JPRS ID: 9835 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400030016-7
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• Sequence Number: 16
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9835
9 July 1981
Sue~-Saharan Africa Re ort
p
FOUO Nt~. 730
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORM~4TION SERVICE
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JPRS L/9835
9 July 1981
SUB-~AHARAN AFRICA REPORT
Fouo No. 730
CONTENTS
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Region Would View Favorably Ethiopia-Somalia Accommodation
(Jacque Gautrand; .JEUNE_.AERTQUE, .10 Jun 81).. -.M.....- -1
BENIN
Imbalanced, Flourishing Economies Coexist, Foreign Aid Needed
(Jacques I,atremoliere; MAftCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS,
1 May 81) 3
GUINEA
- Ups, Downs of Past Toure, Mitterrand Relations Surveyed
(Sennen Andriamirado; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 17 Jun 81) 12
GUINEA-BISSAU
November Coup Reportedly Has Not Lessened Problems
(Colm Foy; NEW AFRICAN, Jun 81j 15
MAI,I
F`resh Party Purg~s May Be in Offing
- (Sennen Andriamirado; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 27 May 81) 16
MOZAMBIQUE
Machel Sends Personal Envoy to Mitterrand Government
(AFRIQUE-ASIE, 9-21 Jun 81) ..a 19
Increasing Assistance From Zimbabwe in Anti-MNR F`ight
(NEW AFRICAN, Jun 81) 20
Defense~s Guebuza Meets With UK Officials
(Victoria Brittain; THE GUARDIAN, 25 Jun 81) 22
,
- a- [III - NE & A- 120 FOUO]
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REUNION
Economic Cooperation With Mauritius
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 5 Jun 81) 2l~
Upcoming Port Improvements to Possession Bay
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 5 Jun 81) 26
SENEGAL
Bri ef s
Ita.~ian Aid Projects 28
Chinese Cultural Agreement 28
Brazil ~ffers Credit 28
ZAMBIA
. Brief s
Austria Provides Aid ?.9
World Bank Loan 29
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
REGION WOULD ~1IEW Fi~VORABLY ETHIOPIA-SOMALIA ACCOMMODATION '
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in Frer.ch 10 .;un 81 pp 34-35
[Article by Jacque Gaurrand: "The Virtues of Lassiru~e"]
_ [Excerpts] Will it be possible ~o break the impasse in the Ho~n of Africa?
Following the good-will mission of President Hassan Gouled of Djibouti in March and
- April 1981 to his counterparts in the region, there are some scattered signs of
evolution. These diplomatic efforts, joined by the OAU, are aimed at convincing
Somalia to "negotiate" with Ethiopia in order to f ind a solution acceptable to all.
On the occasion of a ministerial conference of *he OAU in Addis Ababa in February,
attended by the Somali number two man, Mohamed Said Samantar, a discreet attempt
at reconciliation had not proved successful.
_ Since that time, however, the various protagonists are proclaiming their wieh to
achieve "a durable peace in the Horn."
Invitation
Thanks to its military successes--in the Ogaden--and its diplomatic successes-�-
having "isolated" Somalia within the region--Ethiopia seems to be today in a
preponderant position. This w~uld explain the "advances" made to Mogadishu:
on 30 April, at the end of a tripartite meeting in Addis Ababa ~f the ~thiopian,
Kenyan and Sudanese mini~ters of foreign affairs, the head of Ethiopian diplomacy
implicitly invited Somalia to participate in the common effort. The invitation
- was reiterated more openly by the Ethiopian official press agency on 4 May.
_ ~
As for Somalia, which has been attempting for the past few months to break its
diplomatic isolation, notably by sending emissaries to Europe, it is declaring
itself "favorable to a dialogue."
However, the cond~tions imposed so far by Addis Ababa and Mogadishu inevitably lead
to a dialogue of the deaf: Ethiopia insists on respect for the pri*_:ciples of
"territorial integrity and non-interference." I*.. thus asks Mogadishu to renounce
any claims on neighboring territories, or, in other words, to 3bandon its dream
of forming again "Greater Somalia." In turn, Somalia reaffirms its "pledge in
favor of the seif-determination" of peoples.
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At present, the situation does not seem to be ripe enough for the convocation of
a regional conference on peace in the Horn. The strategy adopted by President
~ Gouled during his "exploratory" mission is aimed more at obtaining "low-level"
results by confronting concrete problems: convin~e Mogadishu to temporarily set ~
aside territorial questions and i~egotiate limited agreements with Ethiopia, such
as the reopening of the passage between the two countries and freedom of circula-
tion for the nomad population. Various factors today point to a reconciliaLion.
On the one hand, Ethiopia wtshes to achieve peace in order to devote itself to
developing its resources. The country aspires at removing the threat from its
borders in order to disengage itself from the military sway of the Soviets and the
- 15,000 Cubans, whose presence is increasingly less well accepted by a fiercely
~ nationalistic population.
Burden
Somalia, for its part, does not have the resources to pursue its expansionist
ambitions: its population is exhaiisted, weakened by war, 2 years of drought,
shortages and famine. The country is crumbling under the weight of 1.7 million
refugees. The 560 million dollars promised in Geneva for African refugees have
no:, been receive~i yet, and the 40 million dollars in military aid promised by
� Washington in exchange for the Berbera naval base are only being dispensed at eye-
dropper speed.
Grumbling
According to rumors, Egypt, one of the handful of Somalia's allies in the region,
may reconsider its promise to provide military equipment, notably tanks. Following
the war between Iraq and Iran, fuel is difficult to find. Moreover, Siad Barre's
regime must face a two-pronged opposition: the Somali Salvation Front, supported
by Ethiopia, and the National Somali Movement formed in London on 6 April, aimed
at overthrowing Barre "by all means available, including arms."
- To the ~iissatisfaction of business circles, which hope for a relaxat3..on of the
economy, must be added now the grumbling from one segment of the army: Presideiit
Barre dismissed 10 members of the Supreme Revolutionary Council at the end of
Apr.il, including the minister of defense.
Under all these pressures, Gen Barre seemingly has no alternative than to negotiate
to br.eak out of an isolation that could prove fatal. Of course, he would have to
negotiate with Ethiopia in such a way as not to lose face. The "small steps"
policy advocated by President Gouled could provide an honorable "out" for Mogadishu:
it is abundantly clear that everyone in the region would benefit from a lessening
of tensions to loosen the hold of the superpowers.
The Unknown
T1ie fireat unknown remains the attitude that would be adopted by the Western Somali
I.i.beration Front vis-a-vis an eventual settlement process. The Front has recently
evicienced a greater independence vis-a-vis Mogadishu in the face of efforts at
conciliation. At its 15 May congress, it came out in favor of Che creation of a
"free and independent" state of Western Somalia, declaring, moreover, that "all
initiatives concerning this region taken without its participation would be illegal."
COPYI:IGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981
CSO: 4719/44
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BENIN
IMBALANCED, FLOURISHING EC~NOMIES COEXIST, FOREIGN AID NEEDED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 May 81 pp 1225-1228
[Article by Jacques Latremoliere: "The Second Session of the Franco-Beninese Com-
mittee. Benin: Parallel Economies"]
[Text] The second session of the important Franco-Beninese Committee was held in
Cotonou 25-29 March. The talks between Robert Galley and the political heads con-
ducted in this forum were not accompanied by any local histrionics, contrar~ to
what happened during the May 1979 meetings. When Mathieu Kerekou ref erred on that
occasion to Bob Denard's surprise move on the country in 1977, he did so to point
out that reconciliation was not the same thing as forgetting the past and that it
should at the very least entail guarantees for Benin. The Minister of Cooperation,
for his part, was concerned about closing the gap which had arisen in the network
of our African friends and wanted, through Benin, to encourage communications be-
- tween the Republic of Niger and its western partners, by looking into the idea of
extending the railroad from Parakou to Dosso and Niamey, among other measures.
The situation has evolved since 1979. Although other countries still all too fre-
quently confuse mercenary activities, supported to one degree or another by some
African countries, with the activities of the French special service, President
Kerekou did not consider it useful to bring up the problem this time. Moreover,
the BCEOM [Central Study Office for Qverseas Equipment] is studying the issue of
- extending the Benin-Niger railway. The Nigerien government's interest in the pro-
ject has, however, dwindled quite a bit as a result of an improvement in removal
and supply conditions by the Togolese line, and next by Algeria, and because of the
inevitability of a break in the loading o~ Arlit ore, whether it occurs in Parakou
or in Dosso. The internationalization of uranium sales, 400 tons of which were sold
to Libya (if one is to believe the HERALD TRIBUNE), is finally following the same
trend. The Nigerien authorities have already made it known that, as far as they
are concerned, completion of the Kandadji dam {est~mated at 3.5 billion French
francs or 175 billion CFA francs) comes before the Niamey railroad on their list of
development priorities.
Thus relieved of these extraneous circumstances, the Franco-Beninese dialogue was
- confined to the usual problems of cooperation: the choice, amount and provenance
of investments and ttie breakdown between grants and loans. The decisions depended
solely on available French funds, on the one hand, and on the financial situation,
farm and industrial production, and socio-economic structures in Benin, on the other.
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Beninese Socialism
Is Benin a socialist state? Official phraseology and the cordial relations with
the East, the USSR and its European satellites, North Korea and Cuba, not to mention
the French Communist Party and the CGT [General Confederation of Labor], all leave
no room for doubt as to the political direction in which Kerekou is leading his
country. The rigid institutions arising from the new constitution a.re those of a
totalitarian marxist state. The school curriculum reforms and the large numbers
of students sent on scholarships to Eastern capitals confirm the leaning.
- However, it would be just as risky to claim that the socialist ideology meets with
the approval of the majority of the people as to detect from their behavior real
signs that they are tiring of this ideo~ogy. A good nur?ber of important people are
still under house arrest. Detention camps remain. The regime is not known for its
savagery. In a country where the pulitical tradition is to be irreverent of author-
ity, where a critical mind is certainly more highly developed than in other parts
of Africa, one might think that adults would still have some nostalgia for freedom
of thought, which has almost completely disappeared. This regime's skill lies less
in repressing manif~stations of this freedom than in drying up its sources through
_ censor.ship and the requirement that all thoughts be cast in a concrete vocabulary.
Generations raised under this system will undoubtedly encounter major difficulties--
if they are ever given the opportunity--in thinking and making decisions outside a
- pr.otective society where po'litical dogmatism is formulated with the certainty of a
- military regulation.
Farming is heavily politicized through local revolutionary committees responsible
ior keeping the tension considered usaful fnr production efforts, and through
regional action centers for rural development (CARDER), whose wide variety of tasks,
z anging from fencing in cropland to stocking and maricei:~:.g, does not encourage
competence. Research has no!: been neglected.
The idea of grouping togethe.r research workers into a national agency, with some
French technicians f rom French institutes assigned as advisers, has proved eff ective
on an experimental basis. But inFormation circulates poorly among complicated, con-
st::ntly changing structures, and the impact of research on development is diluted
accordingly. Having noted these disadvantages, it cannot be said that farming,
which is mostly traditional, i_s socialized. Farmers are merely required to sell
certain products, such as gaim and cotton, to national monopolies. Collective or
government agencies are rare. It wiZl be interesting in this regard to follow the
development of the Save sugar complex when the irrigated area which is to supply
the raw material is put into cultivation.
Out of a gross domestic product valued at 233 billion CFA francs in 1980, the share
of ttle secondary sector is only 10.7 percent, as against 38.7 percent for the pri-
- mary sector. Here again there are no truly socialist structures, but public or
semi.-public companies under close surveillance by the state, which collects for
itself more than 50 percent of the profits, without any great concern for reinvest-
ment needs. The main industries are oil mills (SOBEPALH and SONICOG), cement (Benin
Cement Company--SCB, and the National Company of Benin Cement Factories--SONACIB),
breweries and ca?'bonated beverage plants, textiles (Beninese Textile Company--
SOBETEX, and the Beninese Textile Industry--IBETEX), and finally power plants with
the SBEE [Benin Water and Electricity Company], which produces only 8 percent. of the
electricity it distributes while the rest is supplied by the Akosombo hydroelectric
power plant in Ghana.
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The secondary sector's share of the GDP is, however, going to increase rather
rapidly in the next few years, as some large-scale industrial projects begin opera-
tions.
The Onigbolo Cement Company, 49 percent of whose capital is owned by the government,
41 percent by Nigeria and 10 percent by various foreign partners, will have a
500,000 ton capacity which, together with the SCB and SONACIB, can increase Benin's
production to more r_han a million tons. The cost of the plant is estimated at 30
billion CFA francs.
The Save sugar complex was built by the Belgian firm ABR Engineering, in partnership
with various French companies participating directly or as subcontractors. It
represents a 43 billion CFA franc investme~zt, including an irrigated 5,600 hectare
plantation with a dam, road network, railway branch line, drainage system, and mis-
cellaneous buildings, and a factory with an annual production capacity of 40,000
tons of ref ined sugar. Most of the funds were provided by Belgian credit institu-
tions, under the leadership of the Societe generale de banque [General Banking
Compa:~y]. The Banque de 1'union europeenne [Bank of the European Union] and the
Ba:~que francaise du commerce exterieur [French Foreign Trade Bank], for France, con-
tributed 228 million French francs (11.4 billion CFA francs). Finally, two English
banks participated in the financing with 55 million pounds sterling.
The Bohicon corn and mix~d oil mills in Zou province are much more modest operations.
The first produces corn meal, cattle feed and products for brewing beer. The govern-
ment share amounted to 275 million CFA francs, and the balance was provided by a
matching loan from the Fund for Central Economic Cooperation (CCCE), a buyer's
credit line opened by France, and bank advances. The oil mill, equipped by the
firms Krupp and Koch, will have a processing capacity of 30,000 tons of cottonseed
and 24,000 tons of other seeds or nuts (groundnuts or karite). It will supply
5,300 tons of cottonseed oil, 9,600 tons of groundnut or corn germ oil, 9,120 tons
of karite nut butter and 20,00~ tons of other oilcakes. The Ben~nese Development
Bank providPd 350 million CFA francs to hElp finance this project, and the rest, or
about 2 billion CFA francs, was provided by the Federal Republic of Germany.
Aside from these projects, we should mention that drilling operations will soon begin
at the small offshore Seme oil field, which Union Oil of California discovered in
1968 and prospected. Handed over by Benin to the Norwegian company Saga Petroleum,
with the cooperation of Kwaener Engineering, it has reserves estimated at 5 million
tons. The investment of 20 billion CFA francs is at the break-even point for an
operation which should not last more than 6 years. The rig will include one main
_ platform, five auxiliary platforms and a 200,000 ton tanker for storage. Norwegian
banks financed the venture under the guarantee of the Norwegian Export Institute.
Thus we see that there are only ambiguous economic structures corresponding to the
marxist orthodoxy of the political structuras. Aside from cash crops, these
economic structures leave most of the initiative to the farmers to choose their
ventures and market their crops. In the industrial area, they leave the door open
to private initiative, whether they operate under the traditional form of stock-
holding companies or as markets for equipment and project research and development,
accompanied by technical assistance and management contracts, the effects of which
are more or less the same and sometimes even more advantageous for the foreign co-
contractors, in the end.
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This appears even more in the tertiary sector, exceptionally important for an
African country in the tropical zone. This situation is partly the result--and
this is its negative side--of an overabundant civil service which several successive
regimes have not, despite their efforts, succeeded in trimming down. However, it is
also due to intensive cotmnerce which accounts for 23 percent of the GDP, and which
ranks commerce second among Beninese resources, after farming. Government corpor-
ations have also been created ar.3 given a monopoly over certain exports or impurts
of major consumer goods, either foodstuffs or petroleum products. But consumer
- subsidies, which these companies are dependent on to maintain the government's
- pricing policy, make them more like regulatory agencies than true commercial estab-
lishments. Most commerce, which does not exclude large foreign companies with
offices in Benin as in other neighboring countries, remains in the hands of private
interes ts .
Overall, Beninese socialism, as strict as it seems in official ideology, cannot be
considered from a~ economic standpoint as having reached a point of no return.
President Kerekou probably judges faithfulness to a revolutionary platform to be
more important than the contents of a system where empiricism preserves its rights.
So when Colonel Qadhdhafi announced Kerekou's conversion to Islam following his
visit to Tripoli, the Beninese head of state decided it was better not to deny it
vehemently, as he did not want to dampen his Libyan host's enthusiasm by expressing
an opinion which would, a contrario, have placed Benin in the moderate camp. He
merely continues to call himself Mathieu and not Ahmed, and was not converted in
any sense of the term.
Contradictions of an Economy
Commercial traditions in Benin make it poorly predisposed to planning. The deter-
iorarion of the statistica]. apparatus as well as the illicit nature of a good part
of the tertiary sector's activities make it impossible to find an explanation for
certain phenomena in the government accounts. Has the gradual decline in agricul-
tural and industrial production been offset by an increase in food production? Do
_ smuggling and the unofficial traffic of goods across the border balance out the
official trade deficit? Does the increase in the debt reflect fundamental economic
d:i.sorder or simply budget difficulties? We will have to be content here with a
f ew basic figures, frequently differing from one source to the next, and then, on
the basis of these figures, hazard a few estimates.
Benin. Marketed Production of the Main Cash Crops ~
- (in 1,000 metric tons)
1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80
Palm oil 38.5 9.9 9.4 11.9 12
Palmetto 83 83.5 84 - -
Unseeded cotton 20.5 14 18.7 26.7 15
Groundnuts (in shell) 34.7 61.1 66.5 63.7 70
Karite nuts 7.5 14 14.1 0.4 17
Coffee 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
Tobacco 1.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3
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- Cotton Production in Benin
Area under Cultivation Production
(Tons of cottonseed)
1963-66 - 4,017
1970-71 38,957 35,967
1971-72 54,383 47,252
1972-73 56,170 49,999
1973-74 52,860 44,575
1974-75 48,448 3~,500
- 1975-76 31,667 20,070
1976-77 23,780 17,497
1977-78 20,590 14,032
1978-79 25,994 18,?20
1979-80 31,564 26,766
1980-81 24,985 14/15,000 (estimated)
The fall in farm production for industrial use is a fact. The figures on palm pro-
ducts are e~lained by the 1976 drought and recovery from its disastrous effects
will not occur before 1983, in the best of circumstances. But the figures are still
- far off the mark. In 1975-76, palm oil production amounted to 38,000 tons. After
going down to 9,000 tons in 1977-78, it came back up to 12,000 tons in 1979-80. In
any case, the drought cannot explain the decline of cotton production to the same
degree. We should mention the spectacular growth in this crop from 1962 to 1972
(from 100 to 50,000 tons), thnaks to the assistance of the CFDT (French Company for
the Development of Textile Fibers) in Borgou and of the SATEC (Technical Aid and
Cooperation Company) in Zou. The departure of these two companies marked the begin-
ning of the decline. In 1977, 20,590 hectares under cultivation produced a 14,000
ton crop. Some growth was seen in 1978 and 1979, with 18,720 tons and 26,766 tons.
Unfortunately, the 1980 harvest, which equalled the 1977 one in surface area and
tonnage, did not confirm the premature hopes that the previous growth had nurtured.
Can this situation be explained by factors other than those related to the weather?
First leL's look at the complexity of the structures. A government agency, SONAGRI
[National Company for Agricultural Production], is responsible for importing and
distributi.ng fertilizer and insecticides. It is the CARDER that control the farming
and purchase the crop from the producer. They then deliver the cotton, via shipping
companies, to SONAGRI's ginning factories. But it is another government company,
SONACEB [National Marketing and Export Company of Benin], which markets the f iber.
Synchronizing the whole works is tedious. To these technical factors is added a
certain apathy toward cotton on the part of the planter; the method of payment by
official agencies is considere~ �ull of risks, while the decline in food production
in Nigeria has generated a flow across the b~rder of exports of manioc, yams and
grains (corn and sorghum) on favorable terms, making it possible to escape more or
less legal checks, to boot.
This favorable impact of the imperfections of the cotton industry on food production
will delight the ecologists. Although you have to be cautious in using figures
obtained outside market control, a number of indices do in fact indicate that from
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FOR (11~6'l('1:11. 1'`i' (111.1'
1975 to 1980, corn production increased by 38 percent, manioc production by 60
percent, yams by 42 percent, and beans, at a lower volume, by 100 percent.
, Border traffic goes in the opposite direction for coff ee and cocoa, which are often
sold under better monetary and tariff conditions in Benin than in Nigeria. Hence
the volume of these two products shipped from Cotonou port in 1978 accounted for
25.2 percent, or about ~..4 billion CFA francs, of total Benir_ese exports. Seventy-
five percent of this coffee came from Nigeria, and the rate is 98 percent for cocoa.
Benin. Food Production (estimates)
(in 1,000 metric tons)
1975-76 1976-77 1977-78 1978-79 1979-80
Corn 217 182 242 343 300
Sorghum 52 72 76 62 58
Millet 15 4 5 3 3
Rice (paddy) 13 18 15 9 9
Total (grains) 297 276 338 417 370
*lanioc 461 624 G25 721 741
Yams 445 590 552 643 632
Beans 2~ 23 25 39 42
This traffic considerably changes the trade balance data. On the basis of 1978
customs statistics, the most recent published to date, real exports can be estimated
at 10.6 billion CFA francs, instead of the 5.8 billion announced officially. By
the sau?e token, real imports would be 72 million instead of 60. The theoretical
trade deficit persists, but whether we are referring to illicit import or export
transactions or smuggling, the entry values must be increased when the goods leave
the country by a sales tax, shipping costs, a service charge, and an exchange pro-
fit, all of which is supposed to be reflected in the balance of payments (if it
were possible to find these items). If further proof is needed, all you have to do
is to observe how carefully all the businessmen or officials in Cotonou follow the
fluctuations in the Nigerian naira.
It doesn't take long to realize that there are two economies coexisting in Benin.
The first and relatively flourishing one is based on trade relations with the
neighboring country, of which it is a mere extension. This is the economy of the
middle-class in the south. But the official economy, which covers part of the
primary sector and all of the secondary one, inevitably suffers the consequences of
a trade imhalance.
' The Seme oil field will undoubtedly improve this situation for a few years, as
Benin's oil bill amounted to 12 billion CFA francs in 1980, or double the theoret-
ical value of exports. If, however, nonmonetary capital and transfers continue to
be unable to offset the deficit in goods and services, the public debt will increase
at the same time as the negative balance in the accounts, which have been in dis-
equilibrium since 1977. The debt itself, which was 17 billion CFA francs in 1975,
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went up to 36 billion in 1978 and 84 billion in 1980, for a 33 billion budget.
The annual debt service was 1 billion CFA francs in 1977. At 4.2 billion in 1980,
its ratio to export receipts, even if corrected as we did earlier, goes over the
red line. There is not much chance that the income generated by ongoing projects
will. be enough to deaden the impact of a debt service that could reach about 21
billion CFA francs by 1985. .
Cotonou port traffic, a barometer of the economy, sharply increased in 1979 (1.5
million tons as compared with 775,000 tons in 1975), as a result of the transship-
ment of Nigerian oil. In 1980, however, due to competition from Lome port, a
slowdown of Nigerien uranium ore exports towards the coast, and more generally to
a decline in shipments of goods on the Parakou railway line, port traffic dropped.
1'his situation is all the more alarming since the port authorities will be burdened
during coming fiscal years b~ the repayment of loans contrac*.ed in 1979 to develop
the facilities. This borrowing was done from the CCCE, the World Bank Group, Nor-
way, Canada, the African Development Bank (ADB), and the Arab funds, to the tune
of about 226 million French francs (11.3 billion CFA francs).
The Role of External Aid
Foreign aid and the resulting transfers in the form of grants or loans are the
means of restoring financial equilibrium, as we just noted. A lack or simply a
slowdown of these funds might force the government to suspend payments.
Fortunately, this aid has not been lacking up to now. It is still substantial,
at least as concerns the large international and multilateral development agencies
and bilateral aid from the West. Here as elsewhere in Africa, contributions from
socialist countries are remarkable only by their mod.:st amounts: a 1.2 billion
- CFA franc loan from the IJSSR, study.grants, and technical assistants, whose
numbers have nothing to do with their efficiency. The People's Republic of China
sponsored a 1,000-hectare rice growing project using its own labor and has opened
- low-interest credits for equipment purchases. North Korea has built several cul-
tural buildings.
Total foreign assistance was estimated at $93 million for 1979, out of which 28
percent was French aid of all types and 13.5 percent came from the EEC. The
Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark and Norway follow, in order of amounts of
bilateral aid. As for international or multilateral afd, first is the International
Development Association (IDA), followed by the EEC at S.5 million dollars, UNDP
(4.1), the African Development Fund (ADF) (3.6), the j~orld Food Programme (WFP)
(3.3), the Arab funds (3.1) and the ADB (1.2). Arab assistance, which has been
relatively recent, is clearly on the increase. Algeria has furnished 1.4 billion
_ CFA francs in grant form for rural a~id industrial development. Libya granted $10
million, S for Porto-Novo hospital and S for road construction and sanitation pro-
jects, which have already been the subject of in' rnational bidding, with several
French companies competing. '
- Thus France maintains its leadership in the area of aid, in keeping with its
position as the country's main buyer and supplier. However, while rural develop-
~ ment projects received most (43 percent) of the FAC credits between 1975 and 1979,
with the irrigation of the Ouidah-Nord palm plantation and the agricultural develop-
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1~ctR c~l'F~Ic ~t ~I t ,t' \
ment of Zou aad Borgou, the Franco-Beninese Committee has just confirmed that
efforts would, beginning in 1980, be oriented toward projects involving road, port,
railway, air and telecommunications infrastructure projects. Forty-seven percent
- of available loans ;aill from now on go to these projects, which primarily focus on
modernizing transportation in.the direction of Niger and improving the capacity
and facilities of Cotonou port. Loans from the Central Fund, which increased from
1 to 38 million French francs (50 million to 1.9 billion CFA francs) between 1975
and 1980, have be~n channeled to these projects since 1977, with the exception of
a f ew small housing projects f or French coogerative workers and a Fr 20 million
, (1 billion CFA francs) loan to enlarge the Akakpa electrical power plant.
The same trend for European aid was apparent in Benin after the first Lome Conven-
tion, which allocated 20 million units of account out of a total of 40 transpor-
tation infrastructure (not including Stabex, food aid and special aid). Generally
speaking, aside from humanitarian, social projects, most other aid was also ear-
marked for this sector.
There is room for regret that assumedly productive investment was, if not abandon-
ed, at least neglected for the sake of expenditures which do not always act as a
stimulus to the economy and which in any case entail recurrent costs burdensome to
budgets (at least, that is, when someone thinks to include them in the budget).
The decline in agro-industrial production, to the extent that it can b e attributed
to agricultural agencies' shortcomings, does not encourage anyone to work in this
area, w~zile the voluntary development of food crops in response to the Nigerian
market or for any other reason shows that control is not essential when the farmer
is both motivated and free to choose his ventures.
It is also difficult to consider projects when statistical references essential
for evaluating their chances are too often missing, and especially when their
implementation is scheduled over a period of several years as part of a development
plan wtiose details are unknown. In fact, it is with this in mind that the Franco-
Beninese Committee studied the idea of project identification missions to look at
this area and to check on the spot the economic functions the project is supposed
to l~e perf.orming. In the meantime, it seems easier to gather information on in-
Crastructure projects, since local authorities do not harbor the same prejudices
against the technical studies on which they are based as they do against indiscreet
socio-economic surveys, the conclusions of which may run counter to official doctrine.
In the final analysis, even.if the economic justification for these projects is
questionable, they at least have the merit of giving work to public utility com-
panies. Benin may experience a rather tense financial situation. It doesn't mean
anything more to these Beninese or foreign companies than a market without problems
because it is financed from abroad. Out of these companies, the most active ones
are the French firms (Colas, Lecas, Razel freres, Asetom, SIF and Sobea), with
current contracts amounting to about 6.5 billion CFA francs. Other projects in
~ah-ich they will be participating, totalling about 20 billion CFA franes, are at
the stage oF being advertized or collecting bids.
There are many elements of contradiction and paradox in a country where part of
thc agriculture and trade is voluntarily and advantageously dependent on the liberal
ecot~amy of a neighboring country, while the official socialist economy, which owes
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h'QR OF'N7('l:U. lltii? ONl.l'
its creatiun to forei~;n capit.~l~ i~ h:~r~~lv s;~~rtin}~ bY ~oit:li p~~~~riv ;ui:~~irr~l ::ti�~it�tur~~::~
to the bencfit of puhlir iac,rk;: ~ahirl~ :ic-c~ l;~i't;riy unpt~~,clurt Iv~~. :it I~~:t:+t f~,~� tli~~
- country itticlf. Ai~d ;i11 uf [I?tti .Iil tlic n:im~~ of ~iti 1d~o.lu~;y wliu~c rigicl f.r~c~icl~r
does not prevent acconunodations on the inside. Ttie surprising thing is that, for
better or worse, this economy continues to turn, despite increasing financial
difficulties. But perhaps these paradoxes are part of normal life in Africa and
are more widespread than we think.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981
9805
CSO: 4400/1266
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N'OR OFNIC'IA1. USN: ONt.Y
GUINEA
UPS, DOWNS OF PAST TOURE, MITTERRAND RELATIONS SURVEYED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1067, 17 Jun 81 pp 30-31
[Article by Sennen Andriamirado: "Sekou Toure's Bad Lucla"]
[Text] A convertible is crossing Conakry, with Sekou Toure at the wheel, Francoi.r-.
Mitterrand at his side. Smiles, greetings to the crowds who are applauding the
Guinean president: "Here is Presi! Here is Presi!" And, since the passenger
is "Presi's friend," he is also applauded. The Fr.ench politician is struck by
his host's indisputable popularity. Later, he will write: "Sekou Toure...never
abused his power, and if one could protest against the expeditious character of
his decisions, one cannot f ind in them the slightest arbitrariness or cruelty."
Again in Conakry, a convertible followed by the applause of a delirious population
is crossing the city. At the wheel, for a few minutes, is Sekou Toure, with
Valery Giscard d'Estaing at his side. The French politician will later proclaim:
"My visit is the visit of reconciliation and friendshi~:, with the forces of the
future winning over the forces of the past." Applause.
Love
Seventeen years separate these two scenes. As a special correspondent for the
French weekly L'EXPRESS, Mitterrand was in Conakry in December 1961. Belonging
to the French oppo5ition, he was therefore received in Guinea as a personal friend
of Toure's: 3 years earlier, the latter had closed Guinea's door in the face of
- Charles de Gaulle. With his trip to Conakry, Giscard d'Estaing, in December 1978;
was celebrating the reconciliation of France with Sekou Toure's Guinea. Between
the two dates, there is the uncommon story of a passionate lover who loves and
hates with the same intensity, the story of Ahmed Sekou Toure, going from friend-
ship to publicly proclaiming his hate toward Francois Mitterrand. A delayed and
unexpected consequence: having accepted Giscard d'Estaing's invitation to visit
France in June of this year, the Guinean president is now compelled to abandon
his plans following the ascent to power of Francois Mitterrand.
Separation
Between Mitterrand and Sekou, the idyl had started under the best auspices in
1950. At age 33, the future French president, at the time minister of overseas
France, was successfully attempting to lift the interdiction decreed against
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rvn ~rr~~t,~?L u,r. VIVLY
the RDA [African Democratic Rally] under the leadership of Felix Houphouet-Boigny
because of its alliance with the French communists. Sekou Taure was 3~ years
old at the time and was taking his f irst steps in the shadow of Houphouet-Boigny,
whose most ebullient deputy he would soon become. As a deputy to the French
National Assembly, he was a member of the same parliamentary group as Francois
Mitterrand who, :~aving persuaded the RDA to break up with the French Conmmunist
Party, would succeed in attaching it to his own party, the UDSR (Democratic and
Socialist Union of the Resistance). The UDSR-RDA group would live on to 1958.
~ The ties of friendship formed in Parliament between Mitterrand and Toure, would
be strengthened by a common opposition to the spoiler, Gen de Gaulle when the latter
came to power in May 1958.
Mitterrand then would begin his crossing of the desert. Toure would follow him
when, in September of the same year, Guinea would distinguish itself by opting for
immediate independence and rejecting the French community proposed by de Gaulle.
Symb~l of African dibnity and pride, punished and abandoned by France, the Guinean
leader would be even more isolated following his break-up with Houphouet-Boigny,
accused of plotting with de Gaulle to overthrow him and bring Guinea back into
' the French fold. Mitterrand was already advocating a French-Guinean cooperation.
[1t the end of 1961, he would be received in Conakry and would write in L'EXPRESS
after his return: "On the side of France, Guinea is up against a wall of intran-
sigence and misunderstanding... I still hear Sekou Toure: 'Why does the French
government wish to punish us? Because we chose freedom?"'
Toure ~aould remember this undisguised sympathy. In 1965, having mobilized
marabouts and griots, having ordered prayers and sacrifices for Francois Mitterrand,
then candidate for president, he would address to him, after his defeat, a cable
congratulating him...for having imposed a second election on de Gaulle.
As a member of the opposition, Mitterr~nd would continue to demand better relations
between France and Guinea. However, he would also begin to distance himself from
Sekou Toure, obsessed by the idea of permanent plots. Mitterrand could not
disregard the fact that, if these plots did materialize (as in Conakry on
22 November 1970), repression was blind (massive arrests, secret and swift execu-
tions). On 31 January 1971, he would write in FRANCE-SOIR: "There is no excuse
for a parudy of justice." And he would add: "Justice cannot be overlaoked
because of friendship, even if only from past years."
Nevertheless, Sekou Toure would exhibit some good will. In November 1972, in
deference to Mitterrand during the latter's visit to Conakry, he would hand over
tliree Fren^hmen jailed because of their alleged participation in the November 1970
plot. .
Break-Up
_ 1'wo years later, in April 1974, Mitterrand is again a car_didate against Giscard
d'Gstaing. Again, Toure orders prayers and sacrifice.s, which will not bring victory
to Mitterrand. The Guinean leader is now beginning to lose confidence in his
fri.encl's luck. He is also eager to renew ties with France because his Soviet
rel:itions have not borne fruit. De Gaulle is dead, Pompidou, his successor, has
also fione. As the new president, Giscard is not known as an ir.revocable Gaullist.
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Itecanciliation is therefore possible. Toure then prepared one of the about-faces
of which he is a past master. On 14 July 1975, he frees some French prisoners and
hands them over, not to Mitterrand--now in the opposition--but to Ambassador Andre
Lewin. (;ontacts open with official France. Simultaneously, the break-up *aith the
French opposition is consummated.
Promise
The hop ed-for pretext will be provided through the initiative of an obscure
militant of ihe French Socialist Party--headed by Mitterrand since 1971--of Guinean
origin. Encouraged by the increasingly clearer complaints of certain commissions
of the S ocialist Party as to Sekou Toure's peculiar concept of human rights, this
militant, James Soumah, publishes on 2 June 1977 a document in which he proposes
to the party's congress (in Nantes on 17 June) to pronounce judgment. This
document then denounces arbitrary detention in Guinea.
The Guin ean president grabs the opportunity to break with Mitterrand. On 10 June
1977--and therefore before the Nantes congress--he organizes an imposing meeting
in Conakry. The order of the day: the trial of the French Socialist Party.
It is "t otal war" against Francois Mitterrand.
One and a half years later, in December 1978, welcoming Giscard d'Estain in
Conakry, Toure promises him that Guinea will always support him, even a;ainst
his enemi es in France. He keeps his promise. In April-May 1981, he again orders
prayers and sacrifices for Giscard's reelection, with no more success, however,
than in 1965 and 1974 for Mitterrand...
' Relations with France must now begin again from ground zero. The personalization
of official relations has not benefited Guinea. Sekou has sent emissaries to
Paris, he has used the good offices of old mutual friends, has promised to make
resounding statements in favor of Mitterrand. But he also knows that the latter
is resentful, and even "sensitive like a member of the Comedie Francaise," to
borrow th e phrase of a French politician.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981
CSO: 4719/55
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GUINEA-BISSAU
NOVEMBER COUP REPORTEDLY HAS NOT LESSENED PROBLEMS
London NEW AFRICAN in English Jun 81 p 31
[Article by Colm Foy]
[Excerpts ]
IN THE tow., of Tombali in the eouth of Old and New
Guinea-Bissau, the President of the
Council of the Revolution Nino Vieira On the poaitive side, however, Vieira
_ drew attention to "the flight of inerchan- retaine the truet ofthe army and aeems to
diae and essential goods taken by djilas be gaining international respectability.
(itinerant traders) across the bordera, the ~e return of Vasco Cabral, wounded in
high prices in local markets as a consequ- ~e coup by Vieira's men, to the poat of
- ence of astronomical increases in world Minister of Economic Co-ordination and
prices, and the serious lack of essential Planning haa been uaeful in the latter
goods in the interior". It is a theme he has P~ess aince he has always been a
been forced to expound on often of late. well-iiked and respected figure interna-
The situation, which would have been tionally. Guinea-Biesau is now engaged
grave anyway, is compounded by the in actively cultivating links with the
growth of speculation and a thriving UNDQ and other international economic
blackmarket which relies on cross-border and aid organisations in an attempt to
smuggling and corruption of officials for ehore-up the tottering economy. Vasco
its supplies of goods. Cabral is an old and able hand at this,
having performed an identical function
The economic cost to under Luia Cab:�al.
the State was described by Vieira as Vieira is not without his own friends
` enormous' and he has announced tl-.ut either, the stauncheat of whom is neigh-
aeveral of the much-criticised, more bouring Guinea-Conakry's President
ambitious projects of the Luis Cabral Sekou Toure. Toure's in:tial and rapid
regime will be run down, welcome to the coup has not been
The cost in political terms, too, has forgotten and a delegation arrived in
been high. Food aupplies in the capital, Bissau earlier this year to aign a mutual
though improved, have not come up to economic and social co-operation agree-
expectations and the amashing of a black ment between the two countriea. This in
market ring often has the opposite of the spite of the still unreaolved petroleum-
deaired effect since it remov~s some border dispute. Toure, too, was instru-
people's only source of supplies. There mental immediately after the coup in
have already been rumblinga of discon- softening the effect of shortages by
_ tent, includingastudents'demonstration sending quantities of rice and other food
- in Bissau, and Vieira has demonstrated to Bissau.
his fear of opposition by re-jailing v;o;,.o _,,~d his fellow council
ftaphael Barbosa who was becoming a ~embers will have a very difficult job in
focus for opposition in Bissau. the months ahead to retain the popular
support which came out on to the streets
COPYRIGHT: 1981 IC Magazines Limited for them eight months ago~
CSO: 4700/103.
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MALI
FRESH PARTY PURGES MAY BE IN OFFING
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 27 May 81 pp 44-45
[Article by Sennen Andriamirado: "In Promising Change General Moussa Traore
Tries To Reorganize the Entire Civilian and Military Political Classes. A
New Purge Is Under Way"]
[Text] The first stage of the great shake up affecting the single party will
be over within a month. At the end of June, all of UDPM's [Democratic Union
of Malian People] local committees will be completely reorganized, according
tu the decision of the extraordinary congress held in February 1981.
At that time a progressive purge of a11 other organizations will begin, accord-
ing to a timetable established by Gen Moussa Traore, president of the republic
' and secretary general ~f the party. Between June and September, territorial
sections (districts and regions) will reorganize their bureaus and, from
September to November, a new team should be installed in the National Council.
Very likely, the regular UDPM congress will convene towards mid-November to
_ install a new BEC [Central Executive Bureau].
A major decision is also expected from this congress: The dissol~stion of the
National Assembly which, according to the logic of the reorganization should
reflect the newly installed teams at the head of all the party's organizations.
Acting in favor of the president is the notorious unpopularity of BEC members.
Several are accused of having instigated the violent repression of student
demonstrations a year ago. Moussa Traore also counts on the support of~his
administrative cadres. A number of them--including regional governors--felt
they were being slighted by the oligarchy which took over the party after its
inception in March 1978. Even the president wanted to restore the balance
between the political and administrative classes. For this purpose he had the
I'ebruary congress adopt two important measures: Since then, ambassadors and
regional governors are henceforth de jure members, of the National Council;
henceforth, high officials appointed by decree can aspire to elective offices
both in the National Assembly and in party organizations.
It remains to be seen if the cadres, courted in this manner, will perform
- effectively, by canvassing for positions at various levels of the UDPM. If not
given the party's preeminence over the government, Moussa Traore will, it is
true, again still be president of the republic and secretary general, but
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isolated in the midst of those he could not eliminate. So isolated that he
won't be able to count on the last of the loyal officers who, on
10 November 1968 carried out the coup against Modibo Keita and who supported
him in 1978 when he decided to restore a constitutional existence in Mali.
Only 4 of the 14 who toppled Modibo Keita were still in power at the start of
1981: Gen Moussa Traore, himself; Cols Amadou Baba Diarra, Filifing Sissoko and
Youssouf Traore. The others have disappeared, died, been sent tu prison or back
to the barracks, the victims of the internal rivalries and settling of accounts
which for 10 years were what passed for politics. Then on 7 May 1981 Col Yous-
souf Traore too left the limelight. But he did so by personally resigning from
his position as party information and culture secretary.
This resignation was unexpected from Moussa Traore's constant protege. But it
- was, logical: The party committee he chaired had been dissolved a week before
for having drawn up a report on the school situation which was, moreover,
rejected by tl~e executive bureau. According to reliable sources, this report
supposedly sanctioned measures deemed too favorable to the student movements
(that are outlawed anyhow): The reopening of teaching establishments (the
university has not reopened for the 1980-1981 period, now ending); resumption
of scholarship grants; amnesty fcr the students who skipped last year's exams
anc' are now forbidden to enroll in any other school. According to other sources,
ho~oever, Youssouf Traore and his committee allegedly erred in the direction of
"demagogy" by proposing commitments which, the treasury quite obviously could
not meet.
Flaving lost his right arm in a hunting accident, this strict officer, was still
rioussa Traore's right hand man. Both a man of action and a man of words, Youssouf
Traore acquirea a reputation for "piety" thanks to his marabout friends. A
former minister of education, he even came forth as someone who could talk with
tlle students, even though his dialogue was often reduced to a litany of promises.
So much so that the national education seminar, organized with his help in
December 1978, was the distant source of the 1980 student riots. Promises made
~~t ttiat time were never kept. Youssouf Traore was rejected and will henceforth
be seen by the students simply as a"person who could talk.". On pension follow-
- ing his resignation, he is now back to being a civilian released from his offi-
cer's oath: Loyalty to Moussa Traore. But, Youssouf is not alone in wanting
to distance himself. Twice, since the beginning of the year, Col Amadou Baba
1)i.arra, deputy secretary general of the party and, consequently the number two
man in htaoi, has submitted his resignation to Moussa Traore who turned it down.
Ilis triends say that he remained more out of loyalty than conviction.
The last comrade from 1968, Col Filifing Sissoko also is supposed to have been
eclipsed. As the president's cabinet chief, this taciturn officer has always
been like a spider, backstage, spinning and spreading its web around the lead
actors. But he also is allegedly strongly challenged within the party's execu-
tive bureau.
Adding to this unease surrounding Moussa is a wave of grumbling at the lowest
levels. Since December 'A`"' `wo conspiracies of nonranking police officers
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have been foiled in time. The first one, rather sordid, was instigated by a
first sergeant who had used his participation in an investigative co~nittee
on corruption to avoid paying enormous debts. Ordered by Moussa Traore to pay
a merchant, the officer simply dreamed up the final solution, that is, a coup.
The second conspiracy, discovered in January 1981, was more serious since it
implicated the USSR. A Soviet diplomat was caught in the act of delivering
weapons to nonranking police officers. He was expelled.
_ The incident has greatly cooled relations between Bamako and Moscow. It has,
- above all, heightened the climate of suspicion prevailing in the Mali's capital.
In a word up, Moussa Traore has never had to fight on so many fronts at the same
- time. To realize promised chan:ges he must get rid of the most discredited lead-
ers in his party. Abandoned or, at least, somewhat shunned by his last remain-
ing comrades in arms he hasn't yetsucceeded in winning over the civilian cadres
he needs.
Shaken by "Soviet betrayal" he is no longer safe from another attempted coup.
And this is the moment he has chosen to prepare a constitutional coup: A
forced march to reorganization of the entire political class.
He can succeed, provided the party elections still have some sort of ineaning in
the eyes of the Malians.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981
9626
CSO: 4400/1260
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MOZAMBIQUE
MACHEL SENDS PERSONAL ENVOY TO MITTERRAND GOVERNMENT
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 9-21 Jun 81 p 29
[Text] Our comrade Aquino de Braganca, personal advisor to President Samora Machel,
was dispatched to Paris following President Francois Mitterrand's installation at
the Elysee Palace. Aquino de Braganca's nwnerous friendly ties with French
political circles, notably within the left, have already given him the opportunity
to hold important meetings both at the level of the Socialist Party and of the
Mauroy government, as well as with French trade union leaders. Aquino de Braganca
transmitted to his interlocutors the wishes of President Machel, of the FRELIMO
Party and of the Mozambican people to strengthen Franco-Mozambican ielations.
He was also charged with presenting Machel's strategy vis-a-vis the expansionist
and aggressive aims of South Africa. "In Maputo," Aquino de Braganca told Lionel
Jospin, first secretary of the French Socialist Party, "the hopes of the leaders
and the people have considerably increased with the arrival to power of the French
- left and the positive prospects for a radical change in Paris' policies toward
Africa..."
Additionally, Aquino de Braganca had a long meeting with Pierre Mendes France, who
confirmed to him that he favored sanctions against Pretoria and that he fully
agreed with the ideas developed on the sub~ect by Lionel Jospin during his speech
at the opening of the UNESCO conference.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Afrique-Asie.
- CSO: 4719/44
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MOZAI~IQUE
INCREASING ASSISTANCE FROM ZIMBABWE Ir ANTI-MNR FIGHT
London NEW AFRICAN in English Jun 81 p 34
[Text]
_ THE SOUTH African-backed Mozambi- fteports from the Mozambique-
can Resistance Movement (MRM) con- Zimbabwe border area confirm increased
tinues to be a major source of concern for South African invo!vement in the conflict
President Samora Machel's Government. between the organisation and FRELIMO
The group has stepped up its terrorist troops.
attacks on Mozambican installations and According to white farmers in the area,
on villagers who live in its "operational South African helicopters have been
area", particularly along the Zimbab- spotted just across the border.
wean border. The choppers usually come in during
Recently, close to 200 villagers fled the night and seem to be operating freely,
into Eastern Zimbabwe from the town of mainly due to Mozambique's lack of
Espangura after it had been attacked. sufficient air power.
In the attack, a 2~t-year-old girl strap- It is also known that Zimbabwe, which
ped to her mother's back was shot and has a defence pact with Mozambique, has
died as villagers fled across the border. deployed a crack battalion of its national
The mother was hit in the leg by a army to patrol the border.
bullet and had emergency surgery at Military sources confirmed in Zim-
~Iount Selinda Mission Hospital. babwe that a battalian composed of
According to the mission doctor, the former troopa of th~ etite Rhodeaian
toddler bled to death after a bullet tore Light Infantry and former ZIPRA and
open an artery in her thigh. ZANLA guerillas who know the terrain
well from the days. of the Rhodesian
Lines Cu t liberation war, have been sent there from
their base near Umtali.
This is in line with the stand taken by
The dissidents were also behind the the Zimbabwean leader, Mr Robert
recent sabotage of power lines from Mugabe, who has declared that an attack
- Cabora Basaa Dam, Mozarnbique's on Mozambique is an attack on Zim-
multi-million hydro-power station. babwe.
The lines had been cut several times in The increasing number of visits to
the past resulting in large repair bills Zimbabwe by top Moza~nbican military
having to be met by Mozambicans. officers suggests increasing co-operation
Laying direct responsibility on the in the border war.
terrorist group and its allies in Pretoria, Lt.-General Sebastian Mabote, the
the Mozambican News Agency (AIM) MozambicanDeputyMinisterofDefence,
said in an English language newscast: was in Zimbabwe earlier this year.
"These groups operate from bases in During the visit it was announced by
South Africa with the support of certain Zimbabwe's military chief, Mr Emmer-
sectors of the Pretoria regime." son Mnangagwa, that 40 MRM dissidents
had been captured by Zimbabwean
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forces.
- And during Zimbabwe's Independence
celebrations in mid-April, four top
Mozambican military chiefs including
the Defence Minister, Lt: General Joa-
_ quim Chipande, met in Salisbury for
talks with Mnangagwa and members of
Zimbabwe's Joint High Command.
- The talks centred on the border situa-
tion and the 200 refugees who have since
returned home.
Meanwhile, Zimbabwe has promoted
its wartime guerrilla leaders to the rank
of lieutenar?t-general.
They are Lookout Masuku, comman-
der of Joshua Nkomo's ZIPRA and
commander of ZANLA Rex Nhongo.
ZANLA is the military wing of Prime
Minister Mugabe's ZANU l PF)�
COPYRIGHT: 1981 IC Magazines Limited
CSO: 4700/103
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MOZAMBIQUE

~
DEFENSE'S GUEBUZA MEETS WITH UK OFFICIALS
PM251417 London THE GUARDIAN in English 25 Jun 81 p 7
[Report by Victoria Brittain: "Mozambique 'on Brink of War
. [Text] Mozambique celebrates its sixth anniversary of independence today, having
- weathered the expulsion of a CIA spy ring, overcome an invasion by South African
soldiers aided by [word indistinctJ Mo2ambican officers, and has moved to the
brink of "a very seriaus and dangerous war" with South Africa, according to
Armando Guebuza, deputy minister of defence and FRELIMO's political commissar
of the armed fo rces.
Mr Guebuza's job makes him a close monitor of the subversion and sabotage by
South Africa which has occurred in Mozambique since the Portuguese left in ,
1975--FRELIMO cadres beheaded and impaled on stakes, civilian buses mined,
power transmission cut, refugees fleeing into neighbouring Zimbabwe.
Mr Guebuza is the archetypal successful African revolutionary--elegant,
articulate, well-informed, and too worldly to have high expectations of ~
Western knowledge or interest in the ~risis of his country.
His party delegation to Britain this week has been meeting labour, liberal
and communist party members as part of a diplomatic~effort by African countries
to stop Britain being quieCly wooed into collusion with President Reagan's
southern African policy, "The Reagan administration must choose: to side with
South Africa...racist...inhuman, or stay with free, black Africa."
Namibia is the immediate issue, "Since Reagan came, the South Africans feel
supported...they have succeeded in delaying a decision in Namibia, and Reagan
is aiding them in delaying the decision."
- Mr Cuebuza meets Mr Richard Luce at the foreign office today. "Mr Luce's
statements on Namibia have been correct, important--but does the West really
mean what it says?"
Mr Guebuza is also paying a courtesy call on the Defence Ministry. "All our
- military equipment comes from the Eastern block, The Chinese give assistance
with textiles and agriculture only.... The West has never supplied any arms to
Mozambique. The West avoids supporting any democratic, really democratic movement."
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Will we be asking for British military assistance? "We are trying to develop
cooperation with Western countries." The diplomatic answer seems to indicate
that the cooperation will be only diplomatic not material.
Mozambique has declared this to be the decade of war against under-development
and has experi~nented with some returns to private enterprises. Last year
FREL IMO appeared to be close to joining th e Lome convention, to cooperate with
the European Economic Co~nunity, but they have now opted for COMECON, the
East European economic grouping, according to Mr Guebuza.
_ Immediately after the South African raid on Maputo in January the Soviet Union
sent two warships to Mozambique, the first such visit for a year.
"Seuth Africa is building an army on our borders , They are using the same
methods as the Portuguese and the Rhodesians...these armed gangs in our country,
the South Arricans are commanding them, training them. They give them arms,
communications and logistical support,"
The largest of the known Mozambique dissident movements is MRM (Mozambique
Resistance Movement), previously supported by the white khodesian authorities.
Neither the economic nor political sabotage work of armed attacks over the
border, have altered Mozambique's moral, material and diplomatic support for
the banned South African ANC,
"We do not have military camps in Mozambique, belonging to ANC, as we did
openly for Mugabe. It is a different situation."
For how long? "It depends on how the situation in all southern Africa evolves...
a lot depends on the West,"
COPYRIGHT: Guardian Newspapers Limited, J~.ine, 1981
CSO: 4700/109
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REUNION
ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH MAURITIUS
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Jun 81 p 1554
[Article--passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]
- [Text] The first professional meet3.ngs between businessmen of Reunion and the
Island of Mauritius took place 1-4 April in Mauritius. The talks were organized
by the respective chambers of commerce of the two countries and also the Reunion
liaison committee on economic affairs. Further meetings were to take place 2
months later on Reunion.
The delegation from Reunion participating in the f irst meeting was composed of
officials in the various economic sectors (transport, tourism, banking, data
processing, training, publicity, information, industry, imports, distribution,
professional associations...) who were involved in joint deliberations on the
following four subjects:
--cooperation in tourism.
--inter-island cooperation (maritime, telex and telephone links, postal links,
translations of comanercial documents, exchange of information, meteorology).
--exchanges in the services sector (training, insurance, data processing,
cultural exchanges, radio and television broadcasting).
--shared information on investment possibilities on each of the islands. With
= respect to reciprocal investment possibilities, it should be kept in mind that
three avenues have been proposed:
--The first is based on the observation that each island taken individually does
not have a sufficient market to justify the creation or maintenance of a production
unit, that a viable market would require both countries. It is in this context
that there has been talk of manufacturing on Mauritius or Reunion to supply needs
of the two islands, such as bagasse particle board, grocery sacks, and cement, as
well as stamping of bottle-caps and metallic boxes.
--The second way discussed is that of dividing up the stages in the production
cycle of a product between the two islands in order to benefit as much as
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r~x urr~~iAL U~~ VIVLY
possible from the strong points of each island. Qne could thus imagine that the
part of the production cycle that demands heavy investments and consumes a great
deal of electric energy, for example, would be carried out on Reunion, where
financial investment conditions are favorable and where energy is less costly, .
while the part of the pr.oduction cycle that requires a great deal of manpower
would be carried out on Mauritius, where the conditions in this area are clearly
more advantageous. There was also talk of a textile industry that could have the
� garments made in Reunion and the cloth milling as well as a furniture industry on
Mauritius.
--The third way is creation of new industries where the expansion of e.~cisting
industries in one or the other of the islands, on the basis of mutual financial
participation in specific agreements related to production as well as distribution
- of products--not only to the two islands themselves, but even to the countries
of East Africa. The manufacture of f.ertilizer on Mauritius and of perfume in
Reunion were cited in this connection.
With respect to inter-island communication:
1) On the subject of /maritime links,/ it was decided: to harmonize the priority
- systems of port utilization in the two islands, and the managers of the
respective ports will hold discussions on any investment in port equipment; that
ttlere is a need for both ports to have trans-shipment capabilities and for the
a~hievement of a balanced allocation of tonnage of transshipped merchandise
~n terms of the pr.imary destinations of cargo; to establish, as soon as possible,
a body on Reunion similar to the Mauritian Council of Loaders with a view to
- organizing Feriodic meetings between the two bodies in an effort to reach a
common position in their dialogue with transport help in both aerial and mariti.me
sectors; to harmonize the rate schedules for the services offered by each of the
ports .
2) On the subject of /air links,/ it was suggested that freighting charges
between Mauritius and Reunion be harmonized and lowered, and that a business
affidavit be created for economic operators traveling between the two countries.
_ 3) On the subject of /telecommunications,/ it was decided: to request the
application of so-called "slack-hour~' rates with invoicing charges reduced by
ha1f; to request the Mauritian Gavernment to take the measures needed to improve
the internal network on the island.
4) In a more general way, it was suggested that a/Mauritius-Reunion Office
of Trade and Development/ be established that could take the form of two branches
each }leaded by a chamber of commerce and industry.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981
9516
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REUNION
UPCOMING PORT IMPROVEMENTS TO POSSESSION BAY
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Jun si P 1551~
[Article--passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]
[Text] In a recent "information letter," the Reunion Chamber of Commerce and
Industry discusses plans to expand the port at Possession Bay. This follows a
meeting last March of the ports and industrial zones management and improvements
committee of the consular assembly, a meeting whose aim was to assess the
progress made in studies of the financing of the investments for the construction
work on the port of Possession Bay.
Possible Sites Examined
_ We recall that the results of preliminary studies on the port expansion were
_ presented to the plenary assembly of the chamber of commerce at its meeting on
13 June 1980. These early studies had described the problems with the present port
and their consequences for the future, and had identified what would be needed in
terms of additional studies (trends in vessel size, trends in traffic, projected
- expectations). The case was made for the necessity of adding two new piers to the
port that can receive ships with gross tonnage of 30,000 as a first stage. The
various possible sites for building this expansion were studied, and the plenary
assembly declared itself unanimously in favor of building an extension in
- Possession Bay. At the plenary assembly of 16 December 1980, the plan for
financing the construction and its anticipated consequences to the port authority
budget were the object of a detailed presentation. The measures called for in
the financial study to provide for the financing of the investment--specifically
_ a general increase ix~ port fees, and the creation of specific taxes, were approved.
- These various measures have been in effect since 15 February.
North-Northwest Orientation: Two Piers Lined Up Side by Side
After a call for bids, the technical and economic studies on the port extension
were entrusted to a group made of /The Autonomous Port of Havre and the General
Technology and Research Company (PAH-SGTE)/ and the hydraulic studies to the
/French Central Hydraulics Laboratory (LCHF)./ The first phase of technical
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studies was presented to the port committee at its meeting on 10 June 1980.
Since that time, rough draft studies have been completed. The aim in mind was to
- refine the decision made about the site in Possession Bay.
With respect to the entry channel, the solution adopted was a north-northwest
orientation. As for the internal lay-out of the port,the decision was made to
line the two new piers up side by side. This in effect provides great flexibility
in utilization and assurance of adequate maneuvering ro4m for the pilots. Also
envisioned is a further enlargement of the inner harbor, which would then be 800
x 200 meters instead of the current 490 x 120 meters, thereby providing a stretch
of 1800 meters of piers accessible to ships of 50,000 tons.
Beginning of Construction: End of 1981-Early 1982
At this meeting, the members of the co~ittee also took stock of progress on
technical hydraulic and environmental studies. It was also confirmed that a
series of soundings will be carried out at sea under the pierhead of the dikes
following a parallel series of land soundings, the dredging operations, and the
survey of shifts in the currents made in the fourth quarter of last year...
jdork on expanding the port of Possession Bay should begin in late 1981-early 1982.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981
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SENEGAL
BRIEFS
, ITALIAN AID PROJECTS--Senegalese Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Moustapha
Niasse paid an official three-day visit to Italy between 11 and 13 Ma.y. He had
numerous talks with his Italian counterpart, Emilio Colombo, at whose invitation he
made the trip. In the course of his stay, relations between the two countries were
strengthened. For example, Italy agreed to grant Senegal a credit balance of
4.5 billion CFA francs and another sum of credit totaling more than 2 billion for
fishing. Both parties examined another list of projects, which will be di.scussed
in greater depth during the visit Senegalese Minister of Planning and Cooperation I,ouis
Alexandrenne will pay to Italy. These projects came to several thousands of
billions of CFA francs. In addition, Italy has decided to agree to the most
- favorable conditions for its participation in the OMVS [Senegal River Development
Organization~ projects. (Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
5 Jun 81 p 1532] [COPYitIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie. Paris 1981] 5157
CHINESE CULTURAL AGREEMENT--Senegalese Minister of State for Culture Assane Seck and
Ambassador of the People's Republic of China to Dakar Zong Ke Wen signed a cultural
agreement on 21 May in accordance with which the two countries will develop the
_ relations already existing between Dakar and Beijing. By this agreement, China and
Senegal undertake to promote trade in the realms of art, education and health, and
also in the information sector. The countries already have excellent cultural
- r~la!inns, in par~icutar where educdcion is concerned. In Fact, for sowe years,
Senegalese students on scholarship from Beijir~g are pursuing their education in China
in various fields. Also in the realm of public health, Chinese technicians have
alreac3y made their contribution, functioning in the rural zones in part~cular. Thus
in signing a cultural agreement, Dakar and Beijing have simply created the legal
framework needed for the consolidation of their relations. In addition, China's
- contribution in the farm sector is of undeniable importance, particularly where food
crops such as rice are concerned and in the water power sector. A number of Chinese
projects have already been completed or are being ca.rried out thanks to the China
_ Drilling Mission [Mission Chine-Forages]. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDI-
TERRANEENS in French 5 Jun 81 p 1533j [COP`IRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie. Paris 1981] 5157
BR.AZI~ OFFERS CREDIT--Senegalese Minister of Planning and Cooperation I,ouis Alexandreme
paid an official visit to Brazil between 25 and 29 May to study the use of a credit
line of $12 million offered to Senegal by the government in Brasilia. That govern-
ment reports that the Senegalese are interested in purchasing equipment for the
food industry, electrical projects, reforestation and fire control, water power develop-
ment, hospitals and public works. [Text] [Paris MARCI~S TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS
in French 5 Jun 81 p 1533] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie. Paris 1981] 5157
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ZAMBIA
BRIEFS
AUSTRIA PROVIDES AID--On welcoming Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs Willibald
Pahr in Lusaka on 19 May, President Kaunda emphasized that the production of
ethanol from sugarcane is vital for a country such as Zambia, whose oil bi11 is
high. He expressed satisfaction with Austria's wi.llingness to cooperate in the
establishment of ethanol production units in the country. Also thanks to the visit
paid by the Austrian minister to Zambi.a, a long-term loan of one million kwachas
granted by the government in Vienna to Maamba Collieries was made a gift. In
addition, Austria has recently aided Zambia in the cattle raising and dairy pro-
duction sector. It provided 90 head of cattle in 1979 a.~d I30 in 1980. [Text]
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Jun 81 p 1547] [COPYRIGHT:
Rene Moreux et Cie. Paris 1981] 5157
WORLD BANK LOAN--A spokesman for the World Bank announced in May in Lusaka that the
officials of that body had appro~ed the granting of a Ioan of 9.5 million kwachas
to Zambia for agricultural projects in the eastern province of the country. This
financial aid, over a period of 5.5 years, should make it possible to increase
agricultural production there as well as to raise the standard of living of the
small farmers, through the provision of technical advic~, financial aid and various
services, and increasing the farm product storage capacity. It is hoped that
annual production of corn can thus be increased by 16,SU0 tons, that of cotton by
4,000 tons, that of sunflower seeds by 2,300 tons, and.that of peanuts by 1,500 tons.
[Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Jun 81 p 1547]
[COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie. Paris 1981] 5157
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