JPRS ID: 9786 CHINA REPORT POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020025-8
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 101
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 25
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9786
11 June 1981
China Re ort
p
POLITICAI . SOCIOIOGICAI AND N11LItARY AFFAIRS
(FOUO 3/81)
FBiS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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- enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by ques-
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JPRS L/9786
11 June 1981
CHINA REPORT
POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS
(FOUO 3/81)
CONTENTS
PEOPLE'S RF:PUBLIC OF CHINA
MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECUR~TY
Science, Technology StrESSed in Military Command Schools
(JIEFANGJUN BAO, 18 Aug 79) 1
Ji'nan Unit Forms Complete Set of Training Programs
i4lang Lifeng, et al.; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 15 At~g 79) 3
Air Force Units Test Training Reform
(Du Yuging; JIEFANG,T[1N BAO, 17 Aug 79) 6
= Articles on Meeting Demands of Modern Naval War�are
(JIEFANGNN BAO, 19 Aug 79) 8
'Enlightening Exercise', by Yu Lansheng
= Shortcomings in Training L~xamined, by Chen Shungen
Port, Coastal Training, b;~ Yang Liren
_._Problems Affectiizg Training Reviewed, by Yu Guangxin
Second Artillery Leaders Study for Modernization
- (Chen Jins~ng; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 28 Aug 79) 13
~ Airborne Division Trains New Fighters in Separate Regimen*
. (Li Yungi, et al.; JIEFANrJUN BAO, 30 A~ig 79) 15
_ Air Regiment Improves Training by Studying Enemy Aircraft
(Jin Zhifu; JIEFANGNN BAO, 31 Aug 79) 19
Tank Regiment Decides Man, Not Equipment, Is Key to Victory
(Ping Mingqing; JIEFANGJUrd BAO, 31 Aug 79) 21
Party Members Spur Training in Guided Missile Regiment
(Jiang Huazhou, Guo Qiiigsheng; JIEFANGJUI~T BAO, 1 Jul 80)........ 24
- a - [III - CC - 80 FOUO]
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Cadres Must Stiidy Warfare in Military Academies
- (Fang Hang; JIEFA~IGJUN BAO, 3 Jul SQ) 26
Leaders Asked To Put Themselves in Subordinates` Shoes
_ (Zhong Jie, Xian De; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 3 Jul 80) 29
Naval Academy Makes Major Effort To Improve Teaching Content
(He Wei, et al.; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 4 Jul 80) 31
Division Practices Closing Gap in Line Made by Atomic Weapons
(Chen Xiangmin; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 4 Jul 80) 33
Military Research Must Not Be Oversimplified
(Jiang Fangran; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 4 Jul 80) 35
Troops Must Be Well Educated in Revolutionary Outlook on Life
(JIEFANGJUN BAO, 5 Jul 80) 37
Younger Officers Supervise Training in Guangxi Border Division
(Su Jing, Wu Shibin; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 5 Jul 80) 41
Naval Base Surveys Island-Dotted Operational Sea Area
_ (Huang Yaonian; JIEFANGJUtJ BAO, 5 Jul 80) 43
Wargame Exercises Sharpen Shenyang Commanders' Skills
(Yuan Zhanxian, et al.; JIEFANGNN BAO, 6 Jul 80) 44
Division Practices Strategic Mobility on Changjiang River
(Yu Jianhua, et al.; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 8 Jul 80) 46
_ Satchel Charges Can Be Effective Against Tanks
- (JIEFANG,TtJN BAO, 8 Jul 80) 48
Antiaircraft Division Mechanizes Food Preparation
(Wei Xuding, et al.; JIEFt1NGJUN BAO, 9 JuI 80) 52
Troops Guard Vital Stretch of Vietnam Border Raiiroad
(Zhou Nanyou, Wu Jinhua; :lIEFANGJUN BAO, 9 Jul 80) 56
Divisian of Shenyang Units Benefits From Night Training
(Chen Xiangmin; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 9 Jul 80) 58
Fleet Detachment Practices Night Landing Operations .
(Xu Nengrong, Zhang Ming; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 9 Jul 80) 59
Army Sets Quality Standards for Night Training
(Hung Wei, et al.; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 9 Jul 80) 60
Work on Probationary Party Members Tightened
(Liang Huarong, et al.; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 9 Jul 80) 61
- b -
~nn n~~rrTAT TTCF (~1JT,y
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Teaching Reformed at Infantry School of Fuzhou Units
(Yi Caizi, et al.; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 10 Jul 80) b3
Artillery School, Regiment Help Each Other in Training
~ (JIEFANGJUN BAO, 10 Jul 80) fi5
All Party Members Must Set ~ood Examples for Masses
(Ji Nan; JIEFANGJUI~T BAO, 10 Jul 80) 67
Citizens Exhorted To Become Involved in Courrtry's Affairs
_ (Wang Yihua; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 10 Jul 80) 70
- 'Three Don't Policy' Does Not Preclude Ideological, Political Work
(Hai Xiao, Wang Fa'an; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 10 Jul 80) 72
Further Exploitation of Strategic Nonferrous Metals Urged
(Yu Zhijie; JTEFANGJUN BAO, 10 Ju1 80 76
Witness Report on Operations of Jamming Radar Station
(Wang Changyan, et al.; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 6 Feb 81) 79
How To Fight an Enemy With Superior Weapons ~
(Huang Peiyi; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 6 Feb 81) 81
PLA Ideological Problem Arising I~rom Policy Change
_ (Writing Group of the Propaganda Section of the Political
Department of PLA Beijing Units; JIEFANGNN BAO, 7 Feb 81).... 83
PLA Regiment Carries Out Political Education
~Jun Zheng; JIEFANGNN BAO, 20 Feb 81) $7
Strategic Policy of Positive Defense Analyzed
(Hao Junjie; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 20 Feb $1) 89
Counterattack With Small Detachments Suggested
(Xiong Zhishan; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 20 Feb 81) 93
Deception Is Regarded as Best Tac;tic
(Huang Peiyi; JIEFANGJUN I3A0, 20 Feb 81) 95
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_ MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY
SCIE~ICE, TECHIdOIAGY STRESSED IN MILITARY COMMAND 5CHAOLS
Beij ing JIEFANGJ'~+T BAO in C:hinese 18 Aug 79 p 1
[Article: "Strive to Gtiiltivate Commanders Who Meet the Requirements of Modern
Warfare"]
[Text] In order to strengthen the teaching in military academies and schools of
modern science and technology, and to cultivate more commanders who meet the re-
guirements of modern warfare, the General Staff Department recently held a meeting
on the teaching and research of modern military science and technology in all PLA
acade~ies and schools. The meeting was attended by leading cadres and instructors
from 43 command academies and schools. The meeting made a preliminary investiga-
tion of the way education is being carried out on modern military science and tech-
nology in the academies and schools, in order to make a good beginninq in spreading
the study of a?odern military science and technologg throughout the PLA.
During the period of the meeting, the personnel at the meeting spent 21 days' time
on studying the topics of nuclear weap~ns, guided missiles, artificial satellites,
lasers, night vision techniques, electronic warfare, military systems engineering,
operati.ons research, electronic computers, and command automation. Eaerybody unan-
imously reported that the study had broadened their horizons and increased their
knowledge and that big results had been gained, so that when they return to their
organizations they will have a clearer idea of how to teach.
The comrades at the meeting held that the developments of science and techr.ology
are being widely applied on the battlefield, and that it can be affirmed that the
size and scoge of a future war will be unprecedentedly large, the conditions on the
b~ttlefield will be more complex and will chanqe even more. All these things, they
� said, will impose even higher demands on organizational coa�nand. If a commander
does not have a fixed amount of knowledge about modern science and technology and
does not have the capacity for organiz.ational command in conducting operations un-
der raodsrn conditions, then it will be difficult for him to master warfare and he
will not be able to win a victory. Therefore, tc cul~ivate a large batch of com-
manders and technically talented persons who possess knowledqe about military
science, who are able to master and use modern weapons and equipment, and ~o are
able to skillfully organize an3 command forces in mociern warfare, is a strategic
measure for raising the modernization level of our armed forces and is also an ur-
gent, arduous task for the coaunand academ~es and schools must truly realize the
_ importance of l~unching education on military science and technology,
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conscientiously put it on the daily agenda, and plan, arrange, and take measures for
it. They must adopt measures to improve the organizational leadership and teaching
capability of the leading cadres and instructors of these academies and schools.
They must vigorously organize manpower and material to get a grip as quickly as
possible on the teaching of military sciencE and technology.
The meeting also studied the problems of the content, time, teaching structure, and
teaching guarantees for the teaching of modern military science and technology in
the armed forces' academies and schools, for which it put forward some opinions and
suggestions. The meeting held: The content and time for teaching science and tech-
nology should be put into a teaching outline, and the content must be differentiated
based on the different training targets; in the command academies and sck~ools, the
study of cultural education and of science and technology should be integrated,
with the latter being paramountf if ordi.nary structur2s cannot specialI.y arrange to
take responsibility for the teaching of science and technology, the responsibility
for the teaching of various topics can be separately borne by the teaching and re-
search secti.ons concerned, but the academies and schools that are cultivating cad-
res at the division level and above can, after permission is granted, set up struc-
tures for teaching science and technologys and with the regard to the pr~blem of
teaching guarantees, besides the solutions devised by the academies and schools at
various le~vels, the General Staff Department will provide a unified solution of
the problem of new-type weaponry and equipment, teaching films, and jointly using
models and wall charts. The departments concerned will conscienti.ously study and
solve the above problems.
- During the meeting, He Zhengwen, deputy chief o� staff [of the PLA General Staff
Department] and Tao Hanzhang [7118 3352 4545], deputy director of the Military
Academy, gave speeches.
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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY
JI'NAN UNIT FORMS COMPLETE SET OF TRAINING PROGRAMS
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 15 Aug 79 p 2
[Article by Wang Lifeng i3769 4539 1496], Wang Xiaoling L3769 2556 3781], Guan Jinwu
[7070 6210 2976~, and Gu Guangcheng [0657 0342 2052]: "To Carry Out Training Ef-
fectively It Is Necessary To Formulate a Complete Set of Programs"]
, [Text] Not long ago, a General Staff work team and leading comrades of the Ji'nan
Units led responsible persons of units concerned to a certain unit to observe part
- of a complete set of trainin~ programs on the topics of the "three attacks and
three defenaes." They held that this approach was correct and feasible and that it
~ was an effective way to improve traininq quality.
~ Why Do We Want Complete Sets?
Party committees at all levels in this unit have all along been fairly attentive
to military tsaining. Last year, fn line with the spirit stressed by the Military
Comimssion [of the CCP Central Committee] of "qiving prominence to training in the
, three attacks" and "strengthening training in the "three defenses," the committees
arranged the training content, stipulated the time for completion of the traininq,
, and vigorously imposed demands on the training. Who would have thought that, wYien
examined at yearend, tnost of the companies had jus~ gone throuqh the motions of
training in the "three attacks and three defenses" and that some of th~n had even
not completed the training in the prescribed time. What was the problem: Four
leading comrad~s assigned by the party committees led a work team to carry out in-
vestigation and research in the unit. A great nwnber of facts s?nowed that the
cadres and fighters of the companies wanted to be trained effectively in the "three
attacks and three defenses," and only owing to the fact that some of the training
contents and methods did not meet the requirements of modern warfare, and that for
some training contents the upper levels did not have enough time to put forward
specific methods for organizational implementation so that there was a shortage in
instructional written materials, equipment, and personnel, the companies did things
- haphazardly and the "three attacks and three defenses' training could not be car-
ried out properly. At the beginning of this year, when the unit's party committee
was studying how to shift the focus of its work so that education and traini.ng
would be at the center, it got in touch with reality and conscientiously discussed
the problems existing in the unit's "three attacks and three defenses" training.
The members of the committee unanimously held that training in the unit and educa-
_ tion in a school were the same, i.e., there must be a complete set of training
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programs for the contents of instruction, the methods of implementation, the sup-
ply of equipment, the ranks of instructors, and the standards of examination, and
- that only if each is linked to the othFr can the traininq be done rapidly and with
high quality. EWerybody decided to start by formulating a complete set of training
programs and thus effectively carry out training in the "three attacks and three
defenses."
How Does One Form a Complete Set?
How was a complete set to be formulated? First of all, the party committee organ-
ized leading cadres at all levels to engage in study so that all of them became
clear about the importance of effectively carrying out "three attacks and three de-
fenses" training, and about the task of and demand for f~rmulating a complete set
of training programs; following this, the committee formed joint work teams that
separately went to three companies, where one training topic was assigned to one
squad or platoon, which acted as an experimental point for the topic. For example,
in attacking tanks, what training contents and skills does a fighter need to study
and master? How many classes should these contents be divided into? How much time
is needed for each class? Who is qualified to teach each class? What standards
should be attained~ After this research, teaching plans were written and put into
practice. During the practice, the leaders and the masses linked up with each other
in both doiizg the work and appraising it through discussion. After finding methods,
the squad or platoon became a demonstration unit and demonstrated the instruction
throughout the company, allowing all members of the company to appraise the instruc-
tion through discussion. Then it was again enriched and revised, and �inally ex-
~ amined and revised by the joint work team. Of the prototypes produced by this ex-
perimental point training, 22 were formed into a complete set. Afterward, an
on-the-spot meeting was held at w}:ich the cadres and backbone elements observed a
training demonstration of the complete set of programs, so that the results of the
- experience gained at these points were brought to their attention.
Through this w~ork, enthusiasm was aroused throughoLt the unit for the complete set
of training programs for the "three attacks and three defenses." And once the
masses got moving, many problems that they had previously thought hard to solve
were keenly welcomed and solved.
Were there no teaching materials? Everybody was bold in practice, "you compile one
set, I will write several articles," and very quickly 29 sets were compiled and a
total of over 1,700 copies were distributed to the squads.
Was there a shortage of instructors? The leaders at all levels did not rely upon
others but set to work themselves. They conducted 49 training classes for 1,921
cadres and teaching backbone elements.
Were there no equipment or sites? The party coimnittee allocated funds and materi-
als. After it distributed 450 pieces of 10 kinds of antitank equipment, everybody
sPt to work, using indigenous methods in place of foreign ones, to level hilltops
and fill in ditches, and in less than half a year had solved this problem.
Originally, because some of the topics in the "three attacks and three defenses"
training did not have specific standard~, some comrades felt that the "standards
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were soft" and no one could tell whether the training was goad or not. In line
wit'~ the demands of actual warfare, everybody set standards one by one, so that the
next training session vaould have goals and the upper level had a basis for its
examinations.
Now the training programs for the "three attacks and three defenses" topics form
a complete set, and all training detachments basically have reached a point at
which there are teaching materials to learn from, instxuctors to teach, models te
view, equipment and sites for training, and standards for �..aking sppraisals.

~ The Advantages of a Complete Set of Training Programs
- More than half a year of practice has proven that there are many advantages in ~
complete set of training programs, and of them three are most obvious:
l. It is systematic and regular. Originally, because this or that was lacking,
- and there was no complete set, and there was not wel].-planned arrangements and
strict demands on the leadership, the next training session had nothing to follow
and each person was forced to go his own way and everyone was "fightia~g as a guer-
rilla." The result was that the training plan was constantly changing and the
essential movements were of a wise variety. Now, the key elements i~ training--
teaching materials, equipment, sites, and standards--are unified, and the entire
training is conducted like it would be in a regular school, i.e., it is planned, it
is in proportion, and it progresses in an orderly fashion.
2. Training quality is assured. Becat~se the training content, methods, and mater-
ials approximate actual warfare, the antiaircraft training is not abstract and the
antitank training is substantive, so that the "three defenses" are not just paper
exercises. This has changed the "soft star.dards" that s~ome comrades saw in the
"three attacks and three defenses" into hard standards. Wen Zhaoyue [3306 0340
1971], commander of the 7th Company of a certain regiment, gave me a statistic:
Last year, the days kept in reserve and the after-class time were devoted to train-
ing in firing, throwing hand grenades, and operating instruments. This year, be-
cause the cadres had scope and the fighters had time for training, 90 percent and
more of the comrades conscientiously trained in the "three attacks and three de-
fenses" during the days kept in reserve and the after-class time, and thus the
quality of the training improved markedly. For example, in mine-laying training,
the company, on average, ex~eeded the regular standard of excellence by 57 seconds.
3. The longstanding situation in which at the squad level and below the training
topics were shifted about has been done away with, and the tactical and technical
levels have been raised from top to bot.tom. Previously, the cadres at all levels
spent their time training individual saldiers and squads, and from the beginning
of each year they put off their own tr~ining, which did not suit the requirements
of com}~at preparedn~ss. This year, aft:er the training programs were formed into a
camplete set, there were people to teach all the classes and all levels were as-
signed to teach, so that the leaders at all levels were released for their own
training and they had the energy and time to give combined arms training to cadres,
- headquarters, and those at the battalion level and above.
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MILITARI ADID PUBLIC SECURITY
AIR FORCE UNITS TEST TRAINING REFORM
Beijing JIEFAPIGJUN BAO in Chinese 17 Aug 79 p 1
[Article by Du Yuqing [2659 5940 7230]: "Meet the Demands of Modern Warfare,
Firmly Grasp Flight Traini.ng Raform"]
[Excerpts] The Air Force recently held a training reform on-the-spot meeting at a
certain air division, at which the experiences of 17 experimental-point units were
popularized and the problem of how to further carry out well training reform was
studied.
In the past, Air Force flight traininq basically continued to use the set of inethods
devised by the Soviet Union in the 1950's. Following the development of the situa-
tion and the improvement of weapons and equi~+ment, same training contents and train-
ing methocis no longer met the demands of modern warfare and urgently needed to be
reformed. The Air Force party committee has paid full attention to this problem.
At the begi.nning of the year, the commfttee, relating to actual conditidns in t~?e
Air Force, put forward tentative plans for the training reform and decided on ex-
perimental-point units for the reform. The principal responsible comrades of the
Air Force personally examined and approved the training reform plan, regularly un-
derstood its implementation, and timely discovered and solved problems in the
reform.
Each experimental-point unit, proceeding from the requirements of actual warfare,
carried out training in dayligh~ under low-visibility weather conditions, in night-
time under complex weather conditions, in landing with two engines, in landing
without lights, and in operations with a tactical background, as well as training
in the "four fast's" (fast takeoff, fast muster for flight, fast contact with and
attack on the enemy, and fast return tc~ base), so that the flyers and flying cadres
_ are able to operate under all s~rts fo complex conditions, to attack accurately,
to understand tactics, and to exercise command, thereby improving the units' fight-
ing capacity.(2) We must carry out the: reform based. on present conditions, putting
the focus on the tactical and technicaZ levels of flyers. We must, through con-
scientious research on the performance and principal tactical measures of enemy
_ aircraft, conduct training with simulated enemy aircraft against a tactical back-
ground, summing up a set of inethods that overcome the enemy's weak points with our
strong points, so as to raise everybody's confid.ence in an operational skills for
defeat~ng the enemy.
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Training reform is also a profound idealogical revolution. Each unit paid full
attention to doing good ideological wor.k during the reform. Z'he units principally
solved problems in three aspects: One was to solve the problem of the idea of bein~
afraid to take risks. Some comrades had set training reform agair_et flying safety,
worrying that the carrying out of the reform would cause plane crashes. After the
leaders of each experimental point unit cl~arly stated the advantageous condit~ons
and goals of the training reform, everybody realized that the goal of the reform
is to make the training better conform to objective laws and better meet the re-
quirements of actual warfare. If the reform is carried o~at urell, the training wil
be more scientifically organized, the technical and tactical levels of the flyers
will be raised, and thus safety will be reliably insured. At the same time, the
leaders educated everybody to understand that the reform probes and blazes new
trails so that there is a possibility of new problems arising. This is not strange:
in science, f~~r any invention or progress a certain price must be paid. Our re-
sponsibility is to see that each training item is done as carefully and as well as
is possible and to try to reduce unnecessary losses. 'I'he second problem to solve
was the idea of passively waiting. They educated everybody to rely on the equip-
ment and facilities on hand, to learn assiduously and study with great effort, and
_ to enthusi~~stically carry out and support the training reform. T"ne third problem
to be solved was the idea of fearing h3rdship and fatigue. Each expe~imental-
point unit made a point of educating everybody to establish the idea of hard mil-
- itary training. The goal of the reform is to amek the training hetter conform to
the demands of actual warfare. The requirements of actual warfare mean great dif-
ficulty and require great strength, and we must firmly complete our missions.
, Owing to the fact that the party ~ommittees at all levels strengthened their idea-
logical leadership over training reform, the cadres and fighters maintained a
vigorous fighting morale.
After over 7 months of practice, the Air Force training reform has already dis-
played its superioritp: flying time has greatly increased, and flying is not de-
, layed by weather; the time for second takeoffs is shortenedj prominence is given
to tactical training, so that the flyers and flying cadres are able, under all
sorts of complex conditions, "to operate, attack accurately, understand tactics,
and exercise command" and the f~ghtinq capacity of the units has been markedly
improveds the time that the ground cre~w is on the airfield is shortened, which has
lightened the labor strengtY~ neededj aircraft utilization rate and aircraft main-
tenance have been improved, so that the number of aircraft sorties has increased
by 60 percent and the aircraft maintenxnce capacity has been approximately doubled;
and the political education of flying and ground personnel, the study of occupa-
tional techniques, and the time for CCP and CYL activity has been better insured
than in the past. The cadres and fighters reported: "This reform of the training
is in the right direction, its approach is feasible, its effect is marked, and it
is a model for comb~t preparedness."
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~
ARTICLES ON r~ETING DEMANDS OF MODERN NAVAL WARFARE

-;y~ Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 19 Aug 79 p 2
'Enlightening Exercise'
[Article by Yu Lansheng [0151 5663 3932] of the North [China] Sea Fleet Headquar-
ters: "Looking at the Weak Points in 7~raining From the Angle of an 'Enlightened
Exercise'"]
[Text] Recently our unit organized an exercise at sea, one part of which was
electronic jamming, which partially ref:lected electronic jamming in naval warfare
under modern conditions. Because the Y~ody of cadres have basically not been
trained in electronic jamming during peacetime, the commanders and radar personnel
on the warships were at a loss under conditions of a radar blackout. The comrades
said that this operation at sea under modern conditions was an "enlightening
exercise."
Thus "enlightening exercise" enlightened the comrades of our organization to con-
sider the following questions: What are the new features of naval war�are under
modern conditions? Do the units pay full attention to these new features? On what
level is the training now? Analyzing these questions, we could not but see that,
with regard to the new features� of naval warfare, the greater part of the units are
still in the state of being enlightened and some are even still in the etate of
ignorance. This probletn should draw a high degree of attention at all levels.
In modern warfare, in addition to electronic jamming, a guided missile at�ack is an
important feature. Attacks by various types of guided missiles have alrzady become
the main patterns of attacks by Soviet warships and warplanes. How to ~.iefend
against or evade guided missile attacks and how to lower the probabili~y of guided
- missile hits have become a new topic f~r our operations at sea and a k.ey point of
our training. However, in the current anti-guided missile training, many units
have not touched upon this problem, ancl some of them even think there is no way at
all to defend against guided missiles with the equipment on hand,. and, because of
this, defense against guided missiles has become a weak point, even a gap, in
training.
A modern navy is the epitome of the thr~ee service arms: in the air there are
torpedo-carrying aircraft, on the sea there are all types of warships and under the
sea there are submarines, and coastal ciefence has coast-to-ship guided missiles,
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making modern naval warfare three-dimensional. Therefore, raising the capacity
for coordinated operations wi11 unite and combine the service arms so that a"fist"
~ can be formed in operations at sea. In the past several years, thP basic training
of units has been greatly strengthened, but the training at sea in tactical coord-
ination has remained at a low 1eve1, and there have been many preset and map school
assignments but few live exercises. EVen if there are some exercises at sea, the
movements were coordinated at rigidly set times and places so that the exercises
were carried out according to a fixed pattern. This was very far from meeting the
demands of modern naval warfare. Defense against atomic ~:arfare and chemical war-
fare is also one of our weak links in training. Therefore, if we want to make our
_ training meet the demands of modern naval warfare, turning weak points in the
training into strong points, we must change the guidir.g ideology behind the train-
ing, and from top to bottom strengthen research on the new features of modern naval
warfare. If we do this we will not lose out in a future war.
This "enlightened exercise" also forced us to seek methods based on the equipment
- on hand and to answer new questions posed by modern naval warfare. Practice proved
that only by being bold in practice and. daring to innovate can training focusing on
the new features be carried out well. For example, when beginning to train in
resisting electronic jamming, the units had no way to set about this task. After
searching, many units have su~aed up many good methods, e.g., the radar uses methods
of irregular fanned-out searches and c~ncealed tracking, shorteni.ng the time for
sending out search waves and reducing the opportunities for enemy reconnaissance
to discover the radar, etc. All these methods are fairly effective. In fact, in a
modern local war, like the October 1973 Middle East Naval war, owing to a solid
foundation of peacetime training, The Iaraeli Navy's guided missile ships in tw~o
battles successfully evaded the attacks by guided missiles launched by Egyptian
and Syrian guided missile ships and with small-caliber fast-firing cannot shot the
guided missiles out of the sky. The Egyptian and Syrian guided missile ships
lacked the ability to conceal themselnes from attaclc and had not been trained in
resisting electronic jamming, ao that during these battles they suffered heavy
- losses. From this we can see that the idea that nothing can be done with the equip-
ment on hand is harmful. We must bestir ourselves, establish cdnfidence, and vigori
ously study the new features of modern naval warfare, search for new ways to reform
training, and improve our training.
Shortcomings in Training Examined
Beijinq JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 19 Aug 79 p 2
[Article by Chen Shungen [3088 7311 2704] of the Naval Political Department: "Where
Is the Pace of Trai.ning i2eform Slow?"]
I once covered a story on two headquarters organizations, where, discussing train-
= ing reforni, I encountered two different situations. One situation was that the
discussions were convincing and the questions dealt with causes. Originally the
commander of this unit was not very anxiaus about the unit's training quality. He
made training the central work and went all out in studying the unit's training
problems, and also personally led the naval formations in many exercises at sea.
From the map training assignments of the headquarters organization to attack
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training at sea, he worked with the organization and trained with the unit. For
the new prob~.ems of resist;ng electronic jamming and anti-guided misaile warfare,
he sought some ways of coping with the Soviet Navy's spacial mixed formations.
- However, in the other headquarters organization, when talking about training re-
form, many comrades shook their heads and said that it was "hard to do." Where
was the difficulty? The difficulty was that those who hald primary responsibility
in the headquarters organization did not put their main effort into grasping train-
ing. They did not take part in any of the unit's several exercises at sea but put
their deputies in charge of these exercises. In the exercises many problems ap-
- peared, which the commander did not pa}� attention to, and the organization and unit
became very w~orried. This illustrates a problem: if some of those who hold pri-
mary responsibility in the administration of the armed forces make an effort to
_ grasp training and some do not, there will be great differences in the quality of
training in units. In some units of tYie navy, much is said about training reform
and little is done, and this is the prablem.
If those who hold primary responsibiliL�y in the administration of the armed forces
do not grasp training, this will causa many difficulties in the carrying out of
training reform by orqanizations and units. Generally speaking, some major reforms
can be effected just at the nod of the head by one holding primary responsibility.
However, owing to the fact that those holding primary responsibility do not con-
cretely grasp training, in a given unit's training, with regard to existing pzob-
lems, tendencies that need to be corrected, new situations that arise, major re-
forms, and strategic and tactical research, they don't know what is going on and
do not put forward good positions on the reform, and the opinions put forward about
the reform by the units are like stones dropping into the sea, i.e., they disap-
pear forever. And for some things about which the situation has changed, they
issue repeated injunctions �or thP unit to train in these things, which causes the
unit's training to cover old ground and makes it difficult for enthusiasm to be
aroused for training refo~cn in the unit: and organization.
- To stress the grasping of training by t:hose holding responsibility in the adminis-
tration of the armed forces is especially important for the technical arms of the
navy.
Naval warfare under modern conditions involves scientific knowledge concerning
electronics, navigation, optics, guided missiles, and meteorology, and imposes
higher demands on naval commanders at all levels then on those in other branches
of the armed forces. However, we cannot but see that the foundation of some com-
manders is not very solid, and there is not much remaining from what they had
learned in the past. Some cadres have taken part in naval warfare, but the scale
~ of warfare at that time was small and 1:he enemy's weapons were backward. But our
future adversary is the modernized fleet of a superpower with respect to which our
experience is insufficient. The new conditions of modernized naval warfare urgent-
ly require that the principal commanders at each level personally grasp training
and relearn thinqs, study the equiptnent functions and the operational methods of
both the enemy and ourselves, continually recognize the new features of modern
naval warfare, and in peacetime leaderz~hip training obtain the right to speak at
and in wartime command obtain the capac:ity to engage in modernized naval warfare.
The quicker these ideas and actions ar~ passed along, the quicker will be the pace
of training reform in the units.
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Port, Coastal Training
~ Beijing JIEE'ANGJUN BAO in Chinese 19 Aug 79 p 2
[Article by Yang Liren [2799 4409 0088], chief of staff of a certain mosc~uito
_ boat detachment: "A Training Slogan That Should Be Restored"]
_ Early in the initial period of the building of the navy, the traininq slogan "ardu-
� ous training in ports and along coasts means precision training at sea" was raisecl,
and many warship units set up port and coast training sections in order to lay a
solid foundation for training at sea. However, in the past several years this
traditional effective training method has been discarded. After the "gang of four"
was smashed, every unit stressed hard training at sea. Obviously, this was good.,
but there appeared another phenomenon, viz, the units' time and frequency in the
pursuit see training made them neglect ardu~ous training in ports and along the
coast. Of the many port and coast training sections, some became shorthanded and
merely decorative. Thus, the warshipa at sea went around in circles and the train-
ing was not very effective.
Practice proves that arduous port and c,oast training not only provides the founda-
tion for training at sea but also is a fairly big topic for studying and tackling
difficulties. Our detachment has a mosquito boat battalion [dadui 1129 7130] that,
with regard to the training topic of attacking radar, could never solve prablems in
this regard owing to its limited time at sea. Last year a port and coast radar
teaching and training section was set up, which brought together many outstanding
radarmen who simulated a guided missile attack at sea. Thus, the difffculties in
this topic were overcome.
By advocating "arduous training in ports and along coasts means precision training
at sea," fuel will be saved and the wear and tear on instruments and main engines
will ba reduced, thus being advantageous for the maintenance of the navy's combat
ef fec ~;iveness .
At present, the port and coast training sections of foreign navies have been de-
veloped to a relatively modernized level. We should make a pc~int of assimilating
the advanced methods of foreign armed forces, and, along with innovations in naval
equipment, gradually set up some "training centers" and training points" to improve
the equipment used in automated and simulated training, and thereby enhance the
role of the training sections.
Problems Affecting Training Reviewed
' Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 19 Aug 79 p 2
[Article by Yu Guangxin [0060 1639 2450], deputy section head in the political
department of a certain fleet: "Temporary Shortage of Technical Mainstays Affects
Training Quality"~
Naval warship units co~only encounter a problem in training: the temporary short-
age of .technical mainstays, the insufficient nimmber of training instructors, and
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the low level of cadres assigned to prc~vide instruction seriously affects the im-
provement of training quality. The reasons for the temporary shortage of technical
mainstays, besides being the disruption and destruction of Lin Biao and the "gang
of four," are problems in our work. One problem is carelessness in selecting and
promoting technical mainatays; the second problem is that technical mainstays are
handled recklessly, with some units not treasuring technical mainstays who ha~re
genuine talent and rashly demobilizing or specializing them or changing their oc-
cupations; and the third problem is that the technical cadres have no outlet, with
~ some technical cadres who have been in their posts for a long time, owinq to the
remuneration for their posts being lower than that of administrative workers who
had joined up at the same time as they did, cominonly not keeping their minds on
= technical work, so that the leadership has to transfer them to another post. All
of this has created a weakness in the technical ranks.
The navy is a highly technical branch of the armed forces. In order to can�~rm to
this feature, foreign navies pay full attention to fostering and accumulating tech-
nically talented persons. For this reason, the Soviet armed forces put into effect
the warrant officer system. Warrant officers are not military officers, but they
enjoy a status and material remuneration close to those of military officers, and
they are usually assigned to such posts as chiefs of noncommissioned officers,
team leaders in ordnance, torpedo, or electromechanical departments, and radar
team leaders. The French Navy also pays full attention to keQping technically
talented persons, and their time in such posts as chief of noncommissioned officers
or department heads can be longer than that of a ship captain and theix remun~ra-
- tion is comparatively high.
The training departments of many units have put forward the idea that improving
unit training quality is not only a qunstion of refor.~ming the training content and
~ methods but also a question of how the leadership .;.nd political departments at all
levels handle technical cadres. Z'he solution of the problem of insufficient tech-
~ nical strength in a given unit should be listed as an important item on the daily
agenda. The promotion, transfer, and handling of technical mainstays must proceed
from what is of benefit to the unit's training and operations, must be done through
long-range plans and strict checkups, so that the unit from beginning to end will
maintain a technical contingent equal to any task. Looking at the actual situation,
there are in the cadre establishment, system, and treatment now in effect many dif-
ficulties for keepinq technical cadres,~and their treatment is ripe for necessary
reforms. For example, couldn't technical cadres not be ~estricted by their posts
and their grades and their remuneration be increased and improved according to
their length of service? Can't the sexvice age of technical cadres on warships be
taken into consideration and restrictions on this age be appropriately relaxed?
The navy and the army are differentf t~~ train a technical commander requires a
fairly long time. The maximum service aqe of a destroyer captain or a submarine
captain is 40, but this is precisely the period when they are most technically
skilled and most highly experienced. Obviously, a reform of the cadre system will
have a bearing on the overall situatiot.l and needs to be comprehen~ively considered
by the Military Commission [of the CCP Central Co~nittee], but all levels should
pay full attention to the problem of haw to maintain technical strength.
9727
CSO: 4005/2055
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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY
SECOND ARTILLERY LEADERS STUDY FOR MODERNIZATION
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 28 Aug 79 p 1
~i
~ [Article by staff reporter Chen Jinsong [7115 6855 2646]z "Leading Cadres of 2d
Artillery Res~lutely Study Modern Military Knowledge"]
[Text] The leading cadres of the 2d Artillery, who are resolutely studying modern
military science and technology and the specialized knowledge pertaining to their
service arm, in a little over a year have obtained marked results.
Since March of last year, the leadi.ng cadres of the 2d Artillery have set aside
half a day's time every week for studying modern military science and technology
including specialized knowledge pertaininq to their service arm, and have set up a
name and attendance system. On the study day, normally no meetings are arranged,
no appointments for talks are made, and no documents are read, so that they can con-
centrate on study.
For over 1 year, the leading comrades of the 2d Artillery invited leaders and sci-
entists and technical personnel of the professional departments of the organization
and research institutes to lecture on the function, features, structure, and diffi-
, culties in training of several pieces of weaponry and equipment of this service
arm and on general management knowledge, as well as specialized basic knowledge
such as military meteorology, earth cartography, and data computation. They were
briefed on the present state of development of foreiqn armies' weapons and equip-
ment, and, relating this to the reality of the units, studied the application in
their service arm of Comrade Mao Zedong's strategic and tacta.cal thought. Many
leading comrades left their own units and went to training grounds, where they ob-
served equipment and drills, held symposiums, and modestly requested instruction
from basic-level cadres and fighters. In the past several months they also, side
by side with cadres at and above the orqanizational department head level, studied
modern scientific and technological knowledge pertaining to electronic calculators,
automated command, electronic warfare, infrared rays, and lasers. In every class
session, two persons with primary responsibility in military administration re-
mained laymen and arrived on time to attend the class. After class, some leading
comrades went to the training departments to get reprints of the lecture course
materials, and, relating to the features of their service arm, further studied and
_ digested what they had learned. They said: We older comrades shoulder a very
heavy burden on the march toward the modernization of national defense. If our
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minds are not regularly stocked with some new things, we will not be able to keep
up. The masses responded: "The senior officers have set a good example for us.
We youths must even more wholeheartedly and intensively study for modernization."
9727
CSO: 4005/2456
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AIRBORNE DNISION TRAINS NEW FIGHTERS IN SEPARATE REGIMENT
Aeijing JIEFANGJUN BAd in Chinese 30 Aug 79 p 1
[Article by Li Yunqi [2621 0061 6386] et al: "A Certain Airborne Divisian Achieves
Initial Success in Trial Setup of Regiment for Training Nsw Soldiers"]
[Text) The specific method iss Take a given regiment, retain its
- original organizational systea?, cadres, and squad leaders, and send
its veteran cadres, as an organizai:ion, to another infantry regi-
ment. Take the new soldiers in other regiments and concentrate
them in the given reqiment f~r training, and then after a period
of 1 year has passed since the new fighters had entered the ranks,
send them back to their original units.
A certain airborne division, starting in March of this year, started an experimental
point for carrying out a reform of its training syatem, and has already obtained in-
itial success. The division leadership took the new fighters in the infantry regi-
ments of the division and conczntrated them in an organizational system regiment
for training, whtle another infantry regi.ment concentrated its energy an training
veteran fighters, thereby solving the problem of trafning new and veteran soldiers
by "cooking them in one pot" and "cutting with one stroke of the knife," and ac-
celerating the pace of training.
This division's reform of its training system was arranged by the higher level,
and the specific method is: A regiment retain~s its organizational system and all
the cadres, squad leaders, cooks, and the four kinds of personnel in company head-
quarters (clerical and ordnance personnel, com�aunications personnel, medical per-
sonnel, and supply personnel) of the regiment, and the regiment's veteran fighters
are put, as an organizational unit, into another infantry regiment (in this way,
if war should break out, they can rapidly return to the parent organization), and
the new soldiers of the other regiments a.re concentrated in the one regiment for
training. One year after the new soddiers had enlisted, they are returned to their
original unit. Over 5 months of practice has proved that this reform has many
merits.
It is of advantage in increasing the deqree of difficulty in training veteran
fighters. In the past, when new and veteran fighters were mixed together and the
time and content of their training was the same, "the new soldiers got more than
- they could handle and the veteran soldiers didn't get enough to satisfy them."
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Year after year, the unit's training w~s stuck at the level of "firing by the
numbers and tactics being confined to the squad." This year, after the new and
veteran fighters began to be trained separately, the veteran fighters did not
start from the point at which new fighters began training, and difficulties in
technical and tactical training were added. Once firing began they carried out
applied training, and, proceeding from the raquirements of actual warfare, prac-
ticed individual gun battle fire at night. Every veteran fighter trained in firing
the four kinds of weapons of a company. During the firing, they changed the "three
fixed" (fixed di3tance, fxxed rear sight, and fixed aiming point) to the "three
nonfixed"--(sel!c-estimation of distance, self-setting of the rear sigh~ and s~lf-
firing of the a:iming point)--simulating their actions under conditions of the
"three defenses." Their training focuses on attacking tan;cs. They train in attack-
ing tanks with the five weapons commonly used by infantry, including rocket launch-
ers, mines, and bangalore torpedoes. The artillerymen and rocket launcher soldiers
set a standard of hittinq the target with their first round, and the first-round
hit rate has reached 80 percent and above, with the highest being 96 percent. They
also have assimilated the experiences of the war of self-defensive counterattack
against Vietnam, training in burying and removing mines and in learninc~ how to
read and use maps, in using natural objects to distinguish directions, and in mov-
ing accordingly to the azimuth. Parachute training now covers low-attitude and
formation jumps. Tactical training starts with company-level topics. At the end
- of July, the tactical topics of company and battalion attacking and defending had
been completed, and company-level tactics had been reformed so that the tactic of
making attacks on infantry primary was changed to the tactic of making ?.ttacks on
groups of tanks primary. Before the end of October, the tactical training topics
had been completed and the divisional airborne tactical training exercise had been
carried out. The fast rate of progress and the good quality of this training had
not been seen in the division's training records for many years. The officers and
men said: This time the problem of giving the veteran soldiers enough training to
satisfy them was solved.
It is advantageous for strengthening the basic training of new fighters. In former
years, when the new and veteran soldiers were mi~ced together, the cadres and main-
stays r_ould not put all their energy into training new soldiers, and they also
could not hold up the rate of progress for the new fighters. This was detrimental
to the basic training of the new fighters. Now that the regiment for training new
soldiers has been formed, from squad leader to regimental commander, from company
to organization, the key points stand aut and the guiding ideology is clear-cut,
so that they concentrate their energy nn getting a good grip on the basic traini.ng
of new soldiers. Moreover, owing to tYie fact that the troops are of the same kind,
that the training topics are of the same kind, that the training time and safe-
guards are of the same kind, it is easy to unify the teaching methods, to unify
examinations and checkups, and to organize revolutionary competitions. For every
new training topic, the regiment brings its cadres and mainstays together for group
training in teaching methods so as to asnprove the cadres' ability to be teachers.
Up to the first 10 days of August, 9 of these group training sessions had been
held, with a total attendance of 580~ After the training in every topic is com-
pleted, according to the standards for examinations and checkups, those who meet
the demands advance to the next topic, step by step laying a firm foundation in
basic training and thus universally improving the quality of the training topics.
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The rate of excellents in practicing light weapon firing was raised by 20 percent
over that of last year; the training in attacking tanks ar:~ in the "three defenses"
increased in difficultyj in parachute training, every new fighter completed 12 jumg
missions, from unarmed to full pack, from daytime to niqhttime, from high altitude
to low altitude, from �amiliar level terrain to unfamiliar complex terrain, and
from single aircraft jumps to formation jt~ps. The frequency and difficulty of the
train~ng exceeded those of former years.
It is advantageous for giving prominence to the key point- -cadre training. A1-
though this division in the past frequently shouted that cadre training was the
- key poirit, owing to the fact that the troop training was "tactics at the squad
level," the cadres' capacity for organizational ca~and could not be improved.
This year, after the reform of the training system, tactical fixaining was carried
out from the company straight up to the division, and in this way commanders at
each level had the opportunity to temper themselves in the tactics of organization-
al co~nand at their own level. Now, cadres at the battalion level and below learn
tactical organizational command at their own levels, and the company and platoon
cadres also learn how to command at the next higher level and their test results,
on average, have been good or better. At the same time, after the new and veteran
soldiers were trained separately, the cadres did not need to consider trai.ning
both of them as they did in former year.s and the time for their own training was
insured. Since the beginning of this pear, the division has conducted every month
a training session for senior officers of the division and its regiments and for
the divisional headquarters, and the regi.ments have a training se~sion every mont}:
for cadres at the battalion level and below, each session lasting 7 days, each ses-
_ sion lasting 5 to 7 days, thereby strengthening the study of enemy armies and the
mastery of the knowledge pertaining to the service arms of our army. The senior
officers of the division and its regiments now have a good idea of the main estab-
lishment and operational features of enemy units at the div3sion level and below,
and the cadres at battalion level and below have a good idea of the main estab-
lishment and operational features of the enemy units at battalion level and below.
Cadres at all levels have a good idea of the establishment equipment, and princi-
ples of using the service arms under their command, viz, communications, antichem-
ical warfare, engineer, and artillery. Staff officers and cadres at battalion level
and below have learned how to use the two radio com~unications instruments--the
' walky-talky and the transmitter-receiver--and have become proficient in the skills
of reading and using maps and of advancing according to the azimuth. fie Guanglei
[0149 0342 4320], lst Battalion commander, and Yang Zhaoli L2799 0340 0448], deputy
_ co~nander of the 3d Company, of a certain regiment both said with deep understand-
ing: Having been trained this way, if once we have an airborne combat mission, we
will be more realistic in commanding our units in combat.
After this airborne division reformed its txaining system, some problems arc~se,
e.g., how the basic-level cadres of thc~ new soldier training regiment are to be
selected, etc, that are awaiting study and solution in later practice.
Scientific Training Reform
Special Project 20 Aug 79 p 1
[Editor's postscript: "Training Reform Can Become More of a"Scientific Experi.men~']
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[Text] The first edition of this paper on 21 March published as its lead item a
set of proposals for reforming training. Today, we happily see that a certain
airborne division has already experimented with this problem by settinq up a trial-
poing new soldier training regiment. Although this method awaits further tests in
practice, it is, in the final analysis, a gratifying step forward for a solution of
this problem. Training new and veteran soldiers together, like "cooking in one
pot," was felt to be a longstanding, big, and di�ficult problem. To reform the
training system by providing separate training for new and veteran soldiers was an
idea that had long been discussed informally. Why was the solution of this prob-
lem so slow in coming? One important reason ~~as that this solution remained at
the level of ineetings and was verbalized but not put into practice.
Some comrades, once they heard talk about changing the training system, shut their
eyes and thought that this reform would not be feasible and that reform was diffi-
cult to do, "study, study and again speak," and so in a twinkling 3 or 5 years, 10
or 8 years passed. Now, in training, somc~ proposals and plans for solving this
longstand~ng, big, and difficult problem are stuck at this point. The enthusiasm
of the great numbers of officers and men for reforming training is very high, their
deman3s are very urgent, and they have proposed many suggestions and plans. How
should we deal with these opinions of the masses? The best support for the enthus-
iasm and creativity of the masses is to do things as this certain division (air-
borne? did. After receiving approval from the higher authorities, within the
scope of its powers, it made some "scientific experiments" in a planned way.
Practice is the sole criterion for testing truth. In the last analysis, what opin-
ions are good? What methods are feasible? How can training be advantageous to ~
raising the fighting capacity of units? The answer is: by not being hindered in
practice from distinguishing right from. wrong, making tests and correcting errors,
seeking solutions, and afterward accepting or rejecting suggestions and then spread-
spreading the accepted suggestions over a whole area from one point. In this way
the enthusiasm of the leadership and the enthusiasm of the masses will be combined,
the revolutionary spirit and the scientific attitude will be combined, and we will
be able to quicken the pace of training reform, so that the training will soon be
put on the right track.
9727
CSO: 4005/2456
c
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AIR REGIMENT IMPROVES TRAINING BY STUDYING ENEMY AIRCRAFT
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 31 Aug 79 p 1
[Article by Jin Zhifu [0855 1807 4395j: '"Become Familiar With Enemy Aircraft Per-
formance, Rigorously Train in Aerial Combat Skills"]
[Text) A certain regiment of the [PLA] Air Force has earnestly studied enemy air-
craft, thus strengthening its training focus and obtaining good results in traininq.
At the beginning of this year, this regiment switched to tactical training. At the
beginning, owing to the fact that its study of enemy aircraft was insufficient it
only thought of making more flights, which divorced tactical training from the de-
mands of actual warfare. For example, the tail cannon on an enemy bomber is strong
in firepower and long in firing range, but some flyers still chose the method of
hot pursuit for attacking the bomber. This made the regimental party committee
think: if we want good tactical training, we must earnestly study enemy aircrafts
otherwise, the training will be like "a blind man riding a blind horse," effort
will be wasted and the training will not be useful in actual warfare. Therefore,
in tactical traininq, they orqanized the unit to earnestly launch activities of
studying enemy aircraft. In the regiment time was focused, and they asked depart-
ments concerned at higher levels and comrades who had taken part in air force tac-
- tical training to come to the unit and brief it on the enemy's battle array, the
performance of his main long-range bombers, the performance of his guided missiles,
the performance of his main fighter planes, and his tactical methods. They hung on
walls all sorts of wall charts pertaining to enemy aircraft for the comrac]es to
refer to during their study, and also in timely fashion transmitted to the flyers
materials on the enemy's situation issued by higher levels. During the study, when
a question was encountered that could not be made clear, they conscientiously or-
ganized everyone for a discussion until the question was understood. When the fly-
_ ers were studying the tactical features of enemy missile-carrying aircraft, the com-
mittee focused the study on the features of the guided missile's movement in flight
under specific conditions, e.g., the speed of the guided missile when fired from
- the aircraft is slow at first and fast later, gradually picking up speedj the en-
emy guided missiles are ~ldapted for operating at a fixed distance and not for close
combat; the tarqet hit rate for the guided missiles is high at a high altitude and
low at a Zow altitude; the guided miss.iles on enemy aircraft are guided by radar,
and a target higher than the enemy air~raft is easily hit while a target lower
than the enemy aircra�t, because surfa~e interference to its radar is great, cannot
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be easily hit, etc. On the basis of a detailed study of these features, they
studied the tactical measures we should adopt, viz, close combat, flying at low
altitudes, and flying lower than the enemy aircraft in order to deal with them.
The flyers reacte~3 by saying: This kind of training has a 3efinite object in view
so that there are definite tactics in mind to use and not use.
After realizing the enemy's strong points and weak goints, there appeared in this
regiment this situation: a certain type of enemy aircraft is fast, can decelerate
well, and turns quicklyf a certain type of our aircraft can circle well. During a
training drill, our plane always circled the enemy plane, getting on its tail so
- that it could not turn and shake off our plane and was docilely hit. The regimental
party committee analy~ically studied this situation and came to the conclusion that
in this peacetime training only the enemy's weak points were selected �or our attack
and this did not provide the training required by actual warfare. Therefore, the
committee adopted the method of lecturing on specific examples of battles and dis-
cussing the understanding gained by experience, leading everyone to a clear recog-
nition of the enemy's cunning and the complexity of a future war. They maintained
the scientific attitude of seeking truth from tacts, by both considering our strong
points and the enemy's weak points, and also by paying full attention to the enemy
aircrafts' strong points and our aircrafts' weak points. Once, our plane got on
the tail of ar~ "enemy plane" and was getting ready to attack when suddenly the
"enemy plane" made a quick turn and slipped away. Owing to the fact that our
plane's radius of turn was large it was suddenly rushing toward the "enemy plane's"
front and had lost the initiative. Focusing on the weak points of our equipment,
the flyers here, through their study, have come up with some methods for solving
this problem, have rigourously trained in tactical techniques, and have improved
their fighting capacity.
9727
CSO: 4005/2456
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- TANK REGIMENT DECIDES MAN, NOT EQUIPMENT, IS KEY TO VICTORY
Beijing JIEFANGJGN B~AO in Ghinese 31 Aug 79 p 2
[Article by Ping Mingqing [7458 2494 7230]: "Make Full Use of Existing Equipment
To Acquire by Training Modern Combat Skills"]
[Text] "Is it that the existing equipment does not suit people's military level,
or is it that people's military level does not suit the existing equipment?" The
officers and men of a certain tank regiment of the Beijing Units through discussion
came to this conclueion: people's military level does not suit the existing equip-
ment. On the basis.of a unified understanding, they vigorously took measures to
raise the unit's military level and fully brought into play the combat power of
the existing equipment. Recently, the higher authorities held an on-the-spot meet-
ing to introduce their experience.
In the past, some comrades, thinking that our tanks were not as good as the ad-
vanced tanks of some developed countries, did not put sufficient effort into study-
ing and mastering the existing equipment. Focusing on this mood, the regimental
, party committee edueated everybody to become clear about two questions: First,
even if our existing equipment is not as good as that of some developed countries,
viewing the situation as a whole, our armed forces have developed into a combined
i arms forces of all branches, and we also have a considerable number of aircraft,
tanks, and guided missiles. Historical experience has confirmed that if only we
bring into full play people's subjective initiative and display the power o� ex-
isting equipment to the maximum we can with inferior equipment vanquish an enemy
with superior equipment. Second, although some of our existing equipment is not
completely suited to modern warfare, even more important than this is that our
technical and tactical levels and our co~nand capabilities are not completely
suited to the existing equipment. For example, the tanks we are equipped with can
climb slopes up to 30 degrees, but some tank drivers do not even try to drive
their tanks up slopes of 25 degrees; the stabilizer on our tanks performs well but
many gunners have a very low hit rate when firing from a moving tank; and some
comrades have still not mastered driving with the aid of night-vision instruments,
communicating by countering radio ja~ning, and firing antiaircraft machineguns.
Through analysis, everybody saw that even though our tanks are not very advanced,
_ there are much knowledge and many techniques that we have still not become profi-
cient in and mastered, and that we must expend a great deal of effort, under com-
plex conditions, to drive tanks, fire their machineguns and cannons accurately,
- and keep their communications functioning.
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In order to resolve this contradiction, viz, people's military level not being suit-
able for the existing equipment, they a.dopted the following measures in training:
1. They made the training more difficult so that the proper role of the existing
equipment was brought into full play. Formerly, when this regitnent was training in
tank driving in mountainous terrain, it only stressed safety and did not dare to
make the training more difficult in Line with the tank's performance ability, so
that the majority of the drivers had never driven their tanks over a slope of 25
degrees or higher. Ccntrasting the experience in the war c~f self-defensive counter-
attack against Vietnam, when certain t~nk detachments climbed steep slopes of 30
degrees or more to catc;h the enemy unawares and wipe him out, the officers and men
of this regiment deeply felt that the c~river training in the past could not bring
into play the tank's proper ability to perform and did not provide the genuine
- skills required by actual warfare. Z'herefore, based on the tank's performance
_ capability, they crash-built a training ground for tank driving in mountainous
terrain with a maximum upward slope of 30 degrees and a maximum downward slope of
35 degrees and more, in order to provide a good site for insuring that driving
techniques are improved.
During the training, some dirvers did not dare to drive their tanks over this kind
of strategic and difficult mountainous terrain. Dong Xizhen [5576 6932 3791],
deputy political commissar of the regiment, volunteered to give everybody a demon-
stration of this difficult task and explain its essentials. When deputy political
commissar pong had driven a tank up to the sumani.t, the misgivings in the minds of
the cadres and fighters were removed. Seeing the deficiencies in their own tech-
niques, they put more effort into their training. Now most of the drivers have
mastered fairly well the techniques of driving tanks in stxategic and difficult
mountainous terrain.
2. Using existing equipment, they mast~ered the skills of operating advanced de-
vices. In the past, this regiment, fr