JPRS ID: 9840 JAPAN REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400030021-1
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 47
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 21
• Content Type: REPORTS

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- JPRS L/9840
13 July 1981
Ja an Re ort
p p
(FOUO 40/81)
FBI$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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JPRS L/9840
13 July 1981
JAPAH REPORT
(FOUO 40/81)
CONTENTS
POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
Trend of LDP Members for Increased Defense Spending Studied
(Seigo Shima,zaki; CHUO KORON, Apr 81) 1
Government Consensus Building Analyzed
(Seigo Shimazaki; SEKAI, Jun 81) 9
MILITARY
iCivilian Control' Over Self-Defense Forces Analyzed
(Shin Kanemaru Interview; ASAHI JANARU, 5 Jun 81) 20
SCIENCE AND TECHNOZOGY
Company for Producing Uranium Enriching Equi~m?ent Seen
(JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAI~, 16 Jun 81) 29
Firms Become Sellers of Technologies
(JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 16 Jun 81) 30
Extent of Government Responsiblity in 'National Projects'
(JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 16 Jun 81) 31
Competition Heav~; Between Nation~ U.S. in Semiconductor
Machinery Industry
(JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 16 Jun 81) 33
Trillion Semiconductor Industry Forecast for FY 1981
(JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 16 Jun 81) 34
- Fujitsu Unveils iWorld~s Biggest~ Computer
- (JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 16 Jun 81) 36
- a - [III - ASIA - 111 FOUO]
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Office Automation Seen as ~Must~ in Poll
(Tsunefumi Matsumoto, Kiyoshi Kusaka; JAPAN ECONONIIC
JOURNAL, 16 Jun 81) 37
MITI Extends Priority to Domestic P`irms in Patent Cases
(JAPAN ECONOiMIC JOURNAI~, 16 Jun 81) 39
Chemical ~ber Makers Believe Business Will Be Better
(JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAI,, 16 Jun 81) 40
Interest Changing ~om Mass Production to Technology, Services
(F`umio Takahashi; JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAI~, 16 Jun 81) J~1
Briefs
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Help ?~3
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POLITICA.L AND SOCIOLOGICA,L
TREND OF LDP MII~ERS FOR INCREASED DEFENSE SPENDING STUDIED
Tokyo CHUO KORON in Japanese Apr 81 pp 159-164
- ~Ar~icle by Seigo Sr.imazaki: "Increasing Number of Hawkish Dietmen: LDP"~
~Text~ In this period of low economic growth, LDP Diet
members have become aware of the interests of defense-
related industries which ha.ve annual sales figures of
600 billion yen.
~ 'The First Year of Defense'
On 15 November the LDP will mark the 25th yea.r since the merger that created the
~party. There is no similar example in the adyanced countries of the West of onE
party staying in power for a quarter century. It is possible to ana.lyze the
secrets behind thi~ semipermanent holding of power from ma.ny angles. One thing
tha.t can be mentioned is the flexible structure of the party. The system of
factions inside the party can be skillfully ma.nipulated to shift power between
the factions. And a sense of balance can also be displayed in the realm of
policy that does z~ot seem to be dependent on principle. In this manner, the
party has responded to the international or domestic situation of the moment
and has switched policies with relative astuteness.
Of course, changes in the policy of the goverrnnent itself are generally very
gradual. There ha.ve never been any sudden turnabouts. However, in the rather
long timespan of the last 10 years or quarter century, there are ma.rzy examples
of policy changes made by the LDP government that are very surprising as actions
of a single-party government.
And in these cases, the debate inside the LDP almost always precedes the change
in government policy by several years. You might say that thi.s debat~a acts as
a trial balloon or a kind of trailbreaking from the policies to be chosen by
the LDP government.
Viewed in this way, is it simply speculation to supp~se that the incrsasingly
vocal defense debate in the party proph~sies a shift i.n the defense policy of
the LDP government or to suspect that this discussion is meant to guide public
opinion so that the shift in defense policy can be made more smoothly in a few
years ?
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_ In the quarter century since the LDP was formed there have been four main phases
in the security and defense debate.
The first ptv~se was the period between the Hatoyama and the Ishibashi cabinets
when the ~~if-defense interpretation still used by the present government was
_ basicall;~ established. The second phase, as everyone knows, was the the 1960
security treaty renewal. The third phase was the next 10 years, including the
- Vietna.m war and the 1970 renewal of the security trea.ty.
The fourth phase was, broadly speaking, the period from the total change made
in the power canfiguration of the Far East b1~ the restoration of Japanese-r;hinese
_ relations to the present. More specifically, it was characterized by a close
match in power between the governing and opposition parties and a drawing closer
of the pr~gressive parties to the LDP, which moved the discussion of defense. to
the ri~ht. During this time the "emergency law" debate arose, and an attempt was
made to expand the interpretation of self-defense. This phase reached a peak in
1978 which, within zhe LDP, was called the "first year of defense."
The reason for this, it goes without saying, is that the fourth phase, unlike
the three precedin~g ones, was the first time that the defense debate was actively
advanced by the right. Then the political condition of the party between
conservatives and progressives was blown away by the holding of elections for
the upper and lower houses of the Diet on the same day in June 1980. Sa now the
debate is growing even louder.
As matter of fact, although it may be an exaggeration, the intensifying security
and defense debate inside the LDP has become so clamorous as to make one wonder
if a nationa.l emergency is at hand. What particularly directed the at~ention of
us newspaper report.4rs to the debate in the LDP was the statement concerning
"supralegal action" by General Kurisu, chainnan of the Joint Staff Council, who
was then dismissed by Shin Kanemaru, the director general of the Defense Agency
at the tine.
This happened during the Fukuda administrati.on. Space does not permit a detailed
_ explanation of what happened next, but Prime Minister Fukuda did not make it clear
that he actually supported Kurisu's dismissal. Instead of approving the dismissal,
the prime minister himself made a statement soon after which led to the debate on
~ emergency powers of the milita ry. The extraordina.ry session of the Diet that
fall seemed to be completely dominated by the emergency law debate.
In addition to the debate in the Diet, a review of the Self-Defense Forces Act
was begun by members of the Security Research Commi.ttee and the National Defense
Co~nittee such as Noboru Minowa, fonner parliamenta.ry vice minister for defense;
Ki~oshi Nori; and Masao Horie, member of the House of Councilors. This resulted
in a proposal for an emergency law system.
If a somewhat inductive line of reasoning had been used in this debate, it might
have been the golden opportunity for ha.wkish LDP Dietmen to argue for a stronger
defense by pointing out the defects in the Self-Defense Forces Act, exploding the
fictitious facade of present defense concepts, and debating on the framework of
interpretation of self-defense in the present constitution.
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The Defense Agency authorities, however, made thi~ stater~ent on the emergency
law problem: "After orders to mobilize for defense, would Se1f-Defense Force
tanks have to obey traffic laws and stop for red lights? Under present laws,
there are no exclusion provisions for emergencies. These are the cas~~s we a;.e
investigating." (statement by then chief secretary Takeda) With the Lse of
such a puny, evasive argument against a public opinion which perceived the
emergency law dehate as a very dangerous omen, the debate within the party cooled
down quickly at the same time the Fukuda cabinet was ousted.
Former Prime Minister Ohira, who attacked Fukuda from behind, presented his view
in the middle of the party presidential election tha.t the "Self-Defense Forces Act
itself is weil-constructed for an emergency law system." His opinion was quite
different fr.om that of his opponents, Fukuda and Yasuhiro Nakasone, and under the
Ohira government the intraparty debate was relatively calm.
However, even behind the tremendous volume of arguments on the dePense question
launched by the LDP and the surface hysteria, there was an amazing amount of
hardheaded and skillful manipulation of public opinion.
Patient and Steady
As the internationa.l situation became more tense and dark shadows began to appear
here and there in detente, Japan's lack of effort in defense began to be pointed
out by the United States. In -response to this, members of the LDP promptly began
- to call for an increase in Japan's share of the defense burden. A succession of
arguments appeared for changes in the basic defense plan, and there was a barrage
of doubts voiced over the principle of 1 percent of the GNP for defense.
Then, when the Middle East situation took a turn for the worse, the issue of
protecting the sea lanes came under investigation in the LDP. Also, problems
in the Far East which had been little debated and gathering dust since the
Vietnam war came under close scrutiny. Asao Mihara, chairn~ari of the Security
Research Co~ittee, declared the necessity of convoy protection and stated that
the boundaries af the Far East must be extended from the Indian Ocean to the
Persian Gulf. Ttiis aroused criticism even in the party.
When spies were discovered in the Self-Defense Forces, a special subcommzttee was
set up in the I.~P Security Research Committee. Under the direction of chairma.n
Mototashi Yamashita, work was begun on formulating an espionage prevention bill.
Adroitly handled, the bill.. was outlined by April of this fiscal year, just a few
months after the incideat occurred.
There had been a precedent, during the emergency law debate under the b'ukuda
government, when the former prime minister made a positive reply on the advisa-
bility of a law for prot~ection of secrets. However, the r.esponse of the
_ subcommittee, springing from the shock to the nation created by the spy incident,
was so rapid as to preciude debate.
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Indeed, this astute response to internationa.l or domestic phenomena which ha.ve an
impact on Japanese defense problems is completely different from the past. Since
the defense debate is being advanced by the right, it is clear that they intend
to use the impact of events to smother the response of the opposition parties in
order to develop arguments which will guide public opinion.
Granting the cleverness of the LDP in catching up with the oppositi on in the
defense debate, we must also recognize their prudence and thoroughness of prep-
aration, whether or not their patient, long-term approach is considered inten-
~ tional. A typical example of this thoroughness is found in the issuP of re-
evaluating the basic defense plan.
This basic defense plan, passed by cabinet resolution on 29 October 1978, is the
basis of present-day Japanese defense concepts. T'his basic thinking does not
adopt the idea of inenacing confrontation that leads to arms competition. It is
based on the "basic defense capability co~ncept," which holds that when the fourth
defense capability to deal with limited, small-scale invasions, if not with large-
scale invasions when U.S. military assistance must be sought on the basis of the
U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.
However, this defense plan is based on the premise of a world ~ituation in which
the following conditions involving reliance on others were thought to be semi-
permanent: (1) effective functioning of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty;
(2) continuing antagonism between the Soviet Union and China; and (3) no ma~or
changes in the situation on the Korean Peninsula. From the time the plan was
first proposed, there was a heated argument between the military and the civilian
authorities. The military side, led by Michita Sakata, director general of the
Defense Agency, and Takuya Kubo, parliamentary vice minister for defense at the
time, complained that there had been a loss of perspective due to detente.
However, the civili~n authorities controlled the dissatisfaction of the military
by holding that "we must firs't establish a na.tional consensus on defense," and
moved the plan on to a cabinet resolution.
In reality, everyone in the military felt critical of the plan from the time it
was drawn up, but the first time this was expressed openly ir. pub lic, was 3 years
after the cabinet resolution, in the statement of General Nagano, chief of staff
of the Gr~und Self-Defense Force (at that time), on 28 Ma.rch 1979. Even chairman
Kurisu of the Joint Staff Council never voiced his criticism as a public statement.
Nagano ma.de his statement when he thought the timing was right, during the intensi-
fied security and defense debate after the Kurisu incident.
At that time, Michita Sakata, the father of the basic defense plan, was chairman
of the Security Research Coum?ittee in the LDP. Partly because of this, the rock
thrown by Chief of Staff Nagano did not touch off a debate in the LDP i~ediately.
However, its influ~~nce gradually spread in the party. As a result, a year and a
half after the Nagano sta~ement, in September of this fiscal year, Defense Agencq
Director ~eneral Omura was influenced by the debate within the LDP to state that
the basic defense plan was "inadequate even if it were perfectly achieved."
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The LDP approach t~ defense problems has been cha.racterized by both steadiness
and alertness.
These characteristics seem to have resulted from the LDP's confident attitude
that "there will be no more setbacks for the defense issue."
Although the sequence was rPversed, it would b e one-sided if we did not get a fix
on the domestic and international situation which ma.de it possible for the LDP to
debate defense issues as much as they liked.
Up through the "third phase" of security and eefense developments, or to put it
differpntly, during the period when the opposition parties were completely
dominant in this area, the approach of the government and the LDP was limited to
diligently expanding defense capability and accumulating fait acco~pli to create
a working interpretation of Article 9 of the constitution. Most of the debate over
securiky and defense issues were centered on legal interpretations of the consti-
tution and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, and was unrelated to the actual state
of defense.
The reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and China in 1972 and
the end of the Vietnam war in 1975 were the great changes in the internationa.l
situation which caused a 180-degree switch from defense to offense in the LDP.
. When relations with G'hina. were first restored, the Chinese did not allude fully
Ito Japan's mi.litary alignm.ents~, but it was an undeniable fact that China
entered into improved relations with us while the U.S.-Japan Security Trea.ty
continued to be in effect. Eventually this led to an affirmative statement, and
later to a positive evaluation of the security treaty by the Chinese premier.
The end of the Vietnam war had the effect of destroying at one blow the basis for
the opposition parties' attac:k on the government and the LDP. For a long time,
the focus of debate on the interpretation of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty had
been their contention that "Japan will automatically become enbroiled in conflicts
in the Far East."
T'his development was reflected rather straightforwardly inside the country as the
Japanese political situation was entering a period where power was even}.y matched
between the progressives and conservatives and the opposition parties were pressed
to come up with a realistic approach for a coalition government. This took the
�orm of a change in policy toward the security treaty by the Komeito, the
Democratic Socialists, and a right-leaning group in the Socialist Party.
The LDP s'eems to have calculated very carefully with respect to this change in
the domestic and internationa.l situation and, after an appropriate time lapse,
switched to a more aggressive posture.
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Expanded Arena for Defense Debate
The recent changes and intensification of the defense debate have occurred quickly
and left their mark. If we look at the situation from a different angle, from
inside the party, what first comes to our attention is the change in personnel
leading the debate and the fact that this debate, which was once limited to the
defense specialists in the party, has spread to become a general, universal topic.
' There are three official organs in the LUP which deal with defense issues on a
perma.nent basis.
One is the Security Research Committee. Another is the Nationa.l Defense Committee
organized under the Political Affairs Research Committee to conduct research and
make proposals on goveriunent policies (LDP Party Regulations, Article 48).
The other is the Special Committee for Measures Concerning Military Bases.
In addition, there is the Diet Members Alliance for National Defense, a voluntary
organization from the point of view of party headquarters. Before the growing
defense debate of the last few years, tr~ese four organizations were almost the
only forums for discussion of defense in the LDP.
Of course, ciefense issues had been discussed in t~he General Affairs Cosamittee
and the Executive Co~nittee when occasion dema.nded, but these commi.ttees only
dealt with these issues in the course of their functions as decision-ma.king and
executive bodies. Ultima.tely, the four arganizations I have mentioned were the
"ma.in stage."
However, a change began to occur in 1977 and 1978, the expansion of the arena for
defense debate in the LDP.
Within the existing party organizations, subcommittees and special subcommittees
were established one after another. As the defense debate became more clamorous,
voluntary organi.zations of Dietmen interested in defense sprang up like mushrooms
after a rainstorm.
Let us look at some examples. Two cubcommittees were organized within the
Security Research Committee: the Legal Research Subcommittee and a couuaittee
simply called, without other adjectives, the Special Subcommittee.
The Legal Research Subcommittee was organized as an offi.cial organ of the party
to search for loopholes in the so-called "two defense laws," the Self-Defense
Forces Act and the Defense Agency Establishment Act. Its purpose was to formulate
a reply as a party organ to the allegation of inadequacies in the present laws
, made by Joint Staff Council chairman Kurisu at the time of his dism:i.ssal.
The Special Subcommi.ttee was crganized in response to a succession of incidents,
such as the Soviet "report" ships and espionage in the Self-Defense Forces, to
consolidate apinion on an espionage prevention law and draw up a bi11 ba.sed on
this.
In addition, a Nationa.l Defense Issues Subcommittee was set up within the I~ationa.l
Defense Committee. The purpose of tiais committee is to bring together long-range
proposals related to basic elements of defense.
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How much should we raise the percentage of the GNP spent for defense? What about
- equipment? What sort of logistical support should be provided? Taking the
~ viewpoint of the politicians, we can glimpse a great enthusiasm for strengthening
the concepts and foundations of defense. The attemFt to "ma.ke the security and
defense issue a concern of all LDP Dietmen, not just of a group of specialisCs,'~
was originally the idea of the LDP leadership.
~nE example of this occurred after the general election of 1976, when 47 newly
elected members of the Diet were gathered in one place for a"Defense Problems
Study Conference" in which lectures were given on fundamental defense issues.
This wa.s done under the pretext that the idea came from freshmen Diet members
such as Tokuichiro Tamazawa and Michihiko Shikan. But it seems that in reality,
at a time when the defense debate was expected to become more intense, the party
_ leadership was afraid that it would become confused if enthusiastic new Dietmen,
without basic knowledge of defense, made impromptu $:atements in public.
Many other meetings and organizations related to security and defense, including
policy study groups and political fund-raising groups, have been organized
voluntarily by Diet members.
Money in Defense?
It is true that the number of such groups controlled by party headqua.rters is ~not
great, These voluntary gatherings and organizations are not recognized unless
party headquarters gets involved and expen~es are taken out of party funds.
However, a great number of such organizations organized by individual Dietmen
are thought to exist.
The expanding number of advocates of security and defense in the LDP is definitely
related to the fact that, in vulgar terms, there is money in it.
- When we examine the political coordinating and advisory committees and the
voluntary associations of Dietmen in the LDP, we find that although th ey are
supposedly organized directly under various ministries, agencies and canmittees,
they tend, in reality, to work as pressure groups, serving the interests of
certain sectors of business and ~he bureaucracyo This was seen in extreme fora?
in the aircraft group, the transpor.tation group, the post office and communica-
tions group, and the socialist-labor groups which came under scrutiny in the
Lockheed incident.
Defense industries, however, were not especially cultivated in the past by the
Defense Agency, and there was no generalised structure of vested interest rela-
tionships. (Of course, the selection of the next major fighter aircraft, the
first and second FX, led to graf t and ended up as a prime example of "structural
corruption." However, the only people to reap the illegal benefits were a few
politicians who could participate in high-level decisions)o Therefore, the group
interested in security and defense did not have well-establi~hed organizations
which could handle relations between government and the industry.
For example, the practice of the Defense Ager~~y has been to ask for advice and
make explanations to former parliamentary vice. ministers and defense regarding
basic problems in preparing the defense white papers and budget proposalso
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Nevertheless, the presence of a'"defense group" which exerted pressure on the
policies or budget of the Defense Agency was very weaka For this role, it was
necessary to depend on former officials of the Defense Agency.
- Now, however, the situation has changed completely. This is because it has
become clear to the LDP Dietmen that there is money to be ma.de on the defense
issue.
Altnough the figures differ a great deal depending on the method of calculation,
- the annual sales of defense-related industries are reputed to be about 600 billion
yen annually. In today's low-growth economy, there is clear].y a nest of vested
interests here, especially if it becomes certain that the relative amount of the
GNP spent on defense will increase.
Previously, the only LDP Dietmen involved with national defense were the members
of the Security P.esearch Committee, the National Defense Committee, and other
subcorsmittees tzmporarily orgaiiized under them, so they always stuck together
like "itintaro candy."
The director general of the Defense Agency, the parliamentary vice minister of
defense, the director of tha cabinet cou~ittee on defense, and people who had
served in the Defense Agency were always showing u~ at the same times and places.
This fact by itself indicated the limited nature of the "defense group."
At present, however, Dietmen with no connection at all to the Defense Agency are
having their say about defenseo In fact, the older Dietmen who have served in
the agency or the military are even being shumied because the}r "know too much
about the inside situation and are not in touch with the consciousness of the
people."
At the recent extraordina.ry session of the Diet, the mass visit of cabinet members
to Yasukuni shrine and Justice Minister Okuno's statement on constitutiona.l revi-
sion sparked off a furor in the media over theissue of revising the constitution.
This would seem to be a natural occurrence, but in terms of the security and
defense debate, it was done because the limitations of the working interpretation
of Article 9 of the constitution had become obvious.
The present security and defense debate inside the LDP does not extend to a de~ate
over the constitution. The total security advocated by Prime Minister Suzuki is
sufficient to cast sparks in all directions. This includes the is~ues of protec-
ting the sea lanes in case of trouble in the Middle East, an espionage prevention
law, an emergency powers law, and the percentage of the GNP to be spent for defense.
- However, if we penetrate the surface, it all comes down to one concre~e issue fur
policy selectian: how to expand the overall framework of defense-related expendi-
tures. The goals proffered for the near future hy an unspoken consensus are a
departure from the basic defense plan and are for increased defense spending, beyond
1 percent of the GNP. The next step will be to open up even wider prospects,
xncludit~g the issue of constitutional revisiono
COPYRIGHT: Chuo Koronsha 1981
- 9651
CSO: 4105/168
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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
- GOVERNMENT CONSENSUS BUILDING ANALYZED
Tokyo SEKAI in Japanese Jun 81 pp 112-119
[Article by journalist Seigo Shimazaki]
[Text] "Remember the Occupation Years~'
When the Suzuki cabinet appointed Seisuke Okuno as minister of justice, perhaps no
one was more surprised than Okuno himself.
In December ?972, owing to his achievements in winning four elections, the second
Tanaka ~abinet selected Okuno as zninister of education. At each reshuff].ing of
_ the cabinet since then, his name had appeared on every list of candi.dates for
cabinet posts. He was by-passed every time, owing, unfortunately, to his
non-faction status. Because of this, he must be quite pleased with the present
= appointment.
For a politician, no matter how he appears to remain aloof, unle~s he is given a
responsible post, he will at best degenerate into a politician who merely
represents the interests of his constituents. For Okuna, who, especially as a
former official of the Ministry of Home Affairs, has always felt strongly that
he would rather contribute to national politics in a responsible position rather
than merely represent local interests, the past 6 years without a government post
must have been idle.
But it can be said that Okuno's appointment to the Suzuki cabinet (more accurately,
however, his appointment at the following reorganization of the cabinet, since
Ohira was still active) was already decided at the point when he was appointed
director of the LDP's National Movement as a replacement for Koichi Hamada, wh~
resigned as a member of the Diet due to his involvement in the Las Vagas gambling
scandal, or later, at the point when it was felt that he had contributed somewhat
to the overwhelming victory of the LDP at the dual House election held
simultaneously. This is because it is a part of the unwritten rule of tht LDP
that a pinch hitter of this kind should be re~~~arded for hi~ services with a
c~binet post.
It seems that Okuno was privately hoping that "should he be appo~:nted~' he would
: be ~iven the post of Ministc-r of Home Affairs or Education or Health and Welfare,
~
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all of which are related to the former Mi.nistry of Home Affairs. In other words,
he wanted to wo rk in areas he is most fam~.liar with, such as the electoral reform
system.
But such a wish could not possibly go through within the bureaucratic personnel
affairs where factional speculations take top prior~ty. As a result, he was set
up as minister of justice, a position which, although as a principle is considered
ultra-right, has no particular rights or interests worth mentioning, a position
rather appropriate for a retiree.
Of the past ministers of ~ustice one who has received highest evaluation (but of
course not by the people but by the minfstry and the LDP) is Shigesaburo Maeo.
The reason for this is extremely stznple; the criteria of evaluation were as
follows: 1) on e who does not work; 2) accordingly, one who does not interfere in
the affairs of the ministry and does not make waves; 3) but one who is able to get
the budget approved.
When Okuno was minister of educatior~, he proved himself to be a hard-liner when
he boldly attacked the Japan Teachers~ Union saying, "Tf you like politics so much
why don~t you qu it teaching and become politir_ians.~' On the other hand, he has
also displayed unco~�non shrewdness by resolving in one full sweep the long-pending
issues in the form of the "Tsukuba University Bill,'~ the "Bill Secur3ng Teaching
Personnel," and the ~'Bill Legislating Positions of Vice-Principal.~' Therefore,
the position ~f Minister of Justfce, for which Maeo is regarded ideal, was
fundamentally inappropriate for Okuno.
True enough, it has been reported that at the cabinet organization headquarters
Okuno tried to mask his disappointment at his being appointed to an unchallenging
- post when he 3 okingly told Prime Minist~r Suzuki and others that he "would rather
'work',"
No one would obj ect if it is said that Okuno, who has e~ressed hi$ ~~desire
to work," came up with the issue of the constitutional revision quite suddenly
after having examined every other possibility.
= It just happene d that Jun Eto's long article ~'1946 Constitution--Its Restrictions~'
appeared in BUNGEI S~:UNJU at about the time Okuno was appointed minister of
justice. It is a well-known fact that Okuno was greatly impressed by the article
and recommended it to whomever he met.
I seemed to have deviated from the main theme o� this essay by discussing Okuno~s
private matters, but let me continue a bit further.
Let me set aside for later niscussion the significance of LDP's argument on the
constitutional revision issue evoked by the statement made by the minister.
Speaking from Okuno's private involvement the first thing we can say is that he
wanted to become a present day "kataribe" jstory teller] who would leave for
posterity the account of the ordea].s of occupation years and the experiences he
went through in the resol.ution of the Ministry of Home Affairs. This he would do
through the revi.sion issue.
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There are 34 statesmen who came out of the former Ministry of Home Affa:trs; among
them are Hirokichi Nadao and Kingo Machi~mura of 1914; Seisuke Okuno of 1938;
Masaharu Gotoda of 1939; Tatsuo Ozawa, Joji Omura, and Jusuhiro Kanasone of the
first half of 1941; Masao Endo and Keiichi Nakamura of the latter half of 1947.
Only a~ew among them, however, has, in responsible capacities, experienced the
resolution of the Ministry of Home Affairs in the hands of GHQ or was involved
in the series of changes in the structure of local administration and finance
based on the S-houp edict. Okuno became the director of the "wartime important
business section" at the end of the war; and, after the resolution of the Ministry
of Home Affairs in 1949, he became the director of both the finance and research
sections of the Local Self-Government Agency, all the while negotiating with GHQ
single-handedly.
According to Okuno, no matter how the constitutionalist forces such as the
Socialist Party tried to beautify those occupation years, the GHQ~s handling
of the matter was so forceful that on several occasions he shed tears of helpless-
ness. He also says that he experienced with his own body the effect of having the
Constitution, drafted hurriedly withtn the GHQ during the occupation, forced upon
the Japanese people. There was a scene last 27 August during a meeting of ttie
Justice Committee of the House of Representatives when he unabashedly shed tears;
unmistakably, he was recalling the humiliation he had suffered dur3.ng the
occupation years.
A decade ago, there would have been plenty of politicians from officialdom who had
experienced similar or even worse ordeals than Okuno~ Most of them have retired
from the front line and even if they continue to survive as statesmen they have
been unwilling to speak out. It would seem that behind Okuno's half impulsive
statement on the constitution issue there was a fear that unless someone were
to shout "remember the occupation years!" those days would be long forgotten.
There was a kind of missionary spirit in him.
Another thing T would like to point out in terms of OkunoRS personal ~nvolvement
is the existence of Chief Cabinet Secretary Miyazawa. Using his fluent comcnand
of English, Miyazawa, since in his mid-twenties, had been active in negotiating
with the GHQ as a representative of the Ministry of Finance. In contrast to
Okuno, who suffered the humiliation of having to crawl around on his all fours,
Miyazswa entered the very core of the administrative stronghold while still very
young and survived the period "in style."
Miyazawa was once a very popular man, serving as the leader of the "new right."
But he could be said to be a statesman who accepted all too easily the technique
of the post-war conservative mainstream which brought about the econamic growth
through complete dependence on the United States on matters of security treaty
and defense. Since Miyazawa would see the Constitution interpreted in any number
o� ways, Okuno's outspoken but immature attitude on the constitutional re;~ision
must have been beyond his comprehension. Since the incident last summer involving
Minister of Justice Okuno's statement, cabinet meetfngs have become oddly
entangled; the mainstream faction of the LDP is visibly upset with Okuno,
complaining, "What are you trying to do to the Suzuki administration? Enough 3.s
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enough." Can we not interpret Okunq's ovezzealous attachment to the xeyiSion
issue as being deeply rooted in his pxiyate leud w~.th T~Iiyazawa?
, People Should Epe the "Constitution"
In any event Okuno's statement on the Constitution orig3nated in a kind of
pri~aate enmity and in his own feeling of mission. Of course this issue cannot
be reduced simply to a l~vel of personal antagonism.
Aside from the ultra right theory of const~tutional revis3,on, revision theoxies
set off within the conservative political circles seem to emerge periodically
like the ebb and flow of the ttde.
The "theory of forced Constitution" existed even during the occupation years,
but it was under the Hatoyama administration, that is after the end of the
occupation, when the conservative party publicly and loudly proclaimed its theory
of constitutional revision for the first tilne.
Later I would discuss the circumstances surround:Lng this issue v~s,a-vis the LDP
"platform," but the Hatoyama cabinet, established after overthrowing the Yoshida
administration, directly advocated a constitutional revision and held a general
election in February 1955. In the final analysis, however, they were unable to
- gain the two-thirds majority needed to ainend the Constitution. They were also
unsuccessful at the election of the House of Counc3lors in July 1956. In order to
cope with this, the Hatoyama cabinet devised twa ~measures: the introduction of
the minor electoral system, the so-called "Hatmander," and the establfst~::~nt of
the Cabine*_'s Commission on the Constitution within the administration. The ~inor
electoral system collapsed as it was vigorously opposed not only by the opposition
but also by the fact3ons within the LDP; the Commission alone was to be
established after having resisted severe protest by the opposition.
Later, although the constitut~onal revision fever had subsided temporarily it
resurfaced around 1964 when the Congnission presented 3.ts final report, In the
meantime there was the "1960 Security Treaty," and the final report by the Council
_ could not unify the views regarding ~he need for a constitutional revision and ~
simply listed all the various opinions. It had invited a situation which the
revisionists did not expect. For this reason, the Conanission too was ineffective
in creating a desired situation, and the revisionists had no choice but to retire
from the scene.
Later, the constitutional revisionist movement became sporadic, totally lacking
in organization. In particular, the arrival of the age of no distinct~on between
the conse r*atives and the radicals spurred this downward trend.
However, because of last year's LDP's overwhelming victory in the elect3on of
both Houses held on the same day, the debate over the rev3sion was initiated
by Okuno, as if he were letting off all of his pent up frustrations which
heretofore he could not express even if he had wanted to.
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- In order to sort out the present ~rgumen~s on the rzyision issue let us first
- review the events of the past half year, mainly the movements within the govern-
ment and the LDP.
It was at the last 27 August meeting of the Cammit~ee on Judicial Affairs of Che
House of Representatives rhat Mini~ter Okuno, although prefacing his speech by
saying that "this is a view as a statesman and not as a minister of 3ustice,"
stated that "the present Constitution was set in compliance w3th the instructions
given by the occupation forces; it is desirable that there be a debate emerging
from the people arguin.g for the formation of their own constitution."
This was the beginning. For some unknown reason Seiichi Inaba (Socialist Party)
on the question stand simply refused to pursue the issue. Besides, since this
examination took place after the Diet had closed, the second and the third
_ volleys of follow-up questions never took place in the Diet; consequently,
Okuno lost nothing by uttertng it. A~though each opposition party did informally
express its criticism of Okuno's statement on the constitutional revision, his
statement increased in voltage at every opportunity.
In the extraordinary Diet session held at the end of September, the govexnment
- suddenly found itself in a"state of quandary.~' In retrospect, however, the
government was only pretending to be in a quandary. Be that as it may, in order
- to escape unscathed through the session which was to be the Suzuki cabinet's
_ f irst trial, the prime minister devised a plan. That was to insert the phrase
"Suzuki Cabinet will abide by the Constitution" in his general-policy statement.
This.he hoped would forestall the opposition.
The plan should have worked for the opposition, but it backfired among his own
party and cabinet members.
_ At the extraordinary cabinet meeting held on 1 October to examine the contents
of the gener~l-policy statement, General Director Nakagawa of the Science and
Technology Agency fired the first shot: "Since everyone abides by the
~ Constitution, why the need for the phrase?" Minister Okuno :aasted no time in
jumping on Suzuki: "Obeisance to the Constitution and the issue of constitutional
revision are coropatible. It is unjust to mention only the former, for it has the
effect of blocking the constitutional revision issue!'~
Other cabinet members joined in and chaos followed. In the midst of all this,
the prime minister remained almost totally silent, a role familiar to him as
a longtime chairman of the LDP Council, and let the situation take its own
course. Finally, Chief Cabinet Secretary Miyazawa ended up by promising a
"reexamination."
"Reexamination" simply meant that the phrase would be deleted. At the first
highest-level LDP Council meeting of the Suzuki cabinet, held immediately after
the above confrontation, the prime minister's leadership was also questioned.
After much debate, they finally settled on "respecting the doctrine of the
Constitution"; in other words, it was a desperate measure with a double meaning:
to the rappositton it says that "the present cabinet will not revise the
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- Constitution"; to the ruling party, it says that "the issue of constitutional
revision will not be suppressed."
On reflection, the only thin~ that could be said about the entire affair is that
iC was a total disgrace. However, could it be said that they were merely acting
so that, daring to be disgraceful, they could direct the eyes of the people to
the constitutional issues (which, of course, would include both the "forced
constitution" and the constitutional revision theory).
According to the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, they are prepared to meet problems
such as the revision issue which might shake the foundation of t1~e cabinet. They
do this by directing the attention of "marked" cabinet members to a set of
ready-made answers in an effort to unify opin~ons within the cabinet. For
instance, this was done to Osamu Tnaba (minister of ~ustice) in the Tanaka
- cabinet, Shintaro Ishihara (director of the Environmental Agency) and Ichiro
Nakagawa (minister of agriculture) in the Fukuda cabinet. With the exception of
Inaba's statement of "defective Constitution" (May 1975, at the House of
Councilors Audit Co~ittee meeting), the "marked" cabinet officials who were
considered revisionists all completed their terms of office without making any
disturbing remarks.
On rhe other hand, the Suzuki cabinet, apparently wary of the above incidents
reoccurring and on the occasion of the restatement of the general policy spepch,
di.~tr.ibuted these ready-made answers (a collection of hypnthetical questions and
answers) to all cabinet members in an attempt to hush them up. Ironically, when
this measure is compared with the past practice of "distributing these answers
only to those marked revisionists," it has the effect of making us assume that
every member of the Suzuki cabinet is a constitutional revisioni~t who is prone
to make statements that could mean trouble.
Needless to say, such an eleventh-hour measure did nothing to seal the lips of
revisionists.
Expectedly, the extraordinary Diet session was thrown ~.nto confusion by Minister
Okuno's statement, especially at the Budget CQmmittee. The first statement to conte
out was Okuno's "Japan is not sovereign without its independence."
According to the minister, this statement was in fact comman knowledge among the
officials of the former Ministry of Home Affairs who had to negotiate with
the GHQ during the occupation, and was understood as "a matter that preceded
common sense." As mentioned befoYe, what he is trying to say is that he and
others who had to deal with the CHQ in constant humiliation were at the pleasure
of the occupation forces and had to follow their orders even in the drafting of
a single bi11. The situation was such that even the Diet, the supreme organ of
national power, could not intervene. Okuno and others knew exactly ~'where the
power lay,~' and they had experienced it personally.
This statement of "no sovereignty" interrupted the Budget Committee delibera-
tions, and the minister of justice was made to express his regret; but her,e again
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it is unclear whether the minister's regret was to apply to all o~ his statements
on the constitutional revision issue or only zo the statement of "no sovereignty."
The matter remains unresolved.
It is said that in order to bring LhE~ situation under control, the minister even
"thought about resigning." Ironicall~~, however, it is said that because Okuno's
- resignation would ~uake him a hero to the revisionists and thereby give push to
their movement, not only ~rime Minister Suzuki but also the Socialists, who had
in fact asked for Okuno's dism:tssal, were opposed to it. The latter had gone
backstage to make sure that LDP Diet policy makers "would not make any ha~ty move
in dismissing the minister~" The entire affair simply defies imagination.
The rest need not be repeated. The opposition challenges with qu~stions--the
minister of justice escalates his statements--confusion ensues and deliberat~on
is interrupted--the government announces a unified opinion or the prime ~minister
makes a statement that brings the situation under control. This pattern is
repeated at the regular session of the Diet.
Upon reflection, the attitude of the opposition, especially the Socialist Party,
was also odd. During the extraordinary session a series of statements by the
minister of justice that began with the "no sovereignty during occupation" comment
should have incurred the wrath of the Socialist Party. But for one reason or
another the Socialists settled the issue by saying that fnrther discussion would
- delay the implementation of the mediation ruling of the Japanese National Railways
and the Postal Servic2s, both of which requixed 3.mmediate attent~on. It is
strange that they should be weighing an issue of fundamental importance to t~e
country and another involving a~mere execut3on of political manuevering on the
_ same scale. As if it had anticipated this state of affairs all along, the LDP
moved ahead to solidify 3ts support for Okuno.
- A Detour Strategy
~
In the midst of the confusion at the Budget Committee of the extraordinary session
of the Diet on 9 October, the "National Conference ta Support Okuno~s Statement
on the Constitution" was held at LDP headquarters right across the street from
the Diet. This was one example of LDP support for Okuno. For another, a general
assembly of LDP's Commission on the Constitution, which ha3 been more or less
dormant the past 10 years, was held on 13 October for the first time in 8 years.
Fina~l.ly, the League of Dietmen for Realization of Autonomous Constitution,
chaired by former Prime Minister Kishi, has also begun to make a move: ~'Although
we do not believe that the Constitution can be revised easily, we must first lay
the groundwork." (Director Haruhiko Uetake, former member of the House of
Councilors)
We must note, however, that these movements within the LDP are somewhat different
from those of past revisionists.
That is to say, a'lthough it is a fact that jnew zevisionists] still repeatedly
point out the injustices of the forced Constitution and eagerly engage in laying
down the rails for establishing an autonomous constitution, they are no longer
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interested in taking the arguments directly to the rey~,sion issue. They are
rather interested ~.n trying to focus on inducing public opinion thxough the
revision argument.
The Cabinet's Commission on the Constitution which is a forma.l organization of the
LDP is one example ~f the change in emphasis. At its general meeting on 13
October, Chairman Mitsuo Setoyama Cformer minister of justice) offered the
following comments: The present Constitution has yet to plant its roots among
the people; notice the atisence of any litigation involving the Constitution."
"The suitability of the present Ccnstitution should be debated on the basis of
content. But we cannot overlook the questior~ of:forced or borrowed constitution."
"We musC now debate on where and how we need to revise the present Constitution."
The Council decided to come up with a solution within the next 3 years based on
the above thinking. However, desp~te the fact that more than 80 percent (57)
- of the ;:~tal membership (68) belung to the "League of Dietmen for Realization of
Autonomous Constitution," the arguments presented throughout the meeting were
considerably subdued.
- The LDP's Commission on the Constitution which was established simultaneously with
the merger of the conservatives has, throughout the past 25 years, reflected the
ups and downs of the arguments within the party; that is, although it has
directly taken up the argument of Che revision in the first half of its existence,
thereafter, it has conscioulsy avoided the issue.
To illustrate this, let us compare the interim report compiled by the Commission
in 1959 with the 1972 "draft of the outline of the revision.~' The 1956 interim
r~port determines that tt~.e present Constitution was a forced onP and boldly
exposes its ~roblematic points; on the other hand, the 1972 draft minimizes
these problematic points and uses less bold language.
The fact thar, the Co~nission was ~iormant for as long as 8 years should clearly
indicate the attitude of the LDP toward the Constitution. Even if it does wake
up, the Council will still be far from its usual form.
The same can be said For the League of Dietmen for Reaiization of Autonomous
Constitution, regarded as the "head temple" of the hawk faction within the LDP.
Younger Dietmen tend to shy away from the League as 3.f to imply that the
"Constitution issue is not a vote-getter.~' Although membership did increase
during the past 2 years, there was a time when both Chairman Kishi and Director
Uetake expressed their desire to resign. The activity of. the League is rather
modest in comparison with the strong support for Minister Okuno. Instead of
singular devotion to the matter of constitutional revision thet looms high above
them, the League has changed its strategy by delivering off-speed pitches and
taking de[ours, as in their publi;:ation of theix study on how foreign countries
revised their constitutions after the war.
On the other hand, a new movement has emerged among the Dietmen born in the Showa
era [1926 to present]. They have organized the "Shawa Group to Study the
Constitution" (leader, Takao Fujinami, former minister c~f labor~; it is their
contention that "the League has fallen ~nto the hands oi rigi3 senior Dietmen of
the revisionis*. faction."
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This group is camposed of both the hard~line re~isionists an~' the constitionalists
who, regardless of haw the prasent Constitution came into being, say that it has
become firmly established among the people. The group is characterized by the
fzct that the latter far outnumber the former.
At a glar~ce it would appear that the debate over the constitutional revis~on is
considerably heated; and yet the fact of the matter is that the present LDP is
- handling this matter in a relatively cool manner without getting overly excited
about it as it used to.
What happened---?
Technically speaking, it is because the LDP members haye not forgotten the
troubles they had gone through in establishing the Gengo jJapanese era
designation] system.
While the LDP was blindly shouting for the "legislation of Gengo,'~ the
opposition fought bitterly, claiming that it would ~'revive the Emperor system.~'
However, as in the allegory of the contest between the north wind and the sun,
the LDP began to adopt a flex3ble strategy,~zaobilizing local organizations, and
putting municipal assemblies into action and having them pass resolutions.
Gradually building up the sentiment, it succeeded in establishing the legislation.
It seems now that the LDP has come up with a similar approach in its attempt to
deal with the issue of constit~.itional revision.
As in the case of the gengo legislation, the League of Dietmen for Realization
of Autonomous Constitution has begun to work on local assemblies to pass
resolutions on the revision issue. Although it has not gone in orbit yet, it is
obvious they are hoping for their luck to repeat itself.
Another thing we must point out as a motive for the change in the LDP policy
in the direction of constitutional revision is the fact that the Dietmen's view
of the constitution has changed due to the influx of a new generation of
politicians.
Interesting data reflecting this trend were gathered from questionnaires sent to
all LDP Dietmen by the MEIINICHI SHIMBUN last 20 October and by the ASAHI SHINlBUN
on 4 November.
Both questionnaires revealed exremely low figures for Dietmen actively promoting
the revision, 14 percent in MAINICHI and 17 percent in ASAHI. The two newspapers
carried contradictory headlines: ASAHI~s read "'I~ao-Thirds for Canstitutional
Revision," MAINICHI's, "Majority Takes Cautious Approach to Constitutional
Revision." When we examine the articles thoroughly, however, the contents
were alike. It can be said that a true feeling of the majority of the LDP
Dietmen was that, "We understand well the establishment of an autonomous
constitution as a principle. But realistically speaking, since the present
constitution appears to have taken firm root among the people, we must avoid
any hasty action."
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Mr Senpachi Oishi, who advocates a similar view, wrote an editorial in ASAHI
SHIMBUN objecting to the minister of justice's argument for rev3.sion. When it
was published, Minister Okuno was reportedly mc+re stunned at fi~st than angry;
he exclaimed, "How can it be justified that a Dietman of the LDP, which
advocates constitutional revision as a matter of party p?atform, makes such an
assertion."
At meetings of LDP's Coimnission on the Constitution too, Dietmen who had held
onto an attitude of caution regarding the revision issue and who had thus far
avoided any involvement in the debate, have begun to air their own theories
more actively.
In fact, Minister Okuno's desire to become the modern day ~~story teller~' and his
stubborn mission-bound attachment to the const~tutional revision are signs that
he has become impatient with the changes apparent in the consciousness of these
- Dietmen.
Backstage of the "1955 Party Platform~'
We must note that the increase in the number of Dietmen who regard the present
constitution as being deeply rooted, will inevitably d3scourage the LDP~s
straightforward and rigid advocation of the revision theory. But precisely
because of this it might be said that what they are doing now is putting the
road marks along the path that will finally lead them to the goal of enacting a
revision-autonomous constitution.
It is a well known fact that the revisionists~ "Tmper3.a1 standard~' pxoclaiming
that the "KDP is a party for the constitutional revision~' is found in the "psrty
platform" that was compiled as the fundamental policy of the then new emerging
party (Liberal Democratic Party = LDP) when conservative merger took place in
November 1955.
But contrary to our expectation, despite the fact that it was an era, unlike
the present, when advocates of revision could go unchallenged under Prime Minister
Hatoyama's jleadership], the "party platform's" wording of the constitutional
revision tended to be oddly subdued.
"While firmly upholding the princ3ples of peace, democracy and esteem for the
fundamental human rights, provide for autonomous revision of the present
constitution, reexamine various legislations of the occupation and abolish them
in accordance with the state of affairs of our country---." Worded as such,
it gives us the feeling that what ought to have been placed in the '~alcove~' was
secretly placed near the "back door."
There is an e~lanation for this. The party platform was a product of a
compromise between the Yoshida faction, whose single guiding principle had been
one of interpretational constitutional revision, and the Hatoyama faction,
which directly advocated the enactment of an autonamous constitution. Despite
this, the LDP was a newly formed political paxty facing a general election. It
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is said Ch~~t the sole c~ncern c~f the policy comtnittee compiling the platform
was on winning the election. In other words, they were well aware of the fact
that they had failed to reach their goal in the February election of that year
(1955) when they directly raised the revision issue. The platform was created
with the realization among all members, including the revisionists, that the
constitutional revision was exremely difficult.
In any event, when we ask whether a situation enabling cunstitutional revis~on
was fostered in the next 25 years or not, the answer z~st be in the negative
no matter how favorably we look at it.
We cannot help but puzzle over the sudden emergence of the revision issue just
because the LDP won both Houses.
The present LDP cabinet is re~ponsible for establishing the police reserve force
- under Article 9 of the Constitution, for converting it into the Self Defense
Forces and, eventually pushing it to the eighth largest "mil~tary power" in the
world. There is no sign that government and LDP~s faith in the theory that the
articles in the Constitution can be interpreted in any number of ways has
declined.
If this is the case, can it not be said that the present LDP~s constitutional
revisionists are showing us the liTnits of the theory of multiple interpretation
and application jof the Constitution] in the form of positive responses to the
U.S. demands for strengthening the Defense ~orces. We must look at this as an
indication that, while loudly advocating constitutional revisions, the present
aim of the LDP ~.s to further provide for a stronger theory of interpretation and
application of the Constitution.
COPYRIGHT: Iwanami Shoten 1981
9710
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MILITAR�
'CIVILIAN CONTROL' OVER SELF-DEFENSE FORCES ANALY7ED
Tokyo ASAHI JANARU in Japanese 5 Jun 81 pp 112-118
[Interview with Shin Kanemaru, former director general of the Japan Defense Agency,
by Akihiro Nosaka, critique; date and place not specified~
[Text] [Nosaka] Mr Kanemaru, do you have any military experience?
[Kanemaru] I have. Just as I became a candidate for a reserve officer after
entering the signal unit of the Kwangtung Army, I came down with pleuxisy and
upon being sent back to Japan, the Manchurian incident broke out. So my military
career was limited to that of a recruit.
[Nosaka] With the emperor's words that the Potsdam Declaration would be accepted,
the Japanese military forces surrendered a11 at once. At that time, they completely
lost their spirit to fight. I do not think that the American occupation policies
were exceptionally effective, but there was no underground resistance or any
_ opposition movem.ent of any kind. Really, it was a surrender of such orderliness
rarely seen in history. I was 14 years old then, and the Imperial Army crumbled
before my eyes and became a sight too pitiful to look at. Men of the Imperial
_ Army tho~aght only of themselves and ran away, greedily taking with them the ~tored
military supplies. They did not care at all for the people. As far as I know,
even the Kwangtung Army, of which Mr Kanemaru was once a member, probably had its
reasons for doing so but disappeared before the invasion of Soviet forces. Cadres
all went southward and the main units left, leaving behind only the border patrol
unit. The pitifvl Japanese residents were forsaken, and they suffered a terrible
fate. What was that army there for? It was claimed that the national policy was
preserved, but I wanted to question what was going to happen to our livelihood
even if the national structure were '~cept intact. When I talk about such matters
wi~h ex-military men, particularly those who ~oined the Self Defense Forces [SDF],
they all lament that, "it is truly regrettable that generaTly when the people take
up the subject of the military, the people must be first made to understand what
~ the military is trying to protect. However, I have seen the military collapse.
I want to question tenaciously, "What are you trying to defend by strengthening
the military capability, training daily and carrying weapons?"
[Kanemaru) The Japanese people, who have fully experienced defeat in war, helieve
that they must never become invrlved in another war--and to say this might seem
like a waste of words, but each house has a lock. To protect the lives and property
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c~f a household, the head or the parents or the grandparents, or because it is the
national custom, a lock is placed on the house. As long as the nation is a conglom-
erate of these households, it is only natural that the nation should have a lock
_ to keep out the thieves and burglars. Therefore, we are following the policy that
it is necessary to have enough defense to prevent meddling in our affairs. It
. would be a terrible mistake to think of the present Japanese defense in terms of
the former military forces. I think that the biggest cause of Japan's defeat was
the involvement of the military in politics. That was a grave error. In other
_ words, there was no brake af "civilian control." After the military began to
participate in politics, after su~h abusive words as, "You fool! Shut upl," began
to be spoken in the Diet and after developments permitted the formation of the To~o
cabinet, politics became solely concerned with the expansion of war or the occupa-
tion of territory. In other words, politics became totalitarian without regard
for *he populace. The result was that miserable defeat in war. Therefore, I
think that it would be preposterous to build up a military force with an image o~
the past. This is the reason way souie say, "They are not sure whether Kanemaru is
- rightist or leftist." Kurusu, chairman of the Joint Staff Council, was cautioned
a number of times about his political statements, but he still made them on various
occasions. On the grounds that he was jeopardizing our future, I asked for Kurusu's
resignation, but he asked to do so voluntarily instead of being dismissed by his
superior. It appeared that his retirement pay would be affected so he aske~3 to
resign voluntarily. I believe that the military or the SDF must never shackle
the people or become a burden and threaten the livelihood of the populace. As to
how much defense is considered necessary to prevent internal meedling is a matter
for the public to assess and should not be decided by politicians alone.
[Nosaka] Then, Mr Kanemaru, should we go about our affairs on the assumption that
foreign countries are thieves as well as meddlers?
[Kanemaru] No, I am not saying that all of them are thieves or burglars. There
are cases like that in the world. For example, there are small conflicts in the
Middle East like the Iran/Iraq war and there have been small conflicts here and
there since the end of World War II. Therefore, I think that we should have suffi-
cient defens~ to discourage interference, and I question the state o� being totally
defenseless.
- [Nosaka] In trying to obtain the people's consensus on maintaining the minim~un
defense capability that Mr Kanemaru mentioned, the threat from the north is some-
times represented as the "invasion of four divisions," but as soon as the objective
of the intelligence manipulation i~ attained, the threat is r_hanged to "infiltra-
tion of only 800 men." When the threat of danger is spread around, it cannot be
helped if the true intention is suspected as that of the scheme of the Ground SDF
to build an armored division. In that manner, they have scared us and proceeded
step by step. Since Mr Kanemaru has also served as the director general of the
Japan Defense Agency [JDA], I would like to ask whether erroneous intelligence
analysis is the reason why at certain times, the situation was said to be dangerous,
but now, not dangerous.
[Kanemaru] No, intelligence is gathered through various means, and in Japan, the
Foreign Ministry or the Defense Agency is collecting, but Japan is extremely weak
on intelligence and is in the dark.
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However, posing a real problem is the stationing of 3,000 aircraft in the Far East.
On the fouY northern islands, there are rows of barracks and even missiles and
FTawk's. There are airfields, too. T~ose are facts. Also, at Nakhodka and
Vladivostok, there are altogether over 700 ships, including naval ships formerly
referred to as battleships, as well as submarines. In view of ~his situation,
should we be without any defense? However, there is a li~it to defense capability
and in reality, present-day Japan is not in a position to defend against 3,000
.fighter aircraft. Getting down to brass tacks, the SDF in Hokkaido can only await
reinforcements while retreating if the enemy lands. This is defeatism. Passive
defense harbors the danger that bullets might actually f1y over the heads of the
people. The SDF has a considerable number of tanks. When I was the director
general of JDA, I said that, "When tanks have to be used, Japan is being defeated."
I stated, "We do not need these tanks. Rather, to create security for the Japanese
people, naval and air strengths are needed. Tanks are like children's toys and
when they :~ave to operate, Japan will be covered with blood. Shouldn't such
thinking be changed?" To think that, "tanks are indispensable," is one of the
traditions from the past.
[Nosaka] Believers in tanks include those who suffered greatly in the Nomonhan
incident and those who are still enamored with the German and Soviet tank divisions.
It seems that there are many in the army clinging to a form of faith in "huge war-
ships and big guns."
[KanemaruJ That is right. I admit that. The former army believed that if it had
tanks, they could be carried aboard warships and transports to other countries for
use there. The leaders of the past thought along that line. However, that is
absolutely prohibited under the present Japanese Constitution. As long as Japan
follows the policy of passive defense, we should think seriously only of our
country. There are many in the JSP who claim that, "if our defense is so weak,
we might as well not have it." I keep repeating that, "well, why do you lock your
house? You do so, don't you, to keep out the thieves and burglars? Isn't it all
right to have that much defense?" However, they do not seem to understand.
[Nosaka] But the navy and air force are not inorganic substances like the lock.
A lock is always only a lock, but naval and air strengths continue to grow. If
the counterpart's strength increases tremendously, ours also increases. For a
very narrow archipelago like Japan, there is no means of defense except to strike
at the enemy. The Japan Sea is at the most only 600 to 800 km wide. If the Soviet
Backfire aircraft invade this area, it would be too late if our aircraft took off
after the Soviet aircraft had started the attack. In that case, the only alterna-
tive is to hit the enemy. On the premise that the enemy base must be crushed, can
the Japanese islands carry out a war? I do not Chink Japan can.
[Kanemaru] Just as you say, I do not think we can.
Kanemaru: Defense Without Nuclear Power Is Meaningless
[Nosaka] Although we cannot, if we must place a limit on our defense, our thinking
would be eventually based on the assumption of an invasion of Hokkaido. From the
experience of 36 years ago, I cannot place any trust on the entity called the
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Japanese military. However, if we are going to be subject to outrageous actions,
as an ordinary human being, I feel that I want to resist with violence or to resist
in some other manner. Putting that feeling aside, I do not believe in the posses-
sion of the military as a forceful means to preserve our rights. The military Can
do nothing to protect the people's lives and property, and from the standpoint of
geographical environment and natural resources, I do not think the military can
defend Japan.
[Kanemaru] We11, I fully understand what you are saying. I also feel that even
if we want to entrust our lives and the security of Japan to the SDF, as a realistic
matter, the SDF does not have enough power to protect us. However, I think that
the United States itself will naturally fear Japan's becoming a powerful military
country. I think that the United States wanted JaFan to sign the Nuclear Nonprolif-
eration Treaty because of the concern that if the Japanese possessed nuclear power,
there is no telling what they might do. After that terrible destruction of
= Hiroshima in wt�ich so many of our compatriots died because of the nuclear bomb
or survived but with various physical handicaps, we pledged in our hearts that cse
would not possess nuclear weapons. Although we pledged, we realize in view of
the present world sir.uation that defense without nuclear power is nonsense.
Present-day Japan has no other means than to have its security guaranteed by the
U.S. nuclear umbrella. Ideally speaking, the best course is for each country to
discard, not reduce, military armament and for the world to become one nation.
However, looking at the present world situation, I think it is certain ~hat
countries will not totally abolish armament to become a"unified world."
[Nosaka] That might be so, but for Japan, an insular country which might disappear
after three blasts of hydrogen bombs, it is useless to be armed with or to possess
= nuclear weapons. Furthermore, though we might be under the U.S. nuclear umbrella,
we cannot expect the United States to use nuclear weapons against the USSR in the
evPnt the Soviets invade and the Japanese put up a fight. If you think i.n that
vein, as Mr Kanemaru says, Japan must possess nuclear weapons--but, the situation
- today does not permit the possession of nuclear weapons. If that is so, then
- conversely speaking, the possession of military armament itself should be forbidden.
Then, instead of having military armament, Japan should give more serious thought
to, while considering relations with the United States, lending a hand to the
Soviets to deal with the failures of their present wartime economic system. For
example, the development af Siberia will do. In that event, Japan should proceed
with some awarenecs that it might get bogged in the mud. Southeast Asia should
also be considered not simply from the standpoint of making investments to gain
capital profits but giving aid, in some form, which will make Southeast Asia come
to our rescue when Japan is in trouble. We should assist not only with hardware
but software. The word, "assistance" is not quite right. Perhaps I should say
to continue to live together.
[Kanemaru] You mean co-existence and co-prosperity.
[Nosaka] I think that that is far more meaningful than arming Y~kkaido with model
74 or model 88 tanks or acquiring 14 mine-laying aircraft.
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I~OR OFFI('lAl. lltil~. ()NI.Y
Nasaka: Why Should a Model Arms Reduction Country Aspire To Become a Militaristic
Nation?
[Kanemaru] When the farmers and youths of Czechoslovakia resisted, Soviet tanke
surrounded Prague. At the time, I was at the embassy in Prague and watched the
developments. The people who wanted freedom constituted 90 percent of the populace
and Communist P4.rty members, 10 percent. That 10 percent suppressed the Czechs
with Soviet powEr. Seeing what was happening, I was struck with fear. Though 90
p~rcent of the people oppose co~unism, the 10 percent Communist Party members
took over Czechoslovakia with Soviet force. I believe that we should have enough
defense capability to prevent such occurrences. I am talking of limited defense
with sufficient power to prevent poaching. That is what I mean when I say that
defense is the starting point of politics.
[Nosaka] The problem is inow to protect our lives and property and our culture
and traditions. To do that, not only military power but various otk~er means must
be employed.
[KanemaruJ I agree. In fact, I think that military power is of lesser importance.
I realize that. Even at the risk of their lives, diplomats and politicians should
visit the USSR, PRC, ROK and Middle East and devise means to promote friendship.
In diplomacy, as you just mentioned, if Japan has extra funds and our counterparts
are as~ing for help, we should assist economically so we can co-exist and co-prosper.
I think that it is most important in our advancement to make all-out efforts to
~ steer away from war. It is not necessary to think about war. However, I still
believe that we should be strong enough to discourage internal meddling.
[Nosaka] If war should ever start, it would not be because of ineddling but
strictly the result of a rupture of the military balance between the United States
and the USSR. The big question is what would happen if the USSR decides that, to
cover up its failures in its wartime economic system, it would start a war, and
though realizing that it will suffer a certain amount of damage, it is still con-
fident that it can make a first strike that will wipe out U.S. counterattack
capability. There is talk of what woLld be Japan's role, in that event, but I
think that if things get that bad, there is nothing for Japan to do. At any rate,
because Japan did not foolishly revive military power, it was able to accomplish,
should I say, the world's foremost economic reconstruction. Can't Japan be con-
sidered a model country? At the annual arnis reduction week of the United Nations,
Japan is mentioned as a model country. Other countries, including the FRG, all
think that they should follow Japan's example. It does more harm than good for a
model country to aspire to become, once again, the militaristic nation of the past.
[Kanemaru] You are right. There is no need to build up a force similar to the
old Japanese military. Japan must not become a cat's-paw and disturb world peace.
Just as you say, Japan should never become involved in a war. IC is important for
Japan to avoid war at all cost and to think of various means to work together with
the USSR, PRC or Middle East toward co-existence and co-prosperity. The only
problem is that the Soviets are strongly agitating the sentiments of the Japanese
people over the question of the four northern islands.
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1~()It ()I~FI('IA1. I1tiN: ()NI,Y
Kanemaru: The Constitution That the American VIP's Are Saying To Change
[NosakaJ At any rate, the Japanese evacuated the four northern islands, though
the graves might be remaining. If there is a man on the street who thinks of Che
northern island problem as a directly personal one, I would like to meet him. IC
is probably wrong for the Soviets to occupy them; not only the four, but all of
the Kurile Islands. However, when considering the international situation, one
should be aware that Japan has presented the United States a considera~le number
of military bases in the country under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. For the
Soviets, Japan is a country to be feared. Thinking of the Soviet standpoint and
its fears, I feel things should be left alone, though this might be contrary to
the popular view. Instead of clamoring about the return of the four northern
islands, I think it is more important to think about maintaining amicable relations
with the Soviets from a bigger standpoint and using the northern island situation
to our advantage in some way.
[Kanemaru] Also, there is another reason why the Japanese do not trust the Soviets.
During World War II, as Japan was being driven toward defea.t, the Soviets discarded
the Japan-Soviet nonaggression pact like an old hat and entered the war...That is
to say, Japan's aggressive actions had boomeranged. Some might have thought that
that was the proper action for the Soviets. However, in the populace, there were
others who lost their faith in the nonaggression pact.
[Nosaka] Why did the Kwangtung Army run away despite the judgment that the treaty
might have been abrogated at any time?
[Kanemaru] I am not certain why.
[Nosaka] The military is of no help at all. The Kwangtung Army did transfer two
divisions to Okinawa but before that, dispatched the youths of the "Mammo" group
[land cultivation group of Manchuria and Mongolia] of Uchihara.
[Kanemaru] The land cultivation group.
[Nosaka] All of those who went worked hard, didn't they? Those in the development
group were regarded as a type of militia troops and were forced to carry guns.
They cultivated the farms while undertaking defense duties. These people were all
forsaken. Perhaps the Soviets were wrong but when two countries were confronting
each other and it was known that the nonaggression pact might be scrapped at any
time, I feel that the troops should've remained and let the people escape~ They
could've complained after they had fought. Instead, they ran away hastily. Didn't
they escape, abandoning children on plains where Manchurian wolves were howling?
What happened then is now being shown on TV isn't it? For them, the war has not
yet ended. Though not exactly the same, the SDF is operating in a similar manner,
and when I see that and the means of expansion which follow the traditions of the
old military forces, I feel that I cannot trust them at all. They should take
the blame for the past.
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[Kanemaru] You said that you cannot trust such Japanese military forces and I agree.
When I was serving as the director general of JDA, I replied to Diet interpella-
tions on the SDF. I felt that the troops believed in the use of force and did not
recognize any human rights, and furthermore, when emergencies arise, the troops
sneak away and their whereabou~s become unknown. How will the country be defended?
Recently, I went to the United States and met with officials in responsbile posi-

~ tions. They told me to change our constitution. I said, "Please don't joke. This
- constitution is one that the Americans drafted for us. Since the constitution
you made is faulty, it cannot be changed even if we want to. Under the present
circumstances, it cannot be altered. Since the Germans are accustomed to losing
wars, they included at the end of their constitution, 'when Germany becomes inde-
pendent, this constitution will be nullified and a new one will be drafted.'
Japan's constitution does not contain that phrase so it cannot be changed. This
is impossible, even in the present political envir~nment." They replied, "Well,
you're right."
[Nosaka] Speaking of the constitutio~al issue, since the constitution was drawn
up by human beings, I think it is all right to change it in any way we want. The
constitution and the Japanese people have not been very compatible, so to interpret
it, at certain periods, resourcefully and loosely in one's favor might be the
wisdom born of the people. There is nothing which says that association with
Western-style laws is the best for society. I would like to ask you again but
do you think that Article 9 serves as a restraint on the possession of military
forces?
[Kanemaru] Well, that article was interpreted in various ways and the result is
the present SDF.
[Nosaka] Basically, if a law can be interpreted in any way one wants, it is not
a law.
Nosaka: "Ad Balloon of Lowly Officials" Is Ambiguous
[Kanemaru] Regardless of the interpretation--some in the JSP are talking of non-
armament while others talk of nullifying the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty--but the
reality is, and some in the JSP recognize it, the SDF does exist. These JSP
members are concerned about the SDF going berserk and are considering means to
prevent it. They are facing reality and trying to cope with it. No matter how
Article 9 is interpreted, the reality is that there is an SDF so it is necessary
to recognize this fact in the discussions of our thoughts. The situation would
be different if there were no SDF, but it does exist and represents one interpreta-
tion. There are various criticisms about it. However, it really exists and I
think the Feople should put their heads together to find the best means of handling
the situation.
[Nosaka] It is strange that the successive prime ministers never said a word about
- constitutional revision. Mr Kakuei Tanaka did not utter a word about it. Those
who talk about it are always lowly officials. These lowly officials hoist the ad
[trial] balloon while the high-ranking officials only n~umble in a very vague and
indistinct tone (Mr Kanemaru broke out in laughter)...Perhaps, this is the worst
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way of acting. Unless they are more clearcut, they will look bad. On examining
the makeup of the ranks in the present SDF, one finds that there are about 1.8
officers and noncommissioned officers for each enlisted man. Whoever heard of
such a military unit? So, the organizational structure was built on the premise
that someday, the conscription system would be put into effect. I think that
they should tell the people or us more, including such matters as the preceding
item. As Mr Kanemaru stated, without nuclear weapons, there is no true deterrent
or military power. But we, who have learned from the experiences of Hiroshima
- and Nagasaki, think that we should not possess them and rather than dirtying our
_ hands, we want the United States to do the ~ob. The Americans must think that
- what we are saying is very egoistic.
[Kanemaru] The Americans are probably thinking so.
[Nosaka] Since we *,~ere bombed and saw the pitiful destruction, we ourselves
cannot do it but truthfully, we cannot be protected without nuclear weapons. So
we ask you to do it. This i~ the same as saying I hate to ki7.1 anyone so I will
, not carry a dagger but in a fight, i~ is only fitting to have one so will you
please carry it?
[Kanemaru] Since we signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, we cannot possess
them so what should we do? The Americans have said they will substitute for us...
Kanemaru: If You Do Not Trust the Treaty, What Can You Trust?
[Nosaka] If possession is permitted, do you think Japan should, from the defense
standpoint?
[Kanemaru] Well, I do not think that we should. I think that the people feel very
strongly about this and we should not go against the people's feeling.
J
[Nosaka] Then, if we really want to defend ourselves, we need nuclear weapons.
We must possess them. However, if the people's sentiment is considered, it is
better not to have them. If that is so, isn't it better not to defend or to go
without that capability?
[Kanemaru] That is not so, if the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is going to protect
us.
[Nosaka] Do you think the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty would defend us?
[Kanemaru] I think that it will protect us. From my past experiences, I can say
that in an emergency, the United States wi11 undertake Japan's defense. If the
treaty cannot be trusted, what can you trust?
[Nosaka] For the United States, it is a one-sided treaty with Japan but the latter
. provides the military bases. For Japan, dispatch ~f troops to foreign countries is
forbidden by the constitution, so even if the United States is attacked, Japan
cannot go to its aid. If Japan is attacked, the United States would assist, except
for shipping on the high seas. In actuality, as far as che United States is concerned,
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the Japanese islands might only be a protectorate under its nuclear umbrella, but
for the Soviets, Japan constitutes a form of arc-shaped island defense against the
"soft" Maritime Province. The fact is there are many military bases in Japan. No
matter what anyone says, I think that from a realistic viewpoint, there is no
question that the United States has brought nuclear weapons�into Japan. If not,
they must transport them, whenever needed, from Guam where they are stored. That
is unreasonable. It is only natural that the Soviets are afraid.
If that is true, Japan is significant in serving as the American umbrella, and as
long as the umbrella is needed, I think that the United States will protect it.
When the umbrella. is no Zonger needed--and I think this is true of other countries--
the United States would not defend Japan.
[Kanemaru] No, I don't think so. When you think of the Free Camp, do you think
the United States can go it alone in the future if Japan collapses? What you ~ust
' said is an assumption, too, and you cannot say for certain that the United States
will absolutely refuse to defend Japan. The treaty was mutually agreed upon and
though there are differing views, I think that America realizes it cannot exist
without Japan and Japan is aware there would be no Japan urithout the United States.
I think that that is the reason why the government considers the Japan-U.S. Security
Treaty its backbone. I think th~~ you would not be wrong in placing your trust in
it. ~
[Nosaka] If we of my generation are to truly rid ourselves of the aftereffects
of defeat in war, we should not get thwarted by Japan's role in U.S. world strategy.
It is certain that the United States has its own policy. It is definite that the
United States will rely on the military-industrial complex so we should not be
dragged in--or we could pretend to be dragged in but we should think of how we
could better get along with the USSR and the PRC, too.
COPYRIGHT: Asahi Shimbunsha 1981
9134
CSO: 4105/175
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; ONL :
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
COMPANY FOR PRODUCING URANIUM ENRICHING EQUIFMENT SEEN
Tokyo JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL in English Vol 19, No 959, 16 Jun 81 pp 1,5
[ Text ] Mitsubishi Heavy Indus- ~ade & Industry, recom- manufacturing firm.
tries, Ltd., Hitachi, Ltd. and mended in its recently F'rior to construction of a
Toshiba Corp. heve released report that the commercial uranium enrich-
basically agreed t~ set up a r,ation start operating a ment plant, MITI plans to build
company to manufacturs domestically-developed a prototype enrichment plant
uranium enrichment plant uranium enrichment plant with a yearly capacity of 200-
equipment, including centri- by � around 1990 and 250 tons SWU and to choose a
fuges, by the spring of 1982. domestically manufacture group of companies to manage
This was revealed last about 30 per cent of its total the plant, centering on electric
week by the Ministry ot ~riched uranium require- power utilities, by this fall.
International Trade & ments by 2000. The new company due to be
Industry. As to national research on set by the three heavy elec-
MITI said the new firm an uranium enrichment . trical machinery builders is ex-
~ will play the leadership roie plant, the Power Reactor & pected to supply centrifuges
in the nation's uranium Nuclear Fuel Development and other equipment to the
enrichm~t projects, noting Corp., one of MITI's group.
that the nation was facing organizations, is research- MITI also plans to extend
, the urgent need to establish ing development of a centri- financial aid to the overall
a nuclear fuel cycle, ranging fuge process uranium uranium enrichment projes~t
from uranium enrichment to enrictament plant ~sing a 50- within the framework of the
reprocessing, on its own. ton SWU (separative work fund for domestic technology
In other words, Japan unit) yearly capacity pilot promotion.
urgently needs to plant instaUed at the Ningyo Electric power utilities es-
domesticaliy manufacture Valley, Okayama Prefec- timate the nation's enriched
- enriched uranium whose twe. uranium demand at 8,000 tons
supplies now depend en- In order to propel SWU in t990, 10,0001ons SWU in
tirely upon the U.S., ~ance domestic manufacture of 1995 and 12,000 tons SWU in
and some other advanced enriched uranium, MITI has 2ppp, They fear that the nation
nations. tu~ged ihe three major heavy W~~~ be short of enriched
The General Energy electrical machinery uranium after 1990 unless it
- Council, advisory organ to makers to set up an uranium manufactures such uranium on
the Minister of Internatiolal enrichment plant equipment its own.
COP~.'RTGHT: 1981, The Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc.
CSO: 4120
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t~Uk Ul~h'.t(,IAL USL ONLY
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
FIRMS BECOME SELLERS OF TECHNOLOGIES
Tokyo JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL in English Vol 19, No 959, 16 Jun 81 pp 1,19
. [Text] Sales of technology by Japa- Total payments for ai�e L:il firms which registered
nese companies now outrank technology purchases by these def'icits in technology account,
purchases, a Nihon Keizai firms registered a 40 per cent but 65 firms of them expect to
Shimbun survey revealed last increase over 1975 to ~ 1(14.2 register a surplus in five years
week. The balance has changed billion in 1980, but their and 127 firms say they will turn
during the five years since the payments to foreign rnuntries intc~ the black in 10 years.
, First oil shock of 1973-74. were ~79.1 b:llion, up only 35 It is notable that the number
The survey, conducted per cent over 1975. of firms which registered a sur-
among 638 firms listed in All ttiis meant, the survey plus in the balance of technolo-
Tokyo, Osaka and Nagaya also said, was that the overall gy transactions with foreign
stock exchanges, shoaed in- balance of technology selling countries doubled in the five
come from technology sales, and buying has improved by years - from 70 in 1975 to 131 in
including royalty and other ~40.2 billion in five years of t980. To~rranking is Nippon
technical service fees, totaled which ~ 33.5 billion was Steel Corp. and Vice President
'-F127.9 biltion in fiscal 1980 generated from foreign Y~~taka Takeda (president-
chereafter all the years are countries. Among major in; designate) of NSC says, "Ja-
fiscal years), up 120 per cent dustries, steel earned ~21 pan's steel-making technology
over fiscal 1975. The balance of billion and paid ~9.2 billion, is at the top level of the worid
technology income and pay- recording a surplus of more and this position will not change
ments registered a surplus of than ~ 10 billion while chemical for the next five years."
~23.7 billion in 1980, compared and shipbuilding also hit Observers said booming
with a deficit of ~16.5 billion in massive surpluses due to huge technology sale is a result of
1975. plantexpoctswhichaccompany ,lapanese enterprises'
' The survey sai~f income of technology sales. aggressive investment in
ToplONetEarnersirom Meanwhile, electricaf research and development.
()verse~s Technology machinery and appliances have Eleclronics, autos and steels
rec~rded a deficit of ~7.4
Transaciions in FYt9l~o are leading sectors which
billion becatse of massive support Japanese international
- Renk Company Net Income ~yments for rayalty fees in cam etiliveness and Ja an's
P
m~~~~�~' semiconduckors and color T`?s
1 Nippon5leel ..............t0,eoo . status as "technology leader"
7 Hitachi Shipbuildin{t ?n the past years. But basic appears to have establistied.
6 Engineering 9,~~ te~hnologies introduced from ~he Prime Minister's Office
3 Mitsui Petrochemical 3~ abroad have eontributed said, however, that while bi
~ndustria g
d AsahiChemicatlndusfry 2,+0o greatly to production of high- firms' technology trade hit a
5 Toyama Chemical 4,zvz q~ality goods, thereby im-
6 SumltomoMeral industries T,068 SIICp~tfS, Japan 7S a whole is
7 MitsulTOatsuChemicals 1.~io provi~ng domestic sales and still in heavy deficit, paying 1.8
8 NIIQefaErqineerinp.......... l.~e exports. Also income in the times more than it earns.
- v T9rey I~dusfries � 1.~3~ field of semiconductors has ~
,o nn~fsublshi Heavy Officials ~nt out that 1)
- ;,,d,,,,r,K i,aoo risen 2.8-fold in fiv~ years. ~a anese firms still im rt
(FV1D7VfigurelorNippon5feel) For iudividual eompanies, p ~
firms from technolo sales, , tect~nology from the West and
gY th~,re were 183 firms in 1980, export it to developing coun-
especially to toreign countries, compared with 112 in 1~75, tries like China; 2) import
has risen and accounts for 75 which registcred a surplus in technolugies in such high
- per cent 96.2 billion) of the ~verail technology account. technalogy areas as genetic
total. According to the survey, there engineering and nudear power.
COPYRIGHT: I981, The Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Ir.c.
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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
EXTENT OF GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY IN 'NATIONAL PROJECTS'
Tokyo JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL in English Vol 19, No 959, 16 Jun 81 p 4
[Text] V1lhile the Japanese said, "The Mitsui group of economic cooperalion.
Government has recently claims that the IJPC (Iran- -Prospects are very
upgraded petr~ ~::emical Japan Petrochemical Co.), is high for lhe successful com-
projects in Iran and Saudi a`national project,' so the pletion of the project.
Arabia into so-called Government should render -The Overseas Economic
"nalional projects," the full-fledged support to it. Cooperation Fund has
extent of governmental But the IJPC is a Mitsui already given a subsidy of
responsibility is very olr work, nothing more than more than ~ 10 billion to the
scure and is apparently that. There exists no such project.
inviting sharp criticism `national project,' in a strict Usually the private group
from embarrassed officials. sense." ~ led by the said key company
It is exactly because of As officials claim, it is and the OECF will form a
this ambiguous nature of clear that there is no such joint investment firm in
"national projects" that official word as "national Japan which will, in turn,
government officials are not project" within the bureau- establish a joint venture
so enthusiastic about the cracy. But large-scale with the foreign government
Iran-Japan petrochemical projects the Government concerned to carry out the
project, and the Finance subsidizes could be, if project.
Ministry and the Ministry of anything, referred to as If this is the case, the key
International Trade & In- "national projects" and no firms in the recently decided
dustry have recently clash- officials are voicing any Saudi petrochemical project
ed over to what extent objection to that definition. are the Mitsubishi group
the Government should Thus, it is a commonly held companies led by Mitsubishi
subsidize the Saudi petro- view that "national Corp. and Mitsubishi Chemi-
chemical project. projects" are those large- cal Industries Ltd. And the
"There is no such formal scale ones into which the investment firm is partic-
word or concept as 'national Government pours huge sub- ipated by 59 companies
project' in our official sidies, from various industries
vocabulary. The govern- Regarding those large- including petrcehemical, oil
mental declaration of scale projects, Ministries of and electric power gen-
'national project' gives the F'inance, International eration.
impression that the Govern- Trade & Industry and The Saudi project is sig-
ment alone is responsible for Foreign Affairs and the nificant from the viewpoint
ttie projects whereas the Economic Planning Agency of economic cooperation
main workload is done by have reached the following because it is a joint venture
the private sector. This is "tacit" agreement: with Saudi Arabia, which
very embarrassing to us," -There must be a key provides 30 per cent of
said Naohiro Amaya, vice company in the project and Japan's oil needs. And the
international trade & indus- its affiliated industries be governmental capital outlay
tr}~ minister for international staunch supporters of the totals about ~ 21.6 billion -
affairs. project. sufficient enough to be
A high-ranking official of -The project must be sig- called large-scale project, or
the Finance Ministry also nificant from the standpoint "national project."
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CL/tt UI'1�ll.l[\I~ UJC. VLVLI
_ But it is not clear to what extraordinary "national
extent the Government .will project" because the project
- be re~ponsible for the already was underway and
project. The "tacit" agree- the governmental subsidies
ment only touches upon the came later. Accordingly,
amount of capital outlay and governmental responsibility
- has never stipulated the for the project is very
extent of governmental vague, leading to con-
. responsibilily for the tradictory statements of gov-
- project. ernment officials like: "It
On the other hand, the is up to the Mitsui group
IJPC has started out as a what to do with the project"
joint venture between the or "The project must be the ~
Mitsui group led by Mitsui sake of friendly relations be-
& Co. and the Iraniau tween Japan and the Middle
Government. From the East."
Japanese point of view, it is The Saudi petrochemical
` slrictly a private venture, project is another example
but work was s~pended in of ill-defined governmental
the wake of the iranian responsibility. The Mltsu-
revolution, giving rise to bishi group almast gave up
speculation that the project the project because it is too
might end up in a complete costly for the private group,
shambles. Then, urged by but the Government inter-
the Mitsui group, the Gov- vened and made it into a
ernment ministries concern- "national project" by of-
ed deliberated on the matter fering subsidies up to 50 per
- and decided to up~ade the cent 'of the total capital
IJPC into a "national needed.
project" at a cabinet However, at the final
meeting in October, 1979 by state, the Finance Ministry
providing a capitaloutlay of opposed the 50 per cent
~ 20 billion. That is, a outlay and offered only 45
"private project was per cent. Thus, the Mitsu-
upgraded into a"national bishi group was forced to
project" in this case. ~ find a group which could
A"national project give the 5 per cent capital to
usually starts at the stage the project. An official of the
where the private com- Mitsubishi group is furious,
panies show their blueprint saying, "The Government
to the Finance Ministry and has forced us to continue the
- MITI and hammer out con- project and at the final stage
, crete details on the project backed down on its pledge,
~ with them. According to this being really irresponsible,
usual pattern, the IJPC is an indeed."
COPYRIGHT: 1981, The Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc.
CSO: 4120
32
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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
COMPETITION HEAVY BETWEEN NATION, U.S. IN SEP'IICONDUCTOR MACHINERY INDUSTRY
Tokyo JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL in English Vol 19, No 959, 16 Jun 81 p 9
[ Text ]
Wikh the coming of the sa Major Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment Makers
called "VLSI ( very large-scale Handiing Specialized VLSI Production Machines
integrated circuit) age," JBpe- producers Deelers Products
nese and American SQmICOrt- a~elva Anelva Reacttve ion dry etching equipment
ductor-manufacturin uj Applied Materials Applied Materials Plasme etch(ng equipmenf
g ~ P' Inc. fAIAT) Japan ~
ment makers are competing Perkfn�Etmer Kanematsu Semi� Exposure equipment, etching equipment
with each other to obtain larger conductor (pla~ned)
shares in thC Japanese I11$T- GCA Sumitomo Corp. E`P
anne~equipmenf, etching equipment
ket with their newly-developed Opfimetrix C. Itoh 8 Co. Direcf wafer stepper pro{ection systems
II70d@lS. ~anon Canon Mask aliyners
Nippon Kogaku Nippon Kogaku Exposure equipment
Specialized VLSI-making Note: Among the seven producers, AMT, Perkin-Elmer, GCA and Optimetrix
- equipment have been d@- are U.S. companies.
veloped in succession as semi- - - - - - -
conductor makers demand ma- commercial VLSI etching ma- agents - 5umitomo Corp. and
chines which can meet stricter chine, an Anelva executive Kanematsu Semiconductor
requirements in precision. said. Anelva is a joint venture Corp., respectively.
As the Japanese semiconduc- ~tween Nippon Electric Co. In the field of exposure sys-
1 NEC) and Varian Associates tems for printing circuit pat-
tor industry is expected to in- of the U.S. terns on silicon wafers, GCA
rest more lhan ~ 200 billion for
plant and equipment in the cur- Applied Materials Inc. has been far outstripping other
rent fiscal 1981, marketing (AMT) of Santa Clara, Calif. producers with its Stepper DSW
rivalry among tnese producers also has started receiving model. Recently, however, new
will inlensity further. orders for ils plasma etching entries are conspicuous. Op-
Japan's semiconductor- equipment (AME8100) through timetrix Corp. of Mountain
manufacturing equipment its Tokyo subsidiary, Applied View, Calif. has started mar-
market, now standing at an Materials Japan K.K. AMT re- keting fully-automated direct
cslim:~ted Y 140 billion, is ex- portedly spenl some ~ 1 billion Wafer stepper projection sys-
~x:cted to ~�ow at an average For development of the tems through its agent C. Itoh
- ycarly rate of 20-30 per cent in machine. & Co.
Ihr cc?min~ several vears. GCA Corp. of Bedford, Mass. Canon, Ine., a produeer of
Anelva Corp. seems running and Perkin-E:Imer Corp, of mask aligners, and Nippon
ah~~ad other makers. The Norwalk, Conn., which are the Kogaku K.K., a producer of ex-
1~ uchu ~Tokyo)-based company Big 3 of American semiconduc- posure equipment, recently
earlier succeeded in dc~veloping tor-making equipment manu- bared plans to build specialized
~i reaclive-ion dry etching facturers along with AMT, also VLSI-manufacturing equip-
equipmenl c ILD-40U'l~ which are planning to market their ment plants to make a full-
c:in etch circuit patterns in a 3� VLSI etching equipment short- fledged entry into the promis-
micr~~n width on a silicon ly througli tl~eir Japanese ~ng market.
wafcr. It is the world's first
COPYRIGHT: 1981, The Nihon Ke~zai Shimbun, Inc.
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T'OR OI~rICIAI, t?tit~. ~NLY
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
~1 TRILLION Sh'f4ICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY FORECAST FOR FY 1981
Tokyo JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL in English Vol 19, No 959, 16 Jun 81 p 9
[Text]
Japan's semiconductor in- Top maker Nippon Elec-
dustry will become a"~ i- tric Co. (NEC) will raise
trillion-a-year industry" in production 21.6 per cent to
the current fiscal 1981, rival- ~ 265 billion.
ing color TV sets and video Under the situation,
_ tape recorders. Japan's share in the world's
- A Nihon Keizai Shimbun Setniconductor market will
survey recently revealed further rise in fiscal 1981
that production of semicon- ~
ductors, including in- from ~scal 1980 s 26.2 per
te rated circuits (ICs), by cent in terms of production
g value.
the nation's 11 major manu- Moreover, the 11 Japanese
facturers will rise 27.1 per semiconductor manufac-
cent from the preceding turers intend to make huge
year to a value of ~ 1,193.6 plant and equipment invest- ~
billion in fiscal 1981. ments in fiscal 1981,
Among the 11 companies, amounting to ~ 195 billion in
Oki Electric Industry Co, is total, up 15 per cent, on a
the most aggressive toward construction basis. They are
the fiscal 1981 production. Il trying to cope with the com-
plans to start operation of its ~ng of the VLSI age by in-
64-kilobit dynamic random stalling new machines, build-
access memory ( RAM ) . ing new plants, or expanding
plant at Kiyotake, Miyazaki exislin~ facilities.
in August. The plant is ex- NEC ~�ans to invest some
pected to turn out 300,000 ~ 38 billion, up 18.8 per cent
_ chips monthly from the out- from fiscal 1980's '~32
set. On the strength of this billion. It is followed by
bold plan, Oki's semicon- Hitachi, Ltd. 28 billion, ,
ductor produclion is es- up 21.7 per cenll and Fujitsu
timaled to rise 62 per cent Limited (~F 27 billion, the
from fiscal 1980 to ~ 35 same as in the prece~]ing
billion. year).
Matsushita Electronics Noteworthy is that the
('~rp. follows Oki in terms of production share of the Big 3
the increase rate in produc- (NEC, Hitachi and Toshiba
lion. 1fie affiliatc of Matsu- Corp.) has been declining
shita Electric Industrial Co. year by year, though
plans to raise semiconductor gradually. The share of the
oulput 5U per cent to '~120 Big 3 stood at 59.1 per cent
h~~~~~~~� in fiscal 1979 but slipped to
56.8 per cent in fiscal 1980
34
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and is expected lo further BusinessScaleoFll LeadingJapanese
come down to 54.5 per cent SemiconductorManufacturers .
in fiscal 1981. This is be- c~~buiio~swve~~
cause SUCh medium- and Capitalspending Productionvalue
low-ranked firms as Matsu-
shita, Mitsubishi and ~~CI FY~~~ FY1980 FY1981 FY1980
NEC (M) 3B (+18.8) ' 31 18.5) 265 (+21.6) 418 (+~6.3)
have been drastically boost- H~fa~n~cnn~ sec+si.n Y3 53.3) 205 (t24�2) 165 (t~6.9)
ing semiconductor PtOCIUC- Toshiba (Ml .15 (+15.4) ia c+ ~o.o~ ieo c+~o.o~ iso c+so.o~
tlOll. Fulitsu (Ml 27 ( 0.0) 27 (t 68.8) 14f1 (+33.3) 90 (+40.0)
Matsushita
However, it should not be Electronics (D) 2Y ( o.o~ sz c+izo.o~ izo c+so.o~ eo c+eo.o>
overlooked that the decline Sharp (M) 10 d.2I 9�6 v.i~ es.e i+so.o~ 71�] (+26.61
Mitsubishi (M) 1J (+30.0) 10 25.0) BO (-F31.1I 61 1+38.6)
lfl the production share 111 TokyoSanyo(N1........ 12(tdl�2] B.S(t 97.7) 53 (+49.9) 41 (+32.3)
- t~le domestic market dOCS Oki (M) 14 f+ 4.5) 13.4 (+14J.6) 35 (+64.0) Y1.B (t31.3)
Fu(i Electric (M) 3( 0.0) 3(+ 66�71 45 (+19.0) Yl (+40.0)
~ not necessarily mirror the Sony (0) (+67.5) e c+ eo.o~ ~s c+ss.o~ so c+ii.>>
strength of the Big 3. NEC, Total 195 (+15.0) 169.5 52.2) i,193.6 (+27.1I 939.1 (+37.1)
Hitachi and Toshiba have Notes: (l) Percenta9e change trom the preceding term in parentheses. (4)
b2ef1 steadily building Up Production value includes In~house use. Production values for Sharp and
Oki sfand for total elecironic paris and components production and thus
produetion overseas in order fnclude non~semiconduclor items. Producfion value for Fuli Elecirir
to skirt trade frietions Wlth includes semiconductors imported trom its West German par!ner
the U.S. and Euro an l18- Siemens AG. Initials a(ter ihe company n8mes indicate ihe month
~ when they close books: M-March, D-December, N-NOVember and O-
t1011S. October. ~
Still, however, the fact
that lower-ranked firms
have been stepping up
capital spending on the
strength of their optimistic
outlook on the future trend
will stimulate the semicon-
ductor industry as a whole
and help intensify market-
ing competition.
COPYRIGHT: 1981, The Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc.
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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
FUJITSU UNVEILS 'WORLD'S BIGGEST' COMPUTER
Tokyo JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL in English Vol 19, No 959, 16 Jun 81 p 9
[Text] Fujitsu Limited has in- As the four companies have delay time and 1,300-gate-per-
troduced what the company stood on the same line, they chip and 400-gate-per-chip inte-
says is the world's fastest and will vie for larger shares in the grations, 4-kilobit random �
largest general�purpose com- world's computer market. access memory (RAM) chips
- puter systems - FACOM M-380 According to Fujitsu, the featuring a 5.5 nanosecond
and FACOM M-382. FACOM M-380, a uniprocessor access time and 16K RAM
With Fujitsu's announce- system, provides 2.1 to 2.5 chips featuring a 16 nanosecond
ment, very large-scale com- times the processing capability access time, and metal oxide
puters have become available of the FACOM M-200, Fujitsu's semiconductor (MOS) ISIs
from four leading computer Previous top-performance featuring a 64K-bit per-chip
builders - Nippon Electric Co. gYstem. The M-380 allows.l6 to . integration.
(NEC), International Business ~ megabytes af main storage The FACOM M-380 main-
Machines Corp., Fiitachi, Ltd. and up to 64 channels with a frame will be rented at a
and Fujitsu. maximum total throughput of minimum of ~37 million a
Since NEC's introduction of ~ megabytes per second. The month. The M-380 system
FACOM M-382, a dual-pro- (mainframe, iriput/output
its ACOS1000 system in last cessor system, offers 3.8 to 4.5 units, and program products)
September, these computer times the processing power of ~vill be rented for ~ 50 million a
makers have claimed that their ~e FACOM M-Z00, ~jitsu month. The rental fees will be
models were the "world's sa~d ~ ~ 75 million and ~ 90 million,
fastest" at the date ot an- ~e FACOM M-380 and M-382 respectively, for the M-382
- nouncement. adopt new large-scale inte- mainframe and system.
grated circuit technology in- Initial shipments are sched-
cluding, logic chi~ featuring a uled for the first half of tiscal
350 picosecond propagation 1982.
Comparison of Very Large-Scale Computers
Fu~ifsu NH~ehl NEC IBM
M-3l0 M~480 ACO51000 ~081
Processinp fpeed 1.5 (1) 1.1 (t) - 1(~l
(relative)
� Meximum fforape
cepecity ~mepabytes 34mcyabytes blmeqabytes 92meqabytes
Powerconsumpfion .....~~�9kflovolt~empere IOKVA - 31.BKVA
Meximum Infeyraflo~
of loqic clrculfs 1.3009ates 1,5009etes 1,20pqates 704qates
Elficiency of
Iopiccircuits.......... 0.]Snanoseco~d O.ISns O.Sns 1�Yns
Memory lnteqretlo~ 6r kltobits 16K�blts MK�bits 16K blts
Note: Flyures In~parentheses show Me numDer Of central processlnq unifa.
Relatlve Droce~sinp speed Is celculated by the Nlhon Keizal Shlmbun
Irom tlafe evetleble, Uncslculeble for ACOS 1000 beceute ot the dllfer�
ence in erchltacfure.
COPYRIGHT: 1981, The Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc.
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F'OR OFFICIAL TT~r oNLY
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOCY
~
OFFICE A. ._iTION SEEN AS 'MUST' IN POLL
Tokyo JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL in English Vol 19, No 959, 16 Jun 81 p 15
[Article by Tsunefumi Matsumoto and Kiyoshi Kusaka]
[Text]
Japanese industry is now productive facilities, they may was not unusual, therefore, for
going all out for automated not be able to survive the the company to spend as much
office. According to a recent severe managerial conditions as ~ 140 million in outsid~the-
survey by the Nihon Keizai expected for the 1980s. company typing jobs. Thanks
Shimbun, about one-third ot 741 Automation of administrative to the introduction of the new
corporatious polled replied that sectors has been greatly document preparation system,
they were either already in- delayed because of the highly engineers have been relieved of
. troducing office automation complex nature of the work in- their tedious doc~unent-mahing
equipmenl or were seriously volved. Recent big strides works and the company has
studying the possibility of doing made in development of in- come to save some ~ 60 million
so. Some 80 per cent of all the formation systems and electro- in farmed~ut typing jobs. The
companies polled admitted the mechanical technology how- system, moreover, is quite
importance of office auto- ever, have made office automa- accurate and swift in preparing
mation. tion relatively easy and within necessary dceuments.
Riding on the crest of this reasonable reach of almost any
sharply rising popularity of corporation. Nationwide systems
office automation equipment, Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Nippon Electric. Co. is now
manufacturers are now en- Ltd. has launc:hed a word pro- planning to establish, in a five-
grossed in developing new and cessing and retrieving system Yea~' program and at a total
appetizing products. Corpora- at its Kobe Works since the cost of some ~ 3 billion, its own
tions in other lines of business beginning of this year. communications circuits
also are aggressively muscling Designed to prepare specifi- tW'oughout the nation in order
into the office automation field, cations, estimates and similar ~ Promote office automation.
slrongly attracted by the other documents in four W~th ele~tronic computers,
various terminal machines,
pc~werful growth potential of Western languages (English, facsimiles and TV conference
lhis new industrial field. German, French and Spanish), s stems tied into this central
('omplex works the new system can revise and nationwide system, Nippon
'I'he ongoing boom in office edit sentences previously fed Electric's otfice automation
into it virtually in a moment,
automation equipment has will be on a nationwide scale.
come about by management's thereby greatly cutting duwn Mitsui & Co. also is planning
on document-mpking time.
rcalization that eCficiency toinstall500terminalmachines
impruvemenl in otfice work is When it participates in inter- at its offices throughout the
lagging seriously behind that in national tenders for plant con- nation by the ~?~d of fiscal 1982
manufacturing facilities. Entre- struction and other projects to fully utilize very large-scale
preneurs are now of the firm overseas, Kawasaki Heavy computers installed at the
belief that, unless they lndustries is required to Tokyoheadquarters.
modernize their office opera- prepare more than 1,000 Co�~panies like Kao Soap,
tions just as they did their specifications and estimates. It Ajinomoto, Omron Tateisi
37
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Electronics and Uki Electric Amano's cun~puter-controlled gence" and capacities of
Industries also have decided to timecard system. copying machine, their
install a great number of specialities.
Growth potential
personal computers at their Makers of office computers
offices, while Fujitsu Ltd., itself In a recent report erititled ~.e now rapidly opening up new
"Office automation moves and
a lcading manufacturerof office markets for their products by
automation equipment, has marketing strategies, the developing new software
Research Instilute of Telecom-
rc~cently installed l00 word pro- specially designed for such
cessors at its offices. munications and Economics markets, which include
predicts that sales of office privately-run medical clinics,
hew entrants automation equipment, cen- accounting offices and gas sta-
tering around office computers, tions.
The Nihon Keizai Shimbun facsimiles, word processors
survey shows thal 5.5 per cent and copying machines, will run Furniture makers
of all the companies polled that up to ~ 2,000-~ 3,000 billion by Manufacturers of furniture,
they are pushing ahead with 1990. on the other hand, are
office automalion through sec- Attracted by this strong aggressively trying to enter the
lions or commitlees newly growth potential, related office automation field by
created for the purpose. Addi- mar,ufacturers and trading developing and marketing a
tional 26.6 per cenl companies, companies are now engrossed variety of office furniture
_ on the other hand, are seriously in securing footholds in the eqwp~d with electronic func-
studying the possibilily of in- office automation equipment tions.
troducing office automation industry. Although the scene is Electric communications
equipment. now stron l dominated b
g Y Y companies and software firms
Among corporations listed on companies in related industrial are still mostly on the sidelines
the First Section of the Tokyo sectors, such as computers, as office automation does not
Stock Exchange, as much as office machines and com- yet involve widely-spread
77.2 per cenl is Found to have a munications equipment, those communications networks.
positive attitude toward in- from other fields, such as furni- Nippon Telegraph & Telephone
troducing office automation ture and optical equipment, I public Corp., however, offers
equipment. also are aggressively muscling I facsimile services and data
More than 50 per cent of all inlo the highly promising office communications services,
such listed companies, more- automation industry. while suftware companies offcr
over, is planning to completely Makers of electric machin- ~arious data handling services.
slandardize document forms ery, communications equip- Uffice automalion equipment
within their corporation ment and electronic computers now on lhe market includes
organizalions and introciuce are now engaged in develop- computers, terminal machines,
Japanese language word ment and production of all con- Word processors, private
processors within the next five ceivable office automation branch exchangers, facsimiles,
years. equipment. Backed by powerful magnetic disks and copying
In the meantime, entries into technological expertise and machines. Of these, by far the
the office automation field by development capacity, such most important in leading the
non-specialist companies con- companies will continue to play market are office computers,
tinue exceptionally brisk. In the leading roles in the newly facsimiles, word processors and
recent two month-pericxl alone, rising industry. In the hoping of copying machines.
several new entrants, including maximizing their corporate ~e combined sales of these
Amano, Asahi Glass and Prowess in the development of four important machines now
Brother Industries, have made new office automation prod- total some ~ 300 billion. The
their debut. ucts, many companies have market size grows to some
Development of new products already created special inter- ~ g~ billion if such allied ma-
also has been very brisk. departmental command cen- chines as printers, displays,
Among distinctive new prod- ters. intelligent terminals and
ucls put on the market in the Manufacturers of office ma- rintin machines are added.
latest two month period, there chines, on the other hand, have ~e of~fice automation ui
~ started manufacturing office ~ p'
a~ree Sanyo Ei ptric s portable computers, word pre~essors ment market will keep on
rsonal com uter, Ricoh s ~d facsimiles. The are also growing at an average annual
Japanese language word Y rate of more than 10 per cent
processor equipped with facsi- P~acing extra emphasis on and will run up to the ~ 2,000-
mile functions, Sharp's world's @J'eatly improving mtelli- ~ g~ppp billion level by 1990.
smallest copying machine and
- COPYRIGHT: 1981, The Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc.
CSO: 4120
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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
MITI EXTENDS PRIOR~TY TO DOMESTIC FIRMS IN PATENT CASES
Tokyo JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL in English Vol 19, No 959, 16 Jun 81 p 17
[Text] The Ministry of Internalional Under the circumstances,
Trade & Industry, building many Japanese semiconductor
basic technology today for makers have been calling for
tomorrow's computers and some liberalization in that
optical communication devices, patent right ownership system.
has reportedly decided to grant MITI thus has concluded that
priority rights to domestic although the basic principle of
- enterprises for licensing ensuring national ownerships of
patented or patent-pending patented ideas resulting from a
ideas for joint development by chiefly government-financed
the Government and domestic projects should be kept intact,
industry of integrated circuits, industrial enthusiasm for con-
it was recently learned. tinuing the joint pcoject will
According to sources close to have been retained by the in-
MITI, the decision was mo- centive of giving the patent
tivated by MITI's consideration licenses to the domestic par-
that although the past project ticipants in the project ahead of
under its sponsorship between all other license seekers.
1976 and 1980 proved success,a According to the sources,
follow-up seven-year project it MITI has also decided to be
is to launch this fall would dis- more selective in choosing in-
courage industrial participa- dustrial participants in the pro-
tion under the planned system. ject, weeding out every tech-
MITI is especially worried over nological laggard, American
possibilities of the Japanese style.
semiconductor industry losing MITI's new project divi-
its present technological com- des into two categories - 1) To
petiliveness with American or devclop a three-dimensional
. West European industry be- electronic circuit element for
- cause all existing or prospec- wonder computers of the
tive patent rights for the new futurc. Each elemenl of a 7-mm
(C5 bclong to thc Government cub~ will contain several
as nati~mal ~;ropcrty. Worsc: million transistors and a palm-
still, such nationally-owned siicd astiembly ot elementswill
patent riKhls would have to be be jusl as capable as today's
int ernal ionally licensed ac- medium-sized eomputer sel,
cordin~; l~i a recent 'I'okyo- ~ind 'll 1'o develop and op-
Washin~tun a~;recm~rnt result- ticallv-operable type oC ICs
in~ from 'a demand of Inter- ~upto-clectronics ICs) to be
na~ional liusiness Machines widely applicable to industrial
Corp. and othcr 1f.5. semicon- robots, automobiles as well as
~luctor makcrs. computcrs.
COPYRIGHT: 1981, The Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc.
CSO: 4120
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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
CHEMICAL FIBER MAKERS BELIEVE BUSINESS WILL BE BETTER
Tokyo JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL in English Vol 19, No 959, 16 Jun 81 p 20
[Text] Seven major chemical fiber 1981 recurring profit will total
producers anticipate that their Y 1.5 billion, compared to ~283
performances in fiscal 1981 will million in fiscal 1980. This
improve partly because of anticipation is based on an im-
favorable fiber market and proved market for both syn-
growth of their non-fiber thetic and cotton yarns as well
products. as smooth progress in Unitika's
In fiscal 1980, which ended high-rise apartment construc-
March, this year, increased tion and modifications enter-
costs for energy and raw ma- prise.
terials and burdens of interest Mitsubishi Rayon Co. feels
payments forced all the seven that its resin business will help
to decline their pre-tax recur- expand its recurring profit by
ring proEits by lwo digits. 2g Per cent. An 11 per cent im-
The domestic market for p~nvement is anticipated by ~
fibers is still sluggish. But Kuraray Co., which expects
- exports have been growing recovery in polyvinyl alcohol
smoothly, while the fiber and man-made leather business
companies are trying to realize recovery. Teijin Ltd. expects a
proper inventories by voluntary 6~r cent recovery in its
curbin~ production. Part of recurring profit chiefly because
thcir plants are still trozen. ~~Yester fiber recovery and
Spcaking for the indi~stry, video taperecorder-grade
Yoshitaro Magoku, executive films.
vice president of Toray Indus-
trics, [nc. says, "The synthetic Toray Industries will likely
I'il~er market as a whole will im- maintain about the same profit
prove by the last half of fiscal level this year. Asahi Chemical
~yg~ Industry Co. anficipates a 14
'fhe industry's profitability per cent profit decline partly
will also improve because of no because of increasing burden ot
sizable fuel and raw material interest payments and transfer
cost hikes in the current fiscal of ils polyester fabrics to a sub-
year. ln addition, the seven sidiary. Toho Rayon Co. fears
makers' non-fiber business is its profit will go down by 27 per
expected tu go up. Unitika Ltd., cent due to sluggish acrylic and
for rxample, expecls that its rayon fiber situation.
COPYKIGHT: 1981, The Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc.
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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOG''
INTEREST CHANGING FROM MASS PRODUCTION TO TECHNOLOGY, SERVICES
Tokyo JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL in English Vol 19, No 959, 16 Jun 81 p 24
[Article by Fumio Takahashi]
[Text] protit-conscious foreign capi- up a joint venture with Munenori Yamada, manag-
tal, which frequenlly flows in Bucyrus-Erie Co. ing director of Komatsu, said:
and out of Japan, is rapidly "Procedures for the liquidation
changing its main focus of in- Changin~ pow~r balanc~ of Komatsu-Bucyrus K.K. are
terest from mere mass produc-. Since then, about 20 years smoothly and will
lion and sales of commodities: have passed and recently be completed by mid-July. Per-
to high value-added advanced sonnel dispatched by Komatsu
Komatsu paid rnmpensation
technology and service indus- money totalling about ~4.1 bil- and Mitsui will be loaned back
- tries. to he parent company when
Bucyrus-Erie Co., a major ~~on to cancel a joint venture the liquidation is completed."
U.S. machinery maker, is en- contract with Bucyrus-Erie. ~en, on April 1, Ford Motor
tirely withdrawing its capital This is because Komatsu was ~ c~pletely withdrew from
trom Japan soon. This com- ~g~ to revise and abolish an Japan's auto parts indastry
, pany, one of tnose 500 ranking ~equal agreement signed with When it sold its 50 per cent
firms lisled in Fortune, is a Bucyrus which stipulated that ~~~ngs of Japan Automatic
world-tamous maker of su rb Komatsu had to pay royalties Transmission Co. (JATCO) to
excavators and has been in Ja- for other mac~:inery it had de- Nissan Motor Co. and Toyo
pan since 1962 when it estab- veloped by itself and its exports Kogyo Co. President Yoshio
lished a joinl venture, had to be handled only through Serizawa of JATCU said, "It is
Ko?natsu-Bucyrus K.K., with Bucyrus' a6�nt in Japan. such a coincidence that April 1
Komatsu, Ltd, and Mitsui & Bucyrus-Er;e was not really ~S ~e same day that JATCO
('o., its sales a ent in Ja an. Willing to withdraw its capital
~ p entirely from Japan. But it was started production with the aid
[n 1962 the Government de- forced to accept Komatsu's re- of Ford technology ten years
cided to implement its capital quest for the cancellation of the ag�''
liberalizalion and Caterpillar ~~nt venture because the Fair JATCO, a joint venture be-
't'ractor Co., lhe world's largest ~.ade Commission had pointed tween Ford, Nissan and Toyo
construction machinery maker, out that the unequal agreement Kogyo, came about in 1970 as a
moved into Japan to do busi- Would violate the Anti-Mon- byproduct of negotiations over
_ ness. President Ryoichi Kawai opoly Act and Komatsu's main business cooperation k~tween
_ o! Komatsu recalled: ' At lhat ~pular products, small and Ford and Toyo Kogyo. It is a
time, we felt as if walking on a medium-size hydraulic excava- highly profitable company
tiKhlrope because Caterpillar tors, are developed in fact by without any bank loans and
'1'ractor cuulci crush us if they Komatsu itselE. That is, high dividends as more and
wanted to." Despite Caterpil- guc rus-Erie had no choice but more cars are being equipped
lar's move, Kornatsu decided to to recognize the top-notch qual- with automatic transmission
produce bWldozers, its main ~t of Komatsu which Fortune equipment.
producfs, by itself, but was Sa s"is the onl firm that can Then the y
forced to inU�oduce technology Y y queslion is wh
o[ Bucyrus to the production of catch up with Caterpillar'I~ac- Ford decided to withdraw en-
hydruulic excavators and set tor in the world." tirely from such a profitable
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company. Unc reason is that combination ot various plans keen in this new joint venture
deticit-plagued Ford needed ~e usually picked by those and is working very hard to
funds imme~iiately. But the ~~~~[e planners" to suit cus- make it successful here in Ja-
- main reason i:~ that Ford could tomers' needs and desires. This pan as their position as the
no longer exert a powerful in- is exactly the same sales world's largest commercial
fluence on the management of tnethod adopted by Prut!ential bank is at stake.
JATCO on the basis of its tech- in the U.S. and applied here. Furthermore, major Ameri-
nology alone as Nissan Motor This venture is likely to usher a
had started out prcducing auto- new age into Japanese insur- can and European securities
matic transmissions for front- ance business, which t~sually companies like Smith Barney,
wHeel drive cars with its own employ housewives as part- Harris Upham & Co. have u~
technology. JATCO was estab- time sales agents to push insur- ~'aded their representative of-
lished as the joint venture be- ance plans. Managing Director fices to branches recenlly in a
- cause Ford offered its tech- Kunitake Ando of the new ven- bid to expand business here.
nology as a quid pro quo. It is no ture said, "About nine out of ten Integrated circuits (IC) and
longer competitive as Nissan ~~eholcls in Japan have in- related fields are also where
has star~ed production of its suranc~ plans and we believe foreign capital is coming in.
own automatic transmissions. we can develop a new market For instance, Analog Devices,
()t.her American firms are so long as we devise new plans Inc., the largest maker of
also withdrawing from Japan. to suit customers' needs." Vice analog ICs in the U.S., recently
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. President Akifumi Sakaguchi set up an affiliate company
_ has withdrawn from a capital also said, "I thought we would here and wUl start produciAg
tie-up with Ohtsu 'Itire & Rub- be we11 off if we could acquire its ICs next February. MotoroFa
ber Co. and B.F. Goodrich Co. 1,000 insurance plans this initial Inc. has also disclosed a plan to
has cancelled a 64-year-old year. But during the first establish with Toko Ine. a joint
capital tie-up with Yokohama ~nouth in business, we con- venture, Aizu-Toko, Ine., to
Rubber Co. Uniroyal, Inc. has cluded 250 contracts and we produce ICs for auto parts in
sold 49 per cent holdings of started to think of devising or the future. Al1 this meant that
Sumitomo Naugatuck Co., a upgrading the target by 40 to 50 all U.S. IC makers~, including
joint venture with Sumitomo per cent over the initial figure." the biggest, Texas Instruments,
Chemical Co., to Sumitomo Moreover, Young & Inc. will be here in Japan to
Chemical entirely. Those Rubicam, Inc., the world's start production.
American firms were forced to second largest advertising Commenting on the moves of
withdraw from Japan because agency, had signed a contract foreign companies in Japan, of-
of their deteriorating corporate with Dentsu, Inc., the world's ficials of the Industrial Policy
performance at home. No. 1, to set up a joint venture, Bureau of the Ministry of Inter-
Dentsu-Young & Rubicam K.K. national Trade and Induslry
Nswcomers which will be capitalized 59 per said the ratio of manufacturing
On the other hand, while cent each by both firms and de- companies to the overall For-
those firms are withdrawing s~~~ to develop a new market eign-capitalized firms in Japan
for Young & Rubicam. was about 50 per cent in fiscal
from Japan, some other com- 1973, but was downed to less
panies are moving into Japan Factorin9 busin~ss than 3U per cenl in tiscal 1978.
to do business anew. For ex- On the other hand, the ratio of
ample, Prudential Insurance International Factoring Corp. service industries is increasing
Co. of America, the warld's with capital of ~300 million and occupies 15 per cent of the
biggest insurance company, held a party at Hotel Okura on total since fisca11977.
_ has established with Sony Corp. ~une 8 to celebrate the founding ~at is, foreign capital is
a joint venture, Sony Pruden- of the company. This firm was
tial Life Insurance Co., which established as a joint venture W~thdrawing from mass pra
was capitalized at ~3 billion between the Bank of America duction fields like autos, tires
and started its operations from Group and Nippon Shinpan Co, and construction equipment
this April. This venture has this May. Factoring is a busi- Where Japanese companies
a sales staff of only 30, but its in- ness of purchasing companies' turned out to be very competi-
surance salesmen are all male bills and receivables and offer- tive with foreign makers. It is
college graduates who call ing loans against them. It is not moving into advanced tech-
themselves "life planners." In- We~~ developed in Japan though dustg
eslkwhich haveenotcbeen
surance plans are also diversi- potential demands for factoring cultivated before.
fied and under new sales tac- are considered very high. The
tics called "need sales." A Bank of America Group is very
COPYRIGHT: 1981, The Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc.
CSO: 4120
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SCIENCE AND ~ECHNOLOGY
BRIEFS
NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE HELP--Atomic-energy experts at the General Energy Council's
Nuclear Subcommittee have urged that the Japanese Government help nuclear indus-
tries in realizing completion of nuclear fuel cycle. The subcommittee's propo-
sals, reflecting the experts' discussion since August, were presented to
Rokusuke Tanaka, Minister of International irade & Industry. The ministry in-
tends to plan financial assistance for the cycle ventures, including uranium
- enrichment, reprocessing and disposal of radioactive wastes and uranium stock-
piling. The subcommittee specifically proposed that Japan start uranium
stockpiling program to constantly maintain a volume equivalent to one year of
consumption. It also urged that the industries p.romote uranium developments
overseas so that one half of new requirement can be filled by the nuclear f uel
developed and mined overseas. As for enrichment, the advisory group for MITI
said Japan should run a commercial plant by the last half of 1980s. The plant
was envisaged to be capable of ineeting one-third of total enrichment require-
ment in Japan. The experts also urged that the Government assist the industries'
spent-fuel reprocessing plant construction in siting, financing and offering
technological know-how. [Text] [Tokyo JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL in English Vol 19,
No 959, 16 Jun 81 p 6] [COPYRIGHT: 1981., The Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc.]
CSO: 4120 END
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