JPRS ID: 9775 USSR REPORT MILITARY AFFAIRS

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• Sequence Number: 14
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9775
8 June 1981
USSR Re art
p
MILITARY AFFAIRS
CFOU~ 7/81)
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JnR5 L/9775
8 June 1981
USSR REPORT
MILITARY AFFAIRS
(FOUO 7/81)
CONTENTS
ARMED FORCES �
German Source on Soviet Military Decisionmakers
(Michael Checinski; BERICHTE DES BUNDESINSTITUTS FUER
OSTWISSENSCHAFTLICHE U;~ID INTERNATIONALE STUDIEN, No 3, 1981).. 1
CIVIL DEFENS~
Book Discusses Urban Emergency'Civil Defense Operations
(AVARIYNYYE RABOTY V OCHAGAT~ PORAZHENIYA, 1980) 22
- a- [ II I- USSR - 4 FOUO]
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ARMED I'OR~ES
GERMAN SOfJRCE ON SOVTET MILITARY DECISIONMAKERS
Cologne BERTCHTE DES BUNDESINSTITUTS FUER OSTWISSENSCHAFTLTCHE UND TNTERNAT~ONALE
STUDTEN in German 81, No 3, pp 1-37
[Article by Michael Checinski: "The M3litary E13~e in the Soviet Decision-Making
Process"]
~[Text] The op3nions expressed in the publications released by
the Federal Institute of Eastern and Tnternational Studies are
exclusively those of the author. Correct~on: 3.n titling report
No 3/1981, the editorship was inadvertently omitted. The title
should read correctly as follows: "The Mil3tary El~te in
Soviet Decision-Making," by Micfiael Checinski, edited by Astrid
von Borcke. We regret the omission.
Table of Contents
Introduction
2. By Whom and How Is the Soviet Military Elite Controlled?
3. Soviet Military Elite and Party and Government Leadership
4. Military Strategy and the Economy: Formal and Informal Influence
Exerted by Supreme Military Leadership
5. The Role of the Soviet Military Elite: Myth and Reality
'Footnotes
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Introduction
After more than 60 years, W. Churchill'sfamous remark about the Soviet r~egi.me--"a
riddle inside an enigma"--is in inany respects still correct. Regardless of hundreds ~
of boolcs and articles about relationships between the party and the military in the
USSR, the materialization of the most important military-policy decisions remains
extensively in the dark and the opiniuns of specialists on the role of Soviet mili-
tary elite in the decision-making process in some cases diverge widely.
This essay takes up the issue as to the way in which and the extent to which Soviet ~
military commanders are in a position to influence military, political, and economic
decisions. Here we can contemplate the role of the military elite in the d~cision-
making process from widely differing viewpoints, to wit: .
1. The army as a uniforn?iy organized fighting force in the power struggle among the
various bureaucratic apparatuses;
2. The army as an instrument of the ruling elite in order to exert pressure on cer-
tain social and political groups in the homeland;
3. The effects of the strength and capacity of the army on national consciousness
and the feeling of security of the ruling elite and the entire population;
4. Objective needs and interests of the army which are supposed to serve the na-
tional or allegedly national interests of Soviet government policy. That includes
problems such as the effect of military influence on economic and politfcal deci-
sions;
- 5. The army's influence on foreign policy.
2. By Whom and Ho~~ Is the Soviet Military Elite Controlled?
' An investigation of the role of the Soviet Army in the above-described fields of
political conflict must start with this principal quest3on: how does the party '
leadership control the military elite and the army as a whole? The answer to that
gives us the point of departure for a better understanding as to the extent to which
the "inEluence of the military" on the party leadership's dec3sions is at all pos-
sible.
All Soviet Armed Forces components are under the Defense Ministry. That ministry
includes the central military institut3ons, primarily, in other word~, the General
Staff, the Political Main Administration, as well as the supreme commanders of the
various services, that is, the Air Force, the Navy, the Rocket Forces, and the Ground
Forces, etc. The latter are consulted by the defense minister in connect3on with
important military decisions and naturally constitute a part of the military top
elitel. -
In formal terms, the defense minister and his deputy are appointed upon nomination ~
by the premier. From this (formal) viewpoint, the Defense Ministry is a component ,
of the government administration and, as in a parliamentary system, is under the
premier and the Supreme Soviet, both of which exercise supreme supervis~.on. The ~
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only diFference with respect to the other ministries consists in the fact that the
Defense Ministry is responsible for executing the decisions of the lleFense G~~unril
and the government in mattErs of national defense2. The Defense Council is tlie
highest authority on defense issues3. It spells out the guidelines for national
defense, it coordinates all measures considered ner.essary in this connection, and ~
it is especially responsible for the buildup and organization of the fighting forces.
In the meantime, Secretary-General Brezhnev is at the same time the chairman of the
Defense Council (announced in April 1976) and (following Podgorniy's relief: from
office during tne following P1ay) also chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme~
Soviet4. Officially it is not perhaps the Politburo--which in fact determines the
political guidelines--but rathPr the Party Central Committee wh:ich is mentioned as
the highest political authority of the land and thus also of the Soviet Armed
F~rces5. '
- The above description outlines the purely formal-legal relationships between the
armed forces, the party, and the civiYian government administration.
Regarding actual political practice, we generally start with the assumption that the
political apparatus of the army, under the direction of the Political Main Adminis-
tration, plays a key role in military policy and in the organization of the Armed
Forces6, A description of the formal position of that institution regarding both
the military establishment and the party organizations is therefore necessary.
The director of the very important Political Main Administration performs the func-
tions of a deputy defense minister w~th responsibility for all political matters
involved in the Armed Forces. At the same time he is the chief of a department of
the Central Committee and in that capacit~~ is also responsible for military-policy
questions~. As we know, the Political ':ain Administration has the authority of a
Central Committee department. The hea-.i of the Political Main Administration is
usually a member of the Party Central Committee and a deputy in the Supreme Soviet,
specifically, in addition to his place in the Defense Min3stry's Military Council.
Althougti the defense minister since April 1973 has been a member of the Politburo,
in other words, the highest party authority, political activities an.d personnel
questions involved in the armed forces are handled by a Central Committee secretary
as well as the head of the Central Committee Department for Administrative Agencies
(N. I. Savinkin). The latter mainly deals with personnel questions and special
organizational matters, working in close coordination with the Secret Serv3ce
(Osobiy otdel).
The basis for ttie political activities of the Political Main Administration consists
of the party leadership's resolutions. The latter again often are also fashioned
by the instructions coming from the Central Coinmittee's Propaganda and Press De-
partment. The Political Main Administrat3on likewise maintains close contact with
the leaders of the youth organization, the Komsomol.
There are two institutions that are responsible for control over party and political
life in the army. Tirst of all we have the political sections of the individual
anny units under the direction of the deputy commanders for political lnatters. The
activities of the political sections at varying times and under different military
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leadership reveals certain difFerences which however are not essential. The second
institution consists of the party committees 3.n the army units a~nd t~ieir chairmen.
In this area likewise various organizational and functional changes liave bcen -
carried out; but they likewise are not fundamental. These party institutiou;s ex-
ercise only purely formal control over military life.
This rather conscise description of the formal organization of the poliricai appara-
tus and the party organizations in the army will now be supplement2d by a short
description of their practical functions. The author shares the view of Western
Sovietologists to the effect that the activities of the army's political apparatus ,
must remain coithin the framework of those limitations which on political issues are '
spelled out by the party leadership and in military matters by the military leader-
ship.
One essential task of th~ party and the political apparatus in the army consists in
raisii~g the level of "military discipline," in other words, the creation and applica- ~
tion of instruments of pressure designed to malce sure that all instructions issued
_ and missions assigned by superiors will be carried out unconditionallys.
Another important function of the army's political apparatus is the implementation
of obligatory participation of all officers--regardless of whether or not they a~re
party members--in various political events of national significance.
In view of the organization of the army's political apparatus and the activities of
the Political Main Administration, we must clearly realize that normally any autono-
mous fraction activity in the Soviet Army is impossib~e. If there should neverthe-
less be differences among the party leadership, the military elite, in case of
such a conflict, can even go into action against a fraction in the Politburo, as was
done by Marshal Zhukov in connection with the famous 1957 Central Committee Plenum
(at which time Khrushchev maneuvered the "antiparty group" of Molotov, Malenkov,
etc.),out of the leadership. But a conflict between military leaders and the party
chairman is conceivable only if the military Secret Service is not under the latter's
control. Normally, bureaucratic resistance can be mounted against the party boss
only on the basis of informal ~and personal working relationships between the army
and the political elite. Such relationships--both spontaneously rising and deli-
berately developed--do exist, as we know, outside the official hierarchy. They
petznit certain activities but those activities must under no circumstances be organ-
ized as such9.
This strict control over all personal ties and political activities is an expression
of the deger.~_ration of a political regime which fundamentally rejects any genuine
democratic processes. The inclination to form political groupings i.s in itself a
natural thing; political conditions in every modern state are complex and moreover
keep changing constantly. In political systems under communist rule, such endeavors
however are suppressed. As we know, the power struggle between vari.ous groupings
was conducted all the way to the physical destruction of opponents. There are de- `
tailed descriptions of that especially in the case of the Soviet Union.
There is a widespread opinion in the West that the party, in its capacity as a mass
organization, in the army elite likewise serves above all to buttre~s loyalty.
For example, John N. Hazard writes the following:
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"Up to the 50th Anniversary (of the Soviet Union, in 1967), 85 percent of all army
_ personnel were party members ar Komsomol members and among the officers the rate
was as high as 93 percent. Under these circumstances, in other words, since dis-
ciplined party members have been developed within the armed forces, the influence of
the political commissars seems to have declined because they can no longer claim a
quasimonopoly on loyalty for themselves. They are surrounded by men whose loyalty
likewise must be considered to be very strong"10.
We must take a closer look at this view in order to determine whether it holds water.
Admittedly, in the light of his experiences in the Polish Army and his contacts with
Soviet officers, the author does not always find it easy to agree with ~Jestern
Sovietologists on the role of the Soviet military-policy apparatus.
The currently accepted idea of the political apparatus as a kind of guarantor of the
loyalty of the military establishment is based on a stereotype of the " political
commissar" (politruk) of the years right after the Bolshevik revolution. Such a
role by the political officers was possible only in the past when the Communist
� P~rty as a whole was still a living and real movement. Since the destruction of all
~ pclitical life in the Soviet party during the thirties, the old idea of the political
commissar has lost all practical meaning. Today, the political officers merely
represent one of the ntimerous bureaucratic agencies of the regime. In short, the
Soviet Army's political apparatus is a government ag~ncy, like any other, and its
officers ressemble those who perform any other kind of military service. This is
why the political officers are also being sharply watched by the Military Secret
Service.
The degeneration process i.n the political apparatus was speeded up by a network of
informants who have infiltrated the army, the ranks of the political off icers, the
party committees, the secretariats of the party organizations, and even the Political
Main Administration.
The political officers and the career officers likewise, wha '~ad to work under such
circumstances for many years, have come to terms with a sit~~~ion where they must
live ~inder steady psychological pressure and are not allowe: to entertai.n any in-
dependent thoughts of their own. At the same time they had ~o realize that neither
their political knowledge, nor their pol.itical loyalty coul,. ;'o them any good as
_ such.
The vast majority of political officers in the Soviet Army ~U not have any political
opinion of their own; they remain emotionally uninvolved ar;: they are guided pri-
marily by personal ambition and the desire for a well-paic' ~b. For the rest, most
of them c~nsider their work to be fruitless.
For this reason alone one should not overestimate the :~ce which such an army
--in which even tY?e political officers are "unpolitic . i"-~~~~.terts on the party's
political decisions. That even applies to the supr~�~.�r ;-i:il~tary leadership. The
attempt made by Marshal Zhukov after Stalin's deatl, :i.u {i;: capacity as commander-
in-chief of the Soviet Army, to play an indepE~-~',~ ro~4 ~nce again made it clear
that no party boss would permit such a thing; S"Pr. ~�+t interlude Z hukov was
_ relieved in November 1957 , regardless of the faci ~~:c: ,,ad supported Khrushchev at
the critical moment.
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Another reason why the army would find it difficult to exert direct pressure on the
party leadership is that the military establishment is at a11 times being totally
watched by the party leadership, a leadership which has always been carefu]. to guard
against the dangers that might spring from a mighty, hlghly-disciplined arn?y. This
is why the Military ~ecret Service constantly watches all higher m3litary autliuri-
ties, including the High Command. This is done ~oith the help of highly refin.:d and
extremely carefully devised methods. In the process, they do not even shy away from
blackmail.
The primary mission of the Military Secret Service, the Osobiy otdel of the KGB
[State Security Committee], is not counteres~ionage. (The Soviet concept of espionage ,
is very broad and quite vague to begin with.) Tnstead, it is primarily suppo~ed to
_ prevent the formation of cliques among senior officers, in other words, gatherings
and private contacts which could no longer be checked on. Thus, even the highest-
ranking officers must put up with intrigues, provocations, having their telephones
.tapped, and having their private correspondence censored.
Above all, the army's political apparatus is designed to frustrate any form of un-
supervised organized activity. The main purpose of the political sections and de-
partments of the party organization is to manipulate the army's quasipolitical
activities and totally to watch them and thus at the same time to deprive any other
form of political activity of its legal status.
"Political policemen" naturally can do their job only if they are efficient bureau-
crats. lheir political persuasion and ideological attitude are immaterial here.
The Soviet political officer is therefore characterized not so much by his political
consciousness but rather by his unconditional obedience, an attitude which is also
promoted by army discipline.
The political ignorance of political officers constitutes reinsurance for the
political leadership againsr the army`s political apparatus which �ight possibly,
together with the rnilitary establishment, constitute a source of opposition and thus
a ttireat to central authorityll. Moreover, as we said before, the army's political
- apparatus has been infiltrated and is so tightly watched by the Military Secret
Service tliat it would seem to be impossible for the political officers to formulate
any independent political program12.
Many Soviet experts have the h3bit of estimating the "military influence" on the
party leadership's political decisions on the basis of the number of senior officers
who sit in the Party Central Committee13. But such data must be interpreted with
caution, For the following reasons:
l. The Central Committee of the Communist Party long ago cea~ed to lie the political
decision-making body in the USSR. One of its primary functions is to give the impres-
sion of a consistnetly democratically led party. Tn realitv; i.~s members are desig-
nated in advance by the Politburo. Traditionally, this enabled the secretary-
general to develop patronage and above a11 to get his own followers into the appara-
tus.
In other words, Central. Committee members cannot readily function as "pressure
groups" in support of special interests, such as those of the military establishment.
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They must primarily serve as transmission belts who must transmit the leadership's
policy to the particular institutions and "social groups." Of course, the party
bossdoes not have full control over the Central Committee at all times and under
all circumstances. That became particularly clear in two cases.
tn 1957, during the power struggle between Khrushchev and the "antiparty group"
(Malenkov, Molotov, etc.) and again in 1964, on the occasion of the coup which
ousted Khrushchev. But such occasions are the exception. To the extent that they
did take place nevertheless, the Central Committee members had to confine themselves
merely to approving resolutions that had been drafted in advance by a handful of
conspirarors. A party boss or head of government in the Soviet Union had been over-
thrown onl.y by the "programmed game" played by the mighty outside the Central Com-
mittee. Nevertheless, the Central Committee on such occasions plays an incomparably
greater role than in every day political activities. Every party boss is fully aware
of this risk and therefore tries to secure his position with the help of precaution-
ary measures.
' 2. By controlling the personnel makeup of the Central Committee, the leadership
tries to prevent any possible coordinated actions by that body against its policy.
If a Soviet party boss wants to remain in power for a long time, he must in every
case be highly skilled in this "art" ,of personnel policy. Anottier technique of this
kind is represented by the manipulation of the personnel makeup of even the Polit-
buro whose members especially in recent times again seem to have been appointed