JPRS ID: 9816 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020055-5
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 55
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9816
26 Jun~ 1981
V~est E u ro e R e o rt
p p
CFOUO 30/81)
FBIS ~OREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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NOTE
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JPRS L/9816
26 June 1981
WEST EUROPE REPORT
(FOUO 30/81)
CONTENTS
THEATER FORCES
ITALY
OTOMACH 2: All-Italian Super$onic Antiship Missile
(AIR & COSMOS, 30 May 81) 1
ENERGY ECONOMICS
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Spanish, Portuguese Oil Dependency, Alternative Energy Sources
(LA PENINSULE LUSO-IBERIQUE, 1980) 2
MILITARY
FRA;QCE
Flying, Servicing of Naval Unit's Aircraft Discussed
(Jean de Galard; AIR ~ COSMOS, 2 May 81) 8
Navy Has Received 51 of 71 Super Etendard Aircraft
. (Jean de Galard; AIR & COSMOS, 2 May 81) 12
Helmet-Mounted Artillery Aiming Device Described
(Gerard Collin; AIR & COSMOS, 25 Apr 81) 14
- a - [III - WE - 150 FOUO]
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THEATER FORCES IT~Y
OTOMACH 2: ALL-~TAL IAN SUPERSONIC ANTISHIP MISSILE
- Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 30 Ma.y 81 p 46
[Text] The Italian companies OTO Me].ara SpA a~d Alta Romeo Avio SpA just
announced this past 14 Apr il th at they have signed an agreement for the
_ joint development of a new supersonic antiship missile--completely Italian
- designed and built. The "Otomach 2" mtssile, capable of flying at Mach 2
(as its name indicates) is slated for the Ttalian Navy. Based on the
Franco Italian. "Otomat" developed by OTO Melara and Matra, it will be pro-
pelled by an 800 to Z,000 kg high-efficiency turbo~et perfected by Alfa
Romeo Avio and derived from the AR 318 engine. It will be fitted-out with
a four-stage axial compressor and a two-~tage turb3ne. The Italian firm
FIAT Aviazione will take part in development of the engine via a private
agreement with Alfa Romeo Avio.
Overall performance characteristics of the new missile are not available,
however it is known that the advantages of a supersonic missile is its
range as well as its near-target maneuverab3lity. ,Note that the 200-plus
km-range OTO Melara "Teseo" missile was an offshoot of the 180 km-range
"Otomat" subsonic missile.
Photo caption: General configuration of the new "OTOMACH 2" Italian missile
(sketch by our Italian counterparts at INTERARMA)
CSO: 3100/783
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ENERGY ECONOMICS INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
SPANISH, PORTUGUESE OIL DEPENDENCY, ALTE&NATIVE ENERGY SOURCES
~ Paria LA PENINSULE LUSO-IBERIQUE in French 1980 (eigned to press 3rd quarter of
~ 1980) pp 99-103, 219
[Text or Part 1"Energy Dependence" of aection entitled "Political and Economic
Background" in the book "The Luao-Iberian Peninsula" by Alberto Santos, National
Defenae Studies Foundations.~Journal No 18, Supplement to Paris STRATEGIQUE in
F~ench iesue No 8(4th quarter ~f 1980) 235 pp] ~
, (Text~ Both the Portuguese and Spaniah economiea are heavily dependent on oil
r supplies.
While the Portuguese economy is 84.06 percent dependent ~n oil aupplies,l has no
deposit being exploited and ie not engaged in serious prospecting either on the
continent or on the continental ahelf, Spain, whi~h is, however, exploiting some
depoaite the production of which is declining year by year, is as dependent as ita
neighbor.
For example, in 1977 Spanish oil production totaled 1,630,000 tona, which dropped to
850,000 tons in 1978, an insignificant volume in comparison to the 47,600,000 tons
imported in 1977.2
Portugal's economic vulnerability in terms of oil deliveriea is the greater since the
successive constitutional governments have puraued a~oat ambiguous foreign policy
in relation to the Arab producer countries.
Portugal's relations with the Arab countries became somewhat cooler following
! the peremptory decision of Mr Soares to reestablish relations between his country
and Israel.3
At the present time, relations with the Arab countries are far from reestabliahed,
and the present government's policy of breaking off relations with Iran following the
seizure of the American hostages in Tehran has not improved the situation. Moreover,
Iran supplied 19 percent of the total oil imported and ranked third, after Iraq and
Saudi Arabia, as a supplier of oil to Portugal.4
While Porrugal has problems where a guaranteed supply of oil is concerned, Spain on
the contrary has its supply assured because, in particular, of the continuity of a
foreiga policy which still does not recogniae Israel. In brief, the oil crunch is
much more of a constraint on Portugal than on Spain which, apart from ite limited
production of oil, has other domestic energy and raw material reaources, while
Portugal is very poorly endowed.
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Spain, which supplied irtself with energy during the dictatorship's autarchic
period from its hydroelectric power plants scattered throughout the national
territory and located along the rivere croseing the peainsula (Douro, Tagus,
Gu~diana, Minho, Lima, Mondego), as we1,1 as from the rich coal minea in Asturiae
and on the Leon Platesu, undertook to restructure ite energy policy as soon as it
glim~sed the development of its domestic market. Oil and gas imports increased
considerably at the end of the 1950s and beginning of the 1960s, a period during
which increasing intereat could be seen in the building of nuclear power plants.5
Hydroelectric energq, which is doubtless the cheapest energy.and for which Spain
has excellent conditions, flourished throughout the whole of the first phase of
~ the economic boom period in the 1960s, while interest in coal began to decline.
In 1950, hydroelectric energy supplied about 16.7 percent of total energy produc-
tion, while by 1965 3.t supplied about 27 percent, beginning to decline as of the
end of the 1960s and totaling only 13.4 percent in 1973-74.6 ~
� - - -
_ . _ _ . _
In the course of the years 1967 and 1968, there was a hiatua in the overaccumulation
of dams, accompanied by stepped-up imports of hydrocarbona, coming almoat entirely
from the Middle East. Today, Spain still has 4U0 dame and ranks fourth in the world
among the countries having the most eizable artificial water reservoirs.
But the second half of the 1960s was characterized above all by a co~aitment to the
bui~ding of nuclear power planta. Z'he firet plants on which conatrucCion was under-
taken in Spain are beginning to be productive. The first plant commission~d was
that in Zorita, located 66 km from Madrid, in 1968, followed by that in 5anta Maria
de Garona, near Burgos. The other plants commissioned in the early 1970s are located
nearer the periphery of the country: thoae in Vandellos, near Barcelona; Lemoniz,
near Bilbao; Almaraz, on the Tagus, 70 km from th~ Por.tuguese frontier; Asco, near
Tarragona; Coffrentes, near Valencia; and Sayago, on the Douro, 15 km from the
Portuguese frontier.~
Spain's nuclear potential thus increased subatantially during the 1970s. In 1972,
Spain had already moved ahead of Italy, Switzerland, ~w~den, the Netherlande and
Belgium, and was producing about half as much ~s the FRG.8 Y~ 1974, it ranked
eighth or sixth in the world, depending on whether or not plants under conatruction,
the number of which has not ceased to iacrease, were taken into account. In 1979,
the Spanieh government authorized the conatruction of two new plants, one the central
part of Spain at Trillo, and the other on the Guadia~a, at Val de Caballeros, near
the Portuguese frontier, in th~ province of Badajoz.
The rapid development of nuclear energy production beginning in the aecond half of
the 1960s did not, however, i~mnediately slleviate Spai*~'s vulnerability in the energy
sector. It continues to import an increasing volume of oil from the Arab countries,
and most important, in order to keep its own nuclear power planta functioning, it is
becoming increasingly dependent on the United States, its main eupplier of enriched
uranium.
Spain is a country which is moderately rieh in uranium. In 1975, it had 7 uranium-
be~ring deposita located along the vertical frontier line atretching from the north
- (Chaves) to the south (Elvas) between Spain and Portugal. It has other deposits
located in the Morena Mountaine, on the west~rn.plateau, in the Carnena and Andujar
regions, etc.
Today it ranks ninth among the natione of the world and ita reaervea are eatimated at
200,000 tons,10 but it still does not produce enriched uranium.
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The uranium extracted frou~ the Spanish aubaoil is sold to Canadian and American
firma which process it before reselling it. At the end of the 1~960s and during the
1970s, the United States made massive salee of enriched uranium to Spain, with which
it has nuclear cooperation agreements, although its own legislation prohibits it
_ from selling nuclear materials to countries which are not signatories of the 1968
treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapona.
In 1976, Spain had 1,100 nuclear reactors in operation and 7,200 under construction,
which would allow it to reach a capacity of about 8,300 megawatts by 1985. This
capacity is close to that of England and equal to more than half that of the USSR.11
Estimates by Spanish government bodies, which in our view are optimistic, predict
that Spain will be self-sufficient in the energy field by about 1993.12 The reactors
in service at all of the Spanish nucle~r power plants with the exception of Vandelos13
are American reactors manufactored by Westinghouse or General Electric.
Recently, substantial Spanish public credit has been allocated for the construction
of the uranium processing plant Ciudad Rodrigo, located about three km from the
Portuguese frontier. However, this plant seems to be faced with problems of fuel
supply and storage, despite the aid provided by American technicians.
The fact~~ which have just been set forth, despite "th~ir brevity, show that develop-
ment in the nuclear field is on2 of the key axea in Spain's energy policy. More-
over, the Spanish leaders have expressed their intention to make a nuclear power of
thPir country if necessary: the national defense program and the military policy
adopte~~i by the first UCD [Deraocratic Center Union] congress in October of 1978 bear
witness to this intention. American specialists say, moreover, that Spain has the
capacity to produce 166 bombs per year14 and the Spanish government leaders, for
their part, express the desire to make an atomic bomb of a tactical nature which
could be transported by the Spanish air force operational next year.15
_ Where Portugal is concerned, one of the errora with the most serious consequences
made by the six pro~isional governments and the six constitutional governments which
have followed one upon the other since 25 April 1974 was the indefinite shelving of
the energy policy, which the country nonetheless needed. In fact, imports of energy
raw materials come to about 90 percent of the total, and 15 percent of the population
still does not have electricity,16
The coal resources of Portugal are also very limited. They account for 2 percent of
the energy flow while hydroelectric energy accounts for about 75 percent. Portuguese
hydroelectric energy still falls far short of the vigorous development of that of
Spain, and is in part dependent on this neiohboring country, for it i.s derived from
rivers a part of whose course flows through Spain. Since the Vilarinho Das Furnas
and the Carrapatelo dams were commissioned at the end of the 1960s and early in
1970, no dam has been built in Portugal, with the exception of the launching of the
construction of Alquelva, a major dam on the Guadiana, the work on which was sus-
pended in 1979 by a decision of the IME, which deemed it too costly. Hydroelectric
energy, although efficient, accounts for five-sixths of the country`s electricity
consumption.l~
Where uranium production is concerned, Portugal produces about 90,000 tons, i.e.,
0,3 percent of the world production, which puts it in llth place. Pri~r to the
military undertaking of the captains in April of 1974, the National Uranium
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- Enterprise (ENU) exported about 1,500 tons of uranium oxide (UgOg), basically to
the United States which, having assisted in minir_g prospecting, also provided sup-
port for the establishment of the Portuguese Nuclear Industries Company (CPIN) in
1958. Aa far as we know, there has been a hiatue in the production of uranium, and
above all in the export of this raw material, si~ce 1974.
Unlike Spain, where nuclear plants and uranium processing plants are proliferating,
in particular along the Portuguese frontier, which entails the riek of making
Portugal into a aort of nuclear garbage can, since it has no protection against
failures in the necessary maintenance of safety at the plants, this country has not
one single nuclear plant.
Currently, the building of a plant in the Peniche region, at F~rrel, is being dis-
cussed again. The proposal had already been put forth at the time of the 1973
oil crisis. The resumption of this project seems to be supported by the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), which has indicated interest since
1976 in the sale of nuclear power plants to Portugal. .
This rapid survey of the energy resources existing in the two countries reveals that
we are dealing on the one hand with a country, Spain, with a potential where re-
sources are concerned and which is pursuing an energy policy based above all on the
development of nuclear energy, without neglecting hydroelectric energy; the building
of fossil fuel plants~ and prospecting for possible oil deposits, although not seeming
to pursue any precise long-term planning; and wiCh another country, Portugal, on the
other hand, which is not only poor in resources but in whieh the successive govern-
ments have also shown a disturbing lack of interest where Che implementation of a
coneistent energy policy is concerned.
Although the future seems more viable for Spain than for Portugal in the energy
sector, we are dealing with two countries which are very dependent on foreign
sources, and they cannot alleviate th~s depen3ence except by launching suitable
- exploitation of the natural conditions on their continent~l and insular territories,
which are particularly rich in the sources of such new forms of energy as geothermal
and solar energy, sources provided by swamps, sea waves, wind, etc.
FOOTNOTES
~
1. Henri Baguenier, "Some Energy Policy Problems in Portugal;' ECONOMIA E SOCIALISMO,
48-49, 1980.
2. United Nations Bureau of Mines, ANNALS OF MIAIES, 1979.
3. Recognition of Israel and the establishment of diploma.tic relations with that
nation constituted one of the first steps taken by the Soares government. This
decision, due in part to pressure from Washington; caused something of a stir
within the government team, in particular between the ptime minister and Minister
of Foreign Affairs Ferreira, who expressed concern about the consequences this
might have in terms of relations with the Arab countries, in particular those
supplying Portugal with oil.
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4. Saiz De Bustamante, "The Nuclear Industry in Spain," ECONOMICA INDUSTRIAL, 1974.
According to Bustamante, the development of nuclear programe will be euch that
by 1993, nuclear energy will account for about 36 percent of the total produc-
tion of electricity. The remaining 64 percent will be di~tributed between
hydroelectric power (34 percent) and fossil fuel plants (30 percent).
5. In 1951, Franco created the Nuclear Energy Board, a body with the purpose of
prospecting for uranium-bearing reserves in Spain r-~d training technicians in
the nuclear field. This organization is supported by the United States and since
the beginning it studied the possibility of buildi~g nuclear plants in Spain.
Among the works on nuclear development, see R. Tamanes, "Introduction to the
Spanish Economy," Alianza Editorial, 6th edition, 1971.
6. Seven reactors, producing 6,302 MWe, were under construction in 1979. See
Sipri Yearbook, World Armaments and Aisarmament, 1980, Taylor and Francis, Ltd.,
London, 1980.
7. "United Nations, World Energy Supplies 1969-72," Statistical Papers, Series J,
Table 20, pp 150-157. The period studied shows in particular the great nuclear
boom in the United States, which quadrupled its nuclear capacity in that period.
8. The majority of the officials elected in th~ region, both on the left and the
- right, opposed the building of this nuclear power plant.
_ 9. United Nations Bureau, op. cit.
[Footnotes 8 and 9 as published; apparently they were transposed in the original.]
1.0. Spain, which with South Africa and Egypt maintains certain nuclear activities
which are not under the protection of the IAEA [International Atomic Energy
AgencyJ, was already capable in 1975 of producing 166 bombs per year. See
NUCLEAR NEWS, February 1976.
11. The Vandellos plant functions with natural uranium according to the French
model.
12. At the United Nations Assembly on Disarmament in June 1978, and then before
its General Assembly in October of the same year, Mr Ore~a, Spanish minister
of foreign affairs, confirmed that Spain would not sign the nuclear nonprolif-
eration treaty. Among the reasons the Spanish government presented, it was
stated that Spain would not a priori forgo its potential, and that it would
develop its nuclear capability in order to acquire a greater independence
from the outside. See EL PAIS, 7 June 1978, p 15.
13. According to experts, Spain will produce abciut 8,300 MWe in 1985, which will
permit it to make an average of 166 atomic bombs per year. In effect, accord-
ing to experts, each portion of 1,000 MWe is used in such a way so as to be
- able to produce 200 kg of plutoniimm, and to make a bomb 10 kg of plutonium is
sufficient: 1,660 kg (8.3 x 200) divided by 10 equals 166 bombs a year.
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14. See INF'ORMACIONES of 12 August 1979. Unfortunately, despite our persistence,
in the interviews we had with Spanish military and political officials we
were not able to obtain the least bit of further information on this question
fundamental to the future of Europe itself. See also the article published
in LE MONDE of 24 Auguat 1979 entitled "The Spanish Goverrnnent Would Like '~o
Have the Atomic Bomb."
15. With the exception of a conference held in Parto in November 1975, the indif-
ference of Portuguese rulers toward energy problems is almost total. For
information respectively on the countr;~'s potential and its current energy
policy, see Jose Gaspar Teixeira: "Da energia que temos a energia que queremos,"
COLLECAO ESTUDOS PORTUGUESES, 1976, as well as the weekly 0 JORNAL of 14 March
1980.
16. Op. cit. Henri Baguenier.
17. Op. cit. United Nations, Bureau of Mines.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Strategique
5157
- CSG: 3100/712 .
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_ MILITARY FRANCE
FLYING, SERVICING OF NAVAL UNIT'S AIRCRAFT DISCUSSED
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 2 May 81 pp 25, 27, 29
[Article by Jean de Galard]
[Text] Previously equipped with Etendard IV Ms to carry out priority attack
missions, the 17F Flotilla based at Hyeres-Le Palyvestre was the last of the
three attack flotillas of the National Navy, after the 11F and 14F, both based
at Landivisiau, to receive Super Etendards.
The first four that it received were delivered in September 1980; it was not a
question on that occasion of new planes fresh from the factory, but of aircraft
passed on from the 11F and 14F flotillas where, however, they had only logged a
few flight hours. Later on, the 17F received several planes directly from the
- factory; the most recent to be delivered, bearing thQ number 50, ~oined the
flotilla last January. It is notably equipped with the automatic-automanette
pilot tandem with which all production line planes are equipped today.
Currently, the 17F possesses only 9 Super Etendards; it will have its full com-
plement--12 aircraft--before ne~t swnmer. On 31 March 1981 it had totaled
1,740 flight hours including 242 night hours and 271 deck landings.
It was in February, 1980 at Landivisiau, in the Technical Instruction Center
(SIT) of the base, a particularly effective unit in terms of training, that the
training of the first 20 mechanics and the f irst 4 pilots of the 17F, the latter
all former Etendard IV M pilots, began. The ~raining course for ground mechanics
lasted from 2 to 6 weeks according to their specialiaation. The theoretical
instruction course for pilots lasted around 3 weeks.
This entire.first contingent of 17F pilots and mechanics then transferred to the
14F for practi.cal training while a second contingent of 17F mechanics went to
SIT at the Landivisiau base to begin in its turn theoretical training.
On the other hand, until July,~no other 17F pilot was sent to SIT at Landivisia.
On 27 June 1980, the last flight in form3tion of the 17F Etendard IV Ms took
place before mothballing and at the beginnin~ of the following month, seven other
flotilla pilots went in their turn to Brittany (owing to works which made ttie
Landivisiau runway unusable, the activity of the 14F had then been transferred
to the Lann-Bihoue naval airbase).
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A1~ter a brief so~ourn at SIT and some dozen flight hours with the 14F, the 17F
pilots obtained their Super Etendard certification and set out for Landivisiau,
to which the 14F flotilla was also returning. It was at the end of the stay
in Landivisiau that an accident which was to plunge the 17F into mourning
occurred: during a training flight, under circumstances and for reasons not yet
- completely explained, one of the recently certified pilots was killed and his
plane destroyed.
At the end of July 1980, the 17F pilots and mechanics who were still at Landi-
visiau returned to their Hyeres base. Seventy percent of the flotilla mechanics
were ~then certified for Super Etendard service; the pilots for their part con-
tinuing the progression until the 17F was declared autonomous with respect to
the Super Etendard on 5 September 1980; at that time it numbered four aircraft
and 11 certified pilots.
The latter began intensively carrying out their f irst night flights at the end
of September, and the following month the 17F participated in its first large
exercise:~this involved a joint Franco-Spanish attack at sea, which included
the use of fictive AM-39 air-to-sea missiles.
In November 1980 some ten 17F pilots received their deck-landing certification
operating on the aircraft carrier Clemenceu, at the same time moreover as otlzer
11F and 14F flotilla pilots. There followed quite naturally an on-board period
of over 2 weeks, in order to carry out operational flight~ in conjunction with
othe r ships of the Mediterranean Fleet. Laet December the 17F participated in
the traditional French-American exercise La Fayette, which brings into play
every year the units of the U.S. NavyTs Sixth Fleet and the Fzench Mediterranean
Fleet. With its seven Super Etendards the 17F was the leader of an attack
formation which included, in addition, aix Jaguars, and was escorted by eight
riirage Fl's.
Last Ma.rch, for its second ca.mpaign at aea, the 17F embarked for the first
time with its full personnel complement; 10 of the flotilla's Super Etendards
have taken part in the various training exercisea which brought together in the
Atlantic a part of the National Navy's two fleets.
The 17F's manpower today totals 146, includirig 18 pilots, 9 of whom are offi-
cers. Last year, each pilot accumulated in 12 calendar months 165 flight
hours, or 16.5 hour~ a month if the truly active period is reduced to 10
months; for this year, 180 hours per pilot are planned, or 18 hours a month
_ for an active period of 10 months.
Next month, the 17F is to carry out in Cazaux the f irst air~to-air firing cam-
paign, using SECA PEM panel targets towed by two Super Etendards carrying a
special cylinder mounted under the right wing. T'he 17r^, in spite of particularly
unfavorable weather conditions, has passed a good portion of the present month
getting themselves into a"precampaign" readiness. For 3 weeks next month, the
entire 17F personnel and equipment will be present at Cazaux for a series of
training firing.
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As regards flotilla maintenance of the Super Etendard, there is no major
, problem. Equipment which potentially might fail is immediately discarded and
replaced: it is sent to the Airship Service Department of the Naval Air Base
which uses ATEC test and verification benches in order to examine and deter-
mine the nature of the breakdown or of the malfunction of the replaced equip-
ment. It is the duty of the flotilla maintenance team to carry out, among
- certain engines from the first to come off the SNECMA [National Aircraft Engine
Study and Manufacturing Company] production line, certain specific periodic
check-ups every 25 hours; this frequency is goiag to be quickly raised to 50
hours after modification and standardization of these first engines. Involved
on this occasion are simple, quick check-ups which require neither removal of
the engine nor removing the aircraft from use. Every lOG hours, still with
respect to the flotilla, the engine requires a more thorough verification and
_ ~heck-up by eddy currents. When an engine reaches 200 hours, the plane is imme-
diately turned over to the SEA [Airship Service Department] which carries out the
periodic inspection (every 200 hours) of the 8K50. ~
At the request of operations, discussions are underway between the parties in-
volved so that Super Etendard pil.ots who, ir~ their decklanding pattern, see a
light signal appear, indicating an engine malfunction, may be able to determine
unambiguously--which is not presently the case--whether or not the malfunction
' is serious enough to endanger the safety of the aircraft (or its pilot) on land-
ing. In this case, the need to take no risks in peacetime has occasionally
= led the command to gi ve deviation orders which could have been avoided if the
malfunction could have~ been unequivocally diagnosed by the pilot.
It is of course planne~;i to install a flight simulator in Hyeres. Its delivery
- by the manufacturer LriT depends upon completion at the base of the building
which is to house it. Until it is installed, the 17F pilots will doubtless go
to Landivisiau to make use of the one which was installed there last year and
which works entirely satisfactorily.
It is to the Airship Service Department of the Hyeres Naval Air Base, itself a
part of the Technical Division, that maintenance work of the third degree on
the Super Etendards (and also on the other types of aircraft in service at the
base) falls. A special feature of SEA at Hyeres is that it is responsible not
only for the technical support of the 17F Super Etendards but also of that of
the other flotillas' Super Etendards when they are carrier-based.
As for the airframe, the formula adopted is that of inspection of the IREF
(inspection, repair by f ractional upkeep) type. An IREF inspection is carried
out every 33 months; the third IREF inspection corresponds in fact to an in-
spection of the fourth degree, after 9 years of service.
Periodic (200 hour) inspections of the Atar SK50 are carried c?~.:t by SEA at
Hyeres, which, since the putting into service of the Super Etendard, has car-
ried out three of them; each inspection takes around 2 weeks. The motor is
taken apart and the entire compressor portion plus the hot parts are checked.
General 800 hour overhauls are of the purview of the "Ateliers industriels de
1'Air" or of the "Atelier de la Marie de Cuers."
10
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007142/09: CIA-RDP82-40854R040400020055-5
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SEA makes generous use of ATEC for checking the working of the subassembly of
the SAVEM navigation and attack inertial system. The e~ectable seats are
checked every 4-1/2 months. SEA recei~res for the Super Etendard the benefit
of excellent technical assistance from Dassault-Breguet and SNECMA.
COPYRIGHT: A. & C. Paris 1981
9330
CSO: 3100/747
11
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020055-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400024055-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
MILITARY FRANCE
NAVY HAS RECEIVED 51 OF 71 SUPER ETENDARD AIRCRAFT
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French Z May 81 p 24
[Article by Jean de Galard]
[Text] In 1973, the National Navy ordered from Dassault-Breguet 71 Super Eten-
dard carrier-based planes equipped with an SNECMA [National Aircraft Engine
Study and Manufacturing Company~ Atar 8K50 turboreactor of 5,000 kp. To date,
51 planes have been delivered to Aeronavale which actually possesses only 49,
since 2 of them were destroyed in accidents in 1980. The entire group of
Super Etendards delivered totaled, on 31 March, 13,600 flight hours including
1,600 night hours and 1,900 deck landings of which 160 were carried out at
~ night. For 1980 alone, the 11F and 14F flotillas, based in Landivisiau, which
were declared autonamous with respect to the Super Etendard on 11 September
_ 1978 and 1 June 1979 respectively, have totaled nearly 6,000 flight hours in-
cluding 740 night hours and about a thoueand deck landings of which 150 were
carried out at night.
The 17F Flotilla, based in Hyeres, the third and last Navy flotilla to be equipped
with Super Etendards (normal equipping of a f lotilla is 12 aircraft), was
declared converted only in September 1980; its activity last year is therefore
not significant. .
For Rear