
deposit in Gabon. The company recalls that this project already has proven reserves
of over 500 million tons of ore with 65 percent iron, 300 of which contain under
.1 percent phosphorus and 200 between .1 and .2 percent. At the board of directors
meeting in Libreville, Gabonese Mining Director ~P~ba presented the regional
program to search for additional reserves in a radius of 100 kilometers around
Belinga in Gabon and the Congo. The Gabonese mining minister, who is president of
SOMIFER, also reviewed the construction of the Trans-Gabonese Railroad, which is
now 200 kilometers long and which could in the future carry the ore to world
markets. (Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1858,
19 Jun 81 p 1660] ~COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paxis 1981~ 11,1~64
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GHANA
BRIEFS
BLACK STAR RECOVERY--Ghana's state-owned Black Star Shipping Line is to have its
debts paid off by the Government and it can now look forward to the modernization
ef its fleet of inerchant ships. Minister of Transport, Harry Sawyer, said that
- the move to erase the Black Star's 150 million cedis debts would end the line's
immediate problems and enable it to get back into full operation. The Black Star
has put six of its ships up for sale, four of which have already been bid for by a
Greek line. The refurbishing of the fleet with modern, multi-purpose vessels is
taking place in view of changes in the shipping industry. The latest 'combi'
vessels need less back-up facilities when they arrive in ports. The Black Star's
new ships are built by Hyundai of South Korea which supplied Nigeria's shipping
line with several ships. It is not known for certain when Ghana's new ships will
be delivered as the Korean company has a three-year list of orders to meet. One
interesting disclosure made by Sawyer was that betweer.. July 1970 and February 1981
the Black Star Line earned a total of 106 million ced:~s. [Text] [London AFRICA in
English No 117, May 81 p 81] [COPYRIGHT: 1981 Afric.z .Tournal Ltd]
POSSIBLE FRENCH INVESTMENT--The French are among the first to respond to the
Ghanaian plea for more outside investment in its gold industry. The re~ent
seminar held in Accra, which attracted 50 experts and some 100 representatives
from international mining and financial institutions from the US, Canada and
Europe, underlined the untapped rich deposits in the country. It is understood
that the French are to send a team of experts to inspect investment prospects in
Ghana. [Text] [London AFRICA in English No 117, May 81 p 84] [COPYRIGHT: 1981
Africa Journal Ltd]
'FAVORABLE' OIL INVESTMENT CLIMATE--As part of its new programme to extend a more
welcoming hand to outside oil companies, Ghana has announced that its Keta Basin
l~goon is to be surveyed later this year by Texaco. It is part of the plan also
to extend exploration work to onshore areas for which Ghana will offer "a fair
a~d favourable climate." [Text] [London AFRICA in English No 116 Apr 81 p 99J
L,~OFYI~.IGHT: 1981 Africa Jornal Ltd7
HIGHER CACAO PRICE--On 5 June, the Ghana National Farmers Union sent a petition to
the government asking it to raise the purchase price of cacao paid to the producer
from the current 120 cedis per load to 500 cedis. The petition, signed by Kusi
Ampofo, secretary general of the union, also opposes the proposed creation of the
Na*_io~al Farmers Council, which would replace the union in its activities of dis-
tributing agricultural products. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS
in French No 1858, 19 Jun 81 p 1655] ~OPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981_7
11,1~61~
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~
IVORY COAST
PROBLEMS, DIFFERENCES AFFECT COCOA PRICE AGREEMENT
Ivorian Re f us al
London AFRICA in Engli.sh No 117, May 81 pp 81-82
[Text ]
HERE have been fresh hopes that agreement broke down in March
Tthe Ivory Coast would afterall join the producers unsuccessfuliy tried
the new International Cocoa Agree- to go ~t alone. In June the Ivory Coast
ment which was negotiated in Geneva was forced to sell its 100,000 tonne
last November. At a meeting of the stockpile at well below the minimum
International Cocoa Council in $1.20 per pound which the producers
London, which ended on 4 March, the were seek~ng. With a cocoa surplus of
Ivory Coast requested that a committee over 100,000 tonnes being predicted
be established to review the price this year prices might remain below
range of the cocoa pact. This has been the $1.00 mark for some time yet.
interpreted by some observers to This may well be the reason for the
mean that the Ivorians have had a apparent shift in attitude of the Ivory
chanee of heart about not joining the Coast which has not shared the view of
agreement. other producers that it is better to
The Ivory Coast has said all along settle for a new agreement which
that it wa3 not prepared to join a cocoa would guarantee a minimum price of
pact where the minimum price has ~1.lOperpound.Byasystemofexport
been set at $1.10 per pound, arguing levies producers in the previous agree-
that this was too low. The United ment have built up a$230 million
States, on the otherhand; is refi~~~ng to buffer stock fund. Ivory Coast's share
joir,, regarding the minimum price ~s of this fund comes to $50 million - a
too high. sizeable chunk which other producers
Although it was possible to envision Would sorely miss were they to attempt
a cocoa pact functioning without the to operate a new agreement without
US, which was not a member of the the Ivory Coast.
previous pact, many believe that It is still not yet clear whether this
_ wrthout the Ivory Coast, which money can be transferred to a new pact
exports 22~10 of the world's cocoa, if the Ivory Coast insists that the fund
there would be little chance of a new be liquidated and its share returned.
~ agreementworkin~effectively.Hence The feeling among other members is
the imporiance being attached to thar. that should the Ivory Coast decide not
_ country's request at the London to join there would be little point in ,
' meeting. ~ attempting to get a new pact off the
Since November Ivory Coast has ground. Despite the Cocoa
attempted to improve cocea prices by Agreement being opened for.
building up stocks. When the cocoa signature since 1, January, not many
members among those who negotiated
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it have signed it.
For the first time since Nove~nber,
however, the Ivory Coast has begun to
indicate that it may be ready to sign an
agreement which would, at least,
guarantee a minimum price for its
- cocoa, even though the price may be
lower than is desirable. �
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Africa Journal Ltd
Ivorian Intransigence
Paris LE CONTINENT in French 29 Jun 81 p 8
[Article by Lionel Zinsou: "TEze Ivorian Logic"]
[Text] The cocoa futures market is becoming crazy. Prices, which have been at
their most depressed level for 5 years, jumped up last week just on the strength
of the news that the German Federal Republic would adhere to the principle of an
_ international agreement. However, there is no prospect in sight that this German
initiative will affect the nega*_ive will of the two main actors: the Ivory Coast
- and the United States.
On the contrary, what can one expect of the market within the next few weeks?
There are three basic factors: consumption is sluggish as a result of the finan-
cial crisis in the consumer countries. Speculators are removing capital from the
cocoa market to obtain no-risk profits of up to 20 percent on the financial
- markets. No producing country can agree to unilaterally suspend deliveries and
to carry alone the burden of regulating the market.
Therefore, p rice can only diP. iFnder such circumstances, there is general amaze-
ment at the intransigence of the Ivory Coast, which refuses an agreement that
would guarantee it 110 cents for 1 pound of cocoa at a time when it sells it for
75 cents .
Ivorian fir~ess, however, follows a logic that consumers pretend to ignore. This
country has the financial means to wait it out and its goal is to achieve a truly
regulatory agreement taking into account production prices, instead of signing an
agreement that would only mirror the market's catastrophic state. Thus, it
intends to prove to all these partners, and mainly to fhe EEC, the irrationality
of futures markets. Ruino us for Western industrialists 4 years ago, when prices
were triple those today, cocoa transactions are ruinous today for the peasant
masses of Africa and Latin America. Therefore, the Ivory Coast.is making an
excellent political bet by letting the market itself prove that it constitutes
an obstacle for all involved.
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MOZAMBIQUE
SOUTH AF'RICAN RAID SEEN CONTRIBUTING TO LEFTIST SI,IDE
London ~'~FRICA in English No 116, Apr 81 pp 38-39
[Excerpts] The South African commando attack on Maputo has provoked Mozambique
into a new and very hard line against the South African Government. For the first
time, President Samora Machel has declared explicitly that 'the Boers are the
enemy'. He threw his support firmly behind the ANC (African National Congress)
(see page 35) and called on the Soviet Union for support.
The militancy surprised some diplomats in Pretoria and Maputo. But Mozambique
believes the commando raid is not an isolated event and that S~uth Africa has
- raised the level of the conflict and further attacks zre inevitable. So Mozam-
bique is now preparing for war. Newspaper headlines and banners declare 'We are
not afraid of w~r' and 'Let them come--no one will leave alive'. Security is be-
ing tightened at the airport and other key installations. But ~he stxess is being
put on popular mobilization.
- The reason for the stress on popular mobilization is not that the Government really
believes that Mozambicans can beat South African arms with picks and hoes. Ra-
ther, the experience of the Rhodesian war suggests that the biggest threat, in the
ne~r future, is sabotage.
A higher degree of popular mobilization is the only effective way to combat sabo-
tage. Nevertheless, the Government also believes that further attacks are inevi-
table, and that air attacks on Maputo are possible.
Confrontation
i~n important aspect of this confrontation, and one which has clearly pushed Mo-
zamb~que into its harder position, is that South Africa has taken up the support
_ of the National Resistance Movement. This group of anti-Frelimo Mozambicans was
created, trained, armed and supplied by Ian Smith's Special Branch. After Lancas-
ter House South Africa took up their support and training.
Important as the South African commando raid and Pretoria's involvement in Mozam-
bique may have been, the ke; element which even provoked Mozambique's militant
reaction, appears to be Frelimo's view of the changing situation inside South
- Africa and internationally. The Frelimo Government had always shown a curious
fai~h in White liberals and the White opposition inside South Afrfca. Mozambique
continued to stress that some Whites opposed the Government in Pretoria and so it
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wanted good relations with its southern neighbour even though it abhors its apar-
theid policies. But the unanimous White support for the commando attack on the
ANC even by the supposedly liberal RAND DAILY MAIL, brought a quick end to that
attitude. For the first time, Ma.chel in his speech singled out the White minority
_ as the enemy.
Whereas M~zambique used to sCress that South Africa was a sovereign state, now it
repeatedly refers to it as the 'Nazi, fascist, illegal regime'.
Solidarity
These changes are linked to a much more public and outspoken support for the ANC.
Finally, the international situation plays a part. Mozambique sees the western
countries increasingly siding with South Africa. Mozambique had expected a
stronger reaction from the West to the commando attack. For example, shortly af-
ter the attacks, at a Mozambican Heroes Day ceremony, the President saw the US
ambassador and called him over to ask 'Have you told your President about the at-
tack?'
Thus what the Maputo raid by South African terrorist squad achieved is that it has
pushed Mozambique further toward the socialist b1oc. In his speech, Ma.chel
said that the commando raid was also 'an attack on the socialist camp of which
we are a part.' The Soviet Union responded. Within a week of the speech Russian
warships sailed into Maputo and Beira harbours. In an unusual press conference,
the Soviet Ambassador, Valentin Petrovich Vdovin, said the visit was under the
terms of the y77 Friendship Treaty.
So the battle lines have been drawn, much more firmly and quicker than most peo-
ple expected. Anci as President Machel spelled out: 'we will not allow our coun-
try to be transformed into a firing range. .We do not permit our territory to be
a transit corridor for every mob of murders. We do not permit them to transfer
their internal contradictions into our country.'
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Africa Journal Ltd
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MOZAMBIQUE
DETAILS ON CAHORA BASSA OPERATIONS, FUTURE EXPANSION
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1858, 19 Jun 81 p 1671
[Text] The largest dam in Africa, the Cahora Bassa in Mozambique, has not supplied
- South Africa with electricity for two and one-half months, following the April at-
tack by guerrilla soldiers from the National Resistance Movement (MNR) opposed to
the Maputo regime.
AFP,has just devoted a short study to the subject. It indicates that the halting of
the turbines of the enormous project built on the Zambeze in the band of Mozambican
territory enclosed by Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe is the result of sabotage on the
high-tension line that carries current for over 1,000 kilometers to South Africa.
Four 18-meter pylons were blown up in the Espungabera region in Manica Province,
near the ~order with Zimbabwe.
The pylons have still not been repaired. According to Mozambican leaders, repair
work is made difficult by the rugged terrain and by security problems. Very moun-
tainous and wooded, sparsely populated, the Espungabera region is the MRN "sanc-
tuary," The 200-kilometer section of the line crossing that sanctuary is practi.-
cally impossible to watch.
Although deprived of power from Cahora Bassa, Pretoria continues to supply e~lec-
tricity to Maputo and its region, located near the border. Paradoxically enough,
the power for the Mozambicar capital and its vicinity comes from South Africa.
,
The five turbines buried in the caverns of the Zambeze gorge at Cahora Bassa pro-
duce 11,000 gigawatt-hours a year (1 gigawatt = 1 million kilowatts), almost en-
tirely consumed by South Africa alone. At the present time, Mozambique's total
electricity consumption is only equal to one-third of the production of one of
the turbines because of the embryonic nature of the country's industry.
_ Wi_thin the framework of the "decade of development," the government has launched a
program to set up industries using large amounts of electrical power, but the
country's needs will long remain under Cahora Bassa's production.
The hydraulic power, Mozambique's asset, must therefore be exported. In the name
of commerce, Maputo pragmatically forgets its insurmountable ideological differ-
encPs with Pretoria and even anticipates increasing its deliveries of cheap elec-
tricity to its neighbor, its only customer for the time being.
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- Consequently, construction of Cahora Bassa II is already being envisaged. A
Mozambican leader says that it would be a project with a capacity of 8,000 to
10,000 gigawatt-hours for Zimbabwe but especially South Africa. Maputo has already
Cold South Africa of the project semi-officially but no response has yet come from
Pretoria.
The new project will be bvilt along the same lines as the present Cahora Bassa Dam:
Tunnels dug into the wall opposite that of Cahora Bassa in the Zambeze gorge will
take in water from the river, which will turn the turbines in the planned powerplant.
At the present time, South Africa pays abc~ut $66 million a~~ear for electricity from
Cahora Bassa to an organization controlled by Portuguese and Mozambican interests.
Mozambique's participation does not exceed 18 percent and the government recovers
only 2 percent of the revenue, the rest being devoted to reimbursement of the dam's
construction costs, the fourth largest in the world.
South Africa enjoys a preferen.tial rate in keeping with the terms of the contract
signed between Portugal and South Africa before riozambiq~e's independence 6 years
ago. Since that time, Maputo has strictly respected the obligations of ~his
leonine contract it did not sign.
The South Africans agreed to a slight increase in rates after 1975, the year of
Mozambique's independence, but the inflation of the escudo, the currency in which
payments are made, has canceled out the measure. Consequently, energy fron
- Cahora Bassa is sold to Pretoria at a quarter of the price of electricity produced
in South Africa.
Power from Cahora Bass II will obviously be offered to South Africans at a higher
pri~e. And yet, it would still be advantageous to Pretoria, in the opinion of one
high official who eludes the paradox of commercial relations between MozambiQue and
Soutt~ Africa by recalling a phrase of President Samor4 Machel: "You can choose
your friends, but you can never choose your neighboxs."
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1981
11,464
CSO: 47.19/72
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407142/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R000440030052-7
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MOZAMBIQUE
BRIEFS
FRENCH TOPOGRAPHIC CONTRACT--A French firm will carry out a topographic survey of
one-sixth of the Mozambican territory within the framework of the country's agri-
cultural development. The Societe Francaise Stereotopographique has just signed
two contracts with the Mozambican COTOP [expansion unknown] and DINAGECA [National
Directorate for Geography and Survey] firms amounting to 15 million French francs,
to prepare maps and hydrographic surveys through aerial pictures. The first
contract with the COTOP concerns surveys of the Tete, Niassa and Gaza provinces
for the establishment of rice growing projects. The second agreement with DINAGECA
- entails photogr.aphy of one-sixth of the territory with a view to the creation of
38 large agricultural projects. These two contracts will be financed within the
framework of the credit agreement amounting to 200 million French francs signed
between Mozambique and French banks. A third Franco-Mozambican agreement is
under study for the topographic survey of the entire territory by satellite.
Teams of French technicians are expected to arrive in Maputo during the summer.
[Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1860, 3 Jul 81 p
1786] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981]
CSO: 4719/140 END
23
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